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COMMISSIONER’S INTRODUCTION
While I was regional director of the Lower Colorado Region in Boulder
City, it was a great pleasure to be the executive sponsor of Reclamation’s Centennial
activities. This is one of the last of these activities to reach fruition. Commissioner
John W. Keys III and I opened the history symposium the day after the Water for the
West Foundation sponsored a spectacular birthday party for Reclamation at Hoover
Dam.
The Bureau of Reclamation has a grand tradition of which I have been part
since 1975 when I started work in the regional ofﬁce in Sacramento. Reclamation’s
history closely parallels that of the development of the twentieth century American
West. Reclamation was established in 1902 by President Theodore Roosevelt to
“make the desert bloom.” Reclamation projects have been the seed for many of
the modern American West’s large agricultural and metropolitan centers. I have
watched completion of the Central Arizona Project and seen its effect on growth in
Valley of the Sun communities.
Today, Reclamation provides one out of ﬁve Western farmers with water for 10 million irrigated acres. These farmlands produce sixty percent of the nation’s vegetables and twenty-ﬁve percent of its fruits and nuts. We are the largest electric utility
in the seventeen western states (operating 58 hydropower plants) and the nation’s
largest wholesale water supplier, administering 348 reservoirs with a total storage
capacity of 245 million acre-feet. Nearly 30 million people all over the West depend
on Reclamation projects for their municipal, industrial, and domestic water supplies.
Throughout its history, Reclamation has been an innovator in the engineering and
science of dam design and construction, hydroelectric power production and delivery, water delivery, conservation, and multipurpose uses of water. Reclamation’s
masonry dams represent a distinguished lineage and include many landmarks of the
West: East Park, Pathﬁnder, Buffalo Bill, Arrowrock, Owyhee, Hoover, Grand Coulee, Shasta, Friant, and Morrow Point are only the highlights of the list. Reclamation’s embankment dams follow an equally distinguished lineage and include Belle
Fourche, Anderson Ranch, and San Luis.
Reclamation’s history is a rich tapestry ﬁlled
with the politics, colorful personalities, and the
unique character of the West. It is marked by engineering accomplishments and economic growth
woven into the tapestry of western water development and delivery. These essays prepared for
Reclamation’s history symposium in 2002 add
new dimensions to the story of Reclamation.
Robert W. Johnson
Commissioner
Bureau of Reclamation
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SENIOR HISTORIAN’S INTRODUCTION
On June18-19, 2002, the Bureau of Reclamation and Department of
History at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, hosted a symposium on the
history of Reclamation. The symposium was held in conjunction with the
Bureau’s centennial anniversary birthday party at Hoover Dam the afternoon and
evening of June 17, and Dr. Andrew Kirk and Ms. Mary Wammack made the local
arrangements at UNLV.
Reclamation’s commissioner and executive staff from about 1992
forward supported centennial activities planned by the committee I chaired
for Reclamation, including publication of these papers. Various issues have
prevented preparation of this publication until several years after the symposium
was held. In particular, commissioners Dennis Underwood, Daniel Beard,
Eluid Martinez, John W. Keys III, and Bob Johnson and other executive staff
such as Margaret Sibley, Elizabeth Harrison, and Roseann Gonzales have been
very supportive of the history program and this publication. The support of
my supervisors, Richard Rizzi and Ronald (Rusty) W. Schuster, was also very
important to the success of these activities.
The proposed papers for the history symposium were vetted through a peer
review group consisting of James Corbridge of the University of Colorado School
of Law, Patricia N. Limerick of the University of Colorado, Toni Rae Linenberger
of Reclamation, Donald J. Pisani of the University of Oklahoma, William D.
Rowley of the University of Nevada-Reno, Wm. Joe Simonds of Reclamation,
and me. In addition, Larry Walkoviak reviewed proposals for papers from an
internal Reclamation perspective and provided comments on the proposals.
It was always the intent of the planning to embrace a broad range of
ideologies, attitudes, and interpretations of Reclamation’s history, and neither I
nor the Bureau of Reclamation nor the members of the peer review committee
necessarily agree with, or in any way endorse, the authors’ selection of data or
their interpretation of that data.
I consulted two noted, veteran, western history editors, Dr. Maxine
Benson and Dr. Judith Austin, about how to approach this collection of papers.
As a result, it has been my choice as editor to avoid trying to homogenize each
symposium paper to uniform format, writing, and endnote styles. Instead, each
author’s work is permitted to show differences of professional training, endnote
style, and writing style. Generally we have tried to use dictionary guidance for
spelling and for a few stylistic issues have gratefully used the guidance of The
Chicago Manual of Style’s ﬁfteenth edition. Among a few other items of which
the reader might wish to be aware are the following standards we have tried to
follow:
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quotations, notwithstanding our few efforts at
standardization, were not altered, except that quotations of
three or more lines were separated from text and doubleindented with quotation marks removed;
quotations were not checked for accuracy by the editor;
no U.S. Postal Service or other abbreviations for states were
used outside quotations; no abbreviations for months were
used outside quotations;
we used abbreviations for footnote and bibliography entries
only when they are standard to the publication cited;
we used the convention of “U.S.” with no space between
the letters while placing a space between letters for the
initials of names, e.g., R. F. Walter;
and, except in the more technically-oriented papers, where
we have adhered to the conventions of the authors, we
normally spelled out numbers under 100 and used numerals
for 100 and over.

Because of the lapse of time between the symposium and this publication,
some of the authors have placed their papers in other locations. When those
other publications vary signiﬁcantly from the original manuscript, we have
also published the symposium original. All author-reported publications
incorporating signiﬁcant portions of the original symposium paper are listed
in the “Bibliography of Papers Published in Other Locations.” The remaining
papers are presented in this publication, and we appreciate the authors’ continuing
assistance to us. These papers represent a tremendous amount of labor in terms
of research and writing, and we are pleased that the history program is now
able, through the support of Commissioner Robert W. Johnson, to provide this
information to those interested in Reclamation’s history.
To bring some order to the presentation of these essays, I felt it necessary
to group them according to topic, but that proved more difﬁcult than I had
originally thought. In the end, the groupings became an engineering/technical
section, a general Reclamation history section, and a section devoted to essays
limited largely to a single Reclamation project.
Two technical notes are in order. In neither of these instances have we
tried to correct authors’ text to conform to these technical notes.
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First, there is a widespread belief among historians and the water
community that the Colorado River Basin is divided at “Lee’s
Ferry” into the Upper Colorado River Basin and the Lower
Colorado River Basin. This is an assumption that has gained
currency over the years both because the Lee’s Ferry site, at the
mouth of the Paria River, is of historical signiﬁcance as an early
settlement on the Colorado River at the upriver edge of the Grand

Canyon and because there is a confusing similarity of terminology.
The Colorado River Compact states that the division between the
basins is at “Lee Ferry” and speciﬁes in its deﬁnitions section that
“The term ‘Lee Ferry’ means a point in the main stream of the
Colorado River one mile below the mouth of the Paria River.”
Therefore, “Lee Ferry” and “Lee’s Ferry” are slightly different
locations—the Compact deﬁnition assures that the Paria River is a
tributary wholly within the Upper Colorado River Basin.


Second, some authors have referred to Reclamation as an
“agency.” This is a common misconception held both within
and outside the federal government. The term “agency” refers
to cabinet level agencies, e.g., the Department of the Interior or the
Department of Agriculture, and some independent agencies. The
term “bureau” refers to subdivisions within agencies—such as
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the
National Park Service, all bureaus within an agency—the
Department of the Interior.

Finally, layout and design of our publication was carried out in
Reclamation’s Technical Services Center, by Charles Brown with assistance
from Bonnie Gehringer. The assistance provided from that ofﬁce is particularly
important to the successful and timely completion of this publication.

Brit Allan Storey, Ph.D.
Senior Historian
Bureau of Reclamation
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Concrete Dam Evolution: The Bureau of
Reclamation’s Contributions to 2002
By:
Gregg A. Scott
Larry K. Nuss
and John LaBoon

I. Introduction
Over the last 100 years the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) has
made signiﬁcant engineering contributions to the advancement and evolution of
concrete dam analysis, design, and construction. The beginning of Reclamation’s
long history of world renowned concrete dam construction began shortly after
the turn of the century with landmark masonry dams. Arch, gravity, and buttress
dam design evolved through the 1920s. In the 1930s with the design and
construction of Hoover Dam, signiﬁcant strides were made in design, analysis,
and construction. Advances were also made in concrete materials, temperature
control, and construction techniques. Concrete technology improved to solve
the problems of alkali-aggregate reaction and freeze-thaw damage following
Hoover Dam. In addition to Hoover Dam, some of the largest concrete dams
in the world were constructed by Reclamation during the 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s. Following the failure of Malpasset Dam (France) in the late 1950s, it
became fully recognized that foundation conditions were critical to the stability
of concrete dams. Reclamation made signiﬁcant contributions in the areas of
rock mechanics and dam foundation design in the 1960s and later. In the 1970s
attention was paid to the earthquake response of concrete dams, and Reclamation
was among the ﬁrst to apply the ﬁnite element method to these types of analyses.
A new method of concrete dam construction, termed roller-compacted concrete
(RCC), was developed in the 1980s using earthmoving and paving technology
to transport and place concrete materials, resulting in shorter construction times
and decreased cost. Reclamation advanced RCC materials design and placement
methods. Continued evaluations for dam safety, operations, and maintenance
have been in the forefront of recent Reclamation activities. As the behavior and
risks posed by these dams are better understood, modiﬁcations have been made
for several concrete dams to improve their safety and service life. Part of the
evolution of concrete dam analysis, design and construction, has been associated
with waterways; speciﬁcally spillways and outlet works. These features are key
components to safely pass water through concrete dams. Although these features
are also critical for embankment dams, advances often came during concrete dam
design due to the high heads associated with many of these structures.
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Table 1.1. Large Masonry and Concrete Storage Dams Designed and Built by the
Bureau of Reclamation or Currently in the Bureau of Reclamation Inventory.

Dam

Pathﬁnder
Buffalo Bill

Year
Completed*

Type

Structural
Height
(feet)**

State

1909

Thick Arch

214

Wyoming

1910, 1990

Thick Arch

325

Wyoming

East Park

1910

Gravity Arch

139

California

Jackson Lake

1911

Composite Gravity/
Embankment

66

Wyoming

Theodore Roosevelt

1911,
1996

Thick Arch

Arrowrock

1916

Gravity Arch

350

Idaho

Elephant Butte

1916

Gravity

301

New Mexico

1918, 1993

Thick Arch

84

Washington

Warm Springs

1919

Thin Arch

106

Oregon

Black Canyon Diversion

1924

Gravity

183

Idaho

Gerber

1925

Thin Arch

88

Oregon

Mormon Flat

1926

Thin Arch

224

Arizona

Horse Mesa

1927

Thin Arch

305

Arizona

Stony Gorge

1928

Slab and Buttress

139

California

Gibson

1929

Medium-thick Arch

199

Montana

Stewart Mountain

1930

Thin Arch

207

Arizona

Deadwood

1931

Medium-thick Arch

165

Idaho

Owyhee

1932

Thick Arch

417

Oregon

Thief Valley

1932

Slab and Buttress

73

Oregon

Hoover

1936

Thick Arch

726

Nevada/Arizona

Parker

1938

Medium-thick Arch

320

Arizona

Clear Creek

2

280
Arizona
raised to 356

Dam

Year
Completed*

Type

Structural
Height
(feet)**

State

Bartlett

1939

Multiple Arch

309

Arizona

Seminoe

1939

Medium-thick Arch

295

Wyoming

Friant

1942

Gravity

319

California

Grand Coulee

1942, 1974

Gravity

550

Washington

Marshall Ford

1942

Gravity

278

Texas

Altus

1945

Curved Gravity

110

Oklahoma

Shasta

1945

Curved Gravity

602

California

Angostura

1949

Composite: Gravity/
Embankment

193

South Dakota

Olympus

1949

Composite: Gravity/
Embankment

70

Colorado

Keswick

1950

Gravity

157

California

Kortes

1951

Gravity

244

Wyoming

Hungry Horse

1953

Thick Arch

564

Montana

Canyon Ferry

1954

Gravity

225

Montana

Folsom

1956

Composite: Gravity/
Embankment

340

California

Monticello

1957

Medium-thick Arch

304

California

Anchor

1960

Thin Arch

208

Wyoming

Flaming Gorge

1964

Medium-thick Arch

502

Utah

Glen Canyon

1964

Thick Arch

710

Arizona

East Canyon

1966

Double-curvature Arch

260

Utah

Yellowtail

1966

Medium-thick Arch

525

Montana

Swift

1967

Double-curvature Arch

205

Montana

Morrow Point

1968

Double-curvature Arch

468

Colorado

Wild Horse

1969

Double-curvature Arch

110

Nevada
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Dam

Year
Completed*

Type

Structural
Height
(feet)**

State

Mountain Park

1975

Double- curvature Arch

133

Oklahoma

Pueblo

1975

Composite: Massive-head
Buttress/ Embankment

250

Colorado

Crystal

1976

Double-curvature Arch

323

Colorado

Nambé Falls

1976

Composite: Doublecurvature Arch/
Embankment

150

New Mexico

American Falls

1978

Composite: Gravity/
Embankment

104

Idaho

Upper Stillwater

1987

RCC Gravity

292

Utah

Brantley

1989

Composite: Gravity/
Embankment

144

New Mexico

* For cases where the height or shape was signiﬁcantly altered, the modiﬁcation date is also given
** Structural height is generally the difference between the dam crest and lowest point of the
excavation

II. Masonry Dams and the Early Years
Shortly after the beginning of the twentieth century, just after the
establishment of the U.S. Reclamation Service, explorations were underway for
large storage dams. In September 1903 George Y. Wisner, consulting engineer
for the Reclamation Service, addressed a conference of Reclamation Service
Engineers in Ogden, Utah. He indicated
Reclamation would be required to build
masonry dams of great height in order to
store the water required to reclaim arid
lands. This could be accomplished in
narrow canyons where the arch action
of the dam could be taken into account,
provided the plans were based upon
accurate data and correct determination
of the stresses to which the dams
would be subjected. In 1904, Wisner
began what was to be a leading role in
the design of Pathﬁnder Dam on the
North Platte River in central Wyoming,
collaborating with Edgar T. Wheeler,
consulting engineer, on the analysis. It
was recognized that masonry dams are
far from rigid, and that temperature
1.1. Pathfinder Dam, Wyoming.
was an important load. The modulus
4

and coefﬁcient of thermal expansion were estimated for a composite of rock
and concrete. The dam was designed as a combination of an arch and a vertical
cantilever ﬁxed at the base. The load, both temperature and reservoir, was
distributed between the arch and cantilever so as to produce equal deﬂections.
The stresses resulting from the deﬂections were then calculated. This was the
early beginnings of what was to later become the Trial Load Method of analysis.
The designed cross-section, constructed on a radius of 150 feet, was determined
to give sufﬁcient thickness to safely resist the forces that would act upon it.
Above elevation 5830, reinforcement was considered necessary to reduce thermal
cracking.
The dam was constructed in a narrow granite canyon. A large tunnel was
constructed to divert the ﬂow of the river, and later was used for the outlet works.
Foundation excavation and dam construction were facilitated by an overhead
cableway and guy derricks with steam driven hoist engines. The overhead
cableway was key to constructing in the deep narrow canyon. Cableways are
still an important component of modern construction for such conditions. Steam
engines powered the concrete and mortar batch plant as well as the aggregate
crushing and sorting plant. The side walls of the canyon were excavated to
produce surfaces normal to the face of the dam. The ﬁrst masonry was laid in
August 1906, and the dam was completed in 1909. It was recognized that an
impervious dam could be built at
the same cost as a leaky dam, the
main difference being more rigid
inspection and an understanding at
the start that ﬁrst-class work only
would be allowed. Any rock to be
built against and any material to be
placed in the dam was thoroughly
washed and cleaned. A course of
masonry was built on the upstream
and downstream faces, and granite
stone from the spillway excavation,
1.2. Original Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.
varying in size from one to ﬁve
cubic yards, was set in a heavy
bed of mortar between the faces.
The stones were lifted, reset, and
vibrated with bars as necessary
to get them completely in contact
with the mortar. The vertical
joints were ﬁlled with concrete
consisting of cement, sand, and
coarse aggregate. The concrete
was fairly wet and would ﬂow
into most of the joints, where
1.3. Masonry Construction at Theodore
it would be worked by shovels
Roosevelt Dam, Arizona
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and leveled. Spalls or small stones were placed in the wider joints. The stone
was placed from abutment to abutment. Stone of differing heights resulted in
beds of mortar at varying elevations throughout the structure. Due to the high
cost of cement, which was furnished by the Government, attempts were made to
optimize the use of concrete and mortar. This required skilled masonry workers.
Flat deformed steel bars were placed in the mortar joints near the face of the dam
above elevation 5830. The ﬁnished dam has a structural height of 214 feet, and
impounds about 1 million acre feet of water. The dam has performed extremely
well for nearly a century, and for all practical purposes should have an indeﬁnite
life.
Similar masonry construction was in progress about the same time for
Theodore Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River, in south-central Arizona. The design
of the dam was somewhat more conservative than Pathﬁnder Dam, having a
more conventional gravity dam section. This probably reﬂects the fact that it was
designed under the direction of different engineers, F. Teighman and Louis C.
Hill, and that the design for Theodore Roosevelt Dam probably predates that for
Pathﬁnder Dam, even though Pathﬁnder Dam was completed ﬁrst. Construction
at Theodore Roosevelt Dam began in 1903. It appears that a simpler design
methodology was employed. The dam was designed two-dimensionally such that
the resultant force from maximum anticipated static loading fell within the middle
third of the structure, and then the dam was arched to provide an extra margin of
stability. It was recognized that temperature could affect the upper portions of
the dam, and records indicate that some reinforcing steel was used in this area.
Despite this, the thinner upper portion of the dam cracked vertically at regular
intervals, in effect forming contraction joints. Leakage through these cracks
was minimal. The dam was built in a narrow canyon formed by Precambrian
siltstone, sandstone, and dolomite. Dolomite blocks formed the masonry for
the dam. The construction practices were nearly identical to those at Pathﬁnder
Dam, and a sound and water-tight dam, with a structural height of 280 feet
and a storage volume of about 1.4 million acre feet, resulted. One of the main
differences from Pathﬁnder Dam involved the early use of hydroelectric power
at Theodore Roosevelt Dam. A 19-mile long power canal was constructed from
a diversion dam upstream of the site. The canal fed a 7-foot diameter penstock
tunnel leading to a temporary hydroelectric unit installed in a cave behind the
permanent powerhouse. This provided construction power. Six 25-cycle units
were installed in the original powerhouse with a combined capacity of 11,000
horsepower. President Theodore Roosevelt, in whose honor the dam was named,
attended the dedication ceremonies held on March 18, 1911. Completed in 1996,
modiﬁcations to the dam included raising the crest 76 feet to mitigate dam safety
concerns, provide additional conservation storage (i.e., raise the top of active
conservation from 2136 to 2151 feet), and enlarge ﬂood storage. The original
masonry dam was found to be in excellent condition, and was incorporated nearly
entirely into the modiﬁed structure (discussed later in this paper).
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At approximately
the same time, in northwest
Wyoming, plans were underway
to construct the then highest dam
in the world across the Shoshone
River. Initially called Shoshone
Dam, it was originally designed
as a straight gravity masonry
dam in 1904, but in 1905,
because of the narrow granite
canyon across which it was to
be constructed, the arch design
1.4. Buffalo Bill Dam (includes 1990 raised dam
and replacement spillway), Wyoming
proposed by George Y. Wisner
was also adopted for what was to
later be called Buffalo Bill Dam.
The cross-section of the dam is
nearly identical to Pathﬁnder
Dam. It is of interest to note
that independent arch theory
design, where the thickness of
the dam at any given elevation
is a function of water depth and
radius of curvature, was also
being developed during this time
1.5. Construction at Buffalo Bill Dam, Wyoming.
period. In fact, a discussion by
Note wooden forms at downstream face and plum
John S. Eastwood, describing
stones protruding from previous lift.
how the thickness of Shoshone
Dam could be substantially reduced by using this theory, appears in an early
edition of Engineering News. The construction of the dam differed from that
used at Pathﬁnder and Roosevelt Dams, beginning the transition from masonry
construction to concrete construction. Wooden forms were built at the upstream
and downstream faces for concrete placement. Concrete was mixed and deposited
in 8-inch layers. Granite plum rocks, forming approximately 25 percent of the
concrete volume, were placed in the concrete, and were shaken or rammed into
ﬁnal position. This solidiﬁed the mass to a remarkable degree, and additional
tamping was scarcely required. However, spading and tamping was performed to
work the concrete into all the cavities of the rock and ensure consolidation against
the forms. The plum stones usually projected about half of their thickness above
the surface of the new concrete. This presented a rough surface for bonding
with the next layer. When a layer of concrete had set for more than 24 hours,
the surface was thoroughly cleaned and a thin coat of mortar was placed prior to
the next layer of concrete. The concrete was placed from abutment to abutment
without contraction joints. Due to the contractor’s desire to complete the work,
winter placements occurred under a steam-heated tent. Upon completion in 1910,
the dam was 325 feet high, and capable of storing over 400,000 acre feet of water.
The dam was raised 25 feet in 1989.
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The ﬁrst use of vertical
radial contraction joints for
a Reclamation concrete dam
occurred at East Park Dam in
north-central California. The
radial joints were spaced at
20 feet, and a key, six inches
deep by three feet long, was
constructed in the contraction
joints about six feet from the
upstream face. Although there
is no indication that waterstops
1.6. East Park Dam, California.
were installed in the joints, a
system of four-inch diameter
tile drains was constructed downstream of
the keys to convey water from the joints
to the outlet tunnel. This dam also was
constructed entirely of concrete. The
original design called for sandstone blocks
to be imbedded in the concrete to make up
20 to 30 percent of the mass. However,
the sandstone was of poorer quality than
ﬁrst believed, and the sandstone blocks
were omitted from the construction. The
aggregate was processed and screened
into three sizes (1/4, 1, and 3 inch). A
little over one barrel (4 sacks) of cement
was used for each cubic yard of cement.
The concrete was placed quite wet, and
water cured for 10 days. The dam was
1.7. Construction at East Park Dam,
designed as a curved gravity structure,
California. Note the vertical formed consimilar to Theodore Roosevelt Dam. It
traction joint and concrete forms.
was constructed in a narrow gorge of
massive conglomerate. Although the
dam was completed in 1910, construction began in 1908, after construction of
Theodore Roosevelt, Pathﬁnder, and Buffalo Bill Dams had begun. Despite the
work of Wisner, a more conservative approach was taken. The 140-foot high dam
impounds a reservoir of about 50,000 acre feet.
The reign of Shoshone Dam as the world’s highest dam was short
lived. In 1916, Arrowrock Dam was completed to a height of 350 feet. Once
again, the cross section of this dam was similar to a gravity dam, but the dam
was constructed as an arch. The construction of Arrowrock Dam also made
use of vertical radial contraction joints. Radial joints were formed in the upper
portion of the dam by building alternate sections at different times. The joints
were spaced at various intervals dependent on the elevation and thickness of the
8

dam. Three vertical wells
were formed in each joint
which were later ﬁlled with
concrete during cold weather,
after the dam had undergone
contraction. A Z-strip
annealed-copper water stop
was installed in each joint 5
feet from the upstream face
of the dam, and immediately
downstream from this strip a
triangular drain was formed
in the joint. These drains
collect water which gets past
1.8. Arrowrock Dam, Idaho.
the waterstop and transports
it to inspection or operating
galleries. A unique material called
“sand cement” was used for the
construction of this dam, and for
Elephant Butte Dam, a 300-foothigh straight gravity dam near Truth
or Consequences, New Mexico,
completed the same year. This
consisted of standard Portland cement
to which was added a little less than
an equal amount of pulverized sand,
reground to such ﬁneness that 90
percent would pass a No. 200 sieve.
Although this saved on the quantity
of cement used, the concrete did not
attain as much strength, and as a
result, the durability suffered. This
1.9. Elephant Butte Dam, New Mexico.
was not signiﬁcant for the relatively
mild climate at Elephant Butte Dam,
but at Arrowrock Dam, spray from downstream releases resulted in severe freezethaw damage to the concrete. This necessitated construction of a new overlay
on the face of the dam in 1936. The use of sand-cement in the construction of
concrete dams was discontinued after these projects. The concepts of foundation
grouting and drainage appear at Arrowrock and Elephant Butte Dams, and
galleries were constructed in both of these dams. Shallow grout and drainage
curtains (25 to 30 feet deep) were constructed by drill holes in the granitic near
the upstream face of Arrowrock dam. The foundation drainage holes, spaced at
about 10-foot centers, exit in an inspection gallery 27.5 feet from the upstream
face. Vertical formed drains were also constructed within the concrete, spaced at
15 feet and located 12 feet from the upstream face of the dam. These drains also
exit in the inspection gallery. Similar construction occurred at Elephant Butte
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Dam.
In 1918 Duff A. Abrams ﬁrst published results of research that investigated
the effect of water-cement ratio and grading of aggregates on concrete quality.
This was a major breakthrough in developing the science of concrete technology.
Obviously, Reclamation concrete dams constructed up to that point did not have
the beneﬁt of his research, and the concrete quality and durability was largely a
function of fortuitous circumstances and the experience of the on-site staff. With
the exception of Arrowrock Dam, which required fairly minor modiﬁcations for
freeze-thaw damage due to nondurable concrete, the early concrete dams of the
Bureau of Reclamation have held up remarkably well.
III. The Amazing Arch and Developments of the 1920s
During the 1920s, materials were relatively expensive, and there was a
desire to optimize dam design to reduce the required concrete. Independent arch
theory became the order of the day, as thinner dams resulted from this method
of design. Hence, many thin concrete arch dams were designed and constructed
during this era. In addition, buttress dams became popular for wider canyons,
since they minimize the required materials in favor of a more labor-intensive
construction. The Bureau of Reclamation inventory contains only one gravity
dam (Black Canyon Diversion) from this era. Most of the arch dams from this
era in the Reclamation inventory were designed and constructed by water user
groups. Titles were later transferred to Reclamation for various reasons. One
of the exceptions is Gerber Dam. Gerber Dam was completed in 1925 on Miller
Creek, a tributary of the Lost River in southern Oregon. The dam is a variable
radius arch with a structural height of 85 feet and a reservoir volume of 94,000
acre feet. The Design Engineer was J. L. Savage and the General Construction
Superintendent was F. T. Crowe, two individuals who would play prominently
into later Reclamation projects. The foundation for the dam is basalt with weak
clayey interﬂow zones. As was the practice up until this time, the main concern
for foundation conditions related to the strength and hardness of the rock, and the
water-tightness of the foundation. To assess the water-tightness of the foundation,
tests were conducted in drill holes. Pipes were grouted and sealed into eight drill
holes. Water was applied to all eight holes simultaneously under pressure from
an elevated water tank. The leakage was determined to be small. Still, after
excavating a keyway trench for the foundation to a depth greater than anticipated,
a grout curtain was installed to a depth of 15 feet in holes spaced about 5 feet
apart throughout the length of the foundation. The holes were grouted after the
concrete above the grout hole reached a thickness of 6 feet by applying a steam
pressure of 100 lb/in2. No foundation drainage was included in the design or
construction.
Concrete was placed in the dam by use of a trestle with rail buggies, a stiff
leg derrick, and a high line. Most of the concrete was placed by cars with a
¾ yd3 capacity, run on the trestle from the mixer and dumped into chutes and
pipes leading to the forms. Five to six sacks of cement were used for each
10

1.10. Comparison of Maximum Sections of Early Reclamation Arch Dams.

cubic yard of concrete. Plum rocks, not exceeding 20 percent of the volume,
were placed in the concrete at locations away from the forms, to reduce the
needed concrete volume and provide small keys between lifts. Cold weather
placements required heating the sand and mixing water, as well as heating the
concrete placements under canvas enclosures. The rock foundation and concrete
surfaces were thoroughly cleaned with wire brushes and water jets prior to
concrete placement. All surfaces were sprinkled with water and dry cement
just prior to placements. The concrete was placed in 4-foot lifts between keyed
contraction joints at 50-foot centers, with no plum rocks in the bottom of the
11

lift. The concrete was spaded against
the forms to reduce “bug holes.” Two
closure slots, four feet wide were left
near the ends of the center overﬂow
section. Concrete was placed in these
slots at low temperature conditions, once
the dam had cooled. Extensive ﬁeld
testing was performed on samples taken
during construction. This included sieve
tests of the sand and aggregate used for
the concrete, tensile tests on briquettes
composed of the sand and cement used
in the concrete, compression tests on 6by 12-inch cylinders of concrete taken
from the forms conﬁrming the 1600 lb/
in2 required 28-day strength, colorimetric
tests to determine the cleanness of the
1.11. Gerber Dam, Oregon.
sand, and slump tests for concrete
wetness. The slump was limited
to 3 inches for most of the work
to allow the concrete to ﬂow
through the chutes, but a slump
of 6 to 8 inches was allowed in
thinner reinforced walls. This
represents early use of extensive
standardized testing to control the
work quality. Gerber Dam also
represents the ﬁrst installation of
instrumentation in a Reclamation
concrete dam. Seventeen electric 1.12. Stony Gorge Dam, California.
resistance thermometers were
placed in horizontal layers at
three elevations in the crown
cantilever (vertical plane of
the line of arc centers). Berry
Strain Gages, consisting of
eight posts set in a circle
about a center post, were
installed in nine locations on
the downstream face of the
dam. Two post stations were
installed on the crest of the
dam across contraction joints
1.13. Construction of Gerber Dam. Note
on each side of the dam. A dial closure slot near left side of photo.
gage instrument was used to
take the readings, which were adjusted by also reading a reference invar bar. Four
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survey targets were set in the downstream face of the dam at the line of centers
for measurements relative to reference targets on the abutments. Later tests for
concrete modulus, coefﬁcient of thermal expansion, and other properties were
planned. The intent of the instrumentation was to verify the arch dam design
and analysis techniques. Documentation describing this evaluation could not be
located.
The ﬁrst buttress dam
constructed by the Bureau of
Reclamation was completed in
1928. Stony Gorge Dam is an
Ambursen type slab and buttress
dam built downstream of East
Park Dam. It has a structural
height of about 140 feet, and
a reservoir capacity of 50,000
acre feet. The dam is made of
individual simply supported
elements; buttresses, upstream
1.14. Photo taken during construction of Stony
face slabs, and struts bracing
Gorge Dam, California from downstream side.
between buttresses in the
Note struts between buttresses and sloping slabs
downstream areas. The sloping
on left side of photo.
upstream slabs span
between and transfer
the reservoir loading
to the buttresses; the
buttresses carry the
upstream-downstream
loading and transfer
it to the foundation;
and the struts provide
lateral stiffness to the
buttresses and keep
them from deforming
excessively in the crosscanyon direction. The
reinforced concrete
members were designed
using codes available
at the time. Additional
horizontal reinforcing
was added to the
buttresses following
the early appearance
of vertical cracks in
1.15. Gerber Dam Plan and Sections
some of the taller
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buttresses. A recent check indicates the design is generally acceptable for normal
static loading conditions, even considering modern American Concrete Institute
(ACI) code. The concrete mixing plant discharged into bottom-dump buckets of
1½ cubic yard capacity which were successively transported by hoist, highline
cableway, and small cars on light tracks supported by the buttress forms to chutes
conveying the concrete from the buckets to its ﬁnal position.
The method of using chutes to convey the concrete was common practice
during this era. This required a wet concrete mix for enough workability to
allow the concrete to ﬂow along the chutes. Unfortunately, this also resulted in
somewhat weaker and less durable concrete than could be attained with a drier
mix. In addition, it often resulted in latence rising to the lift surfaces. If this
was not removed and thoroughly cleaned, bonding between successive lifts was
compromised. However, many dams from this time period have performed well
and are still in service. Although concrete technology had advanced, the effects of
alkali-aggregate reaction and freeze-thaw deterioration were not well understood.
Most of the arch dams constructed during this era in cold climates suffer from
freeze-thaw deterioration, such as Gerber Dam. If built with reactive aggregate,
the resulting cracking typically accentuates the freeze-thaw damage. Dams
subject to alkali-aggregate reaction in mild climates, such as Stewart Mountain
Dam, tend to exhibit cracking but continue to perform well.
IV. Prelude to Hoover Dam
Owyhee and Gibson Dams
were built before Hoover Dam and
included experimental sections
for collecting temperature data
and grouting in preparation for
the construction at Hoover. These
were also the ﬁrst Bureau of
Reclamation concrete dams to use
tunnel spillways. Some of the ﬁnal
developments for the Trial Load
Method were also performed during
the design of these structures.

1.16. Owyhee Dam, Oregon.

Owyhee Dam is located on the Owyhee River in eastern Oregon. It is a
concrete, thick arch structure with structural and hydraulic heights of 417 and 325
feet, respectively. The crest is 833 feet long and 30 feet wide at elevation 2675.
The maximum base width is 265 feet. The dam was completed in 1932. The dam
forms a reservoir (Lake Owyhee) with storage of 1,183,300 acre feet at elevation
2675. Owyhee Dam was the world’s highest dam at the time of completion. John
L. Savage, Chief Designing Engineer, wrote:
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From an engineering standpoint the Owyhee Dam, to be constructed
on the Owyhee Project in eastern Oregon, is the most outstanding dam
undertaken to date by the Bureau of Reclamation.… this dam is likely
to stand as the highest dam in the world until the great Boulder Canyon
Dam [Hoover Dam] is constructed.

The Owyhee River valley was visited early in the nineteenth century by
Hawaiian trappers who are credited with having named the river “Hawaii.” Later,
this name was handed down phonetically by scouts, Indians, and early settlers as
“Ow-Y-Hee”, and ultimately the name was given this spelling. The dam site is
also referred to as the “Hole-in-the-Ground” site. Intermittent site explorations
began in 1903, a feasibility report was issued in 1925, and the project was
recommended by the Secretary of the Interior on October 9, 1926. The General
Construction Company of Seattle, Washington, was the low bidder at $3,198,779
and was awarded the contract on July 7, 1928. The government ﬁeld organization
reached its peak in 1931 with 107 employees under the charge of F. A. Banks
(later to become Construction Engineer for Grand Coulee Dam). In June 1931 the
contractor was placing from 40,000 to 50,000 cubic yards of concrete per month.
The contractor’s workforce reached 274 people. Construction was completed ﬁve
months ahead of schedule in 1932. The ﬁrst water was delivered to the irrigation
lands in 1935.
The materials and construction were similar to structures that had come
before. The complete details will not be
repeated here, but a few items of note are
provided. Cobble rock was added to the mix.
The cobble rock was sound, clean gravel or
broken rock of such size as passed through a
screen having 8-inch square or 9-inch round
openings and was retained on a screen having
2¾-inch square or 3-inch round openings.
Porous concrete tile drains were placed
in the dam near its upstream face. The joints
in the tile were not cemented. The concrete
tile had an internal diameter of not less than
5 inches, and wall thickness of not less than
1 3/16 inches. The tile was made of 1 part
Portland cement and 4 parts total aggregate,
the aggregates being so proportioned as to
give a degree of porosity such that an 18-inch
length of tile when set on end on a water-tight
base shall discharge water poured into it at
the rate of not less than 3 gallons per minute.
Construction today would form these drains
using a removable ﬁve- to six-inch- diameter
tapered steel pipe.

1.17. Owyhee Dam, Oregon. Tile
formed drains, strain meter for
Hoover test, and gallery reinforcement.
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The main advancements
made during the design and
construction of Owyhee
Dam involved temperature
control. Owyhee Dam was
the largest dam at the time in
which radial contraction joints
were to be pressure grouted.
Radial vertical contraction
joints were placed at 50-foot
intervals with 9-inch deep
by 3-feet wide shear keys at
3-foot centers along each joint.
The vertical contraction joints
were grouted from March 30
to May 8, 1934, which is two
years after construction of the
dam. Internal temperature
measurements, concrete
cracking, grout operations,
grout takes, grout pressures,
1.18. Owyhee Dam Plan and Sections.
and contraction joint opening
measurements were reported
in 1934. The grouting system installed in Owyhee was similar to that previously
used in Gibson and Deadwood
Dams except for a few minor
improvements. A system of
pipes were installed along the
vertical contraction joints to
cool the mass concrete to 50°F
and grout the joints. Grout
zones were 100-feet high and
isolated with 20-gage soft
copper sheets. The radial
contraction joints in the dam
were pressure grouted with
cement grout forced through
the pipe grouting systems. The
1.19. Owyhee Dam, Oregon. Grout pipes and
grout was forced in to ensure
shear keys on vertical contraction joint.
a pressure of at least 100
pounds per square inch at the
highest point in the system being grouted. Vertical keys were built in the joints.
The entire face of each vertical joint in the dam, except the grouting units and
copper expansion strips, were painted with one thin coat of water-gas tar paint and
allowed to dry before the adjacent concrete was placed against it. The tar paint
served as a bond breaker between the blocks of concrete. Copper grout stops were
16

laid horizontally at vertical intervals of about 100 feet. The top of the grout zone
was at elevation 2400, 2500, 2600, and top of dam. Construction today would
limit the grout zone to approximate 60 vertical feet. The headers on the upstream
face below elevation 2500 were not available for grouting because the reservoir
elevation at the time of grouting varied between 2520 to 2527. Owing to the fact
that there were quite a few cracks in the concrete in the dam, all cement used was
screened through a 200 mesh sieve with the intention that this ﬁne cement would
seal most of the cracks. However, considerable cracking in the concrete on the
downstream face of the dam occurred, primarily due to alkali-aggregate reaction.
Placing the mass concrete of the dam was begun in the fall of 1930 and
completed in the summer of 1932. In the cooler months of the year, concrete was
placed at around 52° to 70°F and heated up to around 98° to 116°F. In the warmer
months of the year, concrete was placed at around 65° to 82°F and heated up to
around 112° to 119°F. At the time of grouting, the internal concrete temperatures
varied from 42° to 62°F. Grouting pressures inside the joint were around 100
lb/in2. The allowable placing temperatures were much higher than allowed
by modern standards and probably contributed to surface cracking. Electric
resistance thermometers were placed in the concrete immediately on pouring.
Dissipation of setting heat was accelerated by circulating water through the grout
system except in the middle of winter. An experimental cooling system was
located in panel 8 at elevation 2486. Tests in Panel 8 measured the effectiveness
of cooling coils to dissipate heat in a thick concrete section. Additionally, the
upper 82 feet of panels 3 and 4 (blocks 3 and 4, between contraction joints at
stations 2+00 and 3+00) at Owyhee Dam were used as a test section to test
cooling coils placed on the top of lift lines and their ability to open contraction
joints for grouting. In this location of the dam, a system of cooling coils 1-inch
diameter were placed 4-feet 7.5-inches apart near the bottom of each 4-foot
lift. The section was highly instrumented to obtain temperature and strain
measurements. The test section was placed from March 3, 1932, to May 28,
1932, at a fairly uniform rate with about three and one-half days between pours.
Reservoir water was circulated
in the test section cooling coils
for only one month between May
13, 1932, and June 20, 1932.
This period of time permitted
cooling until the rising river
water temperatures and lowering
concrete temperatures permitted
no further heat extraction from
the concrete. Measurement of
concrete temperature before
cooling shows interior concrete
around 117°F and the surface
1.20. Owyhee Dam, Oregon. Spillway “Burp”
temperatures around 75°F,
(unstable flow condition, sometimes referred to as
“blow-back”).
producing a thermal gradient
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of 42°F. This amount of gradient is very high and probably contributed to the
surface cracking. The contours after the cooling coils were turned off show
interior concrete and surface concrete about the same temperature at 70°F. The
thermal gradient is very small which would minimize if not eliminate any surface
cracking.
A series of model tests of the Owyhee morning-glory spillway were made
from 1930 to 1931. No formal reports were prepared at the time of these studies.
In 1944, the hydraulic studies for the spillway tunnels at Owyhee Dam and
Gibson Dam were documented. In 1928, when designs for Owyhee Dam were
underway, there were few installations of vertical shaft or glory-hole spillways
and there was little information available that would assist in the design. The
ring gate had no precedent whatsoever. A 1:48 scale model, which included the
topography surrounding the spillway, the spillway and ring-gate control, and the
discharge tunnel below the spillway was built to aid in the design. The design
included forty-eight 1/16-inch holes equally spaced around the circumference of
the lower crest which served as air vents to aerate the crest when the gate was
raised. Prototype behavior indicates for heads of from 1 foot to 2 feet over the
gate, the water falls in a solid sheet toward the center of the shaft, apparently
entraining air faster than it can be released at the outlet end of the tunnel. This
entrainment causes the pressure to increase until it is sufﬁcient to regurgitate
or “break back” through the sheet of overﬂowing water; then air emerges with
sufﬁcient force to carry spray 50 feet or 60 feet above the level of the gate.
This phenomenon occurs sometimes as often as once every ﬁfteen seconds and
sometimes only once in ﬁve minutes, depending on the tailwater elevation. For
heads less than 1 foot over the crest, entrained air can apparently move back up
the spillway shaft unhampered. For heads greater that 2 feet, the air pressure
is not sufﬁcient to break back and the air is forced through the outlet end of the
tunnel, causing spray to be thrown high into the canyon. This action is directly
related to the tailwater as a rather large tailwater depth causes a jump to form
in the tunnel for most discharges. With a 1000 second-foot discharge, the ﬂow
into the stilling basin was undisturbed, but as the ﬂow increased an unexpected
disturbance occurred that was not detected in the model. The stream of water
from the spillway tunnel created waves on the surface of the stilling pool. These
waves traveled across the canyon, reﬂected, and returned. As they struck the
oncoming high-velocity stream from the tunnel an incident occurred which
for lack of a better term, is called an explosion. With this particular ﬂow
(3000 second-feet) the spray from the explosion was thrown two-thirds the
distance up the adjacent cliff. Larger discharges threw spray to the top of the
cliff. Evidently the air drawn into the spillway entrance was ejected as a strong
wind. When the reﬂected waves reach the tunnel portal, they are great enough to
seal the exit for a short time and the air is quickly compressed to the extent that an
explosion results from the release of the air.
During construction, a circular concrete-lined 22.6-foot diameter tunnel
1005 feet long was used for diversion. The tunnel was plugged with concrete
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upstream from the vertical morning glory shaft. Downstream of the vertical shaft
it is used as the permanent spillway outlet. The diversion tunnel was constructed
in rhyolite tuff requiring no timbering. First a 9- by 9-foot pioneer tunnel was
driven followed by the full size tunnel. The rock in the tunnel was hard, selfsupporting, full of incipient cracks, with an occasional mud seam. Immediately
before placing concrete, the foundation surface was cleaned of mud and debris
using a combination of air and water under pressure. The invert was placed by
hand and screeded to shape. The crown and side walls were placed in 20-foot
sections using wooden forms built in place. A 1-yard Ransome concrete gun shot
the concrete through a 6-inch pipe and rubber hose into a V notched in the crown
of the previous placement. The concrete then ﬂowed along training
boards into place. The concrete was worked into place by hammering on the
forms with air hammers and by workers equipped with hip boots working and
spading the concrete behind the forms. Grout pipes were placed into crevices
and holes drilled into the foundation rock at frequent intervals. A 5-sack-peryard mix was used in the tunnel lining between the inlet and the spillway shaft.
A 6-sack-per-yard mix was used from the shaft to the outlet portal. The tunnel
was equipped with a grouting system, and the lining-rock interface was grouted
in 1934 using a 1.0 water to cement ratio in the invert and side walls. Sand was
added to the mix in the roof grouting.
The spillway was featured in the 1956 Transactions of the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). Excerpts from this article are as follows:
The Owyhee Dam spillway in Oregon, completed in 1932 by the USBR,
was a daring design at the time. The capacity is 30,000 cu ft per sec,
the maximum head on the crest for this discharge is 12 ft, and the water
is dropped 320 ft through a vertical shaft. A ﬂood occurred in 1936 in
which 300,000 acre-ft of water were passed in 3 months. The maximum
discharge recorded was 15,000 cu ft per sec, or one-half capacity.
Subsequent to this ﬂow, smaller discharges have passed through the
spillway frequently. A ﬂow of 6,600 cu ft per sec was recorded in 1951.
The greatest ﬂood occurred in 1952, when the spillway operated for more
than a month. The maximum discharge through the spillway was 20,000
cu ft per sec, or 67 % of capacity. Inspections of the spillway have been
conducted frequently since the spillway ﬁrst operated in 1936; the latest
inspection was made after the 1952 ﬂood. The spillway shaft appeared to
be in excellent condition.

The form board marks still appeared on the concrete surface. The visible part
of the invert of the vertical bend showed only slight surface wear, the maximum
probably not exceeding 1/4 inch in depth.
V. Hoover Dam—Quantum Leaps Forward
Hoover Dam is a 726-foot-high, concrete, thick-arch dam located on
the border between Arizona and Nevada about thirty-six miles from Las Vegas,
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Nevada. The dam was completed
in 1935, has a crest length of 1244
feet, a crest thickness of 45 feet,
and a maximum base width of 660
feet. It is the highest concrete dam
in the United States, the eighteenth
highest dam in the world, and forms
the largest manmade reservoir in
the United States. The designs for
Hoover Dam evolved over several
years of careful study, representing the
combined efforts of many engineers
of Reclamation and various consulting 1.21. American Flag displayed during the
boards. Preliminary designs were
1996 Summer Olympics, Hoover Dam,
Arizona-Nevada.
prepared from time to time over a
period of ten years, so the successive
designs reﬂected some of the developments in design techniques during the 1920
to 1930 decade. In 1920, the ﬁrst design for a high dam in Boulder Canyon was
prepared. At that time the highest dam in existence was Arrowrock Dam in Idaho.
Hoover Dam was to be more than double the height of Arrowrock Dam. As such,
it was evident from the start that many new problems in design and construction
would require solution before the dam could be built.
As a result of intensive research, improvements were made in practically
every feature in the dam, spillway, and appurtenances. To bring the materials to
the site, railroad lines of forty-eight miles
length and thirty-ﬁve miles length were
constructed, and paved roads from Las
Vegas were built. A 150-ton cableway
across the canyon was built. Electrical
power had to be supplied to the dam site,
Government operations, and the newly
founded Boulder City. The town of
Boulder City had to be planned and built
for all the workers at the site. Aggregate,
sand, cement, and mixing plants had to be
built for the massive amounts of concrete.
The concrete was artiﬁcially cooled by
circulating water through cooling pipes
placed at the top of each 5-foot high
concrete lift. This required a massive
cooling tower 143 feet long, 16 feet wide,
and 43 feet high. A steel fabrication
manufacturing plant was built to construct 1.22. Hoover Dam, Arizona-Nevada.
the massive penstocks and steel works.
50- by 50-foot concrete block placements
Drill crews on elaborate truck-mounted
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carriages excavated the 56-footdiameter diversion and spillway
tunnels. These tunnels were lined
with 3 feet of concrete. The site had
to be excavated to sound rock for the
foundation of the dam. In the river
channel, silt, gravel, and boulders
had to be removed to a depth of
120 feet. The foundation was then
grouted for the purpose of providing
an impervious zone under the dam.
The initial grouting involved drilling
6,700 feet of holes and injecting
7,500 sacks of cement. The main
1.23. Upstream face of Hoover Dam, Arizonacut-off grouting was not started
Nevada.
until the dam was at 100 feet high.
This operation took 54,000 feet of
holes and more than 60,000 sacks of
cement (1 sack = 1 cubic foot). The
dam was built in a series of 50-foot
by 50-foot by 5-foot high blocks. An
8-foot slot was left open down the
middle of the dam for the extensive
system of cooling pipes. The vertical
and horizontal surfaces have formed
shear keys. A combination of water
stops and grout stops were embedded
in the concrete. After each 50-foot
vertical section of dam had been
1.24. Hoover Dam, Arizona-Nevada:
cooled,
grout was injected into the
Horizontal lift line and vertical contraction
joint.
radial and circumferential joints. The
3.25 million cubic yards of concrete
were placed from June 1933 to May
1935 in approximately 23.5 months.
Systems of drains were installed in
the dam and in the foundation. The
foundation drains were 3.5 inches
in diameter and extended 100 feet
into the foundation at the base
and graduated to 30 feet depth at
elevation 1200. The internal drains
in the concrete were 8-inch porous
concrete pipes placed vertically at
10-foot intervals in a line parallel to
1.25. Hoover Dam, Arizona-Nevada. Relative size of penstocks
the dam axis.
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Hydraulic and structural models played
an important part in the design of Hoover Dam
to verify existing theories as well as advance the
current state-of-the-art for applications of greater
magnitude than those previously developed. The
hydraulic models provided direct empirical data
while the structural models furnished checks
on analytical methods using the Trial Load
Method. There were two complete models of
Hoover. The ﬁrst model, 1:240 scale, was made
of a mixture of plaster and diatomaceous earth.
The second model, 1:180 scale, was made of a
rubber-litharge compound. In addition, detailed
models were made of the crown cantilever and a
thick arch at elevation 900 using model tests and
slab analogy tests. Therefore, three independent 1.26. Scale model of Hoover
solutions of the same problems were obtained.
Dam, Arizona-Nevada.
Determining stress distributions in an arch dam requires a 3-dimensional
analysis which was very difﬁcult in the 1930s. The Trial Load Method of
analysis was developed to represent the 3-dimensional arch structure with a grid
of 2-dimensional arch and cantilever elements. The analysis would adjust the
load into the elements and bring the elements into geometric agreement. As such,
accurate solutions of the arch and cantilever elements had to be known.
V.A. Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical
Investigations: Bulletin 2—Slab Analogy Experiments, Denver 1938.
Professor Harald M. Westergaard, at the University of Illinois in 1931,
proposed the use of slab analogy in experimental investigations of stresses
in Hoover Dam by means of measurements on rubber slabs. Slab analogy
experiments were made to deﬂect slab models of the crown cantilever and an
arch at elevation 900 to obtain stress functions usable in the Trial Load analyses.
Stresses in the slab are proportional to twists and curvature in the slab. In other
words, any system of curvatures and twists possible in a slab due to deformation
of the boundaries is analogous to a distribution of stress in a plane solid of
the same shape distorted by loads applied at the edges. Therefore, to solve a
plane stress problem by slab analogy methods, it is sufﬁcient to apply along the
boundary of a slab, similar in shape to the original, curvatures proportional at
every point of the boundary to the loading on the original. The two structures,
being analogous at the boundaries, are thereby analogous throughout; and
the direct stress or shear at any point in the solid may be determined from
curvatures and twists at the corresponding point in the slab. So proper curvature
measurements were made at the desired location and translated into stresses.
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V.B. Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical
Investigations: Bulletin 3—Model Tests of Boulder Dam, Denver 1939.
Before the Hoover model tests, there were model tests on Gibson Dam in
cooperation with the University of Colorado, the Engineering Foundation Arch
Dam Committee, and Reclamation. Concrete was mixed with the same aggregate
as in the dam, and mercury was used for the water load. Results showed the
Trial Load Method gives accurate results for an arch dam, and measurements
on the model checked closely with measurements on the downstream face of
the dam. It was evident however that a different material would need to be used
in the Hoover model to permit measurable deﬂections. As a result, a mixture
of plaster and diatomaceous earth (Celite) was developed and used for the ﬁrst
model. During testing of the plaster/diatomaceous earth model, the Aluminum
Corporation of America developed a rubber-litharge compound which was used
in the second model of Hoover Dam. It had a lower modulus and same unit
weight as concrete. Water could be used for reservoir load instead of mercury
permitting measurements on the upstream face. The model tests showed stress
concentrations at the top of Hoover Dam where there was a rapid change in
lengths of the arches. As a result, ﬁllets were added to increase the thickness of
the dam near the abutments.
V.C. Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical
Investigations: Bulletin 4—Stress Studies for Boulder Dam, Denver
1939.
Stress studies for Hoover Dam included several special analyses that
had not been previously made including: analysis of tangential shear, twist,
Poisson’s ratio effects, radial shear in the arch elements, horizontal shear in the
cantilever elements, foundation deformation, thermal induced stresses from
artiﬁcial cooling and exposed surfaces, nonlinear stress distributions in arch
and cantilever elements, spreading of canyon walls and settling of the reservoir
bottom from reservoir load, grouting and stage construction sequencing, and
earthquake loading. Maximum stresses and nonlinear stress variations in typical
arch and cantilever elements were checked by slab analogy experiments and by
tests on slab models. The method of analyzing nonlinear stress effects was based
on the analogy between partial differential equations for an Airy’s surface and
for a homogeneous slab loaded at the edges. Solutions were obtained both by
mathematical analyses and by experiments on rubber slabs deﬂected by twists and
moments applied at the edges. Adjustments were made for cantilever elements
varying radially in thickness from downstream to upstream. Supervisors during
the stress studies were R. S. Lieurance for the Trial Load studies, F. D. Kirn for
the nonlinear cantilever studies, and R. E. Glover for the nonlinear arch studies
and special studies.
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V.D. Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical
Investigations: Bulletin 6—Model Test of Arch and Cantilever
Elements, Denver 1940.
It was desirable to obtain comparisons between cross-sectional models and
the three-dimensional model of the entire dam. The cross-sectional models were
performed at the University of Colorado in Boulder.
Cantilever model—the cantilever model was 3-inches thick and at 1:240
scale was the same scale as the three dimensional model of the dam. The depth,
upstream, and downstream dimensions of the foundation were equal to the height
of the cantilever.
Arch model—the purpose of the arch model was to obtain experimental
measurements of strains and deﬂections in a thick arch element. Thin arches
had been investigated in detail, but thick arches had not been thoroughly studied.
A horizontal section at elevation 900 was selected for the study. Prior to these
experiments, this thick arch had been investigated analytically and experimentally
by slab analogy. The arch model was built at 1:120 scale.
V.E. Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part VII—Cement and
Concrete Investigations: Bulletin 1—Thermal Properties of Concrete,
Denver, 1940.
One of the major problems at Hoover was the prevention and removal
of heat in the concrete due to the heat of hydration. The problem was
compounded by the rapid construction and
extraordinary size of the dam—locking
in temperatures that would take more
than 100 years to dissipate. A series of
radial and circumferential contraction
joints were installed to control shrinkage
of the concrete. For the dam to act as a
monolithic structure, the joints must not
open. However, the joints would open as
the dam contracted from cooling of the
concrete. Under this scenario, grouting
the joints would have to be done over
generations. Various methods were
considered to remove the excess heat. This
included low-heat cement and artiﬁcial
cooling. Low-heat Portland cement was
developed to reduce the heat of hydration
by one-third and the temperature rise
by about one-fourth. Investigations
1.27. Concrete cylinder test for Hoover
Dam, Arizona-Nevada
were performed to determine the effects
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of physical and chemical composition of the Portland cement on strength,
temperature rise, and other properties. The design of the artiﬁcial cooling
plan was based on the measured properties and mathematical theory of heat
conduction. Knowledge base at the time did not provide accurate and applicable
values for these properties, so investigations had to be performed. Considerable
preliminary testing was necessary to develop apparatus and procedures for
accurate thermal tests. Thermal property tests on concrete were also made for
Gibson and Owyhee Dams. A method was developed for predicting thermal
properties of concrete from these tests. Computed internal temperatures showed
close agreement with measured test sections at Hoover and Owyhee Dams,
where concrete was cooled by circulating water through metal pipes in the dam.
Laboratory tests showed the effect on concrete temperatures of various rock types,
water content, cement types, mix proportions, and age. The investigations were
made at the Welton Street laboratory of Reclamation under the direction of H. S.
Meissner, Arthur Ruetgers, and Robert F. Blanks.
V.F. Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part VII—Cement and
Concrete Investigations: Bulletin 4—Mass Concrete Investigations,
Denver, 1940.
The selection of the most suitable mass-concrete mix for Hoover Dam
and the exact determination of its properties and qualities was one of the most
important design problems affecting the economies of the design. The effects of
aggregate size, test cylinder size, curing, and relative humidity on the strength,
elasticity, permeability of the concrete; and on the bond strength of the horizontal
lift surfaces were studied. Rocks as large as two people could lift, plums, were
used in the past in some dams. Reclamation felt more satisfactory results could
be obtained with a maximum size aggregate able to ﬁt in a mixer. A 9-inch
maximum size was arbitrarily chosen to match available sources in the area.
Little information existed on material properties using aggregate of this size;
therefore, a comprehensive investigation program was initiated. Procedures
for this type of concrete mix at the time would screen off any aggregate larger
than 1.5-inch and test 6-inch diameter by 12-inch high concrete cylinders. No
complete investigation had been performed to study the effect of the screening
process.
Information existed concerning the effect of various curing conditions on
concrete properties, but no direct comparison could be made between strengths
of concrete cured in the interior of a large dam and the conditions in a laboratory.
Only permeability tests on concrete under low water pressures had been
performed. Because of the height of Hoover Dam, concrete permeability tests
for high water pressures were performed. Most of these tests were performed in
the old Custom House laboratory under the supervision of E. N. Vidal. Concrete
dams are built in lifts. Subsequent concrete placements must be sufﬁciently
bonded. Bond tests were conducted at the University of California Material
Laboratory, Berkeley, California.
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V.G. Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part VII—Cement and
Concrete Investigations: Bulletin 2—Investigations of Portland
Cement, Denver, 1940.
Although Portland cement had been used as a building material for more
than a century, the unsuitability of the standard product for a structure as massive
as Hoover Dam had become generally recognized at the time design work was
begun. The main concerns were the heat generated during the hydration process
and the shrinkage. The ideal cement for all purposes would be one which would
permit the concrete to have no volume change subsequent to setting. Other
desirable properties of mass concrete, which are dependent on the cement,
are slower and better sustained hardening and adjustment to early stresses. In
constructing the dam, contraction joints were provided at regular intervals in both
the radial and circumferential directions. The structure was built in columnar
blocks, approximately 50 feet square. The joints in between the blocks would
allow for contraction of the concrete when it cooled.
At the time Hoover was designed, little work had been done on the
investigation of cements for mass concrete. C. P. Williams during construction
of the Rodriguez Dam in Mexico ﬁrst recognized the value of low-heat cement
in reducing temperatures and reducing cracking. Late in 1930 Burton Lowther,
a Denver consulting engineer, recognized the desirability of a low-heat cement
and performed investigations for Reclamation at the Pierce Testing Laboratories
in Denver. At the laboratories of the Bureau of Standards, Washington, D. C.,
preliminary tests were made of forty-nine commercial cements, selected from
various parts of the United States. The work begun in Washington was continued
and greatly expanded in the Engineering Materials Laboratory of the University
of California at Berkeley. Some specimens cast and tested were concrete, but the
majority were mortar or neat cement. Concurrent with and supplementing the
investigations at Berkeley were the investigations made in the laboratories of the
Bureau of Reclamation in Denver. Unlike the Berkeley test, most of the tests in
Denver were made on concrete specimens rather than mortar specimens.
In summary, it is safe to say that the sheer size of the Hoover Dam
project, and the associated need to overcome many shortcomings in the design,
analysis, and construction of concrete dams up until that time, led to signiﬁcant
advancements in the state-of-the-art, ultimately to become the state-of-practice.
This project, perhaps more than any other, came to represent the Bureau of
Reclamation’s world renowned expertise.
VI. Hydraulics for High Concrete Dams
Without question, a major breakthrough in the understanding of highhead, high-velocity spillway designs resulted from the Boulder Canyon Project
and construction of Hoover Dam. Between 1928 (authorization of the Project)
and 1948 (completion of Project documentation), extensive research formed the
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“benchmark” for presentday spillway designs and
analyses. The unprecedented
size of the spillways (each
with design capacity of
200,000 ft3/s and a maximum
average velocity approaching
175 ft/s) for Hoover Dam
was the motivation to initiate
a comprehensive research
program. Of particular
note, was the research and
1.28. Modern Ogee Spillway crest configuration.
development of methods to
design the “ogee” spillway
crest, which is still used for spillway designs around the world. Prior to this
research, methods of estimating the “under-nappe” of a jet of water moving over
a sharp crested-weir were based on approximate observations made by M. Bazin
in the late 1800s and typically used a vertical upstream face on the spillway
crest. The shape of the under-nappe deﬁnes a minimum shape or proﬁle for
the spillway ﬂow surface. Unless the ﬂow surface matches or is ﬂatter than the
under-nappe, sub-atmospheric pressure can occur, possibly leading to reduced
stabilizing tailwater backpressure, increased cavitation potential, or vibrations.
The Boulder Canyon Project hydraulic research expanded on Bazin’s methods and
developed design tools, which can still be found in Reclamation’s Engineering
Monograph (EM) No. 9 by J. N. Bradley and in Design of Small Dams. The
design tools provide considerable ﬂexibility and methods to: (a) determine the
spillway ogee shape required to best ﬁt the under-nappe of the overfalling stream
for any practical condition of design; (b) derive the nappe shape due to varying
approach velocities; (c) determine the coefﬁcient of discharge for overfall dams
(or spillways) with vertical,
sloping, overhanging and
offset upstream faces; (d)
determine effects on coefﬁcient
of discharge due to different
crest shapes with and without
control gates, including the
effects of adjacent terrain,
piers, and position of gates;
and (e) determine the effects on
the coefﬁcient of discharge due
to downstream submergence.
1.29. Basin X (tunnel flip bucket), spillway discharg-

A second major
ing approximately 27,000 ft3/s - Glen Canyon Dam,
Arizona.
breakthrough in hydraulic
design for high dams occurred
in 1958 with the ﬁrst printing of Reclamation’s Engineering Monograph (EM)
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No. 25, Hydraulic Design of Stilling Basins and Energy Dissipators by Alvin J.
Peterka. This publication summarized twenty-three years of research and design
experience, and provided a practical design tool for sizing stilling basins. Since
that initial printing this EM has been updated and was last reprinted in 1984.
Until the development of this EM, attempts to generalize data from hydraulic
model studies and resulting designs led to inconsistent results. To resolve this,
a research program was undertaken, starting with observing all phases of the
“hydraulic jump.” With an understanding of this phenomenon, it was possible
to develop practical and common aspects of energy dissipation designs. This
EM documents that effort, and provides general design rules and procedures for
ten stilling basin or energy dissipator types, which in some cases eliminates the
need for hydraulic model studies. It should be noted that hydraulic model studies
still play an important role in the design process. They are used to optimize the
structure’s size, account for non-symmetrical approach and exit conditions, and
to evaluate unusual ﬂow conditions in or through the structure. Three types of
stilling basins and energy dissipators have been primarily used for spillways
associated with high concrete dams. These include:
1. Basin V (sloping aprons)—This basin relies on a hydraulic jump to
dissipate energy. The downstream basin slopes gently downstream.
Designs that used Basin V stilling basins included Shasta, Canyon Ferry,
Olympus, Friant, and Keswick Dams.
2. Basin VII (slotted and solid buckets)—As with Basin V, this basin also
relies on a hydraulic jump to dissipate energy. However, the downstream
basin is curved up with a lip at the downstream end. Designs relying on
Basin VII stilling basins included Grand Coulee Dam, (solid bucket); and
Angostura Dam (slotted bucket).
3. Basin X (tunnel ﬂip buckets)—Unlike the basin V and VII, a hydraulic
jump is not initiated. This is an energy dissipater that projects the exiting
jet into the air, spreading and aerating the jet before it impinges into the
tailwater. Basin X energy dissipators were used for Glen Canyon, Hungry
Horse, Yellowtail, and Flaming Gorge Dams.
A third major advancement in evaluating hydraulics for high concrete
dams involved the understanding of cavitation. Although Reclamation had
investigated cavitation damage and implemented repairs since 1941, the
understanding and methodology to adequately mitigate cavitation damage was
not developed until after signiﬁcant cavitation damage occurred at Glen Canyon
and Hoover Dam tunnel spillways as a result of ﬂooding in 1983. Prior to
this, standard practice was to specify very stringent concrete ﬁnishes for ﬂow
surfaces associated with discharge velocities greater than 75ft/s. The concrete
ﬁnishes for these ﬂow surfaces were very difﬁcult to achieve in the ﬁeld. A
more effective method had actually been employed in 1961 and 1969 with the
installation of aerators to address the cavitation damage which occurred at Grand
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Coulee Dam outlet works tubes, and the Yellowtail Dam spillway, respectively.
The installation of the aerator for Yellowtail Dam spillway is thought to be the
ﬁrst of its kind, and after which, it was noted that aerators were being installed
worldwide. It is interesting to note that research had already illustrated the
effectiveness of extremely small quantities of air entrained in ﬂowing water in
signiﬁcantly reducing the tendency for cavitation damage. However, it was not
until the mid- to late-1980s that sufﬁcient research, design, and experience had
been gained to change Reclamation’s approach to mitigating cavitation potential.
Cavitation was found to be the result of formation and collapse of vapor cavities
at abrupt changes in geometry of the ﬂow surface. Resulting from an eight year
effort, Henry T. Falvey’s Engineering Monograph (EM) No. 42, Cavitation in
Chutes and Spillways was published in 1990, providing common-sense guidance
on how to identify and mitigate cavitation potential. Two important developments
include: (1) generalized guidelines and tools were developed to assess the
potential degree of cavitation, and to develop preliminary aeration designs, and
(2) concrete ﬁnishes (surface textures) were decoupled from concrete tolerances
(surface offsets and irregularities), recommended surface tolerances were revised
to be more achievable in the ﬁeld, and these tolerances were linked to cavitation
indices. These indices are a function of the ﬂuid velocity and pressure, and
empirically give an indication of the potential for cavitation.
Today, as standard practice
in the technical evaluations of
existing and new spillways, the
cavitation potential is evaluated by
ﬁrst evaluating the cavitation index
(ı) proﬁles at different discharges.
Based on cavitation index proﬁles,
the required surface tolerances are
determined as a function of the
minimum value of cavitation index.
If the cavitation index is less than
0.2, cavitation would be expected,
and the effects of changing the
spillway geometry on the cavitation
index should be evaluated. If low
values of the cavitation indices
cannot be raised by changing the
geometry, a concept change or an
aeration device should be considered.
Using these procedures, aerators
have been installed in the spillway
tunnels for Glen Canyon, Flaming
Gorge, Hoover, and Yellowtail Dams.

1.30. 1983 cavitation damage in the Left Spillway Tunnel. The “big hole” extends
approximately 27 feet below the tunnel invert,
Glen Canyon Dam, Arizona.
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VII. World War II Era—Large Gravity Dams
In the 1930s the United States was hungry for electric power, and this
became even more important to power war production factories following entry
into World War II in 1941. The technology developed during the design and
construction of Hoover Dam was available to construct large concrete dams and
associated hydroelectric power plants. In order to tap the energy reserves of
large and wide rivers, it became necessary to construct gravity dams. Two of the
largest of these, Grand Coulee and Shasta Dams, were constructed by the Bureau
of Reclamation in the late 1930s and 1940s. These dams became engineering
landmarks, and have been studied and emulated by other countries around the
world. During this time, John “Jack” L. Savage served as Chief Design Engineer.
His ofﬁce in Denver then was
the foremost engineering ofﬁce
in the world for water resource
heavy construction projects.
Savage gained world-wide
renown for his work with
the Bureau of Reclamation,
and received may honors and
awards. He was reputed to be
modest to an extreme, and was
of such character as to readily
1.31. Grand Coulee Dam, Forebay Dam, and Third
receive the loyalty of his
Powerplant, Washington.
capable organization.
The original design of Grand Coulee Dam called for a low dam to be built
to elevation 1116 with the left power plant included. It would accommodate a
future dam raise and expansion of the power plants, but originally would not
provide irrigation water. The speciﬁcations were issued, the contract awarded,
and the Notice to Proceed issued on September 25, 1934, for the low dam
concept. Shortly after the construction activities began, renewed pressure came
from the local agricultural constituents for the high dam. They caught the ear of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt during his August 4, 1934, visit to the site. A
reevaluation of the economics and technical issues associated with raising the dam
indicated substantial beneﬁts in going directly to a high dam. By June 5, 1935, a
major change order was issued, increasing the excavation and changing the shape
and details of the dam to allow immediate construction of a high dam to elevation
1311 through a second contract. The dam would be a gravity structure nearly
a mile long and 550 feet high, with a downstream slope of 0.8:1, and a central
spillway section controlled by drum gates capable of releasing 1,000,000 ft3/s.
Water would be pumped from the Columbia River to a reservoir in the Grand
Coulee, a basin eroded by the river during the Ice Age when ice blocked the main
course of the river. In January 1942, about a month after the Japanese attacked
Pearl Harbor, a contingent of the U.S. Army took up quarters in Mason City and
performed guard duty at the dam due to concerns about a possible enemy thrust
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into the area. All efforts were concentrated
on getting the power online to supply energy
to aluminum plants and shipyards.
Diversion of such a large river posed
many problems, but a series of cofferdams,
and diverting ﬂows over the low blocks in
the dam allowed the construction to proceed.
Landslides in the ﬁne-grained deposits from
the Ice Age mantling the river banks were
also problematic. Stabilization included
ﬂattening slopes, installing drainage, and
temporarily freezing the soil. The dam was
founded on hard granite scoured by the
pre-ice age river. As had become standard
practice, foundation grouting and drainage
were constructed. Three-dimensional Trial
Load twist analyses, fully developed during
the design of Hoover Dam, were performed
1.32. Construction of Grand Cou lee
for
the high gravity dam design. Due to
Forebay Dam, Washington.
stress concentrations in the portion of the
(Note unkeyed contraction joint.)
dam adjacent to the sharply rising abutments
and concerns for potential cracking, vertical “twist slots” were designed for the
abutment sections to give the structure some ﬂexibility to adjust to loads. Five
twist slots were constructed, two on the left side and three on the right side. The
slots were initially ﬁlled with sand. After the reservoir had ﬁlled to elevation
1150, the sand was removed and the slots ﬁlled with concrete.
Low heat cement was used for the project. It had a slower set time
delaying stripping of the forms, but lower heat of hydration than conventional
cement was a great bonus in cooling the concrete and keeping cracking to
a minimum. The concrete was made of aggregate, cement, and water. No
admixtures, other than limited quantities of calcium chloride to accelerate the set,
had become acceptable at that time. Two mixing plants were constructed, one
on each side of the canyon, and at the peak of production 20,684 yd3 of concrete
were placed in 24 hours on May 29, 1939. The rock and concrete surfaces were
thoroughly cleaned for placement of concrete using wire brushes, sand blasting,
and water jets. The concrete was placed in 5-foot lifts and about 50-foot square
maximum size blocks. At least 72 hours were required between successive
lift placements. Cooling coils were placed on the lift surface, and drain forms
installed. Then a ½-inch-thick layer of mortar was placed on the surface to
provide a good bond. Concrete with a 2-inch slump or less was delivered in fouryard buckets using small trains running on a trestle and cranes. The concrete was
placed in one foot layers and thoroughly consolidated with electric and pneumatic
vibrators. The exposed surfaces were kept wet for fourteen days. River water
was pumped through the cooling coils to cool the concrete. An evaporative
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cooling tower was eventually installed to enhance the concrete cooling. The
concrete was cooled to about 45 degrees Fahrenheit, and then the transverse keyed
contraction joints, spaced at 50 feet, were grouted. Reclamation’s 4,000,000 lb.
testing machine was installed in the Denver laboratory at the U.S. Customs House
during the period of dam construction to permit testing the strength of large
aggregate concrete, using cylinders up to 36 inches in diameter.
The Forebay Dam and Third
Power Plant were completed in 1974,
and they greatly increased the power
generating capacity of the project. Two
concrete mixes were used for construction
of the Forebay Dam; a richer mix for
exterior surfaces and a somewhat leaner
mix for the interior mass concrete. Fly
ash and air entrainment were used in all
concrete. The fully automatic batching
plant had provisions for handling
ﬁve aggregate sizes ranging to 6-inch
maximum, and a refrigeration plant for
chilling water and making ice to cool the
mix to the required 40 to 50°F placement
temperature. All concrete was membrane
cured. Vertical contraction joints normal
1.33. Construction of Grand Coulee
to the axis were spaced at alternating
Dam, Washington. (Note Keyed condistances of 50 and 70 feet, the large
traction joint.)
spacing required to accommodate the 40foot-diameter penstocks. Artiﬁcial cooling was performed in the lower portions
of the blocks. The contraction joints contain water stops, but only the lower
portions were grouted, presumably to stabilize the sections of the dam that contain
the penstocks. However, the more important consideration is that the contraction
joints keyed. This allows each block to adjust to movements individually, but also
reduces load transfer between adjacent monoliths in the case of local instability.
Construction of Shasta
Dam in northern California
overlapped with construction
of the original Grand Coulee
Dam. At the time, Shasta Dam
was second only to Grand
Coulee in volume, and second
only to Hoover in height. The
dam is on the Sacramento
River in northern California,
and is the cornerstone of
1.34. Shasta Dam, California.
the Central Valley Project.
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Although curved in plan to match the site conditions, the dam was designed as a
gravity dam, with a downstream slope of 0.8:1. By this time efﬁcient placement
and cooling of large volumes of concrete could be readily achieved, due largely
to the development that occurred during the
design and construction of Hoover Dam.
Construction methods were nearly identical to
those at Grand Coulee Dam. As an interesting
note, two generators lay idle at Shasta Dam
in the early days of World War II, with no
prospect for immediate use. They were
shipped and installed at Grand Coulee Dam,
providing power during the critical war years,
and then returned to Shasta following the war.
It should be noted that during this
period of time the effects of alkali-aggregate
reaction (AAR) came to the forefront. A
chemical reaction between the alkali in
the cement and certain types of aggregates
causes expansion of the concrete usually
leading to cracking, and in cold climates
the damage can be exacerbated by freezethaw mechanisms as water enters the cracks.
Extensive cracking and deterioration at Parker
Dam in Arizona, and American Falls Dam
in Idaho led the Bureau of Reclamation to
conduct studies into the phenomena beginning
about 1941. Petrographic examination of
aggregates became the primary means of
identifying potentially reactive aggregates in
about 1941. The limitation of alkalis in the
cement to less than 0.6 percent as a means
to control AAR was ﬁrst published in the
Fourth Edition of the Concrete Manual by
the Bureau of Reclamation in October 1942.
Investigations into the effects of pozzolans to
reduce alkali- aggregate reaction were begun
in the early 1940s. Using 20 percent Class F
or N pozzolans as a replacement for cement
became standard practice for the Bureau of
Reclamation in about 1970. This not only
reduces the cost of the cementitious material,
but also provides additional protection.
By this time, deterioration of some
concretes in cold climates had been noted,

1.35. Cracking at Friant Dam due
to Alkali-Aggregate Reaction, Friant
Dam, California.

1.36. Freeze-thaw damage on
downstream face of Deadwood
Dam, Idaho. (Note that damage is
near contraction joint due to leakage.)
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and was described in general terms as durability. The problem was freeze-thaw
damage, whereby water present in the saturated cement expands upon freezing,
exerting pressures that far exceed the tensile capacity of the paste, causing
cracking and ultimately failure of the concrete after repeated cycles. It was found
that high strength concrete made with good quality aggregates and low water to
cement ratios generally had better durability. However, experience accumulated
during the 1920s and 1930s suggested that other factors also contributed to
whether a concrete was susceptible to freeze-thaw damage. The Bureau of
Reclamation began testing concrete for freeze-thaw durability in about 1937 with
the development of accelerated freezing-thawing test apparatus. The ﬁrst studies
of standard concrete mixes of the time indicated that failure usually occurred
after about 150 to 200 cycles. Formal studies of the effects of an air-entraining
admixture performed in 1942 reported an increase in the number of cycles to 400
to 450. However, the Fourth Edition of Reclamation’s Concrete Manual provided
no reference to air entrained concrete. Due to World War II, this information
was not published until 1949 in the Fifth Edition of the Concrete Manual. Airentrained concrete as a means to increase concrete durability has been standard
practice since.
VIII. The Post-War Boom—Developments Continue
Following World War II,
the country entered into a boom
period. The demand for power was
high, and the developments that
occurred with the building of large
concrete dams and associated power
plants such as Hoover and Grand
Coulee were put to use in quickly
building several more monumental
concrete dams and power plants,
such as Glen Canyon (a 710-foot
high thick arch dam on the Colorado
River), Yellowtail (a 525-foot high
1.37. Hungry Horse Dam, Montana.
arch dam on the Bighorn River in
Montana), and Flaming Gorge Dam (a 502-foot high arch dam on the Green River
in Utah). The ﬁrst of these large post-war concrete dams was Hungry Horse.
Hungry Horse Dam, constructed in 1948-1953, is a concrete arch structure
that has a structural height of 564 feet and a crest length of 2,115 feet at crest
elevation 3565.0. The dam is located on the South Fork of the Flathead River
in northwestern Montana, south of the southern border of Glacier National
Park. The dam impounds a reservoir containing 3,467,000 acre feet of storage at
elevation 3560.0. The reservoir provides the beneﬁts of power generation, ﬂood
control, irrigation, river regulation for ﬁsheries, and recreation.
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Hungry Horse Dam was designed and analyzed by Trial Load Methods.
(Though not used for Hungry Horse, physical model studies were still in use, and
were performed later for Glen Canyon and Morrow Point Dams.) The analyses
include the stage construction of varying reservoir elevations and grout zones.
Concrete was cooled by embedded cooling pipes to 38°F. Original designs
called for the vertical radial contraction joints to be 50 feet apart, but based on
temperature studies, an 80-foot spacing was used. One cross canyon contraction
joint was used across blocks 10 to 23 at alternating distances of 134 feet and
186 feet from the axis. The vertical contraction joints have shear keys. Formed
drains were constructed at each contraction joint and at 10 feet on centers across
the dam. Collected drainage ﬂows by gravity into a sump consisting of two
pumps each discharging 500 gallons per minute.
The dam consists of 27 blocks numbered from 2 on the left abutment to
28 on the right abutment. Lifts were 5 feet in height. There were different
concrete mixes for the interior and exterior (5 foot minimum to 9 foot average
exterior concrete thickness on the faces and crest roadway) of the dam consisting
of cement, ﬂy ash, and 6-inch maximum sized aggregate. Flyash used as
pozzolan helped reduce the heat of hydration while providing long term strength
gain.
Another major development of the post-war era was the use of airentraining admixtures to increase the durability of concrete to freeze-thaw
damage. Problems with air entrainment persisted throughout construction of
Hungry Horse Dam, but were perfected at later structures. Early stripping of
forms was a major cause of surface damage.
Extensive instrumentation systems had become standard by this time. The
dam has seven lines of uplift measurements at the dam to foundation contact,
three plumb lines, and ﬂow measurements from drain holes in the right abutment.
Deﬂections are measured with three plumb lines located in blocks 8, 17 (crown),
and 24. The dam has permanently shifted upstream about 0.3 inches since 1962.
The dam moves a total less than 0.4 inches season to season.
The dam was constructed close to current day standards with vertical
contraction joints, formed drains at 10-foot centers in the concrete, foundation
drains at 10-foot centers in the foundation, foundation grouting, artiﬁcial cooling
of the mass to 38°F and contraction joint grouting, cleaning of the lift lines
and dam to foundation contact for bond, and concrete strengths (tested during
construction) averaging over 4000 lb/in2. There is radial cracking on the crest
in blocks 4 and 24 progressing 30 feet down on the downstream face and into
the roadway gallery. Radial cracking on the crest is probably thermal induced
cracking because the contraction joints are 80 feet apart and not the typical
50 feet.
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The spillway at Hungry Horse Dam is a concrete-lined tunnel with a
morning-glory intake on the right abutment designed for a maximum discharge
capacity of 53,000 ft3/s for a reservoir elevation at the crest of the dam (elevation
3565.0). The normal high water surface is 5 feet lower than this maximum
with the ring gate in the raised position. The spillway was designed using two
laboratory models and approximately 200 tests. Subatmospheric pressures were
reduced to very low levels by shaping the crest proﬁle, developing an efﬁcient
venting system, increasing the lower bend radius from 55 to 120 feet, and
providing a guide vane for the upper bend together with a pier on the spillway
crest. The only difference in the actual spillway was the elimination of the vane
and pier because of difﬁculty in construction. The venting system vents the

1.38. Plans and Sections of Hungry Horse Dam and spillway, Montana.
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undernappe from the crest structure with nine 8-inch pipes at 30 degree centers
around the crest and vents the crown of the spillway tunnel in the upper bend
at elevation 3514.0 with an additional inlet. Air is supplied by a 6-foot square
air inlet tunnel in the right abutment. With 53,000 ft3/sec discharge, velocities
of the water at the outlet portal are computed to be between 132 and 146 ft/sec.
The spillway crest is controlled by a 64-foot diameter buoyant ring gate having a
maximum lift of 12 feet from elevation 3548.0 to 3560.0. A deicing system using
compressed air bubblers prevents ice forming on the gate. Spillway discharge
varies from free-ﬂow discharge at low heads to oriﬁce-ﬂow discharge at higher
heads.
Several precautions were taken during construction of the spillway to
assure accurate alignment and smooth concrete surfaces. Even construction joints
were eliminated in the vertical curve and deﬂector sections to avoid offsets at the
joints. A 50 degree inclined shaft was chosen over a vertical shaft for economic
reasons and ease of excavation, to cross bedding planes at right angles and conﬁne
overbreaks to the upper right-hand quadrant of the shaft because of one of the
joint systems. After placement of the tunnel lining, the surrounding rock was
thoroughly grouted using pressures varying between 125 lb/in2 and 150 lb/in2.
Irregularities in the lining were eliminated by grinding, sandblasting, hand-stoning
with a ﬁne-grit Carborundum™ stone, and then ﬁnal grinding after 7 days of cure.
The vertical bend and deﬂector sections were placed without construction joints
and cooled with river water pumped through cooling coils. Rather extensive
repairs of the concrete surfaces in the spillway tunnel were required because of
retractions and bulges in the wood forms. Concrete was placed in above-freezing
temperatures and curing was by hand sprinkling.
The foundation at Hungry Horse Dam is the Siyeh limestone formation
with beds ranging in thickness from a few inches to several feet. The average
strike of these beds is N38W and an average dip of 30NE which is upstream
and into the right abutment. Several faults were present in the foundation which
required excavation and backﬁll concrete treatment. Foundation grouting and
drainage were typical for the time. However, an unusual foundation treatment
was used for the ﬁrst time. A clay seam along bedding was discovered in blocks
11, 12, and 13. It was decided to wash out the clay with water and air at less
than 30 lb/in2 pressure and backﬁll with grout rather than to remove the 7,100 cy
of rock above the seam. At some point, pressures of 250 lb/in2 were used. The
seam was excavated above fault 3. The treatment was veriﬁed to be effective by
extracting core and inspections down calyx sized holes.
IX. The Failure of Malpasset Dam—Rock Mechanics and Foundation
Design Develops
Although several concrete dams failed due to foundation deﬁciencies
during the early years of concrete dam construction in the United States, it wasn’t
until the failure of Malpasset Dam in 1954 that the profession recognized a need
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for more rigorous foundation
investigations and analytical
design methods. Malpasset
dam was a 216-foot high thin
arch dam completed on the
Reyran River upstream of
Frejus in the Cannes District
of France. The reservoir had
a capacity of 41,700 acre
feet. Although the foundation
contact was blanket grouted
1.39. Malpasset Dam, Cannes District, France.
with 16-foot deep holes, a
grout curtain was considered
unnecessary due to the low permeability of the rock. No drainage had been
provided in the dam or foundation, and no instrumentation, other than surface
measurement points, was installed. The foundation consisted of metamorphic
schists. Heavy rainfall occurred during the fall of 1954 shortly after completion
of the dam, and by mid-November the reservoir was within 17 feet of the normal
maximum level. At that time operators discovered a trickle of clear water about
60 feet downstream of the dam on the right abutment. Cracks had been seen
in the concrete apron at the toe of the dam, but no one knew when they ﬁrst
appeared. Another intense rainstorm began on November 28, and by December
2, the reservoir was full and the outlet was opened. At 8:45 p.m., the caretaker
left the dam without observing anything unusual. At 9:10 p.m. the dam failed
suddenly, causing total destruction along a 7-mile course to the Mediterranean
Sea.
Analysis of the
displacements of the dam
remains showed that the left
side of the dam and underlying
foundation lifted and rotated
as a monolithic unit about a
vertical axis located where the
crest met the right abutment.
Conventional structural
analyses using a wide range
of material properties showed
concrete stresses were well
1.40. Malpasset Dam failure, Cannes District,
within strength parameters,
France.
and did not explain the failure.
Arch buckling analyses also indicated an ample margin of safety. The failure
left an upstream dipping fault zone and downstream dipping foliation plane
exposed on the left abutment, intersecting below where the dam once stood. The
measured movements and post-failure evidence pointed to abutment sliding on
the fault as the cause of failure. Dr. Pierre Londe developed three-dimensional
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limit equilibrium analysis techniques to evaluate the stability of a dihedral wedge
formed by the fault, the shear, and a third joint release plane. The stability of the
wedge was evaluated under loads consisting of dead weight, water uplift forces on
each plane, and the thrust from the dam. Instability was explained by this analysis
when large uplift forces were assumed to develop on the foliation shear.
Thus, the science of rock mechanics was applied to concrete dam
foundations. Shortly after this, in the late 1950s and early 1960s during the design
of Yellowtail, Glen Canyon, and Morrow Point Dams, the Bureau of Reclamation
began further developing rock mechanics methods in application to concrete
dam foundation design and analysis. Large scale in-situ tests were developed
for determining rock mass deformability properties. Exploratory drilling and
geophysical testing were performed to evaluate foundation conditions, and careful
attention was paid to major discontinuities within the rock. However, it was
not until the designs for Auburn Dam were underway in the late 1960s that the
foundation exploration, analysis, and design were coherently integrated. Under
the direction of Louis R. Frei, James S. Legas, and J. Lawrence Von Thun, world
class foundation investigations, testing, evaluation, design, and treatment occured
at the Auburn Damsite. Although Auburn Dam was never completed, this work
was an enormous contribution to the profession, and formed the basis for future
evaluations within the Bureau of Reclamation.
The Auburn Damsite
consists of complex
metamorphic geology. The
basic rock type is a dense
amphibolite, but numerous
faults and talc zones cut the
rock, and metasediments
occurred within the
foundation. Careful
diamond core drilling
using split inner tube core
barrels, trenching, and
excavation of exploratory
1.41. Photo of Uniaxial Jacking Test performed at the
Auburn Damsite, California, to measure deformation
tunnels and drifts was
properties of foundation rock mass.
performed to deﬁne the
geologic conditions. The
results of this exploration were portrayed on geologic plan, section, and structural
contour maps to provide a complete three-dimensional picture of the foundation.
Weathering proﬁles and fracture density characterization were used to deﬁne
the foundation excavation to suitable rock. It was recognized that the rock
deformation properties were key in determining how load was distributed to the
foundation from the dam, and that jointing and discontinuities within the rock had
a pronounced effect on these deformation properties. In-situ deformation testing
was performed in the exploratory tunnels and drifts. Despite the large size of the
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tests, it was recognized that
they still represented a small
point in the foundation rock.
Methods were therefore
developed to extrapolate
these results to the rest of the
foundation. From this, the
deformation properties of
the foundation were deﬁned
for input to ﬁnite element
and Trial Load structural
1.42. Schematic of Uniaxial Jacking Test performed at
analyses of the concrete arch the Auburn Damsite, California, to measure deformation
properties of foundation rock mass.
dam.
Seepage analyses were performed to evaluate potential foundation uplift
pressures. Exit gradients at fault and talc zones near the toe of the dam were
analyzed, and testing was developed to determine critical exit gradients where
piping of these zones would initiate. Potential modes of instability were identiﬁed
by evaluating discontinuities (faults, shears, joints, foliation planes, talc zones)
within the foundation. “Failure mode assessment” as it is sometimes called, was
developed fully in the rock mechanics arena, and has been a valuable contribution
to other areas of engineering. Foundation blocks formed by discontinuities that
intersected beneath the dam, with the intersection or one of the planes daylighting
downstream, were analyzed using limit equilibrium techniques. The shear
strength of the critical potential sliding planes was evaluated by laboratory and
in situ testing of samples from the appropriate faults, talc zones, and joints. Arch
thrust from gravity, reservoir, and temperature loads; dead load of the foundation
blocks; uplift on the planes that formed the blocks; and earthquake loading were
all considered in the evaluations. Finally, foundation treatment, in the form of
excavation of the weak zones and replacement with mass concrete, was designed
based on the results of all the studies. In some cases the treatment was controlled
by the need to develop a smooth deformation pattern or transfer of load across
discontinuities. In others, the treatment was controlled by the extra shear strength
needed for stability, or by the need to reduce exit gradients.
Although improvements to the analysis methods have been made over
the years including better methods for evaluating seismic stability, the basic
evaluation process remains essentially the same as that developed at the Auburn
Damsite. Many concrete dam foundations have been evaluated using these
procedures. Detailed foundation rock mechanics analyses are now an important
aspect of the standard practice for evaluating concrete dams.
X. The Double-Curvature Arch—A New Standard for Efficiency
Beginning in about the early 1960s a new concept for shaping arch
dams found its way to the Bureau of Reclamation. This shape, termed “double40

curvature” provided for more efﬁcient distribution of loads within the structure
and to the abutments. A double-curvature arch is curved in plan view and section
view. This results in more of a “bowl” shape to the structure. The undercutting at
the heel of the dam that results from this shape, and the inward curvature on the
downstream face, eliminate areas where tensions typically develop in arch dams.
The ﬁrst double-curvature dam
constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation
is Morrow Point Dam. The dam has a
structural height of 468 feet and a crest
length of 724 feet. The dam is a variablecenter arch structure with an axis radius of
375 feet. The crest of the dam at elevation
7165 carries a 12-foot-wide roadway.
Storage in the Morrow Point Reservoir
is 117,190 acre feet at the top of active
conservation.
In addition to being Reclamation’s
ﬁrst double-curvature arch dam, the
1.43. Morrow Point Dam, Gunnison
project also boasts Reclamation’s ﬁrst
River, Colorado.
(and only) underground power plant. The
power plant chamber is tunneled into the canyon wall in the left abutment about
400 feet below the ground surface. Two 13.5-foot-diameter steel penstocks carry
ﬂow to the power plant, which contains two 86,667-kilowatt generators driven by
two 83,000-horsepower turbines.
Because Morrow Point Dam was the ﬁrst double-curvature thin arch dam
built by Reclamation, the geologic exploration program was one of the most
extensive programs ever carried out. The geologic data was developed through a
comprehensive investigation which included detailed geologic mapping, diamond
core drilling, excavation of ﬁve exploratory tunnels, examination of drill holes
by television, and seismic surveys. Geologic studies were also coordinated with
horizontal and vertical in-situ jacking tests and with Whittemore and borehole
strain gage measurements. However, failure mode assessment and foundation
stability analyses were not part of the original foundation studies.
Morrow Point Dam is located in a narrow section of the Black Canyon of
the Gunnison River with very steep canyon walls and many overhangs. The rock
encountered at the damsite consists of alternating lenticular and irregular beds of
biotite schist, mica schist, micaceous quartzite, and quartzite, all of which were
intruded by granite pegmatite ranging from small veinlets to massive intrusions.
The quality of rock type varies considerably, the hardest being the granite
pegmatite and the quartzite with variations of hardness down to the weaker biotite
schist.
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The damsite is located on
the axis of a synclinal fold which
plunges gently to the south (or into
the left canyon wall) at about 5
degrees. The fold is expressed by
the attitude of foliation or bedding
which dips toward the axis from
both upstream and downstream.
The rock contains stress relief
jointing which generally parallels
the canyon walls and dips steeply
toward the river, probably resulting
from unloading through the
1.44. Section thru outlet works and stilling basin,
Morrow Point Dam, Colorado.
removal of overlying rock by
river erosion. Another indication
of stress relief is an apparent halo of fractured rock which extends to a depth of
about 80 feet beneath the valley ﬂoor.
The analyses were very thorough since the design and layout requirements
went beyond the state-of-the-art of that time. The dam was mathematically
modeled and analyzed using the Trial Load Method of Analysis when subjected
to static load and was further analyzed using the computerized adaptation of the
Trial Load Method (ADSAS—Arch Dam Stress Analysis System) to reﬁne the
design and layout for nine different loading conditions, including seismic loads,
construction loads, various temperature and grouting conditions, and the asexcavated foundation layout. In addition, the dam was analyzed by the use of
physical models as a check to the mathematical modeling process. One model
of the dam and foundation was prepared by Reclamation and the other was made
by the Laboratorio Nacional de Enenharia Civil of Portugal. All the analyses
indicated the dam could safely withstand any of the loading conditions applied.
The contract for construction of Morrow Point Dam and Powerplant
was awarded to a joint venture of the Al Johnson Construction Company and
Morrison-Knudsen Company on May 14, 1963, with construction completed
on May 24, 1968. In general, the dam and power plant were constructed in
accordance with the designs and speciﬁcations with only a few complications
arising requiring changes in the planned construction.
Open stress relief jointing, especially in the left abutment, caused several
small rockslides in the excavation for the access road and the upper left keyway.
To keep the excavated surfaces stable and at grade, the contractor had to use
controlled blasting techniques and the installation of many rockbolts. Asphaltic
grouting was later performed to control seepage along relief joints. This adverse
jointing and the presence of shears within the excavation for the underground
power plant caused movement of large blocks of rock within the power plant
walls. This prompted the contractor to install additional access/drainage tunnels
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and extensive systems of rockbolts, post-tensioned cables, and ﬂat-jacks to
support the rock mass and prevent further movement.
At the beginning of concrete placements in 1966, two longitudinal cracks
were found in the top of blocks 9 and 11 at elevation 6777.5. Both cracks were
in the center of the block, extended completely across the block, and had a
maximum width of 0.03 inches. A mat of No. 11 reinforcement bars was placed
over these cracks and concrete placements continued with no additional problems
identiﬁed in this area.
In May of 1966 the center formed drain in block 10 was found to be
plugged at elevation 6815 and had ﬁlled with sand and debris to about elevation
6897. The contractor requested permission to use high pressure water to loosen
and remove the plug. Reclamation granted permission as long as the pressure
in the formed drain did not exceed 100 lb/in2. On May 5, 1967, the contractor
applied the water pressure to the hole, but used pressures of almost 300 lb/in2 and
cracked the concrete in block 10 shortly after placements in this block reached
elevation 7100. The crack formed in block 10 extended completely across the
block and extended a short distance into block 9. The repair work included the
following: all concrete was removed upstream of the crack, 24 rockbolts were
installed within the dam below the crack to prevent downward propagation,
56 No. 11 dowel bars were installed to anchor the replacement concrete to the
undamaged concrete, concrete was replaced using an epoxy bonding agent,
and a mat of No. 11 bars was placed over the repair area to prevent any upward
propagation of the crack. No problems have been identiﬁed at this area since the
repairs were completed.
Several other doublecurvature arch dams were
successfully designed and
constructed by the Bureau of
Reclamation in the late 1960’s
and 1970’s. One that bears
mention is Nambé Falls Dam,
a 150 foot high dam on Rio
Nambé in New Mexico. The
arch is part of a composite
structure with a massive
concrete thrust block on the
left abutment that ties into an
embankment dam. The dam
1.45. Nambé Falls Dam, New Mexico.
is quite thin, and temperature
loadings were difﬁcult to design for. Therefore, a series of ﬂat jacks were
installed in the crown cantilever, and the ﬂat jacks were pressurized to prestress
the dam into a state of compression that could handle all loading conditions
adequately. Another item of interest is the development of elliptical arches by
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the use of “three-centered” geometry. The elliptical arches are approximated by
a central section with a smaller radius, ﬂanked by abutment sections with larger
radii. This allows double-curvature arch dams to be designed for wider canyons.
Although none of these were built by Reclamation, the method was developed
and several designs were completed.
XI. Structural Analysis Developments
A. Development and Computerization of the Trial Load Method
The Trial Load Method of stress analysis assumes that the load applied to
an arch dam would be divided between horizontal (arch) and vertical (cantilever)
elements in such a way as to produce equal movements in all directions at points
of intersection of these horizontal and vertical elements. Each arch and cantilever
element is assumed to move independently of all others, but at the conclusion
of the analysis, geometrical continuity exists at the intersections. Only a few
representative arch and cantilever elements (5 to 10 each) need be analyzed. The
basic concept is that the internal loads equal the external loads at any intersection
point. The internal loads are divided between the arch and cantilever elements
until the deﬂections match. Thus the name, Trial Load Method of analysis. Then
tangential and twist loads are applied in equal and opposite directions, one on
the arch and one on the cantilever. This way the arch and cantilever deﬂections
are brought into tangential and rotational agreement without changing the
external load on the structure. These internal loads set up the three-dimensional
interaction between two-dimensional arch and cantilever elements. To facilitate
the process of dividing the internal loads between arches and cantilevers, certain
patterns of loads called unit loads were developed. In applying the unit loads,
it was advantageous to compute the movements of arches and cantilevers from
unit loads before attempting to divide the external load between the arches and
cantilevers. The total load resisted by the arches and cantilevers are determined
by the Trial Load adjustments. With these loads, stresses are then computed.
There are basically three levels of Trial Load analysis depending
on the desired accuracy and time duration for computations. 1) The crown
cantilever analysis consisted of adjusting deﬂections of arch elements and the
crown cantilever (the maximum vertical section in the center of the dam). The
results were crude and neglected the effects of tangential shear and twist, but
the computation time was relatively short and with judgement was an effective
tool for preliminary designs. 2) The radial deﬂection analysis added two more
cantilevers so radial deﬂection agreement was obtained at the crown and quarter
points of the dam. The distribution of load along the arch was more accurate
but the tangential shear and twist were still neglected, so the accuracy was only
slightly better. The time for a radial deﬂection analysis was only slightly longer
than the crown adjustment. 3) The complete Trial Load analysis produced
agreement of all three linear and all three angular displacements by properly
dividing the radial, tangential, and twist loads between the arches and cantilevers.
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The accuracy was only limited by the number of arches and cantilevers used,
the exactness of the basic assumptions (stress distribution), and the magnitude
of error permitted in the slope (angular) and deﬂection adjustments. The results
from a complete analysis were conﬁrmed by the Hoover Dam model studies. The
major limitation was the time required to perform an analysis.
In the 1960’s
before the application of
computers to structural
analysis, computations for
the Trial Load analysis were
done by a group of six to
eight engineers operating
mechanical “adding”
machines and ﬁlling in values
on large tables. One analysis
would take a pair of engineers
1.46. Seating arrangement in the Analysis Section.
from six to eight weeks
depending on the skill of the
designer. As such, not many load combinations were analyzed. New rotation
engineers performed these tedious computations. They would work in pairs so
one could check the other’s computations as they were performed. The seating
arrangement in the Section was like a Viking ship with the row master behind
the rowers. They worked with an experienced design engineer. It would take
about 5 years to transition from a human calculator to a beginning designer. Arch
dam designers would layout a preliminary shape for an arch dam. The loading
conditions to analyze were decided upon and younger engineers would start the
Trial Load computations. When the computations were complete, the results
were returned to the designer and displacements were plotted. Adjustments to
the loads between the cantilever and arches were determined, and the process
repeated. Some designers, such as Howard Boggs, Milt Kramer, and Carl Jones,
had a tremendous feel for how an arch dam reacted to loads and were very skillful
in making adjustments. This took many years to develop. Howard Boggs wrote
Engineering Monograph No. 36 explaining the beginning steps to lay out an arch
dam. However, this produced only a beginning shape. The real skill then came
in trying to adjust the shape and produce the most optimum design. Layouts were
done on a topography map with a large beam compass, french curve, and graph
paper. Mechanical calculators ran eight hours a day, ﬁve days a week, for weeks.
There were replacement calculators on hand and Eddie Carlson was a full-time
repair person from the Marchant company. The mechanical machines had 100
keys (10 rows of 10 keys) and the decimal point was set with a key.
With the application of computers to civil engineering problems in the
1960s, some engineers saw the potential of having the computer do the tedious
manual calculations while other engineers viewed the computer as a threat to their
jobs. Merlin Copen wrote:
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The major limitation to the use of the complete trial-load analysis is the
time required to perform such studies, and the high degree of technical
training necessary to efﬁciently conduct such an analysis. The time
element has been effectively reduced by use of the electronic computer,
and will be further diminished as the analysis is completely programmed.
The number of highly-trained engineers required will also be greatly
reduced.

In 1957, Loyd Scrivner was the ﬁrst engineer to write a computer program
to compute geometric values. Reclamation initially rented time on an IBM
650 located in downtown Denver and eventually obtained one for themselves.
Scrivner’s initial programs were not written to be reused for other dams but
had hard coded values inserted so a new program had to be written for each
dam. Bob Main started with Reclamation in the summer of 1958 in the newly
created Data Processing Section. Darrell Webber, who later became the Assistant
Commissioner of the Engineering and Research Center, was a rotation engineer in
that unit at the time. Because Bob could program on the IBM 650, he was hired
into the analysis section. Bob wrote the general purpose geometry program for
the lines of centers, introduced the idea of inputting values so the same program
could be used for other dams, and introduced the concept of subroutines.
Loyd Scrivner wrote:
In 1957, the Analysis Unit of the Concrete Dams Section (USBR) began
the development of a series of electronic computer programs to reduce
the time and cost required to complete a trial-load study. Programs have
been developed utilizing the IBM 650 digital electronic data processing
machine (system)…
Most of the programming was done using a modiﬁed form of an
interpretive routine (Bell Interpretive Language) which was developed
to handle ﬂoating decimal arithmetic including the computation of the
elementary transcendental functions. The electronic computer, to date,
has been used primarily for the computation of forces and deﬂections in
arch elements due to unit arch loads. This approach has been followed
because of the following:
1. About 70 percent of the man-hours, and therefore the
cost of performing a trial-load study, is expended making
these computations.
2. These computations are repetitive in nature, which is a
factor favoring advantageous use of electronic computers.
Although we are not committed to any particular solution for the
deﬂection adjustments, serious consideration will be given to an iteration
process as opposed to a procedure based on the solution of a large group
of simultaneous equations.
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Merlin Copen wrote:
The initial layout for an arch dam is based largely on the experience
and judgement of the designer.… As soon as a layout for a particular
site has been completed, it is checked by means of a crown cantilever
analysis to obtain an estimate of the stresses in the proposed dam.
Currently the deﬂections of the arches and cantilevers produced by unit
loads are computed by electronic digital computer. The time required,
in a normal situation, to determine stresses with a crown adjustment, is
approximately three days for two men. Several layouts may be necessary
before a satisfactory stress condition is obtained. Then a radial deﬂection
adjustment is made. This provides a more complete stress picture and
might indicate the possibility of necessary or desirable changes. The
radial deﬂection analysis requires approximately two days more than the
crown cantilever analysis, or a total of approximately ﬁve days for two
men.
In practice, after a design has been analyzed and found to be acceptable
with a radial deﬂection analysis, the effects of tangential shear and twist
are estimated, based on the experience of the designer.… Now the ﬁnal
test of the efﬁciency of the dam is made. While the detailed design
work proceeds, a complete trial-load analysis is made of the structure.
This will require approximately 100 to 150 man-days, depending on
the size and complexity of the dam and the accuracy required from the
analysis. It is anticipated that in the near future, further application of
electronic computer processes will result in considerable reduction in the
layout, such changes are made and incorporated in the detailed design
procedures.

There was plenty of arch dam work in the 1960s. Merlin Copen, George
Wallace, and George Rouse went on a 10-week tour to Europe to see how they
designed arch dams. As stated in their report:
In recent years European engineers have made many important
contributions to the design and construction of concrete dams. Through
experimentation and studies European engineers have devised new
techniques and have extended or improved existing practices.… The
team traveled in six countries and visited 15 organizations.… Fortythree dams in various stages of completion were inspected together
with 25 power stations. Thirteen laboratories were visited as well as six
manufacturing plants and more than 100 engineers were interviewed.

It was this trip that led to the development of double-curvature design
methods at Reclamation. Yellowtail and Flaming Gorge were being designed and
Morrow Point was on the horizon. Additional design staff probably would have
been hired for this work. Additional design groups would probably have been
created and promotion to heads of these groups would have been made. However,
as Merlin Copen predicted, the large staffs were not required for this workload
because of the advent of the efﬁcient computer methods. Interviews for this paper
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revealed there may have been bitter feelings about lost advancements and lost
promotion potential because of the computer. However, the computer did reduce
the tedious part of structural analysis for arch dams. Some engineers that left the
analysis section because of the tedious, boring, and repetitive computation work
actually came back to the unit because of the joy and prestige of designing and
working with arch dams.
There were disagreements on the best way to determine the response and
design of arch dams. In 1960, Merlin Copen wrote:
Since the end of World War II, interest in the design and construction
of dams has received considerable impetus. This interest has resulted
in novel approaches to problems of design. Currently the methods
used appear to fall in one or more categories: (1) analysis of small
scale models; (2) thin cylinder theory; (3) relaxation methods; (4) shell
theory; and (5) trial-load analysis. Each of these has advantages and
disadvantages. The choice of methods generally resolves into accuracy
and reliability desired as opposed to time, ﬁnances, and experience
available for design procedures.
After exhaustive study of the various possibilities, the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, Dept. of Interior (USBR) adopted the Trial Load
Method of analysis for designing and analyzing arch dams. Whereas
there have been notable advances in the use of other methods, the USBR
has still found the use of trial-load to be completely satisfactory and
unexcelled in this ﬁeld. Recent developments in the use of electronic
digital computers, and the effective application of simpliﬁed analyses
have made this method even more effective.

The steps to develop a computerized Trial Load Method were to ﬁrst
program the geometry, then the arch computations, next the cantilevers, and then
combine this into a crown adjustment (several arches and one cantilever). The
computer being used could only handle forty-two equations. The ﬁnal step was
a complete analysis. This was a very challenging task with limited computer
capabilities. After the IBM 650, Reclamation obtained time on a Honeywell
machine in Minneapolis. Cards would be sent in on Friday and results would
be back on Wednesday. Reclamation obtained their own Honeywell 800. The
programming language was Automath, Honeywell’s version of Fortran. Harry
Beck, Assistant Division Chief of the Data Processing Group, taught the new
rotation engineers this version of Fortran. The dams section hired Dale Morsette
as a GS-12 because he had a Masters Degree. This caused some bad feelings
in the Section because most individuals were GS-11’s and the requirement to
be a GS-12 was the ability to do a complete analysis unassisted. Dale worked
on the initial phases of computerizing a complete analysis from 1963 to 1967.
This was a very frustrating task for Dale. In 1967 H. Walter Anderson realized
the Honeywell did not have the capability needed for arch dam analyses, so he
arranged time on a Control Data Corporation (CDC) 1601 at the Environmental
Science Services Administration (ESSA), currently the National Bureau of
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Standards, in Boulder, Colorado. Reclamation had a daily shuttle that would
take cards up to Boulder at 3:00 and return the next day at 10:00. Reclamation
started moving into Building 67 on April 13. Dale left in early 1967, so Glenn
Tarbox was assigned the programming task since he knew how to do a complete
analysis. Bob Main, a computer programmer, started assisting in June of 1967,
and a working version was accomplished in September 1967. The programming
was divided into 4 phases: 1) data reorganization, 2) equations, 3) solution, and 4)
stresses.
These computer programming efforts and advancements for the Trial Load
Method evolved into what is called today the Arch Dam Stress Analysis System
(ADSAS). ADSAS was a computerized version of a ﬂexibility method of analysis
referred to as “trial load.” However, equations were developed and written
to compute deﬂections at any location along the cantilevers and arches. The
equations for deﬂections could be solved directly without using trial-loads. This
essentially is a precursor to the ﬁnite element method. The computers still did not
have enough storage space to hold all the matrices at one time. So ADSAS used
an iteration method to solve the simultaneous equations. The solution technique
used in ADSAS is unique and innovative and based on approaches developed for
the hand calculations.
ADSAS really advanced the state-of-the-art in arch dam analysis, sped
up the design process, and helped justify the engineering mainframe computers.
ADSAS changed the way the concrete dam group operated because more load
combination and geometrical shapes could be investigated in minutes rather
than weeks. Output from ADSAS was still in paper form and was about one
inch thick. Designers would quickly thumb through the large volume of paper
output, propose changes to the dam geometry, and have the younger engineers run
ADSAS and bring back the paper output.
Despite the advances that came with ADSAS, it was still not appropriate
for dynamic analysis. In addition, the ADSAS program and users manual
were developed for internal use, there was machine-dependent computer code
speciﬁcally for a Cyber 70-74/28, and the program was in excess of 39,000 cards
long with over 240 subroutines. This caused problems for others to convert the
program to their computers and use the program.
B. Linear Structural Analysis
In 1974 the Structural Analysis Program (SAPIV) was written by Klaus
Bathe and Ed Wilson at the University of California at Berkeley. Glenn Tarbox
and Karl Dreher were instrumental in getting SAPIV operational on the CDC
mainframe computer at Reclamation, debugging the program, and developing
the ﬁnite element capability for arch dams. Many sensitivity runs were made
comparing the Trial Load Method (ADSAS) with the ﬁnite element method
(SAPIV) during the design of Auburn Dam. Full dynamic time-history, linear
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elastic, three dimensional, modal superposition analyses were performed.
Auburn Dam was the ﬁrst “test” case. Since that time, almost every arch dam
in Reclamation’s inventory has been analyzed using SAPIV for earthquake
loading. SAPIV also has the ability to handle static loading including reservoir,
temperature, and stage construction, making it a powerful tool for dam analysis.
Many engineers in the analysis group wrote pre- and post-processing programs to
work with SAPIV, which sped-up and advanced the ﬁnite element analysis of arch
dams.
Evaluating the results of dynamic ﬁnite element analyses required
advances in estimating concrete strengths for comparison to the calculated
stresses. It was postulated that concrete would be stronger in both tension and
compression under the rapid loading associated with earthquake events. Rapid
loading laboratory tests were developed which conﬁrmed this is the case. An
increase in tensile strength of approximately 50 percent can be expected under
dynamic loading.
Reclamation funded the University of California at Berkeley to develop
a computer ﬁnite element program speciﬁcally for arch dams: the Arch Dam
Analysis Program (ADAP). The development was supposed to occur over three
years, but funding got tight after the ﬁrst year. As such, only a partial program
was developed. Dr. John R. Mays, from the University of Colorado at Denver
was hired part-time to debug the program and get it operational. Over the years,
the University of California at Berkeley, continued to develop ADAP. The
Enhanced Arch Dam Analysis Program (EADAP) contained hydrodynamic
interaction and ADAP-88 was a nonlinear version that implemented contraction
joints in the form of contact surfaces. This program has not been used much at
Reclamation, but has found some use on the outside.
The University of California at Berkeley also developed a series of
computer programs speciﬁcally for arch dams: Earthquake Analysis of Concrete
Dams (EACD). The current version implements hydrodynamic interaction with
incompressible or compressible ﬂuid elements and dam to foundation interaction
incorporating the damping effects of the foundation. Engineers in Reclamation
have developed pre- and post-processing programs to aid in the use of this
program. It has been used for the earthquake analysis of several Reclamation
concrete dams.
In 1978 Reclamation obtained the ﬁrst general purpose nonlinear
ﬁnite element program from Klaus Bathe from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT): Automatic Dynamic Incremental Nonlinear Analysis
(ADINA). The program mainly implemented the material nonlinearity of
concrete. Dr. John R. Mays developed a nonlinear joint element within ADINA.
Howard Boggs and Dr. Mays were some of the ﬁrst engineers to analyze an arch
dam with nonlinear contraction joints. ADINA was used sparingly for specialty
problems at Reclamation until 1996 when Reclamation made the transition to
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ABAQUS. In 1984, the structural analysis group purchased a Hewlett-Packard
UNIX workstation for pre- and post-processing ﬁnite element data using
PATRAN. The ﬁnite element analyses were still run on the Cyber mainframe
computer.
In August 1993 the mainframe Cyber computer was being
decommissioned and the structural analysis group made the transition to a larger
Hewlett-Packard UNIX workstation (HP-755). In 1997 a HP J2240 was obtained
that had 2 CPUs, 2 Gigabytes of internal memory and 90 Gigabytes of hard disk
storage. This was more powerful than the early computers at Reclamation just
35 years previous. Structures modeled with 38,000 nodes, 100,000 degreesof-freedom, contraction joint contact surfaces, and nonlinear concrete material
properties are now being analyzed for earthquake loads.
C. Nonlinear Structural Analysis
Linear ﬁnite element analysis has long been accepted as a way to analyze
structures. There are limitations, however, when performing a linear analysis.
Stresses calculated in a linear analysis can exceed the allowable strengths of
materials. In these cases the actual behavior of the structure after the material
strengths were exceeded could be signiﬁcantly different than that predicted by the
linear analysis. Also, response of geometric nonlinearities (contraction joints or
compression only members) cannot be modeled using linear analysis. In the past,
attempts have been made to model these conditions by modifying the modulus
of elasticity in a particular direction and by using a combination of members to
simulate the expected behavior of a connection with limited success. Analysis
tools have now progressed to the point where good nonlinear capabilities are
available. Nonlinear analysis is the next step in addressing these limitations.
Engineers at Reclamation are very familiar with linear ﬁnite element
analysis. In the past several years, work has been done using non-linear
capabilities as well. Two nonlinear analysis methods have been used using
ABAQUS ﬁnite element code. The ﬁrst method employs the standard stiffness
formulation (F=Kx). The second method solves an explicit formulation with
Newton’s Second Law, F=Ma. Each method has advantages and disadvantages.
The following examples illustrate the use of nonlinear analysis for dynamic and
static loading conditions.
C.1. Nonlinear Structural Analysis of Monticello Dam
Monticello Dam is a 304-foot-high constant-center concrete arch dam,
with ﬁllets at the abutments, located on the Putah Creek, thirty miles west of
Sacramento, California. The dam was constructed from 1953 to 1957, has a crest
length of 1,023 feet, a crest thickness of 12 feet, and a maximum base thickness
of 100 feet. The earthquake response of the structure, incorporating the vertical
contraction joints and weak horizontal lift lines, was analyzed non-linearly using
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the ABAQUS/Explicit computer
code.
In this analysis, eight
elements through the thickness
were chosen to better model the
contact surface interactions. The
8-noded linear brick element
and the 6-noded linear wedge
element were chosen for the 3-D
model. The 8-noded element is a
reduced integration element. The 1.47. Monticello Dam, California.
foundation rock was modeled to a
distance of two times the dam height to properly model earthquake energy around
the dam itself. It was modeled with the same type of elements that were used to
model the dam. For this analysis Rayleigh damping values of Į = 3.0 and ȕ = 0.0
were used. This is comparable to the 5 percent of critical viscous damping used
traditionally in dam analysis.
As expected, the tensile arch stresses are less with the model that

1.48. Finite element model of Monticello Dam, California. (Foundation mesh not shown.)

incorporates the contraction joints in comparison to a linear elastic analysis.
Cantilever compression stresses increase in the center portion of the dam on the
downstream face, and tensile cantilever stresses decrease slightly in the bottom
center of the dam on the upstream side. The existence of tensile cantilever
stresses on the upstream face with the contraction joint model indicates that the
cantilevers are taking load. This is because when the winter temperature load is
52

applied, the cantilevers contract and create openings in the joints. The hydrostatic
loads tend to close these openings, but can not fully because of resistance offered
from the cantilevers in bending (initially no cracking of concrete or horizontal
weak lift lines was incorporated in this model to relieve the stress). Thus, a large
tensile cantilever stress continues to exist on the upstream side toward the bottom
center of the dam. Gravity load was applied ﬁrst. Although gravity was applied
to the entire structure at once, the contact surfaces used to model the vertical
contraction joints prevented the structure “hanging” from the abutments as would
be the case if gravity was applied without contact surfaces. The gravity load
caused the cantilevers to displace upstream, thereby, allowing the weight of each
cantilever to act independently. Next the reservoir load was applied. This caused
the cantilevers to move downstream and the contraction joints to close. The
temperature load was applied as temperature differentials at all the nodes in the
dam. Hydrodynamic interaction was incorporated by adding mass to the upstream
nodes of the ﬁnite element model based on an incompressible ﬂuid element
formulation.
Three earthquake records were applied to the contraction joint model.
Crest displacements, crest velocities, contraction joint opening and closing,
and arch and cantilever stress histories were obtained for each record. Crest
displacements at the centerline of the dam reach peak values of about 7 inches.
Permanent offsets at joints were less than 1 inch. Maximum crest velocities
at the centerline of the dam are on the order of 40 in/sec in the cross canyon
direction, 14 in/sec in the vertical direction and 100 in/sec in the upstream/
downstream direction. Contraction joints at the centerline of the dam open to a
maximum value of about 0.4 inches. Tensile arch stresses reduced signiﬁcantly in
comparison to linear elastic analyses
Large tensile cantilever stresses continue to exist in the dam during static
and dynamic loadings with the contraction joint model. These stresses will be
relieved by horizontal crack formation in the dam. Since the lift lines of the
cantilevers are weak in comparison to the parent concrete (based on laboratory
test of drill core), these cracks will occur at the lift line locations. There are two
ways to model these lift lines. The ﬁrst method is to set the cracking stress to
a low value in the nonlinear concrete material property statement. This would
allow the concrete to crack and relieve any cantilever stress that would exceed
the cracking stress value speciﬁed. However, it isn’t possible to specify that the
lift lines are weaker than the parent material within the concrete cracking model.
The second method, which was ultimately used, is to insert a series of horizontal
contact surfaces, spaced so as to model the effect of the weak lift lines. This
approach further lends itself to a kinematic study; i.e., a series of blocks stacked
on top of each other held in place by the arch action of the dam. The analyses
indicated the dam would be stable even with cracked lift lines. Although 6-inchdeep shear keys exist at each contraction joint of the dam, these keys were not
included in the ﬁnite element model because of the need to keep the contact
surfaces simple in order to obtain a stable solution. The effects of neglecting
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the keys, and better methods for modeling contraction joints, are the subject of
ongoing research.
C.2. Nonlinear Structural Analysis of Pueblo Dam
Pueblo Dam is located
near Pueblo, Colorado.
Pueblo Dam is a composite
concrete and earthﬁll structure
approximately 10,230 feet in
length. The concrete portion
consists of a massive head
buttress dam including a
550-foot overﬂow spillway
section located near the central
part of the concrete dam.
The dam was designed and
constructed by Reclamation,
and completed in 1975.

1.49. Pueblo Dam, Colorado.

The purpose of this nonlinear study was to reevaluate the sliding stability
at potentially disbonded lift lines and the vertical stress level at the dam heel
using a three dimensional ﬁnite element model incorporating horizontal contact
surfaces. Previous linear-elastic ﬁnite element analyses completed at Reclamation
resulted in acceptable factors of safety against sliding (with some cohesion)
but they also indicated that tensions would develop at the dam heel under some
static load cases. Since the linear elastic analyses completed previously used
a continuous mesh, the potential nonlinear characteristics existing along the
dam-foundation contact surface were not captured; therefore, it was necessary to
complete a nonlinear ﬁnite element analysis incorporating a horizontal contact
surface in order to capture the
effects of stress redistribution
upon opening of the contact
at the dam heel, representing
crack propagation along the
contact if weak lift lines are
actually present.
A single overﬂow
buttress of Pueblo Dam was
modeled using ABAQUS /
STANDARD. The model used
three-dimensional 8-noded
fully integrated brick elements
throughout the dam and
foundation. The foundation
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1.50. Finite element model of an overflow
buttress at Pueblo Dam, Colorado.

was modeled as a large rectangular block of solid sandstone, approximately
350 feet long, 250 feet wide and 150 feet in depth. The upper surface of the
foundation block, at elevation 4755 feet, was used to deﬁne the lower half of
the non-linear contact surface in these analyses. The dam model was positioned
in the center of the foundation block with the bottom surface of the dam
model forming the upper half of the non-linear contact surface. The edges of
the foundation were ﬁxed, but there were no translation or rotation boundary
conditions applied at nodes in the dam model. Although a tension limit could
be input, once cracked the only force preventing rigid body motion of the dam
was the frictional force developed on the contact surface; therefore, additional
iterations were required to obtain convergence of the ﬁrst increment of the gravity
loading to establish normal forces on the contact surface.
The ABAQUS / STANDARD ﬁnite element program uses time varying
load application for all of the static loads. The gravity load was applied gradually
from zero to one second of analysis time, followed by application of the
reservoir and uplift pressure loads. The uplift pressures were also automatically
recalculated at each analysis time increment as both a function of the current
reservoir depth and the crack (open contact surface) length. The non-linear
analyses indicated that the dam was stable for these static loading conditions. The
tensile stresses which developed at the dam heel in the previous linear analysis
were relieved upon opening of the contact surface when zero tensile strength was
assumed on the contact surface, but a signiﬁcant portion of the dam remained in
compression, and was capable of carrying the load.
XII. Roller-Compacted Concrete—Rapid Construction for Gravity
Dams
Despite advances in automated mixing, handling, and placement of mass
concrete, the procedures were still somewhat labor intensive and time consuming
in comparison to earthﬁll production rates. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s
some relatively small projects were completed using the concept of rollercompacted concrete (RCC). The concept involved placement of a lean and dry
concrete mix by spreading it in thin layers with a bulldozer, and compacting
it with vibratory drum rollers. The lean mix reduced the heat generated, and
rapid production rates could be achieved, as the placement was mechanized and
there was no need to wait for curing before placing the next lift. The Bureau
of Reclamation began testing a high paste (cement plus ﬂyash) RCC concept
in 1980. This resulted in a strong and stiff material with similar properties to
conventional concrete. Thus, the design of gravity dams using this type of
material could be based on conventional gravity dam design methods.
In 1985 RCC placements began at Upper Stillwater Dam, the Bureau of
Reclamation’s ﬁrst RCC dam and at that time the world’s largest. The straight
gravity dam is about 280 feet high, and nearly 2700 feet long, and contains
more than 1,600,000 yd3 of concrete (most of which is RCC). Although the
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downstream slope is 0.6:1,
the point of intersection of
the downstream and upstream
slopes is above the dam
crest, which results in an
equivalent downstream slope
of about 0.7:1 for the height of
Upper Stillwater Dam when
compared to other typical
gravity dams. The upper part
of the downstream slope was
steepened to allow sufﬁcient
crest width for the construction
equipment. This increases the
mass and stiffness of the dam
when compared to traditional
gravity sections.

1.51. Upper Stillwater Dam, Utah.

Typical excavation
and treatment of the quartzitic
sandstone and argillite
foundation rock were
performed. Crushed aggregate
and sand were manufactured
1.52. Compacting RCC at Stillwater Dam, Utah.
for the RCC. A richer RCC
mix was used near the upstream face. The RCC contained between 135 and 160
pounds of cement per cubic yard, and between 290 and 350 pounds of ﬂyash per
cubic yard. Temperature control was achieved by placing the RCC below 50°F
and by replacing cement with ﬂyash to limit the heat rise. The RCC was tied
to the abutments and to the foundation by use of conventional concrete. At the
base of the dam, conventional concrete was ﬁrst placed to form a level surface
to start RCC placements. At the abutments, conventional concrete was placed
between the RCC and the rock. Laser-guided slip-form machines were used to
place concrete elements forming the upstream and downstream faces of the dam.
This proved to be a fairly rapid means of forming the dam, and eliminated the
relatively time consuming and labor intensive process of erecting and stripping
conventional forms. RCC was delivered to the dam from the batch plant using a
conveyor belt. There it was loaded into trucks, transported to the placement, and
spread with a small bulldozer using a laser controlled blade. A vibratory drum
roller then compacted the material into a dense mass. In 1986, over 715,000 yd3
of RCC was placed in less than ﬁve months. The peak shift placed over 5400
yd3. Joint cleanup was required, depending on the age of the concrete, and joints
greater than 72 hours old were required to be sandblasted or waterblasted. Very
good bond was achieved. In fact, it was difﬁcult to ﬁnd the lift lines in the core
taken from the dam.
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The major drawback to the design and construction of Upper Stillwater
Dam was the exclusion of contraction joints or other means to control the
cracking and subsequent leakage through the dam. Thermal and structural
analyses had indicated that cracking would be limited to the face of the dam,
and would not extend through the dam thickness. However, this proved to be
incorrect, and regularly spaced vertical cracks propagated through the dam normal
to the axis. Leakage from some of these cracks became signiﬁcant, and the
grouting and drainage gallery constructed about 20 feet from the upstream face of
the dam received large inﬂows. The leakage at two of the cracks was exacerbated
by small sliding movements on an argillite layer within the foundation that
stopped when the passive rock mass downstream of the dam was mobilized. This
tended to open the cracks on either end of where the movement occurred. All
open cracks were grouted twice. The upper portions of the cracks were grouted
with hydrophillic polyurethane grout, and the lower portions were grouted with
cement grout. This proved to be effective for several years. However, seasonal
movements of the cracks due to variations in reservoir level and temperature
eventually reopened the cracks, resulting in renewed leakage. Plans are being
developed to seal the cracks with an upstream membrane or a secant wall drilled
across the cracks upstream of the gallery.
The contraction joint
issue in RCC dams is critical.
For gravity dams it is adequate
to control the cracking by
forming joints or placing crack
inducers to control the crack
locations. Water stop features
can then be designed to reduce
ﬂow through the cracks. If
RCC is to be used for arch
dams, it will be necessary to
develop a way to grout the
joints to lock in arch action
1.53. Section through Buttress 8 or 9 at
Pueblo Dam, Colorado. Showing RCC stabilization
at the desired temperature.
measures.
The Bureau of Reclamation
developed such a system for
the foundation modiﬁcations at Pueblo Dam in the late 1990s.
By way of background on this project, nearly horizontal shale layers
beneath the massive head buttresses of the dam daylighted in the spillway stilling
basin excavated at the toe of the dam, downstream of some of the buttresses. Due
to the large population downstream of this dam, potential sliding of the structure
on these shale layers posed a high risk, and was a dam safety concern. A RCC
plug and toeblock, anchored with double-corrosion-protected high strength
rock bolts, were constructed in the stilling basin to block the daylighting planes
and buttress the foundation. State-of-the-art distinct element analyses, and
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probabilistic stability analyses
were performed to ensure
the RCC geometry would be
effective in stabilizing the
dam. The RCC material was
somewhat different than that
used at Upper Stillwater Dam.
Rounded river aggregates up
to 1½ inch maximum size
were used. Approximately
120 pounds of cement and 180
pounds of ﬂyash were used per 1.54. RCC placement, spreading, and
compaction operations in the spillway pool,
cubic yard of RCC. Surface
Pueblo Dam, Colorado.
cleanup and bonding mortar
were used on all lift surfaces of the toe block and on lift surfaces more than twelve
hours old in the plug (below elevation 4728). Although the design strengths
were met, a somewhat porous zone developed a few inches below the lift surface,
particularly for lifts that were a day old when the next layer of RCC was placed.
It was thought that the rounded aggregate made the RCC more susceptible to
damage from construction trafﬁc on lifts that were in a fragile condition just after
setting of the RCC. Windy conditions at the site may have also prematurely dried
the surface of the RCC lifts during and shortly following placement.
Contraction joints were
formed in the RCC by vibrating steel
plates into the freshly compacted
lifts. The joints trending in the
cross-canyon direction needed to
be grouted to ensure that load could
be transferred across the joints with
minimal displacement. The plate
locations were carefully surveyed
1.55. Installing joint inducing
plates in RCC at Pueblo Dam,
Colorado.

prior to installation so that the
joints could be intercepted by
vertical grout holes. Six-inchdiameter holes were drilled
at 10-foot spacing in the
upstream-downstream direction
1.56. Opening of transverse contraction joint in RCC and 5-foot spacing in the crosscanyon direction. Steel plates
at Pueblo Dam, Colorado. Grouting of joints
occurred in February 2000.
were not placed in the drill
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hole locations. Some holes were ﬁlled with polyurethane grout to isolate grout
zones. Tubing was designed and installed in the holes to provide grout supply
and return lines, and venting to remove air and water from the system. Grouting
was performed the second winter following RCC placement when joint meters
indicated sufﬁcient joint opening for grouting. The grouting was successful, and
the joints did not close the following summer, indicating good ﬁlling of the joints.
XIII. Transition to Dam Safety—Applying Technology to Reduce Risk
The Bureau of Reclamation has been actively involved with a formal
safety of dams program since April 1977 when an Executive Order was issued
initiating the Federal guidelines for dam safety. The aim of Reclamation’s dam
safety program is to ensure that the agency’s dams do not pose an unacceptable
risk to the downstream public. To that end, Reclamation has pioneered the use
of risk analysis in assessing dam safety. Once it is determined that structural
modiﬁcations are needed to reduce risk, Reclamation has used the design and
construction technology developed over the past century to ﬁx existing dams. For
concrete dams, this means application of detailed analyses, design procedures, and
modern concrete technology. Two cases, Theodore Roosevelt and Pueblo Dam
modiﬁcations, illustrate this point. The case of Pueblo Dam was discussed in the
previous section on roller-compacted concrete (RCC). Additional details of the
Theodore Roosevelt Dam modiﬁcations are provided here.
Potential deﬁciencies with regard to the potential to pass large ﬂoods,
potential instability during large earthquakes, inadequate release capacity, and
the need for more water storage resulted in major modiﬁcations to Theodore
Roosevelt Dam between 1988 and 1995. Part of those modiﬁcations resulted in
raising the arch dam 77 feet. It was necessary to determine whether the dam and
foundation could withstand this increase in head. Combinations of joints and
bedding planes (dipping upstream at about 20 to 25 degrees) in the Precambrian
sedimentary foundation rock formed potentially unstable blocks. Initial stability
analyses indicated that the foundation would not meet the desired factors of safety
under the increased loading. Therefore, foundation drainage was installed from
adits excavated in the rock and a gallery excavated through the existing masonry.
Piezometers were installed to measure foundation water pressures before and
after construction of the drainage, and pressure contour maps were developed
for determining uplift forces in the foundation analysis. The drainage was
very effective, reducing pressure heads by about 43 to 68 feet. In situ uniaxial
jacking tests were performed in the drainage adits, and correlated with seismic
tomography testing to estimate the deformation properties of the foundation rock
mass and concrete masonry of the existing dam. These properties were included
in ﬁnite element structural analyses to study the behavior of the dam and more
closely determine loads acting on the foundation. Final foundation analyses
indicated that the raised dam with the drainage in place met the desired safety
factors, and was more stable than the existing dam without drainage.
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1.57. Schematic of raising Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.

Constructing an overlay of conventional concrete on the existing dolomite
masonry dam posed some additional challenges. A concrete test panel was
constructed on the downstream face of the dam to determine the likely bond
strength between the new concrete overlay and the masonry. Core samples
were extracted and the interface was tested in tension and direct shear. This
information was used in extensive computer modeling to verify the design and
shape of the overlay. The dam was analyzed for static and dynamic loading using
ﬁnite element methods. The existing masonry was modeled in three horizontal
stages to simulate the layered construction. The mass concrete overlay was
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modeled as it was constructed, in blocks separated by (keyed) contraction joints.
Recommended block dimensions, lift heights, concrete placement temperatures,
and cooling requirements were based on temperature control studies. These
studies took into account the thermal properties of the concrete mix design, and
the expected temperature rise within the mass concrete during construction. The
concrete was cooled using cooling coils embedded in the 10-foot lifts, and the
contraction joints in the overlay were grouted to provide arch action and improve
the stress distribution within the structure. The numerical modeling simulated
this construction sequence. Final analysis of the composite structure indicated
improved stress conditions within the existing masonry portion of the dam, and
results meeting Bureau of Reclamation stability and stress criteria. Seismic
response analyses indicated the structure should perform well under large seismic
loadings. Construction
of the overlay followed
typical mass concrete
placement techniques,
developed and reﬁned
since the construction
of Hoover Dam. A high
line was used to transport
concrete to the placement
in buckets. The concrete
was placed in layers
and vibrated into place.
Something not done before
1.58. Results of seismic tomography testing at Theodore
included placement of
Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.
geo-composite strip drains
between the existing masonry and the new concrete to provide drainage at the
interface.
Other modiﬁcations to the dam included construction of a lake tap
and tunnel system to provide a new outlet works and power penstock. New
mass concrete thrust blocks were constructed on each abutment to ﬁll the gap
formed by the original spillway cuts. New spillways were constructed through
each thrust block. Hydraulic model studies were used in the hydraulic design
of the spillways. Spillway ﬂows enter a diverging chute and ﬂip structure
before plunging to an excavated basin in the river channel below. The spillway
alignments cause the discharge jets to impinge at or above tailwater level, while
both spillways are operating under higher reservoir heads.
The following illustrations show concrete placement during modiﬁcations
to Theodore Roosevelt Dam. Note placement and vibration of concrete in layers ,
placement in blocks against the masonary, and new thrust block and spillway.
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1.59. Concrete placement during modifications to Theodore
Roosevelt Dam,
Arizona.

1.60. Placement and vibration
of concrete in layers during
modifications to Theodore
Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.

1.61. Showing the new
thrust block and spillway at
Theodore Roosevelt Dam,
Arizona.

1.62. Modified Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Arizona, completed and rededicated in 1996.
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XIV. Conclusions
We hope you have enjoyed this tour of the evolution of concrete dam
design, analysis, and construction within the Bureau of Reclamation over the past
century. There is no question that the early pioneers in this effort were extremely
talented and set the stage for some of the great feats of human engineering that
were to follow. Monumental projects like Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams are
still “wonders” today. During the heyday of dam construction in the United
States, the Bureau of Reclamation developed a reputation as a world leader
in concrete dam technology. The construction of dams in the United States is
winding down now after a century of extensive development. The last new
concrete dam constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation was completed over a
decade ago (1989). The legacy and expertise in concrete technology and dam
construction at the Bureau of Reclamation remains a valuable national resource,
and has been recently used to efﬁciently ﬁx dams where safety concerns exist.
So what do the next 100 years hold? As long as dam safety projects remain to
be done, the expertise will be maintained and developments will slowly occur.
However, without large projects, it is likely that the leadership in this area will
gradually shift to developing countries in the future. The Bureau of Reclamation
can be proud of the giant springboard they have provided from which these efforts
can be launched.
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100 Years of Embankment Dam Design and
Construction in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
by:
Richard Lyman Wiltshire
Introduction
The design and construction of earthﬁll and rockﬁll embankment dams in
the western United States and throughout the world have evolved dramatically
during the past 100 years. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) played
a signiﬁcant role in that evolution of embankment dam engineering, construction,
and dam safety. There are now more than 240 water-storage embankment dams
in the western United States that were designed and constructed by Reclamation
during the twentieth century, which was the most intensive period of dam building
the world has ever seen. The list of embankment dams built by Reclamation
includes many of the most innovative, largest, and highest dams of their eras. The
list of civil engineers and other professionals who have helped to design and build
Reclamation’s embankment dams is lengthy and highly regarded.
Reclamation is currently organized into ﬁve Regions, across the seventeen
western states, and the Washington and Denver Ofﬁces. The ﬁve Regions,
which have performed almost all of the dam construction work, are: 1) Paciﬁc
Northwest, 2) Mid-Paciﬁc, 3) Lower Colorado, 4) Upper Colorado, and 5) Great
Plains. The Denver Ofﬁce includes the Technical Service Center, the current
name of the engineering organization that has performed most of the embankment
dam engineering and design work.
This paper summarizes Reclamation’s embankment dam design and
construction history. The last 100 years have seen the design and construction of
embankment dams develop from the relatively simple homogeneous or two-zone
earthﬁll embankments designed in 1904 or 1905 into the extremely complex,
highly analyzed, well-instrumented zoned earthﬁll and/or rockﬁll structures
that are the embankment dams of the new millennium. This embankment dam
engineering evolution has also involved the growth of several related disciplines,
including engineering geology, seismology, hydrology, hydraulic engineering,
instrumentation engineering, mechanical engineering, and electrical engineering.
A central component of the evolution of the engineering of embankment dams has
been the birth and maturation of geotechnical engineering as a civil engineering
specialty. The use of computers and computer programs for the analysis and
design of embankment dams became standard practice within a fairly short time
after they were developed by geotechnical engineers. Another component of
this evolution has been the development of larger, faster, more powerful, and
more efﬁcient earthwork construction equipment. The paper also discusses the
design and construction organizations within Reclamation and how they have
changed during the last 100 years. Reclamation’s publication of its well-known
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engineering books, such as the Earth Manual1 and the Design of Small Dams,2 is
noted. Lastly, the successes and failures that occurred during the last 100 years
of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction history are discussed,
and the lessons learned from those experiences are summarized.
In telling the story of the evolution of Reclamation’s embankment dam
engineering, the paper separates the 100-year history into ﬁve periods, which are
partly based on noteworthy events such as World Wars I and II and the failure
of Teton Dam in 1976. Period I runs from 1902 to 1918; Period II extends from
1919 to 1933; Period III covers 1934 to 1944; Period IV includes 1945 through
1975; and Period V runs from 1976 to the Present (2002). This paper examines
the embankment dam design and construction changes that occurred during each
period. Representative and remarkable/notable embankment dams from each of
the ﬁve periods are discussed. A few problems, some signiﬁcant, occurred during
the construction and/or subsequent operation of Reclamation’s embankment dams
and they are also discussed. And the effects of certain developments, such as the
Proctor compaction (moisture density) test procedure and the failure of Teton
Dam, are discussed in the paper.
Reclamation’s Design and Construction Organizations
In 1902, the new U.S. Reclamation Service (Service) was organized
within and was drawn from the U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) Division of
Hydrography, Hydrographic Branch, that had studied western water resources
for the previous 20+ years. Frederick H. Newell, Chief of USGS’s Division
of Hydrography, was selected to head the new Service under USGS Director
Charles D. Walcott and was titled Chief Engineer, and Arthur Powell Davis
was Newell’s chief assistant.3 Based on the studies previously conducted by
USGS, which had included studies of streams, watersheds, irrigable lands, and
potential dam and reservoir sites throughout the West, six projects were approved
for design and construction by the Secretary of the Interior in 1903. Out of 79
projects investigated, a total of 25 projects had been examined and authorized for
construction by the Secretary within the ﬁrst ﬁve years, and 15 of those had been
started by private companies or by a group of cooperating farmers who requested
the Service’s help.
Period I (1902-1918)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction
Organizations

At the beginning of Period I, each of the 16 western states (17 states
after Texas was added in 1906) had at least one district under the direction of a
“District Engineer,” who was responsible for all Reclamation activities, including
surveys, investigations, designs, and construction. For each authorized project,
a qualiﬁed (civil) engineer was selected as the “Resident Engineer” and he was
responsible for conducting site investigations and developing preliminary design
plans on the embankment dam judged appropriate for the site. On a larger
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project, the Resident Engineer might have the help of an Assistant Engineer.
Supervisory Service engineers, who functioned as liaison representatives of
the Chief Engineer on certain projects, and consulting engineers with special
skills, reviewed the preliminary plans and made project recommendations to
the Secretary of the Interior. Upon the Secretary’s approval, the Service was
authorized to develop ﬁnal plans and speciﬁcations. The early embankment dams
were constructed either by contract with private contractors or by “force account”
using Government forces. Both types of construction were managed/supervised
by Service engineers and inspectors. Most of the dam sites were fairly remote, so
construction included transportation of all necessary equipment and materials to
the dam site, as well as construction of the camps and facilities required to house
the construction workers.
In 1903, a permanent western headquarters ofﬁce was established in
Denver, Colorado, to house the engineers and assistants of the Hydrographic
Branch who would facilitate the location and construction of dams, in order
to avoid overcrowding in the Washington, D. C., ofﬁce. The Reclamation
Service became independent from the USGS in 1907, with Chief Engineer
Newell becoming the Service’s ﬁrst Director and Davis becoming Chief
Engineer. Newell reorganized the 17 states into six divisions to enhance the
Service’s administration of its large workload: the Central, Idaho, Northern,
Paciﬁc, Southern, and Washington Divisions. The Division boundary lines were
determined by the ease of railroad travel and communication, with drainage
boundaries also being considered. Each of the six Divisions was headed by a
Division Engineer. Reclamation’s early Project, District, and Division Engineers
included such notables as: Ira W. McConnell, Raymond F. Walter, Frank E.
Weymouth, Joseph B. Lippincott, Hiram N. Savage, David C. Henny, Ernest G.
Hopson, Louis C. Hill, and Charles H. Swigart. Note that engineers Weymouth,
Lippincott, and Hill were all elevated to Honorary Member status in the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).
In 1913 the Service’s hierarchy was reorganized, creating a ﬁve-member
Reclamation Commission, which included: the Director of the Service, Chief
Engineer, Chief Counsel, Comptroller, and Supervisor of Irrigation. In December
1914 the Chief of Construction was added as a member of the Reclamation
Commission. Davis became Director of the Service in December1914 after
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane removed Newell as Director and named
him “Consulting Engineer.” Newell ﬁnally resigned from the Service in May
1915 and became Chairman of the Civil Engineering Department at the University
of Illinois. Also in May 1915, the Commission’s membership was reduced to
three, consolidating the Director and Chief Engineer positions with Davis as
Director and Chief Engineer and retaining the Comptroller and Chief Counsel
positions (which also appears to have removed the Supervisor of Irrigation and
the Chief of Construction as members of the Commission). That same year, the
direction of ﬁeld operations was centralized at the Denver Ofﬁce under the Chief
of Construction. With the establishment of the Chief Engineer’s Ofﬁce in Denver,
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Reclamation’s engineering design and construction management functions were
centralized in the Denver Ofﬁce. In 1918 the Secretary of the Interior followed
Arthur P. Davis’ recommendations and the top level structure of the Service was
again reorganized, making the Comptroller and the Chief Counsel subordinate to
the Director and Chief Engineer.
Period II (1919-1933)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction
Organizations

In May 1920 Director and Chief Engineer Davis changed his title to
Director and appointed the Chief of Construction in Denver, Frank E. Weymouth,
to the Chief Engineer position. Arthur Powell Davis served as President of ASCE
in 1920. On June 18, 1923, the Service became the Bureau of Reclamation
headed by the Commissioner of Reclamation; Davis resigned from Reclamation
the following day. David W. Davis was named Reclamation’s Commissioner on
July 1, 1923, quickly followed by Elwood Mead after Davis left ofﬁce on April 2,
1924. Dr. Mead served as Commissioner from 1924 until his death on January 26,
1936. Reclamation’s design and construction organizations remained much the
same for the next 20 years. During the 1920s and 1930s, the status of the Chief
Engineer grew as Reclamation’s authority was consolidated in the ofﬁce of the
Chief Engineer headquartered in Denver. Reclamation’s various laboratories ﬁrst
got started in 1930 with the hydraulic model testing performed in the laboratory
of the Colorado Agricultural Experiment Station in Fort Collins, Colorado. The
Concrete Laboratory and the Earth Materials Laboratory were also begun in the
early 1930s in the U.S. Customs House in Denver.
Period III (1934-1944)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction
Organizations

In 1942 and 1943, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes reorganized
Reclamation in accordance with a plan designed to: 1) decentralize the authority
for work execution along regional lines, 2) limit the authority of the Chief
Engineer and his staff to project design and construction, and 3) establish a
“functional type” of organization with the Commissioner’s authority going
straight to the Regional Directors. The reorganization provided for:
Four major branches in the Denver Ofﬁce: Design and Construction
under the Chief Engineer, Project Investigations, Operation and
Maintenance, and Fiscal and Administrative Management. The Chief
Engineer remained Reclamation’s ultimate authority in the technical
execution of construction projects, even though responsibility over
construction in the ﬁeld was now divided between the Regional Directors
and the Chief Engineer.

Six Regional Ofﬁces, later expanded to seven, concentrated on planning
and development activities, and supervised the operation and maintenance of
completed project facilities. The seven Regional Ofﬁces were located at Boise,
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Idaho; Sacramento, California; Boulder City, Nevada; Salt Lake City, Utah;
Amarillo, Texas; Denver, Colorado; and Billings, Montana. The Regional
Directors reported directly to the Commissioner’s Ofﬁce.
Period IV (1945-1975)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction
Organizations

In 1945 the Commissioner won support for his position that “the
responsibility for the technical aspects of design and construction work should
remain in the Chief Engineer, and therefore, authority for this work should also
be vested in the Chief Engineer.” This created problems for the Construction
Engineers because they had two bosses: the Regional Director and the Chief
Engineer. Reclamation’s Denver Ofﬁce included some 2,000 employees by
1948 that were scattered around the Denver metropolitan area. Reclamation’s
new Denver headquarters was established in 1950 as the Engineering and
Research Center at the Denver Federal Center in Lakewood, located 10 miles
west of downtown Denver. In 1953, during the Eisenhower Administration, the
Chief Engineer’s authority was upgraded and the title was changed to Assistant
Commissioner and Chief Engineer. This title continued to be changed, becoming
Director, Ofﬁce of Design and Construction in 1963, Director, Ofﬁce of Design
and Construction/Chief Engineer in 1970, and Director, Ofﬁce of Design and
Construction in 1972.
Period V (1976-2002)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction
Organizations

Reclamation’s Teton Dam failed on June 5, 1976, killing 11 people and
causing about $400 million in property damage. This failure had a profound
effect on the Bureau of Reclamation. Two ofﬁcial panels of technical experts
reviewed the probable causes of the dam’s failure and released reports in
December 1976, April 1977, and January 1980. Signiﬁcant recommendations
by these two panels involved several areas of concern. These included: the need
to establish independent dam design and construction review boards, greater
documentation of design decisions, closer project supervision and oversight
by design personnel, and more intensive construction and post-construction
monitoring of the structures. A team was named by then Commissioner R.
Keith Higginson in 1977 to review Reclamation’s dam design and construction
procedures, which resulted in a November 1977 reorganization that reafﬁrmed
many of the 1943 reorganization’s objectives to more clearly deﬁne the respective
functions of the Denver and Washington Ofﬁces and to streamline the lines of
authority and accountability. Reclamation’s staff for technical review and support
was established and added to the Denver Ofﬁce. Since the failure of Teton
Dam, and with the decrease in the authorization of new projects, the majority
of the embankment dam design and construction work has involved dam safety
evaluations and modiﬁcations of existing dams and appurtenant structures.
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The title Director, Ofﬁce of Design and Construction was changed to
Assistant Commissioner for Engineering and Research in 1978. In 1979, the
Bureau of Reclamation’s name was brieﬂy changed to the Water and Power
Resources Service, which lasted until 1981 when the name was changed back
to the Bureau of Reclamation. The Lower Missouri Region was absorbed into
the Upper Missouri/Great Plains Region in 1985. The Southwest Region was
abolished in 1988, splitting its area between the Upper Colorado Region and
the Great Plains Region. Reclamation now has ﬁve regions: Paciﬁc Northwest
in Boise, Mid-Paciﬁc in Sacramento, Lower Colorado in Boulder City, Upper
Colorado in Salt Lake City, and Great Plains in Billings. In 1994, the Denver
Ofﬁce was reorganized, and the title Assistant Commissioner for Engineering
and Research was changed to Director, Technical Service Center (TSC) under
the Director of the Reclamation Service Center, with the latter position recently
abolished. The 1994 reorganization increased the relative authority and power of
the Regions and their local project and area ofﬁces, and reduced that of the TSC
engineering organization.
The majority of the embankment dam design work, now mostly dam
safety modiﬁcations determined necessary on existing dams, is still performed
by the civil/geotechnical engineers in the TSC. The majority of the embankment
dam modiﬁcation construction work is done by civil engineers in the Regions
and their Project and Area Ofﬁces. There are still Construction Engineers in the
TSC who perform the construction management work and/or function as liaisons
and provide oversight on the construction work managed by the Regions and the
Project and Area Ofﬁces.
Modern Embankment Dam Design and Construction
As different cradles of civilization evolved all over the world, irrigation
works and dams were basic components of their development. The earliest
known design and construction of an embankment dam occurred around
2900 B.C. with the construction of Sadd el-Kafara Dam in Egypt. The early
history of dams in the world includes many other countries as well, such as
India, China, and Iraq. In North America, the Hohokam Indians built diversion
works and canals along the Salt and Gila Rivers in southern Arizona as early
as about 300 B.C. And in the Four-Corners area (Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and
New Mexico), the Anasazi and Pueblo Indians constructed mud-wattle dams
across streams that diverted infrequent runoff into ditches and storage reservoirs
throughout the area in order to support their agricultural civilization, according to
a recent study by Wright Water Engineers, Inc. of Denver, Colorado. According
to Dams and Public Safety4 by Robert B. Jansen (Reclamation’s Director,
Ofﬁce of Design and Construction and Assistant Commissioner for Engineering
and Research, 1977-1979), the ﬁrst dam built in North America by EuropeanAmericans was built in 1623 on the Piscataqua River to operate a sawmill at
South Windham, Maine. The ﬁrst embankment dam was called Mill Pond Dam
and was built in 1677 at Newington, Connecticut. In the far West, in early
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California, Old Mission Dam was built on the San Diego River about 1813 by
the Jesuits to provide water for the mission. It was composed of mortared rubble
masonry and was about 5 feet high.
Starting about 1850, gold miners in California built rock-ﬁlled log-crib
dams faced with wood planking that ranged up to about 125 feet in height to store
water for hydraulic mining, but there were numerous failures. It should be noted
that many of the early dams constructed in California during the latter half of
the nineteenth century supplied water for mining purposes. One of the earliest
notable non-mining dams in the West was San Andreas Dam, constructed on San
Mateo Creek near San Francisco, California, in 1870 to supply water for the city.
This dam is notable because it was unknowingly built across the San Andreas
fault zone. This earthﬁll dam was about 105 feet in height and was built using the
nineteenth century puddled-core technique, where the upstream and downstream
shells consisted of rolled clay and the narrow core was made by manually tamping
wet clay. The dam’s upstream slope was 3.5:1 (horizontal:vertical, H:V) and the
downstream slope was 3:1. The embankment included a cutoff trench excavated
down through the alluvium and colluvium (30 to 40 feet thick) that was backﬁlled
with a clay puddle core about 20 feet wide that was extended upward to form
the central portion of the dam. The dam was subsequently raised about 12 feet
in 1875 and another 6 feet in 1928. The great San Francisco earthquake of 1906
caused a horizontal strike-slip offset of about 6 to 8 feet in the left abutment, but
the dam embankment was not damaged.
Across San Francisco Bay, the highest embankment dam built in the
United States during the nineteenth century was Chabot (Lower San Leandro)
Dam, which was constructed in 1875 above San Leandro (near Oakland) on
San Leandro Creek with a height of 115 feet above the streambed. Its reservoir
stored residential water for the East Bay communities. It was constructed as a
central-core earthﬁll dam, with the earthﬁll dumped from wagons, sprinkled,
and compacted by the wagon wheels and by a herd of horses moved back and
forth across the ﬁll. The dam’s cross-section included a central foundation
(cutoff) trench excavated down through foundation soils to 30 feet below the
streambed. In the bottom of the cutoff trench, three parallel concrete cutoff walls
were constructed 3 feet thick and 5 feet high, with about half the height (2½
feet) anchored into the foundation and half protruding up into the ﬁll. The core
zone was about 90 feet wide/thick at its bottom in the foundation trench. The
embankment’s upstream slope was 3:1 and the downstream slope was 2.5:1. A
buttressing zone of earth and rock material was sluiced onto the downstream
slope, giving the embankment a total volume of about 543,000 yd3. In 1890, the
dam was enlarged by sluicing earthﬁll onto the downstream slope. Subsequent
raising and buttressing of the dam embankment has increased the height to
154 feet. A good source of information on the evolution of dam design and
construction, including embankment dams, is Development of Dam Engineering
in the United States,5 which includes information on six of Reclamation’s
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embankment dams. Such was the state-of-the-art in embankment dam design and
construction at Reclamation’s birth.
The design of modern earthﬁll and rockﬁll embankment dams is far more
complex today than was the case just 100 years ago. There are now many college
courses, books, collections of professional papers, professional groups, computer
programs, etc., related to the design of modern embankment dams. Most of the
major unknowns and uncertainties involved with the design of embankment dams
100 years ago have been removed by the evolution of engineering experience,
research, knowledge, and education. Reclamation has played a central role in
that engineering evolution through its pioneering embankment designs, analyses,
and soil behavior work on developing new laboratory tests and procedures
for soils; development and publication of geotechnical and embankment dam
engineering manuals and books; and contributions to the articles, transactions,
and proceedings of engineering periodicals and professional civil engineering
organizations. Some of Reclamation’s learning and knowledge has come at a high
price, as was the case with the 1976 failure of Teton Dam in Idaho.
In addition to the books and professional papers that now exist on modern
embankment dam design and construction, several professional organizations
regularly deal with and publish state-of-the-art papers on the design and
construction of embankment dams and related topics. These organizations
include: ASCE, the recently renamed United States Society on Dams (USSD,
formerly the United States Committee on Large Dams, USCOLD), its worldwide
parent organization, the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), the
International Society on Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering, and The
Institution of Civil Engineers (in Great Britain).
To the lay-person, embankment dams may look like huge “piles of
dirt” thrown across a valley or canyon, and it can be hard to imagine how truly
complex and amazing they actually are. Most people can perceive how complex
a large concrete dam, like Hoover Dam, must be with a height of 726 feet. The
highest embankment dam in the world is currently Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh
River in Tajikistan at a height of about 1,066 feet, and California’s Oroville
Dam the highest in the United States at about 770 feet. The largest embankment
dam volume in the world is Tarbella Dam on the Indus River in Pakistan with a
volume of about 159,000,000 yd3, and Montana’s Fort Peck Dam is the largest in
the United States with a volume of about 126,000,000 yd3. Many of these huge
embankment dams are almost as amazing in their own way as Hoover Dam.
There are many more embankment dams (currently about 72 percent)
than there are concrete dams (currently about 28 percent) in the United States, out
of the total of about 77,000 dams, meeting minimum dam height and reservoir
volume criteria. Among several reasons, one key aspect of why embankment
dams are so popular is that in general, a properly designed embankment dam
can be constructed at almost any damsite, as opposed to the more stringent
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site limitations associated with concrete dams. A limited “picture” of the
various elements that are included in the design (and construction) of a modern
embankment dam is presented below. A more complete understanding can be
obtained by reading publications such as Reclamation’s Design Standards No.
13—Embankment Dams6 and the previously mentioned Design of Small Dams.
Once the need for a new dam and reservoir and a variety of other factors
such as funding availability and environmental impacts have been resolved,
several potential damsites are studied and investigated in sufﬁcient detail that
a conceptual design report can be developed, which includes recommendations
as to the preferred damsite and the appropriate type of embankment dam and
related features. Once the damsite, the type of embankment dam, and related
features have been selected, more detailed studies, investigations, and analyses
are conducted in order to have the information necessary to start the ﬁnal design
work, which concludes with the preparation of written speciﬁcations and drawings
that are used as the basis for constructing the new embankment dam. The various
studies, investigations, and analyses included in these design phases, which often
overlap, generally include:
1) a hydrologic study of the upstream drainage basin;
2) a geologic study of the damsite and the reservoir basin, including
a seismotectonic study of the area;
3) a ﬁeld investigation of the foundation at the damsite and of the locally
available earthﬁll and rockﬁll materials and concrete aggregates;
4) a laboratory program including testing and analysis of the soil, rockﬁll,
and bedrock materials obtained from the damsite and the borrow
area(s);
5) a conceptual design study, intended to develop and present various
alternatives and their costs, and to recommend the preferred
alternatives for the embankment dam, spillway, and outlet works
features;
6) a ﬁnal design based on the selected-alternative features, including the
necessary construction speciﬁcations and drawings;
7) during construction, embankment design details often change to
accommodate the changed conditions encountered; and
8) during “First Filling” of the reservoir and for the ﬁrst few years
thereafter, the performance/behavior of the foundation and/or
the dam embankment may indicate the need for changes or
modiﬁcations to the original design.
It should be noted that even a brief a description of how to design an
embankment dam is beyond the scope of this paper. The hydrologic study of
the drainage basin above the damsite develops information on the probable
ﬂood hydrology that is used to design the dam embankment and the appurtenant
spillway and outlet works features. If the dam and its appurtenant features can’t
accommodate the ﬂood ﬂows resulting from the various potential storm events,
75

the reservoir can overtop the dam embankment and cause it to fail. The geologic
study develops the necessary information on the geology of the damsite and
the surrounding area, which often affects the type of dam selected for design
and construction. Unless the damsite’s geology is properly understood, the
response of the foundation to the loads imposed by a dam and reservoir may
cause malfunction, leading to serious maintenance or in some cases failure of the
dam. This is especially true in the event of an unexpected earthquake shaking
a dam that is not designed to withstand the severity of the loading imposed on
the structure. The dam, spillway, and/or outlet works can all fail because of a
moderate to severe earthquake event. The ﬁeld investigation and laboratory
testing of the dam foundation and the embankment borrow materials accumulate
and develop engineering design data on the foundation soils, bedrock, and borrow
soil and rockﬁll materials. These ﬁeld and laboratory design data are critical and
must be properly collected and evaluated if dam failure is to be avoided. These
design data form the basic information used in the various analyses conducted
during the design of an embankment dam, including standard concerns about
seepage, internal erosion/piping, settlement, static stability, seismic stability, etc.
Design information on sources of sand and aggregate materials for concrete is
also developed.
After the design data have been properly developed, and the various
design analyses have been completed, the dam embankment’s alignment, crosssection, freeboard, foundation treatment(s), material zoning, ﬁlters, drainage,
camber, upstream and downstream slope protection, and instrumentation (for
monitoring performance) are then determined. Computers have greatly enhanced
the designer’s ability to perform extremely complex analyses, as well as to
create 3-dimensional models portraying the dam’s conﬁguration to ensure that
all of the dam embankment’s components join together properly. The written
speciﬁcations and drawings that describe the details for construction of the dam
are then developed. The spillway and the outlet works are similarly designed, and
must be compatible with the embankment dam’s design. Because of the potential
public danger created by any dam and reservoir, dam design work (including
that performed by Reclamation) undergoes a very high level of review, including
review by boards of outside consultant experts, where appropriate, to ensure that
our designs achieve the high quality required.
A well-known saying related to embankment dam design is that the
design work is not complete until the dam’s construction has been ﬁnished. And,
this “construction period” should also include the ﬁrst few years of a dam’s
performance under full reservoir loading. If the “First Filling” of a large reservoir
takes 10 to 20 years to complete, then the “construction period” during which
design changes and modiﬁcation of the dam may be necessary could last well over
15 to 25 years. The design uncertainty during the dam’s construction involves
the fact that the geologic studies, the ﬁeld investigation data, and the laboratory
testing data actually involve a relatively limited exposure and assessment of the
dam’s entire foundation and all of the earthﬁll materials used to construct the
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embankment. When the ﬁnal foundation surface is completely exposed, there can
easily be overburden soils and bedrock that were not encountered by any of the
subsurface investigations conducted, depending on the damsite geology. And,
when the borrow materials are brought to the damsite for construction of the dam
embankment, some of the material may not be quite what was sampled and tested
in the laboratory. The dam construction process may also be affected by the
construction contractor’s plans for constructing the embankment. The contractor
might propose a different approach than was anticipated by the designer, such
as the use of different construction equipment and the use of soil amendments
to improve one of the earthﬁll material’s characteristics (such as decreasing its
permeability). Design changes during construction are most often subject to the
same review process as the initial design.
The dam engineering work required in the development of the design
data, the performance of analyses, the preparation of the ﬁnal design, and
the construction of a modern embankment dam and its appurtenant features
generally involves a large number of related disciplines, including engineering
geology, seismology, hydrology, civil engineering, geotechnical engineering,
instrumentation engineering, structural engineering, hydraulic engineering,
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and construction engineering.
Several of the above disciplines are included as sub-disciplines or specialties
within the civil engineering profession: geotechnical, structural, hydraulic,
instrumentation, and construction engineering. As you can see from the “brief”
description provided above, the planning, design, and construction of a modern
embankment dam is a complicated process that requires the civil engineers and
other professionals performing the work to have high levels of expertise and years
of experience. The entire dam design and construction process can take years
(sometimes tens of years) to complete.
Improvements in the size, speed, and efﬁciency of construction equipment
during the last 100 years have played a major role in the evolution of embankment
dam construction. The construction of a modern embankment dam and its
appurtenant structures involves a large variety of construction equipment. A
brief list of the common types of larger construction equipment typically used in
constructing an embankment dam includes: backhoe, dragline, crane, articulated
concrete pumper, pneumatic drill, front-end-loader, belly-dump truck, tandem
end-dump truck, all-terrain haul truck, belt conveyors, water truck, bulldozer,
motor grader, self-elevating scraper, excavators of all types, tamping-foot
compactor (static and vibratory), sheepsfoot roller, and smooth-drum roller
(static and vibratory). Construction on a large dam or at a difﬁcult damsite may
effectively utilize more efﬁcient or unusual equipment, such as a belt conveyor
system or a short railroad for hauling the borrow material to the damsite.
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Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam Design and Construction
The history of Reclamation’s century of embankment dam design
and construction is separated into the ﬁve periods already used in describing
Reclamation’s design and construction organizations. More than 240 reservoirstorage embankment dam structures have been designed and constructed by
Reclamation during the past century. Some of the information presented in
the following period sections on Reclamation’s embankment dam design and
construction history through 1958 is taken from Development of Earth Dam
Design in the Bureau of Reclamation7 by F. C. Walker, then Head of the Earth
Dams Section, Dams Branch, Division of Design. The location map and map
index of Reclamation’s embankment (earth-ﬁll) dams are shown in 2.1 and 2.2.

2.1. Location map of Reclamation’s earthfill dams.
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2.2. Location index of Reclamation’s earthfill dams.

Period I (1902-1918)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam
Design and Construction
As already mentioned, at Reclamation’s emergence in 1902, the
USGS’s Division of Hydrography, Hydrographic Branch had been studying
water resources in the West for about 20 years, developing data on potential
reservoir and dam sites. The USGS had published reports such as Reservoirs for
Irrigation,8 authored by James D. Schuyler in 1897. When the U.S. Reclamation
Service was established and given its mission of developing western water
resources, Frederick H. Newell and his nucleus of engineers were transferred from
the USGS’s Hydrographic Branch to the Service and they quickly started work on
the design of the six projects that had been approved for design and construction
by the Secretary of the Interior in 1903. Work on the additional dams and projects
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approved for design and construction during the next few years commenced as
quickly as was possible.
What was the state-of-the-art in embankment dam design and construction
in 1903? Only a few books had been published in the United States that covered
the design and construction of dams, including embankment dams. The ﬁrst such
book was The Design and Construction of Masonry Dams9 written by Edward
Wegmann (Member, ASCE) in 1888, followed in 1899 by his The Design and
Construction of Dams, Including Masonry, Earth, Rockfill, Timber and Steel
Structures10. The third important book on dams, Reservoirs for Irrigation,
Water-Power, and Domestic Water Supply,11 was written by James Dix Schuyler
(Member, ASCE) in 1901, with a second edition in 1909,12 which included
information on the Service’s Minidoka, Belle Fourche, and Cold Springs Dams.
The 1909 book included chapters on: rock-ﬁll dams, hydraulic-ﬁll dams, masonry
dams, earthen dams, steel dams, reinforced concrete dams, natural reservoirs, and
miscellaneous dams, and included a total of 381 photos, ﬁgures, and illustrations.
The publications of several engineering, mining, and construction
organizations were the primary source of information on which embankment dam
designs worked or failed, and why. These publications included: Engineering
News and Engineering Record (both subsequently merged to form Engineering
News-Record), Mining and Scientific Press, Engineering and Mining Journal,
Transactions of the American Institute of Mining Engineers, and ASCE. Service
engineers such as Hiram N. Savage had already written articles on dams,13
published before the Service was created. Within a relatively short period,
more books were written about dams, an increasingly important subject in
the arid West. Articles about the new Service and its dams ﬁrst appeared in
Engineering News in 1903 and then in other publications like Engineering
Record, Engineering and Construction, Irrigation Age, and Pacific Builder and
Engineer shortly thereafter. Papers on the Service’s dams began to appear in the
Proceedings of ASCE in 1907 and of the American Society for Testing Materials
in 1908 (dealing with cement and concrete work).
The Service’s Chief Engineer and his initial staff of 15 (civil) engineers
and related disciplines reportedly had lots of previous practical experience.
Although the Denver Ofﬁce was established in 1903 for the engineers and
assistants from USGS, a Resident Engineer at each irrigation project was
assigned to supervise the development of all phases of the project, which included
investigations, design, and construction. The project plans were reviewed by a
“project board” consisting of the Resident, District, and Supervising Engineers. If
warranted, one of Reclamation’s technical experts or a consultant would assist on
a complex or difﬁcult project. The actual records from this early period are fairly
limited. Once the reservoir storage site was examined and appeared acceptable,
it was used only if the observable geological conditions were “unquestionably
adequate in light of past experience.” Where explorations were made, they were
directed at locating a competent foundation, with little consideration given to the
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material overlying the good foundation. Streamﬂow records were either short or
nonexistent. Except for critical items such as gates, cement, and reinforcing steel
for concrete, materials for constructing the dam, including sand and gravel for
concrete, had to be locally available due to transportation difﬁculties.
Reclamation’s ﬁrst approved project was the Truckee-Carson Project,
later called the Newlands Project that was located in California and Nevada.
Reclamation’s ﬁrst constructed dam was part of that project. Truckee River
Diversion Dam located on the Truckee River in Nevada, now called Derby
Diversion Dam, was constructed as a combination gated concrete structure and
earthﬁll wing embankment dam. Construction of the diversion dam and canal
works began under Speciﬁcations No. 1 in 1903 and was completed in
June 1905. The dam was 1,331 feet long, had a structural height of 31 feet and a
hydraulic height of 15 feet, contained about 37,000 yd3 of earthﬁll, and had a
3:1 upstream slope and a 1.5:1 downstream slope. The Project Engineer
responsible for design and construction was Leon H. Taylor. Reclamation’s ﬁrst
completed embankment dam, whose primary purpose was to impound a waterstorage reservoir, was Minidoka Dam located on the Snake River in Idaho
(see 2.3). Its construction began in 1904 and was completed in 1906 (see 2.4). It
was a zoned earthﬁll and rockﬁll embankment 80 feet high that contained 257,000
yd3 of earth and gravel ﬁll and rockﬁll materials, had a crest length of 664 feet,
and impounded 210,000 acre-feet of water. Minidoka Dam was designed by
John H. Quinton (Member, ASCE) and was constructed under the supervision of
Construction Engineer F. C. Horn.
Rolled (compacted) earthﬁll was generally preferred by Reclamation
for embankment dam construction because of the difﬁculty in handling rockﬁll
material, but hydraulic or semi-hydraulic ﬁll construction was used in several
instances. Foundation treatment varied substantially. Some of the dam
foundations were excavated to bedrock, some had cutoff trenches excavated to
bedrock, and some had multiple trenches. Some cutoff trenches included a
concrete cutoff wall constructed into the foundation bedrock that extended up into
the cutoff trench backﬁll. Some trenches were for drainage and some provided
additional cutoffs. Two dams had pile cutoffs: one made of wood and one made
of steel sheet piling; neither of them was considered very effective. Almost all of
these embankment dams had one to three feet of riprap on the upstream slope.
Most of the embankment dams constructed by Reclamation during Period
I were relatively small structures (by today’s standards) that still took quite
some time to build with the methods available at the time (Belle Fourche Dam
took over 5 years). The designs for these dams, which depended on the nature
of the locally available earthﬁll materials (and still do today), were based on a
relatively limited knowledge of geotechnical engineering and the other disciplines
mentioned earlier. The design standards of that time were limited: 1) an adequate
foundation to support the dam, 2) an impervious core or upstream facing, and 3) a
spillway capable of passing ﬂood ﬂows without damage to the embankment. Data
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on the hydrology of the drainage basins were very limited. The geology of the
damsites may have been studied and documented, but its effect on the dams to be
designed and constructed was probably poorly understood. The ﬁeld investigation
performed at the damsite and on the earthﬁll borrow areas was generally limited
to test pits and borings of shallow depth.

2.3. Minidoka Dam plan and section.

2.4. Minidoka Dam construction.
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Any laboratory testing of the anticipated earthﬁll materials was extremely
limited by today’s standards since most of the tests now performed on earthﬁll and
rockﬁll materials were developed during and after the 1920s. Grain size analysis
was probably performed on the soils, but only of the sand, gravel, and cobble
size materials, and information on the amount of clay and silt materials was not
possible until later. Darcy’s Law about the rate of water-ﬂow through a soil (its
permeability) was promulgated in 1856, and it dictates how and where different
types of earth materials (clay, silt, sand, gravel, cobbles, and rockﬁll) can be
used in an embankment dam, which is still very relevant today. Early scientists,
physicists, and engineers like Charles A. Coulomb (1773), Alexandre Collin
(1846), and W. J. M. Rankine (1857) developed theories about earth pressure on
retaining walls and tests of the shear strength of soil materials, but there were no
standardized shear-strength tests performed on soil materials or analysis of slope
stability as are an integral part of embankment dam design today. The Atterberg
limits tests, still used today to help characterize clayey materials, were developed
by A. Atterberg of Germany in 1911. In 1916 K. E. Pettersson and S. Hultin
developed a slope stability analysis method to analyze the failure of a quay wall in
Goteborg, Sweden, but it does not appear to have been introduced to engineers in
the United States until several years later. And settlement/ consolidation behavior
of soil materials was not tested, although settlement benchmarks were ﬁrst
installed along the edges of the embankment crest at Belle Fourche Dam in 1911.
Thus, the ability to develop the necessary data and to analyze an earthﬁll structure
like an embankment dam during Period I was very limited by today’s standards.
The various types of construction equipment that existed during Period
I played a large role in deﬁning the size and height limitations placed on these
early embankment dams. Excavation of foundation overburden soils (alluvium
and colluvium) or borrow materials was performed by pick and shovel, horsedrawn (Fresno) scraper, dragline, and/or steam shovel. The borrow soil
materials were excavated by hydraulic monitor or dredge for use in hydraulicﬁll embankment dams, and by dragline and/or steam shovel for the other types
of embankment dams. For relatively short distances, transportation of borrow
materials to the damsite was accomplished by hydraulic pipelines or ﬂumes in the
case of hydraulic-ﬁll dams and by horse-drawn wagons and/or scrapers for the
other types of embankment dams. For longer distances, borrow materials were
transported by railroads using trains of side-dump cars pulled by small “dinkey”
steam locomotives. After the earthﬁll material was brought to the embankment
and dumped, it was spread out in relatively thin (i.e., 6-inch-thick) layers using
horse-drawn drags and/or graders. Water may or may not have been added to
the layers of uncompacted earthﬁll before compaction. Each layer of earthﬁll
was then compacted by team and wagon travel, steel-drum rollers, concrete
(cylinder) rollers, and/or steam-powered engines (“traction engines” were used
at Belle Fourche Dam). The use of the sheepsfoot roller for earthﬁll compaction
was reportedly developed around 1905, but they were not used on Reclamation’s
dams for a while yet. Rockﬁll material was either placed without compaction
or was sluiced with hydraulic monitors. Period I construction by Reclamation
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was accomplished either by government forces or by contract with a construction
company.
During this early period of embankment dam design and construction,
the height of dam and the foundation geology had little effect on the design of
the embankment dam section. However, the type of earthﬁll materials available
for embankment construction had a noticeable inﬂuence. Hence, depending
on the nature of the earthﬁll materials available in the borrow area(s), the dam
embankment section was either: 1) an upstream impervious zone supported by
a downstream rockﬁll zone, 2) an upstream impervious zone supported by a
downstream gravel zone, or 3) a modiﬁed homogeneous section, which included
design features that modiﬁed the homogeneous performance.
Upstream Impervious Zone Supported by Downstream Rockfill Zone
Period I embankment dams utilizing this type of cross-section included:
Avalon, Clear Lake, Minidoka, and McMillan Dams, and Elephant Butte Dike.
Avalon and McMillan Dams, both on the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New
Mexico, were actually the second or third reconstructions of earlier private dams
that had failed by overtopping that breached both dams during ﬂoods. Neither
dam included a transition/ﬁlter zone between the earthﬁll and rockﬁll zones,
which was added to later dams of this type. Avalon Dam also had a part sheetpile, part concrete core/cutoff wall the full height of the dam. The upstream slope
of these dams was typically 3:1 that was often steepened to 2:1 above the full
reservoir level, and the downstream slope was typically 1.5:1. The relatively high
cost of using rockﬁll material with the equipment then available was the reason
that few of this type of embankment dam were constructed by Reclamation. The
failure of several non-Reclamation dams of this type during this period probably
contributed to the decision to stop building this type of dam.
Upstream Impervious Zone Supported by Downstream Gravel Zone
Period I embankment dams utilizing this type of cross-section included:
Cold Springs, Lahontan, Keechelus, and Minitare Dams, and Pathﬁnder Dike.
The upstream slope of these dams was typically 3:1 and the downstream
slope was typically 2:1, except for Minitare Dam. Minitare Dam had a 2.5:1
upstream slope to the full reservoir level, a 2:1 slope above that level, and a 2.5:1
downstream slope. Pathﬁnder Dike also had a concrete cutoff wall that extended
above the reservoir level. The earthﬁll zone became thicker during the period,
probably because gravel material was more difﬁcult to use with the construction
equipment then available, and because of the greater relative abundance of
earthﬁll material. Although the mechanics of internal erosion (piping) of earthﬁll
materials was not yet understood, dam designers did understand the nature of the
problems potentially caused by seepage from the reservoir, as indicated by their
efforts to control that seepage with defensive measures like cutoff trenches and
walls. The designers also made the embankment’s upstream impervious earthﬁll
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zones thicker than twice the hydraulic water-pressure head from the reservoir.
Cold Springs Dam, constructed between 1907 and 1908, had a total of four zones
in which the gravel content increased from 50 percent in the upstream zone to
67 percent, then 80 percent, and ﬁnally 100 percent in the downstream zone.
Modified Homogeneous Section
The remaining Period I embankment dams were of the “modiﬁed”
homogeneous cross-section type, and they included: Belle Fourche, Deer Flat,
Strawberry, and Sherburne Lake Dams. Except for Belle Fourche Dam, the other
dams had 3:1 upstream slopes and 2:1 downstream slopes. Sherburne Lake Dam
includes a vertical screened-gravel drain near the center of the embankment
section, with this type of design detail being many years ahead of its time. Belle
Fourche Dam had a “bold” (less conservative) embankment cross-section,
probably due to its large size. The lower upstream slope is 5:1 to a berm, 2:1
above the berm to the full reservoir pool level, and 1.5:1 above that; and the upper
downstream slope is 1.655:1 to a berm and drain gutter, and 2:1 below that level.
At the time it was built, Belle Fourche Dam was reportedly the largest rolled
earthﬁll dam constructed in the world; it is discussed in greater detail below.
Strawberry Dam also had a reinforced concrete core wall that extended above the
reservoir level.
Belle Fourche Dam
Belle Fourche Dam (locally called Orman Dam) is located on Owl Creek
about 10 miles northeast of Belle Fourche, South Dakota, and was the most
notable embankment dam constructed by Reclamation during Period I. The dam
was constructed 115 feet high above its streambed with a crest length of
6,262 feet, an earthﬁll volume of 1,783,000 yd3, impounded a 192,000 acre-foot
off-stream reservoir and a water-surface area of about 8,000 acres, and was fed by
a 6-mile-long canal that conveyed a maximum of 1,600 ft3/s of water diverted by
a diversion dam on the Belle Fourche River. Information on the embankment’s
as-built slopes is given above. The original upper slopes shown on the 1905 Belle
Fourche Dam design drawings were 1:1 instead of 1.5:1 upstream and 1.75:1
instead of 1.655:1 downstream. The decision was made during construction to
ﬂatten the upper upstream slope and ﬂatten the upper downstream slope, moving
the crest downstream (see 2.5).
The greater steepness of the upstream slope, compared to the other
embankments designed and built by the Service during Period I was an important
difference. Construction under contract No. 73 awarded to Orman & Crook of
Pueblo, Colorado, began in November 1905, but work was suspended in early
1908 when Orman & Crook went into bankruptcy. Construction resumed in
April 1908 under a new contract with the National Surety Company of New York,
which was the “bondsman” for Orman & Crook. The National Surety Company
subcontracted with several private companies to perform the construction and
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the dam was completed on June 30, 1911. The total cost, including engineering,
construction, cement, and general expenses, was about $1,299,000. An article
on Belle Fourche Dam by Project Engineer Raymond F. Walter was published in
Engineering Record in March 1906.14 A second article on the dam by Resident
Engineer O. T. (Oliver) Reedy (Associate Member, ASCE) was published in
Engineering Record in April 1910,15 describing the early plans for the project
and the construction to date (early 1910) on the dam and appurtenant structures.
Some of the more unique or informative details related to Belle Fourche Dam’s
design and construction are discussed below.

2.5. Belle Fourche Dam section.

In April 1904 a board consisting of Arthur P. Davis, John H. Quinton
(consulting engineer from Los Angeles), and Charles H. Fitch (Supervising
Engineer) examined the Belle Fourche Project and ordered detailed surveys of the
irrigable areas, potential damsites, and canal alignments. Three dam sites were
located and the ﬁnal damsite was selected in May 1905. The dam foundation
had been “thoroughly prospected” by both open test wells and by earth auger
borings located every 200 feet along the dam’s alignment. The embankment was
founded on a “heavy compact clay,” locally known as “gumbo,” which overlies a
soft slatey shale located 20 to 40 feet below the surface. There were occasional
pockets of gravel encountered in the overburden layer. The dam embankment
was constructed using the locally available clay obtained from borrow pits located
upstream and at both ends of the dam. An expert “Engineer of Soils,” Thomas H.
Means came and tested the proposed earthﬁll material. Small scale experiments
determined that this material needed an additional 7 percent water, by weight,
for compaction to achieve the maximum density of the earthﬁll. Belle Fourche
Dam was designed under the direction of Project Engineer Raymond F. Walter,
with the resulting plans approved by a board of engineers consisting of John H.
Quinton, C. E. Wells, Charles H. Fitch, and Raymond F. Walter, resulting in a
July 5, 1905, letter in which they approved the plans and speciﬁcations,
recommending “that the drawings be reduced to standard size and the
speciﬁcations printed in Washington and that the work be advertised as soon as
possible.” The 1905-era Speciﬁcations No. 56 contained a total of 37 pages and
12 drawings used to show the dam embankment, appurtenant structures, and
canals. The speciﬁcations sections included topics such as: Engineer, Changes,
Sanitation, Use of liquor, Embankment construction, and Measurements. During
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construction, several design details related to the dam’s upper slopes and the
appurtenant structures had to be revised. Resident Engineers Patch and Reedy
were in daily to weekly contact with Project Engineer Walter during the entire
period of dam construction. Visitors (mostly engineers) from as far away as South
Africa and Sweden visited the dam during construction.16

2.6. Belle Fourche Dam: Cutoff trench construction.

In August 1910 engineers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
visited the dam for a few hours and subsequently informed Reclamation that they
considered the dam’s slopes, particularly the downstream slope to be excessively
steep. Reclamation’s engineers, including Project Engineer Walter and Chief
Engineer A. P. Davis, developed the response to the Corps and provided a list of
some 20 recently constructed embankment dams built with slopes steeper than at
Belle Fourche Dam. They knew that the location (height) of the phreatic surface
in the dam embankment would affect the slope stability of the embankment,
so they decided to install some 2-inch-diameter vertical pipes to function as
observation wells for monitoring the “plane of saturation.” More details on these
pipe observation wells are provided below.
The cutoff trench was excavated by horse-drawn “wheel scrapers” and
a locomotive crane, using a ½-yd3 clamshell bucket, after which the trench was
backﬁlled with compacted “select material” (see 2.6). The earthﬁll material in the
borrow area(s) was excavated by 70-ton and 75-ton steam shovels with a 2½-yd3
bucket/dipper and was dumped into the 4-yd3 Western side-dump cars (see 2.7).
The trains of 10 to 13 side-dump cars (a total of about 60 side-dump cars were
used) were pulled by 18-ton Dinkey locomotives that hauled the trains about
¾-mile to the embankment, up a maximum grade of about 4 percent onto the
embankment surface. The 36-inch gage train tracks and wooden ties were moved
every third layer as the embankment rose in height. Three-horse-team 1¼-yd3
dump wagons, ﬁlled by Western graders pulled by traction engines, were also
used to haul earthﬁll from some of the upstream borrow pits.
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Four-horse-team Fresno scrapers were used to move the dumped earthﬁll a
maximum distance of 50 feet away from the tracks, and ordinary four-horse-team
road graders ran over the material deposited by the scrapers to spread and level
the layer (see 2.8). The layer of earthﬁll was thoroughly wetted, if necessary,
using a 2-inch hose to apply water pumped up from wells or small reservoirs.
If the earthﬁll was compacted immediately after being placed on the ﬁll, little
if any water needed to be applied. The speciﬁcations required that the earthﬁll
material be placed and rolled in 6-inch layers using steam rollers weighing not
less than “200 pounds per linear inch of roller rim.” According to O. T. Reedy’s
article, one of the rollers used was a 12-ton roller with a 4-foot rolling base.
According to the Belle Fourche Project History,17 an “8-ton asphalt dirt roller with
smooth wheels” was also used, but it often became stuck on the slick surface of
the embankment. However, most of the compaction was accomplished by four
32-horsepower 18-ton and 21-ton traction (steam) engines, with the rear wheels
having been widened to create a 6-foot-wide “rolling base.” The traction engines
accomplished the compaction more quickly due to their greater power (see 2. 9).

2.7. Belle Fourche Dam: Steam shovel, dinkey locomotive, and side-dump cars in
borrow pit.

2.8. Belle Fourche Dam: Embankment fill construction.
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2.9. Belle Fourche Dam: Traction engine hauling “dinkey” locomotive to damsite.

A somewhat unique feature of the construction of Belle Fourche Dam
was a gap through the embankment in the vicinity of station 42+00 (note that
the distance between stations 0+00 and 1+00 equals 100 feet) that was left open
to pass Owl Creek ﬂows through the damsite from the start of construction until
it was quickly closed in 1909. The “Owl Creek Gap” (Gap) had side slopes a
little steeper than 1.5:1. Flooding on Owl Creek occurred several times during
construction, with a maximum ﬂow of about 5,500 ft3/s moving through the Gap.
Earthﬁll cofferdams were constructed at the upstream and downstream ends of the
Gap. Three cutoff trenches were excavated across the Gap that were backﬁlled
with select earthﬁll material. A drainage system consisting of 4-inch tile pipes
enclosed in screened gravel was constructed in the Gap’s bottom downstream of
the lower cutoff trench to collect and convey any foundation seepage to discharge
into Owl Creek downstream of the dam. The Gap was closed using earthﬁll
hauled to the dam by wagon and by train, which involved dumping the earthﬁll
off a Howe truss bridge, and spreading and compacting the earthﬁll layers as
rapidly as possible. The Howe truss bridge consisted of one 100-foot center span
and two 60-foot side spans built across the Gap. The Gap ﬁll was joined to the
two existing embankments by excavating the slopes of the Gap until ﬁrm material
was reached. Due to the conﬁned area, the bottom layers of earthﬁll were
compacted by hand tampers that could exert a pressure of 1 lb/in2, by a wooden
tamper weighing about 200 pounds operated by the locomotive crane, by the
small 12-ton roller, and then by the wheels of a traction engine.
Another unique feature of the dam’s design was the upstream slope
protection. The nearest rock quarry was located 32 miles away and the
sandstone’s quality was considered poor, together causing its use to be rejected.
The selected upstream slope protection consisted of 8-inch-thick concrete blocks/
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slabs that measured 5 feet by 6½ feet, and weighed about 3,000 pounds each.
A concrete footing wall was constructed at the bottom of the 2:1 slope and the
bottom course of blocks rested against this wall. Along the center portion of
the embankment, the concrete footing wall was buttressed by 10-inch-diameter
16-foot-long timber piles driven into the earthﬁll on 3-foot centers. The concrete
blocks were placed on a 24-inch-thick bed of gravel using stiff-leg 3-toncapacity traveling derricks with 25-foot masts and 50-foot booms operated by
20-horsepower hoisting engines. The blocks were moved into place with the
derrick and were then levered and hammered into place. 2.10 shows the nearlycompleted dam embankment from the right abutment.

2.10. Belle Fourche Dam: Embankment from right abutment.

The upstream slope protection at Belle Fourche Dam suffered some degree
of damage by wave action almost every year due to the common, sustained high
winds in the area and the 8-mile fetch (length) along the Owl Creek arm of the
reservoir. A 4-foot-thick layer of grouted riprap was suggested in 1943 by Chief
Design Engineer John L. (Jack) Savage (Honorary Member, ASCE), but World
War II caused the work to be deferred. A 4-foot-thick layer of dumped rock
riprap was constructed in 1976-1977, but the wave-erosion/beaching problem still
persists in some areas on the upstream slope.
The downstream slope was ﬁnished by placing a 12-inch-thick layer
of rich loam-soil dressing, which was then “seeded with a mixture of grasses
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.” Concrete gutters were also
placed on berms located 30 feet apart vertically, with down-slope gutters every
1,000 feet, to collect and remove runoff during heavy rainstorms.
The dam included two canal outlet works, each one well above the old
Owl Creek channel, and a waste weir (spillway) at the left (north) end of the
embankment. Downstream of the weir structure, the spillway channel was earth
lined below which it was concrete lined. Ensign-type balanced valves were
installed on the canal outlet works in 1910 and 1911. Two 58-inch valves were
installed at the upstream end of the North Canal outlet works conduit and one
58-inch valve was installed at the upstream end of the South Canal outlet works
conduit.
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During the summer of 1910, after the reservoir had reached a maximum
elevation of about 2930 feet, seepage began to surface downstream of the dam
where the ground is at about elevation 2910. Borings were driven to investigate
the cause and source of the seepage, which indicated a strata of disintegrated
shale and gravel about 10 feet below the surface. The engineers had known about
this layer of gravel, but thought it was 30 to 40 feet below the ground surface.
Supervising Engineer David C. Henny of Portland, Oregon, had been brought in
as a “consulting engineer” during much of the work on the dam, and he was again
consulted on the seepage problem. A drainage system was advised, designed,
and constructed along the downstream toe of the embankment in November and
December 1910. This drainage system consisted of a trench excavated about 3
feet wide and up to 17 feet deep between stations 26+00 and 41+00 (1,500 feet),
with 14-inch-diameter “telephone pole auger” wells drilled in the bottom of the
trench that were backﬁlled with coarse screened gravel, covered by ﬁne screened
gravel and then pit-run gravel. A 12-inch-diameter vitriﬁed clay tile pipe was
placed with open joints and surrounded by coarse screened gravel (1-inch to
2-inch) and by ﬁne screened gravel (¼-inch to 1-inch) surrounding the coarse
gravel in the bottom of the trench, which was then covered with unscreened gravel
and regular backﬁll. Manholes were constructed at several locations along the toe
drain—using 2-foot-diameter vitriﬁed clay pipe. The outﬂow from the drainage
system reached a maximum of 45 to 50+ gal/min, which varied with the reservoir
water surface elevation. The ﬂow from this drainage system has been monitored
ever since, and constitutes the longest continuous monitoring performed on one of
Reclamation’s embankment dams.
In late 1911, a series of 2-inch-diameter open-end pipe (observation)
“wells” were installed in the embankment in the vicinity of stations 37+00 and
38+00 to determine the “plane of saturation” (phreatic surface) and to obtain data
on its movements with reservoir ﬂuctuations. A wash-boring apparatus was used
to drill the holes into which the pipes were installed; 34 wells were constructed,
ranging in depth from 10 to 90 feet. These were the ﬁrst “instruments” installed
in a Reclamation embankment dam for the purpose of monitoring the porewater
pressures in the dam and/or foundation. A few of these observation wells are still
monitored, making them the longest continuously monitored instruments of that
type. Their rate of response to reservoir ﬂuctuation is very slow (about a 2-year
lag time) due to the relatively large diameter of the 2-inch pipes and the very
low ﬂow rate (permeability) of the seepage percolating through the gumbo-clay
embankment. Also in 1911, a set of iron benchmarks was installed every
300 feet along the embankment crest to monitor its settlement, also the ﬁrst of that
type of instrumentation installed on a Reclamation dam. Belle Fourche Dam was
quickly turned into the most instrumented embankment dam built by Reclamation
between 1902 and 1911.
The 90-year-long performance of Belle Fourche Dam has been quite
an interesting story. The concrete paving blocks protecting the upstream slope
have suffered storm damage fairly frequently, which is why that type of slope
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protection was not used after the construction of Minitare Dam in 1915. In 1928,
after 17 years of acceptable embankment performance, parallel cracks several
hundred feet long occurred on the embankment crest between stations 27+00 and
31+00, and they occurred close to the upstream slope. This led to an investigation
and exploration shafts; the cracks were up to 3 inches wide and up to 12 feet deep.
The resulting judgement was that drying out of the embankment was the cause.
Other cracks had also been reported in the vicinity of station 39+00 to 46+00.
Then on August 2, 1931, after a fairly rapid drought-caused reservoir drawdown
of 27 feet in 60 days, part of the upstream slope failed, resulting in a slump about
610 feet long between stations 40+50 and 46+60. The slide mass averaged a
thickness of 9 to 10 feet and extended from about elevation 2962 down to the base
of the 2:1 slope at elevation 2920. Several factors contributed to this slide, but
the steepness of the upstream slope, the (low) shear strength of the as-constructed
“gumbo” clay embankment material, the low permeability of the “gumbo” clay
material, and the rapid reservoir drawdown were the primary factors that caused
the failure.
The slope failure was quickly examined by Reclamation’s engineers,
including Chief Design Engineer Savage on August 12th. Plans for reconstruction
of the upstream slope were agreed upon. On August 24th, a ¾-yd3 dragline began
building an access ramp into the slide and began to remove the concrete blocks.
A total of 20,320 yd3 of the slumped embankment material and gravel bedding
was excavated by a larger dragline with a 50-foot boom and a 1¾-yd3 bucket,
making sure to dig at least 1 to 2 feet below the “lowest slip plane,” and placing
the material in stockpiles to one side for reuse. The embankment was then rebuilt
by several pieces of equipment. The larger dragline picked up a half-bucket of
gravel, then ﬁlled the bucket with stockpiled embankment material, and dumped
the material into the excavation where it was hauled and spread in 6-inch layers
by Caterpillar tractors pulling Fresno scrapers. These layers were then compacted
by rollers pulled by the Caterpillar tractors. The initial attempts to use concrete
rollers for compaction encountered difﬁculty when the roughness of the roller
prevented it from being properly cleaned. An “iron mule” loaded with one yard
of gravel was tried, but it was too slow. They then tried an old printing press
roller, for which they had to make a pulling device, and ﬁlled the roller with
concrete. This smooth roller allowed the use of cleaning scrapers and it worked
well pulled by a “Fifteen” (horsepower) Caterpillar tractor. A total of eight
Caterpillar tractors were used, ranging in size from ﬁfteen to forty horsepower.
The most effective “dirt mover” was a “Thirty” Caterpillar tractor pulling a
1½-yd3 Fresno scraper. Up to three working shifts were used due to the approach
of winter. Once the embankment was rebuilt, the gravel bedding was rebuilt and
the concrete paving blocks were placed back on the upstream slope.
After the completion of this reconstruction, Reclamation proceeded during
the remainder of the 1930s to drill, sample, install piezometers (for monitoring
water pressure) in the dam embankment and foundation, and then conduct a
laboratory investigation of the Belle Fourche Dam embankment material in one
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of the most comprehensive laboratory investigations conducted up to that time.
That work was followed by a (then) state-of-the-art analysis of the upstream
slope stability. Finally, in 1939, a 25-foot-wide earthﬁll berm was constructed
to improve the stability by buttressing the upstream slope. The berm sloped at
3:1 and included a 3-foot-thick layer of well-graded ¼-inch to 3-inch gravel that
was placed against the existing dam embankment to provide drainage. The berm
included earthﬁll material similar to the original embankment material, but it was
enclosed in gravel for drainage. The earthﬁll material was placed in 6-inch lifts
and was compacted by 12 passes of a tamping roller. The tamping rollers were
to be conﬁgured such that they had one ball foot or knob for each square foot, a
knob end area between 5 and 7 in2, produced a knob pressure of not less than 300
lb/in2, and were equipped with roller cleaners. The berm was surfaced with 24
inches of riprap placed on 12-inches of gravel bedding. Weep holes were also
drilled on 5-foot centers through the concrete paving slabs for drainage purposes.
The embankment section shown in 2.5 includes this upstream berm. The concrete
paving slabs on the upstream slope continued to be damaged by wave action, and
in 1976-1977, the upper portion of the upstream slope was rebuilt to provide 4
feet of riprap slope protection on a 2.33:1 slope from the top of the 1939 berm
(elevation 2950) to the embankment crest (elevation 2990). Longitudinal cracks
have continued to appear on the dam crest into the 1990s, and the rate of reservoir
drawdown continues to be carefully controlled in order to prevent further
drawdown-induced slope instability.
Belle Fourche Dam is a truly amazing and unique early embankment
dam in Reclamation’s history. ASCE designated Belle Fourche Dam a National
Historic Civil Engineering Landmark in 1988, and (somewhat surprisingly) it is
Reclamation’s only embankment dam so honored. Many of the design details and
construction procedures developed and utilized at Belle Fourche Dam starting 97
years ago are still used by Reclamation engineers today, especially some of the
innovative design and construction concepts.
Period II (1919-1933)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam
Design and Construction
Reclamation engineers had helped advance the state-of-the-art in
embankment dam design and construction during Period I. Reclamation’s
reputation grew as the numbers of its successful projects increased throughout the
West. Reclamation received more and more publicity in the articles and papers
published in western newspapers, magazines, and professional journals to which
Reclamation’s engineers contributed their experience, innovations, and new
design ideas.
Reclamation’s engineering design groups had been centralized and were
better organized in the Denver Ofﬁce, and they produced designs for new projects
and dams at a high rate. Respected civil engineers like J. L. Savage, who had
started his career with Reclamation on the Minidoka Project in 1903, had joined
93

the new Denver Ofﬁce staff as a Design Engineer in 1916 and was subsequently
promoted to Chief Design Engineer in February 1928. The Chief Engineers
during Period II were Arthur P. Davis (also serving as Director of the Service until
1923), Frank E. Weymouth, and Raymond F. Walter.
The embankment dams designed and constructed during Period II were
larger and the designs were more varied. Consultants were used extensively
during Period II, although the list of dams constructed during this period is fairly
small. Most of them were built with homogeneous sections, had little foundation
treatment of note, and generally had 3:1 upstream and 2:1 downstream slopes.
Early in this period, the 40-foot-high Salmon Lake Dam was constructed between
1919 and 1923 on Salmon Creek as part of the Okanogan Project in Washington
state. It was Reclamation’s ﬁrst embankment dam that utilized a central
impervious (sandy loam) core and a ﬂattened downstream toe or “tail” with 5:1
and 10:1 slopes. It was also the ﬁrst dam to be constructed on a “questionable”
foundation (sand and clay of unknown depth). The base of the impervious core
was widened, and in the bottom of the 8-foot-wide cutoff trench located 25 feet
upstream of the dam crest, Wakeﬁeld sheet piling 38 feet long was driven into the
foundation with part of the sheet piles extending up into the core. Note that these
embankment design changes were included on a relatively small dam.
Several other notable embankment dams were designed and constructed
during Period II. These included: Sherburne Lake, Tieton, McKay, Guernsey,
American Falls, Echo, and Cle Elum Dams. Most of the embankment dams
constructed during Period II were compacted earthﬁll structures, with some semihydraulic ﬁll dams built too, such as Tieton Dam. Most of them were built on
rock foundations that required the excavation of the overburden soils. Some of
these dams included reinforced concrete core walls the full height of the reservoir,
such as at Tieton and American Falls Dams. Sherburne Lake Dam, completed in
1921, included a vertical zone of screened gravel located beneath the downstream
edge of the crest intended to prevent saturation of the downstream embankment
material. This was one of the earliest uses of a “chimney drain” inside an
embankment dam to control the phreatic surface and porewater pressures.
Tieton Dam, completed in 1925 with a maximum height of 185 feet above
the streambed, was the highest embankment dam built by Reclamation during
Period II. It was the ﬁrst Reclamation dam designed on the basis of a stability
analysis, and the soil’s shear strength characteristics were assumed on the basis of
the material’s angle of repose. A concrete core wall 10 feet thick was excavated
down a maximum of 134 feet through river-channel deposits and 10 feet into
bedrock. This foundation wall was constructed by mining out vertical shafts
driven to bedrock and horizontal side drifts, forming a wall within the foundation.
The core wall foundation was also pressure grouted using ﬁve holes each 22 feet
deep in one of the ﬁrst such applications (the maximum grout take was only one
sack per foot). Grout is generally a mixture of cement and water, and possibly
sand, bentonite, and other materials. According to Design of Small Dams
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(p. 195), “Foundation grouting is a process of injecting under pressure a ﬂuid
sealing material into the underlying formations through specially drilled holes
to seal off or ﬁll joints, fractures, ﬁssures, bedding planes, cavities, or other
openings.” The Tieton Dam embankment included a puddled-clay core onethird the thickness of the hydraulic head constructed against the upstream side
of the concrete core wall. The remainder of the dam was constructed using the
semi-hydraulic ﬁll method in which the earthﬁll is dumped at the upstream or
downstream embankment shoulder and is sluiced with jets of water, washing the
ﬁnes into the center pool.
McKay Dam, completed in 1926 with a maximum height of 160 feet
above the streambed, rested almost entirely on bedrock and was constructed
of compacted sand and gravel. The upstream slope at 1.75:1 is the steepest
ever constructed on one of Reclamation’s embankment dams and was covered
with a monolithic concrete slab tied to bedrock with a concrete cutoff. Three
cutoff walls were constructed across McKay Dam’s foundation contact, and
the foundation beneath each of the walls was grouted. Steps were cast into the
upper part of the upstream concrete facing to break up the wave runup (unlike the
smooth concrete-panel facing at Belle Fourche Dam). The concrete facing was
very hard to construct and the construction engineer advised against using that
design again.
Guernsey Dam, completed in 1927 with a maximum height of 105 feet
above the streambed, rested on a pervious foundation of unknown depth. Because
of the foundation, the embankment section included an upstream “blanket” and
a large downstream rockﬁll. The central portion of the embankment included
an inclined impervious core zone conﬁned by zones of sluiced sand and gravel
located upstream and downstream of the core. This was the last hydraulic ﬁll
embankment constructed by Reclamation. A new concept used at Guernsey Dam
was the incorporation of the upstream cofferdam into the embankment section. A
partial cutoff trench was excavated and backﬁlled with the impervious earthﬁll.
American Falls Dam, also completed in 1927 with a maximum height of
75 feet above the streambed, was a combination concrete gravity and earthﬁll
structure. The bedrock foundation beneath its reinforced concrete core wall was
grouted.
Echo Dam, completed in 1931 with a maximum height of 130 feet above
streambed, was another zoned embankment. The central core consisted of
compacted clay, silt, sand, and gravel; the zones upstream and downstream of
the core consisted of sand and gravel; and the downstream toe zone consisted of
conglomerate rockﬁll rolled in 12-inch layers. The excavated cutoff trench was
about 25 feet deep to bedrock and included a concrete cutoff wall. The cutoff
trench was located well upstream of the central core and was connected to it
by a thick blanket of the compacted core material. The earthﬁll materials were
hauled to the damsite using gasoline-powered trucks, the ﬁrst such use on one
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of Reclamation’s embankment dams. Compaction of the embankment materials
was accomplished using a sheepsfoot-type tamping roller for the ﬁrst time on a
Reclamation dam. The sheepsfoot tamping roller was an important development
in the evolution of earthﬁll compaction because of the kneading action produced
by the steel knobs or “feet” fabricated around the roller drum. Water and/or sand
were usually placed inside the steel drum to increase its weight and thereby the
amount of stress applied by the ends of the feet during compaction.
Cle Elum Dam, completed in 1933 with a maximum height of 135 feet
above the streambed, was the ﬁrst instance in which a sheepsfoot tamping roller
was speciﬁed to be used for embankment compaction (it was used, but was not
speciﬁed, on Echo Dam). Cle Elum Dam was the last dam designed using just
empirical rules and the last one constructed without earthﬁll testing to verify the
quality of the as-built earthﬁll materials, to evaluate construction practices, and to
conﬁrm design assumptions.
Dams generally put more people at risk than any other type of civil works
structure. Dam failures tend to be catastrophic, which causes them to be studied
very thoroughly to try to explain why the failure occurred and to avoid repeating
any mistakes. The dramatic failures of dams like St. Francis Dam at about
midnight on March 12, 1928, near Los Angeles, California, tended to produce
important changes in the practice of dam engineering. By the end of 1929 several
states had enacted laws placing the construction and maintenance of non-Federal
dams that imperil the lives and property of others under the supervision and
control of the state engineer or other authorized ofﬁcial. With embankment dams,
the need to explain why a dam failed when the same basic design had worked
elsewhere was a major concern to all civil engineers, as well as the general
public. As civil engineering evolved, the increasing knowledge of the engineering
design of certain materials (such as wood, steel, and concrete) that are used in
constructing civil structures (such as buildings, bridges, and dams) generally
improved the overall record with respect to reducing the incidence of structural
failure. However, the failure rate with respect to embankment dams did not seem
to keep pace with the evolution of those other civil engineering structures, and
remained of great concern into the 1920s and 1930s. In general, Reclamation
had a very good record with respect to its embankment dams. However,
Reclamation’s record was not perfect, as evidenced by the rapid drawdown failure
of the upstream slope of Belle Fourche Dam in August 1931. While this slumping
of the upstream slope material did not breach the dam or release the reservoir, the
steep slope did become unstable, and it did fail.
In the years just after World War I, several European engineers began to
specialize in the mechanics of soil and rock materials, and thereby began the ﬁeld
that has become geotechnical engineering. Dr. Karl Terzaghi (Honorary Member,
ASCE) is generally considered the father of soil mechanics (geotechnical
engineering). According to Karl Terzaghi—The Engineer as Artist by Professor
Richard E. Goodman,18 Karl Terzaghi graduated from the Technical University
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of Graz in 1900 with a degree in mechanical engineering, having resisted his
grandfather’s civil engineering profession. However, after a short stint working
as a mechanical engineer, Karl Terzaghi switched and began his lifelong career
in civil engineering. After receiving his Doctor of Technical Sciences degree
from the Technical University of Graz in 1912, Dr. Terzaghi visited the United
States for the next two years. He quickly found his way to a meeting with Service
Director F. H. Newell and immediately began an extensive tour of Reclamation
projects and dams then under construction. Back in Europe, Dr. Terzaghi began
to study the mechanics of soils toward the end of World War I in 1917, working
on the problem of earth pressure against retaining walls that had been worked
on earlier by Coulomb and Rankine. Dr. Terzaghi’s work (in German) was ﬁrst
summarized (in English) in Engineering News-Record in 1920, which wrote an
editorial preface declaring that characterizing earth as an engineering material is
“the outstanding research problem in civil engineering” and that Terzaghi’s article
“heralds the opening of an avenue of progress.” He completed the manuscript
for Erdbaumechanik (Principles of Soil Mechanics) in April 1924 and, after it
was translated from German to English, it was circulated widely in the United
States by John R. Freeman (Honorary Member, ASCE). The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology quickly offered Dr. Terzaghi the opportunity to develop
a graduate course in foundations and soil mechanics. Because of Professor
Terzaghi’s background and expertise in geology, the “marriage” of geotechnical
engineering and geology has been one of his more important achievements.
Professor Terzaghi continued to lead in the development of the new ﬁeld of soil
mechanics and foundation engineering in the United States, with a continued
special interest in dams until his death in 1963. (In his memory, Mission Dam
in British Columbia, Canada was renamed Terzaghi Dam in 1965.) Brieﬂy
described, thus began what is now geotechnical engineering. The birth of
geotechnical engineering as it relates to embankment dams “arrived” at ICOLD’s
First Congress on Large Dams meeting in 1933 at Stockholm, Sweden, which
was quickly followed by ICOLD’s Second Congress on Large Dams meeting in
1936 at Washington, D.C. Reclamation engineers participated in both of these
meetings, including Commissioner Mead and Chief Design Engineer Savage.
Reclamation’s ﬁrst engineering publication, entitled High-Pressure
Reservoir Outlets—A Report on Bureau of Reclamation Installations by
J. M. Gaylord, Electrical Engineer, and J. L. Savage, Designing Engineer,
was published in 1923.19 This book of 179 pages included information and
reproductions of drawings on the outlet works designed for and constructed
at many Reclamation dams, including Minidoka, Belle Fourche, Strawberry,
Lahontan, Minitare, Jackson Lake, Sherburne Lake, and McDonald Dams
(McDonald Dam was designed and constructed by the Service under an agreement
with Interior’s Indian Affairs Ofﬁce). A second engineering publication, entitled
Dams and Control Works, was published by Reclamation in 1929.20 This book
of 164 pages included information written by Reclamation engineers on various
diversion and storage dams, including Tieton, McKay, Guernsey, American
Falls, and Echo Dams. A section of miscellaneous articles presented information
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on topics such as: “Corewalls for Earth and Rockﬁll Dams,” and “Design and
Construction of Small Earth Dams.” And the Appendix included a reprint of
the recent speciﬁcations on Echo Dam. Included in the article on “Design and
Construction of Small Earth Dams” was a material placement recommendation
for two-zone embankment dams. This recommendation called for placement
of the selected water-tight material in the upstream portion of the dam, and of
the heavy, stable, free draining material such as sand, gravel, and stone in the
downstream portion, distributed such that the coarser material was placed on the
downstream slope, changing gradually to the ﬁner and more claylike material
as the impervious material in the upstream portion of the dam was reached.
The importance of the proper placement of soils with ﬁne-grained vs. coarsegrained gradations within a dam embankment became much better understood
subsequently in the 1940s and 1950s.
Field and laboratory testing of soil and rock materials also began to
emerge during the 1920s and early 1930s. In addition to the pioneering soil
mechanics work by Dr. Terzaghi on topics such as soil permeability, others
contributed greatly to the evolution of soil and rock testing in the attempt to
characterize these materials. Reclamation’s Earth Materials Laboratory was
established in Denver at the U.S. Customs House in the fall of 1933. The
primary duties of the new Earth Materials Laboratory “were to determine the
characteristics of proposed embankment and foundation soils, to work with the
design section in planning ﬁeld control tests on the foundation and compacted
embankment, and to train construction inspectors in the test procedure.”21 While
the subject of soil compaction and optimum moisture content had been written
about as early as 1907, Ralph R. Proctor developed a soil test procedure in 1933
that established the principles of soil compaction and moisture content and their
application. A four-article series was published by Engineering News-Record
beginning on August 31, 1933. Proctor’s compaction control test standard was
quickly adopted by every engineer and organization involved with embankment
dams, which was a major milestone in the history of embankment dam design
and construction. In addition to performing Proctor’s density test, Reclamation’s
Earth Materials Laboratory used or developed a variety of soil testing equipment
and procedures, which included mechanical (grain size) analysis, penetration
resistance (on compaction specimens), percolation and settlement, consolidation,
shear strength, speciﬁc gravity, and soluble solids. The laboratory also began
to conduct studies and experimentation on different methods of compaction, on
the percolation rates in different soils, on porewater pressure movement through
different soils, and on consolidation rates of different soils. The rapid drawdown
failure of the upstream slope at Belle Fourche Dam in 1931 indicated that there
was still a lot for Reclamation’s engineers to learn about soil mechanics and
earthﬁll embankments.
As Period II began, World War I advances in mechanized equipment
such as tanks and trucks led to the post-war development of new construction
equipment. Gasoline engines were now used to power 5-ton trucks for hauling
98

earthﬁll materials more quickly and with greater economy. The new 15horsepower Caterpillar tractor was introduced and could be used to pull a roller
for earthﬁll compaction, a Fresno scraper for moving earthﬁll, or a bulldozer
for excavating and moving earth materials. Further development of largersized engines lead to more powerful Caterpillar tractors and other construction
equipment during Period II. As discussed on Echo and Cle Elum Dams, the use
of sheepsfoot tamping rollers for compacting earthﬁll materials on Reclamation’s
embankment dams began in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Period III (1934-1944)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam
Design and Construction
Reclamation’s state-of-the-practice in embankment dam design and
construction at the beginning of Period III had developed to a fairly high
degree of sophistication. Reclamation’s projects and dams were often written
about in publications like Engineering News-Record and its engineers’ papers
were often published in ASCE’s Transactions. Reclamation’s reputation and
those of its engineers were well established in the West and the United States.
Reclamation’s evolution in concrete dams peaked during Period III with the
design and construction of Hoover Dam. While the concrete dams received more
notice nationally and worldwide, Reclamation designed and constructed several
milestone embankment dams during Period III.
Reclamation’s centralized engineering design and construction
organization and the Chief Engineer in the Denver Ofﬁce were well established
and empowered. Reclamation’s Chief Engineers during Period III were Raymond
F. Walter (mentioned earlier under Period II) and Sinclair O. Harper, and J. L.
Savage remained the Chief Design Engineer during the entire period.
The embankment dams designed and constructed during Period III
involved some revolutionary changes and they were larger and more numerous
than ever before. At about the same time, testing of earth materials, construction
testing for compaction and moisture control, and engineering design specialization
all became part of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction
process. The installation of performance monitoring instruments in Reclamation’s
embankment dams became standard procedure during this period.
Data from laboratory testing, construction control testing, and performance
measurements obtained on Reclamation’s embankment dams were collected and
analyzed by the specialized embankment dam design group, which determined
that soil as a construction material was extremely variable and very sensitive. The
data also indicated that the performance characteristics of many types of ordinary
soil could not be adequately deﬁned by the existing tests and procedures. Hence,
the earthﬁll construction practices then in use would not necessarily produce the
desired consistent performance. While attempting to solve these concerns and
problems, the successful empirical design and construction practices historically
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used with success by Reclamation continued to be followed. Government
regulations covering concerns such as working hours, transportation of
equipment, safety, and wage rates became part of the process.
Many notable embankment dams were designed and constructed by
Reclamation during Period III. These included: Hyrum, Pineview, Agency Valley,
Rye Patch, Taylor Park, Moon Lake, Alcova, Caballo, Bull Lake, Midview,
Fresno, Green Mountain, Deer Creek, Vallecito, and Anderson Ranch Dams (the
latter dam wasn’t actually completed until 1947). All of these embankment dams
were constructed as compacted earthﬁll structures. The dams had upstream slopes
ranging from 3:1 to 3.5:1 with ﬂatter slopes at the (upstream) toe where material
needed to be wasted, and had downstream slopes ranging from 2:1 to 2.5:1,
similarly with ﬂatter slopes at the (downstream) toe. These dams were built on
a variety of foundations; almost all of them included a cutoff trench excavated
down through the overburden soils to bedrock and quite a few of them included
concrete cutoff walls in the bottom of the cutoff trench. The cutoff trenches
moved toward the center of the dam. The rock(ﬁll) material produced from
required excavations, that was unsuitable for use as upstream riprap, was often
placed on the downstream slope of the embankment.
Pineview Dam, completed in 1936 with an initial maximum height of
about 55 feet above streambed, included a steel sheet pile cutoff in the foundation,
which was later determined to be ineffective, causing little if any porewater
pressure drop in the seepage percolating downstream. The dam’s crest was raised
about 29 feet in 1955.
Taylor Park Dam, completed in 1937 with a maximum height of 167 feet
above the streambed, was constructed as an embankment dam at a good concrete
damsite because of its remoteness. Comparative cost estimates were developed
for both types of dam, and they indicated little difference in cost. Contractors
were allowed to submit alternative bids, and an embankment dam was the
low bid. This reportedly indicated that earthﬁll construction had developed to
the point where it could be cost competitive with concrete dam construction
at a damsite suited to either type of dam. A large rockﬁll zone mantles the
downstream slope.
Alcova Dam, completed in 1938 with a maximum height of 185 feet above
the streambed, was a fairly complex embankment dam. The foundation consisted
of sedimentary rock dipping downstream that had quite different permeabilities,
artesian pressure in one bedrock layer, and hot sulfurous groundwater. An
extensive “U”-shaped grout curtain was constructed in the foundation and up
the abutments to control seepage and uplift. A concrete gallery was constructed
on top of the excavated bedrock to provide access for drilling drain holes and
to perform additional foundation grouting if the need arose. Alcova Dam was
thoroughly instrumented with the new hydrostatic pressure indicators at three
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sections of the embankment to monitor porewater pressures. A large rockﬁll zone
mantled the downstream slope.
Fresno Dam, completed in 1939 with a maximum height of 75 feet above
the streambed, was built on a very soft foundation of questionable strength.
Consolidation of the foundation and settlement of the embankment became major
problems as construction progressed. A theoretical approach and the results of
plate bearing tests of the foundation were used to estimate the total settlement,
which was estimated to be relatively minor. However, the actual settlement has
been in excess of 8 feet, about half of which occurred during construction. The
base of the dam embankment was widened, primarily to avoid abrupt changes
in the stress in the foundation and to distribute the load from the embankment.
Piezometers were installed in the embankment for the ﬁrst time to monitor the
development of construction porewater pressures in the earthﬁll. The control of
embankment compaction and earthﬁll moisture content proved to be effective in
controlling the earthﬁll porewater pressures.
Green Mountain Dam, completed in 1943 with a maximum height
of 274 feet above the streambed, was the highest embankment dam yet built
by Reclamation. Collectively, Green Mountain, Deer Creek, and Vallecito
Dams marked Reclamation’s initial use of geological data in formulating the
embankment dam’s design. The alignment of Green Mountain Dam was shifted
downstream to avoid an old landslide in the left abutment. The upstream
foundation was excavated to bedrock to remove potentially unstable foundation
material. Shale bedrock unexpectedly deteriorated rapidly on exposure to the air,
which was addressed by spraying an asphalt coating on the shale immediately
after it was cleaned off. This procedure became standard practice on Reclamation
dams whenever shale is encountered. The borrow material was processed to
remove the cobble-size (plus 3-inch) particles from the earthﬁll used to construct
the embankment. The compacted earthﬁll at Green Mountain Dam achieved
the highest dry density yet at 132 lb/ft3. Even at this high density, constructioninduced porewater pressures in the embankment caused by the weight of the ﬁll
were excessive. Studies were begun to discover what could be done to avoid this
effect, with the ﬁnding that slight reductions in moisture content in the earthﬁll
caused a marked reduction in the earthﬁll porewater pressures. Construction
practices on Reclamation’s embankment dams were changed accordingly.
Anderson Ranch Dam, started in 1941 and completed in 1947 with
a maximum height of 344 feet above the streambed and with a cutoff trench
excavated a maximum of 112 feet to bedrock, set a new record as the World’s
highest embankment dam. The scheme developed on Green Mountain Dam
to carefully control the earthﬁll moisture content to avoid excessively high
porewater pressures was followed on Anderson Ranch Dam, but it wasn’t until
near the end of construction that the moisture content control effort effectively
controlled the porewater pressures. The designed upstream and downstream
slopes gradually ﬂatten from crest to toe, going from 3:1 to 3.5:1 on the upstream
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slope and from 2:1 to 2.5:1 to 8:1 on the downstream slope. This was done in
an attempt to balance the cost savings from minimizing the embankment volume
(steeper slopes) vs. the need to maintain adequate slope stability (ﬂatter slopes).
In 1941, the design of the embankment slopes on Anderson Ranch Dam was
based with some conﬁdence on the results of the slope stability analyses and the
earthﬁll strength data developed by Reclamation’s Earth Materials Laboratory.
The contractor on Anderson Ranch Dam introduced a number of innovations
during construction, including the use of a belt conveyor system for transporting
the borrow material to the embankment, with facilities for adding moisture to the
material moving along the belt conveyor.
After Dr. Terzaghi and others began to develop geotechnical engineering
during Period II, and after the First and Second Congress on Large Dams
meetings in 1933 and 1936, Reclamation’s engineers joined the national and
worldwide efforts in advancing the new ﬁeld as it related to embankment
dams. Reclamation continued to develop and make available information on its
engineering work. A second edition of Dams and Control Works was published
in February 1938.22 This soft-cover 261-page book, again written by Reclamation
engineers, contained three parts: One: Storage Dams; Two: Diversion Dams; and
Three: Special Articles. Part 3 still included an article by engineer F. F. Smith
on “Design and Construction of Small Earth Dams.” Paragraph 5 of that article
contains the statement:
Among Engineers charged with the responsibility for the safety of large
earth dams, it is appreciated that the outworn empirical methods have
given way to thorough preconstruction investigations, careful theoretical
design, and construction on known and deﬁnite principles of soil
mechanics.23

A ﬁgure in the article on page 254 portrays “Methods of Zoning Earth Dams,”
and notes that zones 2 and 3 (zone 2 ﬂanks the zone 1 impervious core and zone
3 is located between zone 2 and the rockﬁll zone on the downstream slope)
“are roughly graded from ﬁne material at the inner slopes to coarse at the outer
slopes.” This grading from ﬁner grained material at the zone 1 core to coarser
grained material toward the outer slopes was generally used on Reclamation’s
embankment dams, and provides the ﬁltering action necessary to prevent soil
“internal erosion” (piping). Dr. Terzaghi seems to have started the work to
develop rational ﬁlter criteria. The results of his work and the research work
by George E. Bertram with the assistance of Dr. Terzaghi and Professor Arthur
Casagrande (Honorary Member, ASCE) resulted in a paper by Bertram24 that
is generally given the credit as the ﬁrst document on ﬁlter criteria. The Corps
conducted its own research into ﬁlters in the early 1940s.
Field and laboratory testing of soil and rock materials continued to be
reﬁned in response to the need of designers to better characterize those materials
for potential use in embankment dams. As noted above in the discussion of
Anderson Ranch Dam, the Earth Materials Laboratory was able to provide the
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engineering data necessary to optimize the design of the embankment slopes to be
constructed.
Reclamation’s instrumentation for and monitoring of embankment dams
continued to be improved, with the development and installation in 1935 of
13 water level indicators (WLI) at Hyrum Dam and 12 more WLIs at Agency
Valley Dam. The water level indicators were a combination manometer and
piezometer, but it was not sufﬁciently accurate. This led to the development of
the hydrostatic pressure indicator (HPI), a modiﬁcation of the Goldbeck cell,
which were installed at Caballo Dam, Alcova Dam, and several other dams in
1938 and 1939. The hydrostatic pressure indicator used a thin gold-plated monelmetal diaphragm, which used air pressure on one side to balance and measure the
porewater pressure on the other side of the diaphragm. The HPIs were installed
in the embankment as it was constructed, and copper tubing was run in trenches
from the instrument to the embankment surface where a recording apparatus
could be attached and operated to measure the porewater pressure. Reclamation
developed the more-rugged hydraulic piezometer that could be installed in
either the foundation or the embankment; the ﬁrst 72 hydraulic piezometers
were installed at Fresno Dam in 1939. Reclamation also developed the internal
vertical movement device, which was ﬁrst installed at Caballo Dam in 1936.
The device was installed as the embankment was constructed and allowed the
vertical consolidation behavior of the embankment to be measured at 5- or 10-foot
intervals and also measured the settlement of the foundation at the bottom.
During Period III the equipment available for the construction of
embankment dams continued to improve in size, power, speed, and efﬁciency.
The rockﬁll zones included in these dam embankments could now be constructed
because the construction equipment now permitted the handling of larger and
larger sizes of rock particles, which were usually obtained from the required
excavations for the outlet works and/or spillway. The improved construction
equipment and improved techniques for dewatering below the groundwater table
allowed the excavation of cutoff trenches through overburden soils to become
larger and deeper where necessary.
Period IV (1945-1975)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam
Design and Construction
Reclamation’s state-of-the-practice in embankment dam design and
construction at the beginning of Period IV had developed to quite a high degree
of sophistication. Reclamation’s projects and dams were generally written about
in engineering and construction publications as indicative of the state of the
practice. The reputations of Reclamation and its engineers continued to grow as
more milestone embankment dams were designed and constructed during Period
IV. Reclamation’s Chief Engineers during Period IV were Walker R. Young,
Leslie N. McClellan, Grant Bloodgood, (both McClellan and Bloodgood were
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also Assistant Commissioners), Bernard P. Bellport, and Harold G. Arthur (both
Bellport and Arthur were also titled Director, Ofﬁce of Design and Construction).
The embankment dams designed and constructed during Period IV
generally involved more difﬁcult and complex damsites than had been built on
before, and the resulting designs were more complex. After World War II, a new
rush of dam construction occurred because of the delays caused by the war. The
multi-purpose dam and project came into being at Reclamation, expanding its
previous focus on irrigation projects and storage dams. Signiﬁcant improvements
were made to the construction equipment available at the start of Period IV.
Laboratory testing of earthﬁll materials saw new improvements in the
quality and size of the apparatuses and instrumentation available for conducting
soil and rock testing, aided especially by the introduction of computers for
automated data acquisition during testing. Starting around 1957, Reclamation
started to use computers in laboratory testing and in the analysis of slope
stability. Larger sizes of testing equipment allowed research and development
of data on the effects of larger-size particles on the shear strength of the true
matrix of earthﬁll materials being used in embankment dams. The improved
instrumentation used in monitoring the testing allowed them to be run more
slowly and allowed for the measurement of porewater pressures generated during
shearing of the saturated specimens. Reclamation’s research into ﬁlters was
conducted by K. P. Karpoff, which led to The Use of Laboratory Tests to Develop
Design Criteria for Protective Filters published in 1955.25
In October 1961 Waco Dam in Texas, a Corps dam, suffered a slope failure
during construction that dropped the crest 18 feet vertically and caused horizontal
movements of up to 26 feet downstream. The slope failure was caused by a
combination of high porewater pressures in the foundation clay shale generated
by the weight of the overlying embankment that were transmitted through a sand
layer and the failure of the low shear strength clay-shale foundation. Research on
testing the Waco Dam foundation clay-shale material and improvements in slope
stability analyses resulted from that event (this became important to Reclamation
at the end of Period IV and the beginning of Period V).
Shefﬁeld Dam near Santa Barbara, California, had failed in 1925 due
to earthquake-induced soil liquefaction in the dam’s foundation. Reclamation
became more concerned about the seismic stability of its embankment dams in
the late 1940s and early 1950s, and a technical memorandum entitled Seismic
Stability of Earth Dams26 by Civil Engineer Elbert E. Esmiol (Life Member,
ASCE and USCOLD/USSD) was published in April 1951. Several large
earthquakes occurred during Period IV, which led to the development of new soil
tests and methods of analysis, trying to model the loading of and the response
by the various soils that occurred during those earthquakes. The powerful
earthquakes that occurred at Nigata, Japan, and in Alaska in 1964 caused
geotechnical engineers to begin research on how to model the soil behavior called
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“liquefaction” that was exhibited by sandy soils during those events. The nearfailure and breaching of Lower Van Norman (San Fernando) Dam during the 1971
earthquake that hit the Los Angeles area caused a renewed burst of research into
soil liquefaction, ﬁeld and laboratory testing, and modeling of the deformations
that occurred in the upstream portion of the Lower Van Norman Dam, a
hydraulic-ﬁll embankment. Reclamation’s Soils Engineering Branch participated
in the post-earthquake evolution of ﬁeld and laboratory testing of liquefactionsusceptible sandy soils. Starting around 1962, computers had begun to be used
to analyze soil stresses with the newly-developed ﬁnite-element method of
analysis. This analysis method was subsequently upgraded to allow the Lower
Van Norman Dam embankment and foundation to be modeled, and to estimate the
deformations produced by the earthquake shaking for comparison with the actual
deformations.
Many embankment dams were designed and constructed by Reclamation
during Period IV. These included: Davis, Granby, Martinez, Box Butte,
Scoﬁeld, Shadow Mountain, Cascade, Dixon Canyon, Spring Canyon, Soldier
Canyon, Long Lake, Dry Falls, O’Sullivan, Jackson Gulch, Enders, Medicine
Creek, Heart Butte, Bonny, Cedar Bluff, Shadehill, Dickinson, Trenton,
Kirwin, Webster, Cachuma, Carter Lake, Glen Anne, Lauro, Rattlesnake, Tiber,
Jamestown, Palisades, Sly Park, Wanship, Lovewell, Casitas, Vega, Trinity,
Navajo, Fontenelle, Merritt, San Luis, Soldier Creek, Pueblo, and Teton Dams.
These Period IV embankment dams generally had upstream slopes that ranged
from 2.5:1 to 3.5:1, with ﬂatter slopes ranging from 4:1 to 20:1 at the toe where
excess material could be wasted. The steep 2.5:1 upstream slopes were used only
where an upstream rockﬁll zone created the necessary strength and stability. The
downstream slopes ranged from 2:1 to 2.5:1, similarly with ﬂatter slopes ranging
from 3.5:1 to 20:1 at the toe. These dams were built on a variety of foundations;
all of them were either founded on bedrock or they included a cutoff trench
excavated down through the overburden soils to bedrock, and quite a few of them
included concrete cutoff walls in the bottom of the cutoff trench. The cutoff
trenches remained near the upstream center of the dam. The rockﬁll material
from required excavations was generally placed and compacted in the outer slopes
of the embankment.
Granby Dam, completed in 1948 with a maximum height of 235 feet
above the streambed, encountered several construction problems that were
successfully dealt with. A signiﬁcant change in the borrow source for the
embankment was accomplished with little adverse effect on the schedule. An
attempt was made to use the surface mapping of the damsite’s geology instead of
the usual amount of investigative drilling; however, the use of this approach (used
elsewhere) proved to be inappropriate due to the complex geology of the damsite.
The construction experience on Granby Dam was discussed in F. C. Walker’s
publication:
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It was necessary to perform additional grouting after the structure was
placed in operation. However, this grouting was accomplished so
economically that portions of other dams have since been left ungrouted
until actual performance indicates a need for such treatment.27

This insight into Reclamation’s foundation grouting design philosophy by the then
Head of the Earth Dams Section becomes more meaningful when Fontenelle and
Teton Dams are discussed.
Davis Dam, which spans the Colorado River, was completed in 1950
with a maximum height of 138 feet above streambed. This dam represented
an important advancement because of the diversion scheme for bypassing the
large ﬂow of the river around the damsite. That diversion was accomplished
by excavating an open channel through the left abutment that was later closed
by the construction of a concrete dam, which contained the spillway and the
hydroelectric powerplant penstocks.28
Construction of Enders, Medicine Creek, and Heart Butte Dams and
several other embankment dams were all begun around 1946 and 1947 in the
Great Plains area where the foundations generally consisted of relatively weak
Cretaceous and Tertiary formations of sand, silt, and/or clay. These formations
tend to be fairly permeable if sandy or structurally weak if clayey. The valley
ﬂoors are generally broad and are covered with moderately deep alluvium. The
available borrow materials usually ranged from sandy silts to silty clays, with both
gravel and rock (suitable for use as riprap) scarce to nonexistent. These damsites
also had stream ﬂows that were highly variable, with large ﬂoods possible. It
proved to be cheaper to increase the size of the reservoir to increase ﬂood-storage
capacity rather than build a larger spillway.
Cachuma (Bradbury) Dam, completed in 1953 with a maximum height
of 206 feet above the streambed, was constructed in a highly seismic area close
to where Shefﬁeld Dam had failed during an earthquake in 1925. The design
of the embankment dam was therefore more conservative than otherwise would
have been necessary. A large amount of siltstone and shale rockﬁll was produced
by the spillway excavation, and this otherwise unsuitable material was used by
enclosing it entirely within the downstream sand and gravel zone. In one of
the ﬁrst applications of this type, a concrete “grout cap” was constructed at the
bedrock surface in the center-bottom of the cutoff trench at Cachuma Dam to
provide ﬁrm support for the curtain grouting of the foundation beneath the dam.
Tiber Dam, completed in 1956 with a maximum height of 196 feet above
the streambed, was built on a shale foundation that contained numerous seams
of low shear strength bentonite clay. Hence, the foundation shear strength was
uncertain. The earthﬁll materials available for use as the embankment’s central
core varied widely in characteristics and shear strength, which was expected to
be low. The embankment cross section therefore reﬂected these concerns with a
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waste material disposal zone between the upstream cofferdam and the upstream
slope, and with downstream slopes ranging from 2.25:1 near the crest to 5.5:1
toward the toe. The embankment also included zones ﬂanking both sides of the
core that transition between the ﬁner-grained clay, silt, sand, and gravel core
founded on bedrock and the coarser outer shells that consisted of sand, gravel, and
cobbles.
Palisades Dam, completed in 1957 with a maximum height of 260 feet
above the streambed, was one of the largest embankment dams yet built by
Reclamation. The embankment volume of over 13,500,000 yd3 caused the design
to use nearby borrow materials that might otherwise have been rejected. The
borrow soils available were pervious sand and gravel alluvium on the valley ﬂoor
and impervious soils along the abutments, which had moisture contents either too
high or too low with respect to optimum moisture for compaction. There was also
some concern about potentially high construction porewater pressures created
by the weight of the ﬁll. The design was adjusted to place the better but wetter
borrow soils in the lower and central parts of the embankment and the drier but
poorer borrow soils in the upper and outer parts of the embankment, while still
maintaining adequate slope stability.
Sly Park Dam, completed in 1954 with a maximum height of 175 feet
above the streambed, was one of the ﬁrst and few rockﬁll embankment dam
designs built by Reclamation. The upstream rockﬁll slope was 2.5:1 and the
downstream rockﬁll slope was 2:1. Because of the size of the rockﬁll particles,
the rockﬁll material could not be tested in the laboratory. The design therefore
had to assume that the shear strength should reﬂect the natural slopes of the loose
rock in the vicinity (the angle of repose). Again, the central core of compacted
silt, sand, and gravel was ﬂanked by transition zones, consisting of quarry ﬁnes
in this case. Because of the difference between the properties of the compacted
central core and the rockﬁll shells, differential consolidation between these zones
later caused longitudinal cracks along the crest.
Although vibratory rollers had been developed for compacting
cohesionless soils for roads in Europe in the 1930s, they were ﬁrst used to
compact rockﬁll dam materials at Quoich Dam in Scotland around 1958. In the
United States, the use of vibratory rollers for compaction of rockﬁll materials was
ﬁrst attempted by the Corps at the 445-foot-high Cougar Dam in Oregon, built
between 1959 and 1964. Reclamation ﬁrst used smooth steel-drum vibratory
rollers to compact a sand and gravel zone at Navajo Dam in 1959.29
Trinity Dam, completed in 1962 with a maximum height of 465 feet above
the streambed, is the highest embankment dam ever designed and constructed
by Reclamation, and its volume of 29,400,000 yd3 made it the largest yet built.
Almost all of the overburden material was excavated such that the embankment
rested almost entirely on bedrock. The embankment contained four zones,
grading from the central core to outer toe zones of rockﬁll. The upstream slope
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ranged from 2.5:1 in the upper slope to 4:1 in the lower rockﬁll toe zone. The
downstream slope ranged from 2:1 near the crest to 3:1 in the lower rockﬁll toe
zone. The upstream and downstream rockﬁll toe zones were added to improve
stability; the rockﬁll was placed in 3-foot-thick layers (without compaction). A
belt conveyor system over 10,000 feet long, that dropped 1,000 feet in elevation
and handled 1,850 yd3/hr, moved a total of about 10,000,000 yd3 of earthﬁll
material from the borrow area to the damsite.
Navajo Dam, completed in 1963 with a maximum height of 388 feet above
streambed, had a miscellaneous earthﬁll zone downstream of the central core
that was completely enclosed within a zone of “selected sand, gravel, cobbles,
and boulders.” That selected sand, gravel, cobbles, and boulders zone formed an
inclined transition/drain zone between the core and the miscellaneous earthﬁll and
formed a blanket/drain zone against the downstream bedrock foundation.
Fontenelle Dam, completed in 1964 with a maximum height of 128 feet
above streambed, included: irrigation canal outlet works in both abutments, a
river outlet works near the middle of the dam capable of passing 18,700 ft3/s, a
hydroelectric powerplant, and a right abutment overﬂow spillway of 20,000 ft3/s
capacity at full pool. The river outlet works was large because it was less costly
than increasing the size of the spillway. The embankment cross-section is shown
in 2.11. The embankment zoning included: the zone 1 core, the zone 2
chimney and blanket drain of selected (pit run alluvium) sand, gravel, and

2.11. Fontenelle Dam section.

cobbles, and a zone 3 miscellaneous ﬁll that was completely enclosed within the
Zone 2. The surface of the bedrock foundation was far more broken than had
been anticipated, so the cutoff trench was deepened by 6 feet. The foundation and
abutments were grouted by a single-row grout curtain installed through a grout
cap. Grout “takes” in the upper 65 feet of the foundation were very large and
a second line of grout holes was placed in the vicinity of the river outlet works
and in the right abutment to perform additional grouting. The grouting program
included a total of 45,900 linear feet of drill hole and 143,000 ft3 of cement
grout pumped into the foundation, for an average grout take of 3.1 ft3 per foot of
hole. Reservoir ﬁlling was to be very slow so that if any seepage leaks occurred,
they could be plugged before permanent operations commenced—remember the
previous reservoir ﬁlling and additional grouting experience on Granby Dam.
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There was no surface treatment of the foundation rock beneath the zone 1 core,
such as slush (lean cement) grouting of surface cracks, and smoothing of the
foundation with dental concrete.
First ﬁlling of the 345,000 acre-foot reservoir commenced in April 1964.
During the summer of 1964, after the reservoir had risen to a depth of about
49 feet, seepage appeared in the ﬂoor of an exhausted borrow area 2,000 feet
downstream of the dam and stabilized at a ﬂow of 6 ft3/s. The reservoir continued
to ﬁll through the spring runoff from the heavy snowpack winter of 1964-1965
(which produced a peak reservoir inﬂow of 17,560 ft3/s) until it reached a depth
of about 85 feet in early June 1965. Seepage then began to discharge from a
rock cut in the spillway discharge channel and from a cliff face about 0.6-mile
downstream on the left abutment. The seepage ﬂowing from the downstream
borrow area also appeared to have increased. The reservoir began to spill on
June 15th and the rate of total seepage increased to about 70 ft3/s. A small slough
occurred at the edge of the embankment on the left side of the spillway chute at
about the mid-height of the dam on June 29th, with about 1 ft3/s issuing from a
crack in the rock beneath the chute. On the morning of September 3rd, a wet spot
was observed on the downstream slope of the dam at about mid-height near the
right abutment about 100 feet to the right of the slough that occurred in June. By
mid-afternoon, seepage water started ﬂowing from the wet spot area, causing
erosion and sloughing of the dam embankment material. The ﬂow that evening
was estimated at about 5 ft3/s. Local ofﬁcials were then alerted to stand by, ready
to evacuate downstream residents. The next morning (September 4th), the seepage
ﬂows had increased to about 21 ft3/s and an estimated 10,500 yd3 of material had

2.12. Fontenelle Dam: Large sinkhole on downstream slope.
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been eroded from the downstream slope (see 2.12). Rockﬁll was dumped into
the hole on the downstream slope, trying to stop the erosion, and the seepage
ﬂows appeared to stabilize. On the morning of September 5th, it was decided to
fully open the outlet works, and by the morning of the 6th the reservoir level had
dropped 8 feet from the initial level. That afternoon, an area on the dam crest
about 20 feet in diameter near the upstream edge collapsed (see 2.13) and dropped
about 30 feet, exposing bedrock on the abutment side of the cavity. The reservoir
continued to drop about 4 feet per day until the pool was low enough to halt the
seepage.

2.13. Fontenelle Dam: Crest sinkhole.

There were several causes for the near-breaching (and near-failure) of
Fontenelle Dam, which was barely avoided because of the large outlet works
capacity. According to Chief Engineer Bellport’s “appraisal of the accident”
included in his paper Bureau of Reclamation Experience in Stabilizing
Embankment of Fontenelle Earth Dam30 presented at the 1967 ICOLD Conference
in Istanbul, Turkey, “It is apparent that the weak spot was in the abutment and not
the embankment. Many dams have been placed on similar foundations.… With
steep abutments, it is difﬁcult to obtain adequate shallow grouting because of the
low pressures that must be used to prevent movement in the foundation.”31 The
single row grout curtain was judged to have been inadequate, given the nature
of the sedimentary shale and sandstone bedrock jointing in the abutments. The
problem was (supposedly) ﬁxed by a grouting program consisting of eight lines of
grout holes in the steep right abutment; a total of 80,000 feet of hole was drilled
and an additional 200,000 ft3 of grout were pumped into the abutments during
August-December 1966. Bellport commented in the paper that
In the 20-year span from 1940 to 1960, increasing boldness in reducing
the number of lines and amount of grout seemed to be proving a
philosophy that grouting was mostly superﬂuous. At the Bureau of
Reclamation too, in situations where deﬁciencies could be readily
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remedied, the process of “try and see” was being used with increasing
success until the situation at Fontenelle Dam was encountered.32

Further,
This difﬁculty occurred on ﬁrst ﬁlling of the reservoir which was
unusually rapid due to extremely large inﬂows and the fact that the outlet
work was not being used so that some repair work could be performed.
This experience illustrates the need for slow, controlled ﬁlling of
reservoirs where unfavorable foundation conditions are known to exist.33

Within Reclamation, it appears that information on the near failure of Fontenelle
Dam may not have been widely distributed, but other organizations, such as
the Corps, reportedly changed some of their embankment dam design and
construction practices after reviewing this incident. Fontenelle Dam will be
discussed further under Period V.
Merritt Dam, completed in 1964 with a maximum height of 120 feet
above the original ground surface, was the ﬁrst embankment dam that used
“soil cement” instead of rock riprap to protect the upstream slope. Merritt Dam
is located on the Snake River in north-central Nebraska where the usual rock
riprap material was not economically available. Reclamation had developed
and successfully used soil cement on a test section constructed in 1951 at Bonny
Reservoir in eastern Colorado. Since its ﬁrst success at Merritt Dam, soil cement
slope protection has been used on twelve more embankment dams by Reclamation
and on countless other structures.
San Luis Dam, completed in 1967 with a maximum height of 244
feet above the original ground surface and a volume of over 77,000,000 yd3,
is the largest embankment dam by volume ever designed and constructed by
Reclamation. The embankment included a central impervious core with a volume
of about 42,000,000 yd3. The borrow material was excavated using a BucyrusErie wheel excavator with a 30-foot-diameter digging wheel equipped with ten
2½ yd3 buckets. This machine had a capacity of about 4,000 yd3/hr and loaded a
100-ton Euclid bottom-dump truck every 45 seconds. In September 1981 a
rapid-drawdown of the reservoir led to a slide in the upstream slope that was
caused by a weak clay layer in the foundation. The slide was about 1,300 feet
long and involved the reconstruction of the upstream slope and construction of a
berm along the toe, with a total volume of about 1.4 million yd3.
Soldier Creek Dam, completed in 1973 with a maximum height of 251 feet
above streambed, was built to enlarge the reservoir originally impounded by the
1913-era Strawberry Dam, which was then breached when the water on both sides
equalized. The design and construction of Soldier Creek Dam were similar to
Fontenelle Dam. Soldier Creek Dam was one of seven dams (both embankment
and concrete dams) selected by the Department of the Interior for a postTeton 1977 study by W. A. Wahler & Associates to review recently completed
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Reclamation dams. Soldier Creek Dam will be discussed further in the Period V
section.
Pueblo Dam, completed in 1975 with a height of 165 feet above original
ground, is a composite dam consisting of a concrete massive-head buttress
structure containing the 550-foot- long spillway, ﬂanked by two earthﬁll
embankments. The concrete structure is 1,750 feet long and consists of 23
buttresses with a maximum height of 176 feet. The two wing embankments
wrapped around the ends of the concrete structure and consist of the 3,570-footlong left embankment and the 4,910-foot-long right embankment. Bedrock at
the damsite consists of ﬂat-lying Cretaceous sediments in alternating units of
sandstone, limestone, and shale. The concrete dam section was founded on
Dakota sandstone and the embankments rest partly on alluvium in the valley
bottom and on Graneros shale on the gently rising abutments. The Dakota
sandstone contained a few discontinuous lenses and seams of shale. The Graneros
shale contained a number of seams of bentonite clay up to 6 inches thick. When
the left embankment had risen to within about 20 feet of the ﬁnal crest elevation
in November 1973, the inclinometer casing located at the downstream toe at
station 90+00 indicated a downstream shear deformation through the casing that
prevented the lowering of the inclinometer instrument. Additional inclinometer
casings were installed along the downstream toe of the left embankment, which
ﬁnally indicated the deformation had stopped, after reaching a total of about
6 inches of downstream deformation. There were no piezometers installed in
the shale or the bentonite clay seams prior to embankment construction that
might have indicated the amount of construction-induced porewater pressure
in the foundation. Sampling and laboratory testing of the Graneros shale were
performed, and ﬁnite element analyses were conducted to help judge whether
a long-term stability problem was indicated by this foundation deformation.
This left embankment deformation in the foundation, which occurred during
construction, appears to have been similar to what occurred during construction
at Waco Dam in 1961, although not to the same degree. The left and right
embankments were both completed and the dam and reservoir were put into
service. Pueblo Dam will be discussed further in the Period V section.
Teton Dam was constructed between February 1972 and November 1975
with a maximum height of 305 feet above the streambed. The embankment crosssection was remarkably similar to that of Fontenelle Dam (see 2.14). The wide
zone 1 core consisted of silt, ﬂanked upstream and downstream by zone 2, which
consisted of (pit-run alluvium) selected sand, gravel, and cobbles. There was also
a zone 3 miscellaneous earthﬁll zone downstream, with zone 2 constructed as a
chimney ﬁlter/drain and as a 20-foot-thick drainage blanket beneath the zone 3
and up the abutments. The outlet works at Teton Dam consisted of the river outlet
works with a capacity of 3,400 ft3/s and an auxiliary outlet works with a capacity
of 850 ft3/s. The construction schedule required that the river outlet works be
operational by May 1, 1976, but the contractor was behind schedule and only the
auxiliary outlet works were operational to control reservoir ﬁlling.
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2.14. Teton Dam sections.
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Foundation grouting at Teton Dam consisted of 3 lines of grout
holes up to 310 feet deep. A test-grouting program was conducted in 1969 and
was to inject about 260,000 ft3 of grout into the foundation. The actual test
grouting program pumped twice that amount of grout during the pilot grouting
program, and just two of the test holes took 16,000 sacks of cement and 18,000
sacks of sand, for an equivalent total of about 34,000 ft3 of grout. During actual
construction, the grout was injected into 118,179 lineal feet of drilled holes and
totaled: 496,515 ft3 of cement, 82,364 ft3 of sand, 132,000 pounds of bentonite,
and 418,000 pounds of calcium chloride. Looking at just the cement and sand
grout materials, the above ﬁgures equate to about 4.9 ft3 per foot of drill hole, or
an increase of over 50 percent compared to the initial grouting done at Fontenelle
Dam. Beneath the zone 1 core, the rock foundation surface was cleaned using air
and water jets and some open joints and cracks in the bottom of the key trenches
and the cutoff trench were treated by installing pipes and grouting with a grout
slurry, or by ﬁlling with specially compacted zone 1 material. Surface grouting
stopped at elevation 5205.34 The instrumentation installed at Teton Dam consisted
of surface settlement points and strong motion accelerographs; there were no
piezometers installed in the dam embankment or foundation. Reclamation’s
embankment dam design engineers made only two visits to the damsite during
construction; the construction liaison engineer made six visits during construction.
Data on the dam obtained during subsequent investigations were
summarized in the paper “Teton Dam: Summary of Technical Investigations”
by D. J. Duck, R. W. Kramer, and L. W. Davidson that was presented at the 13th
ICOLD Congress in New Delhi, India, in 1979.35 The zone 2 chimney ﬁlter
and drainage blanket located downstream from the core was intended to: ﬁlter
the zone 1, prevent water from attacking the zone 3, reduce seepage pressures,
and transmit seepage ﬂows to the downstream toe. The permeability of the
zone 2 material was not tested prior to construction. The zone 2 contained 2 to
12 percent silt ﬁnes, average 4.5 percent; had been placed at a relative density
ranging from 80 to 120 percent, average 94 percent; and had a permeability that
ranged from 0.7 to 39.3 x 10-6 cm/s, average 9.4 x 10-6 cm/s. The zone 1 silt
had a mean horizontal permeability of 5 x 10-6 cm/s, which was just a bit lower
than the average for the zone 2 material.36 These permeability numbers indicate
that the zone 2 ﬁlter/drain material was nearly as impervious as the zone 1 core
material. According to Peter Aberle, Field Engineer on Teton Dam construction,
when it rained during construction, the water would pond on the zone 2 surface.37
It appears that the as-constructed zone 2 did not have sufﬁcient permeability to
function as the intended blanket drain.
First ﬁlling of the 288,000 acre-foot reservoir commenced in October 1975
with the reservoir at elevation 5060. The design considerations required that the
reservoir not be ﬁlled faster than 1-foot per day above elevation 5200. In early
March 1976, with the reservoir 135 feet deep at elevation 5170, the ﬁlling rate
limit in the design considerations was “relaxed” and ﬁlling rate of 2 feet per day
was “allowed” to accommodate the high reservoir inﬂows from a large snowmelt
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runoff. However, they had no other option but to relax the reservoir ﬁlling rate
limit and accept the 2-foot-per-day rate of rise—the river outlet works weren’t yet
operational! By early May 1976 the reservoir was 185 feet deep. The decision
was “made” (note once again the inoperable river outlet works) around May 13th
to ﬁll the reservoir to the spillway crest, which led to an average ﬁlling rate of
about 3 feet per day, and a maximum rate of 4.3 feet per day. Teton Dam failed
catastrophically on June 5, 1976, when the reservoir had reached the spillway
approach channel at elevation 5301.7. The failure of this embankment dam
killed 11 people, left 25,000 people homeless, inundated partially or completely
an area of about 300 mi2 that extended 80 miles downstream, and did property
damage estimated at about $400 million. This dam failure changed the Bureau
of Reclamation in many, very signiﬁcant ways. The construction of Teton Dam
therefore completes Period IV. The failure of Teton Dam will be discussed further
in the Period V section.
During Period IV, Reclamation’s engineers continued to enjoy national
and worldwide acclaim as they helped to advance the new ﬁeld of geotechnical
engineering and its sub-specialty of embankment dams by conducting research
and publishing reports and professional society papers. Reclamation continued to
develop and make available information on its engineering work. A total of 6,000
copies of the “tentative edition” of Reclamation’s Earth Manual were printed and
distributed in 1951, followed quickly by another 28,000 copies of the “ﬁrst formal
edition.” The Earth Manual was a huge success worldwide and was in great
demand. A First Edition—Revised, Second Printing was printed and distributed
in 1968 with 783 pages. The Earth Manual combined and revised three earlier
manuals: the Earth Materials Laboratory Test Procedures; the Field Manual for
Rolled Earth Dams; and the Earth Materials Investigation Manual. The Earth
Manual was prepared by Reclamation’s engineers in the Earth Dams Section,
Dams Branch, Division of Design, and in the Soils Engineering Branch, Division
of Research, with editing and coordination performed by John (Jack) W. Hilf of
the Earth Dams Section. Reclamation’s Design of Small Dams was published and
distributed in 1960, with a Second Edition released in 1973.
Reclamation’s instrumentation for and monitoring of embankment
dams continued to be improved during Period IV. During the 1950s, several
modiﬁcations were made to the piezometers used on Reclamation’s embankment
dams. The tubing used between the hydraulic piezometer tip and the embankment
surface was updated to polyethylene tubing. In the 1960s, the tubing was updated
again to polypropylene. Reclamation researched and developed the use of
carborundum disks in the hydraulic piezometer tips in the 1950s for improved
measurement of porewater pressures. In 1959 the use of ceramic ﬁlter disks in
the piezometer tips was ﬁrst attempted by Reclamation at Steinaker, Sherman,
and Merritt Dams. The ﬁrst strong-motion earthquake instrument was installed at
Hoover Dam in 1937, and Cachuma (Bradbury) Dam was the ﬁrst embankment
dam to have one installed in 1954. There are now over 20 embankment dams
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instrumented with such devices. As noted earlier, Reclamation seems to have cut
back on the amount of instrumentation installed in its dams during Period IV.
During Period IV, the variety of equipment available for the construction
of embankment dams continued to improve in size, power, speed, and efﬁciency.
As already mentioned, the wheel excavator used at San Luis Dam produced
4,000 yd3 per hour, and the earthﬁll haul trucks used there were 100-ton capacity
bottom-dump wagons. The versatile front-end wheel loader with a bucket of up
to 12 yd3 capacity was added to the construction equipment available. Earthﬁll
compaction rollers and scrapers became self-propelled instead of having to be
towed behind a Caterpillar bulldozer or tractor. After its initial use at Cougar
Dam, the vibratory roller, both the smooth drum and later the tamping pad-foot
varieties, became available for improved compaction of earthﬁll and rockﬁll
materials.
Period V (1976-2002)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam
Design and Construction
At the start of Period V, the failure of Teton Dam on June 5, 1976, began a
chain of events during which Reclamation’s design and construction organizations
changed dramatically. As already mentioned, the ﬁrst ﬁlling of the reservoir was
very rapid, due to the earlier-than-usual high inﬂows from a heavy snowpack in
the mountains upstream. The reservoir inﬂow peaked at around 4,000 ft3/s in midMay. It should be noted again that Teton Dam’s main river outlet works in the left
abutment, with a full-pool capacity of 3,400 ft3/s, was not yet operational because
the regulating gate had not yet been received from the manufacturer. Only the
auxiliary outlet works in the right abutment, with a capacity of only 850 ft3/s,
could be used to control the rate of reservoir ﬁlling, or to lower the reservoir water
surface in the event of a Fontenelle Dam type of emergency drawdown situation.
Hence, even if the main river outlet works had been operational, the releases from
the combined outlet works would have been about equal to the inﬂows and would
not have been able to drop the reservoir pool as had been the case at Fontenelle
Dam.
On June 3rd, with the reservoir at about elevation 5300, two small seeps
ﬂowing about 60 and 40 gal/min were found 1,300 and 1,500 feet, respectively,
downstream of the dam at the base of the right abutment. On June 4th, a small
seep was found ﬂowing about 20 gal/min at the base of the right abutment about
150 to 200 feet downstream from the toe of the embankment. At about 7:00
A.M. on June 5th, a survey party observed a leak coming from the right abutment
at the top of a berm at elevation 5045. It was immediately reported to one
of the ﬁeld engineers who drove to the dam, and at 8:15 A.M. he estimated the
leak to be ﬂowing 20 to 30 ft3/s. At about 9:10 A.M., a slightly muddy leak was
observed exiting from the right abutment at elevation 5200, ﬂowing about 2
ft3/s. The lower leak at elevation 5045 was estimated to be ﬂowing 40 to 50 ft3/s
at about 9:30 A.M. Between 10:00 and 10:30 A.M., a wet spot was observed on
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the downstream slope of the dam at elevation 5200 and about 15 to 20 feet from
the right abutment. The wet spot quickly increased to a ﬂow of 10 to 15 ft3/s
and was eroding the material on the downstream slope. At about 10:30 A.M., a
loud sound (roar) was heard, followed by the sound of rapidly running water. At
about 11:00 A.M., a whirlpool formed in the reservoir about 150 feet from the right
abutment and its diameter rapidly began to expand. By about 11:20 A.M., attempts
to bulldoze rockﬁll into the opening (as had been done at Fontenelle Dam) proved
futile (see 2.15).

2.15. Teton Dam: Downstream sinkhole at about 11:20 A.M.

A sinkhole developed on the downstream slope shortly before the
embankment crest collapsed at 11:55 A.M. (see 2.16), and the dam was breached
two minutes later at 11:57 A.M. (see 2.17). This sequence of observed new
seepage, wet spots, erosion, sinkhole, whirlpool, crest collapse, and embankment
breaching took only ﬁve hours from start to ﬁnish and the complete release of
the reservoir followed. By 5:00 to 6:00 P.M. that same day, the reservoir had
completely emptied.
On June 8, 1976, just three days after the failure of Teton Dam, the
Under Secretary of the Interior, D. Kent Frizzell, established the Department
of the Interior Teton Dam Failure Review Group (IRG) that was formed to
examine the causes of the dam’s failure and to make recommendations as
appropriate to prevent the recurrence of such failures. The IRG was directed
to “review the following aspects of the failure: geologic, engineering, design,
construction, hydrologic factors, and all other pertinent background information
and testimony.” The IRG was composed of representatives from several Federal
Government agencies, such as the Soil Conservation Service, the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Secretary of
the Interior, Thomas S. Kleppe, and the Governor of Idaho, Cecil D. Andrus,
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2.16. Teton Dam: Crest collapsed at 11:55 A.M.

2.17. Teton Dam. Dam completely breached.

empowered another review group of experts not associated with the Federal
Government, who were referred to as the “Independent Panel to Review Cause
of Teton Dam Failure” (Independent Panel). The IRG and the Independent Panel
operated simultaneously from June to December 1976, with ﬁeld investigations
coordinated and the results shared by the two groups. The Independent Panel’s
report Failure of Teton Dam was published in December 1976.38 The IRG’s
Failure of Teton Dam—A Report of Findings was published in April 1977,34
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and its Failure of Teton Dam, Final Report was published in January 1980.39
The reports/conclusions of the IRG and the Independent Panel were in general
agreement, concluding that the failure of Teton Dam had been caused by:
1. Internal erosion (piping) of the core of the dam deep in the right
foundation key trench, with the eroded soil particles ﬁnding exits through
channels in and along the interface of the dam with the highly pervious
abutment rock and talus, to points at the right groin of the dam;
2. Seepage moving through openings that existed in inadequately sealed
rock joints, and that may have developed through cracks in the core zone
in the key trench;
3. Once started, piping progressed rapidly through the main body of the
dam and quickly led to complete failure; and
4. The design of the dam did not adequately take into account the
foundation conditions and the characteristics of the soil used for ﬁlling the
key trench.
Regarding Cause No. 1 above, it should be noted that the apparently
impervious zone 2 blanket drain material probably conﬁned the seepage ﬂows
and eroded zone 1 core material within the abutment channels, joints, fractures,
and cracks all the way to the right groin downstream, and prevented the safe,
proper interception and collection of the seepage ﬂows. The nature of the damsite
geology, the design of the dam embankment, the treatment(s) of the foundation
bedrock surface and open joints (or lack thereof), the characteristics of the
embankment materials, the defensive measures taken to control seepage and
piping erosion, and the construction practices at Teton Dam were all too similar
to those involved on Fontenelle Dam. The IRG and the Independent Panel both
recommended that Reclamation should take certain speciﬁc measures to prevent
the recurrence of another dam failure:
1. An independent board of review should be convened for each major
dam project to review both design and construction at frequent intervals;
2. Design decisions should be formally documented;
3. Design personnel should remain involved with a project during
construction, including frequent scheduled site visits; and
4. Major dams and their foundations should include an instrumentation
program to monitor construction and post-construction behavior.
Instrumentation data should be promptly interpreted and evaluated.
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In a July 20, 1976, letter, the Comptroller General of the United States
was asked by U.S. House of Representatives’ Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources Subcommittee to examine the dambuilding procedures and practices
used by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers. The resulting
report Actions Needed to Increase the Safety of Dams Built by the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers was published on June 3, 1977.40 The
Comptroller’s report discussed several concerns involving the dam designers,
recommending that
We recommend that the Secretary of Interior direct the Bureau of
Reclamation to establish written procedures to better ensure that design
intent is achieved. In so doing the Bureau should: (1) evaluate and
implement ways to improve the clarity of instructions, speciﬁcations, and
drawings; (2) evaluate and implement ways to better ensure that onsite
personnel fully understand the intent of the designers, and (3) develop
and implement policies and procedures calling for more frequent onsite
inspections by designers during construction.41

The Comptroller’s report also noted the comments made in the paper by Chief
Engineer Bellport about the lessons learned after the near failure of Fontenelle
Dam, and recommended that
Thus, by averting a disaster at Fontenelle, the Bureau had seemingly
learned a valuable lesson regarding reservoir ﬁlling. Yet, at Teton Dam,
over 10 years later, the lesson was not applied.

and
We believe that the failure of Teton Dam and the near failure at
Fontenelle Dam should clearly illustrate to dambuilders the importance
of (1) a slow, controlled ﬁlling rate during ﬁrst ﬁlling to closely monitor
the behavior of the dam and (2) an operable outlet of sufﬁcient size to
release enough water to lower the reservoir level when emergencies arise
affecting dam safety.42

Reclamation’s organization and its state-of-the-practice in embankment
dam design and construction at the beginning of Period V, which were thought
to have been developed to as high a degree of capability and sophistication
as any dam-building organization in the World, were immediately put under
the proverbial microscope. In April 1977 President Jimmy Carter ordered all
Federal agencies that build, maintain, or operate dams to review their dam safety
practices. Reclamation Commissioner R. Keith Higginson named a team to
review Reclamation’s dam design and construction procedures, and charged
the team “to review expeditiously all factors relevant to safety of dams in the
Bureau’s plan-design-construct-operate process and to develop recommendations
which would assure that Bureau procedures follow acceptable standards…” On
March 31, 1977, the Department of the Interior contracted with W. A. Wahler
& Associates to conduct a program entitled “An Emergency Study of Seven
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Completed Bureau of Reclamation Dams.” All seven dams were recently
completed structures, both earthﬁll and concrete dams. The seven dams studied
by W. A. Wahler & Associates were: Crystal, Mountain Park, Mt. Elbert Forebay,
Nambé Falls, Pueblo, Ririe, and Soldier Creek Dams.43 On November 29,
1977, Commissioner Higginson announced a reorganization plan in which
the decentralized ﬁeld structure was retained, and the Denver Ofﬁce became
Reclamation’s center for technical review and support. On November 6, 1979,
under Commissioner Higginson, Reclamation changed its name to the “Water and
Power Resources Service,” but changed it back to the Bureau of Reclamation on
May 20, 1981, under Commissioner Robert N. Broadbent.
Reclamation’s Chief Engineers (now with different titles, which began
as Director, Ofﬁce of Design and Construction) during Period V were Harold
G. Arthur, Robert B. Jansen (title was changed to Assistant Commissioner for
Engineering and Research on February 1, 1978), Rodney J. Vissia, James Cook
(acting for 3 or 4 months in 1982), Darrel W. Webber, Felix W. Cook, Sr. (the title
was changed once again in October 1994 to Director, Technical Service Center),
and by Michael J. Roluti.
While Reclamation still had many dams and projects in its “pipeline”
awaiting funding and construction at the start of Period V, environmental “clouds”
had been gathering on the horizon in both numbers and power and they wanted
to put a halt to the continued construction of new dams. The embankment dams
that Reclamation designed and constructed during Period V generally involved
even more difﬁcult and complex damsites than had been built on before, and the
resulting designs were more complex. Part of this increased design complexity
was a direct result of the ﬁndings and recommendations by the IRG, the
Independent Panel, and the Comptroller on the failure of Teton Dam.
The Wahler Reports on seven of Reclamation’s recently constructed
dams presented some fairly alarming conclusions and recommendations. For
example, on Soldier Creek Dam, the Wahler Report concluded that “there may
be signiﬁcant risk of serious distress and/or failure associated with ﬁlling the
reservoir behind Soldier Creek Dam.” And on Pueblo Dam, the Wahler Report
concluded that “the reservoir behind Pueblo Dam should not be permitted to rise
signiﬁcantly above its present level until certain supplementary investigations
and/or actions have been completed.” After the ﬁndings of the Wahler Reports
were presented to the Department of the Interior (and Reclamation), Reclamation
responded by beginning its own reevaluation of these seven dams, which
included ﬁeld and laboratory investigations, new evaluations of the design and
construction, etc. With the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the
two Teton Dam failure reviews needing to be implemented, Reclamation made
dramatic changes in its design and construction organizations.
In 1978 Reclamation instituted its new Safety Evaluation of Existing
Dams (SEED) Program under the Division of Dam Safety and reporting directly
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to the Assistant Commissioner —Engineering and Research (ACER). The
SEED Program began a comprehensive review of dam design, construction, and
operation records; analysis of material data; ﬁeld inspections; and study of any
apparent deﬁciencies. The Denver Ofﬁce’s engineering staff was increased to
handle the enlarged program. A Technical Review Staff, also reporting directly
to ACER, was added to the Denver Ofﬁce and was tasked with independently
reviewing all new dam and major structure designs, modiﬁcations to existing
dams and major structures, and the SEED Program. Reclamation also hired
independent consulting engineers and other professionals to review and approve
Reclamation’s dam design and construction work.
The work by the Denver Ofﬁce to respond to the embankment dam
concerns raised in the Wahler Reports included ﬁeld investigations that produced
embankment and foundation samples, which needed laboratory testing to develop
information on their engineering properties. This additional engineering workload
and the laboratory testing workload for projects already planned led to an increase
in the size and capability of the Denver Ofﬁce Laboratory. Improved electronics
and computers were involved with the upgrading of the Laboratory’s capability.
New testing equipment was needed in a few cases because of the nature of some
of the dam foundation problems encountered and for testing new materials such
as synthetic geomembranes and geotextiles. For example, the weak clay seams
in the foundation shale at Pueblo Dam required testing for residual shear strength,
which Reclamation had never done before.
During Period V, Reclamation continued to design and build some notable
embankment dams in the West. These Period V embankment dams included: Mt.
Elbert Forebay, Twin Lakes, Palmetto Bend, Funks, Wintering, Red Fleet (Tyzak),
Stateline, Choke Canyon, Sugar Pine, Ridgway, Calamus, McPhee, McGee Creek,
San Justo, Brantley, Davis Creek, Jordanelle, New Waddell, and Buckhorn Dams.
The Period V embankment dams generally had upstream slopes that ranged
from 2:1 to 3.5:1 and downstream slopes that ranged from 2:1 to 1.5:1, with the
steepest slopes at Jordanelle Dam.
These dams were built on a variety of foundations, but after the foundation
problems that in part caused the failure of Teton Dam, the foundation treatments
constructed during Period V were more aggressive and more “complete” than
those previously constructed. This included design details and features such as:
more aggressive cleanup and mapping of foundations, foundation shaping to
ﬂatten steep slopes and remove bedrock overhangs, more dental concrete backﬁll
to shape abutments, lean cement (slush) grouting of surface joints, thorough
blanket grouting in the upper 20 to 30 feet of the foundation-core contact zone,
more lines of curtain grouting, and removal of more poor-quality bedrock in the
foundation. The concrete grout cap used at Fontenelle and Teton Dams was also
eliminated, grouting from the rock surface, removing any damaged surface rock,
or using a reinforced concrete slab so that grout pressure can be applied to near-
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surface rock. Blanket grouting is then done after the curtain grouting has been
completed.
The embankment dam designs changed in several important ways during
Period V. The chimney ﬁlter/drains placed between the core and the downstream
shell material were revised to use processed materials instead to ensure the
prevention of internal erosion/piping. A processed transition/ﬁlter zone was used
between the core backﬁlling the cutoff trench and the downstream alluvium.
Blanket drains were used against the downstream foundation. Processing of
borrow soils or the use of imported soil materials to supply the ﬁlter gradation(s)
necessary was used more aggressively in the chimney ﬁlter/drains and the blanket
drains. These ﬁlters included 1, 2, or even 3 zones of different soil sizes and
gradations where necessary to prevent potential internal erosion/piping. These
ﬁlter/drain systems were interconnected and drained by a perforated toe drain pipe
with emphasis on monitoring seepage ﬂows. There was also more emphasis on
inspection manholes and monitoring devices in the toe drain system, and more
emphasis on the use of relief wells for deeper seepage collection. The design
of the embankment constructed adjacent and around concrete structures such
as outlet works and spillways changed, eliminating the seepage collars around
conduits to facilitate compaction by the tires of heavy equipment rolling next to
the conduit instead of regular compaction equipment such as tamping rollers.
Processed ﬁlters and drains were also placed around the downstream section of
the conduits. New synthetic materials such as geomembranes and geotextiles
were used in modiﬁcations constructed at several embankment dams. Several of
the embankment dams noted above, including San Justo and Jordanelle Dams,
were constructed close to major “active” earthquake faults in California and
Utah, respectively. Starting with the early work by Esmiol, 26 Reclamation has
continued to investigate and develop appropriate design requirements for its
embankment dams in the earthquake-prone western U.S. that have been used by
many others worldwide.
Like other dam-safety programs nationwide, the results of Reclamation’s
Safety Evalualtion of Existing Dams (SEED) Program and the reevaluation of
the existing dams determined that quite a few existing embankment dams needed
to be modiﬁed to improve their condition and to ensure their continued safe
operation. A partial list of Reclamation’s modiﬁed embankment dams includes:
Jackson Lake, Helena Valley, Soldiers Meadow (not built by Reclamation),
Fontenelle, Navajo, Casitas, Soldier Creek, Pueblo, Lost Creek, Twin Buttes,
Twin Lakes, San Justo, Horsetooth (modiﬁcation under construction), and
Pineview (modiﬁcation being designed) Dams. Reclamation has also been
involved with the analysis, design, and construction of modiﬁcations to several
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) embankment dams, including Black Lake, Pablo,
and McDonald Dams on the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana, and dams
belonging to the National Park Service.
Red Fleet (Tyzak) Dam, completed in 1978 with a maximum height of
145 feet above streambed, was one of the ﬁrst embankment dam designs started
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by Reclamation after the failure of Teton Dam. Its design cross-section included
the new defensive features: a two-stage transition zone and chimney ﬁlter/drain,
a transition/ﬁlter zone between the core backﬁlling the cutoff trench and the
downstream alluvium, and a processed sand and gravel drainage blanket beneath
the downstream shell.
Mt. Elbert Forebay Dam, completed in 1980 with a maximum height of
92 feet above the stripped foundation, was built above Twin Lakes as part of a
pumped-storage hydroelectric project. The original forebay reservoir was lined
with compacted earthﬁll, but excessive leakage was detected and it could have
triggered an ancient landslide, endangering the powerplant at the edge of Twin
Lakes Reservoir below. The design was changed to add about 290 acres of 45mil-thick reinforced chlorinated polyethylene geomembrane liner covered by 18
inches of earthﬁll.
Pueblo Dam was identiﬁed in the Wahler Report as needing certain
supplementary investigations and/or actions while restricting its reservoir level.
Field investigations were performed and samples of the Graneros shale and
bentonite clay seams were obtained for laboratory testing, along with work to
resolve several other concerns. Soil testing was performed to determine the
residual shear strength of the bentonite clay and the test data were used to reanalyze the stability of the left embankment. The analysis results indicated the
downstream slope stability was inadequate and the left embankment had to be
modiﬁed to increase its stability. An earthﬁll berm 2,500 feet long and
35 feet high was constructed along the downstream toe of the left embankment
in 1980-1981. Subsequent analysis of the concrete buttress dam section and a
concern about the low strength shale seams in part of its sandstone foundation
resulted in some recent (1999-2000) modiﬁcations to improve its resistance to
sliding along the shale seams.
Soldier Creek Dam was identiﬁed in the Wahler Report as having certain
deﬁciencies that individually or in combination could jeopardize the safety of the
dam. Field and laboratory investigations were conducted and Soldier Creek Dam
was re-analyzed by Reclamation. The results conﬁrmed that several concerns
raised by the Wahler Report were sufﬁciently serious that modiﬁcation of the dam
embankment was justiﬁed. A lack of instrumentation made it difﬁcult to evaluate
the performance of the dam embankment, which led to the installation of over
25 piezometers in the embankment and foundation. The foundation bedrock
surface preparation and the lack of proper treatment with lean cement (slush)
grout placed in surface cracks, shaping, and dental concrete were of concern.
The single-row grout curtain also caused concern. The nature of the zone 1 core
material and the fact that it was placed directly against the untreated foundation
bedrock caused concern. The permeability of the unprocessed zone 3 chimney
ﬁlter/drain and blanket drain material caused concern, as did the fact that the
chimney ﬁlter/drain and the toe drains did not extend all the way up to the full-
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reservoir water surface. Embankment and foundation drainage modiﬁcations
were constructed in 1983-1984 to address these problems.44

2.18. Fontenelle Dam: Section of embankment with diaphragm wall.

Fontenelle Dam continued to have seepage and internal erosion/piping
problems after it was supposedly ﬁxed by the additional abutment grouting
performed in 1966. Instrumentation monitoring data in 1983 indicated that a
potential dam safety problem was developing, and the decision was made to
modify the dam by installing a continuous concrete diaphragm wall through

2.19. Fontenelle Dam: Diaphragm wall construction.
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the dam and into the foundation. There were several aspects of the existing
Fontenelle Dam embankment’s design that were judged to have been partly
responsible for the failure of Teton Dam, such as vertical to overhanging abutment
cliffs, extensive joints and cracks in the abutments, no processed material placed
as a chimney to ﬁlter the erodible silty zone 1 core as protection against internal
erosion/piping, and silty core material placed directly against open, unsealed
bedrock joints, cracks, and crevices. Only one solution was judged to be capable
of alleviating all of these potential problems, and construction of a concrete
diaphragm wall from the crest of the dam down through the embankment and the
upper highly-fractured bedrock was selected as the appropriate modiﬁcation (see
2.18). The concrete diaphragm wall had to avoid damaging the river outlet works
near the middle of the embankment and the spillway on the right abutment. The
concrete diaphragm wall modiﬁcation was constructed between 1987 and 1989.
2.19 and 2.20 show the rockmilling equipment used to excavate embankment and
rock for the diaphragm wall at Fontenelle Dam.
Black Lake,
Pablo, and McDonald
Dams are BIA dams
on the Flathead
Indian Reservation in
Montana; Reclamation
had designed and
constructed Pablo
and McDonald Dams
between 1905 and
1920. At BIA’s
request, Reclamation
investigated and
prepared Safety
Evaluation of Existing
Dams (SEED) reports
on these three dams,
along with the other
14 dams on the
Reservation. Under
a contract with the
BIA, the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai
Tribes entered into an
agreement with the
TSC for Reclamation
to perform ﬁeld
investigations,
laboratory testing,
2.20. Fontenelle Dam: Hydromill rock excavator for diaand engineering
phragm wall.
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evaluations to determine the adequacy and safety of the dams on the Reservation.
Starting with the dam of greatest initial concern, the investigation and analysis of
Black Lake Dam indicated it needed to be modiﬁed to prevent a piping/erosion
failure. The original Black Lake Dam had failed by internal erosion/piping in
1967, and the replacement embankment dam was judged to have several serious
deﬁciencies that could result in another piping/erosion failure. Black Lake Dam
was modiﬁed in 1992 by the construction of a geomembrane liner installed along
the upstream right abutment, across the upstream slope of the embankment,
and as a liner beneath part of the reservoir upstream of the dam. A downstream
drainage berm is scheduled to be constructed in the near future and will hopefully
remediate the current situation.
Pablo Dam was investigated and analyzed next, and it was determined that
the upper portion of the embankment was susceptible to seepage, internal erosion/
piping, and potential failure. The upper portion of the dam was more pervious
because two embankment raises had been constructed and had used more pervious
earthﬁll material than the original embankment. A geomembrane liner was
constructed in 1993-1994, covering the upper embankment to control/prevent the
seepage that had been percolating through it.
McDonald Dam was the third embankment dam investigated and
analyzed. It was located about ½-mile upstream of the Mission fault, which
had experienced a major earthquake about 7,700 years ago, and which was
judged capable of producing a magnitude 7½ earthquake at any time. The dam
embankment had been constructed by Project Manager/Engineer Frank Crowe
(Honorary Member, ASCE) using dumped and sluiced earthﬁll, with a puddled
core created by sluicing the dumped earthﬁll (see 2.21). The embankment
and an outwash foundation beneath part of the dam were judged susceptible to
liquefaction and excessive deformation. Various alternatives were developed
and evaluated, with the ﬁnal decision reached to completely replace the existing
dam embankment, spillway, and outlet works. These modiﬁcations were
designed by Reclamation which also provided the construction management
services. It should be noted that the Construction Engineer for McDonald Dam

2.21. McDonald Dam: Original dam in 1920.
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Modiﬁcation was on the Design Team. The new McDonald Dam embankment
was a completely different embankment design. The new embankment crosssection included: a textured geomembrane covered by earthﬁll and riprap on the
upstream slope, an impervious earthﬁll zone behind the geomembrane, followed
by an inclined processed chimney ﬁlter/drain, all of which rest against a large
miscellaneous earthﬁll zone that sits on top of a blanket drain consisting of
processed drainage material sandwiched between two layers of the processed
ﬁlter material. The instrumentation consisted of piezometers in the embankment
and foundation, embankment measurement points, and weirs to monitor seepage
ﬂows. These McDonald Dam modiﬁcations were constructed in 1994-1995
and 1999-2000 (see 2.22), after which its behavior during resumed ﬁlling of the
reservoir in 2000 and beyond went very well.45

2.22. McDonald Dam: New dam in 2000.

At the beginning of Period V, the failure of Teton Dam and the results
of the IRG, Independent Panel, and Comptroller reviews resulted in many
organizational changes as already discussed. Several of Reclamation’s
embankment dam design engineers retired, leaving a small cadre of experienced
engineers to work with the new staff of engineers then being hired to work on
Reclamation’s new dam safety program and on the embankment dam design work
already in the “pipeline.” That work has been going on for over 20 years now and
is expected to continue for some time. Reclamation’s current dam safety program
includes conducting in-depth reviews, referred to as Comprehensive Facility
Reviews (CFR), which are performed mostly by in-house senior engineers every
six years. The CFRs include an examination of the dam and evaluations of:
the dam’s design, analysis, and construction; its structural behavior; its seismic
and hydrologic hazards; its potential failure modes; its failure consequences; a
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risk analysis; and its performance parameters. Reclamation has continued to
develop, revise, and make available information on its engineering work. The
Earth Manual is now in its third edition, with Part 2 published in 1990 and
Part 1 published in 1998.1 Part 1 of the Earth Manual (now containing 1,270
pages) includes updated information on properties of soils, ﬁeld and laboratory
investigations and test procedures, construction quality control testing of
earthﬁll materials used as foundations and for dams, canals, and other types of
structures built by Reclamation. Part 2 (now containing 329 pages) includes
updated information on properties of soils, ﬁeld investigations, and control
of earth construction. Reclamation’s Design of Small Dams was revised and
published as a “revised reprint” in 1977 and was revised again and published
as the Third Edition in 1987.2 In the 1980s, Reclamation developed its Design
Standards, with Design Standards No. 13—Embankment Dams6 covering all of
the embankment dam design issues and concerns; they are all continually updated.
Reclamation has continued to make its technical publications available to the
public. Reclamation has recently embarked on a new program, generally referred
to as risk-based analysis of existing structures, to help with its decision-making
process.
Reclamation’s instrumentation for and monitoring of embankment dams
continued to be improved during Period V. Since their ﬁrst installation at Fresno
Dam in 1939, almost 2,800 hydraulic twin-tube piezometers have been installed
at Reclamation’s embankment dams. Pneumatic piezometers have more recently
been used to measure porewater pressures and vibrating-wire piezometers are
now the piezometer of choice installed at Reclamation’s embankment dams. In
addition to piezometers, other instrumentation often installed at Reclamation’s
new and modiﬁed embankment dams includes: observation wells, seepage weirs,
embankment measurement points, strong-motion accelerographs (in earthquakeprone areas), and inclinometer casings with inclinometers to monitor known slide
areas. One important aspect of current instrumentation is the use of automated
monitoring systems at Reclamation’s dams, allowing timely monitoring of
embankment dams in remote locations where winter access can be a problem.
Such automated monitoring systems also allow the data to be used by early
warning systems. The monitoring data are collected by the TSC’s Structural
Behavior and Instrumentation Group which automatically interprets and evaluates
the data in a timely manner and alerts the appropriate design groups if any of the
instrumentation data cause concern. Reclamation published its Embankment Dam
Instrumentation Manual in 1987.46
As usual, during Period V, the variety of equipment available for the
construction of embankment dams continued to improve in size, power, speed,
and efﬁciency. For example, 2.23 and 2.24 show the construction of New
Waddell Dam (1986-1992) and the size of the equipment currently used to
construct embankment dams. Compare the end-dump truck in 2.24 and its 35
yd3 capacity to the train of 4 yd3 side-dump cars used to construct Belle Fourche
Dam in 1909 shown in 2.7. Also compare the large excavator in 2.24 and its
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2.23. New Waddell Dam construction.

2.24. New Waddell Dam: Construction equipment.
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12 yd3 bucket with the steam shovel at Belle Fourche Dam with its 2½-yd3
bucket shown in 2.7. During Period V, synthetic materials such as high-density
polyethylene (HDPE) and polypropylene were developed into new products, such
as corrugated pipe, geomembranes, and geotextiles, that were promptly put to
use on embankment dams where judged appropriate. New types of equipment
related to these new materials and products were developed, and quality control
tests, testing equipment, and detailed test procedures were developed, with
Reclamation’s signiﬁcant participation in these developments.
Conclusion
The information presented in this paper has summarized the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction history. During the
past century, Reclamation has designed and built some of the most signiﬁcant
embankment dams in the West. Reclamation and its dam engineers produced
many successes and a few failures during that period. Reclamation and its
civil engineers, through the study of both success and failure and the sharing
of the knowledge gained with all professionals worldwide, have indeed played
a signiﬁcant role in the evolution of embankment dam design and construction
during the past century. Starting before World War II, Reclamation has provided
technical assistance to more than 80 countries and has trained more than
10,000 international colleagues. It is hoped that the lay reader of this paper has
gained some appreciation of Reclamation’s history and just how remarkable
the evolution of embankment dam design and construction has been. It is also
hoped that the design and construction engineers reading this paper have gained
some understanding of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction
history, and of the reasons for doing all embankment dam work with the utmost
knowledge, care, and caution. One of the most important lessons learned from
the failure of Teton Dam involved the need for embankment dam designers and
construction engineers to work as a team, with their primary concern being the
need to design and build the very best and safest dam possible.
Richard Lyman Wiltshire, P.E., recently retired as a Civil Engineer
and Principal Designer in the Geotechnical Services Division, at the
Technical Services Center of the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver,
Colorado. He is a fellow of the American Society of Civil Engineers
(F.ASCE) and serves on its History and Heritage Committee. He is also
a member of the U.S. Society on Dams (USSD).
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Historical Development of Durable Concrete for the
Bureau of Reclamation
By:
Timothy P. Dolen
Introduction
Bureau of Reclamation infrastructure stretches across many different
climates and environments in the seventeen western states. Many of the dams,
spillways, pumping plants, power plants, canals, and tunnels are constructed
with concrete. These structures were built from Arizona to Montana, across
the plains and in the mountains and deserts. Concrete structures had to remain
durable to resist both the design loads and the natural environments of the western
climate zones. Many natural environments can be quite destructive to concrete
and the earliest Reclamation projects were faced with a variety of durability
problems. The state-of-the-art of concrete construction advanced from hand
mixing and horse and wagon transporting operations to automated mixing plants,
underwater canal construction, and pumping and conveyor placing. This paper
ﬁrst overviews the challenges facing concrete construction in the beginning of
the twentieth century. It then traces the Bureau of Reclamation=s role in the
development of durable concrete to resist the environments of the west.
What is Concrete?
Before we begin, we must ﬁrst understand what is concrete, the most
versatile building material. The American Concrete Institute deﬁnes concrete as
a composite material that consists essentially of a binding medium
within which are embedded particles or fragments of aggregate, usually a
combination of ﬁne aggregate and coarse aggregate; in Portland-cement
concrete, the binder is a mixture of Portland cement and water.1

The earliest concretes date at least as far back as early Roman times including
the aqueducts and the historic Pantheon in Rome. These concretes did not
use Portland cement as a binder. Rather, they used combinations of lime and
pozzolanic sands mixed with broken rocks and shards of pottery.
Most twentieth century concretes are composed of about seventy-ﬁve
percent aggregates by volume and about 2 percent Aportland cement paste.@
The paste is the binder and contains cementitious materials and water. The
cementitious materials include primarily Portland cement and sometimes an
additional cementing material such as a pozzolan. Pozzolans are ﬁnely ground,
calcined (heated to a high temperature) materials that react with lime to form
compounds similar to Portland cement. Natural pozzolans are heated by events
like volcanoes. Artiﬁcial pozzolans are calcined in a kiln or furnace, such as ﬂy
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ash. The ratio of water to cementitious materials is about 1.5:1 by solid volume
or 1:2 by weight. The individual components are mixed wet for about 5 to 10
minutes, then placed in forms to harden into their ﬁnal shape.
The chemical process that turns the wet concrete into a hardened mass
is called Ahydration,@ a reaction between the cement and water that forms
strong chemical bonds. Concrete does not get hard by drying like some clay
bricks and lime mortars. It must retain the moisture to allow the cement to
chemically hydrate; usually for about one month. The best concrete is one that
stays continuously moist at a temperature of about 40 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit,
such as the center of a mass concrete dam. The strongest concrete contains just
sufﬁcient water to chemically react with the available cement, about 25 to 40
percent water to cement by weight. The weakest concretes are those that contain
excess water or prematurely dry out, stopping the reaction from continuing.
Pozzolanic materials do not naturally harden through hydration with water; they
must have added calcium hydroxide, or lime, to allow the reactions to take place.
Fortunately, one of the chemical by-products of cement hydration is calcium
hydroxide. Thus, added pozzolan when combined with cement and water makes
for even stronger and often more durable concrete. Cement hydration also
generates heat and can lead to temperature cracking when the interior mass wants
to expand while the exterior contracts as it cools. Thus, any means of reducing
the cement content reduces the potential for cracking.
The durability of concrete depends on the durability of its constituents:
cement paste and aggregates. A concrete with strong paste may not be durable
if combined with poor aggregate, and vice versa. One of the most important
parameters is the Aporosity@ of the paste, which is a function of the amount of
water relative to the cementitious materials. Excess water can dilute the cement
paste leaving a more porous medium. This can be attacked more easily by
deleterious substances and physical processes. The climate is a signiﬁcant factor
inﬂuencing the long-term durability of concrete structures. One of the reasons
the ancient structures have survived is because they were constructed in relatively
dry, temperate climates.
Early Obstacles to Durable Concrete
The turn of the twentieth century presented numerous obstacles to
constructing durable concrete structures, one of which was population expanding
across America into harsh climate zones. The quality of concrete was impaired
by limitations of the quality of the materials and the methods of construction. In
some instances, limitations on the quality of the basic concrete materials: cement,
sand, and gravel, and the proportioning of ingredients impaired quality concrete
construction under the severe exposures and harsh climates of the West. In other
instances, the methods of batching, mixing, placing, and protecting the concrete
limited the rate of construction and the overall quality of the structures. Lastly,
the methodology behind concrete design and construction was just developing
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and was not well documented or distributed throughout the industry. A number
of signiﬁcant events and innovations during the twentieth century contributed to
the development of concrete as a durable engineering material resulting in what
is now considered Amodern concrete.@ First, let=s look at durability environments
and then the state-of-the-art developments related to constructing durable
concrete.
Mechanisms of Deterioration in the Western United States
There are about a half dozen environments that aggressively attack
Portland cement concrete. These include the following:
• Sulfate environment
• Alkali-silica or alkali-carbonate environment—Aalkali-aggregate
reactions@
• Freezing and thawing environment
• Acid environment
• Chloride (corrosion) environment
• Wetting and drying environment
Concretes that remain durable under these conditions were proportioned in some
way to withstand the elements, either accidentally or purposely. Some advances
in the development of durable concrete resulted from observations of concretes
that essentially used chemically resistant cements or Aaccidentally@ introduced
beneﬁcial admixtures, and comparing them with those that rapidly fell to pieces.
The three most critical natural deterioration mechanisms affecting
Reclamation structures are sulfate attack, alkali-silica reaction, and freezingthawing attack. These three mechanisms are described in the paragraphs that
follow. In many cases, concrete deterioration is caused by a combination of
aggressive environments, such as wetting and drying in concert with sulfate attack
in some California desert climates or freeze-thaw attack and alkali-silica reaction
in the northwest. Here, micro-fractures caused by one destructive element
allow moisture to more easily penetrate the paste and contribute to a secondary
reaction. One environment common to United States highways and bridges is
chloride/corrosion of reinforcing steel and the resulting deterioration. It was not
a major deterioration mechanism for Reclamation concretes due to the absence
of chlorides, that is, until some rather dramatic failures of precast, prestressed
concrete pipe in the 1990s.
Sulfate Attack
Sulfate attack is a chemical degradation of cement paste caused by high
concentrations of sulfates in soils and groundwater. Sulfate attack is caused by
chemical interactions between sulfate ions and constituents of the cement paste.
The disintegration appears to be caused by chemical reactions with cement
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hydration products and the formation of a secondary compound, ettringite,
accompanied by a large volumetric expansion and cracking of the concrete.
Sulfate attack was also known as Acement corrosion@ in the early 1900s and is
very common in the white Aalkali ﬂats@ of the arid western states and in seawater,
particularly tidal zones. Sulfate attack was noted in Reclamation structures on
the Sun River Project in Montana
in 1908, shortly after the formation
of the U.S. Reclamation Service.2
3.1 shows the disintegration of a
concrete canal lining in the Central
Valley Project only ﬁve years after
construction.3 Early observations
in these failures identiﬁed certain
cement brands as being more
resistant to deterioration in these
environments than others. ABad@
cements were less resistant and
avoided if possible in favor of more 3.1. Concrete canal lining on the Central Valley
Project.
resistant Agood@ cements.
Alkali-aggregate Reactions
Alkali aggregate reactions (AAR) are the chemical reactions between
certain speciﬁc mineralogical types of aggregates (either sand or gravel) and the
alkali compounds (generally less than 2 percent of the cement composition) of
cement in the presence of moisture.
Typical manifestations of concrete deterioration through alkali-silica
reaction are expansion; cracking, which frequently is of such nature the
designation Apattern@ or Amap@ cracking; exudations of jelly-like or hard
beads on surfaces; reaction rims on affected aggregate particles within
the concrete; and sometimes popouts.4

The reaction products have a swelling nature, leading to tensile stresses that cause
cracking within the concrete. The
cracking may allow moisture to
more readily be absorbed by the
silica gel or accelerate freezing
and thawing damage.
Alkalies in cement can
react with certain Aglassy,@
siliceous aggregates such as opals,
chalcedony, cherts, andesites,
basalts, and some quartz; termed
alkali-silica reaction or ASR,
and certain speciﬁc carbonate
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3.2. Alkali-silica reaction within concrete.

aggregates called alkali-carbonate reaction.5 Alkali-silica reaction, shown in 3.2,
was probably ﬁrst experienced by Reclamation at American Falls Dam in Idaho,
completed in 1927. However, extensive freezing and thawing deterioration
and poor quality construction practices masked ASR as a primary cause of
deterioration at American Falls Dam. Some structures, such as Parker Dam and
Stewart Mountain Dam, suffered early rapid expansion and distress, and then
became relatively stable after a few years as the available alkalies and reactive
aggregates were consumed early in the process. Other structures, such as
Seminoe Dam, are showing continued expansion and resulting distress even 50
years after construction.6
Freezing and Thawing Deterioration
Freezing and thawing (FT) deterioration is the deleterious expansion of
water within the cement paste resulting in destruction of the concrete. Water
present in the cement paste expands about 9 percent upon freezing. When
conﬁned within a rigid, crystalline micro-structure, the expanding ice crystals can
exert pressures far exceeding the tensile capacity of the paste, causing cracking
and ultimately failure of the concrete. The concrete must be nearly saturated
when it undergoes the freezing for this form of deterioration to take place.
Repeated cycles of freezing and thawing are common in Reclamation water
conveyance structures. Areas subject to cyclic freezing, such as the spillway
shown in 3.3, and particularly those in ﬂuctuating water surface levels, or in
splash or spray zones are the most susceptible to deterioration.7 Freeze-thaw
deterioration is most pronounced in more porous concrete having a high water
to cement ratio and those concretes without purposely entrained, air bubbles;
the very same concretes commonly used in early twentieth century construction.
Freeze-thaw deterioration was ﬁrst identiﬁed early in Reclamation history under
the general term of durability
of concrete without speciﬁc
causes or solutions. This form
of damage is present in the
colder and mountainous regions
and non-existent in the desert
southwest. A mixture placed on
the All-American Canal would
have no problems, but, the very
same concrete placed on the
Yakima Project would be severely 3.3. A spillway showing results of cyclic
freezing and thawing.
affected.
Developing the State-of-the-Art of Concrete Technology
Even with quality materials, durable concrete could not effectively be
mixed and placed in the larger Reclamation structures without new construction
practices and equipment. The historical development of durable Reclamation
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concrete can roughly be divided into four generations with regard to both
materials and methods of construction. Each generation contributed to the
knowledge base of the developing state-of-the-art. The ﬁrst generation of
Reclamation concrete technology covers from its inception in 1902 until about
World War I. These practitioners were the ﬁrst Apioneers@ of Reclamation
concrete construction. The next generation, from 1918 until the late 1920s, began
developing concrete as an engineering material. The Boulder/Hoover generation
began in the late 1920s and continued up to World War II. This generation solved
many of the fundamental problems encountered in massive concrete construction
and developed many of the standardized quality concrete construction practices.
They uncovered the mysteries of sulfate attack, alkali-aggregate reaction, and
freezing and thawing durability, leading to the ﬁrst truly engineered, modern,
durable concretes. The postwar generation incorporated the basic concepts of
modern concrete to a multitude of applications for dams, pumping and power
plants, canals, and tunnels under a variety of differing site conditions. This is the
ﬁrst long-lasting, concrete infrastructure.
The Early Years—The Concrete Pioneers (1902-1918)
The ﬁrst generation of concrete practitioners developed the technology
largely through trial and error and continued observation. The earliest concrete
was composed of poorly manufactured cements, unprocessed aggregates,
and was mixed by hand or small mixers. The materials themselves; cement,
sand, and gravel were subject to great variability. The concrete mixture was
proportioned by Arecipe@ based on previous experience, not necessarily as an
engineered material. Many early Reclamation projects were somewhat isolated
geographically and there was less communication beyond regional boundaries.
A change in location or structural design was not necessarily followed with an
appropriate change in concrete mixture design, resulting in spotty performance.
Labor was cheap, equipment and cement were expensive. The resulting
mixtures contained the least amount of cement necessary to meet low strength
requirements, at least by today=s standards. Concrete was largely transported by
wheelbarrows and compacted in place by manual tamping, spading, and rodding.
The production rates were very slow, resulting in frequent Acold joints@ or
unplanned ﬂaws that allowed seepage and subsequent deterioration.
A major change in building technology, the introduction of steelreinforced, concrete structures, at ﬁrst did not improve concrete quality. Pre-1900
structures were more massive and used a stiffer concrete that was tamped into
place. The resulting concrete was less permeable and somewhat more resistant
to the elements due to its low porosity; water simply had difﬁculty entering the
matrix to cause damage. Reinforced concrete structures took advantage of the
tensile strength capacity of the steel and the sizes of structural members were
reduced. In addition to thinner structures, the reinforcing steel interfered with
the placing and tamping practices. As a result, water was added to the concrete
mixture to make it more ﬂuid and thus easier to place. However, more cement
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was not necessarily added, and the weaker more porous concretes started
falling apart in the ﬁeld in only a few years.8 The favorite phrase of concrete
construction workers Aadd more water@ likely came about during this era and a
century later concrete technologists still shudder at the request!
The earliest Reclamation construction projects did not have the beneﬁt
of a developed methodology and speciﬁc equipment for concrete construction.
Construction practices gradually improved during the ﬁrst Reclamation
construction era. Many structures fortunately utilized techniques that have
helped them resist degradation. Theodore Roosevelt Dam in Arizona utilized a
masonry facing and cyclopean concrete methods: large Aplum stones@ were placed
followed by smaller cobbles and boulders and then the concrete was added to
ﬁll the remaining voids. This construction technique left large stones across the
construction joint surface that reduced shear planes. The mixtures had a low
cement content on a per cubic yard basis that reduced thermal cracking and the
cost.9
One construction advance called Achuting,@ shown in 3.4, resulted in poor
quality concrete. An Aimprovement@ over the back-breaking manual hauling by
buckets, long chutes were used to transport concrete to the forms. This permitted
a centralized concrete batching and mixing location and larger batches could be
fed to sometimes intricate, gravity-fed, chute systems. Water was added to make
the concrete ﬂow down relatively ﬂat sloping chutes. The extra water diluted
the cement paste in the concrete. These mixes were much weaker and had poor
durability. To discourage this practice, engineers ﬁnally speciﬁed that the slope of
the chutes could not be ﬂatter than about 35 degrees from horizontal.10
The developing stateof-the-art had a few Ahiccups@
along the way. ASand-cement@
was introduced to reduce the
cost of cement by inter-grinding
crushed rock ﬂour during the
manufacturing process.11 The
ﬁnely ground rock ﬂour was
introduced as a Apozzolan@
to react with the cement for
increased strength, and indeed, the
sand-cement mixtures had higher
3.4. “Chuting” of concrete resulted in poor quality
7- and 28- day compressive
concrete.
strengths compared to the control
mixtures. However, the compressive strength development did not continue
much after 28 days as is more typical of Portland cement plus real pozzolans.
Thus, the problem was the ﬁner ground sand-cement reacted faster, but did not
act as a pozzolan because the rock ﬂour was not calcined. Arrowrock Dam, in
Idaho, constructed using sand-cement in 1915, was rehabilitated with a higher
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strength concrete facing in the mid-1930s to stop continued freezing and thawing
damage.12
First generation Reclamation concretes were vulnerable to sulfate attack, ASR,
and FT deterioration. In spite of these problems, some concretes seemed
remarkably durable. Engineers and scientists began examining concrete materials
to try to improve the quality. Studies conducted at the Lewis Institute in Chicago
beginning in 1914 shed new light on the engineering properties of concrete.
The Abrams Generation (1918-1928)
The ﬁrst major advance in concrete technology during the twentieth
century occurred about 1918 with the publication of Duff Abrams’s “Design of
Concrete Mixtures.”13 Abrams improved on the recipe proportioning methods
through deliberate design practices with proportioning methods and mix design
tables. Abrams’s classic research and his Awater to cement ratio law@ provided
the foundation of concrete mix design still followed today. He found concrete
strength and thus quality could be controlled by the relative proportions of water
and cement. He also found it was possible to design mixes for the same strength
using different materials. Concrete mixes could be designed and proportioned
to meet a variety of conditions and structural requirements. Stronger concretes
were developed to resist deterioration by the environment. Researchers began
investigating the fundamental physical-chemical reactions that were needed
to advance the state-of-the-art. One of the ﬁrst inroads to developing durable
concrete took place with the identiﬁcation of the chemical reaction products
of cement hydration, and development of a method to compute the relative
proportions of each constituent in cement by Bogue in 1927.14 This important
step was necessary to formulate different compositions of cement. Without the
knowledge of its composition, it was not possible to purposely change materials
and manufacturing processes to enhance the performance of Portland cement.
Concrete manufacturing methods also improved during the 1920s,
including centrally batched and mixed concrete plants and systems to haul and
transport concrete to the site, as
shown in 3.5. The daily output
of concrete plants increased,
resulting in fewer cold joints.
The horse and wagon was being
replaced by the locomotive
and trucks. Larger projects
were constructed, and moremechanized processes were
developed. Still, the process
of consolidating concrete was
left to the common laborer
3.5. Delivery of concrete by truck from a
centrally located concrete plant.
through rodding and spading.
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The ﬁrst methods to consolidate concrete with mechanical equipment were
just being developed. Better treatment of cold joints was developed during
this time, improving the continuity between adjacent placements. For the ﬁrst
time, control tests were used to design and monitor concrete mixtures within
speciﬁc parameters. Abrams’s generation of concrete technologists provided the
foundation of knowledge for the next generation, beginning with the decision
in December 1928 to construct Boulder (Hoover) Dam on the mighty Colorado
River.
Boulder Dam / The “Hoover Generation” (1928-1945)
In 1928, the Boulder Canyon Act ratiﬁed the Colorado River Compact
and authorized construction of Hoover Dam.15 The size of Hoover Dam required
a completely new technology for large-scale concrete design and construction.
The Hoover generation raised concrete materials technology, design methods,
and concrete construction technology to unprecedented heights. This generation
of concrete technologists formulated large-scale research and development
programs of special cements to meet the speciﬁc engineering properties for
massive concrete structures. They answered some fundamental questions about
cement chemistry and the effects on mass concrete. Solving these questions
required close cooperation and communication between government agencies,
manufacturers, contractors, and private and academic research institutions. The
application of scientiﬁc methods to solve complex durability problems led to what
we now know as Amodern concrete.@
One of the ﬁrst steps required for concrete for Hoover Dam was to
investigate the composition of cement to reduce the amount of heat generated as
it hydrated. Extensive research on cement composition resulted in developing
a low-heat cement for mass concrete, now known by the American Society of
Testing and Materials (ASTM) as Type IV cement. The hydration product Atricalcium aluminate,@ abbreviated in a simpliﬁed form as AC3A,@ was found to be
one of the principal compounds that generates heat during the hydration process.
Reclamation speciﬁed the chemical composition of cement supplied to Hoover
Dam in 1933 to assure a low heat of hydration. The low-heat cement also had
improved durability because the low C3A cements had better resistance to sulfate
attack. This improved resistance to sulfate attack was the basis for specifying
less than 5 percent C3A for cement used on the Kendrick Project in 1938; another
forerunner of the ASTM Type V (sulfate-resisting) cement.16
Construction of such large projects as Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams
could not have been accomplished without advances in concrete aggregate
processing, concrete manufacturing, transporting, and placing. The use of
block construction techniques, shown in 3.6, and artiﬁcial post-cooling reduced
the potential for thermal cracking. Specialized concrete batch plants with rail
transporting and Ahigh-lines@ or cableways, were used to transport and place large
quantities in round-the-clock operations. One of the underappreciated advances
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in concrete quality developed
by eliminating the backbreaking Atamping@ techniques
of consolidation with the highfrequency, mechanical concrete
vibrator shown in 3.7.17 Vibrators
allowed a lowered unit water
content of the mixture and thus
lowered the cement content. The
concrete generated less heat and
became less porous, while costing
less.
3.6. Block construction techniques reduced the
potential for thermal cracking.

The size of Hoover Dam
required not only signiﬁcant
advances in construction equipment
and materials processing but
also in construction project
management and process quality
control techniques. The designers
and constructors of Hoover and
Grand Coulee Dams were diligent,
meticulous, and to some degree
lucky. Fortunately, one of the
chemical processes that could
cause expansion, cracking, and
3.7. The use of vibrators allowed a
deterioration of concrete; alkalilowered unit water content of the concrete
aggregate reaction, was avoided
mixture.
at Hoover Dam. The cements
furnished to the dam had a high
alkali content and fortunately, the concrete was mostly free from potentially
reactive aggregates; though not by design, because the alkali-aggregate
phenomena had not yet been identiﬁed and studied.18

Two of the indirect products of the Hoover generation were the founding
of the Concrete Laboratory in Denver, Colorado, in 1931 and the ﬁrst printing of
the Concrete Manual in 1936. The Concrete Laboratory and Concrete Manual
grew out of the need for a better understanding of the behavior of concrete and the
control of concrete construction. Over 100,000 copies of the Concrete Manual
have been printed in nine editions and at least four languages. AConcrete schools@
were developed for training engineering and ﬁeld personnel, and have continued
to this day. Reclamation concrete technologists were active participants in ASTM
and ACI, serving as both committee chairmen and as president. This commitment
to voluntary standards organizations continues today.
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As the United States entered World War II, the last two pieces of the
durability puzzle were identiﬁed and ﬁnally corrected. Alkali-aggregate reaction
was encountered by Reclamation at American Falls Dam, and about 150 miles
downstream of Hoover Dam at Parker Dam. While American Falls Dam was
undergoing rehabilitation from a variety of causes, Parker Dam was just being
completed in 1937. Within two years, cracks appeared in the dam.19 The cracking
at Parker Dam was severe enough to warrant a large scale research investigation
and a blue ribbon panel of consultants. In the end, the chemical reactions between
certain altered andesites and rhyolites in less than 2 percent of the aggregates
and the alkalies in the cement fostered a deleterious, expansive reaction called
alkali-silica reaction, known as ASR20. First observed in Pennsylvania in the
early 1920s at the Buck Hydroelectric Plant, ASR became a noticeable problem
throughout the country in the 1930s and early 1940s.21 The solution to ASR was
to use petrographic techniques to identify those aggregates with the potential
for expansion and to specify a 0.6 percent limit of alkalies in the cement.22
Reclamation quickly instituted the low-alkali limit for concrete with potentially
reactive aggregates by April of 1941.23
The last major advance in developing durable concrete was the result
of both accident and observation in 1938. In New York State certain highway
pavements were observed to have superior performance when a particular brand
of cement was used in the concrete. The highway departments began specifying
this particular brand of cement for all their highway construction without fully
understanding the reason for superior performance. Microscopic examination
of the concrete revealed a paste structure containing tiny, entrained, air bubbles
brought about by using beef tallow in the cement kilns during manufacturing.24
This produced the ﬁrst Aair-entrained@ cement, accompanied by signiﬁcantly
improved freezing and thawing resistance compared to other cements. The
microscopic air bubbles absorbed the expansive forces of freezing ice crystals
within the paste, preventing micro-cracking. Though not a direct player in the
initial identiﬁcation of entrained air, Reclamation began testing concrete for
freeze-thaw durability in the mid-1930s. This included evaluating concrete,
aggregate quality, and other additives, some of which may have accidentally
entrained air. The perceived superior durability of Grand Coulee Dam concrete
in the 1930s may have resulted from speciﬁcations allowing grinding aids during
cement manufacturing that may have entrained some air.25 Anecdotal evidence
points to other accidental introductions of air in concrete in the United States as
early as the 1920s. These concretes were quickly rejected due to lower density
and compressive strength! Higginson even refers to the possibility of forms of
entrained air in stucco speciﬁed by Marcus Vitrivius Pollio in the ﬁrst century
A.D.26 Reclamation quickly changed their speciﬁcations and changed to airentrained concrete by 1942.27 By the end of World War II, Reclamation had
ﬁnally overcome the three primary causes of concrete durability problems in the
West, resulting in what is considered Amodern concrete;@ an engineered concrete
capable of resisting the physical and chemical forces of nature.
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The Post-War Generation: “The Constructors” (1945-1990)
The post-war generation of concrete technologists applied the
fundamentals of modern concrete to Acustomize@ it for a variety of new
applications and over a wide range of different environments. This generation
began as post-war citizen soldiers returned to the United States and continued
through the cold war. These people were the constructors. During the ﬁfties
and sixties Reclamation was completing Aa dam a year.@ Large, thick arch
dams became high-strength, double curvature, thin arch dams. Projects were
constructed across the desert and through 14,000 foot high mountain ranges.
Some of the largest water development and distribution systems were completed
during this era, the Central Arizona and Central Utah Projects. The concretes
used new additives to achieve greater durability, economy, and performance.
These concretes should remain durable through the next century.
One of the most signiﬁcant contributions of this generation improved
durability and also made concrete less expensive. The purposeful addition of
natural pozzolans in the early twentieth century was done somewhat as a costsaving measure and later to reduce the temperature rise of mass concrete. The
Bureau of Reclamation began investigating a power plant by-product, ﬂy ash,
in the 1930s and 1940s as a substitute for natural pozzolans in mass concrete.
The ﬁrst large-scale speciﬁed use of ﬂy ash was at Hungry Horse Dam in
1950.28 Reclamation continued research on ﬂy ash, yielding other beneﬁts such
as improving the sulfate resistance of concrete. In the 1970s cement shortages
prompted Reclamation to begin using ﬂy ash in normal structural concrete and
canal linings to save cement. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency=s
implementation of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, beginning in
1980, strongly encouraged the reuse of recycled materials, including ﬂy ash in
concrete.29 The long-term beneﬁts of using ﬂy ash will continue for generations
as these concretes are less porous and more resistant to sulfate attack and alkalisilica reaction, even more than with sulfate-resisting, low-alkali cements.30
The advances in construction equipment design dramatically increased
concrete production during this time. Large-size canal linings are now placed
at ten times the rate as in the early days. Instead of adding water to increase
ﬂuidity, superplasticizers are now added to make concrete ﬂow like water, yet
be twice the strength of its predecessors. Concrete linings were even placed
under water to reduce leakage in unlined canals.31 Concrete vibrators capable of
consolidating 25 to 50 yd3 of concrete per hour were replaced by 10-ton, vibratory
rollers capable of placing 500 yd3 per hour in roller-compacted concrete (RCC)
dams.32 It is interesting to note that the earliest Reclamation concretes were of
such a consistency that they had to be manually Arammed@ into place. The era of
Reclamation concrete dam construction concluded at Upper Stillwater Dam using
RCC of such consistency that was mechanically Arammed@ into place!
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The Present Generation and Beyond (1990-

)

By about 1990, the last large dams were being completed and a new era
was underway. Most of Reclamation=s construction program is now devoted
to rehabilitation of existing structures. The Reclamation Safety of Dams Act
of 1978 provided the Secretary of the Interior with the authority to construct,
restore, operate, and maintain new or modiﬁed features at existing Federal
Reclamation dams for safety of dams purposes.33 As the inventory of dams was
closely examined, it became apparent that many dams were in need of attention.
The safety of dams program recognized dams constructed prior to changes in
the state-of-the-art in dam design and construction were candidates for funding
under this act. In addition to dam safety needs, many aging Reclamation
structures were in need of some type of repair due to the ravages of time. An
example is Tieton Dam, 3.8,
constructed in Washington in
1925. The concrete lined spillway
suffered from serious freezing
and thawing deterioration. It was
ﬁrst rehabilitated in the 1970s and
again in 1999 with operations and
maintenance funding. Concrete
canals, power and pumping plants,
and appurtenant structures are also
being rehabilitated throughout the
West. The present generation of
concrete technologists beneﬁted
from four generations of research
and development. They must
continue to apply the hard won
practical knowledge of their
predecessors to maintain the
existing infrastructure well into the
3.8. Tieton Dam spillway rehabilitated in 1999.
twenty-ﬁrst century.
Conclusions
This paper reviewed the most signiﬁcant causes of concrete deterioration
and Reclamation=s role in improving the technology to the current state-of-the-art.
Without durable concretes, Reclamation could not have developed the western
water resources infrastructure we enjoy today. The development and rapid
implementation of these advances kept Reclamation at the forefront of the stateof-the-art through the twentieth century. This has extended the long-term service
life of our infrastructure well into the twenty-ﬁrst century. 3.9 summarizes many
of the steps encountered in developing durable, modern concrete. Although the
list of accomplishments is long, the author nominates the following as the Atop
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3.9. Timeline for major improvements in concrete quality and the development of
Reclamation durable concrete.

ﬁve@ contributions to durable concrete in the twentieth century (in chronological
order):
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1.

Abrams= design of concrete mixtures and Awater-cement ratio
law@—Abrams applied engineering practices to concrete mixtures
and he was the ﬁrst to institutionalize control of the water content
to improve concrete quality.

2.

Development of special cements to improve concrete quality, such
as low-heat and sulfate resisting cements.

3.

Development of the internal vibrator to consolidate concrete—this
equipment signiﬁcantly reduced the water content of concrete,
making it less permeable.

4.

Determining the causes of and solutions to alkali-aggregate
reaction and freezing and thawing attack—using scientiﬁc methods
such as petrographic mineralogical examination and long-term
testing to identify the parameters which affected the durability of
concrete under these conditions.

5.

Incorporating ﬂy ash in Reclamation concrete construction—ﬂy
ash improved concrete workability, decreased the porosity of the

cement paste, and improved its resistance to sulfate attack and
akali-silica reaction.
The modern concrete of today incorporates all of the advances of the
past century. An example of 1 cubic yard of modern concrete will include the
following ingredients and their proportions:
Table 1. Bureau of Reclamation “modern concrete” - one cubic yard of concrete.

Ingredient

Mass
(lb/yd3)

Volume ASTM
(ft3/ Speciﬁcation
yd3)

Air

5 percent

1.3

C 260

Air-entraining admixture for freezing and thawing durability

Water *

220

3.5

C 94

Sufﬁcient for 3 inch slump

Cement *

390

2.0

C 150

Pozzolan *

100

0.7

C 618

Sand

1080

6.6

C 33

Coarse Aggregate

2120

12.9 C 33

Total

3910

27

Comments

Type II, moderate sulfate resisting with less
than 0.6 percent alkalies to resist alkali-silica
reaction
Class F, AR Factor@ less than 2.5 for improved
sulfate resistance, and decreased potential for
ASR
Fineness Modulus of 2.75

1-1/2 inch maximum size aggregate

* Water to cement plus pozzolan ratio = 0.45 for superior durability in sulfate
and freezing and thawing environments. Water reducing admixture included.

The Author’s Closure:
The Challenge for the Twenty-first Century—Identify, Protect,
Preserve
Reclamation must now face the critical task of maintaining the existing
infrastructure to meet the needs of the twenty-ﬁrst century. The aging of concrete
structures will require a major investment for continued operation. The most
immediate needs are to protect concretes constructed before the Abig three@
durability issues were solved. Unfortunately, this only narrows the ﬁeld down to
about the 50 percent of our inventory constructed before World War II. Of these
structures, those constructed before about 1930 are in need of the most urgent
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attention. A decision support system for aging concrete is under development to
evaluate the earliest structures and present information on their long-term, service
life potential.34 With this information, Reclamation intends to present the status
of our concrete infrastructure on a time-line to prioritize funding for protection
before deterioration processes damage these facilities beyond repair.
I was fortunate to have as a mentor one of the great Reclamation concrete
technologists of his time, Mr. Edward Harboe. Whenever I had a question, I
would stop and talk to Ed because I knew he either had the answer or knew where
to ﬁnd it. Within a couple of hours, Ed would stop by after digging through his
ﬁles to come up with the results of a long-ago study. In my opinion, many of our
questions have already been answered by our predecessors. We must continue
to preserve and to pass on the knowledge base that is our history. I would like
to dedicate this paper to Ed and the many pioneers of Reclamation concrete
construction, with special recognition the late Mr. G. W. ABill@ DePuy, my old
boss, who passed away on January 3, 2002.
Timothy Dolen is a Research Civil Engineer and Senior Technical
Specialist for the Bureau of Reclamation, Materials Engineering and
Research Laboratory. He has been employed for 30 years as a civil
engineer with the Reclamation Concrete Laboratory.
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History of Drainage in the Bureau of Reclamation:
A History of Subsurface Drainage in the Bureau of
Reclamation
By:
Rodney G. TeKrony, Glen D. Sanders,
and Billy Cummins
Abstract
In the early days of the Reclamation Service, the criteria for irrigability
of lands generally consisted of two elements: 1. Is water available?, and, 2.
Can we get it to the land? Within a few years, many of the early projects were
experiencing reduced agricultural productivity and reduced ability to repay
construction loans because their soils were becoming waterlogged and saline.
By 1915 construction of subsurface drainage facilities had been initiated on
several projects. However, at the time, subsurface drainage was more of an
art than a science. Much of the world’s experience with agricultural drainage
had been gained in humid areas which are quite different than arid areas. With
no standards and limited knowledge of ground water movement, these early
drainage efforts met with varying degrees of success.
Faced with large areas of nonproductive land, several irrigation districts
requested and were granted deferments in their repayment contracts. Congress
responded over a period of some 30 to 40 years by passing a series of laws that
progressively attempted to correct the deﬁciencies in Reclamation’s project
formulation procedures. The Fact Finders’ Act of 1924 initiated the economic
land classiﬁcation in which lands were charged according to their potential
productivity. The Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1925 reduced the repayment
obligations for several districts due to nonproductive lands. The Reclamation
Act of 1939 provided for periodic reclassiﬁcations to adjust classiﬁcations
based on current productivity. The Interior Department Appropriation Act of
1954 required the Secretary of the Interior to certify sustainable productivity
of the lands by means of irrigation. This law provides that the Secretary of the
Interior must certify to the Congress that lands to be developed for irrigation are
suitable for sustained productivity under irrigation. This means that the lands
must be drainable at a cost that is economically feasible within the limits of the
repayment capacity of the lands.
To meet this challenge, Reclamation drainage engineers developed
scientiﬁc methods for conducting soil and water investigations and mathematical
procedures for the design of subsurface drainage facilities. Reclamation ﬁrst
adopted existing steady-state methods for drain design and later developed the
more accurate transient state procedures that are in use today. The methods and
procedures developed by Reclamation have proven to be successful not only in
correcting problems that develop on irrigated lands but also in predicting the
drainage requirement before water is applied to the land.
Reclamation drainage engineers were also involved in the development
of modern construction practices and in the development of modern materials
such as corrugated perforated plastic pipe which is used in drain construction
today.
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Even armed with the legal authority and the technical knowledge to
develop sustainable irrigation projects, good drainage practices were not always
followed. Political decisions that run counter to the best available technical
knowledge have contributed to such actions as the Riverton Third-Division
buy-back and subsequent resale, and the utilization of Kesterson Reservoir as
a terminal storage facility for return ﬂows. Agriculture in California=s fertile
Central Valley remains in jeopardy because the planned outlet drain has never
been constructed. The curtailments on the Oahe and Garrison Diversion Projects
were in part due to misconceptions regarding drainage. While these decisions
did not make use of the best technical expertise, they are nonetheless an integral
part of Reclamation=s drainage history.
By the 1950s, Reclamation had gained recognition as a world leader
in the ﬁeld of subsurface drainage. Reclamation drainage engineers have been
responsible for the construction of several thousand miles of subsurface drains
that maintain the productivity of over a million acres of irrigated land in the
western United States. They have also been actively engaged in successful
drainage projects in many countries around the world.
This paper includes brief discussions of how the need for drainage
helped to shape Reclamation law as we know it. It also summarizes the
development of scientiﬁc methods to ensure success. Some of the early projects
that suffered drainage problems, and the challenges and successes in providing
drainage, are also discussed. Reclamation has introduced these methods to
solve irrigated drainage problems at the international level. We will address the
international experience, and how the same methods and procedures are now
being used to design corrective drainage facilities for dams and other major
structures and to support environmental enhancement programs.

Introduction
Drainage of irrigated lands by the Bureau of Reclamation began shortly
after the passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902. However, not until the
late 1940s and early 1950s did engineers in the Bureau of Reclamation begin
pioneering efforts to develop the technology of drainage of irrigated lands into a
modern engineering science. (USBR 1993)
In the early days of Reclamation, the criteria for bringing land under
irrigation were quite simple. If water was available and if it was economically
feasible to get it to the land, the land was irrigable. Within a few years of
development, waterlogging and salinity became serious problems for some of the
irrigation districts. Beginning in 1911 the Huntley Project on the Yellowstone
River in Montana constructed subsurface drainage systems that were very
successful in returning the lands to full productivity. However, subsurface
drainage was more of an art than a science at the time. Much of the world’s
experience with agricultural drainage had been gained in humid areas which are
quite different than arid areas. A lack of standards and limited knowledge of
ground water movement led to early drainage efforts which met with varying
degrees of success. Huntley is located on coarse alluvial deposits that drained
easily and were very forgiving if the drain was not placed in exactly the right
location, orientation, and depth. For other projects, such as Belle Fourche in
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western South Dakota, the solutions were more difﬁcult. Attempts at drainage
met with limited success at best and in many cases they were completely
unsuccessful.
Faced with large areas of nonproductive land, several Irrigation Districts
requested and were granted deferments in their repayment contracts. Over the
years, Congress passed various acts aimed at developing a sustainable irrigated
agriculture in the western United States.
In order to ensure development of lands that could be kept in production
within economic limits, Reclamation drainage engineers realized that they needed
better methods of measuring soil permeability, a better understanding of soil
salinity factors, and better drain spacing procedures. Working in cooperation
with the U.S. Salinity Laboratory and other researchers who were struggling with
the same issues, they adopted state-of-the-art standards for soil salinity, sodicity,
and toxicity to various trace elements. Various in-situ permeability tests were
developed and perfected. They adopted the steady-state drain spacing formula or
ellipse equation as it is often called. Although several authors have published the
same formula in different forms, Reclamation typically uses William Donnan’s
version which was published in 1935. While the Donnan formula is generally
considered acceptable in the industry, it does not account for variations in
irrigation practices nor does it account for speciﬁc yield, the natural water storage
capacity of soils. To address these deﬁciencies, Reclamation engineers developed
transient state procedures that more accurately deﬁned the required spacing and
provided for risk analyses of drain systems. The ﬁrst version of the transient state
procedure, published in 1953, underwent various modiﬁcations for about the next
15 years.
When the Chief Engineer’s Ofﬁce was established at the Denver
Federal Center in 1948, it included the Drainage Engineering Section. This
marked the ﬁrst centralized effort to address drainage issues in Reclamation.
Design standards were developed in order to achieve consistency of methods
throughout Reclamation. The location, depth and orientation of pipe drains were
designed to achieve the greatest system efﬁciency. Materials used and gradation
and placement of envelope materials were controlled by standards, as were
construction deviation tolerances. The standards were generally monitored and
enforced by the Denver Ofﬁce drainage staff.
Within the organizational framework of Reclamation, the drainage
discipline has been unique in that it has been intimately involved in every phase of
irrigation projects, from the preliminary planning through design and construction
and, ﬁnally, operation and maintenance (O&M). The ofﬁce originally designated
Drainage Engineering Section later became the Drainage and Ground Water
Division, and later still the Drainage and Ground Water Branch of the Engineering
and Research Center. From 1953 to 1994, the Reclamation Instructions required
each Regional Director to have a Regional Drainage Engineer on staff. This
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person was to ensure that the Drainage and Ground Water organization in the
Region was properly staffed and that Reclamation drainage policy was followed.
On the organizational charts of that period, the Drainage and Ground Water
Branch was located in the Planning Division in two of the seven Regions, in the
Construction Division in one Region, and in the O&M Division in four Regions.
The functional statements were nearly identical in all of the ofﬁces. There has
never been a Drainage Ofﬁce in Washington, D.C., but for many years there was a
Drainage Liaison position in the Planning Division.
Construction techniques have evolved over the years, sometimes in
response to Reclamation design standards. Contractors developed new and better
ways to handle envelope materials and to maintain grade within the limits of
speciﬁcations.
In the late 1960s, the plastic pipe industry developed corrugated
polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride tubing for use in agricultural drains.
Reclamation’s Open and Closed Conduit Systems (OCCS) research program was
deeply involved in writing corrugated ﬂexible plastic pipe standards.
From the 1950s, through the 1980s, Reclamation=s drainage program was
heavily involved in irrigation and drainage projects all around the world. The
methods and procedures developed for use in the western United States proved
to be useful wherever we went, and the experience gained in other countries was
used to modify and bolster the domestic program.
In 1978 the Drainage Manual containing “the engineering tools and
concepts that have proven useful
for planning, construction, and
maintaining drainage systems for
successful long term irrigation
projects” was published as a
Department of the Interior water
resources technical publication.
In recent years, the
methods and procedures that were
developed for agricultural drains
are gradually being accepted for use
in control of seepage from dams,
slope stabilization, and other nonagricultural applications.
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4.1. In October 1913 a Pioneer traction engine pulled an Austin elevating grader
digging drainage ditches on the Milk River
Project near Malta, Montana.

Legislation
Fact Finder’s Act (December 5, 1924), (ch. 4, 43 Stat. 672)
The status of some Federal Reclamation projects of the western United
States in the early 1920s was dire. Waterlogging and salinity problems were
widespread and such conditions had not been anticipated. Lands were failing,
farmers were failing, and costs for corrective measures were far greater than the
costs originally anticipated. The U.S. Government decided to take action in the Fact
Finder’s Act of 1924, which charged the Secretary of the Interior, the cabinet ofﬁcial
responsible for federal irrigation development, that irrigable lands shall be classiﬁed
with respect to their capacity to support a farm family and pay water charges. The
Secretary was also empowered in that act to apportion equitably the total costs
assessed against the irrigable lands so that they all would pay in accordance with
their productivities. Thus, a federal irrigation development would be composed of
lands having varying productivities and payment capacities, but all would have to be
able to support a farm family and pay operation and maintenance costs.
Omnibus Adjustment Act (May 25, 1926)
This act adjusted water right charges on speciﬁed projects (Belle Fourche,
South Dakota; Boise, Idaho; Carlsbad, New Mexico; Grand Valley, Colorado;
Huntley, Montana; King Hill, Idaho; Klamath, Oregon; Lower Yellowstone,
Montana-North Dakota; Milk River, Montana; Minidoka, Idaho; Newlands,
Nevada; North Platte, Nebraska-Wyoming; Okanogan, Washington; Rio Grande,
New Mexico-Texas; Shoshone, Wyoming-Montana; Sun River, Montana; Umatilla,
Oregon; Uncompahgre, Colorado; and Yakima, Washington.) The adjustments
were deductions from the total repayment of projects’ costs because of unproductive
lands determined by land classiﬁcation. Lands that were found to be permanently
unproductive, generally due to waterlogging and salinity, were excluded from the
projects.
Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (August 4, 1939) (ch. 418, 53 Stat.
1187)
This act provides that the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to require
provisions in Reclamation water contracts for proper accounting, to protect the
condition of project works, and to protect project lands against deterioration “due
to improper use of water.” The contracts will also require advance payment of
adequate operation and maintenance charges. This act requires the classiﬁcation or
reclassiﬁcation of project lands from time to time but not more often than at 5-year
intervals “as to irrigability and productivity those lands which have been, are, or
may be included within any project.” The reclassiﬁcation is to be done only at the
request of the water users association or other authorized representatives of the water
users.
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Interior Department Appropriation Act, 1953 (July 9, 1952) (ch. 597, 66
Stat. 445)
This was the ﬁrst law that requires the Secretary of the Interior to certify to
the Congress that an “adequate soil survey and land classiﬁcation has been made
and that the lands to be irrigated are susceptible to the production of agricultural
crops . . .” before any appropriation for any of the construction items for a project is
available. This requirement was repeated in the Interior Department Appropriation
Act of 1954 and is generally cited under that law.
Interior Department Appropriation Act, 1954 (July 31, 1953) (ch. 298, 67
Stat. 261)
This act provides that no appropriation for any of the construction items for a
project is available until the Secretary certiﬁes to the Congress that an adequate soil
survey and land classiﬁcation has been made and that the lands can be successfully
irrigated.
Drainage and Minor Construction Act (D&MC) (June 13, 1956) (ch. 382,
70 Stat. 274)
The so-called D&MC Act provides for funding up to $200,000 per year for
irrigation districts to correct minor deﬁciencies that developed after the transfer of
facilities to the district for operation and maintenance. The district enters into a
contract with the United States to construct or repair minor facilities not to exceed
$200,000 per year. One of the more common deﬁciencies is inadequate subsurface
drainage. The law allows districts to construct drainage facilities as the need
develops over time. In some instances, it has been used in conjunction with a much
larger rehabilitation and betterment (R&B) contract in order to get the most beneﬁt
from the dollars spent. The D&MC loan is repayable at the rate established by the
district=s primary repayment contract and usually is tacked on to the end to extend
the time of repayment rather than increasing the amount of the payments.
Food Security Act of 1985 (99 Stat. 1354; 16 U.S.C. 3801-3862)
The Food Security Act of 1985, otherwise known as the Swampbuster Act,
makes producers ineligible for certain U.S. Department of Agriculture farm program
beneﬁts if they convert wetland and use it to produce agricultural commodities after
December 23, 1985. The problem then becomes determining what constitutes a
“jurisdictional” wetland. The USDA Soil Conservation Service (renamed National
Resources Conservation Service) was charged with making that determination
on a case-by-case basis. Rules for making the determination were published in
the Federal Register on September 17, 1987, and by October 1, 1987, wetland
determinations had been made on about 750,000 acres on 34,000 farms. (Schnepf)
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The Swampbuster Act did not have a profound impact on Reclamation’s
drainage program because our mission is to maintain agriculturally productive lands
in a productive state, rather than draining jurisdictional wetlands. Nevertheless,
it changed the process in that every proposed drainage project is now subject to
Swampbuster rules and we must be vigilant in avoiding incidental drainage of
wetlands.
Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of 1986 (May 12, 1986) (100
Stat. 418)
This Act requires that Reclamation conduct investigations and provide an
estimate of any trace elements or toxic substances which may be present in return
ﬂows from irrigation. In order to make this estimate, it is necessary to explore the
entire soil proﬁle through which the drainage water from the project will ﬂow.
Federal Reports Elimination Act of 1998 (November 10, 1998) (112 Stat.
3280)
This act eliminated the certiﬁcation of land classiﬁcation requirements by
striking pertinent language of the 1953 and 1954 Appropriations Acts and Section
10 of the Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act. Reclamation may seek to
reestablish the certiﬁcation through legislation.
Development of Transient State Drain Spacing Procedures
The Bureau of Reclamation used a steady-state equation known as the ellipse
equation to determine spacing between drains until the early 1950s. An adjustment
to the equation is made to account for dissimilar ﬂow conditions where drains are
placed directly on an impermeable soil layer (“on barrier”) rather than at some
distance (“above-barrier”). The validity of the drain spacing obtained by use of the
ellipse equation is dependent upon the assumed steady recharge of water to the water
table. The steady-state assumptions seldom represent the conditions produced by
intermittent irrigation applications nor do they account for water storage capacity of
the soil proﬁle.
Reclamation drainage engineers believed that more precise drain spacings
could be computed using an equation that reﬂected the typical pattern of irrigation
applications with alternate drain-out periods and would also account for storage
capacity. Reclamation drainage staff embarked on an initiative to develop a drain
spacing procedure which would be applicable to widely varying soil and ground
water conditions.
During the 1940s and 1950s drainage ﬁeld personnel were making many
drainage investigations of soils across the western United States. The information
collected during these investigations included the capacity of the soils to transmit
water; the amount, source, movement, and chemical characteristics of the water
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to be transmitted; and the available hydraulic gradients. The data they were
accumulating were sent to the Chief Engineer=s Ofﬁce and were used by Drainage
Division staff to develop the transient state spacing procedure.
Ray Winger initially conceived the transient state spacing theory and
recruited Robert E. Glover to develop the mathematics. (Winger 2001) Glover had
previously worked on the heat ﬂow formulas that were used to cool the concrete at
Hoover Dam. (Cunningham) Because the physics of heat ﬂow is very similar to
the physics of ground water movement, Glover was able to adapt the heat transfer
formulas for cooling a ﬂat slab with initial uniform temperature distribution to the
problem of ground water movement to a drain.
In 1953 the transient state procedure used an initial ﬂat water table for drains
above the barrier and second degree curve for drains on the barrier. (Dumm 1953)
Winger and Glover worked together to adjust the shape of the curve based on ﬁeld
data from the Redﬁeld Research Farm on the Oahe Unit in South Dakota. William
Ryan installed and monitored wells on the drainage research plots at the Redﬁeld
farm to determine the water table response to various recharge and drawdown
events. (Winger 2001)
In 1959 the Ofﬁce of Drainage and Ground Water Engineering sent a
memorandum to all Regional Directors presenting new formulas which redeﬁned
the initial shape of the water table between drains to more closely match conditions
found on functioning drains in the ﬁeld. (Maierhofer) This description of the initial
water table condition for the drain spacing solution is important because it more
accurately predicts the height of the water table than the formula with a ﬂat initial
water table and relates the behavior of the water table to time, physical subsurface
characteristics, and drain spacing. The validity of this new concept of water table
shape over a subsurface drain was checked extensively using data from Australia,
Canada, and the western United States. Good correlation was found between the
computed and measured values. (Dumm 1962)
In 1966 W. T. Moody wrote a computer program that used a stable ﬁnitedifference formulation to solve the nonlinear differential equations for various
depths to barrier from zero to inﬁnity and a fourth degree parabola initial water table
condition. This is the ﬁrst time the fourth degree parabola initial water table shape
was applied to the drain on barrier case. This is the basis for the drain-out curves
that were published in the Drainage Manual. (Cunningham) The curves serve as
a tool for designers, eliminating the need to slog through the rigorous mathematics
for each new drain spacing effort. The intermediate curves have largely been
underutilized by the drainage community although recent authors are discovering
this important work.
The success of the development of the transient state formula in design of
drains is due to the ﬂexibility of the drainage engineers at that time. They were
willing to apply the theoretical to the practical and use the results to reﬁne and
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redeﬁne the theoretical. Glover, Maierhofer, Dumm, Winger, and Moody were
also willing to look at ﬁeld results and revamp the formulas for transient state drain
spacing.
Development of Design Standards
It has been said that drainage is as much an art as a science. As quaint as this
sounds, as long as it was true failure to achieve satisfactory results would always
be a probable outcome of building complex drainage systems. On the Shoshone
Project, for instance, many drains were placed at 12 to 14 feet below ground,
depending on how deep the contractor could bury them. This was done in the early
1950s in the belief that deeper was better without regard to scientiﬁc examination of
the soil proﬁle. The problem was that the shale barrier was at 8 to 10 feet—above
the drain—in most locations. As a result, the drains are painfully inefﬁcient.
Although the drains do seem to work as well as they would at the barrier depth, the
spacing is too wide, because it was based on the deeper depth.
Reclamation adopted the attitude that failure was unacceptable. The cost
was just too great. With this motivation, Reclamation set out to establish design
standards that would be as close to fail-safe as good science and responsible
economics would permit.
The Function Statement of the Drainage Section, Chief Engineer’s Ofﬁce, in
1948 charged the Section with the task of developing Reclamation-wide standards
for drainage. Design standards were needed to establish consistency and to protect
the taxpayers and the water users from spending large sums of money for facilities
that offered a low rate of success. Over the years, Reclamation=s policy toward
ground water control has evolved to a stated policy that “. . . drainage construction
is an integral part of all irrigation projects.” Typically, projects must demonstrate
favorable cost-beneﬁt ratio before they are funded for construction. The cost/beneﬁt
factor includes costs for providing subsurface drainage.
The collector drains have always been considered a project cost, but
the relief drains are not always so. In 1951, a general Reclamation Policy was
established that “. . . construction of project drains on farm should be precluded or
deﬁnitely restricted and that the land owner should assume responsibility for such
construction the same as for other on farm development.” (USBR 1954) This
policy was reviewed and modiﬁed in 1963 to allow the cost of drains to “. . . be
considered, depending upon the circumstances, as a project, or a farm cost.” (USBR
1963) Since that time, on farm drainage costs are decided during the planning stage
of all projects. Since subsurface drainage problems tend to indiscriminately cross
property lines and are usually contributed to by the distribution system, drainage is
nearly always considered to be a project cost.
Among the original set of design standards was the placement of a graded
sand-gravel envelope around all pipe drains. While gravel envelopes were used as
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early as 1911, their use was inconsistent and there was no speciﬁc gradation. Design
criteria for envelope design, based on hydraulic ﬂow properties as well as ﬁlter
properties, were published in 1970. (Winger and Ryan) The resulting envelope
enhances the ﬂow of ground water into the drain while excluding soil particles
which would clog the drain pipe. Along with the advent of plastic pipe came a
plethora of synthetic envelopes that were cheaper and easier to install. Beginning in
the 1970s, Reclamation tested many of these envelope materials. Every attempt to
replace the sand-gravel envelope with synthetic geotextiles, fabrics, beads, or mats
has resulted in inferior performance or complete failure of the drains. Each research
effort concluded that the sand-gravel envelope, even with the greater cost compared
to synthetics, is very inexpensive insurance.
The emergence of corrugated plastic pipe for use in subsurface drains
represents the most signiﬁcant change in design standards since the standards
were developed. In 1968 the ﬁrst test sections of 6-inch-diameter plastic pipe
were installed in the Kansas River Projects and in the Columbia Basin Project in
Washington. Within 4 years, plastic had become the most popular material for small
diameter drains and, within 20 years, sizes up to 42-inch-diameter were available.
Concrete pipe is still used in some instances, but clay tile has all but vanished,
and asbestos cement was eliminated when asbestos was classiﬁed as a hazardous
substance.
The advent of plastic pipe allowed for curvilineal design of drains to better
ﬁt topographic features and eliminated the need for certain manholes. It also
speeded the construction process as pipe is laid as a continuous unit rather than in
3-to-5 foot segments. It also opened the door to high-speed trenchers, which at the
time were not large enough to handle rigid pipe sections.
The Reclamation drainage community is concerned with protecting the
resources that Reclamation develops. If we develop ﬂourishing irrigation enterprises
only to see them deteriorate into salt beds and low value marshes, we have failed in
our mission. Reclamation’s design standards and procedures, as described in 1977,
(Frogge and Sanders) have remained nearly unchanged since that time.
Evolution of Construction Practices
The construction of drains over the last century has taken as many forms as
contractors and engineers could conceive. The following discussion is by no means
a complete history of the evolution of construction techniques for drainage, but
includes what the authors are familiar with or could ﬁnd in the literature.
When the ﬁrst drainage problems developed on Reclamation projects,
the solution was to excavate open ditch drains using a horse-drawn earth-moving
implement sometimes called a “tumblebug.” The tumblebug was pulled by 4 or 6
horses or mules. As it was pulled along, it would scrape up about 1/3 of a cubic yard
of earth. When it was full, the operator moved a lever to raise the blade for transport
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to the waste area, usually the drain bank. To unload, the operator pulled another
lever and the implement tumbled to an upside down position, spreading its load over
a short distance.
Some early subsurface tile drains were laid in an open trench and backﬁlled
to make a subsurface drain. One such undertaking on the Huntley Project on the
Yellowstone River just east of Billings, Montana, in 1912 lasted 4 months, from
June 1 through September 30. The Contractor was paid $2,618.40 while his costs
were $2,602.64 leaving a proﬁt of $15.76. (USBR 1912) However, even in that
time better methods were available. The ancestor of modern trenching machines
was introduced on the Huntley Project in 1912. It was an Austin trenching machine
that excavated a trench up to 8 feet in depth. It was joined a year later by a Parsons
trenching machine with similar capability. Construction of 2500 feet of tile drain in
one month=s time was considered good progress. Neither machine carried a shield
for laying the pipe, so where trench walls would not stand, shoring was constructed
behind the machine. Where the grade line was deeper than 8 feet, laborers dug the
last increment by hand, 2 to 4 feet in places. (USBR 1913)
In the summer of 1913 laborers were hard to ﬁnd, so the wage rate was
raised from $2.50 a day to $2.75 and rubber boots were furnished. The construction
crew consisted of 30 to 40 men and from 2 to 8 teams of horses or mules. (USBR
1913)
Another early mode of excavation was the steam shovel, the precursor of
modern backhoes. By the 1950s most open drains were excavated by modern drag
lines which are particularly well suited to ditch excavation.
Subsurface pipe drains were ﬁrst installed by digging an open ditch, laying
a bedding for the pipe, placing the pipe by hand, covering it with a gravel envelope,
and ﬁnally backﬁlling the ditch. Often the bedding consisted of wooden cribbing
placed in the trench to support the pipe. The wooden cribbing was later replaced
by coarse gravel material which will stabilize a trench that displays quicksand
conditions. Surprisingly, open ditch methods of construction are still used in many
cases, although the excavation equipment has generally changed to large backhoes.
In 1951 a trenching machine appeared on the Delta-Mendota Canal in the
Central Valley Project. This machine towed a sled-mounted shield for laying pipe
and gravel envelope. The forward movement of the trencher was assisted by a
cable winch with a block and tackle arrangement hooked to a deadman dozer. This
avoided slippage of the tracks which would quickly dig into the boggy ground
and the trencher would become stuck. Similar arrangements were used to assist
trenchers to move over boggy ground as late as the mid-1970s. In 1955 trenching
machines were working in the Gila Project in Arizona and the Heart Mountain
Division in Wyoming. Both machines were ladder-type excavators and had shields
for placing the gravel envelope and pipe. The Cook and Butler machine on the Gila
Project was mounted on a halftrack with large steel wheels on the front. The wheels
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made traversing boggy ground nearly impossible. Another design problem was that
the shield was rigidly attached to the machine, which prevented separate control of
the shield and the trencher. The machine was still in use as late as 1969. The Heart
Mountain machine was a Parsons model 310. It was track-mounted and the shield
was completely separate from the trencher, having its own set of tracks and being
towed rather than carried.
The Jetco wheel trencher was developed speciﬁcally for conditions on the
Columbia Basin Project where rock-like caliche layers must be excavated. The
wheel was 16 feet in diameter and could excavate a trench to a depth of 12 feet. In
the Republican Valley of Nebraska and in California=s Imperial Valley, quicksand
conditions presented the most difﬁcult conditions. There, Buckeye trenchers with
ladder excavators and wide ﬂoatation tracks were developed. The Buckeye machine
with its trench shield attached was 50 feet long and weighed 50 tons. It could place
drains in fairly boggy conditions at a depth of 10 feet. It carried two large diesel
engines, one to move the machine forward and run the digging mechanism and one
to run the hydraulic pumps to adjust the depth of the digger and the shield.
Both the Jetco and the Buckeye carried a trench shield in which the concrete
or clay tile sections were placed by hand. A hydraulic lift was used to lower 2.5-foot
lengths or Ajoints@ of pipe into the shield where a man placed it in position on a
set of steel rails. A hydraulic ram pushed the pipe tight against the preceding joint
and held it there as the machine moved forward. When the machine had traveled
the length of the pipe joint, the man in the shield sounded a horn and the operator
stopped the machine to allow another joint of pipe to be lowered into place. The
machine moved a pace of about 50 feet per hour, including the stops. Later a dual
ram apparatus was introduced which allowed continuous forward movement as the
joints were handled. The pace accelerated to a dizzying 300 feet per hour.
Besides the rails, the hydraulic ram and cramped quarters for a man to work
in, the shield contained a chute for placing the gravel bed for pipe to lie on and
another chute to place gravel around and over the pipe before it left the shield and
was subject to trench wall caving. Often there was a spool mounted on the back
of the shield to dispense a continuous sheet of plastic or asphalt saturated felt along
the top of the pipe. This so-called blinding was thought to prevent soil from being
washed into the pipe along with the drain water. That practice was discontinued
when the hydraulics of the system became better understood. Most shields also
carried a hopper for gravel material so that a continuous feed of gravel was made
as the pipe was laid. With the advent of plastic drain pipe, there was no longer
a need for a laborer to ride inside the shield. The man and machinery inside the
shield were replaced by a chute through which the continuous pipe is fed so that the
pipe and gravel envelope emerge from the rear of the shield as a single unit. The
machines were not manufactured for placement of a gravel envelope around the
pipe as Reclamation standards require. Contractors typically found it necessary to
modify their new machines by attaching shields, strengthening bearings and shafts,
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and adding special controls before the new machine ever went to the ﬁeld. This
procedure is still common in the industry.
In 1970 a German-made Hoess Machine was introduced in the Republican
Valley. The Hoess was a smaller, lighter weight machine with a high-speed chain
digger. Although the machine could not lay solid pipe joints, it could lay continuous
4-, 6- and 8-inch plastic tubing at 7 feet deep at a pace of 1200 feet per hour.
Several more years would pass before larger-diameter plastic pipe was approved for
use. Many contractors preferred to stay with their old machines rather than have
two large machines on the job. By the end of the 1970s plastic pipe was approved
in diameters up to 18 inches. The need for greater depth and larger shields to
accommodate the larger pipe meant that many contractors simply converted their old
machines rather than investing in the new smaller ones. During this time, several
European companies introduced the larger high-speed trenchers that are now in use.
Forward speeds of 2,000 feet per hour are now common.
In addition to the accelerated rate of construction, ﬁeld drainage engineers
found that trenching machines provided a superior product when working in unstable
soil conditions. (Frogge and Sanders) In 1974 the ﬁrst drains for which a trenching
machine was required by the construction speciﬁcations were constructed down the
center of a primary street in Loup City, Nebraska. The purpose of this requirement
was to ensure that the gravel envelope was placed in direct contact with undisturbed
soil to form a strong hydraulic connection between the soil proﬁle and the drain.
Construction speciﬁcations requiring the use of trenching machines that excavate the
trench, lay the pipe and the gravel envelope are becoming a common practice where
construction costs are high and the consequences of failure unacceptable.
A longstanding problem for contractors building subsurface drains is
operating heavy equipment on wet ground. In many cases, the drains are designed
to remove excess water from land that has become perpetually marshy. A drain
contractor in the Kansas River Projects solved this problem by constructing
through such areas in midwinter when there was a foot or more of frost. Using a
concrete saw, two cuts were made through the frost layer, one foot on each side of
centerline. The blocks of frozen soil were removed with a backhoe making a slot
for the trenching machine to work through. This operation required great caution to
avoid placing frozen chunks in the backﬁll, which is forbidden by the speciﬁcations.
Another solution was the use of ﬂotation tracks. In the early 1980s, a Hollanddrain
trencher having tracks that were 4 feet wide was used on the Riverton Project. It
could easily trench through ground so soft that walking was difﬁcult.
With the early trenching machines, grade control was done one pipe joint
at a time and the digger was adjusted as needed. As speed increased, contractors
began using a string line which the operator tried to follow (with varying degrees of
success) to maintain grade. Another approach to grade control was a line of targets.
This line of targets was set up in the ﬁeld at an exact elevation above the grade
line. The operator sighted on these targets and lined up two targets attached to the
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digging apparatus with the line of targets in the ﬁeld. The targets were more reliable
than the string lines, but still required a skilled operator to maintain an acceptable
grade on the drainpipe. Along with the high-speed trenchers came laser-controlled
grade where the operator adjusted the machine according to a red laser dot that was
aimed at the control panel. Often the laser beam would be warped by the heat of
the trenching machine=s engine, making the dot much larger than the permissible
deviation from grade. Sometimes the dot would disappear entirely. That system
was quickly replaced by laser planes that project a plane of laser light on the correct
slope over the entire ﬁeld by a revolving laser sending unit. The plane is intercepted
by sensors on the trenching machine; the sensors signal the hydraulic controls
several times per minute to adjust the digger and the shield up or down as needed.
Interference from engine heat has been overcome by placing the sensors on masts,
several feet above the machine.
The September 1955 issue of Intermountain Industry Magazine featured a
machine developed by Sumner G. Margetts & Company of Salt Lake City, Utah,
claiming it was “The only machine of its type in the world (government approved).”
The manufacturer was not identiﬁed and photos appear to be different from any of
the machines discussed earlier in this writing, indicating that at that time there were
at least 4 such machines in existence. However, as revolutionary as these giant
machines were they never became common construction industry equipment. A
total of 12 machines were reported to be in operation in 1977, (Frogge and Sanders)
and in the United States, there are currently less than 10 operable machines with a
depth capability greater than 8 feet.
Operation and Maintenance
As noted earlier, the Drainage and Ground Water function organizationally
resided in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Division in four of the seven
Regions for nearly 50 years. This was due in part to the reality that drainage
problems usually arose after the projects had been transferred to the O&M Division.
However, regardless of their position on the organizational chart, the maintenance of
drains after construction was the responsibility of the Regional Drainage Engineer
with the support of the Projects Ofﬁce Drainage Branches.
The same observation well network that is used for planning and design is
used to monitor the effectiveness of drain systems after they are built. Usually, the
records of ground water ﬂuctuation are maintained by the same drainage personnel
who installed the wells. Most drainage ofﬁces in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
maintained handwritten or typed records of all the well readings within their project
area. The wells were measured 2 to 12 times a year, depending on the relative need
for detail. Hand-drawn hydrographs of the measurements were updated annually
and kept in three-ring binders for ready access. In more recent times, the records are
usually kept electronically, and, thanks to modern software, hydrographs are printed
as needed. The hydrographs are used to forecast emerging drainage needs in time
to plan and execute corrective measures before they became a serious economic
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burden on the landowners or the irrigation district. The hydrographs are also useful
in diagnosing deﬁciencies in existing drainage works.
In projects where drainage was a major factor, drainage personnel typically
participated in scheduled reviews of maintenance along with the distribution system
O&M experts. When problems developed in drainage systems, the drainage staff
advised O&M forces on methods of repair and, in many cases, actively participated
in the repair, as they still do. Through the years, these kinds of activities have aided
in veriﬁcation of design criteria and methods.
Early Experience
Many of the ﬁrst wave of Reclamation projects experienced severe
drainage problems within a few years. Efforts to correct drainage deﬁciencies met
with varying degrees of success. The experiences of some of these early projects
are recounted here.
Belle Fourche Project
The Belle Fourche Project was among the ﬁrst Reclamation projects to
be developed. The project was initiated with studies in 1903 and authorized
in 1904. By 1910 many of the facilities were in place and water was being
delivered. However, by 1912, seeped areas totaling 1,420 acres were scattered
over most of the project. By 1914 the seeped areas had grown to 2,500 acres and,
by 1917 they were estimated to be 35,000 acres. Small drainage districts were
formed and managed to get several thousand acres relieved of water charges.
Notes from a landowners meeting in 1920 state, “It begins to look like the only
way to accomplish drainage of the project would be to have an order from the
Secretary of the Interior with provision that the costs be charged to Operation
and Maintenance of the Project.” (USBR 1920) The district requested and was
granted a delay in the repayment contract. The 1926 Omnibus bill provided an
adjustment to water charges due to drainage deﬁciencies.
From 1917 to 1930 a drainage construction program was carried out
to correct the problems. Some 230 miles of drains, mostly open ditch, were
constructed. Over the years, the Soil Conservation Service constructed buried
pipe drains on many of the ﬁelds. Even that effort was not fully successful in
relieving the drainage problems. Improved irrigation practices have helped. In
1984 the District entered into a Rehabilitation and Betterment (R&B) contract
with Reclamation. Work done under the R&B put most smaller irrigation
laterals in pipe and lined many of the larger ditches, thus eliminating many
sources of seepage. In the1990s a land reclassiﬁcation placed some of the more
unproductive lands into class 6 (nonirrigable). All of these actions have improved
the overall situation, but parts of the district suffer from unresolved drainage
problems to this day.
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Huntley Project
Huntley Project was authorized in 1905 and many of the facilities were
completed by 1908. As was the case on the Belle Fourche Project, within a
few years serious waterlogging problems developed—but with a much happier
outcome. In 1911 there were
160 acres of waterlogged land
and “another 40 farms where
seepage has shown up.” (USBR
1911) Even as drains were being
constructed and successfully
relieved seepage problems, the
problems continued to grow. In
1914 there were 1,426 acres
“waterlogged” and 8,000 acres
“threatened” (USBR 1914), but
by 1920 construction had caught
up with demand and the problem 4.2. An Austin trencher digging a drain on the
was well under control.
North Platte Project in 1917.
From 1911 to 1920 some 65 miles of drains were constructed, most of
which were clay tile. Eventually, the total drainage on the project reached 186
miles. (USBR 1981) The manholes or “trap boxes” as they were called, were 3
feet square, made of creosote-treated wood, with 6-inch by 6-inch vertical timber
corners and sides consisting of 2-inch planks. Some of these manholes have been
replaced by corrugated metal pipe, but many of them are still in use. As to the
effectiveness of the drains, they were nearly 100 percent successful and continue
to function with minimal maintenance.
Newlands Project
The USBR Dataweb provides the early project history:
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) began
investigations into possible irrigation projects in the Truckee and Carson
River Basins in the late 1880s. In 1902, the newly organized United
States Reclamation Service took over investigations. On March 14,
1903, the Secretary of the Interior authorized the Truckee-Carson Project,
making it one of the ﬁrst projects authorized for construction by the
Reclamation Service.
Work on the Truckee-Carson Project began in mid-1903. The
original plan proposed reclamation of over 300,000 acres of land in
western Nevada. (Eventually the service area included about 73,000
acres. (USBR 1981))… The ﬁrst water deliveries to project settlers
began in February 1906. …
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As early as 1908 it had been recognized that there were serious
problems throughout the project. In spite [of] the Reclamation Service’s
belief that soils would support a wide variety of crops, that sufﬁcient
water would be available to farms, and that markets existed for produce,
many entrymen soon discovered that a forty-acre farm was too small to
produce an adequate income, that irrigation water did not drain properly,
and that little water was available during the later part of the irrigation
season. By 1912, large areas on the project were saturated and unusable,
and farm prices were much lower than expected. Drainage ditches
excavated in 1906 did not sufﬁciently drain irrigated ﬁelds, and the water
table was very near the surface, saturating the root zone.
Lack of adequate drainage was a signiﬁcant impediment to
successful farming in the region. Area water users formed an informal
organization and began to demand that the Reclamation Service
provide a solution to the drainage problem. Conﬂicts over who was
responsible delayed resolution of the situation. The water users claimed
that the Reclamation Service had promised adequate drainage, while
the Reclamation Service contended that the problem was due to overirrigation and that the farmers should assume the cost of constructing
a drainage system. Offers by the Reclamation Service to correct
the drainage problems with the costs paid by the water users were
overwhelmingly rejected.
In 1916, after several years of resisting the formation of a
formal water users organization, the Reclamation Service proposed to
begin work on a drainage system as soon as an irrigation district could
be formed that could contract for payment of the costs of the drainage
system. In March 1917, the Nevada Legislature passed a bill approving
formation of the irrigation district, and on November 16, the TruckeeCarson Irrigation District (TCID) was created by a vote of nine-to-one in
favor of organization.
A contract for construction of a drainage system was not
approved until 1921, and a second contract had to be approved in 1924.
By 1928, when work under the contracts was complete, more than 230
miles of drains had been excavated. …
Following World War I, conditions on many Reclamation
projects had become so bad with many farmers unable to fulﬁll their
payment obligations that the Secretary of the Interior appointed
a fact ﬁnding commission to investigate the situation and make
recommendations. The commission determined that by 1926, $7,899,479
had been spent on the Newlands Project. Of that amount, the
commission determined that $4,437,820 had been spent without proper
cause and that the water users should not be responsible for repayment
of that amount. The Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 relieved the water
users of that amount and gave them forty years to repay the remaining
$3,281,999. (USBR Dataweb)
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Although the drainage system was considered complete upon completion
of the contracts in 1928, drainage work continued at a slower pace. In a trip
report dated October 28, 1964, Ray J. Winger, Jr., reported “. . . a total of about
335 miles of open drains.” Winger also noted that they observed several small
areas of 100 acres or so that needed additional drainage for good production. He
was told that the farmers do not want drainage because they believed they were
beneﬁting from subirrigation. He noted that, “Under these circumstances, the
lands are becoming salinized. Without drainage they will eventually become
sufﬁciently saline to limit or preclude crop production.” (Winger 1964) His
conclusion was apparently acted on because a 1985 land classiﬁcation report
by Reclamation says, “A maze of nearly 400 miles [additional 65 miles] of
open drains and 4 miles of closed drains presently serve the Newlands Project.”
(USBR 1985)
A unique feature of the Newlands Project is the concept of so-called
“bench and bottom lands” based primarily on subsurface drainage characteristics
which were not clearly deﬁned until some 60 years after the concept was initiated.
In 1925, following a series of legal actions and hearings that began in 1913, a
temporary restraining order was issued. Under the restraining order farmers on
the project were to receive, after transportation losses, 3.5 acre feet of water per
acre for bottom lands and 4.5 acre feet of water per acre for bench lands. The
restraining order neither deﬁned nor identiﬁed project bench and bottom lands. In
1944 a ﬁnal decree simply restated the restraining order. Legal actions continued
through the years and a 1986 Court Order directed the Secretary of the Interior to
prepare and submit a “revised initial designation of Bench and Bottom lands in
the Newlands Project.” The new map was to be based on two criteria, including
waterholding capacity of the soils and the “seasonal high water table.” In 1990,
Reclamation drainage personnel produced a “ﬁnal draft” report which included
detailed maps and legal descriptions of the designations.
Challenges Met
Examples of early Reclamation drainage history are too numerous
and varied to include them all in this paper. A few of the more outstanding
experiences are presented here.
Riverton
The Riverton Project consists of three divisions. Construction began
on the ﬁrst and second divisions in 1921, and ﬁrst water was delivered in 1925.
Drainage problems developed on some of the lands almost immediately. In the
1930s and 1940s, a few open drains were constructed along farm boundaries but
were largely ineffective in controlling the seepage because the spacing was too
wide. In the 1950s additional open drains were constructed midway between
the original drains, but still the spacing was too wide because the open drains
were constructed to keep crop producing areas at an optimum. All of this was
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done prior to the development of the transient state drain spacing procedures.
Meanwhile, construction began on Third Division in 1947, and public notice
number 26 opened 55 farm units for homestead. An additional 50 farm units
were opened in 1950, and 54 units were opened in 1951. Since certiﬁcation
of irrigability was not yet law, no drainage studies were conducted prior to
settlement.
As newcomers, mostly returning veterans from World War II, colonized
the First and Second Divisions in greater numbers, Reclamation heard some bad
news about the Third Division. The Third Division, a foundation of promise for
post-war homesteaders, had a false bottom. A 1951 soil survey reclassiﬁed large
areas of shallow soil in the Third Division as Class 6-nonirrigable. This acreage
drained poorly and was susceptible to waterlogging and salinity severe enough
to prevent cultivation. Congress passed Public Law 258 in 1953 permitting
homesteaders on inadequate farms to amend their existing properties with vacant
lands on the same project. Public Law 258 also allowed farmers to exchange their
units for land on other Reclamation projects. Every landowner on a Reclamation
project in the West could ﬁle a claim under Public Law 258, but the law
speciﬁcally helped farmers working unproductive acreage on the Riverton Project.
(USBR Dataweb) Within a few years, all or parts of every farm unit in Third
Division were suffering from waterlogging and salinity problems. The problem
was attributed to poor irrigation practices as well as natural drainage deﬁciencies
of the land. Many of the farms were located downslope from other farm units, so
they had to deal with return ﬂows from neighbors as well as their own irrigation
applications.
Another problem faced by Riverton farmers and by drainage engineers
trying to correct problems was sodium in the soils. Some of the lands contained
high levels of sodium, which can cause the soil structure to break down leaving
the land impossible to drain adequately. Although the problem may develop on
any project in semiarid climates, the Riverton Project seemed to be particularly
susceptible.
Enactment of Public Law 258 resulted in many farmers leaving Wyoming.
Those who relocated under the provisions of Public Law 258 settled on the
Columbia Basin Project in Washington, the Minidoka Project in Idaho, and the
Gila Project in Arizona. Those staying in Riverton added vacated land to their
existing acreage. Public Law 258 stabilized the Riverton Project as remaining
homesteaders increased the size of their units and subsequently improved
themselves ﬁnancially. Those determined to farm the Third Division formed an
irrigation district in August 1957. By the dawn of the 1960s, a Bureau “Project
History” lamented their decision: “The ratio of operating expenses to prices
received for crops and livestock continued unfavorable.” (USBR Dataweb)
By the early 1960s, the situation on the Third Division required the
Government to make a hard decision. Reclamation proposed to buy out the
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homesteaders and write off most of the $20.5 million on the Federal books.
A congressional delegation came to Riverton in October 1961 to hear local
grievances. The testimonials the delegation heard “were adverse and favored
abolishing the project.” Reclamation responded by threatening to shut off water
to the Third Division if growers refused to sign a repayment contract. One
farmer, Marvin H. West, stated to a Denver newspaper in 1962, “10 to 12 years
should prove the feasibility of these places. We have not made a living or showed
any repayment ability in that time.” (USBR Dataweb)
The growers’ anger was enough to persuade the government in 1964 to
pass Public Law 88-278 authorizing Federal purchase of Third Division lands.
The Bureau bought back 78 units totaling about 22,000 acres. Farmers from
the Midvale Irrigation District leased certain sections of the land over the next 6
years. In September 1970 Public Law 91-409 consolidated the three divisions of
the Riverton Project. Besides employing power sales to pay rehabilitation costs
on project works, the bill restored 8,900 irrigable acres of the Third Division to
private ownership, with provision that no further Federal funds would be provided
for drainage works. In January 1971 the Third Division Irrigation District ceased
operations. The following month, the Government auctioned 43 units to farmers
of the Midvale Irrigation District. By spring, the farmers petitioned the 43
units into Midvale. In December the Government executed a new amendatory
repayment contract with Midvale. (USBR Dataweb)
In 1976, the Midvale Irrigation District entered into a Rehabilitation and
Betterment (R&B) contract with Reclamation to upgrade certain facilities and to
provide adequate subsurface drainage for the First and Second Division lands.
Over the next 10 years, some 200 miles of subsurface drains were constructed.
Many of the original open drain ditches, which had eroded to several times their
design width, were replaced with more effective subsurface drains and backﬁlled,
reducing maintenance costs and increasing the tillable acreage. In an odd twist, a
provision of the law authorizing the R&B contract precluded expenditures of any
of the funds for drainage works on Third Division lands.
A reclassiﬁcation of
the Midvale Irrigation District
in 1999 conﬁrmed that for the
most part, the entire project was
experiencing good productivity.
Although small scattered parcels
of land were placed in a nonirrigable class due to the sodium
content of the soil being too high
to permit economical drainage,
waterlogging and salinization are
under control within the project
lands.
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4.3. A CCC enrollee painting a pipe siphon
across an open drain on the Gem Irrigation
District, Owyhee Project, during February 1939.

Kansas River Projects
A series of irrigation projects in the Republican River Valley from Trenton
in southwest Nebraska to south of Courtland, Kansas, were completed around
1960. By 1965 waterlogging was becoming prevalent in many areas along this
200 mile reach of the river. Drain construction began in 1966 and more than 200
miles of drains had been constructed in the Republican River Valley by 1975.
The Bostwick Division, Kansas, is a 40,000 acre project located mostly
on uplands around the town of Courtland. On July 3, 1967, a ﬁeld review of
drainage needs was conducted by representatives of the Chief Engineer=s Ofﬁce,
the Region 7 Ofﬁce, and the Kansas River Projects Ofﬁce. During that review,
Mr. Lee Dumm of the Chief Engineer=s Ofﬁce noted that the water table was in a
delicate state of dynamic equilibrium and that sooner or later a spell of unusually
wet weather would probably upset the balance, creating serious problems. His
prediction came true sooner rather than later. The fall of 1968 brought heavy
precipitation that continued through the winter and into the summer of 1969. By
August 1969 fully 90 percent of the 27,500 acres under irrigation were seriously
affected by high water tables, and about 2,000 acres were not farmed. In 1970, a
12-person ofﬁce consisting of an investigations crew, a survey crew, an engineer,
and a construction inspection crew, was opened in Superior, Nebraska, with the
speciﬁc purpose of constructing drains on the Kansas-Bostwick Unit and the
lower half of the Nebraska-Bostwick Unit. By 1981 when the Superior Field
Engineering Ofﬁce closed, more than 250 miles of pipe drains and 50 miles of
open ditch drains had been constructed on the Kansas-Bostwick Unit.
In order for this small group to accomplish this effort in a span of 10
years required some innovative measures. Ground water depth probes were
made from ¼-inch iron pipe lined with ǩ-inch plastic tubing. Water level was
read by hooking an ohmmeter to the pipe and inserting a wire connected to the
other terminal into the plastic tubing. When the wire reached the water surface, it
completed the circuit. The probes were easily inserted to a depth of about 5 feet
wherever the water table was less than 2 or 3 feet below land surface, which was
almost everywhere. The probes allowed a 2-man crew to create ground water
surface maps in about one-third the time needed to do it with augers.
Soil proﬁles were logged using a variation of split tube sampler that was
developed by the Superior Ofﬁce. It was driven directly into the ground without
beneﬁt of the hollow stem augers that are usually used. While the tube increased
production of the soil logging operation by four to ﬁve times, it was speciﬁc to the
Kansas upland soils and was never successful in other areas of the country or even
other areas of the Kansas River Projects.
Another ﬁrst for the Superior Field Engineering Branch Ofﬁce was the
hiring of Reclamation’s ﬁrst women as ﬁeld technicians, whose duties included
operating small drill rigs. In 1973, Naomi Fritson, a Nebraska farm girl, and
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Mary Torpin, daughter of a Hollywood ﬁlm director, were Engineering Tech
students at Curtis Community College in Curtis, Nebraska. They were hired as
summer employees. Their 4-month employment with Reclamation constituted
one semester of their required curriculum. At the time, it was a signiﬁcant enough
event to rate a spot on the evening news of the Nebraska Television Network.
Columbia Basin Project
The Columbia Basin Project in eastern Washington is the most extensive
drainage construction that Reclamation has undertaken in our ﬁrst century
of existence. About 540,000 acres has been developed of what was initially
envisioned as a 1-million acre project. The ﬁrst water was delivered in 1948, and
water tables began to rise almost immediately. By the early 1950s the need for
artiﬁcial drainage was becoming evident. Water table levels rose steadily until
they reached a point where drainage was needed on large areas of land to maintain
productivity. By 1968 the water table had risen an average of 150 feet over the
entire project. (Monteith and Myers)
The extensive need for drainage had not been recognized in the original
project formulation, and it was not until 1960 that a large-scale construction
program was initiated. (Christopher and Campbell) The Columbia Basin
Drainage staff was established in 1954 and, during the peak drain construction
period of 1971 to 1976, the staff numbered around 60 full-time drainage
personnel. Innovative approaches to ﬁeld investigations were initiated in an
attempt to increase productivity without increasing staff. In the geologic setting
of the Columbia Basin, 20 feet was the depth of most drainage borings. The
need to increase productivity and lower engineering costs led to the modiﬁcation
of the drill rigs used in ﬁeld investigations. The small rigs were ﬁtted with a
mast and a 20 foot long continuous auger so that 20 foot holes could be drilled
without stopping to insert and remove the standard 5-foot auger sections. Seismic
equipment was used to locate caliche layers so that borings could be farther apart.
The ﬁrst drains to be constructed were open ditches to be used as outlets
for the pipe drains. In 1961 construction of pipe drains began with a 3-mile
segment. This would increase fairly steadily until the peak in 1974 when 195
miles of drains were constructed. By 1979 more than 2,200 miles of drain had
been constructed and, by 1995, the total was 2,845 miles. (Hubbs)
Drainage of the lands was complicated by the existence of caliche layers
underlying most of the project lands. Caliche is a form of solidiﬁed calcium
deposit which occurs at depths shallower than the design depth of the drains.
Construction equipment was often unable to excavate the caliche until it was
blasted with dynamite. The large wheel trenching machines were designed for
this type of construction and were quite successful in reducing or eliminating the
need to blast.
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Drain depths on the Columbia Basin Project are typically 8 to 9 feet,
which is 1 to 2 feet deeper than on most Reclamation projects. This decision was
based largely on the capability of the local contractors’ equipment, although the
depth of the outlet drain and the depth to a favorable drain zone in the soil proﬁle
may control the depth locally. (Brohl)
Central Valley Project
The Central Valley Project was authorized by Congress in 1937. First water
was delivered from the Contra Costa Canal on August 16, 1940. Water deliveries
began on the Delta-Mendota service area in 1950 and the ﬁrst tile drains were
constructed on the Grasslands area in the early 1950s. The drains discharged into
wetlands. (Most of the following was paraphrased from written communications
provided by Michael Delamore, South-Central California Area Ofﬁce, USBR, and
Joel Zander of the Mid-Paciﬁc Regional Ofﬁce, USBR)
In 1956 the California State Department of Water Resources recommended
the state study a “comprehensive master drainage works system” indicating
that drainage problems were beginning to develop on a signiﬁcant scale. Also,
Reclamation submitted a feasibility report on the San Luis Unit to Congress. The
report included a 300 cubic feet per second earth-lined interceptor drain as part of
the “distribution system and drains.” On-farm drainage on the San Luis Unit was
the responsibility of the landowner, but Reclamation was to provide an outlet drain
that could be accessed by irrigators through irrigation district facilities. Construction
of the San Luis Drain began in 1968, and Reclamation acquired 5,900 acres of land
for Kesterson Reregulating Reservoir. The reservoir was to be operated according
to a cooperative agreement with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for the conservation
and management of wildlife, subject to the primary use of the lands for regulation of
drain ﬂows. Water was to be held in the reservoir until ﬁnal discharge permits were
acquired for the drainage water.
On July 1, 1969, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) began managing the
lands acquired for Kesterson Reservoir under terms of the agreement. Construction
of the reservoir began a year later. In 1972 construction of the ﬁrst phase of the
reservoir and the adjacent drain were completed. However, by February 1975,
funds had run out, and construction was stopped with about 40 percent (85 miles)
of the drain and the ﬁrst stage of Kesterson Reservoir complete. Four months later,
the ﬁrst contract for collector drains on Westlands Water District was awarded and
construction began on a collector system, encompassing about 42,000 acres of
irrigated lands.
In 1977 Public Law 95-46, the 1978 appropriation, increased the ceiling
for distribution and drainage systems on the San Luis Unit. Construction was
not reinitiated at least in part because discharge criteria had not been established.
Attempts to address this critical issue were unsuccessful as the State Water
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) had the authority to set discharge requirements
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but was “not in a position to do so at this time.” A March 20, 1978, letter from
Reclamation=s Regional Director to SWRCB explained Reclamation=s position and
hinted at the urgency of having discharge criteria established.
In 1978 use of Kesterson Reservoir as interim evaporation ponds for
subsurface agricultural drainage ﬂows from Westlands Water District began. The
proportion of subsurface drainage ﬂows to surface ﬂows increased yearly until
inﬂows to Kesterson were principally subsurface drainage water in 1981.
In May 1979 FWS began expressing reservations about the quality of the
drainage water from San Luis Drain and the possible effects of toxic constituents
on receiving waters. A year later, they would notify Reclamation that such effects
would need to be evaluated in a Fish and Wildlife Coordination Report and there
were concerns over completion of the San Luis Drain.
In 1981 Reclamation began studies to identify any potential toxic
constituents in the drain water. The studies found high concentrations of selenium
in San Luis Drain and Kesterson Reservoir. Reclamation imposed a moratorium on
additional farm drainage connections to San Luis Drain because Kesterson Reservoir
was reaching capacity and the outlet had not yet been constructed. Existing farm
drains continued discharging through local wetlands to the San Joaquin River.
Meanwhile, Reclamation was developing detailed plans for completion of San Luis
Drain and, at the same time, reevaluating possible alternatives such as in-valley
evaporation, desalinization, discharge to San Francisco Bay rather than Suisun Bay,
and no action. Through the early 1980s, Reclamation and several cooperating state
and federal agencies and universities spent about $4 million gathering information
needed to obtain the discharge permit.
In 1982 FWS found high selenium concentrations in ﬁsh at Kesterson
Reservoir and discovered higher-than-normal waterfowl mortalities and deformities
a year later. Reclamation took action to minimize waterfowl attraction at Kesterson
Reservoir by reducing the number of ponds and providing additional water to
neighboring wetland areas. In September 1984 a hazing program was started to keep
the birds off Kesterson Reservoir. A number of techniques were tried, including
periodic shotgun blasts and chasing birds with ATVs. At the same time, 15,000 acre
feet of clean water was provided to alternate habitat sites.
In February 1983, because of high rainfall, Reclamation ﬁled an application
with the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (CVRWQCB)
for a discharge permit from Kesterson to the San Joaquin River. CVRWQCB
responded by acknowledging the need to discharge excess water from San Luis
Drain and Kesterson Reservoir and requiring Reclamation to immediately begin
a sampling program and submit reports. On January 13, 1984, Reclamation
notiﬁed CVRWQCB that high rainfall amounts combined with drainage water were
threatening the dikes and warning that failure would mean uncontrolled ﬂooding.
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On February 2, the application was approved for limited discharge to prevent failure
of the dikes, but large discharges were not allowed.
On April 8, 1983, Reclamation requested SWRCB approve a schedule for
preparation of a technical report to accompany the application for the discharge
permit to Suisun Bay and for the board to act on the application by November
1984. The Board responded on May 4 saying the schedule could not be met but that
December 1984 was workable only if the report met acceptance by the scientiﬁc
community, the SWQCB, and National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit conditions.
In March 1985 the Department of the Interior announced plans to close
Kesterson Reservoir and San Luis Drain and to terminate deliveries to 42,000 acres
in Westlands Water District because of concern of violation of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act. A month later the Department reached an agreement with Westlands to
continue delivering water to all of the lands in the district, but the drain remained
closed. This was followed quickly by landowners ﬁling lawsuits against the United
States for taking of their property by seepage of drainage water from Kesterson
Reservoir. In November Westlands Water District ﬁled a draft EIR on plans for
on-farm management, water recycling and plugging of the farm drains if necessary.
By May 1986 Westlands completed plugging of the drains to prevent drainage water
from entering San Luis Drain.
On December 30, 1986, the United States and Westlands Water District
reached a compromise settlement known as the “Barcellos Judgment” ﬁled in United
States District Court as a court judgment. The judgment, among other things,
required the Federal Government to develop a plan for drainage service facilities by
December 31, 1991. The Judgment stipulates that the drainage facilities shall have
sufﬁcient capacity and capability to transport, treat as necessary, and
dispose of the annual quantity of subsurface agricultural drainage water
from the District (not less than 60,000 acre feet and not more than 100,000
acre feet) required to be disposed of by December 31, 2007 …

To help ﬁnance construction of the drainage service facilities, the District was
required to make annual contributions to a trust fund established under the judgment.
These funds were released to the District in June 1992 when the court ruled that the
Government had failed to meet the terms of the Barcellos Judgment.
In January 1988, after considerable controversy, Reclamation began
dewatering Kesterson Reservoir in preparation for cleanup. The dewatering was
completed on April 12 and by November low-lying areas of Kesterson Reservoir had
been ﬁlled with dirt. However, this did not end the life of the San Luis Drain.
In 1996 the San Luis Drain was reactivated as part of the Grassland Bypass
Project. Drainage water from 97,000 acres of agricultural land in the Grasslands
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Basin that historically drained to the San Joaquin River is transported through the
lower 28 mile segment of the drain. The drain water contains lower concentrations
of selenium than did the original drain water that ﬂowed to Kesterson reservoir.
The drain carries the water around the Grassland Conservation District to the
terminal structure of San Luis Drain and returns to the San Joaquin River through
Mud Slough. The selenium load is monitored for compliance with agreed-upon
monthly and annual load limits. Fees of $25,000 to $250,000 are levied against the
participating irrigation districts when the limits are not met. (Quinn, et al.)
One of the many entities involved in the drainage problems surrounding the
fertile Central Valley lands was the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program (SJVDP).
Public Law 96-375 passed in 1980 authorized the San Joaquin Valley Drainage
Investigation feasibility study. In August 1984 Governor Deukmejian and Secretary
of the Interior William Clark established the SJVDP as a cooperative effort of
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Geological
Survey, California Department of Fish and Game, and California Department of
Water Resources. The purpose of SJVDP was to conduct comprehensive studies
to identify the magnitude and sources of the drainage problem, the toxic effect of
selenium on wildlife, and what actions needed to be taken to resolve these issues.
By the end of 1990 funds totaling $50 million had been appropriated to support the
Program.
In April 1987 SJVDP issued a draft report which discussed ocean disposal
possibilities. Public reaction was so strongly adverse that the SJVDP Management
Committee narrowed the focus of the program to exclude any disposal of
agricultural drainage water or brine outside the San Joaquin Valley. In September
1990 SJVDP issued its ﬁnal report titled “A Management Plan for Agricultural
Subsurface Drainage and Related Problems on the West Side San Joaquin Valley.”
In December 1991 four federal agencies, including Reclamation, and four state
agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Implementation of the San
Joaquin Valley Drainage Program=s Recommended Plan. The major components of
the plan are to (1) reduce the amount of irrigation water applied to the ﬁeld, (2) reuse
drainage water, (3) store drainage water in evaporation ponds, (4) cease irrigating
lands that have high selenium levels in the subsurface, (5) pump ground water to
lower the water table, (6) discharge to the San Joaquin River, and (7) protection,
restoration, and provision of substitute water supplies for ﬁsh and wildlife habitat.
The controversy over the trace element selenium and how to handle drainage
waters containing elevated concentrations has sparked numerous research efforts
and other spin-off activities. In September 1986 the Westlands Water District Board
approved a $6.6 million drainage treatment plant and a prototype deep well injection
unit. After 18 months, the research project was indeﬁnitely postponed because it
did not appear to be economically feasible on a large scale. However, in October
1989 the District entered into an agreement with state and federal agencies and
universities to begin work on a treatment research center to be located in the district.
At about the same time, Panoche Drainage District began construction of a prototype
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facility to remove selenium from water using an iron absorption process. In June
1989 Westlands began drilling on an 8,100-foot-deep prototype injection well to be
used for disposal of drainage water.
Several treatment methods were employed in an effort to reduce selenium
in the soil, including ﬁeld testing of a biological cleanup plan using selenium eating
fungi.
The problems associated with high concentrations of selenium in the
drainage water at Kesterson Reservoir were the primary reason why the Department
of the Interior launched the Irrigation Drainage Program in 1985 with an inventory
of more than 600 irrigation projects in the western United States to discover the
extent of toxic trace elements in drainage water from the projects. (Department of
the Interior, NIWQP website)
In 1992 Reclamation announced that it would award Challenge Grants for
demonstration projects of innovative approaches to advance water conservation
and address agricultural drainage problems in the Mid-Paciﬁc Region. Challenge
Grants addressing drainage problems would be accepted only for the SJVDP
study area. Six Challenge Grants investigating various methods of treatment or
management of selenium rich drainage water were executed in 1994.
Central Utah Project
In the middle to late 1960s the Central Utah Project (CUP) was one center
of activity for Reclamation=s drainage forces. Detailed drainage investigations
covering nearly 250,000 acres were completed in anticipation of development of
the project, which would provide a full water supply to about 33,000 acres and
supplemental water to the remainder. The bulk of these lands lay in the Uintah
Basin, which is tributary to the Green River, in Emery County in east central
Utah, and in the Sevier Basin, a closed dry lake bed in southwestern Utah. The
CUP was one of the primary proving grounds for the auger hole permeability test,
which has become a standard test for permeability of saturated soils. Several
thousand auger hole tests were conducted, some as deep as 25 feet, and a number
of minor modiﬁcations to the test procedure were initiated. Observation well
networks were installed on about a 1-mile grid and monitored weekly. The
wells generally consisted of a galvanized downspout with holes punched by a
geologist=s pick and an endcap for a lid.
For the most part, drainage ﬁeld crews across Reclamation at the time
were mobile. The CUP crews would make a brief visit to the Provo Ofﬁce
each Monday morning to get their assignment for the week, turn in time sheets
and conduct any necessary personnel business. They would make the 2- to
4-hour drive back to Provo on Friday evening, on their own time. A CUP
ﬁeld crew generally consisted of 10 to 20 people, including a lead engineer,
several subordinate engineers and technicians, and a group of 90-day temporary
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laborers. The lead engineer’s ofﬁce was a pickup truck containing all the tools
and equipment needed for the investigations and briefcases containing reference
materials, test forms, and personnel ﬁles for the engineer and his crew.
The summer and fall of 1965 found enough Reclamation drainage
personnel in the small town of Delta, Utah, to ﬁll all 7 rooms in the only motel
and a good part of the only apartment building for a period of about 6 months.
In October a football game was played between the Feds and the town in which
the Feds scored a narrow victory. On the last day in Delta—before Christmas
break—the local restaurant closed to the public and the owner prepared a special
Japanese meal for the Reclamation employees in appreciation of their patronage.
By 1990 about 50 miles of subsurface drains had been constructed in the Uintah
Basin and in Emery County. As of this writing, the Sevier Unit has not been
developed.
Oahe Unit
The Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Plan envisioned two irrigation
developments in the Dakotas to compensate the states for the loss of prime
agricultural land to the Main Stem Reservoirs, which now form a nearly
continuous lake from Yankton, South Dakota, to Williston, North Dakota. The 5
dams, built for ﬂood control and power generation, ﬂooded thousands of acres of
rich river bottom lands in the Dakotas. Originally the Garrison Diversion Project
and the Oahe Project were each to be more than a half million acres. Construction
was begun on both projects in the mid-1970s, but, to date, neither of them has
been completed.
Although the Oahe Unit was never completed, it was an important
milepost in the history of drainage in the Bureau of Reclamation. Investigations
began on the Oahe Unit in 1950 with the exploration of glacial till soils in eastern
South Dakota. Water for the project would be pumped from Oahe Reservoir on
the Missouri River.
Extensive investigations were carried out in an effort to determine the
ability of glacial till soils to support sustained irrigation. The techniques for
some of the in-place permeability tests that are standard Reclamation procedure
were developed and proven on the Oahe Unit. At the same time Reclamation
was developing the transient state drain spacing procedures, and data from the
Oahe Unit was being used to help establish the relationships that are used in the
calculations.
An exhaustive study of prairie potholes was conducted to understand the
connection between the surface water in the potholes and the ground water under
and around them. At one point, in an attempt to understand the movement of
water in till soils, men were placed in a cage and lowered into large-diameter drill
holes in order to log the sidewalls of the hole.
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The studies of glacial till soils were in concert with similar studies on the
Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota and in Alberta, Canada. Each study
that was done concluded that the permeability of glacial till soils was inadequate
to provide economical subsurface drainage for irrigation. In 1957, based on all
available knowledge, the decision was made to bypass the till soils and develop
the Oahe Unit on the lake plain soils in the James River Valley some 100 miles
east of the Missouri River.
A detailed drainage investigation was carried out on the lake plain soils
in an effort to forecast drainage needs for the authorized 190,000 acre project.
Soil sampling tubes adapted speciﬁcally to the Oahe soils investigations and
other specialized tools were handmade by Oahe drainage engineers because no
commercial supplier existed. (Burnett and TeKrony)
Because soils at drain depth in the Dakota Lake Plain are very unstable
when saturated and construction would be very costly, the plan was to construct
drainage facilities along with the water distribution facilities “in the dry.”
(Burnett and TeKrony) This procedure would also avoid the lag time between the
need for drainage and the construction of facilities. Historically, the lag time on
most projects was long enough to cause economic hardship for the farmers and
the irrigation districts.
Construction of the drainage system before the delivery of water would
have been a ﬁrst for Reclamation. Since drainage construction was to take
place prior to the development of high water tables from irrigation, the drainage
investigations during the planning stage of the project were completed to
design data standards, a much greater level of detail than normal for projects
in the planning stage. As it turned out, project opponents gained control of the
Conservancy District Board in 1977 and requested that Congress deauthorize
the project. The takeover of the Board was bolstered by the fact that thousands
of acres of glacial till lands were being impacted by the 100-mile-long canal,
but were not allowed to share in the beneﬁts because of their inherent drainage
deﬁciency. Deauthorization never was formalized, but the action nevertheless
sounded the death knell for the Oahe Unit. Even though the pumping plant and
parts of the Oahe canal were constructed, no further construction funding was
provided.
Eastern South Dakota Basins Study
The Eastern South Dakota Basins Study (ESDB) was the most farreaching drainage study ever conducted by Reclamation. This study was unique
in that drainability was the ﬁrst controlling element in the assessment of potential
for irrigation development. The entire area east of the Missouri River in South
Dakota was covered by a subreconnaissance-level investigation aimed at locating
lands that would sustain irrigation. Soils were logged on a 3-mile grid covering
the entire area and about 6,000 in-place permeability tests were conducted. Based
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on these data and visual observations, the land was divided into four categories
according to estimated drainage costs if the land were irrigated. Category I was
the least expensive and category IV included lakes, rock outcrops and other areas
considered to be nondrainable. The soils logs, permeability results, and category
delineations were recorded on aerial photos at a 1,000-foot-per-inch scale, and a
narrative report explained the process. The results were published in 1972. The
original report and the photos are on ﬁle in the Great Plains Regional Ofﬁce in
Billings, Montana.
Oakes 5,000 Acre Test Area
One of the obstacles faced by North Dakota=s Garrison Diversion Project
was that the project overlapped the continental divide into Hudson Bay drainage
rivers. The Canadian Government raised concerns over the possibility of biota
transfer from Missouri River waters to the Hudson Bay drainage, where it was
feared that the ﬁshing industry might be adversely affected. Among the solutions
that were proposed was a closed system concept in which no surface return
ﬂows from irrigation would be allowed. In order to test this concept, the Oakes
5,000 Acre Test Area was constructed on the James River south of the city of
Oakes, North Dakota. Missouri River water was to be carried through canals to
the James River where it would be pumped to irrigate the test area. In the early
1980s, the Oakes Ofﬁce drainage staff installed monitoring wells on a ¼-mile
grid so that the water table could be closely monitored. In 1985 42 miles of pipe
drains were constructed to provide adequate subsurface drainage and a terminal
seepage pit was constructed to handle all surface return ﬂows. This was followed
by construction of the pumping plant and distribution facilities. No water would
be allowed to leave the project until it had passed through the aquifer.
As of this writing, the canal system has not been completed and there
has never been a full water supply for the test area. However, the drains have
provided the opportunity to study various irrigation management schemes and
iron ocher problems. The drains have also been effectively used to distribute
artiﬁcial recharge waters through the aquifer. Spring ﬂood ﬂows on the James
River are pumped to the main canal where it is discharged to closed depressions
around the project. The pipe drains help to convey water from the depressions to
other parts of the aquifer. During the irrigation season, the water is pumped by
individual farmers for irrigation.
Wellton-Mohawk
Early history of agricultural development in the Wellton-Mohawk area, in
southwestern Arizona, dates back to 1538 when the Pima Indians irrigated some
of the bottom land adjacent to the Gila River. In the late 1800s settlers developed
irrigation in the area by diverting water from the Gila River, but alternating ﬂoods
and drought encouraged them to turn to pumping the abundant supply of ground
water. This worked well for a time, but, by 1934, Wellton-Mohawk farms were
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facing another hazard. Excessive salt appeared in many wells and the water table
had declined alarmingly. One after another, farms were abandoned as water and
soil became too saline for successful farming.
In 1937 the Wellton-Mohawk Division was authorized as a Reclamation
project. Construction of the irrigation features was started in August 1949. On
May 1, 1952, water from the Colorado River was turned onto the WelltonMohawk ﬁelds for the ﬁrst time. However, importation of water from the
Colorado River caused the water table to rise and threatened crops. (USBR
Dataweb)
Conventional drainage was contemplated, but investigations revealed
that conventional drains would not be effective due to artesian pressures in
the aquifer. (Tapp) The solution was to lower the water table by pumping the
aquifer. Drainage wells were constructed to remove the excess ground water, and
the drainage water was discharged into the Gila River. The drainage water was
highly saline, initially averaging about 6,000 parts per million. Late in 1961, the
Wellton-Mohawk Main Conveyance Channel was constructed for the entire length
of the Wellton-Mohawk Division
to carry drainage water from
about 67 wells. Additional wells
were installed in 1963 to allow
for selective pumping to reduce
the salinity of the efﬂuent during
the winter months and to provide
drainage to other areas with high
ground water. (USBR Dataweb)
The Wellton-Mohawk
Division is unique in Reclamation
as it is the only major drainage
project that relies on pumping
wells rather than horizontal drains
to control ground water levels.
The concept works well with the
single drawback that operation,
maintenance, and replacement
costs are very high compared to
conventional drain systems.

4.4. About 1959 Reclamation experimented
with using dynamite to clean drains on the
Lower Yellowstone Project.

National Irrigation Water Quality Program
Subsurface drainage from Reclamation irrigation projects was generally
considered to be a beneﬁcial side effect of irrigation as long as salinity levels in
the water were not excessive. Even the high salinity waters were often welcomed
by the managers of wildlife refuges. When unusually high numbers of waterfowl
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deaths and deformities were found at California’s Kesterson Reservoir National
Wildlife Refuge in 1982, FWS began an investigation which continued through
1985. The problem was attributed to high levels of the element selenium in the
water and sediments of the reservoir. At very low concentrations selenium is
benign or even beneﬁcial, but at high concentrations it can be toxic to biological
communities. The source of selenium in Kesterson reservoir was determined to
be drainage water from irrigation, which was the primary water supply for the
reservoir. This revelation was to have far reaching impacts to Reclamation=s
drainage program. A more detailed discussion of Kesterson Reservoir and reasons
for the buildup of selenium is included in the Central Valley Project section of this
paper.
Congressional interest and widespread media attention, including several
television programs and more than 100 newspaper and magazine articles,
prompted the Secretary of the Interior to open an investigation of the possible
toxic effects of irrigation drainage water in the western United States. The
investigation resulted in the National Irrigation Water Quality Program (NIWQP).
NIWQP focused on areas important to migratory birds and endangered species
and public water supplies receiving water from DOI irrigation projects. NIWQP,
which is ongoing, is a 5-phase program. The studies are conducted by a core team
of DOI agencies including FWS, Geological Survey, and either Reclamation or
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), depending on which agency sponsored the
project involved.
Phase 1, Site Identiﬁcation, was essentially complete by 1989 (more
sites could possibly be identiﬁed in the future). Based on existing information,
sites likely to have irrigation-induced toxicity problems advanced to Phase 2,
Reconnaissance Investigations. If selenium levels found posed a possible threat
to ﬁsh and wildlife resources, the site moved on to Phase 3. Phase 3, Detailed
Studies, consists of ﬁeld studies to measure the extent of any adverse biological
impacts. Where adverse impacts are found, the site advances to Phase 4,
Remediation Planning, and then to Phase 5, Remediation Implementation. FWS
was the lead agency in phases 1, 2, and 3 with Reclamation or BIA having the
lead role in phases 4 and 5.
A survey of about 600 irrigation projects and wildlife areas was completed
in phase 1. Thirty-one sites moved to Phase 2, eight sites to Phase 3, ﬁve sites to
Phase 4 and two sites are currently in Phase 5. All of the sites involved in Phases
4 and 5 are Reclamation projects. The two Phase 5 sites are Middle Green and
Kendrick. The Middle Green centers around Stewart Lake State Wildlife Area,
which receives a large part of its inﬂow from subsurface drains on the Jensen Unit
of the Central Utah Project. Drainage water containing high concentrations of
selenium are believed to be the source of selenium found in the lake sediments.
In 1999 facilities were constructed to route the pipe drains around the lake so
they discharge directly to the Green River, where the water is quickly diluted to
naturally occurring concentrations. A number of “cleanup” techniques are being
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tested to remove selenium from the lake sediments. The Kendrick site is being
addressed by eliminating return ﬂows to two small closed basins and providing
ﬂow-through water to ﬂush two others. In addition, Reclamation will construct
replacement wetlands at locations away from selenium sources.
Research
Since the Chief Engineer=s Ofﬁce was established, Reclamation Drainage
and Ground Water personnel have been involved in applied research into every
aspect of subsurface drainage. Some of the subjects are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

water movement through soils
ﬁeld permeability testing
salt balance in the root zone
quality of return ﬂows
drain spacing, location, and depth
orientation of drains with respect to natural hydraulic gradient
inﬂuence of irrigation practices on drainage
how water enters drain pipes
envelope design
biological and mineral clogging of drains
construction methods
construction costs
materials used in pipe drains
drain cleaning techniques
well construction and rehabilitation

The purpose of the research was to check scientiﬁc theories, improve
constructability and maintenance techniques, and validate current practices. Analog,
physical, and digital models were used extensively in the various research studies.
The complicated processes by which water moves through soils have been a
focal point of research efforts since Reclamation ﬁrst viewed subsurface drainage as
a science. In many cases cooperating with other agencies or universities, researchers
studied ﬂow through saturated and unsaturated soils, between different soil textures,
and through preferential ﬂow paths. Sand tanks were constructed where water
movement could be observed and 16-mm movie ﬁlms were made of the processes
for training purposes.
In 1978 a 16-mm movie titled “Subsurface Drainage” was produced in
cooperation with Washington State University. The ﬁlm used sand tanks with
manometers to show how water moves through soil proﬁles to buried drains, and
how a shallow saline water table can harm or even kill growing plants. This ﬁlm has
since been copied to video tape for use in standard VCR units.
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The Oahe Project in the early 1950s was the impetus for some of the most
important research in the drainage discipline. The drainage requirements for Oahe
were known to be extensive and the plan was to construct drainage facilities in
conjunction with the distribution facilities. In that way, the ﬁnancial burden on the
farmers and the irrigation districts resulting from the normal lag time between the
need for and the provision of drainage could be avoided. Mathematical theories for
the transient state drain spacing equations were developed in response to this need.
Analog models were used ﬁrst to verify the theories and later ﬁeld measurements
would validate the procedures.
Field tests for hydraulic conductivity, or permeability, that had been
developed in the 1940s were adopted, tested, and, in some cases, modiﬁed to meet
speciﬁc needs of Reclamation projects. These tests were also subjected to analog
model veriﬁcation as well as ﬁeld testing.
Many analog models and digital models have been constructed in an attempt
to predict return ﬂow quantity and quality from various projects. Reclamation has
worked closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture Salinity Laboratory to
establish safe root zone salinity levels and leaching requirements needed to maintain
acceptable salinity levels.
Drainage on sloping land was investigated in the early 1970s by constructing
a sand tank in the Hydraulics Laboratory. The tank was 60 feet long, 2.5 feet deep
and 2 feet wide and was mounted on a platform that could be tilted at slopes between
zero and twelve percent. The wood frame tank was ﬁtted with Plexiglas panels so
that observers could see what was occurring outside the drains. The tank was later
used to study sediment accumulation in drains with sags built into the grade.
Analog models were used during the 1960s and 1970s to predict the effects
of placing interceptor drains on an angle to the natural hydraulic gradient on
sloping land. Field veriﬁcation was done in the Columbia Basin and on the KansasBostwick Unit in Kansas.
Drainage staff participated in the Irrigation Management Service (IMS)
studies that were done beginning in the 1960s. IMS studies were conducted on
several projects and in every region to determine the fate of irrigation water that
was applied to ﬁelds. All water entering the ﬁeld through irrigation or precipitation
was measured, consumptive use was estimated using state-of-the-art consumptive
use formulae, root zone moisture levels were measured, and tail waters leaving
the ﬁeld were measured. Cooperating irrigators were assisted in management of
their irrigation water to the beneﬁt of production and reduction in water usage.
Reclamation phased out the program in the late 1970s, but the practice is carried on
by private industry for the beneﬁt of private irrigators as well as those on federal
projects.
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Analog and sand tank models were used to study the way water enters
clay tile and concrete drain pipe that had open joints for water to enter and how
it enters perforated plastic pipe. Standards were set for the length of the clay tile
and concrete pipe between open joints for various diameters of pipe. The larger
the diameter of a pipe, the longer the pipe section can be. This research included
establishing gradations and thicknesses for gravel envelopes around drain pipes.
Sand tank models to study envelope and pipe perforation design are still in progress.
In the 1970s clogging by iron ocher caused by bacteria growth was noted at
several locations. Reclamation initiated a cooperative program with Dr. Harry Ford,
a renowned expert on ocher-forming bacteria, of Florida State University. The result
was early identiﬁcation of problem soils and various means of treating the problems
that develop.
In the 1970s the “Open and Closed Conduit Systems” research program
was used extensively to study various methods of construction, including the
introduction of high-speed trenchers and trenchless drain construction or “plow
drains.” The program was also used in the development of standards for plastic
pipe drain materials. Video inspections of installed drains were used to determine
deﬂection and other problems associated with pipe strength. Working closely
with the corrugated plastic pipe industry and the Soil Conservation Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, who were also developing a progressive drainage
program, standards were developed for pipe strength and other properties. Mr. Ray
J. Winger Jr. Chief of the Drainage and Ground Water Branch in the Engineering and
Research Center from 1972 to 1981, was inducted into the Drainage Hall of Fame
for his contribution to the advancement of plastic pipe for use in agricultural drains.
In the 1980s a 12-inch-diameter hemispheric demonstration well was
constructed in the Hydraulics Laboratory. The well was completed as an actual well
except that it was ﬁtted with a Plexiglas plate across the ﬂat side so that observers
could see what occurred in the aquifer and gravel pack outside the well during
various rehabilitation treatments.
Not every research venture ended in new methods or products being
adopted. Through the 1970s Reclamation tested Ano envelope@ and thin synthetic
envelopes under various conditions in California, Kansas, Wyoming, Washington,
and Montana. In every case, the drains either failed completely or performed poorly
compared to a sand/gravel envelope. In 1976 and 1978 ABS plastic pipe was
installed at two locations in the Republican River Valley. ABS was a lightweight,
thick-walled pipe formed in 5-foot long sections with bell and spigot joints. In both
cases, the pipe failed to retain its shape after being in place for less than 1 year. In
1974 a “trenchless” plow was used to install drains near Courtland, Kansas. The
drains failed to control the water table and had to be replaced by conventional
drains. In 1989, a thick or “voluminous” synthetic envelope consisting of styrofoam
beads held in place by a nylon net was installed on a drain in central Nebraska.
Hydrostatic pressure forced the beads into the pipe perforations and thoroughly
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plugged them, preventing any water from entering the pipe. These learning
experiences have not deterred the Reclamation drainage staff from being receptive to
new products and ideas.
International Influence
Since the Chief Engineer’s Ofﬁce was established in 1948, Reclamation
Drainage and Ground Water staff have been involved in assisting other countries
in developing responsible drainage programs. The ﬁrst foreign assignments for
drainage staff were in Pakistan, India, Thailand, Peru, Egypt, Taiwan, Sri Lanka
(formerly known as Ceylon), Afghanistan and the Philippines. Much of the
data used to develop root zone moisture and salinity concepts was collected on
assignments to Spain, Turkey, Australia, and other countries. Assignments to the
African continent began when African nations gained independence from colonial
rule: Senegal, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania. Our largest foreign involvement
occurred during the 1970s, when we were involved in drainage and ground water
activities throughout the developing world—South America, Africa, and Asia.
The foreign assistance focus has been to educate foreign nationals on the
importance of understanding agricultural irrigation and the need to minimize land
salinization or waterlogging of the soils. An economic land classiﬁcation which
considers drainage costs is central to protecting the land resources from permanent
degradation and ensuring that the lands being developed are productive enough to
provide the farmer with a living wage. Another area of emphasis is the importance
of operation and maintenance of all facilities, including drains.
The individual assignments of a few weeks up to several years in length
were typically ﬁnanced by World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the U.S.
Department of State under the Aid to Developing Countries Program.
In the 1970s Ray J. Winger Jr. of the Engineering and Research Center
participated in technical meetings of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Specialists Working
group on Cooperation in the Field of Water Resources. The topic “Plastics in
Hydrotechnical Construction” and subtopic “Investigating the Effectiveness
of Utilizing Plastic Pipe in Irrigation and Drainage” were part of the U.S.U.S.S.R. Agreement on Science and Technology of May 24, 1972. Materials and
speciﬁcations were exchanged, ﬁeld experiments were conducted in each country,
and meetings and ﬁeld reviews were held in each country. The results of these
experiments are incorporated into Reclamation=s technical drainage policy.
Reclamation drainage staff served as consultants to the Prairie Farm
Rehabilitation Administration, Department of Agriculture, Canada in the 1950s. A
ﬁeld review and comment on the drainage and related salinity and waterlogging
problems in Alberta and Saskatchewan Provinces were requested by the Canadian
government.
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Through the 1980s and early 1990s Reclamation drainage engineers
participated in an informal discussion group known as the Northern Plains Water
Management Workshop. The workshop was made up of engineers and soil scientists
from various universities and government agencies from the Dakotas, Montana,
Alberta, and Saskatchewan. The workshop had no formal structure, no ofﬁcers, and
no budget, but they would gather once a year at some facility and spend 2 to 3 days
discussing the problems, research needs, and breakthroughs in irrigation of glacial
till soils. The place and time of the gathering depended on someone volunteering to
be the host.
Publications
Drainage Manual
Drainage engineering was in its infancy during the 1940s through 1960s,
and standard procedures for investigation and design had not been adopted. The
purpose of the Drainage Manual was to present engineering tools and concepts
that had proven useful in planning, constructing, and maintaining drainage
systems for successful long-term irrigation projects. The ﬁrst drafts of the manual
were in limited circulation within Reclamation in the early 1960s, but new
procedures were being developed so rapidly that it was very difﬁcult to arrive at
a ﬁnal draft. It was not until the deluge of new concepts began to subside that
the manual was published as a hardcover book. The ﬁrst edition was published
in 1978. The manual was then quickly accepted as an authoritative publication
by many in the world drainage community, and it is used now as a textbook by
several universities. A revised reprint in 1993 contains only a few substantive
changes.
The Drainage Manual is used throughout Reclamation as a guide to
performing drainage investigations, and the design, construction, and operation
and maintenance of drainage systems for irrigated lands. The manual is gradually
gaining acceptance as a guide to other drainage applications such as dam toe
drains and slope stability.
Ground Water Manual
The Ground Water Manual was developed as a guide to ﬁeld personnel in
the more practical aspects and commonly encountered problems of ground water
investigations, development, and management. It standardized Reclamation=s
procedures for ground water. The manual was developed over a period of years.
Its contributors included personnel from the Bureau of Reclamation, other
agencies, foreign governments, and many individual scientists and engineers.
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Comprehensive Construction Training Program
In 1987, Reclamation=s drainage and ground water personnel from several
projects and regional ofﬁces contributed to the Comprehensive Construction
Training Program by producing two modules titled Buried Pipe Drains and Well
Construction.
Plastic Pipe Specification
With the introduction of plastic pipe for subsurface drains in the late
1960s came a need to ensure reliability of the new product. Research and testing
conducted by Reclamation led to the need to develop standards for the strength
and performance of the pipe. As larger diameters of pipe became available, new
speciﬁcations were written to accommodate these sizes. By the early 1990s,
American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and American Association
of State Highway and Transportation Ofﬁcials (AASHTO) had developed
parallel standards for the same product. On February 1, 1995, Reclamation
produced a new document titled “M-20: Standard Speciﬁcations for Corrugated
Polyethylene and Polyvinyl-Chloride Drainage Pipe” which combines all of the
former speciﬁcation documents and relies heavily on ASTM and AASHTO while
retaining certain standards that are more stringent than ASTM or AASHTO.
Spin-off Applications
Not all of the drainage and ground water work is in the agricultural arena.
Often dams, pumping plants, large canals, and other structures require subsurface
drainage facilities to stabilize foundations and prevent damage from sloughing
earthen slopes or seepage water.
Safety of Dams
It has long been recognized that most earth dams and some concrete dams
need adequate toe drains to maintain a stable foundation. It was not until the
1980s that agricultural drainage experts began to have involvement in the design
and construction of drains where the cost of failure could be measured in human
lives. Replacement of the toe drains at Sherman Dam in Nebraska was the ﬁrst
such venture for the agricultural drainage staff. Then slowly came Canyon Ferry
Dam in Montana, Diamond Creek Dike at Buffalo Bill Dam in Wyoming, Bonny
Dam in Colorado, and Glendo Dikes in Wyoming. Success in these projects
has demonstrated that the science of ground water engineering is not limited to
agricultural applications. While adaptations need to be made to deal with the
greater hydraulic gradients and the greater risk in the case of failure, the same
basic concepts, materials and construction techniques are applicable.

190

Canal and Structure Stabilization
Toe drains are constructed along major canals for a variety of reasons.
Slope stability, waterlogging of agricultural lands, and salinity control have all
been accomplished by use of subsurface drains. McClusky Canal on the Garrison
Diversion Unit in North Dakota experienced slope stability problems through cut
sections 100 feet or more in depth. The canal was constructed in the 1970s and
suffered chronic sloughing of the banks into the canal prism. Attempts to solve
the problems using horizontal wells placed with an AAardvark@ horizontal drilling
machine proved futile. After 10 to 15 years of severe maintenance problems,
drainage personnel in the Garrison Diversion Ofﬁce provided solutions to these
problems by applying their knowledge of agricultural drainage in till lands.
The New Rockford Canal in North Dakota was constructed in the mid1980s and marked the ﬁrst example of canal toe drains being constructed as part
of the canal contract speciﬁcally to protect agricultural lands from seepage from
the canal.
The Courtland Canal along the Nebraska-Kansas border is perched atop
the steep river bluffs and causes serious waterlogging problems in the irrigated
ﬁelds below. Most of these problems have been relieved by use of interceptor
drains at the base of the bluffs. However, the volume of water coming from the
canal overwhelmed the ﬁrst attempts at interception in the mid-1960s. Additional
drainage works were constructed periodically for the next 20 years. A ﬁeld
review in the summer of 2000 concluded that the problems have ﬁnally been
essentially solved.
Agricultural drainage techniques were used in 1980 to prevent the
Yellowstone River from washing out the Terry Pumping Plant. As the slope
progressively sloughed, the river threatened to cut a new channel behind the
60-cubic-foot-per-second pumping plant. Field investigations and transient
state computations revealed the source of the problem, and it was solved by
constructing a simple agricultural drain.
Again in 1990 concepts that were developed for agricultural drainage
came to the rescue of a 50-foot-wide, 22-foot-high drop structure that carries
2,300 cubic feet per second at full capacity. The East Drain Terminal Drop
structure below Palmetto Bend Dam on the gulf coast of Texas is subjected to
extreme variations in hydrostatic pressure as tides move in and out. Perforated
plastic pipe drains at the sides of the structure and a graded gravel bed at the
bottom successfully relieved the stresses on the structure.
Wetlands Applications
As the focus of Reclamation activities has shifted from construction
to water management, drainage and ground water personnel have used the
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knowledge gained over the past 50 years to incorporate wetland construction and
management into their realm of expertise. In the Bay Delta, programs associated
with the Central Valley Project in California, the Platte River Recovery Program
in central Nebraska, and the National Irrigation Water Quality Program, the same
concepts that were developed for drainage are being used by drainage personnel
to create and enhance wetlands.
Conclusions
In our ﬁrst century, Reclamation has constructed over 13,000 miles of
surface and subsurface drains to protect an estimated 1 million acres of irrigated
land from damage due to waterlogging and salinity. This does not include
the miles of drains or acres protected on projects that treat drainage as a farm
development cost.
The ﬁrst 50 years were typiﬁed by struggles to cope with technical
unknowns as scientists, engineers, farmers, irrigation managers, and politicians
attempted to develop water projects to attract settlers to the American West.
During the last 50 years, we have seen the uncertain art of drainage evolve into
a science which removes most of the technical unknowns from the drainage of
irrigated lands and allows development of sustainable agriculture to occur in a
controlled manner.
Changing social values in the last quarter century have preempted some
very promising irrigation developments. We have seen our focus change from
developing new agricultural lands to maintaining existing water resources
and environmental assets for the good of all society. We want to take note
of a common thread that repeatedly appeared in the references used for this
paper. It was the concern that Reclamation employees have always had for the
environment. Well before the time of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and most environmental groups, Reclamation drainage engineers were concerned
about the quality of water that ﬂowed from the drains and the effect that it would
have on wildlife and other downstream users. Drainage engineering also has
provided the agricultural community with the comprehension and capability to
keep irrigated farm land in productivity and avoid exploitation. The twentieth
century has been the ﬁrst time in history that large-scale irrigation has not
been marked by a majority of lands that became waterlogged, salinized, and
abandoned.
The lessons learned and the science that was developed around
Reclamation=s experience in drainage and ground water will be useful to future
developments in the United States and around the world as developing countries
endeavor to feed and clothe their people.
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Evolution of the Hoover Dam Inflow Design Flood:
A Study in Changing Methodologies
By:
Robert E. Swain
Abstract
Over the years many changes have taken place in estimating the
maximum ﬂood potential at Bureau of Reclamation dams. This paper traces the
technological changes by using the Hoover Dam ﬂood studies as an example.
The largest recorded ﬂood in the Black Canyon of the Colorado River,
which is the site of Hoover Dam, occurred in July 1884. It was estimated to
have a peak discharge of about 300,000 ft3/s. The Bureau of Reclamation and
the Geological Survey determined the magnitude of the 1884 ﬂood based on
high water marks in the Black Canyon; ﬂood observations at Lees Ferry; and
gage height observations at Grand Junction, Colorado, and Yuma, Arizona. The
ﬁve-month volume of the ﬂood was estimated to be about 30,000,000 acre-feet.
The 1884 ﬂood was considered a Anear maximum ﬂood@ and became the basis
for the design of the spillways and ﬂood control space in Hoover Dam.
In 1990 the Bureau of Reclamation revised the probable maximum
ﬂood studies for the Colorado River Basin and for Hoover and Glen Canyon
Dams. The Dam Safety Ofﬁce identiﬁed the need for the study when ﬂood
operations during the 1983 ﬂood required operating the spillways and resulted
in considerable damage to the concrete lining of the spillways. The ﬂood
hydrology data used for the original dam design were not found to conform to
current technical methodology for estimating the probable maximum ﬂood.
New hydrologic studies were conducted using a hydrologic model to
convert precipitation to runoff. The design storm was developed from historical
storm data that indicated the possibility of two large rain events occurring within
a few days of each other. For Hoover Dam the most critical situation could
occur in August, when a Pine and Cedar Mountains-centered storm follows
a San Juan Mountains centered storm by seven days. This storm sequence
would produce a probable maximum ﬂood at the dam with a peak discharge of
1,130,000 ft3/s and a 60-day volume of 9.3 million acre-feet.
Oftentimes, technological change has resulted in the need to modify
dams to ensure public safety. In this case, routing the probable maximum ﬂood
through Lake Mead does not overtop the dam and results in a maximum water
surface that is still three feet below the top of the parapet wall. However, about
100 of Reclamation=s dams are unable to safely accommodate the probable
maximum ﬂood.

Introduction
A large ﬂood resulting from late season snowmelt in the spring and
summer of 1983 required operation of the Hoover Dam spillways. During this
operation, damage to the concrete lining of the spillways occurred, leading to the
assessment of potential modiﬁcations to alleviate the problem. As a part of this
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analysis, the Flood Section of the Bureau of Reclamation evaluated the adequacy of
the hydrologic engineering aspects of the dam. Additional high runoff occurrences
in 1984 and 1986 kept the ﬂood issues at Hoover Dam in the forefront.
Upon reevaluation, the hydrologic data used as a basis for sizing the dam,
the outlet works capacity, and the allocated ﬂood storage/surcharge space were not
found to conform to the current state-of-the-art with respect to operational criteria
and technical methodologies. These data also do not reﬂect recent hydrologic and
meteorological data acquired since the original design was completed. Previous
design ﬂood investigations were crudely developed from high water marks left from
large historical ﬂood events. More recent investigations account for the effects of
upstream basin development and reservoir regulation, as well as the knowledge
gained from the many large storms that have occurred over the basin since the dam
was built.
Basin Description
The Colorado River above Hoover Dam drains an area of 167,000 mi2. The
drainage basin includes parts of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona,
and Nevada. Approximately 108,000 mi2 of the drainage basin are above Glen
Canyon Dam.
Many dams and reservoirs have been constructed in the basin over the years.
The larger reservoirs are formed from water impounded by Fontenelle, Flaming
Gorge, Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, Crystal, Dillon, Navajo, Glen Canyon, and
Hoover Dams.
The basin is arid to semi-arid with an average annual rainfall of about
10 inches. The annual precipitation varies from over 40 inches in the higher
mountainous areas to less than 3 inches near Hoover Dam. Long cold winters and
cool short summers characterize the climate of the mountains in the basin. In the
lower areas the winters are mild and short, and the summers are long and warm. The
temperature extremes in the basin range from B45qC to 46qC. The average annual
runoff is less than 1.5 inches for the entire basin. Most of this runoff is produced in
the upper basin areas. Snow accumulation normally begins in October in the high
mountains and in some years continues through May.
Basis for Original Spillway Design
Hoover Dam (also known as Boulder Dam) was sized using streamﬂow
records in existence prior to 1929. Reliable recorded streamﬂow records for the
Colorado River at Yuma, Arizona, began in 1902. Less reliable gage heights were
also available at the Yuma site for the earlier period from 1878 through 1901. The
largest recorded ﬂow was 210,000 ft3/s on June 26, 1920. The maximum historic
discharge, since the river was ﬁrst occupied by civilized man in 1856, was believed
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to have occurred in the summer of 1884 and was estimated to range from 250,000 to
350,000 ft3/s.1
On the basis of the ﬂood data and other safety considerations, a spillway
capacity of 400,000 ft3/s with the reservoir water surface at the crest of the dam
(elevation 1232.0 feet) was provided to prevent any possibility of the dam being
overtopped by an unprecedented future ﬂood. The total discharge capacity of the
dam was 520,000 ft3/s, which included the spillway capacity along with the outlet
works release capacity of 100,000 ft3/s and the power plant release capacity of
20,000 ft3/s.2
The total reservoir capacity is 30.5 million acre feet, which includes
9.5 million acre feet of ﬂood control storage. The design and construction reports
for the Diversion, Outlet, and Spillway Structures indicate that the intent of the
design was to accommodate not only the largest possible ﬂood but also a ﬂood
resulting from a dam failure upstream. The report states, AThe ponding effect of the
ﬂood storage, combined with the 520 thousand second-feet of discharge capacity,
provides for an estimated inﬂow into the reservoir of nearly 1 million second-feet
for several days without overtopping the dam. The provision for so large an inﬂow
into the reservoir was based on the criterion that the dam must be entirely safe for
any ﬂood condition, even though the ﬂood might be caused by the failure of a dam at
some upstream location.@3
Original Flood Study
E. B. Debler, Hydraulic Engineer with the Bureau of Reclamation, conducted
the original ﬂood studies that were used to size the spillways and ﬂood control space
for the dam. In 1930 he wrote Hydrology of the Boulder Canyon Reservoir. Data
that were used in the analysis consisted of stream gage records, high water marks,
and newspaper accounts.4
Prior to construction of the many major dams now located in the Colorado
River basin, high ﬂows in the lower portion of the basin occurred frequently.
Between 1878 and 1929, peak ﬂows were estimated to exceed 100,000 ft3/s twentythree times and 200,000 ft3/s three times in the vicinity of Hoover Dam. The
Geological Survey and Bureau of Reclamation estimated the peak discharge for the
1884 ﬂood as 250,000 and 300,000 ft3/s, respectively. These estimates were based
on high water marks in the Black Canyon, gage heights at Grand Junction and Yuma,
newspaper accounts, and a ﬂood observation at Lees Ferry.5
The Geological Survey estimated that the 1884 ﬂood had a peak of 250,000
ft /s at Lees Ferry. A high water mark given by a local resident was compared with
gage heights for the Lees Ferry gage. The rating curve that was used is unknown.
Since the largest gaged ﬂow at this site was 114,000 ft3/s, the rating curve that was
provided by the Geological Survey for this station was extended to estimate the 1884
peak. Several extension techniques were explored to try to reproduce the Geological
3
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Survey ﬂood estimate. Reclamation engineers could get close to their estimate but
could not reproduce it. Therefore, Reclamation decided to develop its own estimate
of the 1884 ﬂood.6
Newspapers of 1884 contain numerous references to heavy snows
throughout the basin. The Gunnison Daily Review Press reported in mid-May snow
from two to ﬁve feet deep at several locations between elevations of 9,000 and
10,000 feet. The normal snow depth for the Gunnison watershed was about
18 inches for the end of April. Other newspaper accounts indicated that this
condition was widespread over the upper basin.7
Only one precipitation station was available for the upper basin in 1884. It
was located at Fort Lewis, La Plata County, in the San Juan basin. At this station
precipitation was about 40 percent above normal from October through May, and
temperatures were below normal during the spring months.8
Flows in upstream tributaries were at all-time highs. The Gunnison River,
Colorado River at Fruita, and Green River at Green River were at their highest
known stages in 1884 and were reported in 1929 as the highest of all time. High
ﬂows were also reported in Utah by the Salt Lake City newspapers. Inhabitants
reported that high ﬂows continued for weeks.9
Based on these accounts and various ﬂow records, Reclamation concluded
that the peaks at Green River, Utah, and on the Colorado River at Fruita occurred
simultaneously. Mr. Robert Follansbee, District Engineer with the Geological
Survey, estimated the ﬂow at Fruita to be 125,000 ft3/s and at Green River to be
95,000 ft3/s. After making an allowance for the lower streams, the discharge at
Black Canyon was estimated as 300,000 ft3/s.10
To check the 1884 ﬂood peak Reclamation used the gage height at Yuma
and channel cross section to compute the associated discharge. Based on 1920
and 1921 ﬂow velocity data, a mean velocity of 7.2 ft/s was used for the hydraulic
calculations. The discharge was estimated as 250,000 ft3/s at Yuma. Since ﬂows
at Black Canyon were greater than at Yuma due to channel storage in the lower
reaches, the Yuma discharge was increased by 19 percent to arrive at the Black
Canyon discharge of 300,000 ft3/s.11
Flows, which formed the basis of a ﬂood frequency analysis, were estimated
at Black Canyon using data from the gages at Yuma, Topock, Hardyville, Boulder
Canyon, Bright Angel, Lees Ferry, and some unidentiﬁed main tributaries.
Empirical relationships were used to transfer peak ﬂows to Black Canyon. Flows for
1878 through 1901 were solely based on the ﬂow at Yuma. Later years, 1902-1929,
relied on comparisons between gages and considerable engineering judgment
to develop the annual peaks at Black Canyon. The ﬂow data were plotted on
probability paper using methods developed by H. Alden Foster and R. D. Goodrich.
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The results are shown on Table 1. The 1884 ﬂood was determined to be about a
500-year ﬂood.12
Table 5.1. 1930 Flood Frequency Analysis for Hoover Dam
Source: U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Probable
Maximum Floods - Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams, (Denver, 1990), 9.
.
Peak Flow
(ft3/s)

Return Period
(Years)

Annual Exceedance Probability
(Percent)

130,000

5

20.00

160,000

10

10.00

190,000

20

5.00

230,000

50

2.00

260,000

100

1.00

320,000

500

0.20

360,000

1,000

0.10

450,000

10,000

0.01

The volume of the 1884 ﬂood was estimated as 30,450,000 acre feet for the
period May 3 through August 22. Flow records were reconstructed for the Yuma
gage to develop the volume estimate. When the inﬂow design ﬂood was developed,
the duration of the ﬂood was extended to include April through the end of August
by using comparisons with other high runoff years. Table 2 displays the monthly
volumes of the inﬂow design ﬂood. As indicated on the table, the inﬂow design
ﬂood volume increased to 33,200,000 acre feet after adding additional spring ﬂows
and extending the period from April through August.13
Table 5.2. 1930 Inflow Design Flood Volumes for Hoover Dam
Source: U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Probable
Maximum Floods - Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams, (Denver, 1990),10
Month

Volume
(Acre-feet)

Mean Monthly Flow
(ft3/s)

April

2,000,000

33,610

May

5,000,000

81,320

June

11,850,000

199,160

July

11,350,000

184,590

August

3,000,000

48,790

Total

33,200,000
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1990 Probable Maximum Flood Study
Reclamation revised the inﬂow design ﬂood for Hoover Dam in 1990.
Meteorological studies were conducted by Morrison-Knudsen Engineers and
are documented in the report entitled, Determination of an Upper Limit Design
Rainstorm for the Colorado River Basin Above Hoover Dam. Reclamation
performed the hydrologic analysis, and the results of this study are documented in
the report, Colorado River Basin Probable Maximum Floods - Hoover and Glen
Canyon Dams. The following sections of this paper describe these studies
in more detail.14
Meteorological Analysis
Modern procedures for developing a probable maximum ﬂood involve
development of the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) and rainfall-runoff
modeling. Probable maximum precipitation is generally deﬁned as Atheoretically,
the greatest depth of precipitation for a given duration that is physically possible
over a given size storm area at a particular geographical location at a certain
time of the year.@ Traditionally the PMP storm is developed by transposing
moisture maximized storms to various locations in the basin. Then differences in
orographic effects between the storm location and the selected storm centerings
are accounted for either by a transposition index or by storm separation
techniques. For Hoover Dam, a slightly different approach was taken due to the
very large drainage area, extreme variation in orographic effects, and deﬁciency
of large-area storms.15
Upper limit design rainstorms (ULDRS) were developed for three
locations in the Colorado River drainage above Hoover Dam. The term, ULDRS,
was used to emphasize that there are differences in the procedures used to develop
these storms from those used to develop the traditional PMP for smaller area
sizes. Speciﬁc storm analyses involved determination of the ULDRS magnitude,
spatial and temporal distributions, storm sequencing, and seasonal variation.16
As with any study of this nature, it was ﬁrst necessary to assemble an
exhaustive listing of all known major storms that have occurred in or near the
region surrounding the Colorado River Basin above Hoover Dam. Due to the
large drainage area and the availability of extreme precipitation estimates from
Hydrometeorological Report No. 49 for areas less than 5,000 mi2, the search for
critical storm data concentrated on ﬁnding severe rainfall events covering larger
areas. Of the 20 storms for which detailed meteorological investigations were
performed, 13 storms were analyzed to provide the necessary depth-area-duration
data.17
Since the study basin is located in a region of complex topography,
which produces a signiﬁcant effect on total storm rainfall, it was necessary to
estimate likely storm centerings and associated Ageneric@ isohyetal patterns prior
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to development of the ULDRS. An important consideration in the development
of likely storm centerings was the location of Glen Canyon Dam in relation to
Hoover Dam. The objective was to provide the necessary design storms that
would affect not only Hoover, but also the two dams operating in combination.
Examination of the isohyetal patterns of rainfall associated with major storms
occurring in the drainage was particularly useful in identifying three storm
centerings and their related isohyetal patterns. The three storms were located in
the San Juan Mountains (Colorado), Boulder Mountains (Utah), and Pine and
Cedar Mountains (Utah).
The ULDRS magnitude for each of the three storm centerings was
evaluated by two separate methods. The ﬁrst approach is commonly referred
to as the storm separation method, where observed areal storm precipitation is
separated into components (convergence and orographic). Each precipitation
component is treated and evaluated separately, and later recombined, to provide
total design storm precipitation. The second approach used the traditional
method of storm moisture maximization and transposition. After evaluation of
the assumptions and uncertainties involved in application of each approach, the
results were averaged to produce the ﬁnal ULDRS magnitude.
Due to the large basin and storm areas involved, it was necessary
to describe the spatial distribution of average areal ULDRS precipitation.
Hydrologic trials were conducted using preliminary average areal precipitation. A
storm area of 40,000 mi2 was critical for development of the maximum inﬂow to
Hoover Dam. The ULDRS magnitude was estimated as averaging from 6.93 to
7.29 inches in depth for 72-hour storms for the three locations.
Critical inﬂow to the dams could result from a series of storms occurring
in sequence. Investigations were conducted to deﬁne the relationship between
storm magnitude and dry-period interval separating the sequenced storms. A
relationship between the days separation between storms, and the magnitude of
areal rainfall both prior and subsequent to the main storm was developed.
To adequately assess the ﬂood potential, it was necessary to deﬁne the
magnitude of the ULDRS event for the period from May through October. It
is during this period that the greatest ﬂood threat on the Colorado River above
Hoover Dam would likely result from the combination of the ULDRS event with
the snowmelt hydrograph. The ULDRS event for all three centerings could occur
with the same magnitude during the period from August 1 through October 31.
Prior to August, the seasonal variation of the ULDRS would indicate a decrease in
rainfall potential.
Hydrologic Analysis
Selection on an inﬂow design ﬂood (IDF) is generally based on an
incremental hazard evaluation downstream for the dam. AThe IDF is the ﬂood
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ﬂow above which the incremental increase in water surface elevation downstream
due to failure of a dam or other water retaining structure is no longer considered
to present an unacceptable additional downstream threat.@ In this case, the
probable maximum ﬂood (PMF) was selected as the inﬂow design ﬂood because
if the dam failed, it would result in catastrophic consequences, including loss
of life. The PMF is deﬁned as Athe maximum runoff condition resulting from
the most severe combination of hydrologic and meteorologic conditions that are
considered reasonably possible for the drainage basin under study.@18
Reclamation used the Flood Hydrograph and Routing (FHAR) computer
program to convert excess precipitation to runoff and generate the ﬂood
hydrograph for the ULDRS. FHAR, which was developed by Reclamation, uses
unit hydrograph theory. The program derives the ﬂood hydrograph by applying
increments of excess precipitation to the unit hydrograph. The unit hydrograph is
computed from the dimensionless graph, given the basin area, lag time, and unit
time.
The lower and upper basins were divided into 99 subbasins for the
analysis. In general, subbasin delineation was made by following major tributary
boundaries. Subbasins that had similar characteristics of elevation, slope,
land use, and drainage pattern were combined where possible. The size of the
subbasins was limited to areas of less than 5,000 mi2.
Field trips were made to become familiar with the subbasins. Soil and
geologic conditions, land use, vegetation type and cover, and basin roughness and
steepness were examined to better estimate loss rates and lag coefﬁcients. These
observations were used for all subbasins visited.
Loss rates are a measure of the precipitation lost to inﬁltration,
evaporation, transpiration, absorption, and minor depression storage in the
basin. In general, the lower basin near Lake Mead and the north-side tributaries
to the lake are areas of low inﬁltration and are subject to ﬂash ﬂooding. The
other areas and tributaries, especially Kanab Creek, Kaibab Creek, and most
of the Little Colorado River basin had somewhat higher loss rates. In these
areas, the vegetative cover was heavier, and the loss rates appeared to increase
with elevation rise. Most of the Little Colorado River basin showed very little
evidence of ﬂash ﬂooding or stream channel development.
In the upper basin, those areas tributary to Lake Powell were very desertlike and exhibited signs of ﬂash ﬂooding. The loss rates appeared quite low,
and the vegetative cover was very sparse. Some portions of the lower Green
River subbasin had extensive outcrops of Mancos Shale. The upper basin areas
exhibited a similar increase in vegetation and loss rates with elevation rise.
In applications of the unit hydrograph approach, the Reclamation lag
equation is used in determining the lag time of the ﬂood hydrograph. Lag time
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is deﬁned as the time from the center of mass of unit rainfall excess to the time
that one-half the volume of unit runoff from the drainage basin has passed the
concentration point. The lag coefﬁcient is a measure of the hydraulic efﬁciency
of a basin to transmit water, which reﬂects overall basin roughness, steepness, and
vegetative cover. Lag coefﬁcients for the basins above Hoover ranged from
1.3 to 5.5.19
The dimensionless unit hydrograph was used to calculate the ﬂood
hydrograph for each subbasin. The basin above Hoover Dam includes three basic
types of terrain—deserts, foothills, and mountains. Data gathered from the ﬁeld
reconnaissance and from analysis of basin features shown on topographic maps
were compared with similar data for basins where unit hydrographs had been
developed from observed ﬂood hydrographs. Separate dimensionless graphs were
used for each type of topography. The following three dimensionless graphs were
used in the study: (1) Salt River for the desert areas, (2) Buckhorn for the foothill
areas, (3) Uinta for the mountainous areas.20
The Tatum method was used to route ﬂood hydrographs from one
subbasin to the next downstream subbasin, and to combine them with additional
ﬂood hydrographs as the ﬂoods move downstream. The Tatum method is a
successive average lag procedure. It is commonly used to route hydrographs
through channels, which have no appreciable storage or large tributary inﬂows,
or where costs of obtaining channel cross-section and other data needed for more
sophisticated methods are prohibitive. FHAR uses the modiﬁed Puls method to
route ﬂoods through reservoirs or through short stream reaches in which the time
of travel and wedge storage is negligible.
Antecedent Flood
The antecedent ﬂood is that ﬂood, and associated climatic conditions,
affecting the basin prior to the onset of the upper limit design rainstorm. For this
study, the antecedent ﬂood is a 100-year snowmelt event. This ﬂood is not nearly
as large as what might be expected as the probable maximum snowmelt ﬂood,
but the volume is still very large when compared to the volume of the ULDRS
ﬂood event. In order to model operations of the reservoirs of the Colorado River
above Hoover Dam, daily ﬂows were required for a complete calendar year. The
100-year base snowmelt ﬂood, which was developed statistically, had an annual
volume of 25,375,000 acre feet into Lake Powell and 1,281,000 acre feet as
intervening ﬂow into Lake Mead from the contributing drainage area downstream
of Lake Powell.
Reservoir Operations
The reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin are operated as an
integrated system. The system has a total ﬂood control space requirement of
5,350,000 acre feet, which must be evacuated from storage by January 1. At least
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1,500,000 acre feet of that space must be in Lake Mead, which is the only facility
in the system with exclusive ﬂood control space. One of the primary goals of the
ﬂood control operations for the Colorado River system is to keep the exclusive
ﬂood control storage at Hoover vacant year-round to regulate potential rain
ﬂoods.21
The 1982 ﬁeld working agreement between Reclamation and the Corps of
Engineers for ﬂood control operations of Hoover Dam and Lake Mead establishes
the reservoir operating criteria. Two sets of operating rules are used to operate
the system. During the space-building or drawdown season, which extends from
August through December, the objective is to gradually drawdown the reservoir
system to create space for next spring=s snowmelt runoff. During the runoff
forecast season, from January through July, the forecasted maximum inﬂow
hydrograph is routed through the reservoir using predetermined release rates, so
that the reservoir system is full by July 1.22
Using the 100-year snowmelt ﬂood values, routing studies were performed
to simulate reservoir operations during the antecedent ﬂood event. The Colorado
River system operation was modeled bimonthly beginning January 1 to reﬂect
proper operations during a forecasted 100-year snowmelt ﬂood. Runoff forecast
errors were subtracted from the actual inﬂows through July 31 in order to make
operational decisions that reﬂect a reasonable degree of conservatism. The results
of these investigations produce the starting elevations that were required to route
the ULDRS ﬂood event.
Probable Maximum Floods
Determination of the probable maximum ﬂoods for Hoover Dam
involved generating seasonal ﬂood hydrographs by applying the results of the
meteorological investigation. Numerous combinations of ULDRS centerings
and storm separations were evaluated to determine the most critical hydrologic
conditions for the dam. The ULDRS ﬂood hydrographs were combined with the
snowmelt antecedent ﬂood to determine the most critical hydrologic condition at
the dam. Results of these analyses produced PMFs for the critical May through
August storm season.
The most critical ﬂood situation for Hoover Dam occurs when the
San Juan storm is followed by the Pine and Cedar Mountain storm. The
ﬂood hydrographs developed for the upper basin were routed through Glen
Canyon Dam, and combined with concurrent runoff and intervening base ﬂow
hydrographs for the area between Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams. The resulting
PMF had a peak inﬂow of 1,130,000 ft3/s and a 60-day volume of
9.3 million acre feet.23
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Discussion
Reclamation=s approach toward estimating the inﬂow design ﬂood for
Hoover Dam has changed dramatically over the years, moving from simple hand
calculations to more complex computer simulations. The original ﬂood study
for Hoover Dam relied on high water marks and gage heights to construct the
largest possible ﬂood for design. The analysis assumed that the largest ﬂood had
already occurred in the basin and was reﬂected in the historical record. Even
today, the 1884 ﬂood is still the largest ﬂood on record in this basin. When put
in a statistical context, it was estimated to have a return period of about once in
500 years. By modern standards, this is considered an unsafe design standard.
However, the engineers who designed the dam sized the spillways and outlet
works to pass the peak of this ﬂood without taking credit for the additional ﬂood
regulation provided by the storage space in the reservoir. These very conservative
design decisions produced a dam that is still safe when tested against today=s
design criteria.
The magnitude of the differences between the two studies can be
determined by comparing the peak discharge and the 60-day volumes. The 1930
ﬂood study produced an inﬂow design ﬂood with a peak discharge of 300,000 ft3/s
and an approximate 60-day volume of 23,200,000 acre feet. The 1990 PMF had a
peak discharge of 1,130,000 ft3/s and a 60-day volume of 9,300,000 acre feet. So
even though the peak discharge of the 1990 PMF is nearly four times as large as
the 1930 IDF, the volume is less than half the 1930 volume.
An additional 60 years of data have been collected since the 1930 study
was completed. Because PMF procedures attempt to produce the maximum ﬂood
possible at a site, one would expect additional data to result in larger ﬂood values
in the 1990 study. Since most of the volume comes from snowmelt, one could
speculate that the 1884 ﬂood was predominately a snowmelt ﬂood with a return
period much greater than the once in 100 years, which was used as the antecedent
ﬂood in the 1990 study. This could account for the smaller peak and larger
volume in the 1930 analysis.
The dams and reservoirs that have been built upstream of Hoover could
also be responsible for some of the volume differences. Hoover Dam was one
of the ﬁrst major structures on the Colorado River. The other large dams, which
were built after 1930, can store much of the ﬂood volume. Normal reservoir
operations use ﬂood forecasting to regulate snowmelt ﬂoods by vacating reservoir
storage prior to the occurrence of the ﬂood peak. This helps maximize power
generation and minimize ﬂood damages in the basin, and reduces the volume of
water into Lake Mead.
Since Hoover Dam was built, engineers and hydrologists have collected
a lot of data and gained additional understanding of meteorological, hydrologic,
and statistical processes. Climate and streamﬂow data available for analysis has
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increased dramatically in both quantity and quality. Computer technology now
allows analysis of detailed storm patterns and construction of rainfall-runoff
models in order to obtain a better understanding of the hydrology of the Colorado
River. This allows the engineer to run numerous computer simulations to
determine the most critical hydrologic condition for the dam.
Robert E. Swain, P.E., is a longtime engineering employee of the Bureau of
Reclamation and served as a Flood Hydrology Technical Specialist in the Flood
Hydrology and Meteorology Group. He was actively involved in safety of dams
work for Reclamation and is now retired.
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A Struggle of Needs: A History of Bureau of
Reclamation Fish Passage Projects on the Truckee
River, Nevada
By:
Rick Christensen and Brent Mefford
Abstract
The Truckee River ﬂows from the Sierra Nevada Mountains of
California eastward to Pyramid Lake, Nevada. The river basin experienced
explosive growth in the mid-to-late 1800s when gold was found in California
and Nevada. The gold rush was followed by an inﬂux of farmers and ranchers to
the area. In about 1905 Reclamation constructed the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
Project, one of the agency’s ﬁrst water diversion and storage projects. Pyramid
Lake and the Truckee River are home to two important ﬁsh that are lake
dwellers and stream spawners. This paper follows the history of Reclamation’s
ﬁsh passage projects designed to protect this important ﬁshery.

Background
The Truckee River originates in Lake Tahoe in the Sierra Nevada
Mountains of California and runs east into Nevada. The river forms Pyramid
Lake where it ﬂows into a large natural sink that lies about 50 miles east of Reno,
Nevada. Being a terminal lake, the water quality of Pyramid Lake is slightly
saline, however, the lake supports several ﬁsh species among which are two
notable lake dwellers and stream spawners, cui-ui lake suckers (Chasmistes cujus)
and Lahontan cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki henshawi). Both of these
species migrate up the Truckee River to spawn during high spring ﬂows. Prior
to the 1900s, cui-ui likely spawned as far as twenty-ﬁve miles upstream, and
Pyramid Lake Lahontan cutthroat trout spawning reached into the Sierra Nevada
Mountains. Historical ﬂows in the Truckee River vary between 1,000 and 2,000
cubic feet per second (ft3/s) during the spawning runs in normal years, with ﬂows
in excess of 3,000 ft3/s in wet years. For nearly one and a half centuries, demand
for waters of the Truckee River by immigrants to the area has impacted the unique
ﬁsheries native to this closed basin ecosystem. And for nearly as long, attempts
have been made to protect ﬁsh in the presence of a growing demand for water.
However, during the 1900s, ﬁsh protection could not keep pace with the growth
of urban and agricultural water demand. The last spawning run of the Pyramid
Lake Lahontan cutthroat trout occurred in about 1938, and the trout was thought
extinct by 1940. In 1967 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service1 listed the cui-ui
sucker as endangered. This paper follows the progression of Reclamation ﬁsh
passage projects on the lower Truckee River that accompanied a century of water
development.
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Early History
The river and its ﬁsheries were impacted suddenly when gold was
discovered near Virginia City, Nevada, in 1859. For the next forty years the
Truckee River experienced rapid changes along its path. Joe Simonds2 depicts the
rapid early growth and its impact on the river as follows:
The Comstock Lode, as it would come to be called, began an
inﬂux of settlers to northern Nevada that would place heavy demands
on the region’s natural resources, including water and timber. Water to
supply the growing needs of the Comstock’s’ mines was diverted from
the Truckee River and Lake Tahoe Basins, marking the beginning of
interbasin water diversions. The demands for lumber to supply the mines
and railroads led to the rapid growth of logging and milling operations
throughout the Sierra Nevada. Before long, the rivers and streams in the
area became clogged with sawdust and logging debris, preventing ﬁsh
migration and seriously degrading the quality of water in the Truckee
River.
In 1861, Congress granted Nevada territorial status. Among
the ﬁrst acts of the Territorial Assembly was to pass a requirement that
all dams constructed in Nevada allow for the natural transit of ﬁsh.
Unfortunately, this requirement was frequently overlooked.
In the early 1860s, the ﬁrst irrigation ditches began to appear.
The Pioneer and Cochran Ditches diverted water from the Truckee River
to irrigate lands in Truckee Meadows. Numerous dams were constructed
on the Truckee River to divert water for irrigation or to power mills. In
1870, the California Legislature authorized the Donner Lumber and
Boom Company to improve the channel of the Truckee River from the
outlet of Lake Tahoe to the California/Nevada state line. The company
constructed a rockﬁlled timber crib dam at the outlet of the lake,
controlling the outﬂow of the lake for the ﬁrst time. Throughout the later
part of the 1800s, growth along the Truckee River continued at a rapid
pace. More dams were constructed, increasing diversions from the river
and further limiting migration of ﬁsh.

By about 1900 the federal government through the United States
Geological Survey and, later, the United States Reclamation Service was
investigating a large scale irrigation project involving the lower Truckee and
Carson Rivers. In 1903 the Secretary of the Interior authorized the TruckeeCarson Irrigation Project (Newlands Project). On the Truckee River, the project
included storage reservoirs on the upper river and a diversion dam on the lower
river, 6.1. The diversion dam, initially called the Truckee River Dam, was
renamed Derby Diversion Dam. Derby Diversion Dam diverts water from the
Truckee River basin through a canal to Lahontan Reservoir on the Carson River.
The thirty-one foot high dam providing about ﬁfteen feet of hydraulic head was
completed in 1905, 6.2. The dam has an embankment that runs across the river
valley to a 155-foot-wide concrete buttress gated spillway that spans across the
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Truckee River channel. The spillway originally consisted of
16, 5-foot by 5-foot cast iron slide gates separated by 5 foot-wide-piers. The
impact of the dam on ﬁsh moving upstream to spawn was recognized early in
the project. It is believed a weir and pool ﬁshway was constructed on the right
abutment shortly after the dam was completed. This ﬁshway was replaced in
1913 with another pool and weir ﬁshway constructed downstream of the ﬁrst
spillway gate, 6.3. The 1913 ﬁshway was a wood ﬂume containing ﬂashboards
(weirs). The ﬁshway provided a series of 16, 6-ft-long by 10-ft- wide pools,
each pool dropping about one foot to the next. The height of the ﬂashboards
was adjustable to accommodate large changes in river ﬂows. The 1913 ﬁshway
was not unlike many of today’s pool and weir ﬁshways. There are no records of
ﬁshway effectiveness or how long the ﬁshway remained in service.
Despite these early attempts to provide ﬁsh passage, there is little doubt
Derby Diversion Dam was one of several signiﬁcant factors that led to the
extinction of the Pyramid Lake Lahontan cutthroat trout by the 1940s. For
the next half century following the extinction of the Pyramid Lake Lahontan
cutthroat trout there was little pressure to provide effective ﬁsh passage at Derby
Diversion Dam. In the early 1970s another species of Lahontan cutthroat trout
was reintroduced to Pyramid Lake. This population has largely been sustained
by hatchery spawning. The goal of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and many
public and private organizations is to restore spawning Lahontan cutthroat trout
to the Truckee River. To this end, in 2000 Reclamation announced a plan to
design and construct a new ﬁshway on Derby Diversion Dam. Working with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Reclamation designed a rock channel ﬁshway
that will allow passage of Lahontan cutthroat trout, cui-ui, and other resident ﬁsh
species currently held below the dam. The rock ﬁshway will consist of a 940 ft
long channel sloping 1.8 feet every 100 feet, 6.4. Flow down the channel will
be controlled by a series of boulder weirs that create pools upstream and small
drops downstream. Each weir is formed by placing boulders about 1 ft apart in an
upstream pointing chevron pattern. The boulder weirs create a hydraulic control
that produces a drop in water surface of about 0.4 ft, producing a maximum
passage velocity of about 5.0 feet per second (ft/s). The ﬁshway was scheduled
for construction in 2002-2003.
The River’s End
The problem of ﬁsh passage on the lower Truckee River is not limited to
Derby Diversion Dam. The conﬂuence of the Truckee River and Pyramid Lake
is a critical location where ﬁsh passage has often been blocked by the inﬂuences
of man and nature. An excerpt from the Nevada Governor’s address to the
Legislature in 1875 cited the start of many efforts to deal with passage issues that
have occurred at the river’s end.3
A subject of importance to many citizens of the state,… is the
preservation of the ﬁsheries of the Truckee River...unless preventative
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6.1. Map of the Newlands Project.

measures are soon adopted and rigidly enforced, their certain destruction
is imminent.... To the Indians there residing (Pyramid Lake) the ﬁsheries
are a valuable source of food, employment and proﬁt.
The mouth of the Truckee, where the river empties into the lake,
is closed by a bar of sawdust at least a mile in length, three hundred
yards in breadth and three feet in depth… I saw hundreds of ﬁne trout
dead and rotten upon the shores. The air was poisoned with the stench of
their decay.

With the construction of Derby Diversion Dam and other upstream
diversions the passage problem at the river’s end changed from sawdust to a
declining lake elevation. The average annual inﬂow to Pyramid Lake for the
period of 1918 to 1970 was approximately 250,000 acre feet, while the average
annual evaporative loss is approximately 440,000 acre feet.4 In 1967 Pyramid
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6.2. View of Derby Diversion and Truckee River.

6.3. Pool and weir fishway constructed at Derby Diversion Dam in 1913.

Lake’s water level reached its lowest recorded level—more than 87 feet lower
than it was in 1906 when Derby Dam diversions began. This lowering was due to
the increased diversions of water out of the Truckee River, the natural evaporative
loss at Pyramid Lake, and also due to some major droughts within this period.
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As the water
level in Pyramid
Lake began to fall in
the early 1900s, the
gradient of the Truckee
River steepened in
the lower river and
exposed a large ﬂat
delta area at the mouth
of the river. This made
upstream migration of
the Pyramid Lake ﬁsh
difﬁcult.
The ﬁrst major
structural effort to
6.4. View of proposed rock channel fishway overlaid on a
improve ﬁsh migration photograph of Derby Diversion Dam.
up the Truckee River
was started by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1942 when it started construction
of a diversion dam and ﬁshway channel near the site of the present Marble Bluff
facilities. However, World War II interrupted construction, and the dam was
washed out during ﬂood ﬂows in 1950.
In 1975 Reclamation completed construction of Marble Bluff Dam and
Pyramid Lake Fishway. The dam was designed as a grade control structure to
stabilize the lower Truckee River gradient. The ﬁshway was designed to provide
ﬁsh passage from the lake to the river upstream of the river delta. The dam is

6.5. View of Marble Bluff Dam and the exit of Pyramid Lake Fishway.
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located approximately three miles upstream of Pyramid Lake, 6.5. The
35 foot high dam is a 1440-foot long, earth ﬁlled embankment with 150-foot long,
centered, uncontrolled concrete ogee crest spillway with gated sluiceway. The
spillway and sluiceway pass ﬂow down a bafﬂed apron drop to the downstream
river channel. Storage at the dam is negligible, as the facility was not intended to
store water.5
In conjunction with the dam’s construction, a ﬁsh handling facility and
two different paths for ﬁsh passage from the lake to the river above the dam
were constructed. The primary purpose of the ﬁsh handling facility was to trap,
examine, and document ﬁsh that migrated from Pyramid Lake into the Truckee
River.6 Two ﬁsh passage paths were needed as river access for ﬁsh is often
blocked, for lake elevations below about 3800 feet, by a large sediment delta at
the junction of the river and lake. Historically, when exposed, the delta causes
the river to fan out into a shallow braided channel that blocks ﬁsh passage up
the river. For these conditions, a direct route was constructed from the lake to
upstream of Marble Bluff Dam, called the Pyramid Lake Fishway. The Pyramid
Lake Fishway combined ﬁve ﬁsh ladders and about three miles of ﬁshway
channel to provide a maximum elevation gain of about seventy-six feet between
the lake and the river upstream of the dam. Typical salmon style ﬁsh ladders
with weir/oriﬁce bafﬂes were designed for the ﬁshway, 6.6. Each ﬁsh ladder was
sloped at a grade of one foot vertical to ten feet horizontal (10% grade), while
the ﬁshway channels linking the ﬁsh ladders were sloped at one foot vertical in
10,000 feet horizontal. The ﬁshway was designed to pass up to 50 ft3/s at a ﬂow
depth of 4 feet and ﬂow velocity of 1 ft/s. The weir/oriﬁce bafﬂes in each ﬁsh
ladder were spaced 10 feet apart, provided an approximate 1 foot drop across each
bafﬂe, and a passage ﬂow velocity of 8 ft/s.

6.6. Location map showing Marble Bluff Dam and Pyramid Lake Fishway.

For years when Pyramid Lake elevation covers the sediment delta,
ﬁsh can move up the Truckee River to the dam and must be passed over. Fish
passage over the dam was originally achieved by constructing a ﬁsh trap with a
mechanical hoist lift system to raise the trapped ﬁsh over the dam.
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The trap, 6.7, was lowered into a sump at the head of a ﬁsh attraction
channel located on the right bank of the downstream river channel. Fish moved
up the attraction channel following attraction ﬂows and passed into the ﬁsh trap.
Operators judged when to raise the trap with the mechanical hoist. The original
system was designed such that all ﬁsh entering the trap/lift system must pass
through the ﬁsh handling facility. In 1987 the trap/lift system was modiﬁed by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to allow the lifted ﬁsh to be released directly to the

6.7. Schematic of the Marble Bluff Dam fish trap used to lift fish over the dam from
1987 to 1997.

upstream river, via the upper ﬁshway channel.
Neither of the original Marble Bluff Dam ﬁsh passage facilities functioned
as intended. During the ﬁrst years of ﬁshway operation, the ladder bafﬂe design
and head drop were found to be a poor match for cui-ui behavior and swimming
strength. The cui-ui displayed a strong bottom oriented behavior in the ﬁshway
that was contrary to passing over a weir and the 8 ft/s ﬂow velocity was found to
be too high for many cui-ui. Cui-ui attempting to move up the ﬁshway at times
crowded so densely that many ﬁsh were smothered. To improve ﬁsh passage,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service added a ﬁsh exclusion gate at the ﬁshway entrance
to regulate the number of ﬁsh entering the ﬁshway and modiﬁed the ﬁsh ladders.
In each ﬁsh ladder, weirs were added halfway between the original ladder bafﬂes
to reduce the drop over each bafﬂe to 0.5 foot and slow down the passage velocity
to about 5 ft/s. Passage of the cui-ui improved, however, ﬁsh passage efﬁciency
remained low.
The ﬁsh trap/lift system also had numerous operational problems and
limitations. The biggest limitation was that the system was too slow, resulting in
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ﬁsh over-crowding, delays, and mortality.
In 1993, two thousand cui-ui died in the river trap due to a mechanical
failure.7 Both ﬁsh passage structures were progressively modiﬁed by U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service in a continual effort to improve ﬁsh passage at the site.
However, ﬁsh passage for the cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat remained a signiﬁcant
problem.
The period from the mid 1980s through the 1990s brought ﬂoods
accompanied by large cui-ui runs that the ﬁsh passage facilities couldn’t handle
and periods of drought with few spawning ﬁsh. High water years in the mid1980s raised Pyramid Lake to an elevation submerging the Pyramid Lake ﬁshway
entrance and opening up river passage to the dam. During these high water
years, thousands of ﬁsh moved up the river to the dam overwhelming the ability
of the ﬁsh trap to pass ﬁsh. This period of high water was followed by a period
of lower than normal winter precipitation from 1988 to 1992. The lake declined
to elevation 3797 feet prior to the spring runoff of 1993. For these ﬁve years of
operation, the entire ﬂow (30-50 ft3/s) of the lower Truckee River was diverted
into the Pyramid Lake ﬁshway during the spawning run seasons. Lahontan
cutthroat trout ascended the ﬁshway in 1988-1990 with the runs ranging from just
over 100 ﬁsh to a high around 450 ﬁsh in 1989.8 During this timeframe, only in
1989 did cui-ui migrate up the ﬁshway to the ﬁsh handling building, and these
seventy-one ﬁsh were transported to the Tribal Hatchery at Suttcliff, Nevada. Due
to the continued drought in 1991 and 1992, bar racks were installed at the terminal
ladder to prevent ﬁsh from migrating into the ﬁshway. Water releases from
upstream storage during this ﬁve year drought period were minor and intermittent.
This dry period was followed by a record wet winter in 1992-1993. Even
though the lake was low, both the ﬁshway and the river trap were operated that
year. It was estimated that on April 3, 1993, tens of thousands of cui-ui entered
the terminal ladder. This mass movement of ﬁsh exceeded the rate that cui-ui
could ascend up the ladder resulting in cui-ui being killed due to crowding and
suffocation, and no ﬁsh passed on up the ﬁshway to the river. A second and even
larger run started on May 29th. To keep the ﬁsh from again overcrowding, ﬁshery
personnel netted cui-ui from the entrance ladder, to reduce their numbers. These
ﬁsh were then transported and released upstream of Marble Bluff Dam. During
the 1993 spawning run, over 18,000 cui-ui and 108 Lahontan cutthroat trout were
passed upstream of Marble Bluff Dam from the ﬁshway, river trap by netting
and transporting, while approximately 4000 cui-ui died due to overcrowding in
the ﬁsh ladders and a mechanical failure in the river trap. Prior to the spawning
run of 1994, Fish and Wildlife Service again modiﬁed the entrance ladder and
river trap to reduce the mortality rate of the migrating cui-ui. The 1994 ﬁsh
runs resulted in 66,425 cui-ui and seventy-nine Lahontan cutthroat trout being
passed upstream of Marble Bluff Dam with about 250 cui-ui killed at the entrance
ladder.9
In 1995, the Bureau of Reclamation assisted a team of federal, tribal, state,
and local organizations in addressing the ﬁsh passage problems at Marble Bluff
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Dam.10 The main objective was to improve passage over the dam. An identiﬁed
objective was an estimated ﬁsh passage capacity of 300,000 ﬁsh during a threeday period to prevent migration delays at the dam. By 1998 this process had
resulted in the Bureau of Reclamation replacing the ﬁsh trap/lift system with a
hydraulic ﬁsh lock, and constructing a new ﬁshway channel exit ladder, 6.8. This
was the ﬁrst time that a hydraulic lock was built for ﬁsh passage by the Bureau of
Reclamation.

6.8. Plan view of Marble Bluff fish lock and Pyramid Lake Fishway exit ladder.

Reclamation’s Fish Lock
A hydraulic ﬁsh lock is simply a water elevator which operates similar to
a boat lock. The sequencing of events required during passage of ﬁsh through the
lock is shown in 6.9. Each lock cycle is divided into four phases: ﬁsh attraction,
lock ﬁlling, ﬁsh release, and lock draining. In the ﬁsh attraction phase, ﬂow
attracts the migrating ﬁsh into the ﬁsh lock chamber. After a preset time, the
ﬁsh entrance gate is closed and the lock is ﬁlled with water (lock ﬁlling phase).
When the ﬁsh lock is approximately full, a ﬁsh crowder is raised by a hoist and
the lock exit gate opened (ﬁsh release phase). The ﬁsh crowder moves ﬁsh up
near the surface and into the ﬁsh lock exit channel. Once the ﬁsh are out of the
lock, the exit gate is closed, the false ﬂoor lowered, and the ﬁsh lock chamber
drained (draining phase). The lock cycle then repeats. The system is operated
manually or automatically via a software based control system linked to water
level and gate position sensors. The new hydraulic ﬁsh lock required modifying
the existing 15 foot by 15 foot ﬁsh trap/lift concrete well and building a new ﬁsh
lock exit channel. The existing ﬁsh attraction channel was lengthened and a ﬁsh
barrier gate was added to provide a method of controlling ﬁsh access to the ﬁsh
lock.
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6.9. Marble Bluff Dam fish lock operating phases.

Soon after the ﬁsh lock design was ﬁnished, nature again changed ﬂow
conditions at the river’s end. In January 1997 a large ﬂood on the Truckee
River (23,000 ft3/s) scoured the river channel downstream of Marble Bluff
Dam lowering the river elevation by several feet leaving ﬁsh access to the ﬁsh
lock facility in question. It was decided that the pre-ﬂood elevation of the river
downstream of the dam had to be recovered if the existing trap/lift structure was
to be modiﬁed into a ﬁsh lock. The problem was solved in 1998 when a nearly
450-foot-long by 2-foot-high rock ramp was constructed in the river channel
about 300 yards downstream of the dam. The rock ramp was designed to imitate
a natural rifﬂe so as not to block ﬁsh passage to the dam.
In 1998 the Reno Gazette-Journal, ran a story that exclaimed “Cui-ui
spawning the biggest in years.”11 The journal further reported that this was the
largest spawning run since Marble Bluff Dam was built. It was estimated that the
new ﬁsh lock can move 3,500 ﬁsh at a time, compared to only 600 to 800 ﬁsh at a
time by the old ﬁsh trap/lift system. In its ﬁrst year the lock passed over 400,000
spawning cui-ui upstream of Marble Bluff Dam. A year later an estimated
600,000 cui-ui passed through the ﬁsh lock with no apparent delay.

A Look to the Future—Rebuilding the Pyramid Lake Fishway
Construction of the ﬁsh lock required removing the upstream-most ﬁsh
ladder on the Pyramid Lake ﬁshway (exit ladder) and presented the opportunity
to design and construct a replacement ﬁsh ladder tailored to cui-ui. Fish ladder
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construction was preceded by hydraulic tests of several ﬁsh ladder designs at
Reclamation’s Water Resources Research Laboratory in Denver, Colorado. These
tests resulted in a unique ﬁshway ladder design tailored to the behavior and
swimming capabilities displayed by the cui-ui sucker. A dual-slot-chevron shaped
bafﬂe design was chosen, 6.10. The new ﬁsh ladder’s slope is about one-third that
of the ladder it replaced (3.1% grade) and holds ﬂow velocity to about
4 ft/s.12 The ﬁshway channel with the new bypass ﬁsh ladder is still not
considered fully operational as the ﬁshway still contains four old weir/oriﬁce style
ladders along its route to the dam. Rebuilding the Pyramid Lake ﬁshway channel
to an effective ﬁshway for both cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout remains a
major task to fulﬁlling the original goals of the Marble Bluff Dam and ﬁshway
project.

6.10. Marble Bluff Dam Fishway exit Ladder.
Brent Mefford, P.E., and Rick Christensen work for the Bureau of Reclamation
in Denver, Colorado.
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Explaining Hoover, Grand Coulee, and Shasta
Dams: Institutional Stability and Professional
Identity in the USBR
By:
Karin Ellison
Abstract
Between 1923 and 1943 the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)
changed dramatically. In 1923, after two decades of operation, the USRS was
small and embattled. It had 27 irrigation projects, 3700 full-time employees, and
a budget of $20.6 million. In contrast, in 1943 the USBR could have celebrated
20 years of growth and success and anticipated more. In 1943, the USBR had 52
projects. It had increased its staff to 6500, or more than doubled it. Even more
impressively, it had increased its budget to $91.7 million, or to almost 4½ times
1922’s budget. One of the big changes in the USBR was the construction of large
multiple purpose dams—Hoover, Grand Coulee, Shasta, and, after World War II,
many more. Multiple purpose dam building, of course, did not arise out of the
blue in the 1920s. USBR engineers took utilitarian conservation ideas, espoused
by Progressive Era scientists, engineers, and politicians, and implemented them by
building large multiple purpose dams.
I explain the advent of multiple purpose dam building, and the growth
of the Bureau of Reclamation, in terms of a stable agency leadership and its
professional culture. Clearly, the Depression and the New Deal government
provided the means that developed rivers, hired new staff, and, generally, fueled
agency growth. President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, Washington
Senator Dill, and others involved in directing relief funds to water development
did not, however, determine the features of the techno-environmental systems that
rivers would become. USBR engineers drew on engineering paradigms, common
solutions that could be ﬁtted to new problems, to reﬁne both the production
practices and design choices of river development and create these systems. These
men gazed at the world through engineers’ glasses and saw disorderly construction
sites and disorderly rivers. In response, they applied the tools of their trade and
rationalized construction sites and rivers. The result was multiple purpose dams,
conservation ideas put into practice, and an expanding USBR.
Biographical data establish the stability of the USBR’s leaders in the
1920s and 1930s, their virtually exclusive orientation towards engineering, and
links between this group and Progressive Era engineering reforms. Two features
of the careers of USBR leaders particularly indicate the stability of the group in
the 1920s and 1930s: the long length of their employment with the USBR and
the dates and reasons that men left. Education and professional afﬁliation reveal
the group as one of professional engineers. With respect to Progressivism, the
biographical data show possibilities. These engineers were in the right places at
the right times to be exposed to Progressive ideas about conservation of natural
resources and scientiﬁc management. They were educated in the Progressive
Era. More importantly, these men began their careers at the USBR in its ﬁrst
decade. They trained into their profession under Director Fredrick Newell and
Chief Engineer Arthur Powell Davis, both notable ﬁgures in the conservation and
engineering reform movements.
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As with many groups of engineers in this period, this stable group
of engineers with links to Progressivism embraced industrial practices and
rationalization. They applied these paradigms to both the processes of building
dams and to the designing of river systems. To illustrate the industrialized and
rationalized elements of dam building and river development plans, I compare
these activities with scientiﬁc management. I chose Taylorism as a framework
for comparison because F. W. Taylor laid out an explicit program for rationalizing
workplaces that can serve as a way to distill the broad ranging changes of
industrialization and rationalization. Further, Taylorism was broadly discussed and
debated in this period, so these concepts would have been part of the intellectual
resources of the USBR leaders as they engaged in river planning and directed dam
construction. Taylor sought to standardize and routinize everything in a factory—
production processes, spatial layout of factories, machines, and, especially,
workers. To do this, he created expanded roles for engineers. Not only would
mechanical engineers invent and reﬁne factory machinery, but they would also
oversee factory operations.
By analyzing the construction methods used at Grand Coulee Dam,
I show that the USBR and its contractors set up a process, like Taylorism, that
placed engineers in the center, emphasized ﬂow, and reﬁned machinery. During
the construction of a dam, USBR employees provided important management
oversight through drawings and inspectors. Contractors set up ﬂowing processes
construction systems, such as a set of trucks and conveyor belts to remove the
“overburden” from the dam site. The USBR employed experts to study and reﬁne
the machinery used in the construction of dams, for example concrete mixers.
As with construction sites, Federal engineers developed the ideas about
river development, advocated by Progressive Era conservationists, into a set of
technical practices, structures, and new landscapes with analysis and management
techniques similar to those used by F. W. Taylor and his followers. Like Taylorism,
conservation included places for professional engineers in large organizations.
Planning and constructing large dams prompted growth of engineering
organizations. When engineers changed free-ﬂowing rivers into series of lakes,
they used the same kind of spatial logic as Taylor’s rearrangement of machinery
on factory ﬂoors. The USBR’s Denver ofﬁce specialized in designing, analyzing,
and reﬁning the main technology of comprehensive river development—multiple
purpose dams—just as Taylor worked on making faster and more precise
machine tools. While Taylor stretched rationalization to encompass workers,
comprehensive planning stretched rationalization to encompass another new
area—large natural systems.

When Interior Secretary Hubert Work called for an investigation and
reorganization of the U.S. Reclamation Service (USRS)1 in 1923 and Interior
Secretary Harold Ickes repeated the exercise in 1943, the institution that they
targeted could hardly have been more different. In 1923 after two decades of
operation, the USRS was small and embattled. By 1922, it had constructed twentyseven irrigation projects, had 3,667 full-time employees, and $20,603,793 in funds
to spend. Its major constituency, the farmers who worked the USRS’s irrigated
land, was in open revolt. The cost of creating irrigation farms had far exceeded rosy
government estimates, and, with the revival of European agriculture in the wake
of World War I, markets for American farmers collapsed. In contrast, in 1943 the
USBR could have celebrated twenty years of growth and success and anticipated
more. In 1943 the USBR had ﬁfty-two projects. It had increased its staff to 6,543,
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or more than doubled it. Even more impressively, it had increased its budget to
$91,665,613, or to almost 4½ times 1922’s budget. Further, this growth included
the construction of Hoover,2 Grand Coulee, and Shasta dams—the ﬁrst set of
monumental multiple purpose structures and the entree to integrated development of
rivers after World War II.3
Given the weakness of the USRS as an organization in the early 1920s, the
institutional success of the USBR in the 1930s and 1940s begs explanation. The
Depression is surely part of the story. The severe economic problems of the 1930s
and the willingness of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration to spend money in an
attempt to solve them provided great opportunities for men with plans. However,
dams were not the only way, or even a particularly important way, for the federal
government to spend money.4
One might argue that the multiple purpose dams themselves adequately
provided the rest of the story of the USBR’s success. The concept of a multiple
purpose dam is clearly well suited to the American political system. Each dam
offers a range of services—navigation improvement, irrigation water, ﬂood control,
and hydroelectricity, most commonly. Each service can have a constituency and
each constituency one or more votes to fund a dam in Congress. However, in
the early 1920s, multiple purpose dams were much more an idea than a reality.
Engineers had reported favorably on a proposal to build Hoover Dam on the lower
Colorado River. However, neither the compact dividing the waters of the Colorado
between the tributary states nor the political coalition, which would wrest approval
and funding for Hoover Dam from Congress, yet existed. The Army Corps of
Engineers had built a hydroelectricity dam and two nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals
on the Tennessee River during World War I. Congress, however, would ﬁght over
how to dispose of these seeds of the Tennessee Valley Authority until Franklin
Roosevelt took ofﬁce in 1933.5
People, as much as money and a new technology, explain the successes
of the USBR in the 1920s and 1930s. In this period, a remarkably stable and
homogeneous group of men6 led the USBR. In the ﬁrst part of this paper, I will
show that overwhelmingly the leaders of the USBR between 1923 and 1943 were
engineers familiar with Progressive reform engineering. In the second part, I
will suggest that the training and professional identiﬁcation of USBR leaders as
Progressive engineers made a signiﬁcant impact on its development. USBR leaders
used experience with and enthusiasm for industrialization, scientiﬁc management,
and conservation to reshape the organization’s activities. Conservation provided
a broad conceptual framework for water development by pairing “comprehensive
planning” with reservoir construction. Industrialization and scientiﬁc management
emphasized process-place engineers at the center and study and reﬁnement of all
processes and components.7
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Engineering Leaders
One of the most striking features of the USBR between 1923 and 1943
was the stability and uniformity of its leadership. USBR leaders devoted their
careers to government service. Overwhelmingly, they came to the USRS during the
Progressive Era with strong ties to engineering through education and professional
afﬁliations.
The organization chart appearing in the USBR’s monthly magazine
Reclamation Era identiﬁed the small groups of key ﬁgures in the commissioner’s
ofﬁce in Washington, D.C., and the chief engineer’s ofﬁce in Denver, Colorado,
as well as a larger group of men heading the various irrigation projects and
investigations across the West. Standard biographical data, such as found in Who’s
Who and other common biographical sources, was available for ﬁfty-three of the
167 individuals so identiﬁed.8 The ﬁeld engineers were by far the largest group.9
Some 125 men held high positions in ﬁeld ofﬁces as opposed to twenty-four men
in Denver and seventeen men and one woman in Washington, D.C. However,
information was much more readily available on leaders from the commissioner’s
ofﬁce and from the chief engineer’s ofﬁce than on ﬁeld men. Data on thirteen
individuals from the Washington group and twenty from the Denver group provided
information on over 70 percent of these leaders. The additional twenty ﬁeld men
identiﬁed only allow analysis of 16 percent of this group.10
The career paths of USBR leaders established a remarkable stability in this
group between 1923 and 1943. The longevity of these men as USBR employees
paired with when and why they left the USBR indicates the stability of this group.
Many of these men worked for the USBR for lengthy periods. Field engineer
Frank Banks, who oversaw the construction of Owyhee and Grand Coulee dams,
set the challenge with ﬁfty-one years of service. While few rivaled Banks, twentyﬁve additional men spent twenty years or more as employees of the USBR. This
pattern of lengthy service is particularly striking when compared with other groups
of federal experts. In agricultural economics, for example, men used employment
in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics in lieu
of graduate school. Many of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics’ early staff only
worked there brieﬂy.11
The small number of USBR leaders who departed between 1927 and
1942—ten—and the reasons they left, further indicate stability. Many of these
leaders did not leave by choice. Seven of the men died while employed by the
USBR. The men in the USBR pushed out the one woman in the group, Mae
Schnurr. Schnurr worked her way up through the federal bureaucracy to a position
of responsibility under Commissioner Mead—assistant to the commissioner and, on
occasion, acting commissioner. After Mead died in 1936, Schnurr was repeatedly
demoted until she arranged a transfer to the Ofﬁce of the Secretary of the Interior in
1941. Even the two leaders who willingly left did not make signiﬁcantly different
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career choices. One retired and the other transferred to a very similar position with
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).12
A clearly deﬁned group of ten engineers did leave the USBR between 1924
and 1926—fallout from reorganization. The Interior Secretary pushed Director
Arthur Powell Davis out of the USRS in 1923.13 He replaced A. P. Davis with David
W. Davis, a banker and politician from
Idaho. After a brief period of reorganization,
D. W. Davis was one of the early 1920s
departers. A second, Morris Bien, retired
in 1924 at age 65 to pursue a private law
practice. The rest followed Chief Engineer
Weymouth. Weymouth resigned in 1924 as
Elwood Mead, an engineer, replaced David
Davis. After slightly over one year in private
practice, Weymouth went on to work as
chief engineer for J. G. White Engineering
Corporation from 1926-1929, for the City of
Los Angeles Water Works from 1929-1930,
and for Southern California’s Metropolitan
Water District (MWD) until he retired. All
seven of the other men who left the USBR
between 1924 and 1926 worked with
Weymouth at one or more of these three
7.1. Frank E. Weymouth.
organizations.14
A stable group, these men also made a very homogeneous group. Homogeneity
started at home. Geographically, Commissioners Mead and Page and Chief
Engineer Walter all hailed from the Midwest or Plains states, and they exempliﬁed a
trend. In all, twenty-two of ﬁfty-three USBR leaders, or 42 percent, came from this
region. The Reclamation West15 and Northeast evenly split a second twenty. Only
three men came from each the South and Europe. This geographic distribution,
however, shifted over time. When I divided the ﬁfty-three USBR leaders by both
birth decades and hiring decades, the eleven born in the 1890s and 1900s and the
thirteen hired in 1923 or later more strongly represented the Reclamation West. In
these divisions, 36 percent and 38 percent respectively came from federal irrigation
states.
In respect to marriage and children, USBR leaders were even more uniform
and conservative. The large majority married and had children. Commissioner
Mead, for example, married Florence Chase in 1882 and, after she passed away,
married Mary Lewis in 1905. In all, Mead had six children. While most USBR
leaders had fewer children: biographical sources identiﬁed none as life-long
bachelors and only three as childless. Information on family, however, was reported
less frequently than many of the data on these leaders. No information on marriage
or children appeared for roughly one-third of these individuals.
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Similarities multiplied at work. The typical USBR leader was born in
the 1880s (42 percent), attended a land-grant university (70 percent), majored in
civil engineering (42 percent), completed his education with a bachelor’s degree
(62 percent), began working in the Progressive Era (74 percent), belonged to the
American Society for Civil Engineers (62 percent), worked for the USBR for 20
years or longer (68 percent), and ended his career at the USBR (51 percent). A
closer look at this data suggests not just similarities, but patterns linking USBR
leaders to Progressivism and engineering reform more speciﬁcally.
USBR leaders were Progressive engineers. Dates of birth, education, ﬁrst
employment, and hiring by the USRS place the beginning of these men’s careers
ﬁrmly in the Progressive Era. The ﬁrst leaders of the USRS pursued reform goals
and taught the leaders of the 1930s and 1940s their jobs in an atmosphere of
activism. Further, the careers of the latter group demonstrated a commitment to
public service indicative of engineering reformers.
Dates place the USBR leaders of 1923-1943 as young professionals during
the Progressive Era. USBR leaders were born between 1858 and 1905. The largest
portion was born in the 1870s (nine) and, especially, the 1880s (twenty-two). Age
meant that the men attended college and began their careers in the Progressive Era.
Thirty-one of ﬁfty-three graduated with a bachelor’s degree between 1900 and 1919.
The addition of the few men who did not have a college degree and those for whom
education information is not available meant that even more began working in these
two decades—thirty-nine of ﬁfty-three.
More speciﬁcally, the leaders of the 1920s and 1930s began working
for the USRS in the reformist atmosphere of its ﬁrst decade. The USRS hired
thirty-four of the ﬁfty-three between 1902 and 1912—the ﬁrst decade of the
organization’s existence. In these early years, reform-minded men led the USRS
and trained the future leaders into their profession. Before 1923, the USRS had two
heads—Frederick Haynes Newell and Arthur Powell Davis. Both these men began
their careers in the U.S. Geological Survey under John Wesley Powell, a colorful
explorer, administrator, and founder of the conservation movement. Newell helped
Nevada Senator Newlands and other western senators draft the Reclamation Act
and became the ﬁrst director of the USRS. He was a leader of the conservation
movement and, as part of the major effort of Progressive engineers directed at their
own profession, advocated unifying engineers in one professional society through
his Committee on Cooperation and the American Association of Engineers. In
1914 a ﬁnancial house cleaning in the USRS led to Newell’s ﬁring. Newell’s chief
engineer and Powell’s nephew, Arthur Powell Davis, moved into the top leadership
position, Davis too pursued conservation. He formulated an early reform tradition
plan for the development of the lower Colorado River.16
A commitment to government service evident in the careers of the USBR’s
second generation of leaders suggests that these men did indeed adopt some of the
values of their mentors. Both career paths and number of years spent in the USBR
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show a commitment to government engineering. Of ﬁfty-three men, thirty-one—
over half—either spent their entire career with the USBR or ended it there. Another
13 gave long periods of service at the beginning or in the middle of careers. Only
ﬁve worked for the USBR for less than 10 years.
Unlike one strain of Progressive engineering reformers, USBR engineers
demonstrated a commitment to government service without condemning
corporations or corporate work. Morris Cooke represented the anti-corporate
strain in engineering reform. A member of the inner circle of the founder of
“‘scientiﬁc’management,” F. W. Taylor, Cooke began his career by applying
scientiﬁc management ideas to the running of a government agency, as Director
of Public Works in Philadelphia, and to the operation of a professional society, the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers. These efforts convinced Cooke of the
dishonesty of corporations, and especially electrical and other utility companies.
He campaigned against utility inﬂuence in the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers in the mid-1910s and, in the New Deal, headed the Rural Electriﬁcation
Administration, one of Roosevelt’s efforts to curb the excesses and go beyond the
self-imposed limits of electrical utilities.17
USBR leaders, in contrast, worked closely with corporations in relevant
ﬁelds and did not see former corporate employment as a ban to a job in the USBR.
Starting in 1925 the USBR organized most of its major construction work by
contract and, as a result, worked closely with corporate executives and engineers.
For example, between 1934 and 1943 two successive groups of general contractors
made Grand Coulee Dam a massive and concrete reality from a set of plans.18 A
consortium of Silas Mason Company of New York; Walsh Construction Company
of Davenport, Iowa; and Atkinson-Kier Company of San Francisco won the ﬁrst
contract. Kaiser Construction Company of Seattle, Morrison Knudsen Company of
Boise, Utah Construction Company of Ogden, J. F. Shea Company of San Francisco,
Paciﬁc Bridge Company of San Francisco, McDonald and Kahn of San Francisco,
and General Construction Company of Seattle joined the ﬁrst group to complete
construction. Below I describe how USBR engineers and their contractors interacted
during routine construction and how they could collaborate to experiment on, and
improve production processes. In terms of careers, many USBR leaders—thirty-two
or almost two-thirds—worked for private companies at some point in their careers.
A handful worked for the large electrical companies Cooke and other reformers
found especially repugnant. For example, Leslie McClellan, the USBR’s chief
electrical engineer, worked brieﬂy for Southern California Edison. Robert Monroe,
another Denver ofﬁce man, worked for Paciﬁc Gas & Electric before coming to the
USBR.19
Between 1923 and 1943 a remarkably stable and homogeneous group of
men steeped in Progressive Era reform movements provided the leadership for the
USBR. Additionally, the ties between these men, the USBR, and engineering cannot
be overstated. The domination of the USBR by civil engineers, rather than experts
on water resources or irrigated agriculture, was a contingent historical phenomenon.
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Other groups with technical expertise critical to the planning, construction, and
operation of irrigation projects were available as choices to staff the new USRS.
Experts in the U.S. Geological Survey, with stronger ties to geology, hydrography,
and geography than to civil engineering, dominated federal debates over irrigation in
the nineteenth century. Experts in the U.S. Department of Agriculture worked with
Wyoming Senator Francis E. Warren to prepare an alternative to the bill prepared by
Senator Newlands and engineer Newell, which created the USRS. Still, engineers,
rather than experts in other related areas, led the USBR. The structure of the USBR,
the ﬁelds of education of USBR leaders, and the professional afﬁliations of these
men show their disciplinary ties to engineering generally, and civil engineering
in particular. Further, these leaders had much in common with other engineers in
this period: regional afﬁliation, educational institutions, level of education, and
international work.20
An organization chart from the 1920s or 1930s immediately reveals the
importance of engineering in the USBR. The USBR was a very strict hierarchical
organization with engineers in all leadership positions, except for a small legal
branch parallel to the main engineering organization. Physically, space separated the
USBR engineers. A commissioner and a small staff led the USBR from Washington,
D.C. By far, however, most of the employees and leaders worked in the West. The
chief engineer’s ofﬁce in Denver served as the technical hub for the USBR. In
addition, each irrigation project had a ﬁeld ofﬁce.
A commissioner—typically with substantial engineering experience—led
the USBR. From Washington, D.C., commissioners and their small staff primarily
interacted with others in the capital—members of
Congress, Interior Secretaries, and other upperadministration ofﬁcials. The USBR had three
commissioners between 1923 and 1945. David W.
Davis broke virtually all USBR patterns. Interior
Secretary Hubert Work appointed this banker and
former governor of Idaho commissioner in hopes
that a businessman could place the USRS on a more
sound ﬁnancial footing. Davis only stayed with
the USBR for a few years. Engineering training
and long careers in public service made the other
two commissioners typical of leaders of the USBR.
Elwood Mead took the commissioner’s ofﬁce in 1924.
It was his ﬁnal position in a lengthy career in water
resources. After working on a survey team during his
teenage years, Mead earned bachelor’s and master’s
degrees at Purdue University and a bachelor’s in civil 7.2. Secretary of the
Interior Hubert Work and
engineering at Iowa State College in the early 1880s.
Commissioner Elwood Mead
A short tenure as professor of irrigation engineering
at the site of the Stony Gorge
at Colorado Agricultural College led to the position
Dam on the Orland Project,
of State Engineer of Wyoming during the 1890s. In
California, in 1927.
228

Wyoming Mead participated in writing water law that made the state the sole owner
of all water. This legislation became the basis for revising water rights doctrine in
several western states. Subsequently, Mead promoted irrigated agriculture through
the following positions: director of irrigation investigations in the U.S. Department of
Agriculture; chairman of the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission in Victoria,
Australia; and director of the state planned irrigation communities at Durham and
Delhi, California. He also worked as a professor at University of California, Berkeley.
When Mead died in 1936 Interior Secretary Harold Ickes appointed civil engineer
John C. Page acting commissioner and then commissioner. Page was a much less
well-known engineer. Other than a year as assistant city engineer of Grand Junction,
Colorado, Page spent his entire career in USBR. His training consisted of a bachelor
of science from University of Nebraska and a year of graduate study at Cornell
University. Page’s work in the early 1930s as the second in charge of the ﬁeld ofﬁce
for Hoover Dam moved him from USBR staff to USBR leadership.21
Designation of a chief engineer as the USBR’s second-in-command further
focused the USBR around engineering. The chief engineer held ﬁnal authority for
all technical matters—construction, design, and research—but focused on overseeing
construction. Denver, Colorado, housed the chief engineer and his engineering staff,
which grew dramatically between 1923 and 1943. In the early 1920s, a few senior
engineers coordinated USBR engineering from Denver. By the 1930s, a leadership
staff of nine—an assistant chief engineer, a chief designing engineer, an assistant
chief designing engineer, a chief electrical engineer, a designing engineer of dams,
a designing engineer of canals, a mechanical engineer, and an engineer on technical
studies—oversaw a staff of over 750.22
Three men held the job of chief engineer between 1923 and 1943. Like the
commissioners, in both education and public service, the chief engineers had strong
links to engineering and engineering reform. A civil engineer from the University of
Maine (1896), Frank Weymouth served his last of twenty-two years with the USBR
in 1924. When Weymouth left, Chicagoan Raymond (Ray) Walter became chief
engineer. Walter joined the USRS as a freshly minted civil engineer from Colorado
State College in 1903, one year after conservationists and western congressmen
created the USRS. He held the position of chief engineer from 1924 until his death
in 1940. Walter’s long-time assistant chief engineer and another career USBR man,
Sinclair Ollason Harper, held the top position in Denver from 1940 to 1944. Harper
received his bachelor’s in civil engineering from the University of California.
After the chief engineer, the most important man in Denver was John (Jack)
Savage, the chief designing engineer. While Chief Engineer Walter focused on
construction, Savage oversaw all aspects of design, planning, and research in the
USBR. Savage too followed the typical education and career pattern. Except for
eight years with a small consulting engineer ﬁrm, Savage spent his entire career
with the USBR. His formal training consisted of a bachelor of science in civil
engineering from the University of Wisconsin. Savage’s achievements, however,
exceeded most USBR engineers.’ He held three honorary doctorates. The National
229

Academy of Sciences and the American
Academy of Arts and Science elected
him a member. The four engineering
founder societies—the American Society
of Civil Engineers, American Institute of
Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
and the American Institute of Electrical
Engineers—awarded Savage the John Fritz
Medal for notable achievement in 1945. In
addition, the Concrete Institute awarded
him its Turner gold medal for his work on
hydraulic structures.
Beyond the central staffs in
Washington, D.C., and Denver, the USBR
detailed engineers to oversee construction
and operation of projects. This group—
7.3. Raymond F. Walter while he served
the largest by number—consisted of
as Chief Engineer of the Bureau of
surveyors, construction inspectors, and
Reclamation.
“ofﬁce engineers.” These last drafted,
made cost estimates, and performed other
engineering ofﬁce tasks. Frank Banks, described by Chief Engineer Walter as
“our best construction engineer,”23 followed the education and career path of other
USBR leaders. Banks studied for his degree in civil engineering at the University
of Maine. He joined the USRS immediately upon graduation in 1906 and retired
in 1957, after 51 years of service. He supervised the construction of several USBR
major dams including Owyhee Dam in Oregon in the 1920s and Grand Coulee Dam
in Washington State in the 1930s.24
Finally, the USBR hired consulting engineers to monitor major construction
endeavors like Hoover and Grand Coulee dams. These men met as a board a couple
of times a year to review designs and speciﬁcations, to inspect the quality of the
work and procedures, and to provide opinions on issues raised by the USBR regular
staff. For example, the USBR’s consulting board for Grand Coulee Dam consisted
of Columbia University Professor of Geology Charles Berkey; retired Stanford
Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Fluid Mechanics William Durand; Seattle
consulting engineer and former USBR employee Joseph Jacobs; and Dayton, Ohio,
consulting engineer Charles Paul, also a former USBR engineer.25
The education and professional afﬁliations of USBR leaders cemented the
connection between the engineering organization and the broader profession of
civil engineering. USBR men primarily chose civil engineering as their ﬁeld of
education—twenty-two men or 42 percent. Another thirteen men selected other
engineering ﬁelds. Electrical and mining at four each were the best represented.
The single man with topographical engineering as a major suggests the weakness
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of remaining ties to the disciplines of the U.S. Geological Survey. Unfortunately,
biographical sources did not reveal the ﬁeld of study for more than 20 percent of the
USBR leaders.

7.4. June 23, 1929, the Board of Engineers for Hoover Dam posed on a viewpoint above
the Black Canyon Damsite. Probably left to right: A. J. Wiley and Louis C. Hill, consulting
engineers; Chief Designing Engineer J. L. Savage, Bureau of Reclamation; Chief Electrical Engineer L. H. McClellan, Bureau of Reclamation; Designing Engineer B. W. Steele,
Bureau of Reclamation; and Project Construction Engineer Walker R. Young, Bureau of
Reclamation.

Participation in professional societies maintained the connection to
engineering, and especially civil engineering. USBR leaders belonged to honor
societies, professional organizations, and social clubs for engineers. Tau Beta Pi
(an engineering honor society), Chi Epsilon (the civil engineering honor society),
and Sigma Xi (a science and engineering research honor society) elected thirteen
USBR leaders as members. Thirty-seven men (70 percent) belonged to at least
one professional organization. By far, the American Society of Civil Engineers
claimed the most USBR men—thirty-three. Societies representing other areas
of engineering, such as the American Institute of Electrical Engineers (5) and
the American Concrete Institute (5), only claimed a handful of men. Roughly
one-quarter of the men also belonged to regional organizations for engineers
and scientists. Among these were the Colorado Society of Engineers (7), the
Commonwealth Engineers Club in San Francisco (3), and the Cosmos Club in
Washington D.C. (3). Membership in professional organizations associated with
geology and agriculture again show only very weak ties between USBR leaders and
these closely related areas of expertise. Two of the leaders belonged to American
Geophysical Union, and one of these men also belonged to American Meteorological
Society. One additional man belonged to the semi-popular National Geographic
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Society. In terms of agriculture, only three men belonged to the American Society
of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE).
The similarities between USBR leaders and other groups of engineers further
show how engineering dominated the USBR. The best quantitative information on
another group of American engineers in the 1920s and 1930s comes from Deborah
Fitzgerald’s Every Farm a Factory. Fitzgerald describes agricultural engineers and
these men shared many, but not all, characteristics with USBR leaders. Fitzgerald
reports on a group of founders, ofﬁcers, or council members of the ASAE between
1907 and 1930. The founders were men of the same generation as the USBR
leaders. They were born in the 1880s and attended college in the ﬁrst decade of
the twentieth century. They also took degrees in engineering ﬁelds and, far from
rejecting business ties, moved easily in and out of commercial employment. Further,
both groups overwhelmingly attended the same kinds of institutions of higher
education, ﬁnished their education at the same level, and worked internationally for
part of their careers.26
The tie between USBR leaders, engineers more generally, and engineering
reform was to a type of education institution and the profession generally, rather
than one speciﬁc university. USBR leaders attended state schools—thirty-seven
or 70 percent. They chose universities all across the West and Midwest. ASAE
founders likewise chose land-grant schools, although all midwestern. Neither group
came out of a unique strong department at a single university. Two groupings,
however, did exist among USBR leaders. Six men came from the University of
Maine. Frank Weymouth—later chief engineer and clearly more of an institution
builder than many in the USRS—returned to his alma mater, Maine, to speak about
his work with the USRS in 1904. His visit recruited Francis Crowe to work for
the USRS that summer (and Crowe would return after graduation). The following
school year Crowe spoke about the West and reclamation with enthusiasm. The
tales of Weymouth and Crowe led several other young men from Maine to join the
USRS.27 Less surprising, given the location of the chief engineer’s ofﬁce, a group
of men also came to the USBR from the universities in or near Denver. Three took
undergraduate degrees at Colorado State College, two at the Colorado School of
Mines, and one at the University of Colorado.
In level of education, USBR leaders followed general patterns for
engineering. For many of the men, 72 percent, the bachelor’s degree completed
their formal education. Likewise, Fitzgerald found that a substantial portion of
ASAF founders and leaders had college degrees. USBR men in the commissioner’s
ofﬁce, as a group, did have more education than their USBR peers or ASAE leaders.
Two held a second bachelor’s degree and three held master’s or professional
degrees. One additional man had done one year of graduate work. These men were
six of the eleven total who had undertaken schooling beyond the bachelor’s and 46
percent of the thirteen individuals from the Washington Ofﬁce.
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Many American technical professionals of the early decades of the twentieth
century consulted or worked internationally. Fitzgerald examines the experience
of agricultural experts in the Soviet Union. Twenty USBR leaders—ﬁve from the
Washington ofﬁce, nine Denver ofﬁce men, and six of the men from ﬁeld ofﬁces—
worked internationally too. They worked on a range of international projects.
These included planning irrigation communities in Australia, building waterworks
in Mexico, and working on the Panama Canal. The Near East, Far East, British
Empire, and Central and South America all provided opportunities for USBR men.28
In all, a special group of men led the USBR during the 1920s and
1930s. All of the USBR’s main hierarchy—commissioners, chief engineers,
Denver ofﬁce department heads, and the top staff of large projects—was a stable
and uniform group of men afﬁliated with engineering and, more particularly,
Progressive engineering reform. Long tenure of USBR leaders created stability
and few departures in the late 1920s and 1930s, in particular, reinforced this
trend. The USBR uniformly hired western or midwestern family men for its
leaders. Strong patterns in education and career paths further demonstrated the
uniformity of the group and linked them to engineering and, especially, Progressive
engineering reform. Virtually all of these men ﬁnished their formal education
with undergraduate degrees in engineering from land-grant universities during the
Progressive Era. They maintained ties to engineering through professional societies,
most commonly the American Society of Civil Engineers. Long careers in public
service further suggest they adopted values of their engineering reform mentors.
USBR leaders did not, however, belong to the anti-corporate wing of Progressive
reform engineering. The USBR worked closely with corporate contractors, and
many USBR leaders worked for private companies at some point in their career.
Engineering Rivers
This group of stable and uniform Progressive engineers drew on the
important experiences of their disciplines as they remade the USBR in the 1920s and
1930s. The sibling Progressive reform movements of conservation and scientiﬁc
management, as well as industrialization more generally, were the most important
of these experiences. USBR men used scientiﬁc management, and some of the
more general principles of industrialization, to reﬁne conservation and create both
industrialized dam construction and industrialized rivers.
Over the nineteenth century, industrialization fundamentally changed the
production of goods and ways of life in the United States. Items made by artisans,
such as guns and shoes, or in homes, such as cloth or butter, became goods produced
in factories. For example, skilled armorers making complete guns gave way to
armories. In the latter, semi-skilled men or boys used special purpose machine tools
to produce standardized parts to assemble into guns. Compared to earlier ways of
making things, factories were specialized, mechanized, capital-intensive, marketoriented, and big.29
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At the turn of the century, engineers formulated rational management
systems, as the ﬁnishing touch to this transformation. Many engineers worked on
such systems but “scientiﬁc management,” as propounded by Frederick W. Taylor,
was the best known and, in many ways, epitomized this movement. A son of a
Philadelphia aristocrat, Taylor became a mechanical engineer by apprenticing to the
eminent businessman-engineer William Sellers and completing a correspondence
course at the Steven’s Institute of Technology. A zealot for “efﬁciency,” Taylor
sought to standardize and routinize everything in a factory—machines, production
processes, and, especially, workers.30
Taylor’s general approach included tuning-up all the work processes and
machinery in a factory and implementing an exceedingly detailed management
regimen. To reﬁne work processes, experts would observe and time the motions
of workers. The experts then broke down complex processes, reﬁned movements,
assigned optimal times, and provided workers with explicit instructions on how
to perform tasks. Taylor tried to sweeten these changes for workers by tying the
reformulated work to incentive pay scales. Reﬁning machinery entailed replacing
belting to make it uniform, installing high-speed tool steel, and arranging machinery
on a factory ﬂoor so that work could ﬂow from one to the next and so on through
the factory. The most visible parts of Taylor’s management reforms were planning
ofﬁces. In these spaces, engineers oversaw the operations of a factory and
coordinated sets of cards, which tracked items around the shop ﬂoor. Finally, Taylor
called his system scientiﬁc because he believed that analysis would provide a unique
“one-best-way” to reorganize a workplace and the process occurring within it.
Drawing on experiences from industrialization and Taylorism, the USBR
and its contractors built dams in a fully industrialized and Taylorized fashion by
the 1930s. The USBR and its contractors split the tasks of building large dams.
The USBR managed and reﬁned work processes, such as pouring concrete. The
contracting corporations handled the construction plant and workers.
Dam sites lacked a space labeled a planning ofﬁce, but, during the
construction of a dam, USBR employees primarily provided the management
oversight, which Taylor placed in planning ofﬁces. The USBR used drawings and
inspectors to manage construction of dams in the 1930s. For example, in building
Grand Coulee Dam, the USBR created at least three distinct sets of drawings to
guide the process. First, preliminary studies, such as the one conducted by Major
John Butler of the Army Corps of Engineers between June 1928 and July 1931,
contained a handful of general drawings to convey the concept behind a proposal.31
For the Grand Coulee site, the printed version of Butler’s report contained an elevenpage description of a high dam and hydroelectric power plant and two drawings:
one plate with a plan and an elevation for a dam cresting at elevation 1266.6 feet
and one plate with sections of the same structure.32 Second, junior engineers in the
USBR’ s Denver ofﬁce prepared a more detailed set of drawings and speciﬁcations
for contractors to use in preparing bids. There were two separate major contracts
for Grand Coulee Dam and two sets of speciﬁcations. The second document,
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from 1937, covered the completion of the dam from roughly low water level to
its full height, the base of a facility to pump irrigation water, and one power plant
to generate hydroelectricity. This document used 161 pages and 122 drawings to
describe the undertaking in much greater detail than Butler.33 Third, during the
process of construction, USBR engineers in Denver made numerous detail drawings
that superseded those in the speciﬁcations. Every particular of the dam would be
laid out in a series of drawings. For Grand Coulee Dam, the Denver Ofﬁce sent
these drawings to USBR Construction Engineer Frank Banks at the site ofﬁce. He,
in turn, gave the drawings to the contractors. Nothing happened on the dam without
authorization from Denver. For example, in January 1936 the contractors and Banks
negotiated with the Denver Ofﬁce over the pouring schedule for a section of the
downstream edge of the dam but could not go ahead without drawings from Denver.
H. Leslie Myer, the contractors’ general manager, worried that any delay in pouring
this section would delay the entire dam. Correspondence only gradually brought
agreement on a modiﬁed plan. Banks wrote several times requesting drawings to
prevent delay before the Denver engineers approved a plan and sent the illustrated
guidelines.34
Inspectors provided the second key mechanism of engineering oversight
in the Taylorist fashion by guaranteeing that contractors followed directions
communicated through drawings. A USBR project ofﬁce employed many inspectors
who worked shifts alongside construction men. Inspectors primarily oversaw the
pouring of concrete for the dam and the grouting of its foundation. (Foundation
grouting was a procedure in which technicians pumped very thin cement into deep
holes drilled into the bedrock under a dam to seal any cracks in the rock.) Inspectors
veriﬁed the quality of these operations. For example, contractors poured Grand
Coulee Dam in blocks and engineers reviewed the setup for each before pouring.
First, men placed wood and metal forms capable of holding 265 cubic yards to
463 cubic yards of concrete. The largest forms measured 50 feet by 50 feet by
5 feet. Second, workers installed hardware for the block, including pipes for grout,
metal sheets to manage the ﬂow of grout in the structure, pipes to carry water to cool
the concrete as it set, and pipes for drainage. Third, they cleaned the concrete and
metal surfaces. This step insured that the new block bonded to those surrounding it.
USBR inspectors checked the performance of all these tasks and issued an OK valid
for three hours. If the contractor did not place the concrete in that time, USBR men
had to reinspect.35
The Taylorist style of management conducted by the USBR matched the
extensively mechanized, ﬂow-oriented, and capital intensive construction plant
erected by the contractors. The contractors employed partially or completely
mechanized systems to remove the dirt, rock, and debris down to bedrock at the
dam site; to prepare materials for and mix concrete; and to convey concrete to the
dam. Unwanted materials ﬂowed out of the site and needed ones ﬂowed into it. To
clear the dam site, contractors brought in a ﬂeet of shovels, bulldozers, and dump
trucks. The trucks moved debris to a conveyor system with four 60-foot feeder
belts serving a mile long main belt, which transported materials to Rattlesnake
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Canyon. After clearing the dam site, producing and placing concrete dominated
construction. The basic components of concrete are gravel, sand, cement, and water.
Contractors mined gravel and sand at a location 1.5 miles from the dam site. From
pits, a mechanized system washed, screened, and separated the raw materials into
three grades of sand, four grades of gravel, and waste. Two automated concrete
mixing plants—one on each side of the river—combined sand, gravel, cement that
had arrived by rail, and water in set ratios to make concrete. Locomotives hauled
buckets of concrete from the mixing plants onto a trestle over the dam. Crane
operators, high above the dam, picked up the buckets and swung them down to
the next block to be ﬁlled. At the block, men dumped the buckets and urged the
concrete into place with electrical vibrators.36
In addition to Taylorist oversight of production and a Taylorist mechanized,
ﬂow-oriented, capital-intensive workplace, the USBR employed experts to study
and reﬁne work processes, much as Taylor and his colleagues used time and motion
studies to modify workers’ performance. USBR men, however, could not analyze
workers. In 1911 molders struck the Watertown Arsenal when Carl Barth, one of
F. W. Taylor’s inner circle, attempted to reorganize the foundry. Ultimately,
Congress banned the use of stopwatches to analyze workers and incentive pay
systems in federal workplaces. Instead of workers, USBR men took on machinery.
Work with cement mixers exempliﬁed this impulse to reﬁne. The two plants for
making concrete—Westmix and Eastmix—each had four mixers that could each
hold four cubic yards (a total of thirty-two cubic yards). During the winter of
1936-1937, USBR engineers and the contractors’ men collaborated on redesigning
these mixers to increase mixing speed. They built model mixers of one-thirteenth
capacity and tested them at a laboratory at the Grand Coulee Dam site. The USBR
engineers tested between ﬁfty and sixty different arrangements of mixer blades
seeking the shortest time to produce a uniform product. The best design reduced
nine blades to three and reoriented them. These new arrangements shortened mix
and discharge time by 16 percent. Since the second contract alone required mixing
5,800,000 cubic yards of concrete thirty-two cubic yards at a time, this timesaving
was substantial.37
While the comparison of a factory ﬂoor and a construction site is fairly
direct, an analogy between a factory ﬂoor and a river is necessarily much
more abstract. At the damsite, USBR engineers provided expert oversight, the
contractors built a mechanized and rationalized construction plant, and the two
groups worked together to investigate ways to reﬁne the equipment. Similarly,
Taylorism experts implemented planning ofﬁces, organized shop ﬂoors, and tuned
up processes, machinery, and workers. With multiple purpose dam building, federal
engineers combined ideas about river development advocated by Progressive Era
conservationists with analysis and management techniques similar to Taylorism.
While engineers formulated around scientiﬁc management, a broader
group of scientists, engineers, and politicians brought conservation to the fore as
a set of “scientiﬁc” ideas to govern the management of natural resources during
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the Progressive Era. Championed by forester and politician Gifford Pinchot,
conservation called for the maximum sustained use of natural resources, such
as forests, grazing lands, rivers, and oil and mineral deposits. As with scientiﬁc
management, technical experts—engineers, foresters, geologists, etc.—implemented
the programs to achieve the goals of conservation. Conservationists called for two
major changes in river development. Comprehensive planning provided schemes
that combined navigation, ﬂood control, irrigation, hydroelectricity, and other
improvements. Construction of reservoirs captured seasonal ﬂoods and made
“wastewater” into a critical supplement to water supply in arid regions.38
In order to implement conservation ideas about river development, in
a Taylorist style, federal engineers began by measuring rivers. Rather than
stopwatches, engineers, like John Butler, used gaging stations, topographical maps,
and geological assessments of potential dam sites to assess the river’s current
practice and as a basis for constructing a new “rational” river. Butler invested
over half of his funds for studying the upper Columbia River (the river above its
conﬂuence with the Snake River) in collection of data and preliminary analysis
of water supply, topography, geology, and land classiﬁcation. Gaging produced
quantitative data on the monthly discharge at 21 locations and on the stages of ﬁve
lakes. Topography provided an overall proﬁle of the river. Finer topography and
core drilling (removing columns of rock to assess the structures) provided more
speciﬁc data on 12 potential dam sites. Land classiﬁcation ranked land near the river
by its quality for irrigation farming.39
To redesign the river, as Taylor redesigned workers’ movements and
machinery, Butler combined this information with broad conservationist goals.
Butler began with the canonical conservation goal for river development: the
intention to consider all of the possible uses of water and their interactions. Butler
stated:
The purpose of this report is to formulate plans for the most
effective improvement of Columbia River for the purposes of navigation,
and for combining such improvement with the most efﬁcient development
of the potential water electricity, the control of ﬂoods, and the needs of
irrigation.40

Adapting this general mandate to the Columbia River, Butler quickly
concluded that production of hydroelectricity and irrigation of the Columbia Basin, a
large arid area southwest of Spokane, Washington, would be the most valuable uses
of the upper Columbia River. Navigation was unlikely to be cost effective, and the
upper river had few ﬂooding problems. With knowledge of the water supply and an
assessment of water needs, Butler set aside water for the irrigation of the Columbia
Basin. He then used knowledge of topography and geology to identify a set of dams
that would allow full use of the remaining water for producing hydroelectricity.
Butler sketched a plan in which each dam backed water to the foot of the next, so
that all the potential energy created by change in elevation could be converted into
hydroelectricity. This approach gave rivers planned in the early twentieth century
237

a characteristic stair-step, or chain-of-lakes, proﬁle—the conservationists’ “onebest-way” to develop a river. Geology narrowed the possible dam sites to those
suited to hold large structures. Ultimately, Butler proposed ﬁve hydroelectric dams;
an electricity and irrigation project at the head of the Grand Coulee; three storage
reservoirs in the headwaters of tributaries to the Columbia River; and two sets of
locks and lateral dams to improve navigation, if increased river use justiﬁed these
last structures at some point.41
Butler, his staff, and his counterparts in the USBR provided the expertise,
called for by both Taylor and conservationists. Butler headed eighteen men
from ﬁve ﬁelds who conducted the upper Columbia River study. Butler’s
acknowledgements indicated a permanent staff of eight men: ﬁve members of the
American Society of Civil Engineers, two members of the American Institute of
Electrical Engineers, and one man identiﬁed simply as an irrigation engineer. Butler
also drew on the advice of ten consultants: four civil engineers, two electrical
engineers, three geologists, and one economist. Similarly, the USBR placed studies
of potential new irrigation projects in the hands of a senior ﬁeld engineer and a small
staff. Men from the Denver ofﬁce often provided consulting services on dam design
and in other areas.42
While ﬁeld staff analyzed and reﬁned the river, the Denver ofﬁce
specialized in analyzing and reﬁning the main technology of multiple purpose
river development—dams. During the 1920s and 1930s as the Denver ofﬁce grew,
it substantially expanded investigation and analysis. First, the USBR developed
two methods for analyzing stresses and strains in dams. Using mathematics,
USBR engineers developed the trial-load method of analyzing arch dams as part of
designing Hoover Dam. When a dam curves from side to side, as Hoover Dam does,
some or all of the weight of the water behind the dam is transmitted to the abutments
(canyon sides) through arch action, rather than to the foundation under the dam by
gravity effects. Trial-load analysis provided a more accurate approach to calculating
the extremely complicated stresses and strains in a potential structure due to this
dual distribution of forces. In parallel with trial-load analysis, USBR engineers
developed a program of photoelastic analysis using models to determine stresses and
strains on potential structures. Beginning in 1927 the USBR built models of dams
at a facility at the University of Colorado in Boulder. The engineers constructed
the earliest models—those of Stevenson Creek Test Dam and Gibson Dam—out
of concrete and used a rubber pouch ﬁlled with mercury to simulate the weight of
a reservoir. They used optical instruments and a system of gages to measure stress
and strain in the models. For Grand Coulee Dam, the combination of mathematical
and photoelectric analyses led USBR men to add twist adjustment slots near each
abutment to reduce twist forces in the structure.43
The second major experimental program for reﬁning dam technology
developed in this period used hydraulic models. Building on a European tradition,
USBR men began making models of dams in metal and wooden beds and running
water over them to observe the qualitative effects of elements of the structure on
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water ﬂow. The USBR men located their ﬁrst laboratories at Colorado State College
(now University) in Fort Collins and in Montrose, Colorado. For Grand Coulee
Dam, the USBR men used hydraulic experiments to reﬁne the “toe” of the dam.
At the downstream edge of Grand Coulee Dam, the structure must dissipate the
substantial energy of a large river pouring off a 430 ft prism of concrete. The shape
of the toe determines whether the water digs a hole under the dam, digs at the dam’s
edge, geysers up in the air, boils and then joins the ﬂow at the base of the dam, or
any number of better and worse possibilities. After observing models of several
different options, engineers chose a curved toe with a 50-foot diameter bucket for
the base of Grand Coulee Dam. USBR men also used a hydraulic model to plan
the order of pouring Grand Coulee Dam. This work reduced the damage to the
riverbanks above and below the dam site caused by the hydraulic characteristics of
the partly complete structure.44
Finally, the USBR used a materials laboratory to tune up dams. The primary
work of this facility was concrete analysis. Originally located at the University of
California, USBR men and their academic collaborators studied cement and concrete
to reduce shrinkage during drying, which could cause uneven distribution of forces
and cracks in a structure. Out of such work, USBR men developed a system of
embedding thin water pipes throughout very large structures to speed concrete
cooling. They also wrote new speciﬁcations for cement.45
Gazing at the world with vision sharpened by engineering training, USBR
leaders saw disorderly construction sites and disorderly rivers. They drew on the
experiences and enthusiasms of their profession—industrialism, Taylorism, and
conservation—to ﬁx the problems they saw. Construction sites looked a lot like a
factory ﬂoor where engineers could be put in charge, work could be mechanized
and made to ﬂow, and components could be analyzed and tuned for speed. USBR
engineers placed themselves at the metaphorical center managing construction with
drawings and inspections. From removing dirt to delivering concrete, contractors,
such as Morrison-Knudsen and H. J. Kaiser, used trucks, conveyor belts, and cranes
to make materials ﬂow out of and into dam sites. USBR engineers and contractors
collaborated to analyze not workers but machines, such as concrete mixers, to tuneup and speed work.
Rivers looked less like factories. Still, USBR leaders fused ideas from
conservation and Taylorism in the planning and building of the ﬁrst generation of
multiple purpose dams. As with Taylor and his program, USBR engineers placed
experts in control, analyzed and rationalized both processes and components,
and believed single “best” solutions existed for the problems they tackled. They
used the conservation concepts of comprehensive planning and increasing water
supplies through storage as the framework in which to seek Taylorist solutions.
First, groups of engineers gaged water supply, mapped terrain, examined beds
of rivers, and classiﬁed lands. They used this analytic deconstruction and the
concept of comprehensive planning to create a new water system tuned to supply
the water resources in a single best way. For example, the whole Columbia River,
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reconceptualized as a signature chain-of-lakes, would use 92 percent of possible
head for an installed capacity to produce 8.5 million kilowatts of electricity while
providing water to irrigate 1.6 million acres and providing a 9-foot navigation
channel 200 miles inland along the Washington-Oregon border.46 Second, engineers
turned their rationalizing attention to dams, the technological backbone of new
rivers. For dam building, they conducted mathematical and experimental analyses to
maximize desired performance—a safe structure with good hydrodynamics—while
minimizing cost.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have demonstrated that between 1923 and 1943 a very
stable and uniform group of engineers with a Progressive pedigree led the USBR.
I have also suggested that the signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding lies in the ways that
these men drew on the experiences and enthusiasms of engineering, especially
industrialization, Taylorism, and conservation, as the USBR grew and instituted
multiple purpose dam building. In the Taylorist fashion, USBR men created central
managerial spaces for themselves, analyzed and rationalized large processes and
their components, and undertook this work with a faith that it would produce unique
optimal solutions. They did this to both dam construction sites and to the planning
of water resources. In the latter, USBR leaders fused Taylorism and conservation to
take multiple purpose dam building from an idea to a reality.
Philosophers of science traditionally end papers with a promissory note that
acknowledges important areas for future research. While I am no philosopher, I
would like to note that the second part of this paper suggests an important area for
additional research. The USBR was certainly not the only dam builder in this period
nor the only one to employ industrialized and Taylorized construction plants. A
broader consideration of the technologies and industrialization of dam construction
would trace the shift from brick or stone and mortar dams built primarily using
animal and human power to concrete dams whose construction relied on internal
combustion engines and electricity.
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From Pathfinder to Glen Canyon: The Structural
Analysis of Arched, Gravity Dams
By:
David P. Billington,
Chelsea Honigmann,
Moira A. Treacy
Abstract
Shortly after its 1902 establishment the Reclamation Service embarked
upon an ambitious program of designing and building large masonry dams in
the West. The design engineers focused attention on the problem of high dams
curved in plan such that the behavior was partly as a horizontal arch and partly
as a vertical cantilever. This physical reality for dam sites in the ﬁrst decade of
the twentieth century posed a challenge to the analytic talents of engineers and
called forth an approach that eventually in the 1920s came to be called the trialload analysis.
In March 1903 the Reclamation Service hired George Y. Wisner as
their structural consultant, and in 1904, with E. T. Wheeler, he embarked on a
mathematical study focused on the Pathﬁnder Dam. Their report, published
in 1905, identiﬁed the two types of behavior—horizontal arch and vertical
cantilevers—and showed how a highly approximate approach could be used
to estimate the overall performance of curved masonry or concrete dams. The
Service used the result for the design of Pathﬁnder and used it to check the
design for the Theodore Roosevelt Dam.
In a 1921 landmark paper, Fred Noetzli, a Swiss-trained engineer,
developed a more complete procedure for the arch-gravity dam analysis
which he applied to Pathﬁnder and found results reassuringly similar to those
published by Wisner and Wheeler.
After much published discussion of Noetzli’s paper, C. H. Howell and
A. C. Jaquith presented, in a 1929 paper, a more extensive procedure and for the
ﬁrst time used the term trial-load as the method of deﬁning the extent of the arch
action and that of the cantilever action. Hoover Dam, then under design, did not
beneﬁt from this analysis but in the 1950s the trial-load method helped justify
the design for Glen Canyon Dam, which unlike Hoover Dam, could not stand
safely as a pure gravity structure.
The paper will conclude with some general observations about the role
of conceptual design, based on approximate methods of analysis, in the search
for structural forms that are sufﬁciently safe and relatively economical. Also
included will be a related discussion about the tension between the massive and
structural traditions of concrete design.

The Beginning of Rational Design
Structural engineering as a modern profession begins with the building of
iron bridges in the late eighteenth century in Great Britain. It began because of
the desire for lighter bridges that could nevertheless be as strong or even much
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stronger than those built of stone or wood. Starting with the French schools, the
Ponts et Chaussées established in 1748 and the Ecole Polytechnique established
in 1794, structural engineering by the early nineteenth century began to have a
foundation of a scientiﬁc basis where mathematical theory could help predict
performance and be, therefore, a guide to designing new forms.
Bridges were the primary focus of early structural theory because they
were pure structure, they had the longest spans, and they also had the most
dramatic failures. During the last half of the nineteenth century structural theory
became formalized, began to be used extensively for buildings, and was taught
systemically in the Polytechnic Institutes of Western Europe. By contrast with
bridges and buildings, dams did not receive the same intensive attention in
schools or in the technical literature. This was so because most dams were low,
were built of earth or rock, and thus remained part of a preindustrial technological
culture. Throughout the nineteenth century dams received little attention either in
the technical literature or in schools of engineering. But at the end of the century
three major changes in the United States brought dams into the forefront of
engineering: ﬁrst, cities were expanding at an unprecedented rate and they could
not grow without new sources of water; second, the new electric power industry
moved rapidly into hydroelectric stations; and, third, the closing of the frontier
raised strong social pressure to develop the west in large part through irrigation.
Those social pressures combined with the advanced state of structural
theory produced the desire for a more scientiﬁc treatment of dams with the belief
that they could therefore be more rationally, hence more economically and more
safely, designed. Just at this time the new and prototypical twentieth century
material, structural concrete, came into general practice to encourage designers
to abandon stone masonry and sometimes embankment dams for ones built using
the new material. But even where earth or rock dams seemed still preferable,
concrete became widely used in spillways, powerhouses, and diversion works.
In addition to these social and technical forces there was the crisis of ﬂood
to prompt federal funds for control dams. The political actions that such ﬂoods
bring naturally result in population growth and urban expansion. As the twentieth
century unfolded, the major dam building in the United States and elsewhere
began to take a new direction, characterized by high dams, huge reservoirs, and
the search for rational methods of analysis as a basis for design. This search led
to two competing visions of structural form, one characterized by the structural
tradition and the other by the massive tradition which we can rephrase as the
battle between form and mass.1
Form and Mass in Structure
In the preindustrial world, with the notable exception of the high gothic
cathedrals, there was an implicit belief that great works were built as massive
structures which were primarily of stone. This aesthetic of mass connoted
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permanence, opulence, and power; it stood in opposition to the ephemeral wooden
structures of peasants and the urban poor. To be monumental was to be safe
and handsome. When engineers began to construct skeletal metal bridges in the
nineteenth century, they were initially banned from urban settings, and when
concrete entered practice in the 1890s it had to be covered in, or formed to look
like, stone to be accepted.
It is therefore of no surprise that when large dams entered modern
America of the twentieth century, they would reﬂect that context, especially those
dams designed by large municipalities and agencies of the Federal Government.
And yet right from the start of federal dam building in concrete, with the founding
of the Reclamation Service in 1902, the conﬂict between form and mass was
immediately present and it would remain as a continuing issue, never fully
resolved, throughout the century.
In its most elementary form, a dam in the massive tradition consists of a
mass of material that, by its weight alone, holds back a volume of water. Such
structures are known as gravity dams, an appropriate name because it is the force
of gravity pulling vertically down on the dam that provides resistance against
pressure exerted horizontally by water in the reservoir. Designs adhering to the
massive tradition can be based upon sophisticated engineering analysis, but the
basic principle underlying the tradition is simple: accumulate as much material as
economically or physically possible, thus insuring that the dam will not tip over,
slide or rupture; in turn, the massive dimensions will increase the likelihood that
the dam can achieve long-term stability in holding back a reservoir.
A dam in the structural tradition, in contrast to gravity designs, depends
upon its shape, and not simply its mass, to resist hydrostatic pressure. For
example, an arch dam in a narrow canyon with hard rock sides allows a signiﬁcant
amount of the hydrostatic pressure to be carried by arch action horizontally into
the canyon walls. Because of this arch action, the thickness (and hence bulk)
of the dam’s proﬁle can be much less than a gravity dam of the same height. In
essence, the amount of material in (or the mass of) a structural dam is a less
important attribute than it is for a massive dam. For a dam adhering to the
structural tradition, it is more important to develop a design that takes advantage
of shape and not just weight.
The Profile of Equal Resistance
Masonry gravity dams can be built without any reliance upon
mathematics, but in the nineteenth century European engineers realized that this
type of structure was amenable to a quantiﬁable approach to design. In the early
1850s a paper published by the French engineer J. Augustine DeSazilly set the
course for all subsequent work in this area of gravity dam design.2 Knowing
the hydrostatic force exerted by a given height of water (which weighs about
62.5 pounds per cubic foot) and the approximate weight of masonry used in dam
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construction (usually about 140-150 pounds per cubic foot), DeSazilly conceived
what he termed the “proﬁle of equal resistance.” Using basic formulas of statics,
he developed a cross-section in which compressive stresses at the upstream
face when the reservoir is empty equal compressive stresses at the downstream
face when the reservoir is ﬁlled. In taking these two extreme conditions, he
hypothesized a design that, at least in cross-section, would minimize the material
necessary to erect a stable masonry gravity dam.
The proﬁle of equal resistance came from a consideration of two major
conditions of dam loading (see 8.1): reservoir empty or reservoir ﬁlled. For the
former case the dead load of the dam, assumed to be a pure triangle in cross
section, caused a maximum vertical compressive stress f 1h at the heel of the dam
(upstream edge) equal to the weight of concrete or stone above that point or
f1 h Hwc (Height H times the density of concrete wc ). For the case of the full
reservoir, to the vertical stress of case one must add the inﬂuence of the horizontal
force F due to water pressure. This force causes the dam to bend and thus creates
§

2

·
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or 3/2. For example,

for a dam 60 feet high the base width would be 40 feet.
The Middle Third
In the early 1870s, the Scot W. J. M. Rankine conﬁrmed the validity
of DeSazilly’s work; he further observed that a stable gravity dam must have
sufﬁcient cross-section so that the combined vector force (or “resultant force”) of
the horizontal hydrostatic pressure and the vertical weight of masonry will pass
through the center (or middle) third of the structure at any horizontal elevation.3
Should the resultant fall outside the center third, a gravity dam will become
susceptible to dangerous cracking because tension (rather than compression)
will develop along the upstream edge of the structure; the further outside the
center third the resultant passes, the greater the tensile stress and the greater the
likelihood that cracking will occur. And if the resultant should fall completely
beyond the downstream edge, then the structure will “overturn.” Although
the “middle third” precept was inherently adhered to by any design developed
in accord with De Sazilly proﬁles, Rankine’s work established it as an overt
principle of masonry gravity design.4
When the stresses for case two are plotted over the dam base we ﬁnd that
they form a triangle with the maximum value at the toe and the minimum (equals
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zero) at the heel. The centroid of that pressure lies at B/3 from the toe. Likewise
for the reservoir empty in case one the centroid lies at B/3 from the heel. Thus,
the centroids of all loading cases between one and two lie between those two
positions or within the middle third of the dam width B (see 8.2).

8.1. Profile of equal resistance.

The Danger of Uplift and Sliding
Interest in other issues relating to gravity design did not remain stagnant
and this is best reﬂected in concern over the inﬂuence of uplift on the safety of
gravity structures. Uplift is a phenomena resulting where water seeps under the
foundation (or into the interior of the dam proper) and—because of pressure
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exerted by water in the reservoir—pushes upward and increases the likelihood
that the structure will slide horizontally downstream. Uplift attracted the attention
of engineers in the early twentieth century and encouraged both the use of thicker
proﬁles as well as the development of grouting and drainage techniques that
would mitigate its occurrence and possible effect.
The 1911 failure of a gravity dam in Austin, Pennsylvania, led the
American engineering profession to look more closely at the inﬂuence of uplift
on dam safety especially as it related to sliding. Figure 8.3 illustrates the forces
that inﬂuence the horizontal movement of a gravity dam over its foundation. In
addition to the force of the water F and weight of the dam W, the water pressure
underneath the dam produces uplift U while the cohesion C between dam and
rock resists sliding. The friction between dam and foundation (usually rock) tan I
will resist sliding in proportion to the vertical force W less the uplift. Neglecting
cohesion and assuming full uplift on a dam where B/H = 2/3, the safety factor
against sliding is less than one. This result helps explain the Austin Dam
failure, where B/H = 0.6 and investigations after failure led to the conclusion of
substantial uplift. Part of the solution was to increase B/H and also to drain the
base to relieve the pressure (see 8.3) and hence reduce the uplift force to 0.5 or
less.5
The most signiﬁcant drawback to gravity designs involved their high cost.
While the “proﬁle of equal resistance” offered a mathematically rational basis of
design, this did not mean that gravity dams would necessarily be cheap to build.
For major municipalities, the economic beneﬁts that accompanied an increased
water supply might easily justify the huge expenditures required to build large
masonry gravity designs. But once cities such as Boston (with the Wachusetts
Dam completed in 1904) and New York (with the New Croton Dam completed
in 1907) erected masonry gravity structures as part of major civic improvement
projects, the technology came to represent—at least in many people’s eyes—the
most conservative, the most appropriate, and, if at all economically feasible, the
most desirable type of dam. In such dams, the free end (top) of a straight gravity
dam will move horizontally as the cantilever bends downstream under water
pressure. In this way the water load is carried down to the foundations (on the
valley ﬂoor) by bending.
Arch and Cantilever Behavior in Dams
Unlike the Croton structure, many dams in narrow valleys have been
designed as arches using an elementary mathematical theory based upon the
cylinder formula (see 8.4). The dam, curved into an arch between the sides of
the valley, will carry water load to the vertical canyon walls, by compression
forces calculated from the cylinder formula. As these horizontal arches carry
compression they will become shorter and hence move in the horizontal
direction downstream. Thus a curved arch dam can carry loads both vertically
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8.2. Dam Design: The middle third.

as a cantilever and horizontally as an arch. The challenge to the engineer is to
determine how much of the load goes to the canyon ﬂoor and how much to the
canyon walls.
This issue is crucial to design because much more material is required
for safe cantilever behavior than for safe arch action. For example, designers
proportioned gravity dams (those assumed to act as cantilevers alone) with a
base thickness B equal to about 2/3 of H, the dam height. Where H = 60 ft. and
B = 40 ft. the amount of concrete required per foot of dam length would be
V = 60 x 40 x ½ = 1200 cubic feet. By contrast an arch dam with H = 60 ft. and
Ru = 100 ft. would require a base thickness of about 7.5 feet from the cylinder
formula ( for f = 350 psi) and hence a total volume of 60 x 7.5/2 = 225 cubic feet
or less than 20% of the material required for the gravity or massive dam.
As a result, some engineers, seeing this great advantage of arch dams, had
a strong incentive to ﬁnd a rational way to determine analytically how much load
was carried by the arching action and thereby justify designing a safe dam with
far less material than a gravity dam carrying load by cantilever action. Engineers
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8.3. Uplift and Sliding.

consulting with the newly
established Reclamation Service
began this process of analysis as
early as 1903.
The Wisner and Wheeler
Report on Pathfinder Dam
In September 1903, the
Reclamation Service held a
conference of engineers at Ogden,
Utah, where their newly appointed
(March 1903) consulting engineer,
George Y. Wisner (1841-1906),
presented a paper which called
8.4. The cylinder formula.
for a thorough study of stresses in
high masonry (stone or concrete) dams to ensure safety and achieve minimum
construction cost.6 F. H. Newell, the chief engineer of the Service, asked a select
committee of four, including Arthur Powell Davis (1861-1933) later to become
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director of the Service, to make him a recommendation which it did formally on
October 5, 1904. Its letter spoke of the two high dams proposed for Wyoming
(Pathﬁnder and Buffalo Bill later renamed Shoshone Dam) and of the fact that
“no thorough analysis has ever been made of the relative economy and stability of
reinforced concrete dams as compared with similar dams of gravity sections.…”
They suggested that such an analysis be commissioned by the Service, and
they recommended Mr. E. T. Wheeler of Los Angeles for the job.7 Under the
supervision of Wisner, Wheeler began work in January of 1905. Wheeler
submitted his ﬁnal report on May 5, 1905, and Wisner sent that report, preceded
by a lengthy discussion of his own, to Newell on May 16. Its importance was
considered to be so great that the Wisner-Wheeler paper was published in the
August 10, 1905, issue of Engineering News. Since this report inaugurated the
structural tradition of large-scale dam design within the federal government of the
United States, it is essential to explain its substance and its impact.8
Although Wisner proposed the study in the light of the Service’s new big
dams—Roosevelt, Buffalo Bill, and Pathﬁnder—he and Wheeler actually focused
only on Pathﬁnder (see 8.5), it being the ﬁrst one to be completed (1909). Wisner
described how an arch dam in a narrow valley (he called it “of short span”)
carried water loads and also how it behaved under wide swings of temperature
both with reservoir full and with it drawn down. He then gave Wheeler’s report
which consisted of the sets of formulas for water loads: one which assumed that
the dam carried the water pressure as a series of horizontal arches supported by
the side walls of the Canyon. He
then computed the horizontal
deﬂection of these arches at
their crowns—essentially only
the vertical centerline of the
dam (see 8.6). Wheeler next
took a vertical slice of the dam
at this centerline and, assuming
it carried all the water pressure
as a cantilever, supported only
on the ﬂoor of the Canyon, he
computed its horizontal deﬂection
at various points from base to top
of the dam. The arch deﬂections
and the cantilever deﬂections
should have been the same at
the same points on the dam, but
this two-part calculation did not
give such results. Thus Wheeler
had to make a second calculation
8.5. Upstream face of Pathfinder Dam on the
by adjusting the amount of load
North Platte River near Casper, Wyoming, is a
taken by the arches and that taken masonry arch and cantilever section. Source:
Bureau of Reclamation.
by the cantilevers. The ﬁrst
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calculation shows that the free cantilever deﬂects far more than the arches do in
the top portion of the dam while the reverse is true at the bottom. Thus the arches
carry more load at the top and the cantilevers carry more load at the base. This
redistribution of load would eventually be called the trial-load method of analysis.
Moreover, Wheeler found that the Pathﬁnder Dam could carry all the water load
as a series of arches with compressive stresses under 200 psi for a material (stone
masonry) whose compressive strength is well over 2000 psi.

8.6. Pathfinder Dam section and elevation diagrams. Wheeler took a vertical slice of the
dam as a cantilever and analyzed the deflections. He then analyzed the deflections in a
horizontal arch section. He repeated these analyses, distributing load to both the arches
and cantilever, until the two sets of deflections were nearly equal.

Next Wheeler studied temperature stresses in the Pathﬁnder dam. Here
he assumed that the temperature dropped 15°F at the top with the reservoir only
ﬁlled up to 100 feet from the top and that the temperature drop decreased linearly
to zero at 120 feet below the top. This drop would cause the arches to bend
and deﬂect in the downstream direction that would cause vertical cracks in the
upper arches; and the deﬂection of the arches above relative to the undeﬂected
cantilevers below would cause vertical bending in the lower parts of the dam and
hence horizontal cracks there. This qualitative description helps explain where
reinforcing steel needs to be placed (if it were a concrete dam), but it does not
give a good quantitative measure. However, by iteration again Wheeler was able
to make a more reasonable estimate of the temperature stresses which he then
combined with the water load to give one design condition.
Noetzli and the Curved Dams
Strictly speaking, the analysis of Wisner and Wheeler was a trial-load
method because it assumed a distribution of loads between arches and cantilevers
and then after various other trials it based design on a ﬁnal iteration. Fred Noetzli
(1887-1933), a Swiss trained engineer, summarized the situation in a landmark
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1921 paper in which he reviewed the practice of arched dams, gave relatively
simple formulas for calculating the cantilever and the arch actions in horizontally
curved dams, and then applied his formulations in detail to the Pathﬁnder Dam.
This last part is the heart of his paper in which he compares his semi-graphical
approach to the purely analytical calculations presented by Wisner and Wheeler in
1905. He concludes that his “distribution of load between cantilever and arches
compares very favorably with that obtained analytically by Mr. Wheeler.”9
Noetzli then proceeded to discuss the central issues in dam design that
went beyond the statics of water-pressure loading: stresses due to temperature
change, to shortening of the arches under water pressure, and to shrinkage of the
concrete as well as the inﬂuence of cracks in the concrete. He showed by simple
calculations that these effects were at least as important as those due to the statics
of water pressure loading.
The beneﬁt of analyzing the dam as a set of independent arch and
cantilever elements is that one can use simple calculations to determine the
deﬂection of any point along an arch or cantilever element. Cantilever deﬂections
are approximated using the moment area method. The height at which a
deﬂection will occur along the cantilever can be calculated for members with
constant and linearly varying cross-sections using simple equations.
The process of determining the load distribution between arches and
cantilevers in a given dam is an iterative approach based on ﬁnding the height, H1,
above which cantilever action no longer exists and arch action takes all the load.
A ﬁrst approximation of H1 is made by applying the full water load individually
to the arch and cantilever elements. The arch and cantilever deﬂections will
coincide at a single point. The results of an independent analysis of the Pathﬁnder
Dam based on the method outlined by Noetzli in his 1921 paper are shown in
8.7 below. 8.7a shows the intersection of the arch and cantilever elements at a
deﬂection of approximately 0.25 inches. This value is used to calculate the height
at which this deﬂection would occur in an idealized structure. As the actual
cross-section of the dam is something between prismatic and triangular, the ﬁrst
approximation of H1 is taken as the average of the results from the two equations.
The load distribution deﬁned by this new value of H1, becomes the basis
for the second iteration. The deﬂection of the arch and cantilever elements is
calculated as before for the new loading and is shown in 8.7b.
Although the cantilever carries no load above H1, the deﬂection continues
to increase up to the waterline. In some cases, the calculated cantilever deﬂection
may exceed the arch deﬂection at the top of the dam, as it does in 8.7b for the
Pathﬁnder Dam. In actuality, however, the deﬂection of the cantilever and arch
must coincide, requiring that the arch must resist any additional deﬂection of the
cantilever. Subsequent iterations involve adjusting the value of H1 and ﬁnding, by
trial and error, the additional “reaction” load on the arches required to bring the
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cantilever deﬂection approximately into coincidence with the arch deﬂection, as
shown in 8.7c.
Table 8.1 summarizes Noetzli’s results for the Pathﬁnder Dam and the
results of the independent check of Noetzli’s analysis. Additionally, a ﬁnite
element model was analyzed using SAP 2000® to check the accuracy of Noetzli’s
values. These results are also given in Table 8.1. In general, the ﬁnite element
results compare favorably with those obtained by the simpliﬁed hand analysis,
indicating the applicability of this method for approximating the behavior of arch
dams under the combined effects of temperature and water load.

8.7. Deflection of Pathfinder Dam, based on Noetzli’s analysis. Deflection of arches and
crown cantilever under combined 20o temperature change and a) full water load, b) under
partial water load, and c) under partial water load and reaction from cantilever.

After giving the details of his analysis of the Pathﬁnder Dam, Noetzli
went on to point out that pure gravity dams rarely have a safety factor against
overturning of over 2.0 and usually it is close to 1.0 (see 8.8). This surprising
claim allowed him to make a strong criticism of such dams, i.e. “no other
engineering structure of acknowledged good design has such a small factor of
safety as a pure gravity dam.”10
The paper, which drew vigorous discussions from major ﬁgures of the
period, established the Swiss engineer as a leading theoretician for dams, and the
discussion largely conﬁrmed Noetzli’s reputation. Running through Noetzli’s
writing was the two-part theme, prototypically Swiss, that good design implies
form over mass and that analysis—often graphically done—can be greatly
simpliﬁed to improve understanding as well as to encourage designers to think in
terms of form over mass. He was at great pains to stress the historical fact that
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Table 8.1. Comparison of Pathfinder Dam deflections from several analysis methods.

mass did not mean safety, but that form, properly conceived, did so—and with
greater economy as well.
Much of the discussion revolved about the relative simplicity of the
graphical approach as compared to the complexity of the mathematical one.11 One
factor in the form versus mass debate was the perception that lighter forms needed
more rigor in solution.

The Trial-Load Method
The writings on curved dams continued throughout the 1920s as the nation
was beginning to move into the largest program of dam building ever attempted.
The articles and discussions up to 1929 discussed both arch and cantilever
behavior and hence qualify as trial-load methods. However, not until publication
of an article in the 1929 ASCE Transactions by C. H. Howell and A. C. Jaquith
does the method acquire publicly the name of “trial load.”12 Both authors had
worked for the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver where they had begun to study
the method in 1923.
In the paper they deﬁned the method as one which considers the dam to
be made up of a series of horizontal arches and a series of vertical cantilevers
with part of the water load carried by the dam considered as arches and part
by the dam considered as cantilevers. The arch loads and the cantilever loads
are adjusted so that the deﬂections of the arches are nearly the same as the
deﬂections of the cantilevers at the same points. They distinguish the trial-load
method from previous similar methods by the fact that they were considering
more than the one single cantilever, which is what Wheeler, Noetzli, and others
had done. By considering a series of cantilevers, rather than one cantilever only
at the centerline of the dam, the Bureau engineers created a detailed procedure
which was used for later dams. In their paper, the authors began by noting the
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8.8. Factor of safety against overturning.

variations in the shapes of canyons in which dams appear and thus they
established the need to use more than one cantilever for more realistic analysis.
As with Noetzli’s paper, the Howell and Jaquith paper brought forward
much substantial discussion. Noetzli and Jakobsen both observed that Alfred
Stucky had used the trial-load method for a Swiss dam in 1922 although the
method was not so named. In fact Robert Maillart had used the same idea
in 1902 for a water tank also in Switzerland.13 Probably the most signiﬁcant
discussion from the point of view of federal dams came from John Savage and
Ivan Houk, both of the Bureau. They gave a more detailed discussion of Gibson
Dam and gave also results from their analysis of the 405 ft. high Owyhee Dam
in eastern Oregon. Savage had assumed a dominant role in the Bureau and was
already in 1929 deeply involved with the Boulder Canyon project. But as the
dams got higher and higher, the Bureau recognized the need to develop not just
mathematical analyses but also physical model testing, and the instrumentation of
full scale dams.
The Stevenson Creek Test Dam
During the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century engineers focused
intently on concrete arches, creating numerous designs for bridges as well as
dams, and stimulating more mathematically complex analytic schemes. In 1924,
four of the twenty Transactions papers dealt with concrete arches and many
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of these pages were ﬁlled with formulas and tables. The 1925 Transactions
contained two extensive articles on arch analysis, in total about 20% of the entire
volume.
But already by 1922, some engineers became uneasy with so much
abstraction and began to worry about ﬁeld performance as opposed to ofﬁce
abstractions. Particularly engineers in the western states saw the need for a
different approach to analysis which led Fred Noetzli to request ﬁnancial support
from the Engineering Foundation for collecting performance data on existing arch
dams and for designing new tests and experiments.14 Noetzli noted the national
signiﬁcance of arch dams by referring to two recent papers on the subject which
had won the Croes Medal in 1920 and 1921 (the second highest award given by
the ASCE; it recognizes special commendation as a contributor to engineering
science). He urged aid for physical testing because “the methods by which most
existing arch dams have been designed are defective and more or less unreliable.”
Noetzli had been worried about the lack of ﬁeld data and later that year would
publish a paper on tests results in full size dams.15
It was becoming clear then that the Service would have to play a major
role in the project.16 In December 1923 W. A. Brackenridge, senior vice president
of the Southern California Edison Company, proposed the building of a large
scale concrete arch dam designed expressly for research, and he further offered
to provide a large amount of the money for it as well as the use of his company’s
facilities. Located on Stevenson Creek, a tributary of the San Joaquin River about
60 miles east of Fresno, California, this dam was approved by the committee and
construction began in August of 1925.17
The test arch design was startlingly thin. The physical structure was set
in a V-shaped canyon, and was 60 feet high with a thickness throughout the top
half of only 2 feet tapering from mid-height to the base from 2 feet to 7.5 feet.
The arch is of a constant 100 ft. radius throughout (see 8.9).18 The tests used
mechanical strain gages and from these measurements stresses were calculated.
Deﬂection and temperatures were also measured.
Meanwhile engineers had been collecting measurements from existing
dams as part of the overall program, and they had found discouraging results
because of the difﬁculties in relating strains and displacements to loading and
temperature changes. They debated the materials from the test dam construction
and instrumentation at a meeting in Fresno in early December 1925.19
The Bureau was becoming convinced that the test dam alone would not
be sufﬁcient and that a series of small scale models ought also to be included in
the program.20 In early 1926 the Commissioner of the Bureau, Elwood Mead,
approved funding for part of the work with small scale models.21 A full report on
all this work appeared in November 1927 and on December 8, 1928, a concrete
model of the Stevenson Test Dam was loaded to destruction.22
263

8.9. Stevenson Creek Dam: Plan, section, and profile along upstream face.

We can summarize the conclusions reached by the committee in late 1927
under three categories: ﬁrst, the great strength of the arch dams; second, physical
experiments have given data useful to engineers developing mathematical
analyses; and, third, arch dams may be designed more economically (by being
thinner) in the future.23
The full report included an analysis by Noetzli following his 1921 paper.
The results are tabulated in Table 8.2. An independent crown-cantilever analysis
was also carried out by the authors of this paper, based on the procedure outlined
in his 1921 paper. The ﬁnal deﬂection of arches and crown cantilever under
the combined effects of temperature and water pressure are shown in 8.10.
Additionally, a ﬁnite element model of the arch under water load was constructed
as a comparison to the crown-cantilever method. These results are also tabulated
in Table 2, along with actual measurements (excluding temperature effects) taken
from the dam itself. As can be seen from
the results, the crown-cantilever method
overestimates the actual deﬂections
whereas the SAP 2000® analysis is
relatively close. However, the crowncantilever method provides a reasonable
and conservative approximation of the
behavior.
Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams
During the early planning stages
for what became the Boulder Canyon
Project, the Director of the Bureau of
Reclamation, A. P. Davis, and his staff
made an effort to consider a range of
possibilities for the design of the big
storage dam on the Lower Colorado.
Based upon the Service’s experiences
with the Roosevelt, Elephant Butte, and
Arrowrock dams, it is not surprising
that a massive concrete/masonry gravity
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8.10. Deflection of arches and crown
cantilever in Stevenson Creek Dam,
based on Noetzli’s analysis method.

Table 8.2. Comparison of Stevenson Creek Dam deflections from several analysis
methods.

design attracted the interest of Davis, his chief engineer Frank Weymouth, dam
design engineer John L. Savage, and project engineer Walker Young. At the same
time, the Service had experience building massive embankment dams (such as
Belle Fourche in South Dakota and Strawberry Valley in Utah) as well as thin
arch concrete masonry dams (Pathﬁnder and Shoshone, both in Wyoming); in
this context, the decision to utilize a curved gravity concrete design did not come
without some consideration of alternative designs. However, the selection did
come quickly and without a laborious public review of alternative designs.
These plans were ultimately carried out and the Hoover Dam was designed
as a pure gravity dam (see 8.11), although later the Bureau made a trial load
analysis of the structure.
The calculation of the factor of safety against overturning, based on the
equations given in 8.8, shows the considerable overturning resistance of the crosssection. Based on the ﬁnal dimensions of the dam (height H = 727’ and base
2
width B = 660’), the factor of safety is S.F. = (2.25)(2) × 660 2 = 3.7, neglecting uplift.
727

S.F. = (1.25)(2) ×

660 2

= 2, still
Considering uplift, the factor of safety decreases to
727 2
reasonably safe. Although the ﬁnal design utilizes an arched plan, the additional
resistance provided by the arching action is unnecessary to carry the loads
imposed on the structure. The ﬁnal structure is shown as built in 8.12below.

Unlike Hoover Dam, the Glen Canyon design did beneﬁt from the trial
load analysis method that had developed in the 1920s and for the site (located
on the main stem of the Colorado River only a few miles upstream from the
spot marking the division between upper and lower basins), the Bureau made
a design for a thin arched dam. The site had long been familiar to the Bureau.
In fact, it had ﬁgured as a possible alternative to Boulder/Black Canyon in
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the early 1920s. By the 1950s,
the Bureau was eager to begin
construction of a huge 700-foot
high dam at Glen Canyon that
would represent another major step
in the development of the Colorado
as a source of hydroelectric power
for the burgeoning Southwest.
Whereas Echo Park lay within a
part of the National Park System
and thus comprised a site well
suited for wilderness advocates to
defend, the Glen Canyon dam and
reservoir site simply encompassed
federally-owned land and thus was

8.11. Hoover Dam, preliminary design of
gravity section.

8.12. Hoover Dam: Downstream face showing powerhouses.
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easier to justify in terms of inundating for the greater public good. Although the
canyon lands upstream from Glen Canyon could certainly have been characterized
as a natural (and national) treasure, they held no place in the national public
consciousness and no great movement developed to protect them. Thus, when
Congress agreed in 1956 to protect Echo Park, wilderness advocates offered little
protest against approval of Glen Canyon Dam in what could later be understood
as a de facto compromise regarding development of the two dam and reservoir
sites.24
In terms of design, the Glen Canyon Dam differed from Hoover in its use
of an arch design featuring a proﬁle insufﬁcient to stand as a gravity dam; in this
strictly technological context it diverged from the precedent set by the Boulder
Canyon Project and instead drew from the Bureau’s work in building thin arch
dams that extended as far back as Pathﬁnder and Shoshone dams prior to 1910.
The ﬁnal structure (see 8.13), with a height of 690 ft. and a base thickness of just
290 ft., had a factor of safety against overturning of just 0.80 without uplift and
0.44 with uplift. Thus the design relied heavily on arch action to resist the loads.
The early version of the trial-load analysis, improved on by Noetzli in
1921 and further reﬁned by Bureau engineers in the late 1920s laid a basis for its
use on the Glen Canyon Dam. This conﬁdence helped lead the design engineers
to design and construct a dam far thinner than Hoover and thus rely on arch action
instead of only cantilever behavior. There were other reasons too. Concrete
quality had improved since the 1920’s so that 415 psi stress limit at Hoover could
be increased 1000 psi for Glen Canyon.25
However, compensating somewhat for the improved concrete, the canyon
walls at Glen Canyon were sandstone, a weaker material than the granite walls of
Black Canyon. Therefore, the stress at the arches abutments was kept at
600 psi by thickening the arches as they approached the canyon walls. The
weaker walls also required the injection of a grout curtain to strengthen the
foundations and prevent seepage under and around the dam. These are the hidden
dam components that are as essential to safety as the more visually obvious
shaped and solidity of the concrete structure itself.
Concrete Forms and Complex Analysis
Fred Noetzli, whose primary aim had been to use tests and calculations,
predicted in 1924 that gravity dams would be replaced by thin arch structures; he
quoted several engineers saying that “the gravity dam is a thing of the past” and
“the gravity dam is an economic crime.” He held the belief common to many
in the 1920s that “engineering science is advancing” and that a more rational
analytic base would lead to thinner and less costly structures.26 But Noetzli did
not imply that more rational would necessarily mean more complex. He worked
with graphical methods typiﬁed by his education at the Federal Technical Institute
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8.13. Glen Canyon Dam. View towards downstream face showing powerhouse.

in Zurich. He did not publish the detailed mathematical formulations that had
begun to appear in the 1920s and would culminate in the Bureau’s 1938 report.27
This type of mathematical complexity was criticized sharply by one of the
most famous structural engineering teachers, Hardy Cross of Illinois University.
In discussing a highly mathematical 1925 paper on concrete arches, Cross noted
the uncertainties of loadings, of actual stress, and of foundations none of which
were dealt with in the paper which “having swallowed these ‘camels’ only the
‘gnat’ of mathematical analysis remains. The ‘gnat’ should be an hors d’oeuvre
and engineers are giving abnormal gustatory attention to it.” He goes on to
proclaim that “the theories of arch analysis which are now being elaborated
in engineering literature are distinctly ‘high brow’ in that their elaborateness
camouﬂages with erudition uncertainties and inaccuracies which are inevitable.”28
In spite of Noetzli’s hope and Cross’s warning, the profession charged
ahead with complexity of analysis and the result was that the Bureau of
Reclamation dams did not get thinner but thicker until after World War II when
the trial-load analysis would be used to justify the Glen Canyon Dam design. A
recent summary of this period stated that:
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Many arch dams built at the time showed a tendency for increasing
thickness. On the one hand the failure of St. Francis Dam in
California in 1928 had raised questions regarding the safety of
any proposed dam of large size. On the other hand, it seemed
that the excellent results obtained at Stevenson Creek, including a
veriﬁcation of the trial load method, were not carried forward with
these arch gravity-type dams.29
By 1927 there had emerged well documented traditions of massive and of
structural dams. The structural tradition brought forth new methods of analysis
both by physical test and by mathematical calculation. The goal had been to build
lighter, less expensive, and safer dams. But as the methods of analysis got more
complex there seemed to grow an anxiety about uncertainties in the analysis itself
and the Federal agencies addressed these worries by designing heavier structures
which they believed to be safer even though the lighter ones were performing at
least as well.
It seems to be a natural characterization of centralized agencies that they
seek to avoid risks, to question innovations, and to justify heavy expenditures
by invoking the specter of failure. But behind this apparent criticism, there lay
a deep cultural ideology that was characterized by the new and prototypical
building material of the twentieth century. American society and indeed western
society as a whole reacted to reinforced concrete in a profoundly ambiguous way.
Modern concrete clearly stimulated the search for new forms that would
carry loads with less material and at least as much safety as heavier designs. But
many engineers, not seeing these possibilities or not valuing them, sought to
discredit this search for innovation. They saw concrete as a mere substitute for
stone masonry rather than a new material which, when cast monolithically, made
the building of integrated structures possible leading to great savings of materials
and weight.
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Origins of Boulder/Hoover Dam: Siting, Design,
and Hydroelectric Power
By:
Donald C. Jackson
Boulder/Hoover Dam is the most prominent structure ever built by
the Bureau of Reclamation and arguably the most famous dam in the world.
Authorized by Congress and President Calvin Coolidge in December 1928, the
structure was commonly referred to as Boulder Dam throughout the time it was
under congressional debate. In 1930
it was designated Hoover Dam by
Ray Lyman Wilbur (President Herbert
Hoover’s Secretary of the Interior)
and construction contracts were issued
under that name. In 1933 Harold
Ickes (President Franklin Roosevelt’s
Secretary of the Interior and no great
admirer of the prior president) decreed
that the name Boulder Dam be used
in place of Hoover Dam. In 1947,
Congress passed legislation, signed
by President Harry Truman, formally
designating the structure Hoover Dam,
the name it still retains. But whatever
the nomenclature, the curved gravity
concrete structure was built in essential
accord with plans developed in the
9.1. Secretary of the Interior Harold
1920s—a time when the name Boulder
Ickes.
Dam held currency.
This essay describes: 1) the relation of the dam to agricultural development of the
Imperial Valley; 2) the role played by hydroelectricity in the dam’s early history;
3) why and when the decision was made to relocate the dam from Boulder
Canyon (where it was originally proposed and from whence its original name
derived) to Black Canyon, the site of its actual construction; 4) the adoption of a
massive, curved gravity concrete design for the structure; and 5) the importance of
Los Angeles and urban development to the dam’s authorization and construction.
These are prosaic goals, perhaps, but worth addressing because of the dam’s
importance within the history of the Bureau and within the larger history of
twentieth century western water development. Because this essay primarily
involves events that occurred at a time when the proposed structure was known as
Boulder Dam, that is the name used in the following discussion.
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Imperial Valley
The conception of Boulder Dam is rooted in a privately-ﬁnanced project
to irrigate Southern California’s Imperial Valley. As conceived by the Colorado
Development Company in the 1890s, this scheme diverted water from the
Colorado River to nourish a huge tract of desert land just north of the California/
Mexico border. Much of this land lies below sea level making it relatively
easy for water to ﬂow to the valley. Conversely, this distinctive topographical
condition also makes the valley susceptible to ﬂooding. In the 1850s, the AngloAmerican pioneer Oliver Wozencroft perceived the agricultural possibilities
afforded by the topography of the lower Colorado River delta. In particular,
Wozencroft realized that the “Alamo River,” an ancient silt-ﬁlled channel of the
Colorado River about 50 miles long had once carried fresh water directly into the
expansive valley known as the “Colorado Desert.” And he appreciated that, with
a little human assistance, it could readily do so again. In the 1890s Wozencroft’s
idea was picked up by the California Development Company, an enterprise
masterminded by Charles Rockwood in partnership with George Chaffey, and
marketed as irrigating the bright sounding “Imperial Valley” rather than the more
foreboding “Colorado Desert.”1
Just north of the Mexican border the company dug a short canal (about
four miles long) to connect the existing mainstem of the lower Colorado River
with the ancient channel. Fitted with wooden headgates designed to regulate
ﬂow and block excessive ﬂoods, the Alamo Canal provided an effective and
inexpensive way to divert Colorado River water into the Imperial Valley. In
the short term, the company’s plans to “make the desert bloom” proved easy
to implement because, in centuries past, nature had accomplished most of the
excavation work needed for the lengthy waterway. By 1902 thousands of acres
of prime agricultural land was “under the ditch” and the company’s prospects
appeared bright. However, a serious problem loomed, as the “cut” connecting
the Alamo Canal and the mainstem of the Colorado kept clogging with silt, thus
impeding water ﬂow to farmers in the valley.2 Because silt accumulation proved
particularly troublesome in the section of the canal closest to the river—and
because interests allied with the company sought to move the headgates beyond
U.S. jurisdiction in order to more readily irrigate land in Mexican territory—the
company excavated a larger, more direct opening to the river at a site a few miles
south of the U.S./Mexico border. Completed in 1904, this new cut also relied
upon wooden headgates to protect the canal from heavy ﬂoods.3
To the company’s dismay, in June 1905 heavy storms in the Gila River
watershed of central Arizona unleashed huge ﬂoods into the Lower Colorado,
washing away the headgates protecting the Alamo Canal. Soon a tremendous
surge of water washed into the Imperial Valley. As ﬂow from the Colorado River
accelerated, the Alamo Canal deepened and widened, allowing yet more water
to be diverted out of the mainstem. Although the Southern Paciﬁc Railroad (a
corporate ally of the California Development Company whose trackage served the
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valley) dumped trainload-after-trainload of rock to close off the canal entrance,
it achieved little short-term effect. Despite appeals to the federal government to
help stanch the deluge, President Teddy Roosevelt declined to interfere in what
he considered the affairs of a private corporation. Eventually, the ﬂooding was
brought under control by the Southern Paciﬁc, but it took almost two years and an
expenditure of 2 million dollars to close the breach. In the meantime, thousands
of acres of low lying land were inundated under what is now known as the Salton
Sea.4
In 1909, the California Development Company entered bankruptcy
after transferring most of its assets to the Southern Paciﬁc Railroad. In 1911,
landowners north of the international border formed the Imperial Irrigation
District and ﬁve years later the district purchased the water supply system from
the railroad.5 Once the ﬂooding stopped, agricultural production resumed in the
valley. Nonetheless, fear that a devastating uncontrolled “break” might recur was
never far from the minds of residents and investors alike. Soon the district and
its boosters began clamoring for federally-supported ﬂood protection and, in the
midst of the uncertainty that followed collapse of the Porﬁrio Diaz government in
1910, for protection from possible Mexican interference with the valley’s water
supply.
The Fall/Davis Report
Prior to the end of World War I, the Imperial Irrigation District sought
assistance from the federal government for excavation of a completely new canal
entirely within U.S. territory (designated the “All-American Canal”).6 As the war
ended, the district also sought federal support for construction of a ﬂood control/
storage dam somewhere in the lower Colorado River watershed that would protect
the Imperial Valley from a recurrence of the disastrous inundation of 1905-07.
In holding back ﬂood water, such a dam could also increase water supplies for
irrigation in the Imperial Valley.
Although the Federal government had refrained from ﬁghting the ﬂoods
of 1905-1907, the lower Colorado River had not been ignored by the Reclamation
Service. As early as 1902 Arthur Powell Davis (at that time Assistant Chief
Engineer of the Service) had considered development of the basin.7 However, for
many years the issue of a major storage dam across the lower Colorado River was
overshadowed by other Reclamation Service projects including Roosevelt Dam
in Arizona, Arrowrock Dam in Idaho, and Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico.
By the end of World War I these large projects were complete and the Service
was seeking new venues for its dam-building skills. In 1915 Davis had ascended
to become Director of the Reclamation Service: in that position he appreciated
that controlling the lower Colorado could involve construction of one of the most
prominent dams in the world. In the words of California water historian Norris
Hundley:
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The proposed legislation [for an All-American Canal] immediately
caught the eye of Arthur Powell Davis… who saw it as a perfect
opportunity to raise anew his dream of harnessing the Colorado River…
the canal made sense, concluded Davis, but only if it were part of a
larger design. To build such an aqueduct without also constructing dams
to control “the ﬂood menace” would doom the canal to a short life…
Davis told all who would listen [that the Imperial Valley problem] “is
inseparably linked with the problem of water storage in the Colorado
Basin as a whole.”8

As a result of Imperial Irrigation District lobbying and support from
Davis, in May 1920 Congress authorized the Reclamation Service to develop
preliminary plans for an All-American Canal and a Colorado River storage dam.9
Known as the Kinkaid Act (it was sponsored by Nebraska representative Moses
Kinkaid, Chairman of the House Committee on Irrigation), this law initiated
practical planning for Boulder Dam.10
In 1922 the Kinkaid Act bore fruit in the form of the “Fall/Davis Report”
a major study formally prepared under the auspices of Secretary of the Interior
Albert Fall and Director Davis. This landmark report proposed a large dam that
would do much more than simply store ﬂoods and protect the Imperial Valley.
Aware of objections that would arise if project ﬁnancing was perceived as a
federal hand-out, Davis advocated hydroelectric power development as a key
part of the project simply because only power revenues could repay construction
costs with any degree of certainty. From a strictly practical point-of-view, the
development of hydroelectricity made much sense as a dam over 500 feet high
and impounding more than 20 million acre-feet of water could generate many
millions of kilowatt hours per year. But from a political perspective, the use of
power revenues as the primary means of ﬁnancing the dam was problematic.
Speciﬁcally, it raised questions about the proper role of the Federal government in
the generation and marketing of electricity.
Privately-ﬁnanced companies controlled America’s electric power grid in
the 1920s and they viewed askance any legislation that would authorize a huge
federally-ﬁnanced dam to be paid for by hydroelectric power revenues. In the
political environment of the pro-business 1920s—when the Republican Party
controlled both the White House and Congress—the “public power” issue always
loomed over the proposed Boulder Canyon Project. As historian Paul Kleinsorge
noted in the 1940s:
The controversy over the power aspects of the [Boulder Canyon]
project, however, was not a dispute that was conﬁned to the relatively
local ambitions of [California and Arizona]. It was a clamorous
argument that took on the aspects of a nation-wide debate, chieﬂy
because it involved the whole question of whether or not the federal
government should enter large-scale power production activities…11
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In the face of possible objections from private power interests, the Fall/
Davis Report nonetheless advocated construction of a high dam and hydroelectric
power plant in the vicinity of Boulder Canyon. The Reclamation Service
recognized that there were other possible storage dam sites along the length of the
Colorado River (including Diamond Creek, Bridge Canyon, and Glen Canyon)
but quickly focused on Boulder Canyon because of its large storage capacity
and its proximity to prospective water users and electric power consumers in
Southern California.12 Both Boulder Canyon and the nearby Black Canyon (lying
about twenty miles farther downstream) featured dramatic, narrow gorges with
steep granite walls extending upwards for several hundred feet. While initial
investigations focused on Boulder Canyon (hence the name historically attached
to the project), Service engineers soon initiated studies at Black Canyon in order
to discern the best possible site for the dam.
Selection of the Black Canyon Site
Even prior to the release of the Fall/Davis Report, Davis had considered
Black Canyon as an alternative to Boulder Canyon. The two canyons offered
similar possibilities of service to southern California, but, because Black Canyon
lay about 20 miles farther downstream, it allowed development of a small (yet
not insigniﬁcant) amount of hydropower that would otherwise be difﬁcult to
capture. This issue was directly addressed in a December 1921 letter from Davis
to Reclamation Service Chief Engineer Frank Weymouth:
I am inclined to think it best to make one or more borings at Black
Canyon, because a dam at that point would utilize about thirty feet of fall
[for power generation] which occurs between that point and our camp at
Boulder Canyon, and this fall cannot be utilized in any other way.13

At the same time, the Black Canyon
dam site was close enough that it could
inundate the expansive reservoir site lying
above Boulder Canyon; in fact, the Black
Canyon site could actually provide for
greater storage capacity than the original
dam site surveyed in Boulder Canyon.
By the beginning of 1922 geological
explorations were underway at Black
Canyon to discern the quality of bedrock
and the depth of excavation necessary for
dam foundations.14 In July Weymouth
reported to Davis that initial investigation
of the upper end of Black Canyon (termed
line “A”) did not appear promising,
9.2. Arthur Powell Davis while Director
advising him that:
of the Reclamation Service.
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The foundation rock at line A in Black Canyon is not suitable for
bearing pressures of 40 tons per square foot as used on the granite of
Boulder Canyon, [and] the soft and porous structure of some of the rock
may render this site entirely unsuitable for such a high dam. In this
connection I will say that I am personally very doubtful of the feasibility
of a dam 600 feet high in Black Canyon, unless the conditions at the
lower site prove to be very much better…15

Despite this less than encouraging prognosis, exploratory work continued
at the lower end of Black Canyon (line “D”). Conditions at the latter location
proved more agreeable to Service engineers and, following a two-day ﬁeld visit
by the Director in November 1922, Davis could advise Weymouth:
No one doubts the feasibility of the Black Canyon site. The rock in
the bottom of line D is much better than that secured at the head of the
canyon last year... I think we should make a choice between Black and
Boulder Canyons as soon as possible so as to stop expenditures at the site
rejected.16

With this endorsement by Director Davis, full attention soon shifted
to Black Canyon. In early 1924—after Davis had formally resigned and the
Service was ofﬁcially renamed the Bureau of Reclamation—Weymouth ofﬁcially
recommended Black Canyon as the site for the proposed Boulder Dam. As
the voluminous 1924 planning study for the project (commonly known as the
“Weymouth Report”) explained:
An extensive geological examination has been made… [and while]
both dam sites [Boulder and Black Canyons] are excellently adapted to
the construction of a very high dam… , the granite of Boulder Canyon
is superior to the breccia of Black Canyon for carrying great loads…
[nonetheless] the investigations led to the adoption of the lower site in
Black Canyon for the reason that it is more accessible [for construction
equipment and materials]; the maximum depth to bedrock is less than
at the upper site in Boulder Canyon and for the same height of dam the
reservoir capacity is greater.17

Thus, the selection of Black Canyon was not made because it offered
better geological conditions (in fact, based on this criteria, it was judged a bit less
desirable than Boulder Canyon). Rather, Black Canyon was preferred because
it would allow for a less costly structure (based upon savings in site excavation
and in connecting the site to regional transportation networks) and provide for a
larger reservoir.
In this light, it is worth recalling that the decision in December 1921 to
investigate the Black Canyon site had been rationalized in terms of an additional
thirty feet of head available for hydroelectric power production. This rationale
was excluded from the recommendation presented in the 1924 Weymouth Report,
but the omission was likely made more for political expediency than because the
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additional 30-foot power drop had somehow been forgotten. Hydroelectric power
generation remained at the core of the planning for the “high dam” but—in light
of possible controversy related to “Public Power” development—it was often
downplayed in the mid-1920s. This is apparent in a description of the proposed
dam provided to the engineer/author Edward Wegmann by the Bureau in 1927:
The primary objects in the construction of this dam are: 1) To permit the
use of the normal ﬂow of the Colorado River in the upper Colorado River
Basin without injury to prior rights below the reservoir by replacing
such diversions from storage. 2) To extend the use of the waters of the
Colorado River for irrigation and domestic purposes in and adjacent to
the lower Colorado Basin. 3) To provide ﬂood protection for lands along
the Colorado River below the reservoir and in the Imperial Valley. The
accomplishments of these objects requires a reservoir of large capacity
and a high dam, presenting attractive possibilities of power development
incidental to the use of water for the primary objects of the reservoir.18

Thus, the Bureau’s ofﬁcial position was that hydroelectric power
production was only “incidental” to the “objects” for building the dam. But, in
fact, this was not reﬂective of the de facto role played by hydroelectric power in
justifying the ﬁnancial underpinnings of the dam. As Kleinsorge later observed:
The generation of electrical energy was given the last place in the list of
purposes of the act [authorizing construction of the dam] and last place
in the priority of uses. Yet in spite of this ranking it is one of the most
important phases of the project. It is through the sale of electric power
that the project is to be made a ﬁnancially solvent and self-supporting
undertaking… The fact remains that no other practical method of
ﬁnancing the project had been suggested and if the project could not have
been made self-supporting through the sale of electric power it would not
exist today.19

Legislation calling for “construction of the All-American Canal and a dam
at or near Boulder Canyon” was ﬁrst introduced in Congress in 1922. Known
publicly as the Swing-Johnson Act (and more formally as the Boulder Canyon
Project Act), it remained in committee for the legislative session and never came
up for a vote. Undeterred, Congressman Phil Swing and Senator Hiram Johnson
(both of California) revised and resubmitted their bill three more times over
the next six years. By the time of its passage in 1928 it called for a dam with a
reservoir capacity of at least 26 million acre-feet and a power plant to be built by
the federal government but leased to other entities (be they public or private) for
operation and power generation.20
By the time the ﬁnal site location for the lower Colorado storage dam
was recommended in the 1924 Weymouth Report, so much effort already had
gone into the promotion of a “Boulder Canyon Project” that no effort was made
to transform the nomenclature to the “Black Canyon Project” or “Black Dam.”
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Nonetheless, from 1924 on, all work related to Boulder Dam revolved around the
lower site (line “D”) in Black Canyon and this is where the structure stands today.
The Design of Boulder Dam
During the early planning stages for what became the Boulder Canyon
Project, Davis and his staff made an effort to consider a range of possibilities
for the design of the big storage dam on the
Lower Colorado. Based upon the Service’s
experiences with the Roosevelt, Elephant
Butte, and Arrowrock dams, it is not surprising
that a massive concrete/masonry gravity
design attracted the interest of Davis, his Chief
Engineer Frank Weymouth, and Dam Design
Engineer John L. Savage. At the same time,
the Service had experience building massive
embankment dams (such as Belle Fourche
in South Dakota and Strawberry Valley in
Utah) as well as thin arch concrete masonry
dams (Pathﬁnder and Shoshone, both in
Wyoming). Although the decision to utilize
a curved gravity concrete design involved
some preliminary consideration of alternative
designs, selection of a massive curved gravity 9.3. John (Jack) L. Savage,
design came quickly and apparently involved Chief Design Engineer, Bureau of
little laborious review of alternative designs. Reclamation.
In late 1920 Davis initiated correspondence with Lars Jorgensen, a
European-trained engineer who had become a prominent advocate of thin arch
dam design (especially constant angle arch dams). Davis wrote to Jorgensen in
order to help determine whether a large thin arch dam might be feasible to build
across the lower Colorado.21 While previously Davis had been prominently
associated with massive gravity dams such as Roosevelt and Arrowrock, he
also retained an interest in the arch designs (such as those used for the Service’s
Pathﬁnder and Shoshone dams in Wyoming) and his interaction with Jorgensen
testiﬁes to this point.22 During the next year, the use of a thin arch design (either
constant radius or constant angle) ofﬁcially remained a possibility, but little action
to promote or investigate such a design is evident in available records.23
The idea that the Service would rely upon a massive design was publicly
expressed by Davis as early as October 1920 (even before he corresponded with
Jorgensen) when he wrote to J. W. Reagan, Chief Engineer of the Los Angeles
County Flood Control District, in response to a “request for some information
concerning tentative plans made for a dam in Boulder Canyon.” In his response
to Reagan, Davis indicated that “studies have been made for a section of masonry
or concrete of the gravity type, and a rock ﬁll and earth section, the latter not
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being regarded as certainly feasible.”24 In 1924 Volume Five of the Weymouth
Report focused speciﬁcally on “Investigations, Plans and Estimates” and
presented the results of the Bureau’s dam analysis undertaken over the preceding
four years. In this study, no mention is made of any thin arch designs that may
have been considered for the big storage dam. Instead, the Weymouth Report
indicated only that “studies have been made of rock-ﬁll and concrete dams of
various types,” further explaining:
there is a grave question whether life and property below a dam of such
unprecedented height and a reservoir of such enormous capacity should
through the construction of a rock ﬁll dam be subjected to a risk which
could be removed by the adoption of a concrete dam… With all possible
safeguards taken in the construction of a rock-ﬁll of the height proposed
it must be admitted that its overtopping would result in certain and
sudden destruction with overwhelming disaster in the valley below. The
dams adopted are believed to be the safest that can be built—concrete
dams of the gravity type built on a curved plan and estimates prepared
indicate that the concrete dams could be built at less cost than rock-ﬁlls
of the same height.” [note: the use of the plural ‘dams’ in this quotation
refers to three designs of various heights ranging from about 525 feet to
over 700 feet developed for the same site].25

Although the Bureau estimated some possible economic advantages
for selecting a massive curved gravity design, concerns over the possibility
that a rock-ﬁll design might someday be overtopped comprised a key rationale
for selecting a curved gravity design. In fact, the Weymouth Report went so
far as to advocate a curved gravity design that would not feature any spillway,
noting that overtopping could probably be prevented by opening up all possible
discharge outlets through the powerhouse and the dam. But even if the ﬂooding
overwhelmed the capacity of the discharge outlets, the report reassured that:
Any overtopping would be of short duration and [designs for the concrete
gravity] dams have been designed to pass rare ﬂoods over the top with
safety which can not be done in the case of a rock-ﬁll dam.26

Instead of spillways drilled through the rock abutments, the Weymouth
Report proposed that outlet pipes (controlled by huge valves) be built directly into
the dam itself. These could draw water from the lower depths of the reservoir
and discharge it from the downstream face of the structure. The other means
of discharging water from the reservoir would be through penstocks drilled
through the rock abutment along the Nevada side of the canyon; these would
feed into a hydroelectric power house about a half mile downstream from the
dam. In formulating a basic plan for how best to construct the dam, Weymouth
also proposed that the same tunnels used to carry water to the powerhouse could
provide vital service during construction. Speciﬁcally, they were to divert the
ﬂow of the Colorado River so that temporary rock-ﬁll cofferdams could protect
the site from ﬂooding and facilitate excavation.
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By the beginning of 1924 the Weymouth Report laid out the basic features
of what would become Boulder Dam. The plan evolved over the next few years
and by 1928 important revisions had been made under the supervision of dam
engineer J. L. Savage. These included:
1) drilling of diversion tunnels through both the Nevada and
Arizona abutments (two tunnels on both sides of the river);
2) construction of two “glory-hole” spillways that would connect
into the diversion tunnels and insure that the dam would never
be overtopped;
3) construction of powerhouses immediately downstream and
adjacent to the dam structure on both the Nevada and Arizona
sides of Black Canyon; these would tap into the diversion
tunnels and to other tunnels connected to outlet towers built
directly upstream from the dam.27

Clearly, these changes represent important alterations to the Weymouth
design and are of central importance in deﬁning the form of the dam/powerhouse/
penstock/ spillway system as it was actually built. But, beyond the drilling
of spillway discharge tunnels to feed into the diversion tunnels, they do not
constitute anything that cannot be understood as an evolution of the Weymouth
design. And even the addition of spillway tunnels represented an uncomplicated
(yet certainly creative) expansion of Weymouth’s diversion tunnel concept.
During the mid-1920s, the speciﬁc character of the Boulder Dam design
continued to evolve as more was learned about geological conditions and as
the Bureau became interested in utilizing the “Trial-Load” method of design to
conﬁrm the safety of the massive curved gravity design. While the “Trial-Load”
method of analysis undoubtedly ﬁgured into the ﬁnal dimensioning of the dam’s
proﬁle, it did not prompt any dramatic changes or modiﬁcations.28 In fact, it is
difﬁcult to discern any radical differences between the preliminary proﬁle that
accompanied Weymouth’s 1924 report and the design as built. Both represent
curved gravity designs featuring extremely ample gravity sections and the use of
“Trial-Load” techniques of analysis did little in terms of altering the basic form
of the design. In the same way, research on scale models of the dam also ﬁgured
into the Bureau’s analysis of structural safety and gave them greater conﬁdence
in its stability, but it is difﬁcult to perceive how the basic form of the design was
altered by such work.29
In May 1928—near the end of the approval process for the Boulder
Canyon Project—Congress authorized the formation of a special “Colorado
River Board,” separate and distinct from the Bureau’s own board of consulting
engineers, and charged it with providing an independent assessment of the
proposed dam’s safety and feasibility.30 At the end of the year, just prior to
congressional passage of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Colorado River
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Board approved the dam’s basic design, but recommended that the maximum
allowable stresses in the massive structure be reduced from 40 tons per square
foot to 30 tsf. Although this might have appeared to the layperson as a rather
simple way to increase the strength of the design, to the Bureau it presented a
problem because strict adherence to a 30 tsf limit would signiﬁcantly add to the
(already massive) bulk of the dam and signiﬁcantly increase its cost. Without
overtly resisting this directive, the Bureau nonetheless made no meaningful
alteration to the existing design. Instead, the Bureau opted to claim that more
sophisticated mathematical analysis (in line with the “Trial-Load” method)
indicated that the proposed design in fact did not exceed a maximum allowable
stress of about 34 tons per square foot and this was considered adequate to meet
the 30 tsf criteria. In Mead’s words: “It is not believed that the maximum stress
as ﬁnally calculated will appreciably exceed the 30-ton limit. It is believed that
the general plan of the dam can be agreed upon without serious difﬁculties.”31
The Colorado River Board’s recommendation thus had no substantive effect on
the ﬁnal design as the Bureau simply asserted that they could adhere to the 30 tsf
limit without making any substantive design changes.32
In his 1928 “Revised Plan” for the dam, Savage took care not to criticize
the Weymouth Report as being somehow faulty and in need of correction. Rather,
he stated that “The Weymouth plan for the dam and power plant… constitutes
a preliminary study on which to base an estimate of cost. The plan was not
considered as a ﬁnal design and should not be considered as such.”33 In this
context, the design of Boulder Dam cannot be ascribed to any single individual,
but instead represents a collaborative effort that extended over several years’
time. Davis, Weymouth, and Savage all played important roles in overseeing
preparation of the basic design, and, in concert with other Service/Bureau staff
members, deserve credit as designers of Boulder Dam.34
Los Angeles
The preceding discussion has focused on engineering aspects of the basic
dam design. In contrast, the architectural treatment of the dam’s surface features
was handled in a very different manner and emanated from a source separate from
the Bureau’s Denver ofﬁce. During the 1920s the architectural treatment of the
dam was assumed to adhere to a neo-classic style featuring design motifs such as
eagles with wide-spread wings. In 1931, long after all the major technical issues
involving the design had been determined, the Bureau commissioned Los Angeles
architect Gordon Kaufmann to develop a more modern appearance for the dam.
By simplifying the surface treatment of the design and adopting a monumental
“art deco” style, Kaufmann created an evocative, streamlined facade for the
massive structure. While the prominence of the dam in American culture is no
doubt tied in part to its modernistic design motif, the circumstance of hiring a
non-government architect to carry out this work occurred very late in the design
process and was very much separate and distinct from the rest of project.35

283

In many ways it is appropriate that the surface treatment for the
Boulder/Hoover Dam emanated from a Los Angeles architect because, in the
interim between the initiation of the project by Imperial Valley advocates after
World War I and its ﬁnal authorization in the late 1920s, the City of Los Angeles
and other southern California communities came to play an increasingly vital role
in promoting the Boulder Canyon Project. As early as July 1921 Los Angeles
had expressed interest in helping build Boulder Dam in return for control over the
hydroelectric power plant.36 And by 1924 this interest had expanded into a formal
water claim ﬁled on the city’s behalf for 1500 cubic feet per second of Colorado
River ﬂow.37 With this claim, the City of Los Angeles served as the catalyst for
the Colorado River Aqueduct and for what soon evolved into the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California (MWD).
Perhaps most importantly in terms of Congressional approval for the
Boulder Canyon Project, the MWD was to comprise the most important customer
for hydropower. As noted in the MWD’s ﬁrst annual report:
It was early recognized that to secure favorable [congressional]
consideration [the Boulder Canyon Project] must be self-supporting
and that the power to be generated from any development… must ﬁnd
a market which would eventually return all costs of the entire project to
the Government. As additional engineering work for a Colorado River
Aqueduct was done it became evident that any practicable diversion of
the river must… involve pumping. Such pumping was practicable only
if a large amount of power could be obtained at low price. This created,
at once, a potential market for a substantial part of the power from any
major Colorado River development. When these facts… were laid
before Congress support for the Swing-Johnson measure became easier
to obtain.38

Put another way, the need to use huge amounts of electric power to pump
water through the Colorado Aqueduct helped convince hesitant Congressmen
that Boulder Dam would not become a ﬁnancial white elephant, generating huge
quantities of unmarketable power. The MWD could sign contracts guaranteeing
power sales, and, in turn, the Federal Government (and Federal taxpayers) could
rest assured that such contracts would be honored because the MWD possessed the
right to directly tax land within its service area. In 1930, when Secretary of
the Interior Wilbur authorized 50-year leases governing use of Boulder Dam
power, 64 percent of the dam’s power was reserved for use in Southern California,
36 percent went to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California to
pump water through the Colorado Aqueduct, a little more than 9 percent to the
Southern California Edison Company and other private power companies, and
about 18 percent to the City of Los Angeles and other municipally-owned utilities
in Southern California (Los Angeles and Southern California Edison were to share
primary responsibility for operating the dam’s power plant). Although Arizona and
Nevada were each allotted 18 percent of the dam’s power, many years would pass
before these states developed markets large enough to utilize their full share.39
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Thus, the primacy of hydroelectric power that energized Davis’ initial
promotion of the Boulder Canyon site because of its relative proximity to southern
California—as well as the initial investigation of the Black Canyon site because it
allowed for the capture of an additional 30-foot water drop — proved key to the
dam’s legislative and ﬁnancial success. While the project may have been born out
of the ﬂooding of the Imperial Valley by a rampaging Colorado River, its longterm viability rested upon the ability of urban interests in greater Los Angeles to
absorb its enormous cost— budgeted at a minimum of $165 million in the 1928
Boulder Canyon Project Act.40 And because of the tremendous revenue that could
be generated by power sales to an urban market, the Bureau could readily adopt
a massive curved gravity design requiring more than 4 million cubic yards of
concrete.
Fostered by a desire to promote and protect irrigation in the Imperial
Valley, Boulder/Hoover Dam ultimately depended upon the urban development
of Los Angeles to effect its construction. In this, the dam’s history highlights
how in the 1920s the Bureau’s mission was shifting away from support for
irrigated agriculture (as called for in the 1902 National Reclamation Act) and
towards a broader involvement in western economic development encompassing
hydroelectric power generation and urban growth.
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The First Five: A Brief Overview of the First
Reclamation Projects Authorized by the Secretary
of the Interior on March 14, 1903
By:
Shelly C. Dudley
While Frederick Jackson Turner might have declared that the frontier was
at an end in 1893, countless lands within the American West had not yet been
reclaimed or made productive. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
federal government surveyed the country in the western states and territories,
examining potential diversion and storage sites while calculating irrigable
acreage. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 30 million acres could be
irrigated, but by 1890, only 3.6 million acres were being farmed. Because of the
vision of certain individuals who knew that for America to reclaim its arid western
lands required the involvement of the national government, the fertile acreage in
the Salt River Valley in Central Arizona, the lands in western Nevada, the valley
of the North Platte River in Nebraska and Wyoming, the farmers along the Milk
River situated in northeastern Montana, and the region along the Uncompahgre
River in Colorado would have the necessary water to promote and sustain growth.
This is a brief overview of the ﬁrst ﬁve projects authorized by the Secretary of the
Interior under the national Reclamation Act from their beginning, to their place
today in the settlement of the West.

10.1. Reclamation’s first five projects.
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John Wesley Powell, Civil War veteran, explorer of the Grand Canyon,
surveyor of Western lands, and head of the U.S. Geological Survey, believed
that the federal government should reserve lands for the small family farmer and
assist in the development of irrigation projects. Powell wanted settlement of
the West to be in the hands of the individual homesteader even though it would
require support by Washington, yet not all the lands were still available; land
speculators claimed much of the potentially good farm acreage. But neither the
early small landowning farmer, nor land developers or eastern entrepreneurs, had
the necessary resources to ﬁnance the construction of dams to store additional
water to reclaim the western lands. In his report on arid lands, Powell wrote that
he considered the character of the lands themselves, the engineering problems
and suggested “legislative action necessary to inaugurate the enterprises by which
these lands may eventually be rescued from their present worthless state.”1
Promoters of western irrigation, including the inﬂuential National
Irrigation Congress, maintained that the federal government should be involved in
developing the arid lands. George Maxwell, a leading spokesman for the national
irrigation movement, believed that settlement of western lands by yeoman farmers
would solve the social ills of the eastern urban centers with the movement of
the population and met with Frederick Newell, chief hydrographer with the U.S.
Geological Survey. Newell, a protege of John Wesley Powell, surveyed the arid
lands of the West and understood the plight of the homesteader who could not get
enough water to irrigate his lands and grow crops to support his family. Maxwell
and Newell met frequently with Wyoming Senator Francis E. Warren and Nevada
Congressman Francis G. Newlands to devise a plan so that the government could
sponsor federally funded water projects.”2
At the turn of the century many in Congress realized that, without the
support of the national government, settlement of additional lands in the West
would not be possible; various congressman supported a reclamation act which
would provide federal monies to construct irrigation works and further the
development of the arid lands. Yet, only after the assassination of President
William McKinley and the ascendency of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency
did Congress enact the national Reclamation Act. The statute, by authorizing the
use of federal money from the sale of public lands, would make extensive areas
of the West suitable for irrigation, provide homes for America’s citizens, increase
the agricultural production of the nation, and “make beneﬁcial use of two of its
national assets, land and water.”3
Although the national Reclamation Act was not signed until June 17, 1902,
government engineers prior to its passage had already investigated the western
landscape for potential dam sites and irrigable farmlands. After the measure’s
enactment, the engineers of the U.S. Geological Survey and then the newly
created U.S. Reclamation Service prepared a list of potential projects for the
Secretary of the Interior to authorize. The Reclamation Service considered certain
criteria, such as water supply, storage facilities, alignment of canals, and selection
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of feasible lands. While the engineers usually required several years of study to
make these necessary determinations, the western settlers were eager to begin the
work of reclaiming the land and wanted projects announced as soon as possible.
The Reclamation Service, aware of the current circumstances,
recommended ﬁve projects that could be clearly deﬁned with the costs and results
estimated. As early as 1889 John Wesley Powell had explored the arid lands of
the West, noting potential storage dam sites and the fertility of the land. Fellow
geological engineer, and later ofﬁcial in the Reclamation Service, Arthur P. Davis
surveyed the land in the West by the turn of the century. With this background in
place, it would not take long for the ﬁrst projects to be selected by the Secretary
of the Interior.
On March 7, 1903, Charles D. Walcott, Director of both the U.S.
Geological Survey and the U.S. Reclamation Service recommended the ﬁrst ﬁve
projects to the Secretary of the Interior: Sweetwater (North Platte) situated in
Wyoming and Nebraska, Milk River in Montana, Truckee (Newlands) in Nevada,
Gunnison (Uncompahgre) located in Colorado, and the Salt River Project in
central Arizona. On March 14, 1903, Secretary Ethan A. Hitchcock concurred
with the suggestions, stating that the Reclamation Service should concentrate its
efforts upon these ﬁve projects, secure the lands needed for the dams, reservoirs
and appurtenant irrigation works, negotiate with current owners of irrigable lands,
and prepare contracts for the construction of the reclamation works.4
Each project presented both unique conditions while being similar in other
respects. All ﬁve projects contained both private and public lands. A few projects
had some irrigation works, while others needed the construction of storage dams
to provide additional water supply as well as canals and ditches to bring the
water to the land. Towns and communities were created within the reclamation
projects while the opportunity for others to grow and become major cities became
a reality. By examining individually the ﬁrst ﬁve projects, we can appreciate the
impact of the national Reclamation Act on western America.
The First Five
Newlands Project (Truckee)
Is it any wonder the Newlands Project was selected by the staff of the
Geological Survey, considering the national Reclamation Act was sponsored by
Nevada congressman Francis Newlands and much work was already done in the
state by government and private engineers? Even though the money available
from Nevada’s reclamation fund was the smallest of all the western states and
territories, the need was great. At the turn of the century, farmers irrigated
approximately 500,000 acres throughout the state, but the potential was limited
because a few settlers and cattlemen controlled much of the land around the water
sources. The Humboldt, Truckee, Carson, and Walker streams provided most
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of the water during the winter months, but water storage was necessary for the
successful reclamation of the desert lands year round.5
As early as 1860 ranchers arrived in the Lahontan Valley in northwestern
Nevada and gradually started to farm, with cultivated land reaching 5,000 acres by
1880. The Powell Irrigation Survey examined the resources in Nevada, indicating
that the Truckee River could be diverted through a canal to the Lahontan Valley,
but beyond this study, no viable action was taken. At approximately the same
time, Francis G. Newlands, son-in-law and trustee of the William Sharon estate
which held extensive acreage in Nevada, moved to Carson City and started to
acquire his own land along the Truckee River in 1889. Newlands expanded his
holdings and commissioned surveying parties to examine reservoir and canal
sites; the entrepreneur also used reclamation as an issue in his bid for political
ofﬁce. Between1899 and 1900, L. H. Taylor, an engineer and director of the
University of Nevada Agricultural Experiment Station, investigated a number
of reservoir locations and, after the passage of the Reclamation Act, surveyed
additional sites, including those along the Carson and Truckee rivers. Rainfall in
the Carson Sink Valley averaged approximately six inches a year, not enough to
provide a stable water supply without the construction of storage reservoirs.6
The initial irrigation structures of the project designed by the reclamation
engineers included the earthen Derby Diversion Dam on the Truckee River, the
thirty-one-mile Truckee Canal, with a carrying capacity of 1,200 to 1,500 second
feet, the Carson River Diversion Dam, and a distribution system of canals and
laterals carrying water to the farm units. The original plan for a storage dam
on Lake Tahoe was halted by the property owners along the lake who feared
the water levels would ﬂuctuate greatly, so federal engineers constructed the
Lahontan Dam and Reservoir in 1911. A legal settlement was ﬁnally reached with
the Truckee River General Electric Company concerning storage of water at Lake
Tahoe, and the federal engineers proceeded with construction of a dam on the
lake. As part of its work to insure the productivity of the lands, the Reclamation
Service constructed a network of drainage ditches to prevent rising groundwater
levels from causing alkali damage to the land and to crops.7
With designation
of the Newlands Project
as one of the ﬁrst projects,
changes occurred that could
only happen when enough
water is available. Prior to
its selection as a reclamation
project, Churchill County,
being the slowest growing
county in the state, contained
only 830 people within 4,883
square miles, but within ten
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10.2. Levelling land on the Newlands Project.

years Fallon alone, the county seat, boasted a population of 1,000 people in 1913.
The community, which had originally served as a supply depot for the nearby
mining districts, experienced real growth and a building boom. By 1926 Fallon’s
residents doubled to 2,000 as the town’s population increased due to construction
workers on the reclamation project, suppliers providing needed livestock and
equipment to Reclamation, and new homesteaders eager to farm the land with
the newly developed water. The City of Fallon contracted with the Reclamation
Service to supply residents with electricity produced by the Lahontan hydropower
plant. The system had grown to such an extent that eighty-ﬁve percent of possible
customers were receiving power from the reclamation project.8
By the mid-1920s alfalfa was the principal crop, still providing for the
original livestock industries focused on cattle, sheep, and hogs, while dairy farms
started to make an ever growing appearance in the region. Farmers also grew
wheat, barley, potatoes, sugar beets, and garden truck with celery and cantaloupes
harvested commercially. With the assurance of a stable water supply for growing
sugar beets, the Hinze Brothers of California organized the Nevada Sugar
Company in 1910 and opened a factory in the center of Fallon, providing new
opportunities for the farmers and factory workers.9
The acreage on the Newlands Project encompassed over 200,000 acres,
and boosters, including the Central and Southern Paciﬁc Railways which owned
approximately 10,000 acres, expected to have all that land farmed. Within ten
years of the selection of the Newlands Project, however, farmers irrigated just
43,000 acres, and that amount increased to only 45,000 a decade later despite
water right applications having been ﬁled for 70,000 acres in 1923. While at least
half the farmland held was in private ownership, the remaining public lands were
open to homestead entry, providing opportunities for new settlers.10
Uncompahgre Project (Gunnison)
First described by Captain J. W. Gunnison in 1853, “as a desert unﬁt
for cultivation and inhabitation only by savages,” the southwestern Colorado
territory attracted new people beginning with the westward movement of miners.
The Ute Indians were forced to give up their lands between 1868 and 1881 and
relocate to the Utah Territory, while their homelands opened to the public for
settlement. With the development of the mining industry and the necessity for
foodstuffs to be near at hand, enterprising farmers seized the opportunity to move
into the Uncompahgre Valley and construct ditches, diverting water from the
Uncompahgre River to irrigate the crops; the ﬁrst shipments of hay were delivered
to the mines.11
The valley contained approximately 175,000 acres of irrigable land and
the new settlers believed the river contained enough water for the fertile acres.
In the early 1880s the immigrants formed several canal companies, including
the Montrose and Uncompahgre Ditch Company and the Delta Ditch Company,
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constructing over 110 ditches and 475 miles of canals. Besides providing water
to the farmlands, a number of these companies delivered water to the burgeoning
towns. As was typical in many western regions, the farmers and canal companies
overestimated the amount of land that could be irrigated by the 1890s, putting
only 30,000 acres under the plow. Water was in short supply, especially during
the summer growing season, and there was not enough to irrigate the agricultural
lands.12
The farmers started looking elsewhere for an additional water supply, at
ﬁrst considering taking water over the divide from the Cimarron River. Then in
1890, F. C. Lauzon conceived the idea of building a tunnel from the Gunnison
River to the Uncompahgre Valley. Although the U.S. Geological Survey
conducted a reconnaissance survey of this project, the implementation of any
plan involving the construction of a tunnel was beyond the means of the people
in western Colorado. The Colorado Legislature was approached about assisting
in this project, and in 1901 the Legislature set aside $25,000 for the construction
of the tunnel. That same year, Frederick Newell allocated $4,000 to survey the
tunnel and canal location. The Geological Survey mapped the region as well
as conducted several additional surveys, including the geologic structure of the
tunnel route and the elevations of the region. The State of Colorado started
construction on the tunnel in the fall of 1901, but the project was abandoned due
to lack of funds.13
On Secretary of the Interior Ethan Hitchcock’s initial list of ﬁve projects
was the Gunnison Project. Beyond the initial expenditures made on surveying
possible irrigation sites in southwestern Colorado, Walcott may have had other
reasons for suggesting the Uncompahgre Valley as the location of one of the
ﬁrst reclamation projects selected. Congressman James Shafroth of Colorado,
besides being a member of the House Committee on Irrigation, met extensively
with Representative Newlands, Senator Henry Hansbrough of North Dakota,
and Senator Warren and Congressman F. W. Mondell of Wyoming, following
President Theodore Roosevelt’s decision that reclamation would be a priority
in his administration. While Shafroth initially introduced his own reclamation
legislation, he worked with these men on a congressional conference committee
that eventually drafted the measure that became the national Reclamation Act;
Shafroth was also the ﬂoor manager of the House when the Newlands bill came to
a vote in Congress.14
To supplement the ﬂow of the Uncompahgre River, the federal engineers
used the original plan of diverting the Gunnison River by a tunnel six miles in
length and a canal almost twelve miles long. The Reclamation Service started
work almost immediately and over the next several months the government
acquired the rights to the tunnel, although it took several years before the
arrangements became ﬁnal. Under the aegis of the Reclamation Service,
contractors began digging the tunnel, but within a year, the builders went bankrupt
and the federal engineers continued to direct the crews on the project, having to
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change the location of the tunnel. As a testament to the engineering efforts, a
model of the Gunnison tunnel was prepared and shown at the Louisiana Purchase
Exposition in St. Louis in 1904, and President William Howard Taft was the guest
of honor at the grand opening ceremonies for the Gunnison-Uncompahgre Tunnel
on September 23, 1909. During the ensuing decades, the Reclamation Service
built additional diversion dams and either purchased private canals or constructed
new ones, totaling approximately 470 miles, to bring water to the project lands.
In 1932 the Uncompahgre Valley Water Users’ Association accepted control of the
project from the federal government.15
When the Uncompahgre Project was authorized in 1903, the reclamation
engineers estimated that approximately 171,000 acres could be irrigated, with
116,000 acres being already in
private ownership and most of
the balance open for reclamation
homestead entry. As construction
continued on the irrigation works,
water was delivered as soon as the
Gunnison tunnel was completed.
Although Charles Dana Wilber’s
epigram that “rain follows the
plow” was part of the Myth of the
Garden in the nineteenth century
Great Plains, in the West “where
there is water people will come”
is a truism. The population of the
Uncompahgre Valley grew as did
the acres of cultivated lands. The
population in the Uncompahgre
Valley was 5,171 in 1912 with 3,464
living on the project farms, which
increased to over 6,000 in 1923. In
1913, the Uncompahgre Project
canals delivered water to 37,000
acres while the private irrigation
10.3. About 1914, “Slim” Pickins, an
structures transmitted water to
Uncompahgre Valley farmer, displayed
13,600 acres. While the major crops produce from his farm at the county fair in
were alfalfa, potatoes, oats, wheat,
Montrose, Colorado.
sugar beets, and apples, the Project
Engineer suggested the farmers diversify their products to include dairy stock. He
also suggested settlers better prepare the soil, acquire better seed, and improve the
methods of water delivery and use. Within the next decade, the acreage increased
to 64,180 acres irrigated within the project.16
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Milk River
As in most western territories, farming in the Montana region saw little
activity until the 1860s, although limited agriculture occurred earlier near the
fur trading posts. The gold miners rushing to stake and work their claims did
not want or have the time to till the soil for vegetables and grains, requiring
others to provide those commodities. Farmers soon came to cultivate the land
and construct small water delivery systems. Although the Milk River Valley in
northeastern Montana receives approximately 20 inches of rainfall, irrigation was
a necessity. The communities of Chinook and Harlem developed canal systems
with a communal diversion dam, as did the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the
Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. By
the turn of the century farmers irrigated 35,000 acres, growing oats, vegetables,
and pasturage for livestock. But without a stable water supply, the economic
growth of the region could not be assured.17
Under the instructions of Frederick Newell, Geological Survey Engineer
Gerard H. Matthews studied the feasibility of diverting water from the St.
Mary River to the Milk River in 1900. The engineers determined that with the
construction of a gravity canal between the two rivers, it was possible to transport
water from one river to the other. Cyrus Babb continued the survey of the region,
investigating various diversion points and identifying what lands needed to be
withdrawn. Eventual plans depended, however, on an agreement between the
governments of Canada and the United States, because the waters of the St. Mary
River traveled through Canada before returning to the United States. Although
a treaty would not be reached for almost a decade, the Reclamation Service
suggested that the Milk River Project be among the ﬁrst approved. The waters
of the Milk River Project also created problems within the continental United
States when, as requested by the Reclamation Service, a determination of water
rights was set in motion in 1905. The U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding the case of
Winters v U.S. in 1908, established the Indian and federal reserved rights doctrine,
a precedent followed by today’s judicial system.
Although it is not clear why the Milk River Project was among the ﬁrst
chosen, the United States government may have wanted to protect the water
supply of the Milk River from overuse by Canadian farmers or possibly guarantee
it as a stable source of water for the Indians on the Fort Belknap Reservation. In
his autobiography, Newell noted that the Milk River Project had “international
complications,” and like the other ﬁrst projects, he was instrumental in sending
out the engineers to survey potential reservoir sites and alignments for canals.18
The Reclamation Service engineers designed a system of irrigation canals
and dams which would deliver water to the farmers for the irrigation of 120,000
acres. Beginning with the construction of Lake Sherburne Dam, the stored water
would be released into the St. Mary River before being diverted into the twentynine mile long St. Mary Canal and then discharged into the Milk River. The water
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continues to ﬂow northward
into Alberta, Canada, before
re-entering the United States,
traveling more than 200 miles
where it is stored in the Fresno
Reservoir until it is needed by
the farmers, proceeding through
a series of diversion dams having
journeyed through 200 miles of
canals, 219 miles of laterals, and
10.4. Freighting a portable engine to a sawmill on
295 miles of drains.19
lower St. Mary Lake in June of 1906. The lumber
was to be used in construction work on the Milk
River Project.

As construction of the
engineering features continued
through several decades, settlement of the lands progressed slowly. Even though
there was no formal opening of the Milk River Project by the Secretary of the
Interior for many years, the Reclamation Service allowed World War I veterans to
ﬁle entries on the public lands in 1920. During the next decade, landowners with
large holdings, not eager to divide their land into the smaller units as required by
the Reclamation Act, hindered development on the Project. New farmers also
had a difﬁcult time adjusting to the farming conditions and many left within the
year after planting their ﬁrst crop. Those that remained produced good yields
of grains, hardy vegetables, and alfalfa, which supported the local livestock
industry.20
Throughout the Montana drought of the late 1920s, and the Dust Bowl
of the 1930s, the Milk River Project acted as a haven for those farmers who lost
everything. The federal government assisted in relocating both the “dry land
farmers” who had tried to make a living in other parts of Montana and Texas and
Oklahoma settlers who saw their lands blown away. The Bureau of Reclamation’s
mission was still helping the small farmer make a living and settle the arid West.21
North Platte
When the early fur trappers and traders traveled through the North Platte
Valley seeking beaver in the ﬁrst decades of the nineteenth century, they were
among the ﬁrst Euro-Americans to visit the region west of the 100th meridian.
The trails they helped blaze led later immigrants across the land to the northwest
territories and established the ﬁrst trading posts at Fort Laramie and Fort Casper
in the Wyoming region. Following in the wake of the pioneers, who crossed the
prairies to the green lands of Oregon and Washington, were the cattlemen who
saw the open range as the space necessary for their livestock. But within the last
two decades of the nineteenth century, homesteaders decided to stay in Wyoming
and Nebraska, ﬁghting the cowmen, the blizzards, and the droughts.
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Although not initially receptive to the idea of irrigation as a means
of watering the land, the farmers along the North Platte saw that increases
in agricultural production were possible when they no longer relied solely
on rainfall. They dug canals, used water wheels, and while envisioning the
cultivation of 60,000 acres along the North Platte, they were lucky to irrigate
between 5,000 and 8,000 acres with the limited water supply. As with most
locations in the arid West, local capital or private investors could not raise
the funds necessary to construct dams to store enough water for the irrigable
lands. Surveys had been prepared at the turn of the century for the construction
of irrigation works, but it was not until Wyoming Senator F. E. Warren helped
with the passage of the national
reclamation bill that there was hope
for the lands along the North Platte.22
As possible recognition for
Warren’s assistance as well as the
Nebraska congressional delegation’s
efforts in enacting the national
reclamation law, Secretary of the
Interior Hitchcock authorized the
Sweetwater Project, later known as
the North Platte, as one of the ﬁrst to
10.5. Pathfinder Dam on the North Platte
be developed by the newly formed
(Sweetwater) Project.
Reclamation Service. Within the
space of ten years Reclamation completed the Pathﬁnder Dam, cornerstone of
the project and named after the early explorer, John C. Frémont, who traversed
the North Platte River and perchance thought one day that the river would be
tamed and provide the necessary life-giving water to the land. Over the next
two decades, federal engineers constructed a diversion dam and irrigation
system, including the 130-mile long Fort Laramie Canal and the Interstate Canal.
Reclamation delivered water to farmers as early as the 1908 irrigation season.23
There were immediate signs of success on the North Platte Project with
the construction of the Pathﬁnder Dam. Agriculture expanded with over a
thousand newly irrigated farms by 1912, and during the next two years, the farm
population increased by ﬁfty percent. Livestock, both cattle and sheep, were
brought to the project lands to feed on the crops during the winter. By the mid1920s, over two thousand miles of canals and laterals were constructed on the
North Platte Project, bringing water to about 220,000 acres in both Wyoming
and Nebraska. Reclamation engineers resurrected an earlier idea to construct a
regulating reservoir with Guernsey Dam, at Goshen Hole, Wyoming, and built
additional reservoirs at Lake Alice and Lake Minatare in Nebraska. With the
assurance of a water supply, the farmers started growing “speciality crops,” such
as sugar beets and alfalfa while continuing to raise potatoes, oats, corn, wheat, and
barley. Under Warren Act contracts, the waters from the North Platte Project’s
storage dams are delivered to an additional 100,000 acres.24
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Although the early reclamation settlers on the North Platte Project now
had a water supply, they still faced other hardships, especially if they were
unfamiliar with irrigation farming. The strong winds often blew the topsoil away
with the newly planted seed, and uneven application of water could send it all
down the drainage ditch to the canal or river. Bounties were often placed on
grasshoppers and gophers. Many of the new farmers could not produce enough
crops to pay for all the costs of keeping a household and paying the reclamation
charges too. Those who were successful were usually the farmers who came from
neighboring states or regions and were familiar with agricultural techniques, such
as soil preparation and crop rotation. After the First World War, the United States
gave returning servicemen the opportunity to farm on the North Platte Project,
but while these soldiers and sailors could survive on the battleﬁeld, few would
be productive in raising crops. Farming was not always an easy enterprise on a
reclamation project.25
Salt River Project
The early travelers crossing southern Arizona on their way to California
followed the Gila River, not usually proceeding up the Salt River. But when
the miners discovered bodies of ore along the Hassayampa River and then the
military came to keep the hostile Indians away, Jack Swilling found the remains
of prehistoric canals in what became the Salt River Valley. By the 1870s other
farmers and settlers found the land along the Salt River to be fertile and stayed
to cultivate the soil, growing extensive ﬁelds of grain or alfalfa, or establishing
commercial businesses, but within thirty years the ﬂow of the river was overappropriated and growth could not be maintained.
At least a half dozen companies constructed canals, and most were
cooperative organizations of local farmers who worked together to build the
irrigation channels to deliver water to their own land. In 1883 the Arizona Canal
Company sold bonds to investors around the country in order to construct the
Arizona Canal in the northern area of the Salt River Valley. This canal company
expected to make a proﬁt from the sale of land and water rights to new settlers
and with its chief construction contractor, W. J. Murphy, and original incorporator,
Clark Churchill, formed the Arizona Improvement Company. Sitting on the ﬁrst
Board of Directors were local businessmen, Murphy, Churchill, and William
Christy, along with California and Nevada entrepreneurs, Frederick W. Sharon
and Francis G. Newlands.26
W. J. Murphy and his family purchased several tracts of land under the
Arizona Canal and started an experimental citrus orchard with over 1,800 young
orange and other fruit trees from southern California. The trees proved so
successful that other varieties were planted including olive and lemon. Because
the Arizona fruit ripened prior to the orchards in Southern California, Arizona
landowners could sell their produce to the eastern markets ﬁrst. By the mid-1890s
over 150,000 citrus trees were growing on 1,500 acres, and farmers learned they
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could grow the trees with less acreage
and work than the traditional harvests of
grain.27
W. J. Murphy built the Ingleside
Club, complete with a golf course, near
the Arizona Canal to bring investors
and potential landowners to the Salt
River Valley. With the help of men like
Murphy, the population of the Salt River
Valley doubled between 1890 and 1900,
10.6. The Granite Reef Diversion Dam
reaching almost 20,000 residents, and
diverting water into the Arizona Canal in
irrigated acreage increased from 111,000 1908.
to 130,500 acres. By the turn of the
century, however, the landowners realized that a storage dam was needed on the
upper Salt River for growth to continue, but private enterprise could not provide
the needed funding.28
Arizona’s struggle for a permanent water supply moved to Washington,
D.C., at the beginning of the new century. Benjamin Fowler, chairman of the
Maricopa County Water Storage Committee, had been in the federal Capitol at
various times since 1900, lobbying for passage of a bill to permit the county to
issue bonds for construction of a dam, and he then stayed to ﬁght for a federal
reclamation act. Through the efforts of national reclamation lobbyist George
Maxwell, Fowler, who later became the ﬁrst president of the Salt River Valley
Water Users’ Association, became well acquainted with Frederick Newell and
Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester. Fowler offered the U.S. Geological Survey
$1,500 in matching funds to continue its earlier investigation of the Salt River,
including a survey of a damsite at the conﬂuence of the Salt River and Tonto
Creek. Maxwell moved to the nation’s Capitol, leasing a house near Newell to
aid Francis Newlands in his congressional ﬁght for a reclamation act. At his
Washington residence, Maxwell gathered Newell, Fowler, and Pinchot to discuss
the national irrigation movement and a possible Salt River Valley reclamation
project.29
Gifford Pinchot and George Maxwell were good friends with vicepresident Theodore Roosevelt, a strong supporter of the reclamation and
conservation movements. Following the ascendency of Roosevelt to the ofﬁce
of President, the reclamation measure passed Congress and received Roosevelt’s
signature. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to choose the ﬁrst projects
from a list supplied by Newell. The inﬂuence of Newell, Pinchot, and Maxwell,
with Fowler’s organization in the Salt River Valley, made the Tonto Project an
attractive enterprise to the federal government, although most of the land was in
private ownership.
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Within months of the passage of the Reclamation Act, engineers arrived
in the Salt River Valley to survey the lands and possible location of irrigation
works. Prior to the construction of what would become Theodore Roosevelt
Dam, the engineers constructed a sixty-mile road through the rugged Superstition
Mountains and the canyons of the Salt River to bring supplies from the railhead
at Mesa to the dam site. Building the “Apache Trail” would be one of the
most dangerous tasks of the dam construction process, and in its ﬁrst month of
operation, over a million and one half pounds of freight would be hauled over
it. Louis C. Hill, the supervising
reclamation engineer traveled the
Apache Trail while overseeing
construction of the Roosevelt Dam.
Built between 1905 and 1911, crews
laid stone quarried from the neighboring
canyon walls for the rubble-masonry
thick-arch structure which spanned
the Salt River to an original height of
280 feet and crest length of 723 feet,
holding back over 1,300,000 acre
10.7. By 1907 the aerial tramway was
feet of water. Stonemasons cut the
delivering concrete from the batch plant
upstream and downstream faces of the
to the Theodore Roosevelt Dam site. In
order to reduce the cost of the project,
six to ten-ton blocks which were laid
Reclamation built a plant to manufacture
in a stair step fashion, giving the dam
cement at the dam site and even shipped
its identiﬁable appearance. President
cement down the Apache Trial to the
Theodore Roosevelt attended the dam’s construction at Granite Reef Diversion
dedication, traveling over the Apache
Dam.
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Trail, on March 18, 1911.
Flooding would delay construction at the dam site, but would also lead to
the present conﬁguration of the Salt River Project. The Arizona Dam, just below
the conﬂuence of the Salt and Verde rivers, diverted water to the north side canals
but was prone to damage by ﬂoods, and in 1905 a major ﬂood swept down the
Salt River. The Arizona Dam was washed away and the farmers north of the Salt
River approached Louis C. Hill for assistance. To unify the lands in the Salt River
Valley, the Reclamation Service constructed the 1,000 foot long Granite Reef
Diversion Dam which diverts water to both the north and south side canals. The
federal government purchased many of the existing canals within the Salt River
Project boundaries and built additional ones to bring the waters of the Salt and
Verde rivers to 170,000 acres.
After prolonged conferences on irrigable acreage and repayment costs of
the project, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane signed over operational
control of SRP to the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association in 1917.
Signiﬁcantly, the September 6, 1917, agreement permitted the Association to
retain the power revenues generated at SRP facilities, thus allowing for its future
growth. Conceived by the Reclamation engineers as a source of electricity for
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construction of Roosevelt Dam, power generation, developed at ﬁrst through
construction of a power canal and later as part of the dam, was in the drawings
almost from the initial plans. During the 1920s, Salt River Project management
expanded its hydropower installations with the construction of three additional
dams on the Salt River, and more lands joined the Association, bringing its
membership up to 242,000 acres.
2002
In 1902 the authors of the national Reclamation Act provided a way for the
settlers to support their families and develop the West through farming. The ﬁrst
ﬁve reclamation projects encountered varying degrees of success, but all managed
to transform the land, some as originally intended, others with certain limitations,
and at least one changed a fertile agricultural valley into a major metropolitan
center that sparked development of the whole state.
While the men of the Newlands Project envisioned irrigating 200,000
acres at its inception, only 62,000 acres received project water by 1970. Today
claims by others to the waters of the Truckee and Carson rivers and Lake Tahoe,
including land and water set aside for a wetlands project in Lahontan Valley and
settlement of water rights with the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, limit the amount
available for farming. Despite these water woes, the population has increased
from under 1,000 people when the Newlands Project was authorized to over
18,000 people living within the Project lands. The “businessman/farmer” has
become a part-time entrepreneur and more than 4,000 part-time farms, averaging
thirteen acres, contribute approximately 35% of the current economy in Churchill
County with a total crop value of a little over $13 million in 1992. The waters of
the Newlands Project also support the growing recreational activities of camping,
boating, and ﬁshing.31
Currently farmers irrigate approximately 70,000 acres on the
Uncompahgre Project, more than double the amount prior to its selection as a
reclamation project, but less than the 130,000 acres planners imagined could be
cultivated. Following the transfer of the operation and maintenance of the project
to the Uncompahgre Valley Water Users’ Association in 1932, additional irrigation
works were constructed, including the Taylor Park Dam to regulate the water for
the Gunnison Tunnel. With the exception of sugar beets, crops grown today are
principally the same as when the project started. In the 1960s project farmers
started growing malt barley for the manufacture of beer by the Adolph Coors
Company. Today the population is closer to 20,000, whereas a century ago, the
region contained fewer than 5,000 residents.32
Farmers on the Milk River Project cultivate about 100,000 acres, more
than three times the amount irrigated 100 years ago. Project lands, stretching 165
miles, are divided into the Dodson Pumping Unit, and the Chinook, Malta, and
Glasgow Divisions with individual irrigation districts operating the transmission
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and distribution facilities and the Bureau of Reclamation retaining control over
the storage works. Like the Newlands Project, many of the current farm sizes
provide income for only a part-time living, while owners have jobs in nearby
cities. The irrigated acreage has remained relatively stable in recent years, with
ranching and farming the main industries on project lands.33
Urbanization has not been a factor on the Milk River Project, but other
elements have inﬂuenced this reclamation project. Over the years, changes in
crops grown have impacted the neighboring communities. Sugar beets, once a
major crop that required a large labor force as well as producing feed for sheep,
are no longer grown on the project lands. The elimination of this crop had a
trickle down effect—without the sugar beets, the large numbers of migrant
workers have not been needed and the sheep industry left the Milk River area.
Extreme weather conditions, ranging from 100 degrees in the summer to minus
40 degrees in the winter, have aided in the reduction of population on the Milk
River Project. Farmers also have to contend with endangered or threatened
species issues in the future to keep their irrigation water. Recreation is a major
growth industry in the West and the creation of the Fresno and Nelson reservoirs
and Lake Sherburne, have provided a favorite venue for boaters and ﬁshermen
who can also enjoy the waters of this reclamation project.34
Since a handful of mountain men began trapping beaver, to the early
immigrants looking for a better life, to the rancher seeking grazing lands, to the
farmer searching for the fertile acreage and enough water, the North Platte Project
transformed the prairies into a part of America’s farmland. At the turn of the
century, the population of Scotts Bluff County was less than 3,000 people, while
in 2002, in the city of Scottsbluff alone, there are over 14,500 residents. With
the North Platte Project, the irrigated acreage increased from 3,000 acres to over
300,000 acres and encouraged the development of the sugar beet industry worth
over $47 million in 1991. Besides being a cash crop, sugar beets also provide
feed for the traditional western occupation of ranching; nearly a half a million
head of cattle, sheep and hogs are raised on the North Platte Project. Almost from
its start, the waters of the North Platte have been a safe haven for wildlife because
President William Howard Taft created the Pathﬁnder National Wildlife Refuge.
Project lakes continue to provide a resting place for migratory fowl as well as a
setting for recreational activities, including boating and ﬁshing.35
From its foundation, bringing water and power to its shareholders in the
Salt River Valley, SRP has become the largest raw water supplier in the Phoenix
metropolitan area and the nation’s third-largest public power utility, delivering
power to over 745,000 customers. Maricopa County is the major population
center of Arizona, increasing from 20,450 people in 1900 to over 3 million in
2000. Phoenix, in the heart of the Salt River Valley, is the county seat, the state
capitol of Arizona, and now the 6th largest city in the United States.
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For almost one hundred years, the Association has continued to provide
water to over 300,000 acre member and neighboring lands and has evolved into
a multi-dimensional water service provider. Although only 44,000 acres are still
being farmed in 2002 within the Project, SRP delivers water to urban irrigators
and several municipalities which treat the water and distribute it to SRP’s urban
shareholders. To this end, ten water treatment plants operated by eight cities dot
the SRP water system.
SRP’s stewardship of central Arizona’s water supply has made it a
leader in the management of water resources, encompassing a wide range of
activities. In partnership with several Valley cities, SRP jointly owns and operates
the Granite Reef Underground Storage Project (GRUSP), one of the largest
recharge projects in the United States. GRUSP stores Central Arizona Project
water on behalf of the Arizona Water Banking authority and others for use in the
future when dry conditions will prevail. To assist various Valley entities, SRP
cooperated with the Bureau of Reclamation in the delivery of Central Arizona
Project water with the construction of the CAP/SRP Interconnect Facility near
Granite Reef Dam. Operated by SRP, the interconnect links the CAP canal with
SRP’s irrigation system, further allowing for the purchase of surplus Colorado
River water to meet the demands of our shareholders during times of water
shortage as well as to assist in water exchanges.
At the end of World
War II, the Salt River
Valley experienced a major
explosion of growth which
impacted SRP’s traditional
farming community. The
returning veterans wanted
homes, and farmers sold
agricultural lands for
thousands of houses in
the newly developed
subdivisions. With
increased urbanization,
the Association had to

10.8. The Salt River Project’s modern control room for
its water system. Courtesy of the Salt River Project.

10.9. The SCADA system on the Salt River
Project controls this canal control structure.
Courtesy of the Salt River Project.
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ﬁnd new ways to operate and maintain its canal system. Under the Bureau of
Reclamation’s Rehabilitation and Betterment Program, SRP started construction
and implementation of the Supervisory Control System in the late 1960s. The
advances in electronic equipment allowed for the design of a water distribution
system covering 138 miles to be handled by a single operator. By the mid-1970s,
computer equipment monitored telemetered data which displayed water levels
and gate positions. The dispatcher could regulate 331 radial gates and almost one
quarter of the deep-well pumps belonging to SRP. With this system, the water
levels of the canals and laterals could be maintained at a constant level. Gone are
the days when bells rang at the home of the gate operators to warn about pending
trouble.
Keeping pace with new technology allowed SRP to utilize the new water
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system developed between
1989 and 1991. SCADA is a complex computer-based system which allows
remote control and monitoring of the entire water canal system, a major portion
of the deep-well system, and numerous sites of interest to water accounting
concerns. The system remotely scans and operates over 120 sites on the canals
and controls over twenty off-project ﬂow and special-delivery sites and an everexpanding number of water quality monitoring stations throughout the system.
With thousands of homes adjacent to the canals, SRP continues to
maintain the physical appearance of its irrigation facilities. No longer are
sheep seen eating the grass along the canal banks or Yaqui laborers leading
the horses in the ditches to eliminate aquatic moss and weeds. In 1989 SRP
instituted a program of stocking its canals with white Amur, a sterile weed-eating
ﬁsh that originally came from China and is considered an economically and
environmentally safe alternative to chemical and mechanical weed control. SRP
crews trim the trees and remove brush and other vegetation along the canal banks,
not only for its own maintenance vehicles, but for the thousands of bicyclists,
joggers, and horseback riders who use the paths for recreation. As part of a
program completed in 1989, SRP installed safety steps and ladders providing a
quick exit for stray animals and people who accidently enter the canal system.
From its earliest development providing electricity for the construction
of Roosevelt Dam, power generation has been an integral part of the Salt River
Project. The Association constructed its ﬁrst hydropower plants on the Valley
canals between 1911 and 1913, expanding its production with the construction of
three additional dams, Mormon Flat, Horse Mesa, and Stewart Mountain, on the
Salt River between 1923 and 1930. SRP had forty-nine power customers in the
1920s; by 1947 it delivered electricity to over 12,000 customers, and by 2003 it
should transmit power to close to 800,000 people.
To meet this continually growing demand for electricity, SRP upgraded
its transmission and distribution systems over the years, converting from 25 cycle
power to 60 cycle after World War II and building non-hydropower plants. Within
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the Salt River Valley, SRP built several oil or natural gas generating stations and
participated in several coal-ﬁred power plants in the southwest region, including
Mohave Generating Station and the Four Corners Power Plant. As part of the
Central Arizona Project, SRP was chosen as the construction manager and plant
operator of the Navajo Generating Station near Page, Arizona, participating
with other utilities and the federal government. During the 1970s, SRP decided
to construct the coal-ﬁred Coronado Generating Station alone, while being a
partner in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station southwest of the Salt River
Valley. In order to provide its customers with a reliable source of power in the
future, SRP is expanding its Valley generating stations and ﬁnding new and
environmentally compatible methods for the production of power, including
landﬁll gasses and solar energy. From its inception to the present day, Salt River
Project has supplied both water and energy that helped fuel the growth of the
Association and central Arizona.
The passage of the national Reclamation Act heralded a new era in the
development of the arid West. While some might argue that the rhetoric of its
passage is mythic, nonetheless, the act President Theodore Roosevelt signed
on June 17, 1902, transformed the West. Prior to selection by Secretary of the
Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock as the ﬁrst ﬁve reclamation projects, the lands in
Nevada, Colorado, Montana, Wyoming-Nebraska, and Arizona, were being
farmed, but without a stable water supply sustained growth could not be achieved.
The federal government, in the name of the Reclamation Service and later the
Bureau of Reclamation, provided the funding and the engineering expertise to
construct the necessary storage works, to allow for that development, whether in
actual increased irrigated acreage, population, or economic value. The success
of the national Reclamation Act can be measured by the accomplishments of the
Newlands, Uncompahgre, Milk River, North Platte, and Salt River reclamation
projects.
John Wesley Powell surveyed the American West more than one hundred
years ago and saw thirty million acres that could be irrigated. Because of the
vision of a few men and the Bureau of Reclamation, nine to ten million acres
are productive, whether growing crops, homes, communities, or industries.
Reclamation is the cornerstone of growth in the West: providing a stable water
supply for crops, transforming the desert to farmlands, and now farmlands to
cities, businesses, and communities; producing electricity to operate the irrigation
pumps, light the homes, and now power our industries. Reclamation’s objective
hasn’t ceased, but instead becomes more fully developed: the foundation of
growth in the American West.
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10.10. Newlands Project.
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10.11. Uncompahgre Project.
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10.12. Milk River Project.
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10.13. North Platte Project.

10.14. Salt River Project.
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Creating an Irrigator’s Reclamation Service:
I. D. “Bud” O’Donnell, Civic Capitalism, and the
U.S. Reclamation Service in the Yellowstone Valley,
1900-1930
By:
Carroll Van West
The capitalist transformation of rural America in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries is a central issue in American history. The economic
development of the Yellowstone Valley of the northern plains between 1880 and
1920 mirrors the wider American experience in its intersection of governmental
policy, the decisions of major corporate interests and international bankers, and the
actions of local leaders. Throughout the Yellowstone, the passage of the Newlands
Reclamation Act in 1902 and the creation of the United States Reclamation Service
(USRS) encouraged local interests to think of their communities and their futures in
new ways. Twenty years of agriculture in the valley was proof enough that farmers
could not tame the region=s demanding environment, but they could replace nature
with massive engineering works that they could control. Although privately funded
ventures had started the valley=s irrigation, key civic capitalists in the Yellowstone
were eager to exchange private development for federal funds and expertise to
build a physical infrastructure for modern, market-driven farming. This exchange,
however, was not a simple top-down reordering of the landscape and local economic
priorities as dictated by federal policy. Rather, the goals and needs of local interests
shaped the reclamation projects of the Yellowstone from the beginning, and the
interaction between federal policy and local interests eventually led to basic
change—a heightened regard for both irrigation and the individual farmer—in the
United States Reclamation Service itself.
The central ﬁgure in the Yellowstone=s search to build an irrigated empire, and a
central ﬁgure in the history of the irrigation in the U.S. Reclamation Service, is
I. D. O’Donnell of Billings, the service=s ﬁrst Supervisor of Irrigation. The USRS=s
Thirteenth Annual Report announced O’Donnell’s appointment and praised his
contributions. The report=s authors noted:
The underlying thought which prompted the creation of this ofﬁce and the
appointment of Mr. O’Donnell as the ﬁrst incumbent was that there should
be in the ﬁeld, connected with the service, a practical business farmer, who
could look at questions involved in the operation and management of the
projects from the standpoint of the water user as well as from that of the
service; who could advise the other ofﬁcers of the service on all matters
having to do with the efﬁcient operation of the projects, and assist the water
users on all matters coming under the general head of “better farming”
methods.1
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For the rest of the decade O’Donnell would push the interests of irrigators,
and “practical” farmers before local, regional, and national forums, culminating in
the 1918 publication of his treatise Better Business, Better Farming, Better Living:
Hints from a Practical Farmer to the Settlers on the Projects of the United States
Reclamation Service by the Reclamation Service. Although recognized today as
“the father of irrigation in Montana,” he is a neglected, largely forgotten ﬁgure
within the history of the Reclamation Service and the later Reclamation Bureau,
even though he continued to preach his vision of an irrigated West into the 1930s.
O’Donnell came to the west as a cowboy, not an irrigator. Ignatius Donnelly
“Bud” O’Donnell was born in Ontario, Canada, on September 19, 1860; he was the
second child of second-generation Irish immigrants, Daniel and Margaret McIntosh
O’Donnell. His family moved in 1864 to Michigan where his father worked in the
timber industry for several years before buying his own farm in Midland County,
Michigan. Young Bud O’Donnell worked the farm and attended school in Saginaw,
Michigan, until his early teen years, when he took up full-time work in the local
timber business. He continued working in Michigan until he was twenty-one years
old and he left with a friend for work in Chicago. Jobs were lacking there, however,
and the lure of the west proved irresistible. O’Donnell took a Northern Paciﬁc
Railroad train to Dakota and Montana, where he looked for construction work.2
O’Donnell=s ﬁrst stop in Montana was at Miles City, where the Tongue
River joins the Yellowstone River. A natural with an axe, he took a job cutting ties
for the railroad, which was then streaking westward towards the Rockies. With
that grubstake in hand, O’Donnell left for the gold and silver mines at Maiden,
to the north of the Yellowstone. Quick riches proved beyond his reach, and once
his grubstake was gone, O’Donnell was on the move again, and accepted his ﬁrst
cowboy jobCputting up hay for a federal government contractor. He efﬁciently built
corrals, stables, and fences and his experience qualiﬁed him for the next jobCbeing
a cowboy at the I J Ranch, a stock-raising enterprise owned and operated by a bunch
of rich kids from back East—including Parmly Billings and Edward Bailey, the son
and nephew, respectively, of railroad capitalist Frederick Billings, a former president
of the Northern Paciﬁc Railroad and the largest private landowner in the newly
established Yellowstone County.3
O’Donnell proved to be the right man, in the right place, at the right time.
Frederick Billings had long been interested in agricultural reform, and in making his
sizeable interests along the Northern Paciﬁc line, especially in Yellowstone County,
highly proﬁtable. While Northern Paciﬁc president, he had encouraged the creation
of the Cass-Cheney demonstration farm, which popularized the “bonanza farm”
boom of the late 1870s and swelled land sales in Dakota Territory. He operated
his own farm in Vermont as a demonstration farm, especially one that touted the
value of hybrid seeds, purebred livestock, conservation, and diversiﬁcation. But in
Montana Territory his son and nephew soon tired of the hard work of ranch life, and
Frederick Billings had a problem of his own in the city of Billings where his agent,
Congregational minister Benjamin F. Shuart, had proven to be unreliable. In 1885
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the elder Billings rearranged his business ventures in the Yellowstone Valley. He
ordered his son and nephew to move to Billings, where they took over management
of the family’s land and development company, the Minnesota and Montana Land
and Improvement Company, and established a private bank, the Bailey and Billings
Bank. Frederick Billings then placed his various agricultural interests under
the supervision of O’Donnell, who was placed in charge of the I J Ranch, along
with other valley ranch land, and Reverend Shuart, who moved to his own ranch
along Canyon Creek and the land company’s “Big Ditch” irrigation system, east
of Billings adjacent to large parcel of Billings family land, where he started the
famed Hesper Farm. Shuart too followed the lead of his patron, Frederick Billings,
and operated Hesper Farm as a model agricultural landscape, with irrigated ﬁelds,
diverse crops, and modern soil conservation techniques.4
O’Donnell made the most of his opportunity to impress his patrons and after
Parmly Billings’s death in 1886, Edward Bailey sold O’Donnell the agricultural
interests owned by Parmly Billings and they became partners. By 1890 Bailey
and O’Donnell was a well established livestock ﬁrm; as O’Donnell later recalled,
“we fed a number of bands of sheep, took up various land holdings, and kept a
quantity of range. It was through these experiments that I caught a glimpse of
a great future for farming in the Yellowstone Valley.” Since the Billings family
trusted his management instincts, and O’Donnell had already proved to be a quick
study, the family named him as manager of the Minnesota and Montana Land and
Improvement Company. By default, he became an irrigator since the land company
had established and operated the “Big Ditch,” the largest private irrigation effort in
the region since 1883.5
For a cowboy, O’Donnell took to irrigation quickly, and by decade’s end,
he was considered one of the region=s irrigation experts. He helped to establish
the Montana Irrigation Society and served as its president. O’Donnell became
an aggressive spokesman for northern plains irrigation. In the 1894 national
publication, The Irrigation Age, O’Donnell bragged about the potential of the
Yellowstone Valley’s Clark Fork Bottom (where his Hesper Farm was located),
predicting that due to irrigation the land was “destined to be the great feeding center
of this section of the country.” He improved and expanded the works of the “Big
Ditch” and improved the land company=s image and reputation among the farmers
who relied on it. In 1892 he and Bailey purchased the Hesper Farm for $10,000
and O’Donnell began his own experiments with irrigation, with a special concern
about what crops would grow most efﬁciently. The Billings Gazette Illustrated
Edition of July 1894 approvingly commented that O’Donnell “enlists science to his
aid in farming, irrigation and stock ranching, with the best results.” Also in 1892,
O’Donnell founded the Yellowstone Fair Association, where he began an annual
ritual of promoting irrigation, scientiﬁc agriculture, and the cultivation of alfalfa and
sugar beets, which he had successfully cultivated at Hesper Farm.6
O’Donnell is credited with producing the Yellowstone’s ﬁrst successful sugar
beet crop and the ﬁrst alfalfa crop in Montana. Both products, however, needed
317

more water than other crops typically cultivated in the northern plains—a fact that
also drove O’Donnell to support irrigation development. In 1893-1894 he began to
serve as a lecturer for the Farmers’ Institutes, sponsored by the Experiment Station
of Montana State University, with alfalfa and irrigation being his favorite topics.
O’Donnell also established new local irrigation ventures; the High Line Ditch
Company, capitalized at $10,000, came in 1895 and ﬁve years later he joined with
Preston Moss and others to create the Big Ditch Company, capitalized at $64,000.
In 1898 he applied for a patent for his own improved headgate design. He served
as a Montana delegate to various regional and national irrigation congresses; a
meeting in Cheyenne, Wyoming, he recalled, was where “I gave my maiden address
in the interest of an [federal] irrigation law” several years prior to the passage of the
Newlands Reclamation Act.7
By the end of the nineteenth century, O’Donnell had proven sugar beets
could withstand the harsh Montana climate—and that a Montana beet was higher in
sugar content than those from other sections of the country. He had patched together
a network of fellow irrigators across the region; and he had improved the efﬁciency
of the Big Ditch as a water provider. He was ready to launch his holdings, and
those of many other Yellowstone farmers, into a new agricultural age, one based on
irrigation and the production of sugar beets. As horticultural expert S. M. Emery, the
director of the Montana State Experiment Station, predicted to O’Donnell in April
1900: “The time is surely coming when Montana will produce its own sugar. You
have all the conditions down there to make such a plant a success.”8
To make that success, O’Donnell needed help from a variety of quarters.
First, he needed new partners. The Billings family and Edward Bailey had
bankrolled his ventures for over ten years, but with the new century on the horizon,
the Billingses and Bailey had both tired of their western adventure. They were
willing to sell the land company to O’Donnell, if he could ﬁnd the partners.
O’Donnell formed an alliance with the president of the First National Bank in
Billings, Preston Moss, and together they bought out the Billings and Bailey
interests. Moss and O’Donnell, soon joined by engineer Henry W. Rowley, became
powerful business partners, and good friends. (In the early 1900s they all built
architecturally distinctive homes next to each other in a new trendy neighborhood
of Billings.) Moss was a native of Missouri, who moved to Billings in 1892 to
be the vice-president of the First National Bank. Four years later he became the
bank’s president and invested in new Billings enterprises and agricultural projects
in the Yellowstone Valley. He also owned a local telephone company, the Northern
Hotel, the Gazette Printing Company, and the Billings Utility Company. Trained
in civil engineering at the University of Minnesota, Rowley had been the original
engineer of the Big Ditch and a Billings resident since 1882. He too brought money
(gained from real estate investments and the Billings Water Power Company) to
the partnership, along with experience with building large irrigation systems from
scratch, something that O’Donnell had never done.9
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The importance of the O’Donnell-Moss-Rowley alliance should not be
underestimated; all three were classic examples of what historian John Cumbler has
called “civic capitalists,” who sought their “own proﬁt, but each understood that
his welfare was bound up with the welfare of others of his kind and the city that
nourished them.” The ﬁrst major venture of these three civic capitalists was the
Billings Land and Irrigation Company. They also jointly ventured into banking,
commercial, and manufacturing enterprises while demonstrating their civic duty
through support of such institutions as the new Parmly Billings Library. Due to
his prior career within the Billings family’s business circles, O’Donnell perhaps
understood better than the others the need for reciprocal arrangements to nurture the
fragile economy and settlements of the northern plains. As argued by an editorial in
the Billings Gazette, after his appointment to the Reclamation Service in December
1913,
In Billings, there are many men, who are really doing things, who
have the right mental attitude. They make up the predominating inﬂuence
of society, they lead, and the result is that the right mental attitude, the
spirit, the loyalty of the Billings citizen has become proverbial throughout
the land.

The “Doctor of Mental Attitude,” concluded the editorial writer, was “I. D.
O’Donnell.” A later contemporary account of O’Donnell=s career, published in 1919
after his years with the Reclamation Service, noted that O’Donnell “is the city=s
principal booster and has had more to do with organizing and getting new businesses
started than almost any other man there.” And a 1923 story praising O’Donnell in
the Great Falls Tribune concluded that “in Billings whenever money is needed to
build an addition to the public library or money is needed for something of historical
importance [or] the help is needed of some public spirited citizen, the community
instinctively turns to Mr. O’Donnell.”10
To build a Yellowstone empire, O’Donnell needed more than strong local
allies. He also needed, at least, federal recognition of the potential of an irrigated
Yellowstone, if not federal support and money for Yellowstone irrigation. Through
his ofﬁce as president of the Montana Irrigation Society, and by attending various
irrigation conferences, he had connected with various federal ofﬁcials then exploring
the possibility of new irrigation programs for the arid West. In particular, he
assisted and supported the efforts of Elwood Mead to promote irrigation within the
Department of Agriculture. He had met Mead at an 1897 irrigation conference,
a key meeting that encouraged Congress to establish a division of Irrigation
Investigations within the Agriculture department’s Ofﬁce of Experiment Stations
in 1898. Under this program, Samuel Fortier and Elwood Mead came to the
Yellowstone in 1900 and investigated the Big Ditch, while interviewing O’Donnell
at Hesper Farm. In their follow-up report, Fortier and Mead acknowledged the
assistance of O’Donnell, approvingly noted the 10,000 acres of alfalfa currently in
the irrigated Yellowstone, and discussed how O’Donnell paid for Mead to install a
weir at Hesper Farm in order to measure the water ﬂow.11
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Federal recognition, strong local allies, and a marketable crop were all
important, but most importantly, O’Donnell needed more land than what the
scattered holdings of the old Minnesota and Montana Land and Improvement
Company provided. To acquire the needed land at the lowest possible cost,
O’Donnell and Moss initially turned to the Carey Act of 1894, which granted free
federal land to states for major irrigation projects. In 1903, a group of Washington
state investors arrived in Billings to investigate the possibility of establishing an
irrigation project on the Billings Bench northeast of the city. O’Donnell toured the
capitalists around the city and county, convincing them that indeed the Yellowstone
was the right place for such a project. In mid-October 1903 John Schram and W.
T. Clark of Washington State, in partnership with Preston Moss, I. D. O’Donnell,
and Henry Rowley, incorporated the Billings Land & Irrigation Company. The
Washington investors put up $75,000, which was matched by a $50,000 loan from
Moss and his First National Bank and $12,500 each from Rowley and M. A. Arnold,
the cashier at Moss=s bank. By 1905, the construction of the irrigation system was
largely complete, cultivation was underway, and in April 1905 the company received
its ﬁrst land deeds from state ofﬁcials who administered the Carey Land Act board.
The project eventually irrigated over 24,000 acres.12
O’Donnell and Moss, however, did not plan to stop with Carey Act
largesse—Bud O’Donnell had argued for a more comprehensive federal reclamation
law for several years, and when the Newlands Reclamation Act became a reality in
1902, he immediately began to look for a suitable Yellowstone project. He located a
perfect site: 35,000 acres of “open” land south of the Yellowstone River, bordered by
the Big Horn River Valley, and serviced by the rails of the Northern Paciﬁc Railway
(NP) and the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy (CBQ or Burlington Route). There
was one hitch—and in the West of those days it was viewed as a hindrance more
than an obstacle—the preferred land was on the Crow Indian Reservation.
CBQ ofﬁcials had pushed their railroad through the Crow reservation in the
mid-1890s, where the line linked with the Northern Paciﬁc, and spurred growth in
the Yellowstone Valley. That cession had proven easy enough to negotiate, but the
railroad merely passed through the reservation and could do little to develop local
trafﬁc along the line. After railroad magnate James J. Hill, international ﬁnancier J.
P. Morgan, and others combined the interests of the Burlington Route with those of
the Northern Paciﬁc and the Great Northern Railway at the turn of the century, the
new Hill-Morgan empire became even more interested in cracking open the Crow
reservation to settlement. The railroads strongly supported the reclamation project,
and for more reasons than mere trafﬁc on the line. In 1900, a worried Montana
Senator T. H. Carter warned James J. Hill: “This state will be dominated by a mob
until the reclamation of the arid lands transfers the balance of power of the farmers.”
Hill, in particular, wished to boost agricultural production for both political and
economic reasons, and his correspondents in 1902-1903 periodically informed him
of developments in Montana.13
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In April 1904 Congress approved a bill to amend current agreements
with the Crow Indians to permit the withdrawal of land from the reservation to
be used for the reclamation project in exchange for $1.15 million. The Crows
already living in the ceded area had a choice: stay or accept compensation for their
improvements and leave. Only three Crow settlers stayed. Engineers from the U.S.
Reclamation Service soon surveyed the ceded land, and in May Assistant Chief
Reclamation Engineer Arthur P. Davis came to Billings, where he met with X. H.
Fitch, Supervising Engineer, and Robert Stockman, Engineer of Billings, to assess
the engineers’ ﬁndings. Davis ruled that the preliminary surveys were promising
enough to justify the creation of a reclamation project and he ordered more intensive
survey work under Stockton’s supervision.14
Billings interests carefully monitored the work of the federal engineers;
Moss and O’Donnell began their plans for creating a sugar beet reﬁnery in earnest.
On February 26, 1905, the USRS’s Board of Engineers ratiﬁed the feasibility of the
project—all that was needed now was an ofﬁcial authorization from the Secretary
of the Interior. The approval of the engineering board was enough for Moss,
O’Donnell, and Rowley. Less than three weeks later, on March 14, 1905, the three
allies, together with M. A. Arnold and F. W. Shaw, incorporated the Billings Sugar
Factory, with a capitalization of $750,000. Moss put up $650,000 while O’Donnell,
Rowley, Arnold, and Shaw pitched in with $25,000 each. After Secretary of Interior
E. A. Hitchcock signed off on the construction of the $900,000 Huntley Project (so
named after an early settlement in the project area) on April 18, 1905, the creation
of an expanded irrigated Yellowstone empire was formally underway. In May
the Billings group signed a contract with the newly created Great Western Sugar
Company (incorporated in New Jersey in January 1905) to provide sugar reﬁned
from Yellowstone-grown sugar beets. O’Donnell and his allies had used their own
moxie, engineering expertise, boosterism, irrigation experience, federal land, and
federal dollars to establish a potential powerful economic engine of change, where
federal support made private enterprise possible. Billings now had its ﬁrst truly
large locally owned and operated industry, which depended totally on the success of
irrigation and sugar beet cultivation.15
In 1906 the sugar company signed contracts with local farmers for seven
thousand acres of beets. With the building of the Billings Sugar Factory—with a
capacity of converting 55,000 tons of beets into 161,000 bags of sugar—a new age
of reciprocal agricultural-industrial partnership was underway. The completion of
the Huntley Project did not come as quickly as local interests had wished, although
from the perspective of USRS engineers, the project had the sort of delays common
to the service’s initial projects. Local historian William Hancock observed:
They all had problems common to construction today including wages,
strikes, delays in the delivery of materials, adverse weather, ﬂooding
conditions and soil and drainage problems not contemplated. Horses and
men were hard to ﬁnd. One contractor shipped in two carloads of horses
from Iowa and inexperienced Indian labor was often used.
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On May 21, 1907, progress had proceeded to the point that President
Theodore Roosevelt ofﬁcially declared the Huntley Project acreage open for
settlement, a total of 28,921 acres, enough for 585 farms between 40 and 160 acres
in size. The remaining project acreage had too high of an alkali content, and the
USRS only allowed settlement if prospective settlers knew they were claiming land
of dubious value. To serve as trade centers for the Huntley settlers, the Reclamation
Service also platted towns, such as Huntley, Ballantine, Worden, Osborn, and
Pompeys Pillar, and opened lots for sale in August 1907.16
That most of the Huntley Project properties were small—40 or so acres in
size—reﬂected a shared assumption by both O’Donnell and F. B. Linﬁeld, director
of the Montana Experiment Station and later dean of the College of Agriculture at
Montana State University. Small acreage forced farmers to cultivate thoroughly and
carefully as well as showing restraint in using the all-too-valuable supply of water.
It also called for some diversiﬁcation: small garden plots to provide food could exist
adjacent to the sugar beet ﬁelds (indeed the small plots were a convenient way to
force farmers to rely on sugar beets for their primary cash crop). Small lots also
meant more settlers—and increasing the population was always a goal of O’Donnell
and other like-mind investors in Yellowstone County.17
Forty-acre farms, however, did not please other Billings residents. The
publisher of the Billings Gazette, E. H. Becker, pointedly referred to O’Donnell
when he complained that the 40-acre tract reﬂected “a pet hobby of the reclamation
service, backed by a very small minority of those who call themselves experienced
farmers in irrigated districts.” Becker insisted that there was “no demand in eastern
Montana for 700 40-acre tract farmers at the very doors of this city.” Admitting
that the goal of the project was to produce sugar beets for the local factory, Becker
pointed out that the “lands under the Huntley ditch alone, if intensely cultivated,
would supply a sufﬁcient number of beets to supply the demand of four factories,”
but there were no other factories on the horizon. To “protect the best interests of
the settlers, but the best interests of the community commercially as well,” he urged
local residents to demand that the federal government grant larger farms.18
Becker=s comments reﬂected the concerns of the region’s large stockgrowing
interests—some of whom had been grazing on Crow land for years—as well as the
interests of real estate speculators who wanted to grab as much of the cheap irrigated
land as possible when it became available. When the Huntley lands were made
available to settlers, most registrants were merely interested in seeing how high a
number they would draw in order to select the best available land. 5,491 individuals
registered for the ﬁrst 582 farms, but of the ﬁrst 1,000 names drawn, a mere 76
completed ﬁling and claimed a farm.19
Those who were serious about settling at Huntley soon discovered that while
water had been diverted into the system, it was only for the priming and puddling
of the canals, laterals, and structures. It would be months—April 6, 1908—before
water was actually delivered to the farms. Then the Reclamation Service did little,
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in the farmers’ eyes, to help the settlers. Since the irrigation system only delivered
water to the high point of the farm unit, farmers had to build their own ditches, and
most knew nothing about irrigation technology or even when and how to irrigate
their ﬁelds to best advantage. Alex Kimonth, who lived near Ballantine, recalled his
problems that ﬁrst summer of water in July 1908:
After a lot of hard work correcting mistakes made by ourselves and, also,
by the government in placing ditches in the wrong place, we ordered water.
Having never done any irrigating, we had a hard time to get the water in
the places where it did any good. . . Our ditches were too small and we had
to build them larger. By the time we had worn out two shovels, we got the
ditches so that they could carry water.

The ﬁrst year of cultivation at Huntley was generally a bust. While ﬁelds were
planted by April, grains were largely produced, and yields were disappointing.
Sugar beets would have to wait until the 1909 season.20
The delays and controversies of 1907-1908 troubled O’Donnell. The
Reclamation Service had built the irrigation machine he always wanted for the
Yellowstone, but now it seemed the machine did not immediately produce the
garden that he and his allies envisioned. True to his personality, however, O’Donnell
aggressively sought solutions. In 1907 he moved to shore up support for the project
within the Billings business community by leading the transformation of the city’s
old Commercial Club into the Billings Chamber of Commerce, with himself as
President. The chamber strongly supported the sugar factory and beet farming in its
early publicity.21
O’Donnell also joined with others to establish a new educational institution
to further the cultural process of turning cowboys into farmers. As early as 1904
Billings merchants John Losekamp and Christian Yegen had joined forces with
educators Ernest T. Eaton and Lewis Eaton to establish a private high school, which
operated out of various downtown buildings for its ﬁrst four years. In late July
1908 the school was reorganized as the Billings Polytechnic Institute, with ﬁve
individuals providing the vast majority of its capital: Losekamp and Yegen with
$10,000 each, and O’Donnell, Preston B. Moss, and Henry W. Rowley with $5,000
each. The latter three also helped to provide the location for a new 60-acre campus,
north of town along the Big Ditch. The announced educational goal of the Billings
Polytechnic was
industrial and technical education. It is now realized that hand training is
mind training and that the young man or woman who is not trained to do
something and to do that something well, has not been half educated.

The new school would have machine shops, home economics classes, and (not
surprisingly) a demonstration farm where about 40 acres “will be put into crops
under the direction of an expert in intensiﬁed farming.”22
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Another goal of the institute was to transform cowboys into farmers by
replacing the region=s early dependency on stockgrowing with industrial and
agricultural ventures. This theme became predominant in 1911 as the institute’s
founders approached railroad magnate James J. Hill to donate 100 acres to the
school. Hill’s Great Northern Railway had operated a small dry land farming
demonstration next to the school’s 40 acres of irrigated land in 1909. School
ofﬁcials promised that with Hill=s donation these efforts would be magniﬁed into
a “Model A” demonstration farm. “To bring about a solution to the agricultural
problem here,” a 1911 memorandum to Hill explained, “the Institute would conduct
a series of model demonstration farms. These farms would be placed under average
condition and on an entirely practical basis. It would have them so arranged that
the farmers could come and study the methods for themselves. Not experiment but
demonstration would be the work of these farms.” This mailing to Hill included
mock “before and after” photographs, with one showing three boys in cowboy hats
and chaps, labeled as before, and the after photograph showed the same boys in
farmer clothing and caps, with a big stack of sugar beets in front of them, as happy,
healthy farmers.23
Also in 1908 O’Donnell directly helped the Huntley Project settlers by
bankrolling its ﬁrst experiment station, so the farmers could learn proper irrigation
and cultivation techniques. In the summer of 1907 USRS engineers stationed at
Huntley understood that many of the settlers who claimed units needed help. They
contacted the Montana Agricultural Experiment Station and asked state ofﬁcials to
create a demonstration program for the project. When in 1908 the state refused to
step forward—budgets were tight already and the experiment station was actively
promoting dry land farming—USRS Supervising Engineer H. N. Savage asked
O’Donnell to help immediately before the growing season was over. “I know it
would proﬁt the settlers very much to have this demonstration farm operated by
you,” claimed Savage, “in order that they might have the beneﬁt of your experience
and example, and also opportunity to consult with you about the crops growing
under your management and their own within the project.” Savage could offer
O’Donnell little in return for his assistance. He promised to supply a “suitable”
barn, a couple of small residences, four horses, a wagon, plow, disk harrow,
tooth harrow, and plank smoother, and about 45 acres, of which the Reclamation
Service only wanted ﬁve acres planted in sugar beets and a “few” acres in alfalfa.
O’Donnell would be liable for everything else, including “all the running expenses
and furnish the labor and seed.”24
O’Donnell had too much tied to the future of the Huntley Project to say no;
he accepted the arrangement and the Huntley Project Demonstration Farm became a
reality. In 1910 O’Donnell=s control passed to a partnership of the USRS, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, and the Montana State Experiment Station. The property
was expanded to 300 acres and renamed the Huntley Project Experiment Station.
Over the next decades, especially during the administration of Dan Hansen, who was
superintendent between 1910 and 1949, the various programs at the demonstration
farm proved of great beneﬁt to the settlers. By 1910-1911 sugar beets had ﬁnally
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become a dominant crop, with approximately 4,000 acres planted, and even railroad
promotional brochures were passing on the O’Donnell doctrine of intensive
agriculture to prospective settlers. “After beets have been grown for three years,”
a Northern Paciﬁc Railway pamphlet recommended, “some other crop should be
planted, and a proper rotation of grain, alfalfa, and sugar beets will retain the fertility
of the soil and make maximum yields possible.”25
The early difﬁculties at Huntley opened O’Donnell=s eyes, and purse strings,
to the possibility of dry farming as a complementary method of cultivating the vast
bench lands of eastern Montana. In 1909 Billings was the host city to the Fourth
Dry Farming Congress and International Dry Farming Exposition. Preston W. Moss
was the local chair, and I. D. O’Donnell was the treasurer. Dry farming was all
the rage in Montana in the ﬁrst two decades of the twentieth century, and incessant
boosting of dry farming encouraged hundreds of thousands of settlers to come to
the state and try their luck. O’Donnell and Moss were never vocal dry farming
proponents, but they accepted that dry farming, in addition to the irrigated lands
of the Yellowstone Valley, could open up a potential 2.5 million acres “directly
tributary” to Billings. Moreover, supporting the congress would be good for local
business, and their various other local ventures. For example, the conference was
a perfect way to boost the Huntley Project (a tour was planned), the Billings Sugar
Company (a photograph was included in the conference book), and Moss’s Northern
Hotel, where the important national and international delegates and ofﬁcials
would stay. Since the Great Northern’s James J. Hill was going to give one of the
congress=s major addresses, Moss also would have an opportunity to discuss with
Hill his development plans for “Mossmain,” a planned community that never really
developed, located near the new railroad yards at Laurel in Yellowstone County.
Their involvement in the successful dry farming congress is an excellent example of
the civic capitalism of Moss and O’Donnell in these crucial decades of expansion in
Yellowstone County.26
The early years at Huntley showed O’Donnell both the potential and the
problems inherent in the initial USRS irrigation projects. He was not alone in
realizing that while the projects were impressive engineering feats, mere engineering
alone would not transform the arid West into an agricultural garden. In fact, as
more of the initial projects went into operation, criticism of the Reclamation Service
grew among the settlers and adjacent local leaders who had hoped to substantially
beneﬁt from the federal largesse. The criticism had grown to a storm of protest by
the time the administration of President Woodrow Wilson took ofﬁce in March 1913.
A series of conferences took place in Washington in 1913-1914, and Congress took
action to amend the payment schedule for settlers while the USRS itself looked to
internal reforms. In its Thirteenth Annual Report, the Reclamation service reminded
readers (and quite likely its own staff) that “home making” was its primary goal:
“increasing the number of farm homes and extending the area of productive lands
in the United States are the objects of the work of the Reclamation Service.” The
USRS then admitted “that in order that the greatest possible good may be realized
from the efforts of the Government and the irrigators, it is necessary that the
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irrigators appreciate the efforts of the United States to further their interests and that
ofﬁcials responsible for the administration of the irrigation projects fully understand
the needs of the irrigators.”27
In late 1913 Secretary
of Interior Franklin K. Lane
addressed the problem
aggressively by appointing
a Reclamation Commission,
a ﬁve-member panel headed
by USRS Director F. H.
Newell and including I. D.
O’Donnell in a new position,
titled Supervisor of Irrigation.
Bud O’Donnell now had an
opportunity to do on a national
stage what he had been doing
11.1. The Reclamation Commission, left to right,
in the Yellowstone Valley
W.A. Ryan, Comptroller; I.D. O’Donnell, Supervisor
for twenty years—promote
of Irrigation; A.P. Davis, Chief Engineer; Will R. King,
reciprocal partnerships
Chief Counsel; F.H. Newell, Director; Franklin K. Lane,
between farmers, agricultural Secretary of the Interior.
experts, and irrigation
specialists; teach farmers the value of scientiﬁc agriculture; and demonstrate how to
best use irrigation technology to cultivate individual crops.28
From all accounts, he entered his new career with missionary zeal.
Numerous meetings have been held with the farmers and the ofﬁcials
of the water users’ associations for the purpose of discussing on the
ground questions of interest to the water users, stress being laid upon the
improvement of farming methods,

reported the Reclamation Service. He became a regular contributor to the agency’s
ofﬁcial magazine, the Reclamation Record, where published versions of his favorite
lecture topics appeared. His family kept news stories about his appointment and
travels across the irrigation systems of the west in a large scrapbook. The local
Montana press carefully reported his various trips and his frequent proclamations.
In its 1914 anniversary edition, the Billings Gazette published O’Donnell’s overview
of his ﬁrst months in ofﬁce, ending with a message that he constantly repeated over
the next four years:
To view as a whole the magniﬁcent constructive work of the government
irrigation plan is to forget the small and relatively unimportant irksome
details involved in the administration of this work. With a knowledge of
the good that may be accomplished, I ﬁnd unending pleasure in helping
the farmers on all the projects with their difﬁculties. I ﬁnd that these
men and their families who have with conﬁdence in the integrity of the
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representatives of their government settled on these government irrigation
projects do not expect our Uncle Sam to demonstrate a paternal interest
in their affairsCall they expect is opportunity to make good under the
conditions in which they are placed.

O’Donnell saw his responsibility as providing them with that opportunity through
instruction, demonstration, and preaching the virtues of being a “practical business
farmer.” He relished this role as a national farm advisor. By organizing and
hosting a major national meeting on irrigation in Billings in March 1915, however,
O’Donnell showed that he had not forgotten his role as a Yellowstone civic
capitalist. The business generated by those who attended the meeting, and the
positive national exposure of a rapidly booming Billings, brought added, and direct,
beneﬁts to the various business ventures of his local partners. The following year,
1916, he extended his help to the immediate region by creating the Midland Empire
Fair, a huge celebration of the greater Yellowstone region, with particular emphasis
on the areas included in the USRS projects at Huntley and at Shoshone, south of the
Montana-Wyoming border, land that O’Donnell referred to as the Midland Empire
with Billings as its urban commercial and industrial center. In the eyes of O’Donnell
and his allies, the two Reclamation Service projects created the potential for an
agricultural bonanza rarely equaled in the northern plains.29
The Reclamation Service at ﬁrst provided O’Donnell with considerable
praise. The Thirteenth Annual Report, published in 1915, observed
It may be safely stated that the work of the Supervisor of Irrigation had
aided materially in bringing out a feeling of conﬁdence among the water
users in the administration of the Reclamation Service and a desire on the
part of the water users to cooperate to the fullest extent with the service in
the interest of the projects.

But support within the agency waned over the next three years; by the time the
Reclamation Service published O’Donnell’s Better Business, Better Farming, Better
Living: Hints from a Practical Farmer in the summer of 1918, O’Donnell resigned
as Supervisor of Irrigation.30
Agriculture groups outside of the agency acknowledged the signiﬁcance of
O’Donnell’s years in the Reclamation Service. In his 1919 article for The Country
Gentleman, Philip S. Rose praised O’Donnell as the best farmer in Montana, but
reserved his highest commendation for his USRS service: “the humanizing of the
Reclamation Service has been Mr. O’Donnell’s greatest public service.” While he
may have resigned from the Reclamation Service, he “had not resigned from doing
what he can for the general public welfare.”31
O’Donnell’s work in the next decade showed his continued commitment to
his early civic capitalist philosophy. While no longer a federal employee, O’Donnell
continued as a voice for irrigation and diversiﬁed farming for the remainder of
his career. He signed on as an agricultural specialist and spokesman for the Great
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Northern Railway, and the extended
Hill railroad interests, during the
1920s. He watched as an outsider
as the Reclamation Service was
reorganized and renamed the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation in 1923. He
continued to write articles supporting
reclamation and irrigation. In a 1925
article in the New Reclamation Era
titled “Irrigation Hints from a Practical
Irrigator,” he once again sounded
a favorite theme: “the better the
farming the less irrigation required . . .
Cultivation before and after irrigation
should be your motto.” O’Donnell
approved when in 1928 a local group
of farmers and settlers created the
Huntley Project Irrigation District,
ending the federal government’s
twenty years of administration. In
the decade, he also became one of the
Yellowstone’s ﬁrst serious collectors
of the valley’s early history. He
paid for a stone obelisk to be placed
at the ﬁrst cemetery in the Billings
area; he collected stories from other
early settlers and published them as
Montana Monographs in 1927. He
began to enjoy a semi-retirement,
taking a world tour with two of his
daughters in 1931. When the New
Deal came in the 1930s, some of his
early friends in western agriculture,
such as Elwood Mead and M. L.
Wilson, held important national
positions. O’Donnell, however,
accepted only local responsibilities,
with an appointment to the state’s ﬁrst
Water Conservation Board in 1934.32

11.2. Pursuing his belief in education of
Reclamation settlers, I. D. O’Donnell wrote this
article “Common Birds Around the Farm,” for
the June 1915 issue of Reclamation Record.

By the Depression decade, his friend Elwood Mead was commissioner of
the Reclamation Bureau and historians stressed that the future of the agency was to
return to its original focus on home making as the true purpose of the Reclamation
Bureau. But few now remembered O’Donnell’s contribution to reclamation as
a “home making” endeavor. O’Donnell himself, in interviews in his last years
and in his stab at writing his memoirs, emphasized his cowboy days and the early
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settlement of Montana, going so far as to pose on the cover of the Western Humane
News of December 1940 in full cowboy regalia, complete with chaps. After his
death in 1948, his family continued Hesper Farm and today his grandson, Harley
O’Donnell, still farms the land and maintains the homestead much as it was eighty
years ago. But by the end of the century, his contributions had been mostly forgotten
even in his home of Yellowstone County. Yet, when the Agriculture Committee of
the Billings Area Chamber of Commerce recently planned a one-day guided tour of
the now “historic” Huntley Project, “one of Montana=s most productive agricultural
areas,” its schedule included a stop at one of Huntley’s best farms, where “the
careful rotation of corn, malt barley and sugar beets helps these producers maximize
productivity, while combating disease and insect threats.” Bud O’Donnell’s legacy
as the “practical farmer and irrigator” of the early twentieth century is not in the
history books, but in the land itself.33
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“Did The Secretary Sell Us ‘Blue Sky?’”: Inclusion
of Warren Act Contractors in the North Platte River
Project
By
Alan S. Newell
Introduction
Construction of Pathﬁnder Dam on the North Platte River beginning in
1905 suggested the dawn of a new era of economic growth and prosperity for
farmers in Wyoming and Nebraska. Since the early days of settlement in the North
Platte River Valley in the 1880s, irrigators had contended with excess water during
the spring and early summer months and with water shortages during the months
of July through September. Pathﬁnder Dam and its one million acre foot reservoir
offered the hope of a more regulated and predictable water ﬂow, particularly in the
critical late summer months.
The North Platte Project (authorized in 1903 as the Sweetwater Project)
involved the construction of numerous dams and canals along a 111-mile stretch
of the North Platte River between Guernsey, Wyoming, and Bridgeport, Nebraska.
(See Figure 1) Reclamation Service engineers anticipated storing sufﬁcient water
behind Pathﬁnder to irrigate more than 300,000 acres of public land downstream
from the project. However, as conceived, the North Platte Project offered little
beneﬁt to existing downstream irrigators; those who held water rights to the natural
ﬂow of the North Platte River. Established farms, some with water rights dating
to the early 1880s, were not considered in the initial legislation. The beneﬁts of
Pathﬁnder and similar Reclamation Service projects were readily apparent to these
North Platte farmers, who looked to the project to supplement their precarious
supply of water. Congress responded to this interest by enacting the Warren Act in
1911 (34 Stat. 925). Legislators viewed the statute as a vehicle for incorporating
existing private district irrigators into the new government sponsored units, thereby
more efﬁciently utilizing the public project.
The Warren Act, similar to the Reclamation Act, received overwhelming
support in both houses of Congress. Yet few supporters of the bill gave much
thought to just how these existing irrigation districts would be integrated into the
federal project. This task was left to Reclamation Service ofﬁcials, who, during
the ﬁrst year following passage of the act, addressed three threshold administrative
issues—all three of which fundamentally altered operation of the North Platte
Project and eventually spawned protracted litigation. The ﬁrst issue focused on
the nature of “surplus water” as envisioned under the Warren Act. Was this to
be a temporary disposal of water, contingent upon a determination of the yearly
surplus prior to the sale? Or, would lands in private irrigation districts be able to
acquire permanent rights to surplus water and be integrated into public district
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12.1. North Platte Project map.

lands? Potential contractors overwhelmingly favored the later approach, and as
the spokesmen for a private irrigation company remarked in 1931, without this
guarantee of permanency, the United States would be selling farmers “blue sky.”
The second issue followed closely on the heels of the secretary of the
interior’s decision in November 1911 to provide permanent surplus water to
Warren Act contractors. At that time, the ﬁnal design of the North Platte Project
was not yet complete. But, it was clear to Reclamation engineers that providing
permanent water to Warren Act contractors would necessitate a reduction in the
size of future government units. The secretary made the decision to reconﬁgure
the project and to reduce the size of prospective government districts during the
ﬁrst few months after passage of the Warren Act.
The disposal of permanent water and the reconﬁguration of what became
the Fort Laramie Unit structurally incorporated the Warren Act irrigators into
the North Platte Project. The operational integration of them into the project,
however, required an additional threshold decision. Facing pressure from its
ﬁrst potential contractor, Tri-State Land Company (later Farmers’ Irrigation
District), early in 1912 to allow for future as well as existing lands to be served
by Pathﬁnder water, the Reclamation Service imposed a limit on the maximum
amount of water that would be delivered to Tri-State by the government. As a
practical matter, the imposition of this “cap” required the commingling of natural
ﬂow and storage water. The contract provision was readily agreed to by Tri-State
and future Warren Act contractors. But, it had little signiﬁcance until the drought
years of the 1930s.
Faced with periodic water shortages, beginning in 1931, the Bureau of
Reclamation allocated water to government and Warren Act districts on a prorated
basis. In doing so, the Bureau was consistent with the decisions made in 1911 and
1912, that Warren Act contractors were equal partners in the North Platte Project.
From the perspective of management, the Bureau of Reclamation believed that
such an allocation was the only way practically to administer the North Platte
system. Despite peripheral legal and other challenges to their interpretation of the
Warren Act, Bureau engineers consistently followed this allocation system.
The Origins of the Warren Act
Historians have long recognized the importance of the National
Reclamation Act of 1902. Some have argued that the act represented the
expectations of a technical elite, focused on directing the efﬁcient use of the
nation’s resources in a “progressive era.” Others have seen the act as a triumph
of established western interests seeking to utilize public money to encourage
economic prosperity in the nation’s arid region.1 Given the difﬁculty in separating
realistic economic goals from political decisions, it is no wonder that the
legislative and administrative history of the 1902 act soon assumed an identity
distinct from its legislative history.
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One of the progeny of the Reclamation Act of 1902 was the “Warren Act”,
passed by Congress on February 21, 1911. This rather short statute provided for
the distribution of surplus storage waters from reclamation projects to existing
private irrigation districts within federal project areas. It authorized the secretary
of the interior to contract for the storage and delivery of surplus waters conserved
by any reclamation project in excess of the requirements of the project. Three of
the nation’s leading proponents of federal irrigation projects, Francis E. Warren
of Wyoming, William Borah of Idaho, and Thomas Carter of Montana, were
the principal ﬁgures behind passage of the Warren Act. All three men saw the
advantage of incorporating private irrigation ventures into the federal projects
then being constructed by the Reclamation Service.
Wyoming’s Republican Senator
Francis Warren was particularly interested
in developing as much of the North
Platte River Basin as possible. Warren,
longtime Wyoming merchant, rancher, and
the state’s ﬁrst elected governor, lobbied
the federal government for construction
of Pathﬁnder Dam, but also advocated
funding other reclamation projects, such as
the Shoshone Irrigation Project in the Big
Horn River Basin of northern Wyoming.
As Warren explained to one supporter
from Wheatland, Wyoming, eventually all
of the arable land in Wyoming would be
occupied and developed either by dry12.2. Senator Francis E. Warren of
land or irrigated farms. The senior senator Wyoming. Courtesy of the U.S. Senate
visualized:
Historical Office.
The full development of the water
in Wyoming … to have it as an adjunct to reinforce the rainfall and the
conservation of rain and snow fall, so that, while certain crops may be
raised without irrigation, there will be water on hand for other crops that
demand partial irrigation, complete irrigation, or a little bit of help—say
once in the course of the summer;2

Such an optimistic view of the state’s agricultural potential led Warren to believe
that Pathﬁnder Dam had “ample capacity to irrigate all of the lands under it in the
North Platte Valley in Wyoming and Nebraska which can be reached by irrigation
works of reasonable expenses.”3
Warren was an early proponent of allowing existing private district lands
to beneﬁt from Pathﬁnder storage water. The Wyoming senator may have viewed
the incorporation of these irrigators, many of whom resided in Nebraska, as a
means to resolve downstream irrigators’ claims to early direct ﬂow water rights.
Indeed, Warren expressed both concern and uncertainty as to the extent of these
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potential rights.4 However, Warren’s interest in expanding the North Platte
Project was driven principally by his desire to see lands south of the river, in what
was termed the “Goshen Park” area, beneﬁt from the planned Fort Laramie Canal.
It appears likely that Warren believed that by broadening the scope of the North
Platte Project through such measures as incorporating private district lands into
the project, he could ensure the greatest development possible at Goshen Park.
Ironically, it would be the need to serve these “Warren Act” contractors that would
later require the Reclamation Service to scale back the extent of lands that would
be irrigated by water from the new canal.5
The salient feature of the various bills introduced by Warren beginning in
December 1909 was the authority given to the secretary of the interior to
(1) deliver surplus storage water to non-project entities and (2) to cooperate with
individuals, districts and associations in enlarging existing project facilities to
accommodate additional non-project lands. Opposing this effort were various
western interests who either feared federal control over the distribution of water
or who were concerned that the already ambitious plans of the Reclamation
Service would be expanded to include new federal projects that served only
private lands.
Both the title and the text of the original bill as introduced in
mid-December 1909 (S. 4002), and later under new numbers in late February and
March 1910 (S. 6723 and S. 6953 respectively), clearly stated the proponents’
objectives. The proposed legislation authorized the secretary of the interior
to contract for the delivery of “surplus water” from any reclamation project to
private projects that had been established under the Carey Act of 1894 “or under
the laws of any State or Territory.”6 The various bills as introduced also suggested
that the sponsors envisioned expanding current federal projects to serve existing
private district lands. This clause speciﬁcally authorized the secretary to enter
into agreements “with persons, irrigation districts, associations, or corporations”
to deliver water from enlarged federal facilities (dams, canals, etc.). As explained
in the bill, these structures could be expanded because the government had
secured a favorable site where a dam could be raised to store additional water, or
canals widened to convey water to additional acreage.7
The purpose of S. 6953 and its predecessors may have been a bit too clear
for members of the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation of Arid Lands, who
at the urging of the Interior Department amended the title of the bill to remove
the term “surplus” water and to be less speciﬁc about the nature of a project site
that might beneﬁt from the legislation. Secretary of the Interior Richard Ballinger
made clear his understanding of section 2 of the bill however, when he stated that:
In some cases the Government has secured available sites whereon
reservoirs may be erected of such dimensions as will irrigate a much
larger area of land than it is deemed advisable to include within a
government project. In the construction of a government reservoir the
reclamation fund should only be used to construct it of such dimensions
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as will impound a quantity of water sufﬁcient to supply the lands within
the government project. Hence, unless the Secretary of the Interior can
cooperate and contract with companies, associations, or districts to the
end that reservoirs may be erected of such dimensions as to irrigate
larger areas than the Government has included within its own project,
great quantities of arid lands capable of irrigation will necessarily remain
barren.8

Ballinger’s concept was to allow federally-funded reclamation projects to expand
by incorporating existing privately irrigated lands into the government project.
The implication in this idea that public money might be used to ﬁnance private
district irrigation or that, under state law, there could even be such a thing as
“surplus water” fueled much of the congressional debate over the Warren Act.
Senator Weldon Heyburn of Idaho addressed the issue of “surplus water”
in the spring of 1910. Heyburn was a resident of Wallace, Idaho, and represented
industrial water users, such as mines and smelters, rather than irrigators. His
Senate colleague, on the other hand, William Borah, lived in Boise in the Snake
River Basin and had long been interested in irrigation ventures. Borah strongly
supported Warren’s bill. But Heyburn viewed it as an assault on state control of
water, which he proudly claimed was sanctiﬁed by the Idaho constitution. Much
of the lengthy and, at times, raucous debate, on S. 6953 centered on Heyburn’s
assertion that Congress was allowing the federal government to usurp a state
right.9 Heyburn was particularly intrigued by the Committee on Irrigation’s
amendments to the original bill and charged that “They took out the word
‘surplus’ in order to disarm those who are opposed to the bill.”10 Heyburn may
have been correct about why the language of the bill was changed. However,
the bill’s supporters maintained that these changes clariﬁed the purpose of the
legislation, which remained consistent throughout the debates; i.e., to allow the
Reclamation Service to derive revenues from existing excess storage capacity and
to utilize fully prime reservoir sites that were under federal control.11
In the end, Senator Heyburn convinced few that his concern for federal
infringement on state water law was a real threat. Indeed, this issue had been
addressed earlier in passage of the Reclamation Act, and most congressmen
seemed satisﬁed that supplementing that legislation would not pose additional
problems. Given the senatorial sensitivity to this issue, however, Heyburn
extracted a concession in the form of a proviso to section 2:
That nothing contained in this Act shall be held or construed as enlarging
or attempting to enlarge the right of the United States, under existing law,
to control the waters of any stream in any State.
This did not mollify Heyburn who quipped, “The amendment is an apology, and
only adds to the confusion as to what the statute will mean.”12
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Of more concern to proponents of the Warren Act and more illuminating
as to the legislation’s provisions is the skepticism of Nebraska Senator Elmer
Burkett. Burkett distinguished between the purposes of sections 1 and 2 of the
bill. While voicing support for section 1, he had reservations about the wisdom of
section 2. Burkett was not concerned about Heyburn’s charge that, by passing the
bill, Congress was authorizing the secretary of the interior to sell surplus water.
At the same time, the Nebraska senator was not misled by phraseology.
The fact is we can call what we are selling the delivery and charging a
price for it, or we can say we are selling water and charging a price for it.
But the result is just the same. We are going to charge the people who get
the water, call it whatever we may.13

What one called the process of “selling … excess water,” as provided for in the
bill did not bother Burkett. However, section 2 of the proposed bill, according to
the senator, provided “for another and a distinct thing.”14
Burkett believed that section 2 would allow the United States to invest
in private irrigation projects, even if that investment involved no public domain
lands. He explained:
The ﬁrst section [of the bill] provides that they [Reclamation Service]
may use the water for private lands, but the second section provides that
we will go into partnership with private concerns, and we will build these
reservoirs, we will dig these canals, we will construct these ditches, for
what? For private lands.15

While supporting the sale of truly “surplus” water, Burkett had grave concerns
about the efﬁcacy of promoting broader ventures between public and private
entities. Burkett noted during the debate that the Reclamation Service was
already strained by the cost of projects that it was presently involved in, and he
saw little value in further expansion.16
Most senators did not share Burkett’s concern for over-extending the
reclamation fund. They understood section 2 to simply allow the secretary of the
interior to enter into agreements to extend existing or planned federal projects.
Indeed, given the requirement of the Reclamation Act that federal projects be
designed to reclaim public domain land, they could not envision the scenario
contemplated by Burkett.17 Wyoming Representative Frank Mondell clearly
articulated what he saw as the two prong beneﬁts of S. 6953. In making his
comments, Mondell was thinking speciﬁcally of the North Platte River Project.
The ﬁrst section of the bill relates primarily to those works which have
been constructed. As I have said, it is an income to the service which
otherwise the service could not acquire, and without this law, in the case
of the North Platte Dam, the additional impounded water not needed for
the irrigation of the lands under the project would simply be turned into

339

the stream and the service would receive no beneﬁt from it. This is the
ﬁrst section.
Now, the second section contemplates two essentially different
operations: First, that the settlers on a unit of a reclamation project who
are anxious to have immediate construction and do not care to wait for
the time when the service in the expenditure of its funds can build their
canals may make contracts with the Reclamation Service under which
they build their own works on the unit, and the contract with the service
in ﬁxing their water-right charges gives them credit for the work they
have done at their own expense, and which otherwise would have to be
done by the Government.18

Mondell considered this provision of section 2 to be the most important feature of
the bill and he understood that it gave the secretary of the interior broad authority
to maximize irrigable acreage.
Congress clearly expected private irrigation companies and the federal
reclamation project to beneﬁt from this new legislation. However, in only
one instance during the entire debate on the Warren Act did Congress actually
consider how the integration of a private system into a federal reclamation project
might actually work. In the ﬁnal House debate on S. 6953 on February 17, 1911,
Illinois Representative James Mann queried Kansas Representative William
Reeder, “Suppose there is a shortage of water in the end—who loses the water, the
private parties, or the parties on the Government project?” This question would
plague Bureau of Reclamation engineers for the next 50 years, and it immediately
perplexed Reeder, who could only respond by hypothesizing that the ﬁrst unit of
the government project would be served ﬁrst. However, if private existing lands
were added to the project before completion of the federal portion, those earlier in
time would be served before the public entity.19
Wyoming Congressman Frank Mondell again stepped in to clarify
Reeder’s response by explaining that the contracts entered into pursuant to the
bill “can not affect the water right of any entryman under a reclamation project,
for this reason, that when the reclamation project is inaugurated or initiated the
water rights for the entire project and all units of it are ﬁled, and the right dates
from the time when the water-right application is made, provided due diligence is
used in building works.”20 According to Mondell, all users of project water would
have the same priority under state law and would be served equally by the United
States.
Mondell’s reference to the “relation back doctrine,” as with Reeder’s
adherence to priority, underscored Congress’ concern for ensuring that the Warren
Act did not undermine state water law. However, the job of delivering water to
the various government and “Warren Act contractors” was left to the discretion of
the secretary of the interior. This task would require the Bureau of Reclamation
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to develop ﬂexible procedures to ensure that all parties were dealt with equitably,
particularly during periodic dry weather cycles on the Great Plains.
Creating and Administering Warren Act Contracts on the North Platte
Project
Passage of the Warren Act in 1911 provided a statutory mechanism to
incorporate lands within private irrigation districts into the publicly ﬁnanced
North Platte Project. Numerous questions remained, however, as to the number of
potential irrigators who might elect to contract for surplus water. Moreover, since
the only water that could be disposed of was “surplus water,” the Reclamation
Service had to determine the available supply from Pathﬁnder Reservoir, as well
as the ultimate demand from future government project units that would be part of
the North Platte Project. What indeed was “surplus water”? The answer that the
Service found to this and other questions led to interpretations of the Warren Act
that guided federal reclamation policy for much of the twentieth century.
The clamor to incorporate existing private irrigation district facilities into
the North Platte River Project began even before passage of the Warren Act. A
number of private irrigation companies and districts petitioned Secretary of the
Interior Richard Ballinger during the winter of 1910-1911 to purchase water from
Pathﬁnder Reservoir.21 The secretary responded by explaining that legislation
was pending to allow such a sale, but, at present, he was without authority to do
so. Ballinger argued that, even with legislative authorization, he would need to
be assured that there was sufﬁcient water available in the reservoir to serve new
irrigators on the government project before providing water to existing private
lands. Unfortunately, Secretary Ballinger explained that the Board of Army
Engineers had already prepared a report in 1910 indicating that there would be
no surplus water available after meeting the needs of the North Platte Project
as then contemplated.22 Notwithstanding the secretary’s ﬁnding, requests to
purchase water from Pathﬁnder increased after passage of the Warren Act in late
February 1911.23 The Interior Department continued to base its response on the
1910 Board of Army Engineers report that had concluded that a surplus of storage
water was unlikely, given current plans for the North Platte Project. Accordingly
it would not agree to requests to sell storage water.24
The departure of Ballinger in March 1911 signaled a change in department
policy. Beginning in June 1911 the secretary’s ofﬁce started forwarding
applications for surplus storage water to the Reclamation Service.25 That summer,
Reclamation engineers began working on adjustments to the North Platte Project
in order to free water for private use. The Board of Engineers determined in its
July 24, 1911, report that Pathﬁnder Reservoir could provide 600,000 acre feet of
water. Approximately 200,000 acre feet was committed to the Interstate Canal,
40,000 acre feet to a pending contract with North Platte Irrigation Company and
240,000 was to be reserved for the planned Fort Laramie Canal. The balance of
surplus water was thus estimated to be 120,000 acre feet annually. The board
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recommended that the best use of this surplus was its “disposal” to existing canals
on some equitable basis.26
The federal government’s
initial policy was to “rent” water
to private district irrigators on
a temporary, one-year basis
until engineers could make a
determination of what surplus
water was available. As
Reclamation Service Director
Frederick Newell explained to
Nebraska Senator Norris Brown
in July 1911, “The system for
utilization of the surplus stored
water in the Pathﬁnder Reservoir 12.3. Pathfinder Dam on the North Platte Project.
will not be completed for several
years and the Department feels
that pending such completion it should not provide for any permanent rights for
these canals.”27 Although most irrigators desired a more secure supplemental
water supply, the Interior Department was soon inundated with petitions for
temporary contracts.28
Newly appointed Secretary of the
Interior Walter L. Fisher and Reclamation
Service Director Newell were well aware of
the importance of the North Platte Project
when they met with irrigators at Mitchell,
Nebraska, on August 4, 1911. At that meeting,
the secretary heard testimony concerning the
development of the North Platte River Valley.
He learned that the sugar beet processing
industry had focused its interest on intensifying
agriculture in the region through access to
government and private irrigation projects.
Secretary Fisher also was informed of the need
for late season water. F. M. Sands of the Gering
district explained that:

12.4. Walter L. Fisher while Secretary of the Interior.

I believe we are all agreed as to the great beneﬁt coming to this country
when the Government came in and constructed the Pathﬁnder reservoir.
But in the administration of the reservoir, there is a chance that the
waters withdrawn from use by the early ditches during the ﬂood season
will not revert to them later in the season…. In other words, without
any intention in the matter, there is a possibility that the Government
will take waters from us in June and not give it to us in August. A gallon
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of water in August is worth two or three gallons in June. It is right and
proper that the excessive June ﬂow should be reduced—but I think we
have a right to ask that the Government sell us at a fair price water that
they have withheld from us in June.29

The secretary also heard from those who wanted the Reclamation Service
to begin construction on a long-sought southside canal. The Fort Laramie or
Goshen Hole Canal was considered by many to be part of the initial plan for
the North Platte Project. Secretary Fisher noted a distinction between those
mostly private district lands on the southside of the river from the largely public
district lands on the northside. He questioned whether the participants in the
Fort Laramie Canal would allow the federal government to place liens on their
property to secure payment for the cost of construction and operation of the canal.
The project’s supporters assured the secretary that they would agree to such a
condition.30
The interests of the Fort Laramie Project participants were potentially in
conﬂict with the private district irrigators who sought permanent rights to surplus
water from Pathﬁnder Reservoir. As noted above, consistent estimates placed
the supply from Pathﬁnder at 600,000 acre feet annually. If those estimates were
correct, there was potentially 160,000 acre feet available annually for private
projects.31 Estimates did not always prove correct, however, and Secretary Fisher
wanted assurances from the private district irrigators that their right to surplus
storage water under the Warren Act was second to that of the government project.
One of the questions raised is what would be the situation of the present
settlers or those coming in under the Government canal as compared with
those holding land under the old ditches, if in the future there should be
an actual shortage of water in the Pathﬁnder reservoir, and there would
not be sufﬁcient for all. Under those circumstances, you recognize
you would probably have to concede the prior right of those under the
Government canal. That seems to be the purpose of the law.32

The North Platte River Valley irrigators agreed with the secretary, but
they also believed that the federal government would not sell them a water supply
that was not dependable. Private district irrigators sought permanent rights to
Pathﬁnder storage water and expressed a willingness to pay a ﬁxed sum for the
cost of construction and operation of the reservoir. They did so, as Fred Wright of
Farmers’ Irrigation District explained, “In view of the permanency that would be
given us by the lump sum payment …”33
Secretary Fisher also had to insure the permanency of the government
project, speciﬁcally, the Interstate Canal. He did so by 1) conﬁrming a secure
supply of water for the “Government [Interstate] canal” and 2) by suggesting
that future conﬁguration of the federal project be determined by the need to serve
Warren Act contractors as well as government district irrigators. An exchange
between Fred Wright, one of the ﬁrst Warren Act contractors, and Secretary Fisher
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is illuminating. In responding to the secretary’s concerns about a government
district needs in water short years, Wright offered the following:
MR. WRIGHT: In regard to that I take it that the Government knows
better than any one else as to what the probabilities are and as to whether
they were selling us anything of value or not. If the reservoir supply
of water is taken up—that is a matter that the Government would be
able to determine and regulate. I would assume that the position of the
Department would be not to do anything intentionally that would bring
hardship upon any one.
THE SECRETARY: That is one of the serious questions on the south side
[Fort Laramie Canal]. It would be a very serious thing if the Government
should establish a project and invite settlers to take up the lands and build
their homes, and there was a liability of being a shortage of water.
I must say frankly that I concur in the general proposition stated—that
the existing settler on the ground, even though he may not have come in
under a Government canal, but coming under a private enterprise, if they
are willing to do what is fair and reasonable, is entitled to a priority of
right over an unknown settler who has not got here. …

Secretary Fisher’s view was that Warren Act contractors would be sold a
permanent water supply from Pathﬁnder, recognizing the preference to the
existing government districts. He did not anticipate, however, the irrigation of
any new government district lands so as to threaten the supply to Warren Act
contractors. The secretary’s views were welcomed by those potential contractors.
According to the reporter, the secretary’s statement was met with “unanimous and
hearty applause.”34
With this statement, Secretary Fisher initiated a policy that would govern
the Bureau of Reclamation’s future operation of the North Platte Project with
respect to water delivery during years of shortage. Henceforth, Warren Act
contractors would be considered part of the North Platte Project and would
receive a guarantee of water delivery alongside the government district lands.
The key to understanding of the government’s position is the recognition that
Secretary Fisher, adhering strictly to the terms of the Warren Act, protected
the Interstate Canal, while providing for Warren Act contractors through a
reconﬁguration of the future North Platte River Project. The importance of this
compromise was apparent soon after the August 4 meeting.
Early in October 1911 R. F. Walter, Reclamation Service supervising
engineer in Denver, wrote to Chief Engineer A. P. Davis in Washington, D.C.,
acknowledging the latter’s request for a recommendation on departmental policy
with respect to the sale of surplus Pathﬁnder storage water. Walter claimed that it
was premature to ﬁx the amount of surplus water that would be available from the
project. He acknowledged that there were senior water rights to the project held
by downstream irrigators in Nebraska, and, until they were determined, he (Walter)
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would be unable to render an opinion. Walter recognized that “People under these
Nebraska ditches as well as the people under the proposed Fort Laramie unit are
clamoring for water and are very anxious to make a contract at this time.” The
Denver engineer thought that the Reclamation Service could use this anxiety “as
a lever” to secure a ﬁnal determination of senior water rights. To that end, Walter
reported that his ofﬁce had begun an investigation of Nebraska water rights, albeit
without the cooperation of the State of Nebraska.35
A few days later, North Platte Project Engineer Andrew Weiss echoed
Walter’s concerns, but acknowledged that “It is probable that extremely strong
pressure will be brought to bear on the Government to sell excess water rights from
the Pathﬁnder, and it seems doubtful to me that if in the end this pressure can be
successfully resisted.” Weiss also noted that if the Reclamation Service did not
prevail and continue to issue temporary, rather than permanent rights, then “it is
exceedingly doubtful if the Fort Laramie unit can be undertaken at all.”36
Neither Weiss nor Walter had to wait long for a response. Chief Engineer
Davis reacted angrily to Walter’s plea to allow more time to assess the volume of
surplus water available in Pathﬁnder Reservoir. Davis charged that Walter was
forgetting “that the Departmental policy in this matter was carefully considered
and decided by Secretary Fisher last June.” The secretary had determined that
“preference should be given to lands already irrigated which require additional
water supply, and that the irrigation of new lands should be secondary to their
requirements.”37 Davis placed the future Fort Laramie canal in the same category
as other new government or private district projects. He stated emphatically that
“you … appear to assume that we must build the Fort Laramie project to its full size
and then perhaps have a little water to sell to old ditches. This is the reverse of the
present policy.” Rather, surplus water should be offered as soon as possible so that
the Reclamation Service could determine the size of the Fort Laramie unit.38
Walter’s caution was not only unwarranted, but also politically ill timed.
Davis informed Walter that the secretary had approved a letter drafted for Nebraska
Representative Moses P. Kinkaid to be used at a public meeting in Bridgeport,
Nebraska. That speech adhered to the policy of using surplus water for “old
irrigated lands.” By this, Davis meant that only existing privately irrigated lands
would have a preference. Projected irrigable lands within the potential Warren Act
contracts would not be considered comparably. Davis added that Walter would
have to show a very good reason to reverse departmental policy on this issue.39
Both Walter and Weiss quickly responded to the chief engineer in a joint
letter dated November 1, 1911. They claimed that they were in complete accord
with departmental policy and had only raised this issue because they assumed
“that the Fort Laramie Canal like the Third Lateral District under the Interstate
Canal is part of the North Platte project.” The engineers expressed concern
about a possible conﬂict with the Warren Act. However, absent such conﬂict,
they concurred in the plan to offer surplus water as soon as possible and “before
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the construction of the Fort Laramie extension is authorized.”40 With all project
personnel in line, Secretary Fisher announced his policy on November 6, 1911,
and, soon thereafter, the North Platte Project declared its intention to enter into
contracts for the supply of permanent surplus water.41
The United States entered into its ﬁrst Warren Act contract with existing
water users on the North Platte River before the ﬁrst major canal (the Interstate
Canal) was completed on the north side of the river in 1915. That contract,
executed in 1912, was with Tri-State Land Company, predecessor to Farmers’
Irrigation District. By the end of 1912, “practically all the representatives of the
older canal systems west of Bridgeport [had] expressed a desire to supplement
their water rights to the direct ﬂow from the river by Pathﬁnder storage.”42 In
1913 the United States signed ﬁve more Warren Act contracts with irrigation
districts and companies that were using natural ﬂow water from the North Platte
River.43 In 1914, 1915, and 1917 three more Warren Act contracts for North
Platte Project water were signed with existing irrigators, bringing the total to nine
contracts (see Figure 1).44
All nine of the contracts contain the proviso from section 1 of the Warren
Act that the government projects shall be “prior to” the Warren Act contractors
in the right to the use of storage water.45 Of course, as noted above, the
availability of surplus water through the reconﬁguration of the project had already
been decided through secretarial policy. Thus, all of the contracts conﬁrmed
that surplus storage water was available from Pathﬁnder Reservoir with the
expectation that existing government district irrigators and Warren Act contractors
could be satisﬁed with the available supply. The contracts provided for the
government to deliver a supply of water to the Warren Act contractors in exchange
for a ﬁxed purchase price from the contractor plus the contractor’s commitment
to pay a set percentage of operation and maintenance costs connected with the
storage facility providing the water. A delivery schedule with amounts and dates
was included in each contract, together with the cumulative amount of water that
each contracting district was to receive each year.46
Soon after execution of the ﬁrst contract, private irrigation companies
began raising issues that strained Secretary Fisher’s accommodating policy.
Fisher had initially approved the sale of surplus water under the Warren Act with
the proviso that only currently irrigated lands would receive water.47 Tri-State
approached the Interior Department in 1912 with a proposal to include “lands
which, although never irrigated, are under existing ditches or ditches existing at
some particular time.”48 Responding to this request, the Reclamation Service
established a new policy of setting a “maximum limit” on “the total water rights
of the purchasing company after purchase shall have been completed.”49 This
new policy allowed Tri-State and other potential Warren Act contractors greater
ﬂexibility in deﬁning the lands that would receive surplus water, while providing
a measure of certainty to the Service of the total demand for water.
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The issue for Tri-State
and other private companies was
how much control the federal
government would have over the
total water supply (natural ﬂow and
storage) to their lands. Although
the Interior Department consistently
deferred to valid early rights
to natural ﬂow from the North
Platte River, Reclamation Service
engineers also recognized that, with
construction of Pathﬁnder Dam, the
North Platte no longer operated in a
natural state. Reclamation’s answer
to the problem was to incorporate
the “maximum” natural ﬂow and
storage water into the Warren
Act contracts. This solution was
12.5. Morris Bien of the U.S. Reclamation
apparent in the Tri-State contract.
Service.
In reviewing a draft of that contract
in July 1912 Reclamation Engineer Morris Bien informed the director that he had
objected to Article 11 as initially drafted. That article stated that:
In order to enable the United States to deliver the supply of water herein
speciﬁed on the basis of payments as herein provided it is agreed that the
United States shall hold in trust for the beneﬁt of the lands of the District
all claims of the Company to the waters of the North Platte River and
that the said Company shall assist the United States in the defense of
said claims by the furnishing of all evidence and other like matters in its
power or knowledge.50

Bien objected to this clause “because it places upon the United States the
responsibility of acting as trustee in regard to these waters for the beneﬁt of the
lands of the District.”51 The Interior Department in Washington suggested a
change in the language of Article 11 to provide for the company assigning its
“rights, title and interest to the waters of the North Platte River” to the United
States.52 But this proposed change did not satisfy Bien. Rather, he suggested the
following contract revision.
The delivery of the water supply provided for in this contract will be
accepted by the Company as in full satisfaction of all its rights to water
of the Platte River, both natural ﬂow and surplus storage from the
Pathﬁnder reservoir and other reservoirs of the Reclamation Service
constructed in connection with the North Platte Project.53

Although Bien’s suggested language was used in the ﬁrst Warren Act contract
with Tri-State (August 20, 1912), subsequent contracts employed the substitute
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language originally proposed by the Interior lawyers in Washington.54 The
Reclamation Service’s practical approach to providing storage and natural ﬂow
water apparently satisﬁed North Platte irrigators in 1912. However, the legal
validity of assigning natural ﬂow rights to the United States would be contested
by those irrigators during the years of low water supply beginning in the 1930s.
Completion Of the North Platte River Project
Prior to passage of the Warren Act, the Reclamation Service had
calculated the annual storage supply from Pathﬁnder Reservoir at a minimum of
600,000 acre feet.55 In its July 1911 estimate of water supply requirements for
anticipated projects, the Board of Army Engineers concluded that lands irrigated
by the Interstate Canal system would require 200,000 acre feet and the proposed
Fort Laramie Unit would use 240,000 acre feet.56 Reclamation engineers also
considered that, in the future, more surplus water might be available because of
1) more economical methods of water use; or 2) the Goshen Park unit of the
project might not be constructed. One month later, Reclamation Service Director
Newell stated that “no man is safe in prophesizing what will happen,” but he
reiterated that the Service would be “reasonably safe in disposing of 600,000 acre
feet [from Pathﬁnder] as a minimum.” Of this amount, he said, “250,000 [acre
feet] goes to the Project, and under the terms of the law, this Project has a prior
right.”57
North Platte Project Engineer Andrew Weiss concluded in 1912 that
250,000 acre feet of Pathﬁnder water would eventually be sold to Warren Act
contractors, including an anticipated 120,000 acre feet of storage water to the TriState Canal.58 Estimates for the Interstate Unit remained at 200,000 acre feet of
Pathﬁnder’s storage water. The total of committed water was thus established at
450,000 acre feet. Engineer Weiss acknowledged that this amount could change
if additional lands were to be irrigated, either by enlarging the North Platte Project
or the private irrigation districts. However, based on current reports, Weiss
expressed concern that all of Pathﬁnder’s minimum ﬂow of 600,000 annually
would be utilized.59
The Board of Engineers reviewed the North Platte Project again in May
1912 and concluded that the Fort Laramie Canal would cover 125,000 acres.60
The board added that selling storage rights to existing irrigators who had applied
for storage water would not jeopardize the Pathﬁnder’s water supply for the new
unit under the anticipated scenario.61 This optimistic view of the project’s water
supply changed quickly following the close of the January 1, 1913, deadline for
Warren Act applications. By 1913 construction of two of the three canals making
up the Interstate Canal system were completed. The Highline Canal diverted
water from Lake Alice, which had a storage capacity of 11,015 acre feet, and
the Reservoir Supply Canal carried water from Lake Alice to Lake Minitare (see
Figure 1).62 Also, by the end of 1913, six private irrigation districts had entered
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into Warren Act contracts for surplus storage water from Pathﬁnder.63 The total
amount of storage water sold to the Warren Act users was 143,465 acre feet.64
With these additions to the project, computations of available water and
irrigation needs in 1914 showed that there was an inadequate supply of water
for the proposed Fort Laramie Unit, which by then had been reduced from the
1912 estimate of 125,000 acres to 107,000 irrigable acres. According to the
new calculations, the planned unit could now only accommodate 84,000 acres.
Accordingly, consultants to the Reclamation Service recommended suspending
further Warren Act contracts, except those in progress, until more water supply
studies could be completed.65 The consulting board also suggested that the Fort
Laramie Unit be reduced to a smaller size and that the planned Goshen Park Unit
be eliminated.66
Further analysis of the 1914 study, as well as additional studies, were
completed in 1915 by three of the four members of the 1914 consulting board.
This new board considered the storage water demand by Warren Act and project
users to determine the total amount of required storage water. The board also
reassessed the amount of storage water available. It’s analysis involved use
of a “more correct method of applying actual demand,” assumption of a larger
diversion into the Interstate Canal at the beginning of the irrigation season, and a
slightly smaller amount of storage water per acre for any new project land to be
irrigated.67
In their 1915 recalculation, engineers determined that there was an
adequate water supply to irrigate 116,000 acres of new project land.68 They
recommended that the 116,000 acres of land be divided between a unit to be
irrigated by the proposed Fort Laramie Canal and a new project district that would
be irrigated by an anticipated extension of the Interstate Canal, via the Warren
Act Tri-State Canal (Northport). Despite their higher estimate of available water
supply, they afﬁrmed the earlier recommendations that there be a moratorium on
new Warren Act contracts and that the proposed Goshen Park High Line project
be cancelled.69
Construction of the Fort Laramie Canal system started in 1915, after
liens were placed on 90 percent of the deeded land to guarantee repayment of
construction costs. The Reclamation Service estimated that the canal would
irrigate 100,000 acres when ﬁnished.70 Upon its completion in 1924, the canal
actually was capable of delivering water to 107,000 acres.71 By that time, the
secretary had entered into agreements with the Gering and Fort Laramie District
of the North Platte Project covering all of the Fort Laramie division in Nebraska
and the Goshen Irrigation district covering all of the Fort Laramie division in
Wyoming.72 Also by the time of completion of the Fort Laramie Unit other
project units were operating. In accordance with the 1915 Board of Engineers
report, the secretary of the interior signed a contract with the Northport Irrigation
District in 1919, agreeing to construct a canal that would provide water to
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15,000 acres of land in the new project unit. Construction on the Northport Canal
started that year and was completed in 1923 (see Figure 1).73
The constant
recalculations and revisions
to the North Platte Project
ultimately allowed the Bureau
of Reclamation to meet most
irrigator demands, at least
partially. By 1924, the Bureau
had completed construction of
the principal components of
the project, which included the
12.6. The Frank Vanchura homestead on the Fort
Laramie Division of the North Platte Project.
four government units and the
nine Warren Act contractors.
To accommodate these interests, the Bureau had to redesign portions of the
government units as originally conceived in the early 1900s.
The Bureau of Reclamation’s Delivery of Water During Water-Short
Years
The Bureau of Reclamation, delivered storage water to Warren Act
contractors by following the delivery schedules in the speciﬁc contracts for
the eighteen years following the ﬁrst Warren Act contract—1912. Warren Act
irrigators used their appropriated natural ﬂow waters from the North Platte
until that water ran out. Then they requested the delivery of their storage water
according to the schedule in their respective contracts. Sometimes, when demand
was particularly heavy, the Bureau implemented a rotation system. In 1912, for
example, the rotation period was four days.74
Even though there was no shortage of project water during the 1920s,
the Bureau faced questions as to whether or not government districts should
have a “better right” than other users to project water, based on the Warren Act’s
acknowledgment of government contractors’ “ﬁrst right” to the use of storage
water. In addressing this question in 1924, the Bureau suggested that water sold
under the terms of the Warren Act were “permanent water rights.” It noted, “It is
argued by some that the water users under the projects proper [government units]
should have a better right than the water users outside of the projects [the Warren
Act users].” The Bureau acknowledged that Warren Act contracts “are now rather
generally being made under section 2 of the [Warren] Act, and provide for rights
having the same priority as those on the project from which the water is sold.”
In cases of existing Warren Act contracts, the Bureau dismissed the position that
the government projects should have any better right than the Warren Act users.
“There does not … seem to be any good reason to uphold this position,” the
Bureau concluded. “The Warren Act contractors outside of the projects pay in full
for what they get in the same manner as do the water users under the projects.”75
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The drought that visited the high plains beginning in the early 1930s added
poignancy to this academic discussion.
In 1931 lack of snow in the mountains and an absence of rain the previous
summer, resulted in signiﬁcant shortages of water in the North Platte River.
Storage water from Pathﬁnder Reservoir was predicted to be exhausted before the
end of August 1931, if withdrawals were to continue as in the past.76 Anticipating
drought, early in 1931, Farmers’ Irrigation District ﬁled a request with the Bureau
of Reclamation to change its summer delivery schedule. Farmers sought to defer
receiving early water in April and May and, instead, receive a greater allocation
than its contract allowed between June and September.77
The Bureau’s response to the predicted drouth was to initiate its allocation
system. Bureau ofﬁcials explained this plan at a June 17, 1931, meeting with
irrigators in Mitchell, Nebraska. At that meeting, W. J. Burke, the Bureau’s
district counsel, advised the four North Platte Project irrigation districts that “the
Warren Act contractors had purchased a water right and were entitled to their
share of water.” During the same meeting, the Bureau’s Superintendent of Power
C. F. Gleason advised the North Platte districts that he expected to “pro rate the
water on an acreage basis, [and that] the acreage to be used would be the same as
the acreage used in computing the O. & M. payments for the reserved works.”78
Within days of stating this position, Bureau engineers began reﬁning an
allocation system to address the water shortage. They apportioned a prorated total
supply to the various users, allowing the districts to determine when and at what
rate to divert the apportioned amount. Under this system, the Bureau allotted
approximately one-eighth of the total water supply to Warren Act contractors,
after “carefully” studying the matter of how to apportion the available water
among them and the government project districts. The Warren Act apportionment
was “prorated upon their [the districts’] several contract schedules according to
the percentage of a full reservoir supply” at Pathﬁnder on May 12, 1931.” As a
result of the proration, each Warren Act contractor received 62.5% of the water
in its contract schedule. The Bureau notiﬁed the project users of the allocation
system in late June.79
Later in the summer of 1931, Acting Chief Engineer S. O. Harper restated
his intention to supply Warren Act irrigators in water short years. Harper
responded to project users’ arguments that Warren Act contractors should not
receive any storage water until the project users received their full amounts. He
stated that the uncertainties inherent in the contracts “leaves the way open for the
adoption of a policy that would not result in direct conﬂict with the provisions
of the contract and yet result in the most equitable use and distribution of the
available water in a year like the present.”80
While Bureau ofﬁcials were implementing their allocation system, the
Farmers’ Irrigation District’s earlier request to change its delivery date remained
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pending. In late December 1931 the Bureau’s chief engineer addressed a letter
to all North Platte Project water users (government projects and Warren Act
contractors) seeking their views on the Farmers’ request. Most of the districts
responded by opposing Farmers’ request and raising various interpretations of
Warren Act contracts. Two government units—the Pathﬁnder and the Goshen
districts—contended that language in the Warren Act “preserving a ﬁrst right
to lands and entrymen under the project” gave the government districts a prior
right to project storage water over Warren Act contractors.81 Gering Irrigation
District, a Warren Act contractor, contested that position, arguing that such an
interpretation amounted to saying that the Warren Act “authorized the secretary
to sell blue sky.”82 The Bureau supported Gering’s view and rejected the
government projects’ interpretation. Seeking an equitable distribution to all
irrigators, Chief Engineer R. F. Walter eventually rejected Farmers’ request for a
contract modiﬁcation.83
The Bureau continued to allot a partial schedule of storage water to
Warren Act and government project users throughout the dry years of the 1930s.84
Yet, government districts persisted with their position that they had rights to
storage waters that were superior to Warren Act users’ rights. Pathﬁnder Irrigation
District objected to the Bureau’s allocation system in 1934, continuing to insist
that stored water could not be delivered under those Warren Act contracts unless
there was “more than sufﬁcient to supply the project lands.”85 Commissioner
Elwood Mead concluded that the matter probably could be settled “only by a
court decision in a case where all parties affected will have had an opportunity
to be heard.”86 Nebraska ofﬁcials weighed in on the side of the Warren Act
contractors arguing that:
No responsible person would enter into a contract if he knew that the
rights obtained by him through such contract could be taken away
from him at any future time. Neither would the Nebraska Warren
Act contractors have contracted to pay one million dollars for storage
capacity in the Pathﬁnder Reservoir if that storage capacity could be
taken away from them for the use of any government canal that might be
constructed in the future.87

In 1940 Bureau ofﬁcials again debated how to treat Warren Act contractors
in water shortage years, tying the debate to the issue of whether the Warren
Act districts had rights to storage water that were junior to North Platte Project
districts. They anticipated a water supply of about 45 percent for the 1940
irrigation season. District Counsel W. J. Burke initially signaled a reversal of
the government’s position when he suggested that Warren Act users had rights to
storage waters that were junior to the government districts. On instruction from
the commissioner, Burke, joined by other Bureau ofﬁcials, drafted a new position
paper more in line with Bureau policy. That paper conﬁrmed the Bureau’s earlier
view, as reﬂected in a commissioner’s decision in 1932, that Congress did not
intend project lands to have a priority over Warren Act lands.88 Burke and his
co-authors proposed that Warren Act schedules for storage water be reduced
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to a percentage of the total contract amounts, as an administrative method of
addressing water shortages. Warren Act contractors would receive their natural
ﬂow water as they saw ﬁt, with storage water being used to supplement that
natural ﬂow up to the established percentage of the total amount as reﬂected in
the individual contracts. The Bureau would apply the pre-determined percentage
equally to Warren Act and government project contractors. This proposal was
accepted on a temporary basis by the secretary of the interior.89
In accordance with this policy, storage water for the 1940 irrigation season
was again allotted to Warren Act contractors on a prorated basis. Rather than
basing the amount on the relative interest that contract holders had in Pathﬁnder
Reservoir, however, the basis of the proration was now a percentage of the total
contract schedule, which had been determined to be 41 percent of the amount in
the contracts with the government.90 Farmers’ Irrigation District protested the
method of allocation for 1940 claiming that it improperly deprived the district of
storage water from Pathﬁnder.91 In 1941 water again was allotted to Warren Act
contractors based on a percentage of the total contract amount, which in 1941
was 68 percent of the schedule. There were no water shortages during the years
1942-1944 and Warren Act contractors had their full contract amounts available to
them.
The protests of Farmers’ Irrigation District and others to the Bureau
of Reclamation’s water allocation system did not end with verbal or written
exchanges. Beginning in the mid-1930s, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Warren
Act contractors, and the States of Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado were
involved in legal action seeking answers to questions that were fundamental to the
operation of the North Platte Project. Although neither of the two principal cases
(United States v. Tilley, et al. and Nebraska v. Wyoming) speciﬁcally addressed
the nature of Warren Act contracts, the courts’ conclusions forced the Bureau to
incorporate new factors in its water delivery method.
The issue of whether Warren Act contractors had transferred or assigned
their natural ﬂow rights to the United States in exchange for their Warren Act
contract rights was before the court in the case of United States v. Tilley, et al.
Establishment of the Northport Unit in 1915 required an agreement with Warren
Act contractor Farmers’ Irrigation District’s predecessor, Tri-State Land Company
to carry 250 cfs through its canal to the government project. The Bureau
negotiated this agreement and Farmers’ complied with it until the drouth year
of 1936, when Farmers’ failed to deliver sufﬁcient ﬂow downstream to Northport.
The Bureau took the position that the Warren Act contractors had assigned their
appropriative rights to the United States, and that this water was available to the
United States for storage and delivery back to the contractors. The Bureau of
Reclamation protested Farmers’ action, but failed to deter the irrigation district. The
State of Nebraska appealed the Bureau’s interpretation of the Warren Act contract
to the secretary of the interior, arguing that Nebraska’s water rights could not be
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legally assigned to the United States or any other entity. In a June 1937 decision, the
secretary found in favor of the Bureau and against Nebraska.92
The issue eventually ended up in federal court in Nebraska, when the United
States sought injunctive relief against Nebraska and Farmers. The district court
ruled in 1938 that a Warren Act contractor did not convey its natural ﬂow rights
to the United States under its Warren Act contract.93 The case was appealed to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in 1941, also held that a Warren Act
contractor’s appropriative rights did not transfer to the United States. The circuit
court reasoned that the language in Article XI of the Tri-State contract “does not on
its face purport to transfer anything directly to the United States.”94
The Tilley decision forced the Bureau to reconsider the validity of its
allotment provisions for water short years. Speciﬁcally, the Bureau questioned the
propriety of restricting natural ﬂow diversions to the contract schedules and using
a percentage of the contract amount as the basis for water allotments to Warren Act
contractors in water short years. The Bureau interpreted the decision as requiring it
to adopt a policy of supplementing natural ﬂow water with storage water up to the
amount of water provided for in the delivery schedule in the Warren Act contracts at
any given time. From its reading of the Tilley case, the Bureau determined that the
1940 method of allocation for water-short years, based on contract schedules alone,
could not be used as a basis for a water allotment.95 Prior to the decision in Tilley,
the Bureau apportioned natural ﬂow and storage water. After Tilley, the agency
revised its procedures to apportion only storage water in the North Platte River
system.
The Supreme Court in its initial decision in Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945)
also brieﬂy addressed the Warren Act when it spoke about “surplus water.”96 In
that litigation, the United States argued its long held position that a determination
that there was surplus storage water available for use by Warren Act users was
made prior to entering the Warren Act contracts. The United States contended that
“surplus water” was “storage water in excess of that believed to be needed for the
North Platte Project as then constructed and as proposed for extension.…”97 The
opinion and decree that resulted from the original Nebraska v. Wyoming litigation
addressed only the interstate apportionment of the natural ﬂow of the North
Platte River.98 Nonetheless, the court stated that storage water “should be left
for distribution in accordance with the contracts which govern it,” and generally
acknowledged that the contracts were to be honored, including in times of low water
supply.99 The court also considered the management issues facing the Bureau and
conﬁrmed that a pro rata distribution among contractors was appropriate. In its
opinion, the court recognized “the nature of the problem of apportionment and the
delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.”100
The Bureau’s system for delivering water since 1945 has recognized the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the Tilley and the Nebraska v. Wyoming
decisions.101 In making adjustments to its allocations, the Bureau continued to
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maintain the same essential delivery system that it had established during the ﬁrst
year of water shortage, whereby it delivered pro rata shares of all contractors’
water. During water short years, the Bureau designed and implemented an
equitable method of ensuring that the four North Platte Project districts and the
nine Warren Act districts all received a portion of their full amounts of water. But,
following these decisions, Bureau ofﬁcials also were more ﬂexible with Warren
Act and government unit contractors.
In 1954 the Bureau established a water allocation system when the
storage water reached its maximum. The stated purpose of setting up the system
of allotment was to “allow both the Warren Act contractors and the Project
districts to participate in the storage with beneﬁts to both groups.” The advantage
described for the Warren Act contractors was that it gave them “an opportunity
to receive storage at a later date in lieu of natural ﬂow.” The advantage to the
projects was that they would be able to “participate indirectly in the natural ﬂows
and thus supplement their storage during the entire season.”102 The formula
used to compute allocations included documentation and averaging of previous
years’ storage water and diversions. After making adjustments for credits and
improvements, Bureau ofﬁcials determined the amounts for each of the thirteen
districts.103 The formula established for computing the water allotments for all of
the districts was developed by Peter Anker, Chief of the North Platte Irrigation
Operations, and has continued to be used since the 1950s.
Conclusion
Existing private irrigators within planned federal reclamation projects at
the turn of the century recognized the value of partnering with the public projects
in providing an adequate and dependable water supply from the North Platte
River. Following passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902 and authorization
for the North Platte Project less than one year later, irrigation companies along
the river in Wyoming and Nebraska quickly moved to ensure their place in the
reclamation plan. Passage of the Warren Act in 1911 conﬁrmed the importance
that Congress placed on responding to these needs and to garnering broad support
for ambitious projects like the one planned for the North Platte River. It was left
to the Bureau of Reclamation, however, to devise a mechanism to incorporate
these private companies into the public project and, at the same time, not diminish
the importance of reclaiming public lands for a new generation of farmers.
During the fall and summer of 1911, Interior ofﬁcials faced the problem
of reconciling the needs of potential Warren Act contractors for “surplus water”
with expectations for the ultimate size of the North Platte Project. They reached
an accommodation by 1) negotiating contracts for a permanent supply of storage
water for Warren Act irrigators; 2) reconﬁguring the remainder of the project
to meet the needs of all irrigators; and 3) placing a “cap” on the total amount
of water that would be delivered to Warren Act contractors. This approach
satisﬁed the needs of all parties until the water short years of the 1930s. Faced
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with the prospect of diminished supplies throughout the system, the Bureau
of Reclamation allocated water on an equitable basis both to government and
Warren Act districts. Although both government and private irrigation districts
complained about the system of allocation, and eventually ﬁled lawsuits to stop
or alter it, the Bureau continued to use the approach while reﬁning the methods
of calculation. To have done otherwise would have jeopardized the tripartite
relationship between the Bureau of Reclamation, the government districts, and
the Warren Act contractors. To not provide the Warren Act contractors with a
permanent water supply would have been to admit that the United States had sold
them “blue sky.”
Alan S. Newell is the founder of and a Senior Associate Historian with
Historical Research Associates, Inc., in Missoula, Montana. He is active in and
past-president of the National Council on Public History.
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The Path Not Taken: The Development Company
of America’s Hudson Reservoir Project, Arizona
Territory, 1898-1902
By:
Robert L. Spude
During the early summer of 1900, a group of businessmen held
clandestine meetings over lunch or in private ofﬁces in New York City to discuss
the building of the nation’s highest dam and creation of a thirty-three square mile
reservoir. Among them was Elton Hooker, the chief engineer of New York state’s
Public Works and a just returned member of the U.S. investigatory commission
that studied the possibility of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Ex-Secretary
of War Russell Alger, soon to be Senator from Michigan, was in attendance
as was Henry M. Robinson, New York City corporate lawyer and player in
the consolidation then underway to create U.S. Steel, the ﬁrst billion dollar
corporation. Two westerners, Governor Oakes Murphy of Arizona Territory and
his brother Frank, a rising ﬁnancier of the territory’s mines and railroads, brought
the group together to negotiate with Henry Man, of Man & Man, New York City
lawyers, and possessors of the right to build a dam on the Salt River upstream
from Phoenix.
The editor of the Arizona Republican, the Phoenix newspaper, shadowed
the group in New York and leaked the story.1 It appeared that the long-awaited
storage dam and reservoir to ease all water shortages in the Salt River Valley were
to be built, if, the editor asked, the citizens would agree to supply a $500,000
bonding subsidy. In the months following, two factions in the Salt River Valley
soon coalesced, one supportive of the private project, another demanding that the
federal government take charge of the site and build the dam.2
Instead of supporting the Murphy brothers, the other group in Phoenix
accused the governor and his brother of trying to bilk taxpayers of $500,000
and defraud the Salt River Valley’s residents. For the next two years the two
factions clashed, one pro-Murphy and private enterprise, the other in opposition
and pro-federal control. Today, the tale of the passage of the Newlands Act in
1902 and the federal construction of Roosevelt Dam at the site on the Salt River,
1903-1911, is well known. What is left out is the other group, the proponents of
corporate dam building projects, of the path not taken.3
The leading promoters of the private project were the Murphy brothers,
Frank and Nathan Oakes. Born in Maine, but raised in the lumber camps of
Wisconsin, the two men followed separate paths West, sometimes together
in Kansas or California, sometimes not. In December 1877 Frank moved
to Prescott, Arizona Territory. After a period of varied jobs—stage driver,
haberdashery clerk, scribe for the territorial legislature—Frank found his calling
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as a mine promoter. In 1883, his older brother Nathan Oakes Murphy, always
known as Oakes, joined him in Prescott.4
Oakes had taught school, served in the military, then joined his brother
in the ﬁrm of F. M. Murphy & Brother. One of the properties they acquired was
the hydraulic gold mining operation along Lynx Creek, ten miles east of Prescott.
Hydraulic mining used a stream of water to cut down stream banks, which then
ﬂowed into sluice boxes where the gold nuggets and ﬂakes were washed out of
the gravels. In the late 1880s, F. M. Murphy & Bro. operated their diversion dam,
ﬂume, and hydraulic nozzles during the high water of each spring.5
As others have pointed out, the basics of western water law came from
the experience of hydraulic miners in the placer gold mining regions of Colorado
and California. The experience at the Lynx Creek hydraulics would be used by
Oakes, in training to be a mining lawyer and in his later irrigation views. He
also understood the engineering basics as evidenced in his promotional pamphlet
printed ca. 1889 in an effort to sell the mines. A British company, the Lynx Creek
Gold & Land Co., Ltd., bought the property, built a sixty foot dam, cleared a
storage reservoir site, and by 1891 began working the Arizona gold ﬁelds. By
then Oakes had taken his proﬁts and moved to Phoenix.6
Oakes had become active in Republican politics and rose through various
appointed positions, ﬁrst as personal secretary to the governor, then secretary of
the territory, similar to a lieutenant governor today, and then, ﬁnally, governor
in his own right in 1892. Forced to move to Phoenix with the removal of the
territorial capital from Prescott, Oakes soon became a leader in the growing
agricultural community in the Salt River Valley.7
Phoenix had risen upon the ruins of the prehistoric Hohokam peoples’
homes and irrigation system. After 1867 a series of ever larger and longer ditches
and canals supported the new farms and ranches along the Salt River. Phoenix
became a territorial trade and political center, especially with the arrival of the
capital in 1889. The 1890 census takers counted 3,152 residents.8 When Oakes
arrived in the small town, the city fathers had been working to build a railroad
connecting the northern and southern parts of the territory via Phoenix. He
organized a company, ushered through a twenty year tax exemption from the
territorial legislature, and ceremoniously broke ground for the Santa Fe, Prescott,
& Phoenix Railroad. Because of his gubernatorial duties, he passed the leadership
of the project to his brother Frank, who completed the line to Phoenix between
1892 and February 1895. Wealthy investors from Chicago and Detroit, backing
the Murphy brothers’ railroad, also invested in Salt River Valley canal companies
and land.9
During the 1890s the water diverted from the Salt River did not meet
demands of boosters and land speculators, especially during drought years.
Oakes Murphy became a leader in the political debate over water and irrigation,
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especially governmental support. At the 1892 National Republican Convention,
Oakes was able to have included as part of that major party’s platform the ﬁrst
call for federal support of private irrigation projects.10
In 1894 Oakes ran for and was elected to the U.S. Congress as Arizona
Territory’s delegate or non-voting member, and again pushed for support for
irrigation projects in the territories. During his tenure as a member of the U.S.
Congress, Phoenix hosted the National Irrigation Congress, one with many ideas
but dominated by disputing factions and many resolutions. Murphy pushed for
the cession of lands for irrigation projects, in line with the 1894 Carey Act.11
When Oakes left ofﬁce in 1897, he turned to developing a resort
and opening a land ofﬁce in the Adams Hotel, Phoenix. Among the investors
who had backed the Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix Railroad were some of the
nation’s most prominent businessmen, who now invested in his new projects.
These investors included Dexter M. Ferry and C. C. Bowen of Detroit, the
nation’s largest seed producers. Through a ﬁeld man, Dr. Alexander J. Chandler,
they had bought Salt River Valley lands and built a major canal. Simon Murphy,
a millionaire timber man from Detroit and “uncle” of Frank and Oakes, also
invested in Salt River Valley lands, and supported the canal and land promotions
of the Ferry and Bowen crowd through Simon’s ranch manager A. C. McQueen.12
Included in the group of Detroit men was Russell Alger, another
millionaire timber man. Alger had been a one-time candidate for U.S. President,
but relinquished his bid to aid the Republicans and elect Benjamin Harrison.
Eight years later, as payback, President William McKinley appointed Alger as
his Secretary of War. Alger provided access to the White House for the Murphy
brothers, and, in 1898, helped Oakes Murphy receive a second appointment as
governor of Arizona.13
Upon his return to ofﬁce Governor Murphy joined other residents in
stating that the biggest need in the Salt River Valley was a means to store
enough water to ensure that a steady stream could be provided for the expanding
farmlands. He spoke at national arid lands meetings, raised awareness within the
federal government, and sought incentives to assist private enterprise. By 1898
too, he, with his brother Frank, looked at ways to take over the company owning
the best dam and reservoir site along the Salt River, the foundering Hudson
Reservoir & Canal Company.14
Some sixty air miles east of Phoenix, the Salt River ﬂows from a broad
twenty-six mile wide valley into a narrow canyon barely two hundred feet across,
an ideal water storage dam site. An 1889 visit by a Senatorial committee to
Phoenix spurred the ﬁnding and description of the dam site, followed by a savvy
New York lawyer who lay claim to it under the revised 1891 Federal land laws.
In 1893 Wells Hendershott organized the Hudson Company Reservoir & Canal
Company to build the dam and create a reservoir estimated, at ﬁrst, at eighteen
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square miles. U.S. Senator John Martin of Kansas became president and secured
the company’s claim from the federal land ofﬁce.15
However, 1893 was the worst time in the nineteenth century to promote
new ventures. Across the nation railroads, banks, and canal companies went
bankrupt as the country entered a depression that lasted from 1893 to 1897.
Hendershott, a tall handsome promoter with personality, raised only $3,900. Sims
Ely, secretary for Senator Martin, recalled that Hendershott had borrowed from
the New York City law ﬁrm of Man & Man in order to keep an ofﬁce open in
Phoenix, take water measurements, and do minimal engineering assessments for
the Hudson Company. The amount of capital needed—the Hudson Company
had estimated $2.5 million—was beyond the reach of the Salt River Valley
ﬁnancial world at that time. Overextended, Hendershott transferred his control
of the company to the Man brothers, particularly Henry Man. Sims Ely moved to
Phoenix in 1895 as manager for the company.16
The company received a boost two years later when the U.S. Geological
Survey published a report that conﬁrmed that the site was the best along the
river—indeed, was one of the best sites for a reservoir and storage dam in the
West. That year Frank Murphy with Dr. Chandler visited the Hudson site. In
addition, Sims Ely, Hudson Company manager, became part-time reporter for
Frank Murphy’s Arizona Republican newspaper. The following spring of 1898,
Ely also became personal secretary to Governor Murphy.17
In his ﬁrst report as governor, Oakes Murphy outlined in optimistic terms
the products of the Salt River Valley, but added that without the Hudson Reservoir
the limit of water for irrigation had been reached. His report also contains a
lengthy description of the potential of the Hudson Company project, written as
a promotional tract by secretary Ely. It stated “the further development of water
supply is, therefore, one of the most absorbing problems with which the people of
this Territory have to deal with.”18
The Governor proposed several legislative initiatives to help build the
dam, which was to remain a private enterprise. The territory should be given
federal lands which it could then sell and use the revenues for irrigation projects.
Also, the dam project should receive subsidies like railroad projects had,
including tax breaks and county or territorial bonds. Frank Murphy had been in
Washington asking Congress to allow the territory to issue gold bonds for public
improvement projects, including water systems. He also boasted to a New York
Times reporter that Arizona oranges could reach eastern markets two days ahead
of those grown in California.19
Frank was the key to raising capital to build the dam. Ferry, Bowen,
Simon Murphy, and Alger all helped back Frank Murphy’s Santa Fe, Prescott &
Phoenix Railroad. These men owned large tracts of land southeast of Phoenix.
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They also pushed for a railroad extension to these undeveloped farmlands. The
railroad could also support the dam building effort.20
In 1900 Frank Murphy and his partners owned the territory’s richest gold
mine, were consolidating its richest silver mining district, and held one of its most
proﬁtable railroads. They also owned newspapers, banks, mercantile, and other
support business.21 Imitating others, they began discussing the formation of a
large holding company, ultimately called the Development Company of America
(DCA), to transfer their operating companies to and then seek other opportunities
for investment. The DCA would investigate new business proposals and, when
one had promise, undertake its initial ﬁnancial support by setting up an operating
company. They would control the operating company by holding half its stock
and bonds, but selling shares and mortgage bonds to the general investing public
to raise funds. The Hudson dam project was an obvious choice for the group.22
The meeting in New York City in the summer of 1900 was followed
by the drafting of the proposed company’s documents. George W. Kretzinger,
Chicago attorney and a director of Murphy’s railroad and investor in Arizona
mines, described the best way to organize the company. The Hudson Company
was to be taken over by a new corporate entity, all the canals in the valley were
to be acquired, the canals were to be improved and extended, all water franchises
acquired, and the operation of an electric power system begun. This company
would be controlled by a holding company, the Development Company of
America (DCA).23
The DCA would be presided over by Frank Murphy. Engineer Elton
Hooker would serve as vice president and general manager; he also represented
his father-in-law Dexter Ferry. Making up the rest of the holding company
directorate would be Senator Alger of Michigan; New York City lawyer Henry
M. Robinson; N. K. Fairbank, Chicago grain and ﬂour millionaire; Benjamin P.
Cheney, representing the Santa Fe railroad and a Boston millionaire; Clement
A. Griscom, Philadelphia shipping magnate; Eliphalet B. Gage, president of
the Phoenix National Bank, Tempe Land Co., and the Tombstone Consolidated
Mines Co., Ltd.; and seven other directors. Each had holdings in Arizona, were
participants in earlier Murphy projects, and controlled wealth in their own ﬁelds.24
More importantly, while they were discussing possible projects in Arizona,
they were ready to come into massive amounts of investment funds. Robinson
was negotiating for steel and coal men in Michigan and Ohio with banker J. P.
Morgan, who would buy them out to form U.S. Steel in 1901. At the same time,
Frank Murphy was negotiating the sale of the Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix
Railroad to the Santa Fe Railway for a reported three million, consummated
in October 1901. These funds would be directed through the DCA to Arizona
projects.25
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The ﬁrm of Man & Man stood as ready and willing sellers of the Hudson
project. Man & Man had continued to hold claim to the site and had funded Sims
Ely, its Phoenix agent, to monitor water ﬂow, collect statistics, and to work with
local canal companies to ensure, if built, there would be water for all. In 1899 he
had arranged an agreement with the canal companies that ensured certain water
levels and levels of proﬁt for the Hudson Company.26
The canals on the south side of the river, controlled by the Michigan
group, would come into the new DCA operating company. Murphy was
discussing cooperation with lawyer W. B. Cleary, manager of the New York
controlled Arizona Water Company, owners of the Arizona, Grand, Maricopa,
and Salt River canals, all the major canals north of the river. Also in support
was Moses H. Sherman, now of Los Angeles, but major owner of the Phoenix
municipal water and electric power system, trolley line, and an extensive land
owner.27
Governor Oakes Murphy pushed the territorial legislature to pass a
tax break of 15 years for new reservoir projects and then began pushing for a
bond package of up to $2 million. During 1900-1901, various backers of the
consolidation and holding company visited Phoenix. Senator Alger visited as
did others including Chicagoan Marshall Field, backer of Murphy’s railroad and
one of the ten richest Americans of all time. Most importantly, in May 1901,
President William McKinley visited Phoenix and the Congress gold mine, owned
by Frank Murphy’s group. McKinley made quips about Arizonans backing the
gold standard, but, unstated, he supported his governor and his pro-business
political attitude.28
During fall 1901 the ﬁnishing touches on organizing the Development
Company of America were completed, and the initiation of construction of
the Phoenix & Eastern Railroad began. The railroad would support valley
communities and the dam construction. Papers were drawn to transfer the Hudson
Company to the DCA. DCA vice president and engineer Elton Hooker readied
himself to take charge of the DCA’s many projects, including building the nation’s
largest dam. Construction engineer F. S. Washburn of Tennessee, expert in water
control systems, joined DCA.29
As Oakes Murphy pushed for bonding legislation and Frank Murphy
drafted papers for the organization of a strong operating company, advocates
of federal irrigation continued to oppose private projects. Fate would be on
their side. Outspoken leader of the group George Maxwell, a California lawyer
specializing in water and irrigation law, was adamantly opposed to private sector
involvement. The residents of Phoenix were of mixed minds; some, when
meeting with Maxwell, followed his lead. Just as easily, when meeting with
the Murphys, the same groups backed the Murphys’ program of bonds and tax
support for private projects. The name calling, begun in the summer of 1900
when the Murphys’ newspaper ﬁrst announced the plan, had died down—one
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can speculate that this abusive rhetoric was part of a political attack on Oakes
Murphy, then the Republican candidate for Delegate to Congress (he lost). But
the desire for public ownership and control continued to grow.30
In 1901 events took a decided turn. In September 1901 President
McKinley was assassinated and Vice President Theodore Roosevelt took ofﬁce.
Unfortunate for the old guard, including Oakes Murphy, their access to the White
House closed (Roosevelt had been a major critic of Secretary of War Alger
during the Spanish-American War). In his ﬁrst message to Congress, December
1901, Roosevelt also became a friend to federal irrigation project proponents by
including a strong pro-federal reclamation statement and concluding that such
projects were “too vast for private effort.” The president’s speech was followed
by resolutions and outpourings of popular western support of a federal program.31
At that time, Frank Murphy wrote to a business partner,
I have about made up my mind there is not much use trying to organize
a local company on the lines we discussed, as I am inclined to believe
we would ﬁnd great difﬁculty in placing the securities of a reservoir
company if controlled by local inﬂuences. I am about convinced that
if the water consumers and tax payers are not willing to let a private
enterprise take hold of the reservoir proposition on a fair basis, the next
best thing for them to do is to get authority to issue their county bonds
for enough money to construct the dam …32

As the Maxwell contingent gained access to the White House through
Roosevelt’s friend Gifford Pinchot, Governor Murphy was rapidly falling out of
favor. Oakes met his new boss at the Grand Canyon April 6, 1902, and announced
his resignation the next day. In a letter to a friend two weeks earlier, Governor
Murphy had written that he would be relieved to quit the “very unproﬁtable and
thankless ofﬁce.”33
The Murphys continued to push for support of the bond issue for the
reservoir project. In May 1902 Frank met with some 300 business leaders in
the Adams Hotel, Phoenix, asking their support for bonding their county for $1
million in order to get the reservoir built. At the same time, Governor Murphy,
not ofﬁcially out of ofﬁce until July, was in Washington as part of a lobbying
effort to inﬂuence reclamation legislation. The group worked with Senator
Francis Warren of Wyoming for a reclamation bill friendly to the territory,
especially its businessmen. Unfortunately, Senator Warren left suddenly because
of his wife’s death, and Oakes Murphy wired Phoenix that there would be no
passage of the bond bill—it would not even make it to the ﬂoor of the House.34
As we know today, another group, led by George Maxwell, inserted
instead the legislation introduced by Francis Newlands, Representative from
Nevada, which passed June 17, 1902. At the last minute the initial proposal to
provide support for only undeveloped federal lands was changed to allow for
369

aiding private lands. As Karen Smith wrote, with this change, Salt River Valley
land speculators “saw their land turn golden.”35
With the passage
of the Newlands Act, if not
before, the Development
Company of America halted
the Hudson Dam project,
a project later completed
by the U. S. Reclamation
Service as the Roosevelt
Dam. Elton Hooker left in
the fall of 1902 to become
a leader in chemical
manufacturing. The
Murphy brothers continued 13.1. This 1909 Phoenix orange grove is typical of the
to promote land deals in the agriculture local farmers expected to be able to support
with water from the Salt River Project.
valley, Oakes opening an
ofﬁce in the Adams Hotel. He proﬁted from his speculations, sailed to Europe,
and died in 1908 at the Coronado Hotel in San Diego.36
Frank Murphy and the DCA turned primarily to mining and operated some
of the territory’s largest mines. Unfortunately, the holding company’s Tombstone
Consolidated Mines, Ltd., hit an underground river equivalent to the ﬂow of the
Salt River and spent $8 million trying to pump the mines dry. The ﬁrm lost nearly
as much as the Roosevelt dam would cost in the unsuccessful attempt and closed
operations in 1911, the year Theodore Roosevelt dedicated his namesake dam.37
The different tracks followed by the Murphys from the well known
triumphal story of the events leading to the passage of the Newlands Act and the
construction of Roosevelt Dam brings up the question, could private industry have
built and proﬁted from the project? Were 90% of canal and irrigation companies
in ﬁnancial straits in the 1890s, as proponents of the federal act claimed?
Evidence suggests that proponents of federal reclamation over-stated the crisis
of the time. They claimed that not enough capital existed to build such works.
Obviously, the Development Company of America had the funds.
The muckraking critics of the era pointed to the government’s Roosevelt
Dam project as being a scandal, called Uncle Sam a lawbreaker. The government
by its lax regulation of land laws, one muckraker wrote, had encouraged
fraudulent irrigation of thousands of acres of the public domain held by Dr.
Chandler and his backers, when the water was to aid small farmers and owners
of 160 acres or less. Further accusations were aimed at giveaway electricity.
The Reclamation Service’s contracts with Paciﬁc Gas & Electric, heir of Moses
Sherman, Murphy and other investors’ Phoenix Light & Water Company, the
muckraking critic pointed out, were scandalously low priced.38
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Finally, Man & Man, through Sims Ely and ex-Governor Murphy, gained
less than they hoped but their rights were bought out for a proﬁtable $40,000. The
New York, Michigan, and Chicago investors also made money in selling their
canal companies to the government. In short, the Murphys and their friends were
not hurt by the passage of the Newlands Act.39
The Development Company of America’s Hudson Reservoir project
ﬁt well into the politics-as-handmaiden-of-business outlook of the William
McKinley era of the 1890s. But, like many such projects, it was never undertaken
by private enterprise. Instead, Teddy Roosevelt and the progressives brought new
ideas and legislation, and for the West, irrigation projects beyond the imagination
of any nineteenth century empire builder.
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Irrigation and Early Hydropower Development in the
Salt River Valley
By:
Stephen Sloan
Abstract
Water and power have always had an intricate relationship
throughout the modern history of the American West. The limited
availability of reliable sources for irrigation and accessible traditional
means of energy production led residents of Arizona’s Salt River Valley
to take extreme measures to guarantee water and power. Without the
development of these two resources in the early decades of the twentieth
century, the post World War II boom in central Arizona would have
remained an impossibility.
Experiments with hydropower development in western U.S.
reclamation projects at the turn of the century provided a glimpse of the
dividends water storage could offer in energy production and revenues. In
the Salt River Valley, the success of early power generating plants on the
canal system and at Roosevelt Dam led developers to seek an expansion
of reservoir capacity and hydropower generation. As a result, the Salt
River Project constructed three dams below Roosevelt and above the
canal diversion dam at Granite Reef. Through the operation of generating
stations at these sites, the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association sought
a rapid and signiﬁcant increase in power revenues to fuel further project
expansion and ease governmental debt.
In the case of the Salt River Valley, however, the goals of
hydropower generation and efﬁcient irrigation were divergent during
periods of the 1920s and 1930s. In times of drought, farmers often
demanded additional water to be released from dams on the upper Salt to
water their ﬁelds. When requests went unheeded, many of the farmers
claimed that SRP was holding water to be used for power generation, which
provided much higher revenues than irrigation. Farmers’ organizations
argued that the project was catering to power buyers rather than focusing
on their primary mission, providing a reliable and sufﬁcient water supply
for irrigation. Until the development of additional reservoirs and the
implementation of pump storage technology, times of drought renewed the
underlying tensions between hydropower and irrigation.
Although much has been written on water in the West, the
relationship between western irrigation and hydropower is a topic often
neglected. Focusing on the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, the paper
reveals how the character of a project changes when irrigation and
generation not only coexist, but compete. Such a study offers needed
insight into not only the history of the Bureau of Reclamation, but reveals
much about the nature of the twentieth-century arid West.

375

Water and power have always had an intricate relationship in the history of
the American West. These two elements were the cornerstone for the creation of
modern Arizona and the Salt River Valley. Without the development of each of these
resources in the early twentieth century, the reality of the post World War II Valley
boom would have remained an impossibility.
Aridity, according to many western scholars, is the deﬁning characteristic of
the American West. For early residents of the Valley in the late nineteenth century,
aridity represented a primary obstacle to permanent settlement. The Salt River, the
major water source for central Arizona, varied in ﬂow from raging torrent to a small
stream. Early settlers, such as the Swilling party, based the ﬁrst recorded attempts
to irrigate the ﬂatlands along the Salt River upon a system of irrigation ditches
constructed by prehistoric Valley residents. The Hohokam left a legacy of 600 to
700 miles of primary irrigation canals and laterals. Many of these ditches became
the foundation for the modern network of Valley waterways.1 Like the Hohokam,
modern settlers began damming, diverting, and ditching the Salt to make the most
efﬁcient use of limited water resources.
As the population grew and more irrigation enterprises depended on the
erratic ﬂow of the Salt, better control over the water supply became a necessity.
Farmers along the river witnessed cycles of ﬂood and drought that compromised
their ability to prosper. Flood meant not only damage to crops, but, more
importantly, was seen as a waste of valuable river water. Drought brought conﬂict
over water rights and dramatic drops in farm production. A solution to the problems
of ﬂood and drought required a comprehensive irrigation plan for reducing loss
and increasing supply. An answer to the question of how to develop the irrigation
resources of the Valley came with the passage of the federal Reclamation Act
of 1902. The act allowed funding for the construction of Roosevelt Dam at the
conﬂuence of the Salt River and Tonto Creek, seventy-seven miles east of Phoenix.
The dam impounded ﬂoodwaters for agricultural use during dry years and served as
the keystone of the new irrigation system. With creation of the Salt River Project,
local farmers had hope that triumph over the obstacle of aridity was close at hand.
Along with the challenge aridity presented in much of the West, western
power generation development was an equally formidable task. In the Salt River
Valley, the inaccessibility of traditional power sources, such as timber and coal
deposits, caused developers to look for alternatives for energy. Steam plants
that used fuel oil to operate boilers provided an early, yet expensive, alternative.
The development of western U.S. reclamation projects provided glimpses of the
dividends that water storage could provide in energy production and revenues.
The ﬁrst reclamation projects, including the Salt River Project, used hydroelectric
power in the construction of irrigation features. As Bureau of Reclamation Director
Elwood Mead would later note, the earlier government effort made “extensive use
of the opportunities which existed on many mountain streams, to cheapen the cost of
excavating canals by employing hydroelectric power to displace coal and gasoline,
horses and mules.”2
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Soon after planning began
for Roosevelt Dam construction,
reclamation engineers realized
that hydropower could provide
the most reliable and efﬁcient
source of energy for construction.
Developers noted that the energy
produced at Roosevelt could not
only be used for construction,
but also wholesaled to the nearby
Globe area mines, sent to the
Valley as power for pumping,
or transmitted to Phoenix as a
municipal energy source.3 The
hydroelectric units installed at
Roosevelt started the Salt River
Project in the power business
and created the ﬁrst multipurpose
14.1. Roosevelt Dam and Powerhouse in August of
project under the Reclamation Act. 1909.
As the Bureau of Reclamation continued to develop irrigation features
throughout the Valley, the work at Granite Reef Diversion Dam and along the
canal system required a new network of transmission lines to power construction
and excavation equipment. The lines erected during this period would later form
the main distribution system reaching out to all corners of the Valley.4 The water
distribution network thus determined the structure of the early power grid for the
valley. As work continued, additional hydropower plants were created along the
canal system to supplement the primary generation at Roosevelt.
In 1917, U.S. Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane insisted that the project
cease to be federally operated and that control be turned over to the landowners. He
argued that government paternalism had no place in such a local concern. Although
many local representatives were hesitant about the change, Karen Smith argues
that one of the factors that led them to agreement was a recent “reinterpretation of
reclamation policy which allowed proﬁts from the sale of power to be used in any
way the water users wanted.”5
The prospect of future hydropower development was an important factor
in rallying local support for the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association’s
assumption of project control. The revenues created by hydropower sales could be
used by the Association to pay off government debt and subsidize the cost of water
storage and transmission. Although plans for expanded power production were not
yet widely considered, the revenues being generated by the power production system
in place indicated the proﬁt potential that might be available from an expanded
system.
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In 1917, the generation
system included the Roosevelt
units and four small hydro plants
in the canal system. The principal
power development of the project
remained at Roosevelt, where the
Association operated a generating
station with an installed capacity
of 16,000-horsepower. The
Association, in accordance
with a 1910 contract with the
government, created the four
smaller plants, Crosscut, South
Con, Arizona Falls, and Chandler. 14.2. Granite Reef Diversion Dam in 1910.
Built in 1914 at the junction
of the New Arizona Crosscut and the extension of the Grand Canal, the Crosscut
hydro-plant was the closest generating station to metropolitan Phoenix. The South
Con, built in 1910, served as a generating station at the junction of the Eastern
and Consolidated Canals, a few miles below Granite Reef diversion dam. Arizona
Falls, an older facility on the Arizona Canal, was ﬁtted with two hydroelectric units
in 1912. Originally a steam plant, the Chandler Power Plant was converted to
hydropower around the beginning of the decade at the existing site on the Tempe
Canal.6 All four generating stations operated on the existing canal network and did
not involve any signiﬁcant retention or diversion of water that was to be used for
irrigation. Together with Roosevelt, the ﬁve generating stations had a total capacity
of 27,000-horsepower.7 The small network of power producing hydro-plants would
soon prove inadequate to satisfy the growing demand for industrial and residential
power.
Soon after taking control of the project, the leadership of the Association
began to realize the unique positioning of the project in relationship to power for
Arizona. T. A. Hayden, an Association engineer, noted that, in 1920, 80% of the
total annual power load for the state of Arizona was “used within a radius of less
than 100 miles of the Association=s plants; half of this load being already in touch
with the Association=s existing transmission lines.”8 Project leadership recognized
that a ready and accessible market needed new power sources and the unused
hydropower potential of the Salt could provide the answer.
One of the leading proponents for the expansion of hydropower generation
on the Salt River Project was C. C. Cragin, the general superintendent and chief
engineer of the Association in the 1920s. Cragin, who was recently named one of
Energy Markets Most Inﬂuential People in Electricity and Gas, had a bold vision
of what the Association generation system could become with new developments.
In a proposal for additional hydropower development submitted to the Association
board in 1922, Cragin provided a detailed analysis of the power situation for the
Association board. His Report on “Proposed Additional Hydro-Electric Power
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Development in the Salt River” included a brief analysis of the early relationship
between hydropower and irrigation. In the report, the engineer acknowledged
that the superior right to the waters of the Salt had been and should always be for
irrigation. Cragin argued, however, that the centrality of irrigation did not preclude
the development of power resources. For Cragin, the Association could no longer
ignore the unused power potential of the Salt. He noted that it had become “quite
evident that large quantities of power are now going to waste while the water drawn
from Roosevelt Reservoir, for irrigation use, drops to the lower level of the Valley.”9
Early proponents of energy development such as Cragin recognized
the difﬁculties of matching the goals of an irrigation project and a hydropower
generation venture. The water movement patterns for irrigation were by no
means ideal for power generation. Water releases through Roosevelt and the
canal system vary greatly throughout the year. In summer, when the agricultural
demand for water was high, generation capacity could exceed demand, while in
winter electricity available plummeted with the drop in irrigation. Any future
development of hydropower had to deal with a heavy water ﬂow for seven months
of the year and a very light ﬂow for ﬁve months. Cragin argued that the relationship
between irrigation demand and hydropower production forced the Association to
choose between three alternatives: contract for a variable power supply depending
on irrigation demand, waste water for power, or build additional storage to
regulate water releases for power purposes.10 In considering a course of action,
the Association=s concern regarding competing power suppliers made contracting
for variable power an unattractive alternative and wasting water went against the
fundamental nature of the project.
Although proponents of hydropower expansion spoke of the usefulness of
the new power for residential and agricultural purposes, a large consideration in
pursuing additional energy development was the potential industrial load. Some of
the larger enterprises in the market for additional hydropower at the time included
the Inspiration Consolidated Copper Company, Ray Consolidated Copper Company,
Magma Copper Company, and Southwest Cotton Company. These ﬁrms represented
potential markets for power as well as partners that could be used to help ﬁnance
new developments. As H. J. Lawson, president of the Association in the 1930s,
would note, “the Project was most fortunately situated as regards to power
development, being far from any other source of power or fuel supply and in a fast
developing country with a very considerable and industrial mine load.”11
It became evident by the early 1920s, that a new source of energy was
required to supply the growing needs of the developing Valley. Many members of
the Association were of the opinion that if the Project did not provide the desired
energy, outside interests would take advantage of the opportunity. The introduction
of new competitors in power production could not only have resulted in a loss of
revenue due to lower rates and less customers, but could have caused an interference
with the existing irrigation system.12 Additional hydropower development was
necessary both to reach new markets and protect established ones.
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Additional reservoir construction along the Salt seemed to be the only
acceptable solution for the power generation situation encountered by the
Association. More storage could ease the complications presented by attempting to
generate hydropower on a system with a single dam. With additional water storage,
irrigation water passed through Roosevelt Dam could not only generate power and
be captured by lower dams until needed, but also generate additional hydropower
when passed through the lower dams. The additional water storage would bring
power production to an underutilized 45-mile long, 604-foot drop from Roosevelt
Dam to Granite Reef Diversion Dam. Once water left Roosevelt, it could be used
for power several times before entering the canal system. Just as waste had been an
overriding concern in developing the irrigation system, it became a central theme in
developing the Valley’s power resources.
The ﬁrst dam constructed on the new system was built approximately
seventeen miles below Roosevelt in a box canyon near Mormon Flat. The
construction of Mormon Flat Dam, 1923 to 1925, began the fundamental shift of
the project from one devoted exclusively to irrigation to an irrigation/hydropower
development. According to Cragin, the value of the Mormon Flat Dam would
be that it “permits the generation of hydro-power during times when there is no
irrigation draft on Roosevelt.”13 Of secondary importance, the new dam could
stabilize the daily and weekly ﬂuctuations in power development at Roosevelt by
offering additional irrigation storage downstream.
Along with the Mormon Flat Dam, the Association constructed two
additional storage reservoirs on the lower Salt and gated the Roosevelt spillways in
the 1920s. Horse Mesa, located between Mormon Flat and Roosevelt, 1924 to 1927,
and Stewart Mountain, constructed 1928 to 1930, completed a seven-year period of
construction, and Stewart Mountain, built below Mormon Flat above the Granite
Reef Diversion Dam, contributed both additional water storage and hydropower
generation to the Project. Manipulating the water levels at the four generating dams
on the Salt, the Association could better maximize energy production.
Power, which in the early days of reclamation was viewed as primarily
for construction and pumping, was now supplied to towns, homes, cotton gins
and mines. As a result of the additional development, the Project increased
the generating capacity of the hydroelectric system from 23,000-horsepower
to 103,000-horsepower. The gross annual power revenues escalated from
approximately $500,000 annually to yearly revenue of nearly $2,500,000.14 The
additional revenue proved important in many ways: to subsidize water delivery
costs, to pay portions of the expansion costs, and to repay government debt. As
Association President H. J. Lawson would later note, “the only reason why the Salt
River Project has been able to meet its obligations to the government can be given in
one word—power.”15
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The expansion of the power system increased the electricity available to both
the urban and rural areas of the Salt River Valley. For the Salt River Valley farmer,
the beneﬁts provided by the new development were many. By 1930 2,000 farms had
electricity with approximately ﬁfty new connections per week. Power was used not
only for pumping, but for “cooking ranges, water heaters, ensilage cutters, milking
machines, cream separators, feed grinders, incubators, brooders and a host of other
farm appliances.”16 Advertisements for the latest in home electrical appliances were
prevalent in local newspapers as retailers claimed the ways in which new products,
such as the vacuum cleaner and the washing machine, could lessen manual work and
improve the quality of life in the Valley.
Despite the gains in rural electriﬁcation realized through the expansion of
the hydropower system, some argued that the irrigation/hydropower relationship
remained strained. The dual objectives of maximizing hydropower generation
and efﬁciently providing irrigation were often at cross-purposes. Although the
development of additional storage below Roosevelt Dam was proposed as a way to
reconcile the variant goals of irrigation and hydropower, the expansion served to
increase the tension within the relationship by raising the importance of hydropower
to the Project.
In a 1932 journal article in the American Society of Civil Engineers Papers,
C. C. Cragin reﬂected on the dynamics of developing hydropower on an irrigation
project. He noted three fundamental restrictions that must be honored when
embarking upon combined development: power development is justiﬁed only when
there is little or no interference with the irrigation system, generation expansion
is only warranted when the proﬁt margin assured is signiﬁcantly greater than that
required in an independent power concern, and an irrigation project is justiﬁed
to enter the general power business only in the most unusual of circumstances.17
Although he argues that the Salt River Project’s hydropower expansion considered
these three restrictions, Cragin was conscious of the many tensions inherent in the
creation of a dual-purpose project.
In the early 1930s some Salt River Valley farmers’ groups argued that the
Project had forgotten its true purpose and lost its way. Critics protested that the
pursuit of hydropower distracted the Association leadership from the heart and soul
of the Project, water storage and irrigation. In times of drought, unmet demands for
water releases from Valley farms caused some to accuse the Association of catering
to power buyers over irrigation interests. By holding water, critics argued, the
Project was timing releases for the generation and sale of power, which provided
much higher revenues than irrigation.
In some cases, the Association offered to sell power to Valley farms for the
pumping of irrigation water rather than release reservoir storage. Farmers often
objected to this new policy based on claims that the land was legally entitled to
river ﬂow, which they argued was of a much higher quality than pump water. In a
1936 court case, E. C. Adams vs. Salt River Water Users’ Association, the plaintiff
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sued maintaining that “crop yields have for a number of years been gradually going
down, down, down and that these things are a direct result of what the Association
had done.”18
Critics of the changing character of the Project contended that the
relationship between hydropower and irrigation was irreconcilable. Some argued
that a farmers’ organization had no place in such a highly competitive business
as energy; an endeavor that required a great deal of long term planning and
management as well as the development of new sources of capital for expansion.19
The local division of opinion regarding the future role of the Association in
hydropower was so prevalent that it eventually reached Washington. In a 1937
memo, Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner John C. Page noted that in light of the
dispute, Association directors “might well consider the basis on which they would be
willing to release all power facilities to the United States.”20
The Association hydropower development of the 1920s became a heated
political issue in Valley political debates during the 1930s. The argument
over the irrigation/hydropower relationship created warring factions vying for
control. Critics attempting to gain control of the organization contended that the
leadership of the previous decade guided the Association down the incorrect path of
hydropower expansion. Defenders of hydropower countered that their reactionary
opposition preferred to eschew progress for a return to the horse-and-buggy age.
They argued that, for whatever ﬂaws may exist in the hydropower system, “it is a
utopian condition too good to be lost, just because some petty conspirators are trying
to paint the picture far blacker than it really is.”21
Tensions in the relationship between hydropower and irrigation remained
high until several new developments in the Valley in the late 1930s. Three changes
that quieted the controversy were the creation of additional water storage on the
Verde River, the implementation of pump storage technology, and the development
of alternative power sources. Bartlett Dam, completed in 1939, had no hydropower
generation and offered water storage exclusively for irrigation. The new dam on
the Verde was also situated below Salt River generation and could release water
directly to Granite Reef and into the canal system. Pump storage technology made
it possible for the Project to use inexpensive, off-peak power to pump from the
tailwaters below dams back up into the reservoir at night. Pump storage allowed the
Project to replenish reservoir capacity with waters that had already been released
for power generation. The development of additional steam plants in the late 1930s
and the completion of transmission lines for Colorado River power in 1940 eased
the reliance on Salt River generation by providing a variable load not dependent
on irrigation demands. The Association now had alternative answers to the often
challenging problem of supplying a reliable source of energy.
With the transformation of the Valley following World War II, the
relationship between hydropower and irrigation changed dramatically. In the context
of the new rapid residential and industrial growth the earlier hydropower expansion
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was seen as a critical development for the future success of central Arizona. Upon
reﬂecting on the changes of the 1920s and 1930s, the period was not just one of the
evolution of the Salt River Project, but the beginnings of a Valley metamorphosis
from an agricultural/rural area with a priority of irrigation to a non-agriculturalurban region with a need for energy.
In 1998, only 22 percent of the water deliveries from the Salt River Project
went to agricultural customers. Although agricultural production still exists in the
Valley, the urbanization of the Valley has changed the basic function of the Project.
In the 1930s, critics argued against attempts to build hydropower on a project
devoted to irrigation. By the end of the twentieth century, irrigation now exists as
somewhat of an adjunct on a project much of the population perceives as devoted to
power generation.
Only through knowledge of the early relationship between hydropower
and irrigation can one realize the dramatic changes that have taken place in the
Salt River Valley. Such awareness provides a new angle on the well told story of
the West and its water. Understanding the dynamics of the relationship between
hydropower and irrigation offers needed insight into not only the history of central
Arizona, but much of the twentieth century arid West.
Stephen M. Sloan is an assistant professor of history and co-director of
the oral history program at the University of Southern Mississippi in
Hattiesburg.
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Water, Culture, and Boosterism: Albin and
Elizabeth DeMary and the Minidoka Reclamation
Project, 1905-1920
By:
Laura Woodworth-Ney
In July 1904 thirty-three year-old Albin C. DeMary traveled from his
home in Boise, Idaho, to the Reclamation Service’s newly opened Minidoka tract.1
DeMary’s duties as clerk of the U.S. Assay Ofﬁce alerted him to the Reclamation
Service’s ﬁrst Idaho irrigation project. Proposed in 1903, the project would provide
water to the arid sagebrush plains of southern Idaho’s Snake River desert. DeMary
returned with an enthusiastic vision for Minidoka’s commercial future and with a
steadfast commitment to reclamation. “The character of the soil is such that the
establishment of a beet sugar factory upon the tract would prove an unbounded
success,” DeMary told a Boise newspaper reporter. He and his companions had
been “struck” by “the absence of lava rock…upon the entire 60,000 acres.”2 Less
than a year later, DeMary moved his parents and his wife of four years, Elizabeth
Layton DeMary, to Minidoka, where he established a homestead three miles
northeast of present-day Rupert.
DeMary’s optimism,
characteristic of a generation of
early irrigation entrepreneurs in
the arid West, stemmed from the
notion that government aid could
do what individual investors could
not—turn Idaho’s windswept,
lava-rock-strewn desert into an
agrarian oasis. Federally-funded
irrigation projects, DeMary
and other boosters reasoned,
would provide small farmers
15.1. The buildings on the east side of the square
an unprecedented opportunity
in Rupert, Idaho, on the Minidoka Project in July
for economic independence.
of 1906.
DeMary’s Commercial Club
and Water Users Association, along with his wife’s Culture Club, represented the
political and cultural inﬂuence that young, educated settlers exercised in newly
established irrigation communities during the settlement period (1870-1920). The
efforts of the DeMarys and their like-minded associates—a self-styled Protestant
“elite”—inﬂuenced the formation of city government, shaped community policy, and
challenged gendered divisions of work. The activities of the Commercial, Culture,
and Water Users associations reﬂected the political and social values of Progressive
reform; their methods married coercive and positive environmentalist approaches
to social change.3 While their methods and their technology represented the future,
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their vision of agrarian utopia was grounded in the Jeffersonian past. Dusty and
desperate, reclamation towns offered middle-class reformers a unique opportunity to
shape business and social environments..4
After arriving on the Minidoka tract in 1905, Albin DeMary quickly built a
modest house on his claim, where he and Elizabeth began raising their four-year-old
daughter, Dorothy. A photograph from this period shows Elizabeth and Dorothy
DeMary standing on the packed dirt outside of their one-room house, dressed in
their ﬁnest clothes and hats, seemingly oblivious to the blowing dust and sagebrush
surrounding them. Their ability to look beyond the dust to an agrarian paradise
transcended economic development. The future held more than accessible water–it
also possessed a Progressive culture. Reclamation promised to turn the desert into
an “irrigated Eden,” but new irrigation towns offered the promise of cultural, as
well as land, reclamation.5 Irrigated settlement harkened back to a past of small
farms in rural America, but irrigation’s entrepreneurial settlers challenged the social
landscapes of the rural West. The creative work produced by Elizabeth DeMary’s
Culture Club resided at the center of cultural construction on the Minidoka Project.
The creative expressions of Rupert clubwomen reﬂected the unique circumstances of
settling an arid land, and provided a contrast to the progress narrative articulated in
booster literature. Through their literary practices, Culture Club members redeﬁned
and shaped cultural perceptions of the
irrigated landscape.6
Albin DeMary had been a
reporter for the Idaho Statesman and a
clerk in the U.S. Assay Ofﬁce in Boise
before coming to the project. DeMary’s
background, coupled with his degree
from Illinois College, distinguished
him as one of the Minidoka Project’s
elite settlers. When suspicions of fraud
15.2. Harvesting potatoes in 1909 on the
and embezzlement forced the U.S.
Henschied Ranch near Rupert, Idaho.
Land Commissioner for the newly
platted town of Rupert to resign in April 1906, DeMary received the appointment to
succeed him. DeMary held the ofﬁce until 1924, and throughout his tenure served
as an informal liaison between the Minidoka settlers and the Reclamation Service.
His various roles as land commissioner, charter member of the Rupert Commercial
Club (became the Rupert Chamber of Commerce in 1917), and founding member
of the Minidoka Settlers’ Association (later the Minidoka Water Users Association,
and one of the earliest water users’ organizations in Idaho and the Intermountain
West), gave DeMary the authority to inﬂuence Rupert’s business environment. At
the same time, he negotiated with federal ofﬁcials to achieve control of reclamation
water for Minidoka settlers. Like many Progressive reformers, DeMary believed
in the scientiﬁc management of resources, and he remained committed to the ideal
of federal reclamation. He also believed that once the service completed a project,
local control of water became essential for business development. Reclamation
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could provide both agricultural and commercial opportunities, but only if local
settlers and businessmen exercised authority over the project.7
While Albin DeMary worked to achieve local control of the Minidoka
reclamation project, his wife, Elizabeth DeMary, labored to provide the project’s
fastest-growing community–Rupert–with an urban, Progressive culture. DeMary
seemed intent on proving that an early twentieth century reclamation town did not
have to exhibit the abhorrent cultural characteristics of many frontier outposts.
Elizabeth DeMary was salutatorian of her class at MacMurry College, Jacksonville,
Illinois, in 1893, and she had further literary training at the University of California
and the University of Chicago. Throughout her life she published poetry, essays,
and travel articles. Her work appeared in many local and national publications
and anthologies, including Times Magazine, The Reclamation Era, Seeing Idaho,
Sunlit Peaks, Poems of the Northwest, Homespun, and The Book of American
Verse. Before coming to Rupert, DeMary organized the South Boise Improvement
Society, which applied Progressive “city beautiful” principles to a section of the
state’s capital city. Reclamation towns, however, offered the kind of aesthetic and
social control that could never exist in an established community. Rupert possessed
none of the problems “city beautiful” adherents associated with older, “decaying”
environments.8
The land that the DeMarys
chose to homestead occupied a tiny
portion of the Minidoka Project,
designed to encourage agricultural
settlement in the arid regions of the
Snake River Plain in southern Idaho.
The sagebrush desert and lava ﬁelds
of the south-central Snake had long
intimidated potential homesteaders.
Oregon Trail diarists told of the dust
and heat of southern Idaho—for
overlanders the trail through what
15.3. The office of the Minidoka Irrigation District
would become Idaho’s “Magic
in Rupert in 1927.
Valley” signiﬁed only hardship, an
obstacle to bypass on the way to the Willamette Valley. Because of its lack of appeal
to homesteaders, the area did not experience large-scale agricultural settlement until
late in the nineteenth century. Much of this late-arriving settlement, moreover, came
from the West, not the East. Homesteaders who reached Oregon and California
too late to procure land in those regions turned back to try their luck in the arid
interior regions. The ﬁrst non-Indian settlement in the Minidoka area began in the
1880s and 1890s, when small numbers of farmers and ranchers came to the region
and settled near the Snake River. Farmers like Henry Shodde constructed private
irrigation systems, some under the homestead provisions of the Desert Land Act
of 1877, using water wheels in the river’s ﬂow to irrigate up to about two-hundred
acres. With its vast elevation variation, hot summers, and a yearly rainfall of
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between nine and twelve inches, the Snake River Plain defeated most individual and
private irrigation enterprises.9
The failure of private and state irrigation projects provided federal
reclamation adherents with the ammunition to lobby for a federal reclamation act.
The national bill came in 1902 with congressional approval of the Newlands Act, a
bold measure which created the United States Reclamation Service and authorized
the federal government to ﬁnance and construct large-scale irrigation projects in the
arid West.10 After passage of the Reclamation Act, the Interior Department withdrew
130,000 acres of land from homestead ﬁlings north and south of the lower Snake
River to create the Minidoka tract. Crews, including an all-female survey group,
arrived to survey the Minidoka Dam site in March 1903. In April 1904 the Interior
Secretary appropriated $2,600,000 for the construction of a dam, spillway, canal
system, power house, and pumping mechanism at Minidoka, making it the seventh
project funded under the Newlands Act. The Reclamation Service entered into a
contract with Bates-Rogers Construction Company, Chicago, in August 1904 and
within the year work on the dam commenced. Bates-Rogers completed the dam and
its supporting structures in 1909; at that time the project’s irrigation water impacted
approximately 45,000 acres. It
was during this initial phase of
construction that Albin DeMary,
along with his father and two
other interested businessmen,
visited the Minidoka Project and
became enthusiastic about the
economic prospects of the region
north of the Snake River—the
territory that, through DeMary’s
inﬂuence, became Minidoka
15.4. Minidoka Dam in 1911.
County in 1912.11
Homesteaders appeared in the Minidoka area almost immediately after the
Reclamation Service chose the site. Most of the early inhabitants of the project
associated themselves with the Rupert town site, though the Reclamation Service
also created the towns of Heyburn and Paul as part of the project. The Rupert
Pioneer announced in November 1905 that “Rupert is on the map, and is out for
business, all she can get in a legitimate way.” The boosters had their eye not only
on the land north of the Snake River, at that time part of Lincoln County, but also
on development opportunities south of the river, in Cassia County. “… No ordinary
stream will be permitted to become a barrier in extending Rupert’s commercialism,”
the Rupert paper warned the neighboring community of Burley in 1905. “Eight
months ago a sagebrush plain, inhabited only by coyotes and long-eared jacks,” the
Pioneer continued,
now, at the close of eight months, a city of 400 inhabitants, a school of a
hundred scholars, a business aggregation of 64 concerns, an opera house,
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two secret orders, a Methodist Church, a Sunday school, a lawyer to get
people out of trouble … a doctor to cure people of their ills, and a glorious
future that no man can doubt.12

Albin and Elizabeth DeMary committed themselves to securing that
“glorious future.” Elizabeth DeMary inﬂuenced the cultural climate of Rupert
primarily through her founding of the Culture Club. Rupert’s unformed social
structure held great promise for DeMary and her associates, for they could engage
in municipal building rather than in mere “Municipal Housekeeping,” the term then
applied to women’s club reform.13 Instead of battling existing institutions, they were
the institution. Considered “the ﬁrst rural community woman’s club in Idaho,” the
Culture Club heralded Rupert’s entrance into the Idaho Federated Women’s Club
movement. The General Federation of Women’s Clubs, founded in 1890, served
as a national umbrella for women’s organizations. Though wide-ranging in size,
location, and membership, the federated clubs shared a commitment to education,
literacy, political activism, and environmental beautiﬁcation. The clubs enjoyed
their greatest membership in urban environments, but may have had their greatest
relative inﬂuence in rural environments. Isolation, blowing dust, unrelenting
sun, and scarce water led many women on the reclamation frontier to seek female
companionship through the club movement. Throughout the irrigated West, these
groups supported public libraries, city parks, and restrictions on certain behaviors,
including sidewalk spitting and alcohol consumption. The Culture Club and other
federated clubs advocated a conservative political role for women, based on the
moral exceptionality of women, rather than a more radical equal rights position.
They also took the majority of their membership from the ranks of white, Protestant,
and well-educated women. The General Federation motto “Unity in Diversity”
referred not to the diversity of the women but to the variety of clubs—few
immigrant, African-American, American Indian, or Hispanic American women were
invited to join the ranks.14
Women’s clubs in the reclamation West were particularly lacking in
diversity. In places like Rupert, where everyone started out in the same dusty
shack, “keeping up appearances” placed additional emphasis on associating with
the “right people.” By the early twentieth century, a certain level of consumption
was required to maintain middle- or upper-class status, consumption that was
often unattainable on the sagebrush ﬂats. The household manual Our Home, Or
Influences Emanating from the Hearthstone, published in 1899, warned housewives
that appropriate furnishings were essential for the proper rearing of children: “It is
as much the duty of parents, then, to adorn and beautify their home as it is to keep
the moral atmosphere of that home pure.”15 Nineteenth-century sentimental novels
portrayed the degraded and “uncivilized” conditions of frontier life. Women in
irrigated settlement areas attempted Victorian and Progressive domesticity without
gas lighting, indoor plumbing, or household help, at a time when their urban peers
experienced a revolution in home convenience. To avoid the grim demise of
female protagonists in Victorian sentimentality—to lose status, reﬁned taste, and
thus authority—middle-class women in irrigated settlement communities founded
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literary societies.16 If their living conditions placed them among the laboring
masses, their creative endeavors set them apart from both the irrigated landscape
and from association with the working class. The societies also formed the basis for
a political voice that inﬂuenced living conditions for all residents on the sagebrush
plains.
Elizabeth DeMary and six other women inaugurated Rupert’s Culture
Club at the home of Anna LaRue, the wife of another of Rupert’s ﬁrst homestead
ﬁlees and businessmen, in October 1905.17 The club chose to limit its membership
to eighteen, ostensibly because it planned to meet exclusively in private homes,
and committed itself to the cultural and artistic advancement of Rupert. The club
did not welcome immigrants or Catholics. The group held its second meeting
in the DeMary home, but by the spring of 1906 moved some of its meetings to
the (relatively) prestigious dining room of the Rupert Hotel, located on the town
square. At the ﬁrst meeting, club members signed a petition requesting that the State
Traveling Library include Rupert on its schedule. The traveling library, founded by
the Columbian Club of Boise in 1893, had become the primary source of literary
material for over two hundred Idaho communities by 1905. Hosted by women’s
clubs throughout the state, the traveling library illustrated the connection between
literacy, education, class and culture that infused rural women’s groups. The Culture
Club claimed the traveling library, which ﬁrst visited Rupert in 1906, as an early
victory in its perceived struggle against frontier illiteracy and degradation.18
The Culture Club engaged in a variety of other civic programs, and actively
encouraged the literary and artistic pursuits of its own members. The group funded
a lyceum lecture series, sponsored an art exhibit, lobbied for women’s public
restrooms, and spawned a plethora of other women’s clubs, including the Clionian
Club, Fortnightly Club, Rupert Civic Club, and Merry Go Round Club.19 In
advocating the institution of public restrooms, the club supported more than a place
for a lady to use private facilities. Public restrooms for women corresponded to a
value system of domestic consumption–in order for women to shop in town, they
needed to have access to a private place. Women’s lounges offered an escape from
street grime, and a place in which to gather, where literature and reading could be
placed for the pleasure of the cultured woman. Restrooms also enabled farm women
to come to town with the knowledge that there would be somewhere to rest and,
perhaps, to read.20 To further expand the minds of Rupert’s populace, Culture Club
women also leant their support to Rupert’s Opera House and Dramatic Association,
which hosted its ﬁrst production in November 1905. The only such venue south of
Boise, the opera house reﬂected the cultural idealism of Rupert’s clubwomen. When
it ﬁrst opened the town newspaper declared that the theater was “designed in such a
manner that between acts out of town people can gaze upon it and be convinced that
their wants can be supplied in our city.”21
The ladies of the club did not, however, want all needs to be met in Rupert.
The club discouraged alcohol consumption and participated in the elimination of
Rupert’s “Red Light District.” Village trustees and “a large number of citizens,” the
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Rupert Pioneer reported in September 1906, met to discuss the town’s “social evil.”
The group informed red light district occupants that they had twenty-four hours to
leave town or face arrest and ﬁnes; the “social evil” responded by leaving on the
night train.22 Saloons also became a target of the Progressive spirit in early Rupert.
In November 1909 three Minidoka project reclamation towns—Rupert, Heyburn,
and Acequia—passed legislation illegalizing the sale of alcoholic beverages.23
Elizabeth DeMary’s club drew upon the irrigated landscape to portray Rupert
as a uniquely progressive urban center. Yearly “moonlit excursions” to Minidoka
Dam married the ideals of the Culture Club to the optimism of reclamation.24 A
photograph housed at the DeMary Memorial Library in Rupert indicates that the
Culture Club held meetings in the verdant, irrigated backyard of the DeMary home.
Eight well-dressed women in hats sit near an arbor while Elizabeth DeMary serves
tea and cookies from a white-clothed table.25 In giving her 1907 presidential address
to the Culture Club, Elizabeth DeMary declared that the club, like reclamation water,
was responsible for breaking “the unspeakable quiet of the desert.” Reclamation
water turned the desert green; Progressive women’s clubs provided the appropriate
social and cultural landscape. The club had grown in membership “until a name
upon our roll is a coveted possession,” DeMary explained in her 1907 presidential
speech, because “our aim is one of mutual helpfulness and a reaching out for those
things which broaden and enrich life.” “Our vision is not bounded by the endless
sage brush and the encircling hills,” DeMary continued; “We have penetrated
beyond.” The 1907 banquet ended with a series of lecture presentations by Rupert’s
elite settlers. Topics included “A Little Journey in the World: A Contrast of Naples,
Italy, and Minidoka, Idaho,” “Reminiscences on Roast Turkey,” and “Art in a
Shack.” The latter speech emphasized the need for culture even in a “humble
shack” in a “bleak desert.”26 DeMary later described her cultural contribution in the
Reclamation Record. Every reclamation woman, she emphasized, “had made a great
sacriﬁce to come to this new land in order that she might help to create in the desert
a new garden.”27
The literary practices—the reading, writing, and poetry—maintained by
the Culture Club, and other irrigated settlement women’s clubs, reﬂected and
deﬁned cultural perceptions of the irrigated landscape. DeMary’s poem “Irrigation”
appeared in Reclamation Era magazine, and illustrates the connection between
women’s literary work and the “reclaiming” of the desert:
Oh, Mesa, with those wise clear eyes of old
Could you have dreamed this vision to behold?
Long aeons you have gazed across the plain
And Man’s control have held in high disdain
But now where gone are deer and antelope
The stubborn sage that clung to every slope
The caravan that wound its weary way,
The lurching stage that would not brook delay?
Again where vanished tribes of warriors bold
Who bravely fought these native trails to hold?
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Gone to oblivion, and through the land
A magic wand is Irrigation’s hand.
From distant ports skilled birdmen
wing their ﬂights
While desert dark gives way to myriad lights;
Where once the drifting dunes of sand held sway
The children gather ﬂowers as they may,
And tapestries are spread o’er all the ﬁelds
Where yellow ripening grain abundance yields
Oh, Mesa, with those wise clear eyes of old
Could you have dreamed this vision to behold?28

Like DeMary, Irene Welch Grissom, a clubwoman appointed Idaho’s PoetLaureate in 1923 “in response to the request of the State Federation of Women’s
Clubs,” portrayed a gendered irrigated landscape in her work. DeMary’s desert is
transformed by “Man’s control”; Grissom’s desert yields to masculine engineering:
A dreamer comes–as dreamers will–
To watch the swirling torrents spill
Between the steep, black lava walls,
And on the foaming, crashing falls.
He sees the desert, vast and grand,
Give way before a man-made land,
The sparkling streams ﬂash here and there,
And life is springing everywhere.29

With the desert’s greening comes feminine inﬂuence; DeMary’s “children gather
ﬂowers as they may,” while Grissom’s irrigated landscape is dotted “with houses set
in misty green, And church spires lifted high.”30 These gendered portrayals deﬁned
the position of women’s clubs on the irrigated frontier. First, men tamed the desert
with engineering marvels. Then, women “settled” the new “garden” by introducing
the elements of civilization—children, homes, and churches.31
In providing a forum for women’s views, supporting women’s literacy and
education, and by sponsoring women’s creative practices, the Culture Club indirectly
supported other Progressive reforms, including suffrage. No evidence exists
that the club openly endorsed national suffrage. Indeed, many Minidoka settlers
viewed the group as narrow and elitist. But, as the ﬁrst women’s organization on
the Minidoka Project, the club inspired a host of other organizations that supported
more radical reforms. The Federation of Women’s Clubs, of which the Culture Club
was a member, endorsed suffrage at its 1910 national convention.32 A photograph
of the Rupert square, taken during the early 1910s, reveals that the reclamation
community hosted a suffragette parade. Finely dressed women march down the
dusty street, carrying signs with slogans such as “Rupert for Suffrage” and “Votes
for Women.” The parade appears to be well-attended; rows of men and women line
the streets of the square. Minidoka Project suffragettes already possessed the right
to vote, because Idaho became the fourth state to grant that right in1896. Rupert’s
suffrage parade suggests that women in states and communities that already had the
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vote were essential in procuring the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. They actively
lobbied for a right that they already possessed, so that women who could not safely
ﬁght for that right would eventually possess it as well. Many of the women who
already had the vote lived in the arid West, the area served by the Reclamation Act.
Wyoming (1869), Utah (1870), Colorado (1893), Washington (1910), California
(1911), Oregon (1912), Arizona (1912), Montana (1914), and Nevada (1914) all
granted full suffrage to women before 1920. Women in reclamation communities
used their unique relationship with the federal government to support national
suffrage. Reclamation communities received unprecedented federal attention;
suffrage advocates used this attention to lobby for women’s voting rights.33
Elizabeth DeMary’s inﬂuence extended beyond the cultural landscape to
the built environment. Rupert’s central green, the only town square in the state
of Idaho, recalled the city squares of Midwestern towns, where both DeMarys
spent their childhoods. The Reclamation Service platted Rupert in 1904; by 1905
businesses had sprung up on four streets facing a square, where Reclamation
ofﬁcials planned to dig the ﬁrst well on the Minidoka tract. Settlers called the town
Wellﬁrst, or Wetﬁrst, until the service ofﬁcially changed the name to Rupert.34 The
earliest businesses to locate on the town square did so illegally, as the lots were not
appraised and sold until 1907 and 1908. Pressure from concerned citizens, like the
DeMarys, helped to maintain the integrity of the square throughout 1905 and 1906,
despite problems with squatters and a lack of water. When, during the spring of
1906, an enterprising businessman attempted to erect a building in the center of the
square, a group of concerned citizens formed a committee to halt the construction.
Albin DeMary participated in the group, which convinced Cal Masterson to
move his building and collected six dollars in donations to help defray the cost of
relocation.35
In June 1907, with the ﬁrst irrigation water in sight, Rupert surveyed,
cleared and graded its streets and planted poplar trees throughout the central
green. “In the center will be a circle of 75 feet in diameter surrounded by trees,”
the paper explained, “in which seats will be placed for summer lounging, and to
which walks will lead diagonally from each corner, and one from each side of the
four side centers.” To further enhance the irrigated landscape of the town square,
town trustees forbade carriage trafﬁc on the immediate side streets, so that women
would not have to step over steaming clumps of manure, and instituted an ordinance
requiring teams to be “properly tied either to a hitching post or suitable weight.”
In 1910, Rupert’s trustees issued contracts to build sidewalks around the square;
the town voted to pave its streets in 1919. By 1947, the Minidoka County News
declared, “no city of comparable size in Idaho has as many hard-surfaced streets
as the City of Rupert, and every one of them oiled since 1919!” The Rupert town
square remains a testament to the Edenic idealism of reclamation settlers. An elite
corps of Rupert founders managed to make the city green a priority, even when
water was scarce and intended for crop irrigation, not aesthetic use. In January 2001
the National Park Service listed the Rupert town square and its surrounding historic
district on the National Register of Historic Places.36
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Albin DeMary’s inﬂuential civic organizations overlapped and
complemented the efforts of the Culture Club, blurring the lines between the
political and domestic spheres of men’s and women’s activity. In February 1906
DeMary and twenty-three other men, many ﬂedgling Rupert business owners,
gathered at the Benton building on the square to form the Commercial Club. The
group committed itself to procuring a water works, electric power plant, ﬂour
mill, sugar factory, and graded city streets. Throughout the 1910s and early 1920s
DeMary and his colleagues never missed an opportunity to further Rupert’s business
environment. The establishment of the Amalgamated Sugar Factory between the
towns of Rupert and Paul in 1917 provides an example of the Commercial Club’s
accomplishments. The Minidoka Project’s vast acreages of irrigated land and
small family farms attracted the Amalgamated Company; the Commercial Club
provided the push to bring the
plant to Rupert. The Commercial
Club helped convince Minidoka
farmers to appropriate over 5,000
acres for sugar beet production.
DeMary’s organization also
secured the right-of-way for
a road leading directly from
Rupert to the processing plant.
Throughout 1917 the Commercial
Club collected donations to
compensate farmers for the land
15.5. Irrigating sugar beets on the Minidoka
Project.
they surrendered for the road.37
In spite of victories like the traveling library, Rupert town square, and
sugar factory, organized optimism and boosterism did not create the kind of
cultural agrarian paradise that the DeMarys envisioned. The Minidoka Project
remains one of the most successful in reclamation history—Rupert and the other
project settlement communities are still viable communities with economies
based on irrigated agriculture. But the DeMarys were not successful in fending
off the “frontier image,” or in preventing dangerous settler squabbles. Elizabeth
DeMary’s club activities could not, in the end, produce a permanent Protestantcontrolled culture. In many ways, the idealism of Progressive settlers like the
DeMarys stemmed not from actual successes, but from the desire to appear to be
succeeding in their efforts to turn irrigation projects into Progressive garden oases.
Observations by visitors to the project during the ﬁrst decade illustrate the difﬁculty
of this endeavor. Henry A. Wallace, who toured the Minidoka project in 1909 as part
of his investigation of irrigated farmland for the family journal Wallaces’ Farmer,
found little to praise in Rupert and its surrounding farmland. Wallace attributed the
slow development of irrigation and urban culture in the Minidoka area to the very
fact that it was a federal project—as opposed to the more developed, private Carey
Act project in Twin Falls. “Rupert is a government townsite [sic], and shows the
effects of it,” Wallace wrote, “for it is one of the most dilapidated little towns which
I have ever seen.” His description must have horriﬁed Rupert’s boosters:
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All the buildings are little square frame affairs with just enough ambition
to be painted. The ramshackle buildings are arranged on four sides of a
square which has a ﬁne stand of blue grass and white clover which the town
hasn’t had energy enough to mow. There are a few poplar and locust trees
which may make some shade some day.

After observing the Rupert square, Wallace toured the countryside and interviewed
individual homesteaders, many of whom expressed frustration with the landscape
and with reclamation. “At ﬁrst we didn’t get water when the government promised
it to us,” a woman from Iowa told Wallace, “then when we did get water the wind
was so strong that we could hardly get anything seeded down before the wind would
come along and blow it out or cut it down.” The owner of a three-year old claim,
a man from Montana, explained that Minidoka farms had a ramshackle appearance
because “these people around here are not a very high class of irrigators.” Most of
the homesteaders came to the country without capital, and “for the ﬁrst two years
they had an awful hard time hanging on, for the water wasn’t ready yet and on their
own places there wasn’t anything but sage brush … then when the water did come
they didn’t have enough money to ﬁx their land right, and they just stuck in their
crops haphazard.” Another settler complained of the wind, and to illustrate told
Wallace the already mythic story of the Minidoka project. A man on one side of the
project, the tale went, planted a garden. The wind came up and blew it ﬁfteen miles,
across the river, to another settler’s claim, who then raised the garden himself.38
Despite Wallace’s grim observations and disgruntled interviewees, he looked
beyond the poverty of the present to a prosperous, well-watered future. Wallace saw
potential in the Minidoka soil, even as he wrote that “it is a backward country, the
people are without money, and there is no booming whatever.” The country “should
grow steadily,” he predicted, “and a thickly populated little farming community
should develop here.” He also shared Albin C. DeMary’s Progressive commitment
to scientiﬁc solutions. While the town and homesteads disappointed Wallace, the
Minidoka dam did not. The structure “is a tremendous affair,” Wallace proclaimed,
with “3,200 feet of spillway” on the south of the main dam which makes up “the
prettiest part of the whole thing.” Wallace’s description of the concrete spillway as
creating a “beautiful parabola in going over” mixed natural imagery with scientiﬁc
accomplishment, an integral characteristic of the reclamation vision. Terms like
“tremendous,” “prettiest,” and “beautiful” presented Wallace’s Midwestern readers
with an image of the Minidoka Dam as a natural wonder.39
Wallace’s research uncovered the contradictions inherent in the reclamation
vision.40 Homesteaders desired government-supplied water, but they wanted to
control it; claimants took advantage of accessible land, but they didn’t possess
the capital to develop it; settlers envisioned an agrarian Eden but lived in oneroom houses on plots of blowing dirt; Progressive ideals competed with the needs
of immigrant farmers; and a growing schism between middle-class irrigation
professionals and impoverished farmers threatened the cooperation necessary to
make reclamation work. These problems reached a fever pitch during the early
1910s, creating the need for settlers’ and water users’ associations to negotiate
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directly with the Reclamation Service. DeMary served as the settlers’ representative
throughout this period. As reclamation settlers and government ofﬁcials
institutionalized the patterns of irrigation on the Minidoka tract, Progressive ideals
began to take a back seat to water allocation, control, and development.
From the project’s inception, the conﬂict between vision and reality
contributed to the disillusionment of settlers and deteriorating relations between
the Reclamation Service and water users. The geographic characteristics of the
Minidoka project created difﬁculties for water users. Most of the land suitable for a
gravity-ﬂow canal system lay on the north side, or Rupert side, of the Snake. Terrain
on the south side of the river necessitated construction of a pumping system to lift
the water to farmland. Construction of both the gravity canals and the south side
lifts proceeded slowly, while reclamation ofﬁcials struggled to work out the complex
allocation and payment schedules of both sides of the river. Settlers who ﬁled and
moved onto their claims waited for several years before they received irrigation
water. The dam at Minidoka reached partial completion in the fall of 1906, but a
scarcity of available labor forced delays in the construction of the north side canals,
which did not deliver water until July 1907. Many north side settlers planted seed
in anticipation of water that year, but did not receive it in time to save their crops.
North side settlers complained, but they were fortunate; on the south side, settlers
waited until 1912 and 1913, when reclamation ofﬁcials completed the lift stations.41
Dam and lift completion inaugurated new problems. In November 1906,
only two months after Minidoka Dam began service, the Snake River shrank to a
trickle. The Rupert Pioneer declared that “for many miles below the Minidoka dam,
there was hardly enough water ﬂowing to ﬂoat a toothpick.” Dam gates were closed
and ferry service was interrupted until reclamation ofﬁcials released water from
the Minidoka reservoir, Lake Walcott. Canal erosion and seepage wasted irrigation
water, which bled the Snake dry. By 1906 the Reclamation Service employed one
water master and eleven “ditch tenders” or “ditch riders” to monitor canal banks
for bank erosion. During the early years of the project, before the canal banks
were packed solid and sodded, waves created by southern Idaho winds constantly
threatened to wash out their banks. Ditch riders patrolled about six miles each of the
main canals. If they encountered a wash or bank erosion, they notiﬁed the service
and made the necessary repairs. Seepage, or water leakage through soil inﬁltration,
represented a more insidious, and invisible, threat to water control. Nearly 100,000
acre-feet of water seeped out of canals on the Minidoka Project’s north side in
1912. Even after the early settlement years, seepage and erosion continued to haunt
Minidoka settlers, necessitating the eventual lining of main canals with stone and
mortar or concrete.42
Other unexpected environmental consequences accompanied the Minidoka
construction. Canal digging and ﬁeld plowing stirred up enormous clouds of dust,
which combined with strong southern Idaho winds to make the project nearly
uninhabitable. Dust settled in homes, destroyed machinery, and blocked out the
sun, requiring the use of oil lamps during the middle of the day. “When we looked
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toward the west,” Minidoka settler Gerhard A. Riedesel recalled of a 1914 dust
storm, “we saw a dark, threatening wall of dust advancing with a vertical front
perhaps 1,000 feet high, extending from the southwest to the northwest as far as
we could see.” Riedesel’s family sought cover in the house, but the “dust sifted
through the cracks around the door and windows and soon the entire ﬂoor and all
the furniture were covered with a dusty, dry, gritty layer of yellow silt.” Respiratory
problems plagued Minidoka homesteaders. Dry winds and dust often forced farmers
to reseed, as they did across the project in 1908 and 1909. Since most settlers
lived in one- or two-room houses, often without adequate windows or door frames,
homesteaders could not escape the ﬁne silt that invaded their private oases.43
Frustrated by delays and dust storms, settlers eager for water found that
once they had it, they couldn’t get rid of it. Water seeped out of the canals only to
cause saturated ﬁelds to ﬂood. Drainage on the north side of the Snake presented as
great an engineering challenge as construction of the original gravity canals, forcing
water users to pay additional funds to the Reclamation Service in order to ﬁnance
the construction of miles of drainage ditches. “Funny, how we hurried to get water
on the land and then had to spend a lot of money in drainage to get it off again,”
Albin DeMary recalled in a 1944 letter to a former reclamation ofﬁcial. “Just now,”
DeMary added, “we have the promise of another drain a mile south of Rupert to take
care of some wet land.” By 1909 more than 10,000 acres of Minidoka soil were no
longer arable because they were too wet. In August 1909 the Reclamation Service
began construction of a $400,000 surface drainage system in order to regulate the
elevation of the sub-water. Surface drainage ditches did not provide adequate relief,
so the service added drain wells and pumping stations to remove excess water. More
than seventy miles of drainage ditches had been dug on the project by 1912.44
Settlers on the north side battled drainage problems, while on the south
side pump division settlers found that they had to construct their own lateral canals
when the service diverted part of the Minidoka Project’s funds to the Boise-Payette
Project. Beginning in 1906 the service envisioned a cooperative effort between
water users, who were supposed to dig the lateral, or sublateral, irrigation ditches
connecting individual farms to the main canals. The service organized more
than four hundred local districts to complete the work, but did not always get the
cooperation it sought. Farmers competed with each other for completion of their
section of the lateral ditches. Homesteaders hired someone else to build their
section of the lateral canal, leaving their neighbors to complete the task on their
own. Disagreements between neighbors over lateral water distribution, in some
cases, turned violent. In July 1908 a settler referred to only as Mr. Landford and
his neighbor, John Fleming, had a heated argument over who would have the use
of the lateral water on that day. Landford prevailed; Fleming went home to plan
his revenge. The following morning, Fleming hid himself in a ﬁeld of alfalfa and
waited for his neighbor, the father of three, to arrive to check his ditches. When
Landford approached, Fleming shot and killed him. Fleming received the sentence
of death by hanging, but it was later reduced to life. The guilty Minidoka settler
served twelve years in the state penitentiary.45
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Dust storms, water shortages, settler rivalries, and reclamation policy
combined to create near rebellion on the Minidoka Project in 1911. Some
discouraged water users relinquished their improved claims for sums ranging from
$400 to $4000 (for eighty acres), while others worked through the settler association
to achieve control of reclamation water. Settlers openly questioned the authority
of the Reclamation Service, despite the fact that their very existence on the desert
tract depended on the service. In March, one settler lamented in the PioneerRecord that the Reclamation Service’s “charges for operation and maintenance
are assessed against the settler without his consent and expenditured [sic] without
his knowledge.” “No function of this United States government is self-contained
enough, or big enough,” J. D. Akins continued, “that it can trample with impunity
the rights of its humblest citizens.” Settler anger increased in April when the service
revealed that it intended to issue a new contract replacing the original water charge
of $22.00 per acre with a charge of $26.00 per acre. Albin DeMary’s Commercial
Club rushed to form a committee to draft a statement to send to Idaho Senator
William Borah, decrying the new policy and demanding graduated water payments
“without any strings.” Ignoring the fact that Minidoka businesses and farms had
been the beneﬁciaries of the government’s construction projects, the club issued a
public statement declaring that if the service had overspent on construction, then it
“should stand the loss the same as any individual would have to stand it . . .” The
Minidoka Water Users Association, which replaced the ﬁrst settlers’ organization,
joined with the Commercial Club in rejecting the new contract. DeMary, acting
on behalf of both the Commercial Club and the Minidoka Water Users Board of
Directors, prepared a series of resolutions to unite the settlers in their opposition.
DeMary recommended that the settlers agree to the new contract, provided that the
service publish an itemized schedule of
its operation and maintenance expenses;
offer the settlers a graduated scale for
water right payments; give the settlers fair
representation in the management of the
project; and pledge itself to help secure
passage of legislation giving settlers patents
to their lands (as it stood, patents could only
be issued after water users had paid for their
water right in full).46
The water users succeeded in
prompting the Interior Department to send
“legal representatives” to Rupert in May
1911 to meet with Albin DeMary and other
members of the board. On May 23 Morris
Bien and Philip H. Wells met privately with
DeMary and several other men from the
water users’ executive committee; later in
15.6. 1920 portrait of Morris Bien who
the evening they held a public hearing. The was sent to deal with settlers over
executive meeting lasted several hours and charges on the Minidoka Project.
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threatened to erupt when one board member accused local reclamation ofﬁcials of
making false statements. DeMary outlined the settlers’ position, emphasizing that
“a good many of the settlers when they ﬁled on this project … believed that the
government would take it and operate it at its expense.” Now, DeMary explained,
the settlers resented what they viewed as “improper use of money in the operation
and maintenance of the project.” Reclamation ofﬁcials made no apologies for the
policies of the service, noting instead that “it is easy to say that this should have
been done better. … Everybody knows if they look back, they could have done
differently.” Still, the federal ofﬁcers concluded that they intended to “work up a
public notice … that will settle everything.”47
Albin DeMary’s proposals and his representation of the settlers at the
users’ meeting did not meet with the satisfaction of all of the project’s farmers.
Some settlers refused to participate in the association, which they viewed as a
self-interested, elitist institution. “We are sick and tired of the antics of the men
who style themselves the Minidoka Water Users Association …,” P. O. O’Rourke
bellowed in an editorial in the Pioneer-Record: “There will be no treaty making
[sic] with the truce breakers, there will be no surrender.” Despite the opposition
of settlers like O’Rourke, DeMary and the water users could claim at least some of
the credit when Interior Secretary Walter
L. Fisher and Reclamation Director
Frederick Newell visited the project in
September 1911. Fisher and Newell met
with the water users and listened to their
grievances; by October, the water users
had a new contract which addressed
some of the settlers’ concerns. The new
contract allowed for graduated payments
and divided water and drainage payments
equally throughout the project. It also
grandfathered any settler who had an
original contract at the $22.00 per acre
rate. Interior Secretary Fisher refused
to reconsider the loathsome $26.00 per
acre amount, however, and he further
maintained that the authority of the
Reclamation Service could not be divided
by providing for ofﬁcial representation of 15.7. Frederick H. Newell visited the
Minidoka Project in 1911 with Secretary of
the water users in the governing body of
the Interior Walter L. Fisher.
the agency.48
The new contract and visit by reclamation ofﬁcials met with criticism in the
Pioneer-Record; one editorialist declared that “this city was inﬂicted last Tuesday
with the presence of a bunch of high reclamation ofﬁcials, whose visit amounted
to about as much as ___(ﬁll in the blanks for yourself).” Nonetheless, the new
contract heralded a better relationship between the water users and the Reclamation
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Service. The years following 1911 were good ones for Minidoka farmers. By 1913
DeMary estimated that 8,700 people lived on the project, which also boasted 1,684
farms at an estimated average value of $6,454. DeMary’s boosterism paid off when,
in November 1914, voters on the Minidoka Project voted to make Rupert the seat
of Minidoka County. DeMary’s 1913 history of the project credited the Interior
Department with giving settlers “more latitude,” extending the time for water
payments, and limiting the number of cancellations made on homestead entries.
DeMary also recognized his wife’s efforts at shaping the culture of the reclamation
community. Several women’s clubs engaged in “serious literary work,” DeMary
noted, and exerted “a large inﬂuence in moulding the character of the citizenship.”49
DeMary’s efforts at forming an inﬂuential water users’ association laid the
groundwork for future organizations, including the Minidoka Irrigation District,
founded in 1917, and the Burley Irrigation District, formed in 1918. The power
these groups wielded, however, declined by the late 1910s. As more watered
acreage was added to reclamation projects along the Snake River, competition
for water from homesteaders outside of the Minidoka tract increased. Scientiﬁc
engineering complicated the river’s ﬂow, and made water allocation for all Snake
River users more complex. Throughout the 1910s, water users upriver, in Rigby and
Idaho Falls, decried what they viewed as unfair allocation of the water to “Magic
Valley” (Minidoka and Twin Falls) users. Reclamation ofﬁcials attempted to
preserve the Minidoka Project’s water in the Jackson Lake reservoir (completed in
1907 and expanded in 1910 and 1916), but this allocation had to travel downstream,
past Idaho Falls and Rigby farms, to reach Rupert farms. The service could not
speciﬁcally identify, of course, what part of the living river was Minidoka water.
Conﬂicts up and down the Snake resulted in the creation of intra-cooperative
water users’ associations. Groups like the Snake River Committee of Nine utilized
attorneys, water engineers, and relations with the Bureau of Reclamation (the
Reclamation Service became the Bureau
of Reclamation in 1923) to negotiate
water allocation between projects on the
upper and lower Snake. At the same
time, the bureau increasingly relied on
technical experts to manage its projects,
particularly after creation of American
Falls reservoir in 1927. These trends
limited the ability of small, projectoriented settlers’ groups to negotiate,
like the Minidoka Water Users did in
15.8. American Falls Dam in 1927, soon after
1911, directly with the government
completion.
50
agency.
Changes in the political environment also affected the Culture Club.
Like many federated women’s clubs, the group disbanded during World War I.
Competition from other women’s organizations, the transfer of club goals from
cultural advancement to the support of the war effort, the debate over women’s
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suffrage and paciﬁsm, and a perceived linkage between socialist groups and
organized women’s clubs hurt attendance nationwide.51 The demise of the Culture
Club may also have been reﬂective of a population shift on the project. Despite
Albin DeMary’s best efforts to expand reclamation on the north side of the river and
to attract businesses to the city, by 1920 it became clear that Burley, the community
on the southern side of the Snake River, would outstrip Rupert in population and
become the premier commercial center on the Minidoka tract. Burley’s proximity
to Twin Falls, Paul, and Heyburn gave it a strategic geographic advantage. Between
1920 and 1930, the town of Rupert lost population, dropping from 2,372 to 2,250
inhabitants.
Some of DeMary’s commercial projects conﬂicted with the values of his
wife’s Culture Club. The Amalgamated Sugar Factory stimulated the production of
sugar beets; sugar beet farmers employed children to do the monotonous hoeing that
beets required, at a time when federated clubs worked to limit child labor. Snake
River farmers hired immigrant workers, changing the original demographic structure
of reclamation towns like Rupert. German and Russian Catholic immigrants came
in large numbers to take advantage of homestead claims, particularly on the “North
Side” of Rupert, where it was found that a natural aquifer made dryland farming
possible. These immigrants found the kind of opportunity advocated by Progressive
women’s clubs, but, at the same time, their presence diluted the inﬂuence of Rupert’s
elite Protestant settlers. Moreover, these new immigrants failed to adhere to the
domestic and cultural standards maintained and supported by clubwomen. By the
1920s, the Idaho State Federation of Women’s Clubs was advocating a ﬁrm stance
on the issue of immigration and Idaho communities. “Throughout the Federation
this term emphasis was on Americanization,” the Federation’s historian explained,
“for war had shown the need for assimilating into American life the foreign born
upon her shores.”52 It may have seemed to Elizabeth DeMary that the urban
evils she had tried to escape–child labor, corporate inﬂuence, Eastern European
immigration, poverty–had followed her to the desert.53
The efforts of Elizabeth and Albin DeMary to create a locally-controlled
irrigated oasis with a Progressive culture on the Minidoka Project revealed the
complex ideology underlying reclamation settlement. Albin DeMary’s careful
negotiations between water users and the Reclamation Service, his relentless support
of commercial enterprises, and his involvement in southern Idaho’s earliest water
users association made Rupert the business center of the Minidoka Project until
the 1920s. In founding the Culture Club, Elizabeth DeMary created one of rural
Idaho’s ﬁrst women’s organizations. Her support of Progressive aesthetic values
helped to preserve Idaho’s only town square. Rupert’s opera house staged the only
live musical performances south of Boise; its streets played host to suffrage parades;
its elite Protestant founders outlawed houses of prostitution and saloons; and its
paved streets offered shaded, manure-free walking. Through their literary practices,
clubwomen shaped and deﬁned cultural perceptions of the irrigated landscape.
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The reality of life on the sagebrush ﬂats often interfered with the Progressive
vision. Rupert’s position as the lead Minidoka city faded as the relationship between
local water users and the Bureau of Reclamation became more complex. By the
mid-1920s, large, multi-project water users’ organizations had overshadowed
their smaller, project-based antecedents. New reclamation dams and reservoirs,
population growth, and greater demand for power generation limited the relative
power of small users’ associations in reclamation settlement towns. The demise
of the DeMary vision for Rupert paralleled a decline in the relative authority of
small farmers on the projects. During the brief settlement period, however, the
DeMarys demonstrated that water users and reclamation homesteaders possessed a
considerable amount of authority in determining the shape of their projects and the
cultures of their towns.
Laura Woodworth-Ney prepared the original of this paper for the history
of Reclamation symposium on June 18-19, 2002, at the University of Nevada–Las
Vegas. In September of that year she revised the paper. A different version of
this paper, one based on Elizabeth DeMary, was published as “Elizabeth Layton
DeMary and the Rupert Culture Club: New Womanhood in a Reclamation
Settlement Community,” in Dee Garceau-Hagan, editor, Portraits of Women in the
American West (New York: Routledge, 2005). Dr. Woodworth-Ney is chair of the
Department of History at Idaho State University in Pocatello. She is the author of
Mapping Identity: Creation of the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation, 1805-1902
which was published by the University Press of Colorado in 2004.
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“LAW OR NO LAW!”—Elwood Mead and The
Struggle Over Power Plant Revenues,
Shoshone Project, 1926-1953
By:
Robert E. Bonner
On January 11, 1912, the ﬂedgling Water Users Association on the
Shoshone Reclamation Project held its third annual meeting. Following an
animated discussion and the passage of resolutions in support of such things as
an extension of the repayment period and public accounting for operation and
maintenance expenses, they offered their ﬁnal resolution of the evening. Their
outgoing president referred to the matter as their “birthright,” and urged them to
look well to it. They resolved
To the end that all waterpower rights, privileges and possibilities
may be conserved to the people of this project we ask that no step in
relation to same be taken which may have within it the possibility,
however remote, of either loss or deterioration in respect to such
property rights. That absolute ownership and control of all power
sites, perquisites and privileges, within the limits of this Project, must
ultimately repose in the aggregate body of land owners or water users.
Our heritage in this connection must not in any wise or at any time be
placed in jeopardy.1

Much of the discussion among historians of the waterpower developed by
the Bureau of Reclamation at its damsites throughout the West has centered upon
the big question of the relation of this publicly-produced power to the private
power industry.2 Indeed, the issue of public vs. private power was of concern to
Reclamation leaders from the passing of the Waterpower Act of 1920. Settlers on
Reclamation projects, however, had a quite different view of the power question.
The prospect of hydroelectric power development on a project meant a signiﬁcant
increase in the standard of living of the local farmers, and as such was advertised
heavily in publications like Reclamation Record. But the Shoshone water users in
January of 1912 were not thinking of electric lights in their houses. Since April of
1906 every person who bought a water right on a Reclamation project purchased
at the same time a future interest in the proﬁts of any power development on the
project. Tacked on (section 5) to the act governing the withdrawal of townsites
on Reclamation Projects was a provision directing that the money derived from
the lease of power on a project be “placed to the credit of the project” in the
Reclamation Fund.3
From 1906 to 1939, according to the ofﬁcial historian of the Bureau,
Reclamation policy with respect to the distribution of proﬁts from power plants
was governed by that provision.4 Power revenues on many projects were handled
in this way. And it is true that the only general legislation on power revenues
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between 1906 and 1939 merely conﬁrmed the 1906 law.5 However, the policy
was frequently a subject of controversy and required authoritative redetermination
more than once.6 Moreover, the ofﬁcial account ignores the facts that there
were legislative interventions for a decade before 1939 designed to direct power
revenues away from projects, in contravention of the Act of 1906, and a serious
sustained effort to rewrite Reclamation law to separate water and power income in
the early 1930s.
As it happened,
the legal storm over
power plant revenues
broke on the Shoshone
Project in northwestern
Wyoming. The Project
consists of four divisions.
The ﬁrst to open, in
1908, was the Garland
Division, approximately
35,000 acres divided into
roughly 650 farms on the
ﬂat bench land around the
16.1. The “Claim shanty of Roderick Seaton, Garland
town of Powell. A decade Flat,” Shoshone Project, Wyoming, April 13, 1906.
later the Frannie Division,
north and east of the Powell ﬂat and less than half the size of Garland, was opened
to homesteading. Settlers in both of these areas took land in full knowledge of the
1906 act. They were paying the costs of the dam in the canyon west of Cody, and
they expected to beneﬁt someday from the development of a power plant there.
The Reclamation Service put off building the power plant until they needed a
source of power to operate construction machinery on the third unit of the project,
Willwood. The power plant was completed in 1922, as construction began on the
Willwood Diversion Dam and canal system.7
The twenties were a
difﬁcult period for American
agriculture, especially on
Reclamation projects saddled
with rising construction
costs. The major effort of the
Reclamation Service in the early
20s was the so-called FactFinders’ Commission, a kind of
Domesday inquest into every
facet of every project to ﬁnd
solid ground of agreement on
costs and procedures between
16.2. School children on the Willwood Division of
farmers and administrators. This the Shoshone Project in September of 1930.
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was Interior Secretary Hubert Work’s great effort to refound Reclamation. Out
of it came a new name, the Bureau of Reclamation, a new leader (Elwood Mead,
who had been prominent on the Commission), and comprehensive legislation
known as the Fact Finders’ Act, passed December 5, 1924. Many changes were
embodied in the Act, but power policy remained unchanged. Subsection I of the
Act provided that whenever water users take over the operation of a project, the
proﬁts “as determined by the Secretary” of any power plant on the project will
be credited annually to the construction charges of the water users, conﬁrming
thereby the Act of 1906.8
The same Act provided for a new and more generous method of repaying
construction charges, limiting the payment per acre to ﬁve per cent of the average
gross annual income over the past ten years. However, in order for settlers to
take advantage of the provisions of this act they needed to form an irrigation
district under state law. The farmers of the Garland Division had generally
resisted forming such a district, but the enticement of the 5% provision plus the
conﬁrmation of the power plant rights convinced them that it was time to take on
the responsibility. They formed the Shoshone Irrigation District November 28,
1925, and then entered upon lengthy negotiations with the Bureau for a contract.
Almost a year later they completed those negotiations, and the Irrigation District
took over the operation of the works for the Garland Division. Paragraph 31 of
their contract, in language that directly repeated Subsection I of the Fact Finders’
Act, guaranteed that any net proﬁts realized by the power plant would be credited
to the construction charges owed by the district.9
The Frannie Division of the Project also organized itself into an irrigation
district, the Deaver Irrigation District (so-named for the major town in that part
of the project) and worked out a contract with the Bureau in the fall of 1926. The
contract with Deaver contained a signiﬁcant new provision with respect to the
power plant, whereby the Deaver district obligated itself to pay a proportionate
share of the costs of the Shoshone power plant, “in order to receive its share of
net proﬁts of said plant.” This provision was to be effective only if the Shoshone
Irrigation District similarly agreed to accept a share of the power plant costs,
which they had not done in their contract.10 Commissioner Mead stated that the
idea to include this provision arose from the district negotiators, although since
similar provisions had been showing up in contracts with other districts, it seems
likely that the government negotiators had some role in it.11
The Deaver contract caused some consternation among Shoshone unitholders. Some felt their own contract language protected their rights in the power
plant, believing that they were already being charged those costs as the plant was
an integral part of the project, while others thought it best to amend the contract
to accept speciﬁc obligation for the costs of the power plant. At the same time,
ofﬁcials of the Bureau were trying to sort out their own position. E. E. Roddis,
District Counsel, offered his opinion that the law gave the Secretary no power to
build a power plant without a repayment contract, and therefore the water users
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were implicitly understood to have contracted for it and could expect proﬁts from
it to be applied to their construction charges. This was not how Elwood Mead
saw it. Whatever the legal theory of Reclamation might be, it was the policy of
the Commissioner from December 1927, that districts had to accept a speciﬁc
obligation to repay the additional construction expenses of building a power plant
before they could expect to beneﬁt from power revenues.12
Among other developments, the impending construction of Boulder Dam
made it imperative, in Mead’s mind, to separate power revenues from irrigation
repayments; power was no longer simply incidental to irrigation construction.
The power plant on the Salt River Project had shown for years the potential for
commercial power sales.13 Although the Shoshone power plant was smaller than,
say, Minidoka, none of the power was required for pumping for irrigation, and
the potential commercial development was consequently larger. The Bureau was
pursuing plans for expansion of the Shoshone power system, but found itself
ensnarled in legislation from an earlier time.
The news about power plant repayment was unwelcome to the Shoshone
farmers, but they quickly overcame their disappointment and began to negotiate
a new contract to assure their rights. Everyone knew that their power plant was
now a proﬁtable venture and was likely to become a cash cow very soon. Bureau
ofﬁcials in Powell, Billings, Denver, and Washington continued to grapple with
the meaning of Subsection I of the Fact-Finders’ Act. Some wanted to hold off
payment to Deaver and Shoshone until all power project costs had been repaid.
Since there were still three units of the project to be constructed, each of which
presumably would incur a share in the power system expenses and proﬁts,
that position would mean the ﬁrst two districts would have to wait decades to
receive any beneﬁts. Others said that the 1924 legislation clearly directed that
surplus revenues be applied as soon as they became available, which would
be very soon. This was the position of the Denver ofﬁce, stated forcefully in a
letter accompanying a draft contract dated March 5, 1928. Powell, Billings, and
Washington ofﬁcials were, however, increasingly uncomfortable with the prospect
of so much money going to the credit of these unit-holders. They began to search
for a means to hold it back.14
The District Counsel in Billings initially proposed that a repayment
contract be made for 20 years or less, presumably to prevent it from being too
generous a deal for the farmers. He based his position on the theory that power
plant repayment was an entirely separate contract rather than an amendment to
the 1926 contract, and therefore the repayment could not be made on the 5%
of crop-return basis embedded in that contract. Congress had repealed the 5%
crop-return repayment method in the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926. The
Commissioner, in seeking clariﬁcation from the Interior Department, pointed
out that if their current contract were applied to the power plant the unit holders
would pay nothing for the power plant until 1986, when the plant would probably
be obsolete, but they would collect at least ﬁve cents per acre immediately based
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on present prices. The Department solicitor ruled that while a contract could not
be made on the basis of the 1924 repayment method, a new contract might go
forward on the basis of a 40-year repayment period, according to the provisions of
the 1926 act.15
Knowing the water-users’ antipathy to increased assessments, the
Bureau believed no contract would be acceptable to the Shoshone District that
did not simply extend their 5% crop-return payment schedule to cover the new
indebtedness. Moreover, when the Commissioner instructed the Denver ofﬁce
how to proceed with the contract he stipulated that any new contract include a
provision for paying depreciation on the plant, estimated at ﬁve to seven per cent,
as a matter of operation and maintenance. He also interpreted the forty-year
repayment provision as having begun when the ﬁrst water-right contracts were
taken out, in 1908 (more than a decade before the plant was even designed!),
leaving a twenty-year period for the district to accomplish the repayment of power
system costs. Acting Commissioner Dent suggested to the Chief Engineer in
Denver that he remind the water users that the plant is not presently showing a
proﬁt if depreciation is ﬁgured in, as that “may make the district disinclined to go
on with the purchase of an interest in the power plant.”16
R. F. Walter, the Chief Engineer, seems to have been uncomfortable with
his colleagues’ strategy of discouraging negotiation. He proposed terms more
attractive to the water users and continued to deal with them in apparent good
faith.17 The Bureau sustained an appearance of serious negotiation throughout
the spring and summer. In August Elwood Mead himself met with the Shoshone
District board at the Burlington Inn in Cody, and in September Secretary Ray
O. West visited the Project with Mead and discussed the contract. District
negotiators worked to secure a 40-year repayment schedule that would begin in
1929, but the Bureau resisted. It seems clear that as the negotiations began both
District and Bureau negotiators assumed that not only Shoshone and Deaver but
the yet-to-be-built divisions of the project would share in the costs and beneﬁts
of operation of the power system. But as contract negotiations stretched out,
Elwood Mead developed other ideas. In the negotiations he was driving a hard
bargain, apparently hoping to discourage the District. At the Cody conference,
for instance, Mead took the position that the District must agree in 1928 to pay as
much as it would have had to pay if they had agreed in 1926, meaning they would
have to make up two years’ payments when a new contract was signed and cover
any operating losses during that same period of time.18
On November 16, 1928, Mead made public his new view, in his
introductory message to the Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations in charge of Interior Department appropriations for ﬁscal year
1930. He had previously circulated it within the department, particularly to
those engaged in the Shoshone negotiations, as a conﬁdential memo, in search
of responses. The core of the matter, as Mead presented it, was that projects
with power plants were deriving a subsidy from their power sales that gave
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them a striking advantage in repayment over water users on projects without
power plants, and this problem could only be expected to grow worse as power
revenues increased. He cited situations on the Newlands and Minidoka projects,
and dwelt on the Shoshone negotiations at some length. He noted that expansion
of the Shoshone power system was under consideration, the money for which
would come from the Reclamation Fund, but that under current law the eventual
proﬁts would all go to the farmers, “and the revenue promises to be large.” He
proposed a legislative remedy, in which power revenues would be applied ﬁrst to
power system expenses, then to construction debts of the project on which it is
located, and ﬁnally back into the Fund to recover losses incurred in Reclamation
development.19
It seems unlikely that Mead was as concerned with disparities among
project repayment situations as he was horriﬁed at the possibility of power
revenue leaking away into the hands of so many farmers. Experience seemed to
be showing him on every side that control of falling water was more important to
the future of his Bureau than control of spreading water. The Chief Engineer and
he had already initiated speciﬁc studies for doubling or tripling of the power to be
generated from Shoshone Dam, all of which was to be sold commercially.20 If he
was to build a mighty Bureau, as indeed seems to have been his determination,
he would need to seize control of power proﬁts wherever they were not already
contracted away. It was in this
environment that the end-game
of the Shoshone power plant
negotiations was played out.
Mead’s was truly a
move to cut the Gordian knot.
Power policy was ensnarled in
old laws, arcane theories, and
complicated interpretations
of precedent. Reclamation
ofﬁcials were uncertain how to
proceed. The superintendent in
Powell, who had argued from
the beginning for delaying
power revenues until all
construction costs had been
repaid, nevertheless reminded
Mead that power generation
on the Shoshone project
would have been impossible
without the dam and reservoir,
the cost of which the farmers
were already repaying. That
common sense consideration
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16.3. Buffalo Bill (Shoshone) Dam and the
Shoshone Powerplant, Shoshone Project, Wyoming.

was brushed aside at higher levels. Chief Engineer Walter recognized the
importance of capturing the power revenues, but wrote of it as something to be
considered when entering into further investments in power.21 On the other hand,
District Counsel Roddis encouraged Mead by referring to the law of trusts. The
power plant had been built by the Reclamation Fund, which was a trust. Putting
revenues from power directly into the Fund would result in faster repayment than
would result from repayment contracts with the farmers, and as trustees of the
Fund they were obligated “to use the trust estate to the best possible advantage.”22
The Shoshone water users, however, surprised Washington by their
determination to contract for power plant construction expenses. They were
receiving active encouragement from the farmers on the Deaver District, whose
own interest in the power plant depended upon a satisfactory contract being
reached with the Shoshone people. The District submitted a contract proposal
abandoning their stand on repayment on a crop-return basis, accepting the
Bureau’s insistence on a new, 40-year contract. As they in effect called the
Bureau’s bluff, Mead’s solution seemed the only way out for a Bureau desperate
to retain power revenues.
Late in November Assistant Secretary of the Interior E. C. Finney wrote
to the District’s attorney, Ernest Goppert of Cody, who had written him to try to
move negotiations ahead,
It is believed that at the next session of Congress legislation will be
proposed which would affect the disposal of the unsold interest in
the Shoshone power plant. Under the circumstances it is considered
advisable to await the possible action of Congress at the next session
before deﬁnite reply is made to your letter.23

In this manner Mead’s sword descended upon the knot. He showed the House
subcommittee overseeing Interior Department appropriations how power revenues
could be redirected and they accepted his formulation before the end of 1928.
The change in policy, while not general, affected other projects besides the
Shoshone.24
The ofﬁcial Bureau history of these events crystallized within the year
1929. Ignoring the genuine attempts of the District to negotiate a contract, Bureau
apologists—notably Elwood Mead himself—put the onus on the water users,
claiming that they had never been willing to repay construction costs on the power
system. He never mentioned the terms under which negotiations were terminated.
The Bureau then treated the Interior Department Appropriation Bill passed
March 4, 1929, as if it were a Congressional intervention rather than a clear result
of Bureau policy. It is true that Congressman Cramton had a record of watching
carefully over the Bureau’s handling of the Fund, and there can be little doubt that
he genuinely supported the change, but it was obvious then and it is obvious now
that the Bureau did not negotiate in good faith.
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Mead’s candor in the Interior Department appropriation hearing makes this
perfectly clear. In his introductory presentation he expressed his dismay that the
Newlands project received $16,000 a year from power while they only paid $8000
a year in assessments for the power plant. More shocking still, the South Side of
the Minidoka project received an excess of more than $100,000 a year to apply to
extension of their system, with no obligation to repay. Later in the hearing, when
Representative Cramton argued that the Bureau should never have entered into
the contract they did with Deaver, Mead blurted out, “I am clear that, law or no
law, we do not want to make any more contracts of that kind.”25 He went on to
argue forcefully that the increased demand for power due to oil development near
Powell made it likely that power would bring in more money than irrigation soon,
and if it were developed in a business-like way it would be very large indeed,
which he believed ought properly to belong to the Government.26 In light of such
statements, the letters water users received from Washington during the year after
the Mead coup were arrogant as well as insulting to those who knew how things
had gone.27 Nevertheless, agents of the Shoshone Irrigation District continued to
pursue the matter with the Department of the Interior.
During 1930 and 1931 the District sent members to Washington to
talk with Interior Department personnel, and set about preparing an elaborate
legal appeal to the Solicitor. The success of water users on the North Platte
Project in securing their own rights to the power plants there, which Mead had
also attempted to terminate, gave them courage for this effort. Briefs from the
District and the Bureau were presented and a hearing held before the Solicitor
in the spring of 1931, and on July 29, 1931, Solicitor E. C. Finney handed
down a decision supporting the Bureau, denying the District any share in the
power revenues. The District’s appeal argued that the Act of March 4, 1929,
was unconstitutional, in that it deprived them of rights guaranteed by the FactFinders’ Act and their contract, but since neither of those instruments speciﬁcally
mentioned payment for the costs of power system construction the Bureau’s
defense was successful. Apparently the District realized they could not get any
farther by claiming treachery on the part of the Commissioner, so they fell back
upon this much shakier ground of constitutional argument.28
While pursuing administrative relief, the water users also turned to their
Congressional delegation for help. Senator Robert Carey introduced a bill
December 11, 1930, that would have provided a legislative remedy to the situation
created by the Act of March 4, 1929, compelling the Department of the Interior to
follow the provisions of the Fact-Finders’ Act insofar as the Shoshone Project was
concerned. The Bureau believed that the process of appeal to the Solicitor had in
fact been undertaken primarily to obtain the Bureau’s brief so they could attempt
to get favorable legislation passed. Mead’s response to this legislation was swift
and powerful. He drafted an 8-page memo for Secretary Wilbur to employ in
response to the House Committee, detailing the write-offs and adjustments that
had beneﬁted the Shoshone settlers already amounting (in the always-suspect
Bureau calculations) to over $2½ million, and underlining the extent of the
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subsidy they would receive if they got power revenues in addition. He developed,
in December 1930, the strongest argument yet for separating power and irrigation,
embracing fully the potential of commercial power development. This was the
ﬁrst blast of the full-scale legislative initiative that was to occupy the Bureau for
the next three Congresses.29
Senator Carey tried to mediate some resolution between Mead and the
water users toward the end of 1931 but found Mead inﬂexible.30 Ernest Goppert,
the District’s attorney, in consultation with a Washington law ﬁrm, determined
to ﬁle a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior, now Ray Lyman
Wilbur, hoping to compel him to perform his duty to pay out proportionate
power revenues to the District annually under the 1924 act. To make this case
they had to argue that the 1929 act was unconstitutional, a violation of the Fifth
Amendment provision against taking property without due process. The property
in question, they alleged, was their right to power plant revenues guaranteed them
by the 1924 act and the 1926 contract. This was a far stretch, since the Bureau
could argue in response, ironically, that the very efforts to negotiate for a share of
the power plant costs that Mead had interrupted showed that the District knew it
had no vested interest without agreeing to pay for the construction costs. Blandly
brushing aside the complicated negotiations discussed above, the Bureau simply
noted that the Congressional intervention of March 4, 1929, made it impossible
for them to comply with the 1924 act. They did not need to argue that the 1929
legislation was constitutional.
The District tried to show, what District Counsel Roddis had seen at the
outset, that there was no authority for the Bureau to build power plants except as
part of irrigation projects: the construction charges, therefore, that they had been
paying for two decades gave them those rights implicitly. They also produced
considerable evidence that all conversations regarding power plant revenues held
between the District and the Bureau until late in 1927 had regarded the power
plant as part of the Shoshone Project upon which they were paying construction
charges and to which they had clear legal rights. This should have been a strong
argument, and might have been in another legal process, but not in this one. The
attempt to enforce a writ of mandamus was a difﬁcult legal strategy.31
The Bureau, perhaps stung by having lost the North Platte case, pulled out
all stops to defend its position in this suit. Their position here was stronger, of
course, because of the Act of March 4, 1929, and a slightly different contractual
history. They bombarded Judge Graves, the solicitor defending the Secretary of
the Interior, with advice and documents, even offering to send ofﬁce employees
who were present at the 1926 contract negotiations to testify that the District had
not then been interested in purchasing an interest in the plant. The most useful
of these communications was probably the suggestion by Acting Commissioner
Porter W. Dent that mandamus cannot be used to enforce a contract right, but
only a duty imposed by law. The Shoshone case, he suggested, is a contract case,
by their insistence that Article 31 of their 1926 contract is the ground for their
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property right in the power plant. Dent also reminded Graves that the District
would not be without remedy if their petition were denied, since the Court of
Claims exists to adjudicate contract disputes. After noting that Congress was
well within its constitutional rights when they passed the 1929 act, Justice Atkins
appropriated Dent’s legal argument and rejected the District’s petition for a writ of
mandamus on June 13, 1933.32
The District and their lawyers immediately appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. They ignored the suggestion of contract
adjudication in the Court of Claims and persisted in their pursuit of a mandamus
ruling. This was clearly not a good idea. Justice Atkins had made it clear that he
thought the merits of their case were worth considering, but not in this way, and
they chose to ignore him completely. The result should have been predictable.
The appeal was argued February 5, 1934, and decided April 9, 1934. Associate
Justice Van Orsdel reafﬁrmed every point of the Supreme Court’s decision. He
dwelt emphatically upon the fact that the Secretary of the Interior has discretion
to determine the matters at issue, that mandamus does not extend to discretionary
matters, and he reminded the District that the federal government cannot be
sued without its own consent.33 Even then the District did not give up the legal
ﬁght. In June they ﬁled a petition in the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of
certiorari, but it was quickly denied and they turned instead to Congress.34
Congress was at that very moment engaged in the ﬁnal stage of deciding
the fate of Commissioner Mead’s attempt to achieve a statutory basis for his new
power policy. When the ﬁrst attempt by the Wyoming delegation to overturn the
Act of March 4, 1929, failed, Congressman Cramton introduced a bill, written in
concert with Mead, to provide that power plant revenues on reclamation projects
everywhere should be handled as they were after 1929 on the Shoshone Project.
H.R. 16976 was introduced February 9, 1931. It was sent to the Committee
on Irrigation and Reclamation, from whence it returned two weeks later with a
favorable report. Mead had drafted not only the bill but also Secretary Wilbur’s
letter in support of the bill. He argued that changing circumstances required this
bill’s adoption, noting in passing that the policy developed with respect to the
Shoshone Project had also been adopted on the Black Canyon Power Plant on
the Boise Project and the Kennewick Highlands unit in Washington. Mead was
walking a ﬁne line, trying to convince the Congress that power on the projects
should be developed in a business-like manner while at the same time attempting
to pacify critics of government entry into the development of commercial power.
He also needed to reassure his audience that contracts presently in force would be
honored. Still, his goal was clear; as he told the committee, it was of “the utmost
importance that a uniform law be adopted.”35
The effects of the Depression and the continuing problems of Reclamation
ﬁnances had combined to drive Mead to search for a solution through power
income. There was an obvious ﬁnancial crisis within Reclamation. They had
been operating on loans from the general fund which stipulated returns to the
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Treasury of $1,000,000 per year, they faced demands from Western interests
for maintaining and even extending construction, and crop values, the basis of
returns to the Reclamation Fund, had fallen by $3,000,000 in the last year. Power
revenue offered the possibility of meeting the loan obligations and funding
continued development as nothing else could do. In fact, it was almost certainly
the desire to expand power production and sales at the Shoshone plant that forced
his hand in 1928; he needed to increase revenue but could not do it while the
disposition of power revenues was uncertain.36 Mead campaigned aggressively
with members of Congress for his new law, showing them the amounts of
money now being generated by Reclamation power plants, detailing the losses
of ordinary Reclamation revenue, and painting Reclamation settlers on projects
with power plants as undeserving government debtors about to collect unearned
dividends in perpetuity. It was a good case, and he made it outside Congress to
such people as the editor of the Saturday Evening Post as well. It failed, however,
to overcome political opposition in the Congress.37
The House, as will be seen below, carried a grudge against the Bureau
for the manner in which earlier legislative maneuvers had been carried out. The
Senate, it seems, was more circumspect. Senators seem to have been much less
concerned with the details of Reclamation ﬁnance than Congressmen. Senator
Thomas Walsh of Montana, for instance, expressed surprise, in a letter to Mead
in April 1932 that the Bureau was building power plants to subsidize irrigation
on some projects. When the Casper-Alcova project was authorized that month,
Senators removed from the bill a provision that would have enacted Mead’s
policy of returning power revenues to the Reclamation Fund after construction
charges had been met. They substituted an article stipulating that future proﬁts
“shall be disposed of as Congress may direct.” Senator C. C. Dill of Washington,
the author of that amendment, maintained that the Congress was not ready to
decide Federal policy on this question.38
When the Roosevelt administration was fully settled in Mead tried again,
this time in 1934. Administratively, the landscape had changed dramatically, with
Harold Ickes now running the Department of the Interior. The bill that went to the
73rd Congress was a much more forthright assertion of a new order than the ﬁrst
bill had been, and Ickes clearly had a large role in preparing it. The core of the
Secretary’s position may be found in his letter to the Senate committee hearing
the bill:
Now that power development has become a more important feature of
irrigation and community development, provision should be made for
the full utilization of the latent and possible power developments created
by the construction of irrigation projects. The Government should be
the agency to determine the economic and social beneﬁts that may result
from the full utilization of these power possibilities, and to use these
latent and possible power developments in the upbuilding of the project
and surrounding communities. Operations of the past and present enable
the Government to estimate the economic beneﬁts and ﬁnancial returns.

417

Absence of some uniform legislation of the kind proposed by
this bill has prevented the full utilization of possible power development
at several large reservoirs. Under existing general legislation the
repayment of this development must be underwritten or guaranteed.
Repayment requirements of irrigation costs are such that agriculture will
not carry the added burden of power development.39

This bill put power ﬁrst in a wholly new way. Not only was he proposing to
separate the power and irrigation functions of the Bureau of Reclamation, he was
proposing to do it in the pursuit of an aggressive development of public power
resources that subordinated the traditional irrigation mission of the Bureau. In
retrospect, Ickes made Mead’s 1931 bill look rather timid, more of a bureaucratic
defensive ploy than a major policy initiative.
Not surprisingly, Ickes’s bill met with virtually no resistance from the
Senate. S. 3375 was introduced April 13. Ickes’s letter to Senator Alva Adams,
Chairman of the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, was sent May 10.
On June 6, S. 3375 was read for the third time and passed by the Senate without
a nay vote.40 It was a different story entirely in the House. Introduced the same
day, H.R. 9124 was sent to the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation,
chaired by Representative Dennis Chavez of New Mexico. Where the Senate
Committee had seen no need for hearings, the House Committee scheduled full
committee hearings starting in early June. Determined opponents of Elwood
Mead like Representatives Vincent Carter of Wyoming and Terry Carpenter of
Nebraska led the charge against the bill, supported frequently by other western
congressmen. Taking away the actual and potential assistance power revenues
offered to struggling farmers on Reclamation projects did not set well with them.
Others were opposed to the idea of the Department of the Interior setting itself up
in the power business. The spectre of large power companies taking cheap power
from these projects and selling it back at exorbitant rates haunted the hearings.
Things went so badly that Marshall Dana, president of the National Reclamation
Association, a hand-picked mouthpiece of Mead’s, offered the suggestion that the
committee not proceed to a vote on the bill until they had had a chance to talk it
over with their constituents. When the committee adjourned on June 14
H.R. 9124 was clearly dead.41
It could be that the House was more hostile than the Senate because it
was more closely tied to local interests. It could also be because there was a
palpable current of hostility to the Bureau of Reclamation among the members
of the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation. At several points in
the hearings on H.R. 9124, Representative Carter referred with a nasty edge to
the proceedings by which Mead had got his way on the Shoshone Project power
plant. Within the ﬁrst hour he had drawn the Committee’s attention to the actions
of Representative Cramton back in 1928, slipping the Shoshone provision into the
Interior Department appropriation bill “the night before Congress adjourned…
with no committee having had a chance to have a hearing on it.”42 On the ﬁfth
day of hearings he interrupted the testimony of the Bureau’s chief accountant
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to remind everyone that “the Cramton amendment” had never come before the
Reclamation Committee, and that if a point of order had been raised against it
when it was attached to the Appropriations bill the point of order would have been
sustained. He concluded, “I know that if the question of that policy had come
before the Reclamation Committee it would never have been adopted.”43 Among
the many reasons the bill died, this resentment surely bulked large.
As the Bureau effort ground to a halt, the District resumed its attempt to
get the 1929 act overturned in Congress. In fact, they had never really abandoned
this course. Senator John Kendrick took up the cause in 1932, when the Senate
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation held hearings on a bill to relieve the
Shoshone District. In these hearings an alternative vision to that of the Bureau
regarding the events of 1928-1929 was developed, with Mead and Cramton as
the villains. J. T. Whitehead, spokesman for the Shoshone Irrigation District,
testiﬁed that Cramton and Mead worked together to produce the language for the
1930 appropriations bill. “Those hearings under Mr. Cramton were never open
hearings. Judge Winter was the Congressman from Wyoming at the time. He
did not know that that provision was in the appropriation bill.”44 The bill went
through the House in four days and only ten days in the Senate. The provision
for the Shoshone Project was not germane to the appropriation bill, i.e. there was
no money being appropriated for power. Mead attempted the same thing with the
North Platte Project power revenues, but the Nebraska congressman saw it and
insisted on having it removed. Senator Kendrick learned of it just before it passed
and notiﬁed the Shoshone people, but by the time they got back to him the bill had
passed the Senate. In testifying to this view of the facts Whitehead was careful
not to challenge the wisdom of the new policy with respect to power revenues, but
to focus on the sanctity of contract and the deviousness of Mead and Cramton in
pursuing the overthrow of valid contracts.45
These early efforts did not succeed, but they established the ground
of a continuing attempt to get justice for the Shoshone District. In 1933
Representative Carter introduced H.R. 17, identical to the Kendrick bill of the
previous year. The following year was spent defeating the Interior Department
bill, but 1935 saw a renewed offensive from Wyoming. Representative Paul
Greever introduced H.R. 6875 in March, and Senator Joseph O’Mahoney
introduced S. 2286. These bills tried to meet the Bureau half way by providing
that the power revenues on the project that were properly allocable to the
unconstructed divisions be handled according to the terms of the 1929 act, but
that the revenues allocable to the divisions that had contracted with the Bureau
be handled according to the terms of the contracts. The House committee gave
Greever’s bill a full hearing in May. The Department of the Interior, in opposing
the bill, denied that existing contracts in fact gave any rights to the districts.
They also insisted that it was bad policy, contrary to the principles set forth in
H.R. 9124. Since that bill had failed to pass, it seems strange that the secretary
would be relying upon it in this way, but it is surely revealing of the mindset of
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the administration. They had, after all, been following the principles of Mead’s
Shoshone policy without legislative approval on other projects since 1930.46
The argument for the Shoshone District was carried by Ernest Goppert
again. Their strategy this time was to insist that the 1926 contract was valid
even without speciﬁc language regarding the power plant, and the 1929 act
was an abuse of Congressional procedure and administrative power. Goppert
repeated arguments developed in the court cases. The water users had actually
been charged enough to cover the power plant costs in addition to the irrigation
system, but Bureau accounting procedures had kept the money in a separate
account. The Bureau had no authority to set up a separate power account. All
features constructed on the project were covered by the public notices of original
and supplementary construction costs, and that was the only way the Bureau
could legally proceed. The District could ﬁnd no remedy in court only because
they were prevented from suing the government without its permission. In fact,
Goppert testiﬁed that Justice Atkins stated from the bench “that if this was a suit
against a private individual, he would have no difﬁculty in entering a decree in
our favor.”47 Since the Department of the Interior had relied upon the 1929 act to
rule against Shoshone while they ruled in favor of North Platte water users on a
similar case, Goppert appeared conﬁdent that removing the 1929 act would result
in a decision favorable to the District.
On the second day of these hearings Goppert had the opportunity to
question R. M. Patrick, of the Bureau legal division. It was a very hard-nosed
examination, in which Goppert pursued the way the Bureau handled its accounts,
hoping to show that the 1929 act was part of a change in procedure that was
unauthorized by Congress and kept secret from the water users. Patrick admitted
that original construction charges on the Shoshone Project did contemplate
repaying the cost of the dam and reservoir, but since 1929 they were no longer
charged against the irrigation districts. More signiﬁcantly, he stated that the
Bureau had had no objection to the provision in the Shoshone District contract
(Section 31) for distribution of surplus power revenues, “because the amount
was to be determined by the Secretary, and we felt perfectly safe that if a net
proﬁt came to the district from the operation of the power plant, no portion of the
proﬁt would be allowed to go to the Garland Division.”48 He tried to place all
the responsibility for the midnight legislation of the 1930 Appropriation bill on
Representative Cramton, exonerating Mead in particular. And he attempted to
dodge Goppert’s contention that the District had paid enough to cover expenses
for the plant by saying that it was only money; if they were not charged for the
power plant they could not have paid for it. This straightforward exposure of the
way the Bureau did business did not help their case.49
The issues on both sides had by this time been ﬁnely distilled, and
the questioning brought them out very clearly. The committee, particularly
Representative Robinson, seemed determined to ﬁnd the equity of the matter,
inquiring into just what the water users themselves had been led to believe about
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power revenues. Both the Bureau’s goal of using power for development when
irrigation repayment could not manage it and the District’s goal of re-establishing
a right they felt was theirs by custom and contract got a full hearing. The
testimony from both sides showed quite clearly how the Bureau had pursued
its policy by manipulation of its own cost accounting procedures, and Goppert
was much more persuasive than Patrick on the matter of the District’s legal
rights. The simple, eloquent letter from Herman Krueger of Deaver, detailing the
1928 negotiations and Mead’s public promises in Powell and Deaver that their
interests would be taken care of carried considerable weight.50 The committee
unanimously agreed to provide the Shoshone District the relief they sought.
In spite of that, and in spite of its having passed the Senate in June, the bill
never came to a ﬁnal vote in the House in that Congress. In the 75th Congress,
however, Representative Greever and Sen. O’Mahoney brought it back. The
Bureau seemed resigned to its passage and put up little resistance, and without
much ado in the way of hearings or debate the bill received President Roosevelt’s
signature on April 8, 1938.51 After nearly a decade of combat in a variety of
theaters, it seemed that the water users of the Shoshone Project had won their war.
Although there was great celebration in Powell in the spring of 1938,
it soon dissipated. One-fourth of the unit-holders on the Shoshone Irrigation
District held back the ﬁrst installment of their 1937 construction payment in
expectation of some help from the legislation. But the Bureau informed the
District by telegram only a week after the bill was signed that they would do
nothing without an opinion from the Interior Department solicitor, and concluded,
“Believed very doubtful that it will result in any credits to water users at this
time.” They then passed the matter to the Interior Department.52
The Bureau asked for a solicitor’s opinion, but Secretary Harold Ickes
took the matter upon himself to pronounce as a matter of policy, rather than
simply a legal interpretation. He took a great deal of time to prepare it, while
the Shoshone District wrote and cabled Commissioner John Page and Ickes
repeatedly to learn where they stood. Page tried to be polite and helpful, but
Ickes was not cut from the cloth of those early Interior Secretaries who had
nurtured government settlements all over the west. He resisted the farmers
and their political representatives, and it was not until September 1940, more
than two years after the relief legislation had passed, that he communicated his
determination to the Bureau and the District.53
The legislation of 1938 had in effect done away with the infamous
appropriation bill rider of 1929, authorizing and directing the Secretary to
apportion power revenues according to the contract of 1926. Commissioner Page
had warned the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation that this was not likely
to produce any result: “the bill in effect merely proposes to grant something,
providing the contracts grant it. But according to the Department the contracts
do not do so, while the districts contend that they do.”54 Ickes emphatically
closed the door. No stranger to high-handed administrative action, he endorsed
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completely the Mead history of the contract negotiations. Ignoring the fact that
the water users had understood themselves to be paying for the dam and reservoir
for twenty years, he denied that they had paid anything for the power system
and therefore they were not entitled to any of the proﬁts. Power was a separate
element of the Project, he said, conveniently overlooking the fact that there was
no legislative authority to do that in 1929; the Government alone had taken the
risk and to them belonged the proﬁts. Point by point he rejected the District case,
and brushed aside the clear intent of Congress.55
The door so emphatically slammed did not stay shut, but the details of
negotiations over the next 14 years need not weigh us down here. In the end,
by Act of Congress dated July 14, 1954, the Shoshone District was awarded a
credit of $426,000 on their construction charges, an approximation of what they
might have earned had the 1938 legislation been honored in spirit. Deaver also
received their proportionate share. For their part, the Bureau cleared their claim
on Shoshone power revenues and strengthened the fence around them where the
other districts of the Project were concerned. The Bureau resisted only feebly in
the end, but the damage had been done long since.56
What are we left with, then, at the end of what one Interior staffer called
“this long, bitter controversy?” Looking at the history from the local viewpoint,
the settlement may be viewed as a testimony to the determination of the Shoshone
settlers. Certainly, from start to ﬁnish, they never abandoned their conviction that
the dam and its attendant power revenues were part of what they had bargained
for when they took out water rights in that valley. It is interesting to note that
one of the principal spokesmen in the 1954 hearings was one C. W. Fowler,
then an attorney in Washington but also the owner of a farm near Powell that
he homesteaded in 1910; he had been secretary of the water-users association at
that January 1912 meeting when power revenues were ﬁrst formally discussed.57
These farmers were more than ordinarily stubborn in defense of right as they saw
it. They convinced three generations of Senators and Congressmen to carry their
case in Washington, and ultimately achieved a good part of what they set out for.
Perhaps we could say they won.
If they won, however, it was at a terrible cost. Twenty-six years of settled
hostilities between the settlers and the Bureau left a residue of virulent antifederal sentiment in the Shoshone Valley that is a feature of life there to this day.
The Shoshone Irrigation District paid off its construction charges to the federal
government in 1978. The water-users knew they were paying off sooner than
they would have done without the settlement, but they could not forget that they
would have paid off even sooner and still be enjoying income from the plant if
the original contract as they understood it had been honored. There are people on
the Project today who talk of legal action to restore those rights. It is perhaps no
surprise that the Shoshone Irrigation District built its own low-head power plant
on its main canal and subsidizes its irrigation operations today with power plant
revenues.58
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Looked at as a piece of the history of the Bureau of Reclamation, this
story should be chastening. The staff of the Bureau seems to have groped their
way through the matter of power plant revenues in general and certainly fumbled
the Shoshone case. They had to work out the law and policy of power revenues
more or less by the seat of their pants; theirs was not the arrogance of power but
the desperate bluff of people who know they are on shaky ground. Elwood Mead
grasped an essential point about Reclamation ﬁnance but pursued it with such
devious arrogance and defended it with such blind passion that he alienated not
only project settlers but a generation of powerful men in Congress. In terms of
his drive to bureaucratic dominance, Mead would give nothing away to Floyd
Dominy.59 There were real obstacles to shifting the basis of Reclamation ﬁnance,
but violating law and contract and exposing the underside of Reclamation
bureaucratic methods in Congress surely made things worse. It is quite possible
that if he had acted in good faith with the people of the Shoshone Project, and
with their elected representatives, Mead would have got his power revenue bill
passed in 1935 or even earlier. The merits of the policy change, after all, were
recognized by Congress with the passage of the Reclamation Projects Act of 1939,
after they had dealt with the equities of the Shoshone matter.60
Because Mead and Ickes were in the business of building powerful
bureaucratic entities to compete in the modern world, and because the issues at
the center of this story were key to that growth, this story also reveals in passing
the processes and consequences of developing big government. In 1928 Mead
and Secretary West went to Powell and Deaver to meet with the people, as
Secretaries and Commissioners had been doing for two decades. By 1940 no one
would have thought of such a thing. Mead had been a very popular choice for
Commissioner in 1925, but there was open enmity between him and Shoshone
Project leaders from 1929 on. In 1933 S. A. Nelson, President of the First
National Bank in Powell and a pioneer homesteader, published his own account of
the negotiations; he had been present at every conversation affecting the Shoshone
water users since 1909. It is perhaps enough to note the title, “The High-Water
Mark of Bureaucratic Racketeering,” to catch the ﬂavor of this pamphlet.61 Both
the pamphlet and this larger story seem to show that people were moved out
of the center of Reclamation during the New Deal; power, under a variety of
descriptions, moved in.
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From Self Sufficiency to Colony: The Bureau of
Reclamation and Wasatch County, Utah
By:
Jessie L. Embry
Abstract
Wasatch County, Utah is the home of three Bureau of Reclamation
projects, Strawberry, Deer Creek, and Jordanelle reservoirs. All three transfer
water from the county to Utah’s more populated areas. The dams provide essential
water for Utah and Salt Lake counties, but they have a negative impact on Wasatch
County. Residents lost grazing lands and the use of water. Farmers adjusted their
businesses. Land was buried. Once self-sufﬁcient farming and ranching towns
are now bedroom communities for the Wasatch Front. The reservoirs are Utah’s
playgrounds, increasing the population with day visitors who require services but
spend little or no money in the county.

Welcome to Wasatch County, Utah, a series of mountain valleys with
changing reputations. First, they were the impossible to settle. Then, they were
the sheepmen’s paradise. According to some records, ranchers shipped more sheep
from the railroad depot in Heber City than anywhere else in the United States in
the late nineteenth century. Recreation was always important with ﬁshing in the
Strawberry and Provo rivers. But dairy farms and creameries were also important
industries.
All that has changed, and the Bureau of Reclamation played an important
part in that transformation. Heber City, Midway, and Charleston, once known for
their sheep, horses, and cows, are now bedroom communities for the Wasatch Front.
Settlement of Wasatch County1
When the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin in 1847, they settled on the
easily accessible lands. But areas such as the Salt Lake and Utah valleys ﬁlled
quickly, and newcomers and a second generation looked elsewhere for land. In
1857, Provo (Utah Valley) residents working at sawmills in Big Cottonwood
Canyon, southeast of Salt Lake City, crossed over the mountains to the south and
examined a valley formed by the Provo River. They were impressed. When they
announced their ﬁndings in Provo, other residents rejoiced and some hoped to
move.
The sawyers were not the ﬁrst to see the valley. Others had considered
settlement, but there were two major obstacles. First was climate. There were
rumors of frost every month of the year. Despite these fears, cattlemen took their
animals to the south side of the valley and started harvesting meadow grasses for
winter feed. During the spring and summer of 1857 other Utah Valley residents also
explored the area and considered permanent settlements in the valley.
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An even more pressing concern was the difﬁcult mountain pass. Provo
Canyon, formed by the Provo River, was steep and narrow. The ﬁrst attempt
to build a road failed in 1852. In 1855 the Utah Territorial Legislature passed
a bill allowing the Provo men to construct a road. The “Utah War” in 1857, a
confrontation between the United States army and the Mormon pioneers over the
attempt to replace Brigham Young as territorial governor, halted all road work.
But before the “war” was over, a group of Utah County residents proposed the
road again to Brigham Young. Young met with Provo citizens on June 6, 1858,
and the next day the group formed the “Provo Kanyon Company.”
When the road was completed, Provo residents made plans to settle
at the head of the canyon. They held planning meetings during the winter of
1858-59, and in that spring eleven adventurers moved. Of the nine men there is
information on, eight were born in England and one was born in Canada. They
were between twenty-three and sixty-two years of age. By the end of 1859
eighteen families lived in the fort that the settlers built to protect themselves from
the Ute Indians. The next spring there were sixty-two homes in the fort.
The ﬁrst settlers named their valley Provo after the river, but then changed
it to Heber, after a Mormon Church leader Heber C. Kimball, to avoid confusion
with Provo City in the lower valley. They established communities where they
could ﬁnd irrigation water along Center, Daniels, and Snake creeks. Later, others
established communities such as Lake Creek, Center Creek, Buysville, Daniel,
and Hailstone, near available water, but even those farmers had to transport water
to their farmland. Those not close to a stream had to move the water farther.
Lacking capital, farmers banded together in cooperative efforts to dig irrigation
canals. The limited water was then shared by all.
Strawberry River and Reservoir
The settlers were always looking for additional water sources, and more
were found in the mid-1860s. Then some Utes, led by Black Hawk, responded to
a smallpox epidemic and a cold winter and started stealing Mormon cattle. While
most of the raids occurred in central Utah in Sanpete and Sevier counties, there
were some in Wasatch County. To control the attackers, some residents followed
the Utes east into the Uinta Basin. There they also saw water and grazing
opportunities. They started working on a canal in 1872, using territorial and
federal laws for ﬁnancial assistance and land ownership. Then in the late 1880s
farmers engineered and constructed a 1,000 foot tunnel through the crest of the
Wasatch Mountains, thereby diverting water from the Strawberry River to their
farms. At the turn of the century, they also converted lakes into reservoirs despite
concerns from those in the lower valleys that their water supplies would be cut
off.2
Water was limited throughout the state, and other farmers were also
looking for more water sources. At the turn of the century, desperate Utah Valley
farmers turned their attention to the Strawberry River for water, made possible
430

after the federal government removed the Ute Indians further east to the Uintah
Indian Reservation. Seeing the earlier success of the Heber Valley farmers, Henry
Gardner of Spanish Fork in Utah County envisioned a similar effort to transfer the
water from the Strawberry River only on a much grander scale.

17.1. This August 1910 photograph of a peach orchard on the Strawberry Valley Project
south and east of Utah Lake. The picture is looking toward the Wasatch Mountains.

Gardner’s project proved to be too expensive and too complex for the
farmers of Utah Valley. But the passage of the 1902 Newlands Act which
established a revolving fund as well as the predecessor of the Bureau of
Reclamation made the project possible. In 1903 the Utah County farmers
presented their plans to the federal government, and within a year work began on
the Strawberry Valley Reservoir.
For the farmers of Utah Valley, the Strawberry Reservoir was a savior;
they developed new farm land, older farms received additional water, and
residents returned to the community of Payson which had been withering from
lack of water. As a result, historian Thomas G. Alexander concluded, “It is
difﬁcult to conclude that the Strawberry Valley Project has been anything but
successful.”3
The project, however, cost the people of Wasatch County. Besides the loss
of water, they also lost grazing rights. For nearly a quarter of a century, ranchers
and farmers from the valley had leased summer grazing land in Strawberry
Valley from the Utes. The development of the Strawberry Reservoir limited
summer grazing opportunities for the livestock of the ranchers and farmers
of Wasatch County. While the reservoir was under construction, the federal
431

government leased the surrounding lands to sheepmen. John C. Cummings
from Wasatch County held the lease from 1905 to 1907. During this time Utah
County sheepmen tried to obtain permission to run sheep on the project, but the
government told them that there were too many sheep and cattle already on the
land.
In 1907 Heber City residents acquired a lease from the Reclamation
Service which allowed them to be on the land from June 1 to December 31, 1907.
The Heber men were able to hold on to their leases by outbidding sheepmen
from Utah and Salt Lake counties as well as other sheep owners from Wasatch
County. When the group did not exercise its option to renew in 1909, the property
came open for bid again, and although the same group got the land, the cost went
from $10,408 to $10,600. In 1911 the highest bid was only $6,126. The project
engineer claimed that the sheepmen had kept the bids down, and he refused to
accept any of them. A group from American Fork and Lehi in Utah County ﬁnally
bid $9,126, and Wasatch County residents lost the use of the Strawberry lands to
Utah County ranchers.4
A further limitation developed when Utah’s U.S. senators, George
Sutherland and Reed Smoot, pushed through a bill in 1910 to protect the
Strawberry watershed from overgrazing and to raise additional money to help
repay the construction costs of the reservoir. Wasatch County stockmen opposed
the withdrawal of additional acres from grazing. In a pamphlet, “Some Facts
You People of Wasatch County Should Know,” some county residents claimed
that Smoot was not being honest. The pamphlet authors encouraged residents
to vote for men who “by their deeds have demonstrated that they are for you
good people” and not the “kind that sit idly by while big interests grab up your
birthrights.”5
The pamphlet authors’ efforts were unsuccessful. Smoot continued to
be a senator, and the Strawberry Water Users continued to control the lands
surrounding the reservoir. The conﬂict between the Strawberry Water Users and
the Wasatch County livestock men, represented by the Heber Horse and Cattle
Growers Association and the Wallsburg Grazing Association, came to a head in
1919. The water users from Utah County and the Wasatch County residents both
appealed to national organizations to resolve their differences.
Wasatch County people felt that they had rights to the lands based on
their leases with the Native Americans for the past forty years. They questioned
whether the government had purchased the lands properly from the Utes. They
contended that they could not survive ﬁnancially without grazing rights in the
area. In a passionate appeal to the director of the Reclamation Service, the
Wasatch County residents explained, “A grave injustice would be done the people
of Wasatch County if these lands were again thrown open for competitive bids and
they were refused these grazing rights which they have so long enjoyed and which
are essential to the welfare of these entire communities.” The letter continued
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that the Utah County water users were mainly farmers, and “these grazing lands
are not now and never were essential to the prosperity of these farmers and water
users.”6
The U.S. Forest Service agreed with the Wasatch County residents. The
acting forester wrote to the Reclamation Service that the watershed around the
Strawberry Reservoir was “one of the most important in the State of Utah” and
needed to be protected. He described the cooperation that he had always received
from the Wasatch County stockmen, adding that the Forest Service policy was
to “give preference to small nearby stockmen who are so situated that they are
dependent upon the use of the range for their livelihood.”
The Strawberry project manager, however, favored the water users, telling
the chief engineer, “I cannot see any good reason for considering the desires
of the Heber people who have no interest in the project.” He complained that
Wasatch County residents had not bid the highest for the use of the land, resulting
in “material loss to the water users.” He insisted that the water users were as
interested in the watershed as the Wasatch County stockmen and would work with
the Forest Service. The disputes continued, and the Secretary of the Interior,
F. K. Lane, attempted to resolve them by asking the water users to lease land to
the small livestock operators from Heber, arguing that there ought to be enough
range for small operations from both counties.7
The Utah County water users and the Wasatch County livestock
organizations held a face-to-face meeting on October 24, 1919. The livestock
group wanted to see the land divided so that each group had control of an
area. The water users were willing to lease some property but not to divide the
land. The debate continued, and in November the two groups met again and
ﬁnally came to an agreement. At the end of the current lease, the Bureau of
Reclamation would give the Strawberry Water Users a ﬁve-year lease on the
land, and the water users would sublease part of the area to Wasatch County
residents. Water users would be treated as other lessees until the reclamation
project was completed and turned over to them. Wasatch County residents
complained because as sublessees, they had to work through the water users.
The Reclamation Service refused to answer direct questions.8
The battle continued. Wasatch County residents asked Utah congressman
Don B. Colton to introduce a bill to put the grazing lands back into the Unita
Forest jurisdiction. In 1922 the Strawberry Water Users sent representatives to
Washington, D.C., to prevent passage of the bill which they felt violated their
contract with the Reclamation Service. At the meeting George Fisher spoke on
behalf of the Wasatch County residents. After explaining that the Strawberry
Reservoir took valuable lands away from stockmen, Fisher concluded, “The
whole record of the people of Wasatch County is one of inﬁnite patience and
forbearance as step by step their public lands were either disposed of or their
use abridged.” Senator William H. King of Utah countered that the water users
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had the right to the private land and it should not be transferred to the federal
government. With the support of leaders like King, the Wasatch County plan to
transfer the lands to the Forest Service did not make it out of committee.9
By 1926 when the sublease with Wasatch County grazers expired,
the water users wanted to cancel any association with the Wasatch stockmen.
Pointing out that the Wasatch County people were to have adjusted their grazing
needs so they didn’t need the land and that the people had “no interest or right
whatever in the lands,” the water users complained to the project engineer that
they had suffered because of the sublease. The lease was not renewed, and the
Wasatch County stockmen lost all use of the land.10
Wasatch County residents
not only used Strawberry Valley
for grazing; they also went there
for recreation, mainly hunting and
ﬁshing. The ﬁlling of Strawberry
Reservoir provided additional
opportunities for county residents
and people from the Wasatch
Front to ﬁsh and boat. Within a
few years, Strawberry became a
17.2. Rainbow trout caught in Strawberry
prime ﬁshing hole in the state,
Reservoir in 1918.
attracting anglers by the thousands.
In 1926 the Strawberry Water Users Association took over the management
of the reservoir and began developing its recreational possibilities. With no
established guidelines, the ﬁrst ﬁshing villages sprang up at random along the
reservoir’s shores. By the late 1970s old house trailers, buses, cabins, and boats
dotted the landscape in an unsightly clutter. Uncontrolled development along the
shores threatened to pollute the reservoir. For nearly a decade there was a debate
between Wasatch County ofﬁcials, the Strawberry Water Users, the state board of
health, and the Bureau of Reclamation on who was responsible for establishing
and maintaining cabin regulations.11
In 1978 an expanded Strawberry Reservoir threatened to ﬂood out some
cabins. Cabin owners had three years to move their homes, but some simply
abandoned them. The county and water users argued over who should remove the
buildings. The water users said the county should because it had collected taxes.
The county ofﬁcials contended that the water users had collected the fees for the
cabins. In the end, the water users moved them under the direction of the Bureau
of Reclamation. Because of continued disputes with the water users, the National
Forest Service now manages the recreational uses at Strawberry.12
What has been the recreational impact of Strawberry Reservoir on Wasatch
County? It has brought visitors. In the late 1970s the Bureau of Reclamation
called it “Utah’s ﬁnest ﬁshing hole.” Visitation increased from 168,629 in 1973
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to 248,338 in 1975. A study showed that it was the sole destination for most of
the visitors. At ﬁrst glance it might appear that Strawberry added to the economy
of Wasatch County, but that was not the case. A Utah State University study
found that these visitors spent very little money in the county. About 80 percent
spent fewer than ﬁve dollars while they were at the reservoir; 44 percent spent
nothing at all. Most people came with their own supplies; they did not stop in
other parts of Wasatch County to buy them. While Wasatch County received very
little revenue from Strawberry, its expenses were high. The county ofﬁcials were
responsible for public health and safety, ﬁre protection, and law enforcement.13
While the overall effects of the Strawberry Reservoir were negative for
Wasatch County, Strawberry Valley was not where most county residents lived.
The reservoir took away water and grazing rights and brought in additional
tourists, but it did not affect residents’ homes. However, the second Bureau of
Reclamation project, Deer Creek, had a greater negative impact because it was in
the Heber Valley.
Deer Creek Reservoir
Plans for a reservoir on the Provo River developed slowly. After World
War I, water users from northern Utah and Salt Lake valleys turned their attention
to Wasatch County in search of additional water for their growing cities and
expanding farms. One important source they saw was the unused high volume
spring runoff in the Provo River watershed. If this runoff could be stored, it
would help solve a water crisis. In 1922 water users from Utah and Salt Lake
counties looked for a place to build a reservoir. The site they selected was in
Wasatch County, a short distance downstream from Charleston where Main Creek
from Round Valley and Deer Creek joined the Provo River. There were, however,
problems with this site. Much of the community of Charleston would be ﬂooded,
and the Denver and Rio Grande railroad line and the highway from Heber City to
Provo ran through the center of the proposed reservoir. Wasatch County farmers
also feared that with the construction of the reservoir they would lose precious
water rights.
The Utah Water Storage Commission and the Bureau of Reclamation did
not consider the Deer Creek project a top priority and delayed plans. However,
between 1931 and 1935 there was a severe water shortage in Salt Lake and Utah
valleys. Utah Lake dropped from 850,000 acre feet to 20,000 acre feet. Residents
again appealed to the federal government for assistance, and in 1933 the Federal
Emergency Administration of Public Works gave the Provo River Project
$2,700,000 to build the reservoir and other facilities.14
In surveying the site, the Provo River Water Users Association, a
committee formed to represent the newly formed municipal water users, found
that the dam would cover much of Charleston. Though the committee reported
that Charleston had some of the most valuable ranching land in the state, it
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determined that the people along the Wasatch Front needed the water and that was
more important than preserving the ranch lands.15
Allen M. Winterton recalled that the state was purchasing the land for the
reservoir about the time he got married. “Our farm was one of those affected
by the backed up water.” When the water users offered to purchase his farm,
he saw no other option. Max North recalled that the Provo River Water Users
purchased his father’s farm. His parents “got as much out of it as it was worth.”
Others were not as happy. The local newspaper, the Wasatch Wave, reported that
60 percent of the Charleston residents wanted more money for their land. Most
settled though, and by the end of 1938 the Provo Water Users Association had
purchased seventy-two tracts of land totaling 4,117.31 acres. The association paid
$364,462.66 for this land. When the sale was completed, the association sold the
land to the Bureau of Reclamation.16
Still some people refused to sell their property unless they received more
money. The Provo Water Users Association condemned the property and took
the owners to court. At the end of 1938, the water users’ legal counsel, with
the help of the Bureau of Reclamation’s attorney, ﬁled eight cases. During the
next three years, the Wasatch County District Court recorded thirty-eight cases,
some dealing with the same people, ﬁled against the Provo River Water Users
Association.
The ﬁrst case was heard in the Wasatch County District Court in 1938.
The Arvil Scott trial lasted twelve days, and the jury awarded the defendant
$24,417 for 102.2 acres and $4,961 for the damages to the remaining 600 acres.
The Bureau of Reclamation complained, “This was greatly in excess of the
appraised value… and grossly unjust.” The water users appealed eventually to
the state supreme court, but then settled out of court for 14 percent more than the
appraised value. Although this was the ﬁrst case to go to court, it was one of the
last resolved and was not completed until 1941.
All the cases tried in Wasatch County resulted in awards higher than the
appraised value. Because the Bureau and the Provo Water Users Association felt
that they could not receive a fair trial with Wasatch County juries, they requested
a change of venue. Their motion was successful in only one case; the courts
moved that case to the Cache County District Court. There the jury awarded
$2,000 instead of the $800 appraised value. Because it was less than the Wasatch
County courts awarded, the Bureau called the settlement “satisfactory.”
Eventually the Provo River Water Users Association agreed to settle
most cases out of court. The association, for example, offered John and James
Ritchie 14 percent more than the appraised amount for their property. They
justiﬁed the increase since they could not win a change of venue and court costs
were high.17
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Some Wasatch County
residents were bitter about
Deer Creek. In 1946 when
the Forest Service asked
local residents to stop
overgrazing to protect the
Deer Creek watershed, L. C.
Montgomery remembered
what the construction of Deer
Creek meant to his family,
arguing that “not one drop
of water of the entire Provo
17.3. This 1940 photograph by Ellis Armstrong, later River watershed is entitled to
a Commissioner of Reclamation, shows CCC forces
be stored in the Deer Creek
dismantling the Atwood house in the Deer Creek
Reservoir.” He continued that
Reservoir area near Charleston on the Provo River
his family owned “one-fourth
Project.
of the water of the Daniel
Creek project and it was necessary to conﬁscate my property to protect it.” As a
result, he concluded, “The hundreds of thousands of people [who] would get the
beneﬁts of that conﬁscation ought to pay me for it.” Moroni Besendorfer’s family
lived above the dam in Charleston, but he knew all the families whose property
was taken. He recalled, “Some people just died because they were affected so
much. It took everything they had. Some of the ranchers had beautiful homes
down there.… It took big barns. It took livelihoods and wiped them out.”18
Deer Creek Reservoir changed Wasatch County in many ways. Its
immediate effect was to cover hundreds of acres of rangeland and inundate twothirds of Charleston. That town’s population dropped from 342 in 1930 to 323
in 1940, a 5.5 percent drop. Overall the rest of the county grew, partly because
construction workers moved into the area. As the government continued to
purchase land, Charleston’s population dropped to 175 in 1943, a decrease of 50
percent.19
The Wasatch Front population continued to expand and demanded more
water. Even though the Wasatch County area already provided 95 percent of the
water for 84 percent of Utah’s population, the Bureau of Reclamation suggested
taking more in 1959 with an expansion of the Deer Creek Reservoir. According
to the Wasatch Wave, while the reservoir had “become a beautiful and permanent
part of our valley,” the plan to raise the water level had “opened old wounds and
recalled bitter memories of farms and yards and roads and familiar landmarks
which went reluctantly under water. It could happen again.” The planned
enlargement would destroy homes, displace ninety families, and require the
railroad, the Charleston bridge, two highways, the Charleston community center,
and the Midway ﬁsh hatchery to move. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saint meetinghouse in Charleston would be “accessible by rowboat.” The
editorial concluded, “Wasatch County, wake up and ﬁght for your land.” Later
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the newspaper complained, “Deer Creek was just completed a few years ago.
The people did not have the foresight at that time for the enlargement. Why is it
feasible now at additional costs?”20

17.4. Construction at Deer Creek Dam.

The expansion was not made, but Deer Creek Reservoir continued to
impact Wasatch County. All valley residents lost water rights. One resident,
Calvin Giles, recalled that before Deer Creek Dam the residents had free use of
the water, then “they started to put weirs to measure water.… We were used to
taking all [the water] we wanted. But as time went on, they regulated the water
and cut us down severely in the valley.”21
In addition, the reservoir raised the water table, and since its water went
directly into the culinary systems in Salt Lake and Utah counties, governments
along the Wasatch Front encouraged Wasatch County communities to upgrade
their sewage treatment facilities. In 1953 Salt Lake City threatened to sue if
Heber did not clean up its sewage system. Heber City residents passed a bond in
1953, and the system was completed in 1955. The Wasatch Wave boasted that it
was one of the best in the nation. Within ﬁfteen years the system was outdated.
In 1970 the Wave reported that sometimes “manholes. . . [spewed] raw sewage
out of open ditches and on into canals and then into Deer Creek.”22 Midway also
needed a sewer system. In 1965 the county commission formed a sewer district
for Midway, and the town passed a bond in 1966. Alvin Kohler, the mayor of
Midway at the time, explained, “We had Deer Creek Dam to the south of us
and that water was being diverted into culinary use. We felt that we weren’t
contributing to the water quality for people downstream.”23
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Communities also had to improve their water systems. Charleston had
unique problems because it was so close to Deer Creek Reservoir. Residents
there had used thirty shallow wells since 1875 to supply culinary water. In 1948
the state board of health condemned the wells, claiming “hazardous surface
contamination.” The Salt Lake City Board of Health threatened not to use the
milk from the town’s sixty-ﬁve farms if the water supply was not improved.
Charleston received grants from the Utah Water and Power Board and developed
springs east of town. The new pipeline served 270 people and 450 cows.24
Eventually all of Heber Valley’s cow population disappeared as
technology changed and small farmers could not afford to upgrade their systems.
Although the reasons were complex, protecting the water supply in Deer Creek
Reservoir was one argument. Elmer Kohler remembered that in the early 1930s
many Midway residents started producing milk for the Salt Lake market. For
example, Kohler had 25 head. However, in 1970 he explained,
I was crowded out. We were on Salt Lake City’s drinking watershed.
More of Deer Creek’s water was used for culinary. Salt Lake was quite
concerned about the drainage from corrals and farms going… into
Deer Creek. It would pollute their drinking water. They just made the
requirements tougher until we had to quit.

Kohler continued that the Salt Lake City Board of Health gave him a year to
upgrade his facilities and recommended he visit a milking parlor in southern Utah.
He complained, “I was only making about $4,000 a year proﬁt on the milk. You
can imagine how many years it would have taken to pay off a $100,000 place just
to milk the cows.”25
Unlike Strawberry, initially Deer Creek was not used for recreation.
According to county planner Robert Mathis, “For the ﬁrst thirty years or so of its
existence, Deer Creek Reservoir was ruled off limits. Commissioner [Moroni]
Besendorfer always says that he wasn’t allowed to go swimming in Deer Creek
Reservoir because he’d pollute the water.” That policy changed, and as a result,
tourists came. In 1989 314,532 visitors came. Those numbers dropped with the
development of other state parks. In 1999 197,547 visitors went to Deer Creek
State Park, and 73,325 visited between January and July 2000.
There were some cabin and camping facilities near Deer Creek Reservoir,
but they were never the problems that they were around Strawberry. Even then
the Utah Division of Parks and Recreation eventually removed any cabins and
only allowed camping at Snow’s boat camp.
However, many visiting Deer Creek are day users, coming up Provo
Canyon with all their supplies and not going into Heber City or Midway. As
Robert Mathis explained, “The type of recreation that we’ve had in the county
has largely been people packing picnic baskets and driving to the county.” He
compared recreation in Park City and Wasatch County, pointing out, “They are
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milking the tourist business. Wasatch County is not. Despite some businessmen
that would like to encourage it, I still see skepticism.” Then referring to the study
about the expenses at Strawberry, he continued,
But I think the point that was made in that study is real. In our county
we get a few dollars from the people that come through. In Salt Lake
City, they get $75 or $80 from the people who come through. In Park
City, they get more than $100 from each one. We have an opportunity
that we have not exploited to this point.26

Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir
As the communities along the Wasatch Front continued to grow, residents
demanded more water. The Bureau of Reclamation considered several proposals
including the Deer Creek Dam enlargement, but none were developed. In 1963
a dam was proposed for Jordanelle, six miles north of Heber. The idea was not
new; an engineer had suggested diverting Colorado River water from the south
side of the Unita Mountains to the Wasatch Front as early as 1905. The Colorado
River Compact of 1922 and the Upper Basin Compact of 1948 guaranteed Utah
a share of Colorado River water. To transport this water to the populated area,
Utah ofﬁcials and Bureau of Reclamation engineers began planning the large
and complex Central Utah Project in 1956 which included the Bonneville Unit,
the largest section. The Jordanelle Dam was to be “crown jewel” of the Central
Utah Project. It would help maintain a full Deer Creek Reservoir and store
approximately 320,000 acre feet of exchange water which had been stored in Utah
Lake for the Salt Lake Valley.27
The Bureau of Reclamation planned to build the Jordanelle Dam near the
border of Wasatch and Summit counties on land belonging to the Jordan family.
John Jordan came to Heber in 1859. He bought a ranch east of Heber and moved
there in 1875. John’s son George and his sons ran cattle and sheep there until
George retired in 1931. George also built a small resort with a store and cabins.
The family brand was Jordan L, so they named the resort Jordanelle.28
Before the dam could be completed, the U.S. Congress needed to approve
the Central Utah Project and seven counties—Juab, Utah, Summit, Wasatch, Salt
Lake, Duchesne, and Uintah—had to approve a water conservation district. In
1962 ﬁve of these counties—all except Duchesne and Uintah counties—approved
the water district. Walter Montgomery, Wasatch County commissioner, told the
Midway Boosters that the county needed the conservation district to save its
water interests. “Wasatch County’s area is the birthplace of most of the water
for the northern part of the state of Utah, and we can’t get a drink,” he lamented.
Residents could not even drill wells because in 1921 the Provo Water Users
Association ﬁled on the underground water and claimed wells in Heber Valley
affected their water use.29
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By 1964 all seven counties approved the conservation district, but
for the next ten years the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project was a
political football in the U.S. Congress. In 1975 Clyde Ritchie, Wasatch County’s
representative on the conservation district, supported plans for a dam at Jordanelle
because it would increase Heber Valley’s water supply by 20 percent and bring
recreation to the area.30
Other residents were not as supportive. In 1978 the Bureau of
Reclamation conducted a telephone survey of Wasatch County residents. Many
residents agreed with Ritchie that the dam would help the county: 30 percent
felt it would bring tourism, 25 percent saw more employment opportunities, and
21 percent said improved water. On the negative side, 42 percent opposed the
growth the dam would bring, 15 percent were concerned about safety, and 11
percent expected an increase in crime.
The Bureau of Reclamation study that year pointed out other beneﬁts.
Irrigation companies would receive 26 percent more water, which could boost
farm income by a million dollars a year. It would also bring 100 jobs and
seasonal housing during construction. Eventually the study pointed out that the
reservoir would create 1,300 jobs but acknowledged most of the employees would
probably commute from the Wasatch Front. On the negative side, the study
explained the reservoir would bury 3,060 acres and required use of another 3,000
acres.31
Jordanelle threatened the lifestyles of thirty-eight families, approximately
100 people. The dam’s water covered three businesses, farms, and a family
cemetery, and also destroyed wildlife and river habitat. County Commissioner
Tom Baum complained, “Private land is continually being used here for public
uses and we are losing out. We have two reservoirs, ﬁsh and game land,
mitigating land and with the possibility of the reservoir our private lands are
slowly diminishing.” Residents of Keetley protested that the relocated Highway
40 would split their farms. While the environmental impact statement talked
about the recreational advantages for Wasatch County, some residents complained
that the focus was all on leisure activities and ignored those who made their
homes in the area.32
The citizens had an even greater concern. What would happen if the
dam did not hold and the stored water dumped on Midway and Heber City? Just
before construction began, the Teton Dam, a large federally constructed project
in eastern Idaho broke, ﬂooding much of the downstream area. Could the same
thing happen in Wasatch County? County commissioners were especially
concerned when some geologists pointed out that a fault line ran through the
proposed dam site. One geologist, Leon Hansen declared the dam site was
unsafe and said that if it broke “a minimum of 50,000 lives would be lost.” Four
geologists from Brigham Young University questioned the safety of the dam
because of the geological conditions in the area. The Bureau of Reclamation
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geologists agreed there was a fault line in the area but argued “lay observers…
and even experienced geologists are not qualiﬁed to comment on whether or not
engineering can compensate for site problems.”33
As the groundbreaking date neared, many Wasatch County residents saw
the disadvantages outweighing the advantages. As Robert Mathis explained,
“People were really unhappy. They were unhappy about water rights, unhappy
that the dam was here, and unhappy about the loss of tax base. I thought most
importantly they were unhappy about being left out of the basic planning.” In
1975, by a vote of 1,090 to 853, county residents voted against a request by the
Central Utah Water Conservancy District to enter a supplemental repayment
agreement. Along the Wasatch Front voters had agreed to the proposal by a 73
percent margin.34
Changes in the Central Utah Project continued, and Wasatch County
residents became more upset. While the original bill gave $20 million to
provide pressurized irrigation systems for Heber Valley, in 1990 that was cut to
a $500,000 feasibility study. Other water projects would transfer water from
Daniels Creek. In March 1990 the Wave protested:
First Wasatch people lost rights to Strawberry water. Then almost an
entire community was uprooted from their family farms and homes
to make room for Deer Creek Reservoir to store downstream water.
Then the bureau took more homes and farms to store upstream Provo
River water, and now their eyes are on Daniels water. We’ll share our
water—reluctantly, yes, but we will share. However, we expect a fair
deal, including a place in the front of the line for our own water and a
sprinkling system, free of charge without having to grovel for it.35

County commissioners Moroni Besendorfer and LeRen Provost went to
Washington, D.C., to protest the loss of water rights in Wasatch County. They
claimed, “It would take twenty percent of the county’s irrigation water and
dry up Daniels Creek in order to increase ﬂows in the Upper Strawberry River
tributaries.” The county ofﬁcials formed an unlikely partnership with state
environmentalists and presented the argument that adapting the project to meet the
needs of Wasatch County residents would also preserve the wetlands. Congress
modiﬁed the legislation. In 1996 the county had two representatives on the
Central Utah Water Conservancy District Board, but “people were still somewhat
distrustful. They felt that by getting the [Central Utah Project] Completion Act
through that a deal had been struck which allowed us to receive some beneﬁts
from the project and prevented further changes in lifestyle.”36
In 1994 Besendorfer thought people still worried about the location of the
dam. He said he tried to watch the construction, and “a couple of times they kind
of ushered me away from the areas because they did not want me to see what was
there. Hopefully nothing ever happens because if it does, it’s not just going to
affect our county.”37
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The construction of
Jordanelle prompted the
Bureau of Reclamation
to look at recreational
possibilities not only on
that reservoir but also on
the Provo River between
Jordanelle and Deer Creek.
The bureau ﬁrst asked for
a ﬁfty-foot access rightof-way. Property owners
protested that they did
not want to deal with the
17.5. Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir
trespassers and garbage
that would come with the public access and that they did not want the area fenced
off because they wanted their animals to be able to get to the river. According to
Tom Baum, “We are tired of giving up our land in Wasatch County so that others
can come in here.… We have already given up hundreds of acres of land here for
recreational use and it’s our economic loss.” Later the government condemned
the ﬁfty-foot access area.38
The river continued to be an issue. In 1996 the Utah Reclamation and
Mitigation Conservation Commission made plans to return the Provo River to a
“meandering, blue-ribbon trout stream.” The environmental impact statement
talked about the beneﬁts to those ﬁshing along the river and not the effects it
would have on Wasatch County. According to a Salt Lake newspaper article,
“The county’s population is subject to dramatic seasonal surges. Counting day
visitors, the population could grow from 12,000 to over 100,000.” When asked
what could be done to deal with the impact, locals responded, “Pay an honest
price for condemned land.… and then cough up a few million to help ﬁnance
law enforcement, garbage collection, road maintenance and the other services
visitors now get for nothing.” The problems only got worse. In 1998 the “series
of meanders” were enlarged from ten to twelve miles. Wasatch County residents
again protested. As Bill McNaughtan, who would lose 34 acres explained, “It’s
an emotional impact, knowing your father and grandfather worked the land.”39
The Jordanelle Dam was completed in 1993 and the reservoir was ﬁlled
by 1996, a year ahead of schedule. Tourists immediately started arriving, ﬁlling
the 180-reservation campground each weekend and meeting the 300-boat limit by
11:00 a.m., with hundreds being turned away.40 In 1999 338,200 people visited
the park; for the ﬁrst six months of 2000, the state park recorded 58,938 tourists.
Boating continued to be popular, so in 2000 the State Parks cut the boats allowed
on at any one time. But Jordanelle, like the other reservoirs, provides day trips for
Wasatch Front residents and does not bring a lot of money to the county.
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There is one difference though between Deer Creek and Jordanelle.
Jordanelle is in an undeveloped area on the edge of Summit and Wasatch County.
Park City is only a few miles down the road and has grown rapidly with seasonal
homes. Developers see great potential for similar subdivisions around Jordanelle.
Wasatch County approved construction that would create a city larger than any
other in Wasatch County and double the homes in the county. Wasatch residents
were concerned about who would provide the services such as building a ﬁre
station at Jordanelle and handling sewage. While the county issued bonds to
cover these expenses, ofﬁcials insisted that those receiving the services would pay
off the debt. Some Wasatch residents questioned that and were afraid they would
pay as well.41
Summary
During the summer of 2000, Deer Creek and Jordanelle were both down,
and the water users’ association explained that if there is not an above average
snow fall, water use will have to be restricted along the Wasatch Front. Residents
of Salt Lake and Utah valleys may no longer have green lawns and all the water
they want. They dread the loss of water resources.42 They have come to depend
on the water from these two reservoirs just as residents of southern Utah Valley
depend on Strawberry Reservoir. Yet, Wasatch County residents have experienced
the same losses throughout the twentieth century so that the more populated
Wasatch Front could have water. Over the years the communities in Wasatch
County have changed from self sufﬁcient ranching and farming communities to
bedroom communities and playgrounds for Utah.
Jessie Embry is associate director of the Charles Redd Center for Western
Studies at Brigham Young University and has written numerous books and
articles, including A History of Wasatch County (Salt Lake City: Utah State
Historical Society, 1996).
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Private Power at Boulder Dam: Utilities,
Government Power, and Political Realism
By:
Sarah S. Elkind
Several years ago, I toured Hoover Dam.1 I was unprepared for its scale
and was struck by the bare logistics posed by its construction. The thing that
stayed with me most, however, was the fact that Southern California Edison and
several other private ﬁrms operated turbines in the dam. Indeed, I am not the only
one who has been surprised by this. The Water Power Act of 1920 speciﬁes that
all hydroelectric power developed in association with federal ﬂood control and
irrigation go ﬁrst to publicly-owned power distributors. Many early supporters of
the dam assumed it would contribute to the growth of public power in the United
States. So how did this dam come to symbolize the triumph of public-private
cooperation instead of public enterprise?
Boulder Dam, as Hoover Dam was known throughout the 1920s, was
conceived in the height of the Progressive Era’s public power campaign. The
most important proponents of the dam did not, however, emphasize the dam as
a boon to public electrical systems. Boulder Dam forced southwestern leaders
into heated discussions of water rights and the relations between the states and
Washington. They conceded use of the dam to private utilities, rather than waging
two political battles: one for the dam and a second for public hydroelectric
power development at the dam. Indeed, by itself the battle for the dam raised
the specters of interstate and international rivalry, and an ever more imperial Los
Angeles.2 It is this compromise that I wish to examine here.
In 1928 Congress ﬁnally passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
Ostensibly to control ﬂooding in Yuma, Arizona, and in the Imperial Valley,
the dam promised to improve irrigation and urban water supply, curb Mexican
claims to the Colorado River, and increase hydroelectric power available to local
mines and, once the problems of long-distance power transmission were solved,
to distant cities.3 Because the Water Power Act of 1920 stipulated that all power
from federal dams go ﬁrst to public utilities, early backers assumed that federal
development of the Colorado would bring public power to the Southwest. As the
largest single water project undertaken in the 1920s, this was an important test
case for federal dam construction and the politics of public ownership.
By 1928 proponents of the Boulder Canyon Project Act no longer insisted
on public hydropower on the Colorado because the private utility industry’s
opposition threatened to defeat the project altogether. For its part, the utility
industry regarded a federal dam as direct competition, but also opposed federal
construction on principle. Any expansion of public enterprise, they argued,
posed a general threat to private enterprise. The utility industry had some special
claims on the Colorado River because Southern California Edison had applied
447

for hydropower permits on the river long before Congressmember Philip Swing
introduced the ﬁrst Colorado River bill. In political terms, these private claims
were most important when they stimulated Arizona’s and Nevada’s protests
that a federal dam would help Southern California in trying to steal their water,
power, and revenues. In the end, private utilities won at Boulder Dam, gaining an
important foothold in their efforts to forestall the wholesale substitution of public
for private utilities in the United States.
Boulder Dam stands as a compromise between the Progressives’ desire for
comprehensive, public development of natural resources, and conservative fears
of excessive federal power. Federal funds paid for the dam, and the Bureau of
Reclamation operates it, but private as well as public utilities use its hydropower.
This arrangement evolved for three reasons: proponents compromised on the
public power because they viewed other aspects of the dam as more important;
rhetoric about the dangers of expanding federal authority threatened to scuttle
the dam; and, ﬁnally, the need—again political—to limit the outlay of federal
funds for construction of Boulder Dam made ﬁnding buyers of hydropower more
important than protecting public utilities. Boulder Dam, the ﬁrst cash-register
dam and a strange amalgam of public and private enterprise, sprouted from the
intersection of the Progressive Era and the Red Scare.
A River in Great Demand
A number of overlapping natural resource desires inspired Boulder Dam.
Farmers in Mexico and California’s Imperial Valley wanted water for irrigation.
Residents of Yuma, Arizona, and the Imperial Valley also needed protection from
the Colorado River ﬂoods and silt that threatened their ﬁelds, waterworks, and
homes, but found that development in one part of the valley increased problems
elsewhere. Mining companies in Arizona and Nevada wanted cheap electricity
from the river, as did the many Arizona farmers who used electricity to pump
ground water onto their ﬁelds. Los Angeles hoped for Colorado River water
and power. Meanwhile, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming eyed
developments along the southern section of the river with deep suspicion. They
feared that these more rapidly growing communities would claim all the water
rights ﬁrst, and thus preclude their own development.
American irrigation along the lower Colorado River began in 1901 when
Charles R. Rockwood’s California Development Company brought water through
Mexico into the Imperial Valley.4 In February 1905 ﬂoods breached Rockwood’s
levees, swamping ﬁelds under silt and mud, tearing up railroad track, and surging
into Salton Sink. Two years later, the Southern Paciﬁc Railroad repaired its
broken track and some levees, but tensions between the California Development
Company and ofﬁcials in Mexico impeded efforts to ﬁx other problems left by
the ﬂood.5 By the 1910s political unrest in Mexico complicated repairs, and,
naturally, Mexican irrigators resisted any changes that might reduce the water
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reaching their ﬁelds. By the 1910s these problems inspired proposals for an AllAmerican Canal.
An All-American Canal would carry Colorado water directly to Imperial
Valley ﬁelds, without crossing the Mexico border. This would eliminate many
of the logistical complications of trying to build and maintain waterworks
that crossed an international border. Supporters expected the All-American
Canal to increase the amount of water available to Imperial Valley farms by
bypassing leaking canal sections south of the Border, and the Mexican farmers
who had come to rely on the old waterworks.6 Proponents of the All-American
Canal also lobbied for their project on purely emotional grounds. In the years
after Rockwood built the original Imperial County canals, American investors
developed and leased thousands of acres of irrigated farmland in northern Baja
California. Wealthy Los Angeles businessmen, including Harry Chandler of
the Los Angeles Times, routinely rented land to Chinese and Japanese farmers,
even though Chandler decried the Asian presence in California. Many southern
Californians loathed Chandler for giving American water to Asians, and for
supporting what they saw as an incipient, dangerous Asian colony so close to Los
Angeles.7 That these wealthy Americans then also used the cloak of America’s
international responsibilities to ensure their own proﬁts reeked of political
inﬂuence, proﬁteering, and cut-throat economics. The legacy of these early
conﬂicts over Mexican water rights, race, and the shape of the American economy
continued to shape Colorado River policy for many years.
The Colorado also attracted attention from federal reclamation engineers
and hydroelectric utility corporations. In 1902 Joseph B. Lippincott surveyed
the lower Colorado River and identiﬁed Boulder Canyon as one of the most
promising sites for federal development.8 Representatives from Southern
California Edison joined federal surveys of the river in 1902 and 1921, but
because of the costs of damming a powerful river like the Colorado, and because
the Mojave mining district had only limited power needs, Southern California
Edison concluded that it could not expect to make an immediate proﬁt from
power sales. Only with efﬁcient long-distance power transmission technology
developed in the early 1920s could Southern California Edison, or the Bureau
of Reclamation for that matter, expect to sell power to a market large enough to
recoup construction costs.9
Once long distance transmission was possible, Southern California Edison
applied to the Federal Power Commission for permits to develop hydropower
dams at Boulder, Glen, and Pyramid Canyons.10 By 1924 Southern California
Edison had additional incentives for these permits. A drought reduced their
hydropower generating capacity in California. Meanwhile, growing resistance
to Los Angeles’ expanding demand for water and hydropower in California
promised to make future development for Southern California consumers ever
more difﬁcult. This crisis environment allowed Southern California Edison
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to emphasize the public services it provided both in developing new irrigation
resources and by meeting consumers’ power needs during the crisis.11
Los Angeles began its own Colorado campaign about the same time as
Southern California Edison. The Los Angeles city council declared its interest “in
the building of the dam at Boulder Canyon and allocation of the power privileges
at that dam.”12 At a public hearing in 1922, Los Angeles representatives called
for federal dam construction and municipal distribution of hydropower consistent
with the 1920 Federal Power Act.13 Many other Angelenos, however, considered
electricity from the Colorado so important, that they were not so picky. They
agreed that power revenue should subsidize dam construction even if this
increased the cost of electricity. They claimed to have no opinion about who
should manage Colorado River ﬂood control even though ﬂood control could
affect hydropower operations. Most importantly, they professed not to care who
else received electricity from the dam even though this, too, could increase power
prices or reduce available supplies.14 In their ostensible indifference on these
questions, Angelenos distanced themselves from some of the most contentious
issues surrounding the Colorado River. They also left open a door for the
intermingling of public and private development that eventually evolved here.
Power supplies outweighed other considerations because Los Angeles
quickly outgrew the Department of Water and Power’s generating capacity. In
1914 Los Angeles voters approved bonds for a public power system.15 By 1919,
and over the objections of the Los Angeles Times and utility ﬁrms, the city of
Los Angeles had arranged to purchase Southern California Edison’s grid inside
the city. The Department of Water and Power planned to buy electricity from
Southern California Edison until it completed the ill-fated hydroelectric plant and
reservoir in San Francisquito Canyon.16 But even before the Saint Francis Dam
was ﬁnished, growing power consumption strained supplies so much that even
the combined electric capacity of the municipal and private systems could not
meet the city’ needs. The Department of Water and Power could not guarantee
power supplies to new “factories, smelters, or reﬁneries.”17 The projected power
shortages under public management and the failure of the Saint Francis Dam
allowed private utilities to paint public power as unsafe and badly managed
throughout the Colorado River debates.18
Los Angeles did not turn immediately to the Colorado River for additional
electricity. First, the Department of Water and Power went “prospecting for other
power sites.” Because Southern California Edison, Southern Sierras Power,
and other utilities had long since claimed or developed the best power reservoir
sites in the region, the city had few options. At one point Los Angeles even
tried to take a Southern Sierras Power Company facility in the Owens River
Gorge by eminent domain.19 Detractors criticized Los Angeles for pursuing the
Colorado River, frequently citing the Owens Valley conﬂict as evidence of the
city’s imperial heartlessness. In fact, its plans for the Colorado did make Los
Angeles look aggressive and over-conﬁdent. Few cities, after all, challenged state
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governments other than their own. The decision to pursue the Colorado, however,
decreased political conﬂict in the arenas most important to Los Angeles’ future.
By the 1920s Los Angeles could not expand its water or power networks in
southern California without creating even greater opposition than they had in the
Owens Valley. Had the city turned instead to northern California’s streams, Los
Angeles would likely have created determined enemies in state politics.20 Boulder
Canyon represented a reasonable alternative because it solved Los Angeles’s
problems without increasing political conﬂict in California.
Of course, Los Angeles wanted more than electricity from the Colorado
River. The 1923-1924 drought that threatened the city with power shortages also
raised the specter of future water famine. In this context, William Mulholland
informed the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation in 1924 that
Los Angeles wanted 1000 acre-feet a year of Colorado water to supplement
its other supplies. The drought prompted Los Angeles voters to approve both
the aqueduct from the Colorado and the Metropolitan Water District. Other
cities in southern California also saw the Colorado as a solution to their water
and power problems. Riverside advocated construction of a dam “in response
to the necessities of the cities and the people in these southwest states, with
Government development and Government construction and Government sale,
providing the waters cheaply at cost and the power to the people.”21 The City of
Long Beach hoped Colorado River power would reduce electricity costs enough
to help it compete with Riverside, Los Angeles, and other Southern California
communities.22 This interest in the Colorado changed the whole question of
Colorado River development. Los Angeles, Riverside, and Long Beach would
buy enough electricity to make the dam economically feasible. They had enough
congressional representation and political pull to get the project built. The city’s
designs on the river conﬁrmed Arizona’s and Nevada’s worst suspicions about
Los Angeles and the real purpose of the dam.23
Interest in the Colorado, of course, was not limited to Imperial County
and Los Angeles, but no major development could take place until all the
seven states along the river reached an agreement on water rights. The federal
government had jurisdiction over the Colorado River as a navigable river, and
as a hydroelectric power resource in the public domain. So any community,
state or private corporation that wished to develop the river needed federal
approval. In addition, any project would establish water rights on the river by
prior appropriation that could interfere with subsequent development. Federal
jurisdiction gave state ofﬁcials the opportunity to lobby against projects in other
states, but thus blocking development was the only means by which state ofﬁcials
could protect their constituents’ interests in the Colorado. So no project could get
through Congress until state ofﬁcials felt reasonably assured that their constituents
would have access to Colorado River water when they needed it. The Colorado
River Compact, signed by all the Colorado basin states except Arizona, and
ratiﬁed by Congress in 1928, ﬁnally resolved this deadlock, by allocating half
of the water in the river to the so called Upper Basin States of Colorado, New
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Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, and half to the Lower Basin states of Arizona,
California, and Nevada.24
The Colorado River Compact did not entirely resolve interstate disputes.
Because the Compact did not allocate water within each half of the basin,
the states still had to agree on how to develop their half of the river. Of the
lower basin communities interested in the Colorado, only Los Angeles was
actually poised to use waters impounded by a dam in Boulder Canyon. Thus,
only California had the means and need to establish rights to the lower basin’s
portion of the river. Arizona’s state ofﬁcials had refused to sign the Colorado
Compact because they feared that California, and speciﬁcally Los Angeles, would
appropriate all of the lower basin’s water, and thus leave Arizona dry. To protect
its future access to the Colorado, Arizona therefore consistently disputed federal
jurisdiction over the Colorado and dismissed California’s plans as Los Angeles’
illegitimate scheming.
By the mid-1920s the fate of a dam at Black or Boulder Canyon rested on
the resolution of several entrenched conﬂicts. Los Angeles and Imperial County
hoped for federal construction of a reservoir for hydropower, ﬂood control,
irrigation, and urban water
supply. Southern California
Edison expected to build private
hydroelectric facilities on the
Colorado. Arizona wanted to
block any development that
might establish water rights
in California. Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming,
secure in the belief that the
Colorado River Compact
protected their futures, still had
18.1. Black Canyon during early preparations for
to decide whether to side with
construction of Boulder Dam.
California or with Arizona in
the dispute over Boulder Dam.
The upper basin states hoped federal construction at Boulder Dam would ease
the passage of upper basin projects, but they had no assurance that California
would support funding for these projects or that California would refrain from
campaigning to limit upper basin use in violation of the Colorado Compact.25
Eastern voters and some residents of the upper Colorado Basin dismissed Boulder
Dam as a lavish federal expenditure that served special interests in California
rather than the national good.26 Meanwhile, the United States’ resolution of
Mexico’s claims to the Colorado, the Rio Grande, and other border rivers in
1944 added to the demands for Colorado River water by guaranteeing Mexico
1,500,000 acre feet of water from the Colorado each year without specifying who
had to give up their water to meet this obligation.
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The Limits of Federal Authority: The Hydropower Debate
Clearly these conﬂicts complicated Colorado River politics. A closer
look at just one of the conﬂicts, hydroelectric power development, demonstrates
that Boulder Dam was a product of a national debate over political philosophy,
not a localized dispute over water rights. Even so, the water resource conﬂicts
were important. Indeed, the very intractability of inter- and intrastate disputes
over water made it possible, indeed necessary, for supporters of the dam to
marginalize the power question. Arizona’s unbending opposition to the Colorado
River Compact magniﬁed the threat of utility corporation opposition to the dam
and made the staunchest supporters of the dam all the more eager to compromise
the Water Power Act of 1920 for the sake of the Colorado River project. But
public power development was not ancillary, and the evolution of debate over
hydropower demonstrates how participants in that debate used contemporary
political philosophy and rhetoric to shape public policy for the twentieth century.
Although Arizonans’ objections to Boulder Dam emphasized the threat
that outsiders—including California, federal ofﬁcials and the private utility
corporations—posed to their state, the hydropower development question must be
considered in a broader context. Philip Swing proposed a federal dam at a crucial
moment in the negotiation between federal and local governments and between
public and private enterprise in America. Public utility advocates nationwide
sought to strike a balance between the business-centered “normalcy” of Coolidge
and Harding on the one hand, and public demand for public services on the other.
This debate revealed deeply-rooted anxieties about federal authority. In nearly
every commentary on Boulder Dam, this fear of public authority appears in
warnings of federal intrusion on local autonomy, and of government displacement
of private enterprise. So, when private utilities mobilized the rhetoric of limited
federal authority, they bound their interests and the principles of private enterprise
ﬁrmly to Americans’ desire to use federal monies to meet local priorities, without
losing local autonomy. The utilities’ ability to navigate these conﬂicting impulses
about public services and private enterprise, and about federal assistance within
local control ultimately left proponents of federal dam-building with little room to
maneuver on hydropower development at the great dams.
Even though westerners focus on the Colorado, debate over power
development there echoed national discussions of the fate of Wilson Dam at
Muscle Shoals, Alabama.27 Approved as part of the National Defense Act of
1916, Wilson Dam was intended to power a cyanamid plant producing nitratebased explosives. After the war, private companies sought control of the
dam, even though the authorizing bill prohibited the federal government from
privatizing the facility after the war.28 Alabama utility corporations sought to add
Wilson Dam to their own power networks. Henry Ford, meanwhile, promised
to produce 40,000 tons of nitrate fertilizer for sale at only an eight percent proﬁt,
if the federal government completed and maintained the dam, and gave him a
hundred-year lease on the property.29 At the same time, public power advocates
453

suggested that the Secretary of War complete the dam, build distribution lines, sell
electricity to public utilities, and use the proceeds to fund research on fertilizers.30
The senate debate on Muscle Shoals turned on two issues: should public agencies
or private companies operate the dam; and, should the dam power the fertilizer
production at the cyanamid plant or provide electricity to domestic and industrial
consumers throughout the region?
Presidents Coolidge and Hoover vetoed bills for public operation of
Muscle Shoals in 1928 and 1930, despite the fact that both the Water Power Act of
1920 and the National Defense Act of 1916 seemed to mandate public operation
of the hydropower plant at Muscle Shoals.31 These vetoes, like the debate over
public power at Boulder Dam, reﬂected deep divisions over private enterprise
in America. Americans wanted inexpensive power, but could not agree whether
private or public power would yield the lowest rates. They also responded to
political statements about the beneﬁts of small government, even as they looked
to public ofﬁcials to control the political, economic and social inﬂuence of major
corporations.
In Arizona this ambivalence appeared throughout the debate over the
Colorado River Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act, even though
Arizonans were more preoccupied with California. California appeared
frequently in the correspondence that Arizona congressional representative Carl
Hayden received expressing alarm that the Bureau of Reclamation’s dam would
only feed Los Angeles’ insatiable demand for water and electricity. Many of
these letters urged Hayden to push for a federal dam at Glen Canyon to better
irrigate Arizona farms.32 Senator Henry F. Ashurst also complained that the
Colorado River Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project disproportionately
beneﬁted California. He complained that California had negotiated in bad faith
during the conferences that yielded the Compact, and he cited the creation of the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California in 1926, three years before the
Boulder Canyon Project Act passed, as proof.33
Some Arizonans favored the Colorado River Compact because they saw
in federal development a means to counter California’s considerable political
inﬂuence. Arizona’s delegation to the American Association of Engineers,
for example, projected that the Compact would promote growth for Arizona
agriculture, mining, and industry by increasing energy supplies.34 Others
expected the Compact to bring more federal ﬂood control, irrigation, and
hydropower to Arizona.35 More pessimistic Arizonans resigned themselves to
California’s use of Colorado River resources for which Arizona had no immediate
need, but proposed that California at least pay Arizona for the use of Boulder Dam
electricity.36
In keeping with the national debate in the late 1920s on the expansion
of federal authority, the fate of Arizona’s autonomy featured prominently in the
Colorado River debate. The Phoenix Real Estate Board suggested that the dam
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might bolster local control because the federal government could turn the dam
over to an independent irrigation or power district.37 Other observers cautioned
that private development would transfer even more resources to California than
would the federal plan. In this light, Southern California Edison’s application
for a permit to develop Glen Canyon Dam represented an “attempt to acquire
control of the Colorado River,”38 because Southern California Edison had
already declared and justiﬁed its intention to sell Colorado River electricity to
Los Angeles consumers.39 Although Arizona’s relationship with California, not
private utilities or the growth of federal authority, dominated these discussions,
the public power debate permeated the way Arizonans deﬁned the threats to their
own autonomy.
In the national arena, the public power question ﬁgured more prominently
and more directly in debates over Boulder Dam. Given their defeat at Muscle
Shoals, many public power advocates saw Boulder Dam as the last opportunity
to reverse the policies that had led to enough “larceny of public assets to last
a century or two.”40 The Los Angeles business community found itself caught
between desire for Boulder Dam’s water and power, and their commitment to
private enterprise.41 Meanwhile, the utility industry remained a signiﬁcant force,
by funding the publicity campaigns in defense of private enterprise undertaken
by such groups as the Better American Foundation and the Greater California
League, and by successfully lobbying against both large federal projects like
Boulder Dam and the local bond measures that cities needed to purchase or build
distribution grids.42 Despite this considerable political inﬂuence, the utilities did
not block Boulder Dam completely; it is not clear that they wanted to, whatever
their rhetorical position in defense of private development on the Colorado.
In 1928 Congress approved the Colorado River Compact and Boulder
Dam over Arizona’s continuing objections. The Boulder Canyon Project Act did
not settle the question of hydroelectric power development, however, because
it did not specify whether the Bureau of Reclamation would wholesale power
from federally-operated turbines, lease machinery in a federally-constructed
power plant, or lease the right to generate power in a power plant built and
operated by lease-holders.43 Congress left this ambiguity in the bill in order to
pass it. The bill also required the Bureau of Reclamation to get power contracts
signed to guarantee enough power revenue to underwrite construction before
any construction began.44 So, regardless of the political expedients behind the
ambiguities in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the question of who would
develop and distribute power from Boulder Dam had to be settled quickly. Los
Angeles offered the only ready market for Boulder Dam electricity. In fact, this
market was so important that the Bureau of Reclamation based its contracts on
the cost of steam-generated electricity in Los Angeles.45 This merely conﬁrmed
Arizona’s worst fears, but for the rest of the country the Boulder Canyon Project
Act provided an opportunity to continue the debate over public versus private
enterprise.
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In the late 1920s the notion of the public interest ﬁgured prominently
in the public discourse. Periodicals like The Nation and The New Republic
insisted upon federal involvement because state regulation provided inadequate
public protection.46 During the presidential campaign of 1928 Al Smith insisted
that private control of hydropower sites reduced public control of power rates,
weakened regulatory authority over electric utilities, and exposed the public to
unnamed future hazards. Given these dangers, he argued, there was “nothing
socialistic or revolutionary” about regulating utilities or developing public
power.47 Franklin D. Roosevelt, unsurprisingly, praised Smith’s vision of public
power.48 Hugo Black, then a senator from Alabama, accused the “power trust”
of reaping excessive proﬁts from the sale of a necessity.49 Gifford Pinchot
maintained that public generation of power at Boulder Dam would curb the
growth of the utility monopoly, and viliﬁed the opposition for playing into the
hands of the utility corporations.50 Even years later, critics raged that private
corporations “still claim[ed] the right to install their own generators in public
dams, build transmission lines and retail the power.”51 These arguments all relied
on Progressive faith in public enterprise as an antidote to the excesses of private
capital, and a well-established tradition of portraying utilities as greedy, willful
monopolies that refused to accept public ownership in spite of public opinion.
Whatever Pinchot thought of them, private utility advocates used the
rhetoric of the public interest just as readily as did Smith, Roosevelt, and The
Nation, but their deﬁnition of the public interest differed. A pamphlet by the
Ohio Chamber of Commerce exempliﬁed the private power advocates’ use
of “public good” rhetoric. The Chamber objected to Boulder Dam because it
opened “this wide crack in the door for the entry of state socialism,” and because
it allowed federal ofﬁcials arbitrary authority. The Chamber warned that the
Boulder Canyon Project Act gave the Secretary of the Interior authority “at his
own discretion, to engage the government of the United States in the manufacture
and sale of electrical power.” They called this a radical concentration of power in
the hands of one man, and a “typical instance of the increasing centralization of
authority and expenditures in federal bureaus.” The Chamber went on to protest
the Boulder Canyon Project Act as a threat to democracy and local control: “This
is a far cry from the ideas of the founders of this government. If the present
tendency to center power and administration in Washington for all sorts of power
is not checked, the states of the Union will be reduced to the position of mere
counties within the next two or three generations.”52 The implication, of course,
was that the state governments were far more capable of serving voters than a
remote Congress or Cabinet ofﬁcer.
The utility industry likewise warned that public ownership threatened
democracy. In 1927 American power corporations denounced public development
at Muscle Shoals and Boulder Dam as “‘socialistic’ and ‘dangerous.’“53 Southern
Sierras Power Company called federal dam-building defective and costly,
concluding that “Political engineering, political banking, political railroading,
and general public utility operating is usually unsound and dangerous.54 The
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utility insisted that private enterprise retain a role in Boulder Dam.55 Because
they paid taxes and could complete dam or hydropower plants without the “delays
and excessive costs that are usually incident to the construction and operation of
public owned works,” 56 Southern Sierras claimed private enterprise participation
would reduce the overall burden on the national treasury, and thus would beneﬁt
the public.
Public ofﬁcials issued similar warnings. In a 1921 memo to President
Harding, for example, Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall called the City of Los
Angeles “socialistic” for pursuing a public power system.57 A few years later,
New Jersey Congressional Representative Charles A. Eaton characterized Boulder
Dam as “the adoption of a socialistic Russian Scheme of having the Federal
Government go into the power business in competition with its own citizens in
private ﬁelds.”58 Eaton reportedly endorsed only those river development policies
that kept the federal government out of “the ﬁeld of private business.”59 Likewise,
Elmer O. Leatherwood, a member of the House Committee on Irrigation, called
the Boulder Dam project “inimical to the best interests of the United States and
the people of the whole country” because it violated the “principle of private
industry in the country,” and might eventually allow groups to “practically
federalize the entire development” of western streams.60
Advocates of public power had a response to the implication that only
the cooperation of business and government preserved American democracy.
Drawing parallels to the Teapot Dome scandal, public power advocates alerted
Americans to the “powerful interests” that exerted pressure on public ofﬁcials.
The Nation blamed campaign contributions by the nation’s private utilities for
Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur’s and President Hoover’s willingness
to undermine the Water Power Act of 1920 by permitting private utilities too
much access to and control over hydropower facilities at federal dams.61 The New
Republic cited as evidence a proposed amendment to the Swing-Johnson Bill
that would have compelled the federal government to lease all power rights at
Boulder Canyon. Bad enough that this would have turned “over to private proﬁt
without adequate compensation, not millions of dollars’ worth of government
oil, but millions of dollars’ worth of government water power.”62 The real
danger, however, lay in power of the utilities to create a “system of depriving the
people… from sharing equally in the public domain resources.”63
The utilities also wielded inﬂuence outside the halls of government. The
United States Chamber of Commerce, a bitter opponent of public power, had
many ties to power companies. In fact, the president of the Chamber from 1927
to 1928, Lewis E. Pierson, served on the board of directors of several power
companies and worked with executives from several powerful utility ﬁrms on
the governing board of Nation’s Business.64 The utilities used media and public
relations campaigns to promote their positions. These efforts were so pervasive
that The Nation raged, “There is no other ﬁeld of public interest in which
there is so complete, effective, and continuously operating machinery for the
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dissemination of misinformation and silencing of opposition as in the domain of
the public utilities.”65 In 1929 the Federal Trade Commission investigated the
political activities of the utility industry to see if a power trust truly threatened
American democracy and public interests.66
By 1929 it was clear that the Bureau of Reclamation was going to build
Boulder Dam. Opponents of federal dam-building had lost, the public interest
had been deﬁned to include an increased federal role in the development and
distribution of western resources, and the still unresolved matter of power
development was about to set important precedents for private and public
enterprise. The utilities adjusted their strategy accordingly. Southern California
Edison now argued for federal construction because the region would beneﬁt, not
“in the emancipation of an oppressed people from the tentacles of an imaginary
power trust octopus, but in the impetus that will be given the Lower Colorado
Basin by ﬂood protection, irrigation, and the disbursement of hundreds of millions
of new money for material, labor and supplies in that territory.” 67 In other
words, Boulder Dam would serve the public by promoting growth; private power
development was consistent with this program of economic development.68
The utilities’ political ﬂexibility in the face of shifting policies frustrated
their opponents. Many public power advocates cited the utilities’ changing
strategy as a sign that the companies had always intended to proﬁt from dams
built with the taxpayers’ dollar. The utilities and their allies did not defeat the
dam, but only because Congress left the public power question out of the ﬁnal
Boulder Canyon Project Act. The fact that many American’s suspected that the
federal government had exceeded its authority by infringing on states’ rights
as well as private enterprise clearly
increased the inﬂuence of private
enterprise in Colorado River policy.69
As Al Smith found, Boulder Dam,
Muscle Shoals, and projects like them,
went against too many currents in
American politics. Interstate disputes
over power rights, and regional
conﬂicts over the distribution of
federal largess, forced advocates of
both public utilities and federal dams
to compromise. The justiﬁcations for
this compromise were explicit. Philip
Swing recognized that California
interests had to remain united
throughout the ﬁnal authorization of
the dam because intramural conﬂict
would likely reduce the water available
for Imperial County and the power
18.2. The interior of Nevada Powerplant at
Hoover Dam.
available to Los Angeles.70
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John R. Haynes saw private operation of Boulder’s generators as an acceptable
way to protect Los Angeles and other public agencies from taking on too much
ﬁnancial responsibility for the dam.71 Although Boulder Canyon had presented
an obvious opportunity to implement the Water Power Act of 1920 and to set
a precedent for publicly-generated and publicly-distributed electricity, the
difﬁculties of so extending federal authority and of implementing the Reclamation
Act and the Water Power Act made this politically impossible.
Anti-Federalism and Political Realism at Black Canyon
When Southern California Edison and the Bureau of Reclamation signed
contracts for Boulder Dam power, they all but settled the debate over public power
in the United States. Public ownership proceeded in the Tennessee Valley and
parts of the Columbia River, but Boulder Dam did not herald a new age of public
ownership. Boulder Dam’s hybrid of public and private enterprise came to be
portrayed as the acme of effective government, subject to far less criticism even
than the participation of industry leaders in designing industrial regulations. Yet
this arrangement was at once an accident of politics, and the product of a very
speciﬁc campaign by the utility industry to protect their interests in the nation’s
hydropower resources.
Philip Swing’s vision of the dam included public power development,
but he considered the dam itself and the All-American Canal far more important.
Others grafted their vision onto his, adding water supply for Los Angeles,
hydroelectric power for Arizona mines and, ultimately, for Los Angeles’ industries.
In order to justify the dam, early advocates emphasized the need for electricity
in general, as much as they did the need for public sales of that power. This was,
perhaps, a crucial mistake for the public power movement because it divorced
the dam from the question of who should generate power at the dam. But given
the early participation of Southern California Edison in river surveys, and given
national resistance to a project of this magnitude in a region of the United States
that contributed so little to the national economy, this may also have been very
astute politics.
So many groups opposed the dam for so many reasons that this
compromise may have been the only way to get the dam built. The utility industry
astutely exploited the rifts in American politics. They championed private
enterprise against creeping socialism. They offered themselves as mediators
between federal and state authority, and perhaps even more importantly, between
California and the other states of the Colorado River Basin. National ambivalence
about federal authority worked for the utility industry in a second way. Many
Americans feared government growth as much because increased federal activity
would increase taxes as for any other reason. So, Congress insisted that power
revenues cover the costs of construction and so reduced the amount of tax funds
spent on the dam. This, too, made secure hydropower development far more
important than publicly-owned generation or distribution of that power.
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In the end, interstate rivalry, competitive envy of Los Angeles’ commercial
expansion, and a generalized desire to limit federal authority permitted private
utilities to retain major claims on natural resources—in spite of the Water Power
Act and in spite of the fact that no private corporation had the resources to take
on the Colorado River. But the ambiguities in the Boulder Canyon Project Act
and the resolution of those ambiguities in favor of the private power corporations
reveal deeper patterns in American political thought. News coverage of the
utilities’ lobbying efforts against the Water Power Act, Muscle Shoals, and
Boulder Dam portrayed the utilities as heavy-handed, greedy, and self-interested.
Although a consensus had emerged against expanded federal authority, something
of the Populist and Progressive concern about the tyranny of private enterprise
remained. This is why the “cooperation” between public and private entities
met with such approval. At Boulder Dam, the public sector checked the private
sector, and the private sector checked the public, even as they both supplied the
Southwest with extremely important public services. This then, would be the
model for development for many decades to come.
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Boulder Dam Recreation Area: The Bureau of
Reclamation, the National Park Service, and the
Origins of the National Recreation Area Concept at
Lake Mead, 1929-1936*
By:
Douglas W. Dodd
The struggle to keep dams out of the national parks that pitted
conservationists against the West’s water and power interests has constituted a
major recurring theme in American environmental history. From the early ﬁght
over the fate of Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy Valley, to the campaigns to keep dams
out of Dinosaur National Monument and Grand Canyon National Park, historians
have recounted the continuing effort to keep the National Park System free of
dams. But what would happen if things were the other way around? What if,
instead of trying to keep a dam out of a national park, the National Park Service
(NPS) invented a new type of area—a national recreation area—that would have
at its center the world’s largest dam, reservoir, and hydroelectric generating plant?
Between 1929 and 1936 that is exactly what happened, as the U.S. Department
of the Interior made plans for the lands that would surround Boulder Dam and its
reservoir, Lake Mead.
In October 1936 Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes approved an
agreement between the National Park Service and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
(USBR) to create Boulder Dam Recreation Area—America’s ﬁrst national
recreation area. The Boulder Dam Recreation Area agreement concluded
seven years of work begun during the Hoover administration, and it marked
the beginning of a decades-long cooperative partnership between the NPS and
USBR to plan for and develop outdoor recreation at federal reservoirs in the
West. The mutually beneﬁcial partnership allowed each of the two agencies to
further its own interests. For the National Park Service, it meant gaining new
areas to manage while expanding its role in outdoor recreation. For the Bureau of
Reclamation, it meant the ability to promote recreation as a beneﬁt of its projects,
while avoiding the distraction of managing recreation itself. This achievement
was all the more remarkable in that it was accomplished without signiﬁcant
opposition from private local interests or conservationists.
The development of the Boulder Dam Recreation Area has not received
full treatment in the historical literature of environmental history or the national
parks.1 Yet it is a story that is as signiﬁcant as it has been obscure. First, the
effort to create the Boulder Dam Recreation Area challenged the National
Park Service to ﬁnd a way to reconcile its own ideal of preservation and public
* This article is reprinted courtesy of the Southern California Quarterly which published a
slightly different version in its volume 88 (Winter 2006-2007).
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enjoyment with an enormous utilitarian project, a dam belonging to another
federal agency. The resulting compromise established the precedent for a new
type of National Park Service area—a national recreation area—that emphasized
outdoor recreation while seeking to balance preservation and education with
other uses—dams, grazing, and mining, for example—that were traditionally
not allowed in national parks. This compromise would become the central
principle behind the forty national recreation areas that would follow. Second,
the NPS-USBR partnership produced important, if unintended, consequences.
The increasingly cozy relationship between the two agencies that began at Lake
Mead resulted in the National Park Service’s acquiescence to the Bureau of
Reclamation’s later proposals to build the Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur National
Monument and the Bridge Canyon Dam in the lower Grand Canyon—setting the
stage for two of the pivotal conservation battles of the 1950s and 1960s.
The development of America’s ﬁrst national recreation area—conceived
during the Hoover administration—was a consequence of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928. In the act, Congress directed the Bureau of Reclamation to
construct a major water-resources-development project on the lower Colorado
River for the purposes of controlling ﬂoods, storing water for both irrigation
and domestic use, and generating hydroelectric power.2 Boulder Dam would
impound the waters of a mammoth reservoir reaching 115 miles upstream—as
far as the little community of St. Thomas, Nevada, on the lower Virgin River, and
Pierce’s Ferry, Arizona, in the Colorado River’s lower Grand Canyon. Although
recreation was not a purpose speciﬁed in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, Bureau
of Reclamation ofﬁcials understood that public recreation would be a signiﬁcant
use of the new Boulder Dam Reservoir. Indeed, the bureau had ﬁrst noticed
the recreational potential of its reservoirs shortly after the 1906 construction of
Theodore Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River Project in Arizona. Swimming and
boating became popular at the reservoir, and a hotel to accommodate visitors
soon followed.3 In 1914 Arizonans even tried—unsuccessfully—to have the
area surrounding Roosevelt Reservoir designated a national park.4 By the 1920s,
throughout the arid West, the recreational importance of its reservoirs to local
residents and to their tourist economy was becoming clear to the bureau. As a
1928 Bureau of Reclamation pamphlet noted, “They are entering increasingly
into the life of the people as pleasure resorts and playgrounds, as bird sanctuaries,
and as excellent ﬁshing grounds…”5 The federal government provided little
in the way of services or facilities at the reservoirs, however, despite their
growing recreational appeal, other than the issuing of permits for private-sector
developments and the stocking of ﬁsh by the Bureau of Fisheries.6
But the Boulder Canyon Project’s enormous dam and reservoir would be
the world’s largest—attractions destined to become, in the words of Reclamation
Commissioner Elwood Mead, “a tourist mecca,” that would draw visitors, not just
from the Southwest, but from “every part of the world.”7 Many of these tourists
would be coming simply to gaze passively upon the dam and reservoir—much
as tourists gaze upon Niagara Falls or the Grand Canyon—and then move on.
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But tourism and outdoor recreation were changing in the 1920s and 1930s, and
a growing number of visitors would not be content with such passivity. The
interwar years saw a revolution in the nature of outdoor recreation. Those tourists
whom John Muir had once derided as “tender, pulpy people,” who traveled
in “smooth comfort” to gaze upon scenic spectacles, were now being joined
by legions of Americans who shared Muir’s love of a more strenuous outdoor
experience.8 The outdoor recreation boom was partly the result of increasing
leisure time, particularly for middle-class Americans. But more importantly, as
Paul Sutter has argued, it was improved transportation—private automobiles and
modern highways—that put outdoor recreation venues within the reach of city
dwellers seeking a weekend outing or a week’s vacation and brought “remote
natural areas into the recreational orbits of modern Americans.”9 As a result,
participation in auto-camping, hunting, ﬁshing, and recreational boating increased
rapidly.10
Looking to the future of the Boulder Canyon Project, the U.S. Department
of the Interior recognized that these new patterns in recreational demand
would necessitate building not only roads, overlooks, and lodgings but also
campgrounds, trails, swimming areas, and boating facilities. Furthermore,
visitors would require interpretive and educational services to provide them
with “information about the dam and lake, as well as the natural glories of
the region.”11 But the Bureau of Reclamation, although it acknowledged the
importance of the reservoir’s recreational potential, had no interest in assuming
the responsibility of developing and operating recreational programs and
facilities. Providing high-quality outdoor recreation opportunities, along with the
other beneﬁts associated with its projects, would undoubtedly generate publicrelations dividends for the bureau. But the agency possessed, its leaders readily
conceded, “neither the necessary experience [n]or personnel to administer the
area” for recreational use.12 The bureau saw itself strictly as an organization that
constructed and operated water-resources- development projects, not parks, and it
did not want to assume additional functions not directly related to its mission.
While the Bureau of Reclamation lacked the expertise and interest
to develop the Boulder Canyon Reservoir for recreational purposes, the
National Park Service abounded in both. Since its creation in 1916, the NPS
had administered and promoted recreation in its national parks and national
monuments. It knew how to plan, design, and construct the necessary facilities
and developments; it provided educational and interpretive services; and it had
policies and procedures in place for managing and regulating visitor use. The
Park Service considered itself the nation’s foremost recreation agency and was
proud to claim “years of experience and experimentation in handling visitors
in such manner as to lift them from the place of mere tourist to that of the
enthusiastic seeker after the fascinating facts of natural history.”13 Management of
the recreational aspects of the Boulder Canyon Project would fall to the National
Park Service.
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National Park Service involvement in developing a recreation area at
Boulder Dam began during the Hoover administration. In June 1929, Secretary
of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur made a trip to inspect the Boulder Canyon
Project area and recognized the scenic and recreational value of the public lands
surrounding it. Secretary Wilbur grew up in southern California and as an
undergraduate at Stanford University had participated in a botanical collecting
expedition to southern Arizona, which had instilled in him, he later recalled,
“a real love of the desert and also some understanding of its signiﬁcance.”14
His visit to the dam site seemed to reawaken his fascination with the desert
landscape. Upon his return to Washington, Wilbur ordered a report on the
“national park possibilities in connection with the Boulder Canyon Reclamation
Project” and directed the
Bureau of Reclamation and
the National Park Service to
consult with one another about
the future management of the
area.15 Between 1929 and 1932
National Park Service staff and
consultants made a series of
studies and investigations of the
area surrounding the planned
reservoir.16
19.1. During a tour of Hoover Dam construction

One of the ﬁrst proposals, on November 12, 1932, Ray Lyman Wilbur (third
from right) accompanied President Herbert
advanced in 1929 by Ernest
Walker Sawyer, Wilbur’s assistant Hoover (between Mrs. Hoover and Mrs. Wilbur).
secretary of the Interior, sought to
preserve the area from “depredation” through the establishment of an enormous
“national park, recreation area, or outdoor nature shrine” between the Colorado
River and Zion National Park. Tentatively labeled the “Proposed Virgin National
Park,” the project would span the lower Virgin River and the Colorado River
country upstream of the Boulder Dam site. The area would comprise nearly 8,000
square miles surrounding the dam’s projected reservoir and would be accessed
through highway entrances at Boulder Dam, Moapa Valley, and Zion, and by
airplane from Grand Canyon National Park. Sawyer intended the expansive
boundaries to include numerous outstanding features: the Boulder Dam reservoir;
archaeological sites such as Salt Cave, Gypsum Cave, and the “Lost City of
Nevada” pueblo ruins; historic Mormon settlements like Fort Callville and
Pipe Spring; and numerous scenic natural features such as the Kolob Canyons
(near Zion), the Valley of Fire, and areas in the western Grand Canyon such as
Toroweap, Shivwits Plateau, Lava Falls, and Vulcan’s Throne.17 The idea found a
champion in Secretary Wilbur.
At Wilbur’s prompting, NPS Director Horace M. Albright reported that
the proposed Virgin National Park region had much to recommend it: The canyon
of the Colorado below Grand Canyon National Park was of “great scientiﬁc
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importance”; the prehistoric Indian ruins along the lower Virgin were of interest
to archaeologists; and the Kanab and Shivwits Plateaus were excellent examples
of wild tablelands. The region possessed, in short, “many natural features
demanded of any area under consideration for national park status.” But the area
fell short of fully meeting NPS standards of suitability and feasibility. Suitability
was impaired in two ways. First, although the area was highly scenic, many of
its best features duplicated those already better represented in Grand Canyon
National Park, and NPS policy held that duplication was to be avoided within
the park system. Second, and more signiﬁcantly, the presence of Boulder Dam
and its artiﬁcial reservoir would be “contrary to the well established policy of
maintaining natural landscape conditions…” With regard to feasibility, Albright
noted the problems presented by a considerable acreage of private and state
land intermingled with federal holdings, a longstanding pattern of extensive
livestock grazing that would be “difﬁcult to extinguish,” and the presence of
Indian reservation and
national forest lands
within the boundaries
of the area, all of which
would “operate against the
administration of the area
within the principles of
national park protection.”
As a consequence, Albright
concluded that the area
should not become a
national park, although
he recommended further
19.2. In 1927 or 1928 Stephen Mather and his ranking
study to identify “certain
staff sat for this portrait in Washington, D.C.
smaller areas” that appeared From left to right: Arno B. Cammerer, Arthur E.
“worthy of preservation” as Demaray, Stephen T. Mather, George A. Moskey and
Horace M. Albright. Photo courtesy of the National Park Service.
national monuments.18
Despite Albright’s negative report, Wilbur remained interested in the
scenic and recreational potential of the region. Perhaps an expansive Virgin
National Park was not the best way to proceed, but he still believed that some
action should be taken to protect the area. He told Albright:
Since it is unique in character, the land is largely public land, and
the lake will provide a new feature both of beauty and for transportation,
I think that we should devise some method by which it can be held in
the public interest. Whether it should be classiﬁed as a recreation area,
a national monument, or in some other way, I do not know. I would like
though to have you seriously consider not letting it leave the National
Park Service and of originating legislation which will give us a chance to
retain it in its original beauty. Even if it is not of National Park standard,
it is of sufﬁcient national signiﬁcance to warrant most careful study by us
as to its ultimate disposition.19
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Committed to his goal of protecting the scenic desert landscapes surrounding the
Boulder Dam reservoir, Wilbur urged President Hoover to withdraw the lands
from entry, guaranteeing that they would remain in public ownership until the
matter could be resolved.
In April 1930 President Hoover signed an executive order withdrawing
from settlement 4,212 square miles of public land upstream from the Boulder
Dam site, based on Wilbur’s determination that the lands would be “of
greater public value from a scenic and scientiﬁc standpoint than for economic
development” and that the new reservoir would offer “unusual recreation
opportunities.”20 In particular, the reservoir would improve public access via
scenic boat tours, according to the Interior Department, that would allow visitors
to “enjoy a stupendous view of the great gorge of the Colorado River that
hitherto could be seen only by the most hardy and experienced boatmen, and that
even for them was fraught with serious danger.” The reservoir at Boulder Dam
would open new vistas to the touring public “second in signiﬁcance only to that
portion of the Grand Canyon within the Grand Canyon National Park.”21 Based
on the recreational potential identiﬁed in NPS studies, Secretary of the Interior
Wilbur recommended that “at least part” of the area be established as a “national
monument or some other special preserve to be developed and administered by
the National Park Service.” 22
Yet the question of National Park Service involvement with the Boulder
Canyon Project would be problematic. The National Park Service had been
created in 1916 in the aftermath of the titanic battle to stop the city of San
Francisco from damming the Tuolumne River in Yosemite National Park’s scenic
Hetch Hetchy Valley. The ﬁght had helped to deﬁne what kinds of development
would be appropriate in a national park. Although San Francisco won the battle,
the dam at Hetch Hetchy would prove the exception rather than the rule. Indeed,
park advocates, such as the Sierra Club and the American Civic Association,
pointed to the loss of Hetch Hetchy—and the urgent need to prevent another park
from suffering the same fate—as a prime example of the urgent need for Congress
to establish a national park agency with a strong preservation mandate.23 During
the 1920s the young National Park Service fought to prevent the Bureau of
Reclamation and its supporters from building more dams in the national parks. In
particular, NPS Director Stephen T. Mather and his assistant, Horace M. Albright,
worked to protect Yellowstone National Park and Glacier National Park from
dam proposals that would have beneﬁted irrigators in Idaho and Montana.24 But
now Secretary Wilbur was suggesting that the NPS add to its holdings a new area
with the world’s largest manmade dam at its center. How could such a thing be
reconciled with the national park idea? As historian Richard Sellars has noted,
“Philosophical contradictions” were bound to emerge when “the main feature was
itself a gigantic impairment to natural conditions.”25 How the agency resolved
this contradiction would set an important precedent.
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Whether the Boulder Canyon Project area met the exacting criteria
of national park quality and national signiﬁcance, and whether a dam could
be allowed in an area under NPS management were questions that demanded
answers. The National Park Service exerted powerful inﬂuence over decisions
to create new parks and monuments, and although the agency was eager to
expand into new areas, it frequently rejected “inferior” park proposals that fell
short of its rigorous standards.26 As a result, scrutiny of the project launched a
round of vigorous and searching discussions within the national park leadership.
M. R. Tillotson, superintendent of Grand Canyon National Park, advocated
for NPS management of the dam and reservoir area due to its superlative size.
As the world’s largest, Tillotson believed that it would make “an attraction of
considerable tourist interest.” In order to assure its proper development, he said,
the withdrawn lands around the proposed reservoir “should become a National
Park or Monument, either as a distinct unit or as an addition to Grand Canyon
National Park.”27 Assistant Director Conrad Wirth was eager for the NPS to
begin helping the Bureau of Reclamation to administer the recreational facilities
of the project, but he had reservations over how the area should be designated
due to the presence of the dam. “I do not see how this area could be considered
for a national park, on account of its artiﬁcial make-up,” he wrote. Although
national monument status might be warranted because of the dam’s “scientiﬁc
qualiﬁcations” as a “tremendous engineering accomplishment,” as well as the
area’s potential for “national recreation,” he maintained that the area should be
“placed in some other classiﬁcation than a national park or monument.”28 Others
within the agency concurred with Wirth. Wallace R. Atwood believed that the
project area would “prove to be a very valuable recreation section,” but he was
not convinced that it should be part of the national park system. “Maybe we
can look forward to a classiﬁcation which will include areas of this nature,” he
wrote.29 Education and Research Director Harold C. Bryant concurred, writing
Director Albright that he was “not convinced of the value of the Hoover Dam
Site as a national monument.” He regarded it as “one of those third class areas
needing another name.”30 A consensus emerged: First, the area required further
and more intensive study to determine its suitability. Second, the National Park
Service needed to devise a new category for areas that were primarily valuable
for recreation, rather than for their superlative natural or historical signiﬁcance.
Such a new category—distinct from parks or monuments—was needed in order to
ensure that allowing a dam in a recreational area would not become precedent for
allowing one in a national park. In the absence of such a categorical distinction,
the NPS could expect opposition to the plan by groups—such as the National
Parks Association, the American Civic Association, and the Sierra Club—whose
mission it was to safeguard the parks from despoliation.
Establishing a primarily recreational area would be a new departure for the
National Park Service. To be sure, recreation was a key element of the agency’s
mission. The 1916 Organic Act directed it to “provide for the enjoyment” of park
resources and make arrangements for the “accommodation of park visitors.”31 A
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1918 letter, known as the “Lane Letter,” from Secretary of the Interior Franklin
Lane to Stephen Mather, spelled out how the agency should implement the
Organic Act; it speciﬁed that outdoor recreation activities would be allowed in
the parks, so long as they were consistent with the policies intended to safeguard
the parks and preserve them unimpaired.32 Moreover, during the 1910s and
1920s, Mather emphasized tourism and recreational development in the parks
as a means of developing a national constituency that would provide the NPS
with the political support it needed. As Mather’s successor, Albright was also a
“dedicated proponent” of outdoor recreation and tourism.33 Yet recreation was
secondary to the purposes for which the parks had been established: to preserve
unimpaired for future generations the superlative and nationally signiﬁcant natural
and cultural resources they contained. What the NPS now contemplated creating
at Boulder Dam was something new, something that risked the appearance that it
was compromising its mission of preservation.
The National Park Service’s internal concern over whether the Boulder
Canyon Project area met national park standards was not the only obstacle
standing in the way of protecting the area. The ranching and mining interests
of Arizona and Nevada, wary of any further federal encroachment or regulation
upon their activities, were hostile to the idea of a new national park or monument
surrounding the reservoir. Rather than calling for preservation, for example, the
State of Nevada hoped the electrical power and roads associated with the dam
project would accelerate the development of the area’s mineral resources, and the
governor called for a thorough survey of the “mining potentialities in the vicinity
of Boulder Dam.”34 Similarly, the State of Arizona opposed the large executive
withdrawal of public lands around the project area.35 There was strong sentiment
in the state against “any more land being included in Federal Reservations,” one
NPS ofﬁcial noted.36 Even Utah entered the fray. Because the rural ranching
economy of southern Utah was closely tied to the “Arizona Strip” lying north
of the Colorado River, the Utah State Legislature memorialized Congress in
opposition to the monument withdrawal, arguing that the establishment of a
monument would “retard the development” of the region by banning 75,000 sheep
and 15,000 cattle from their accustomed range and by preventing homesteaders
from acquiring property in the area. Any move to make a park or monument
designation could expect stiff resistance from the affected states.37
Facing these challenges, in 1932, Secretary Wilbur assigned Louis C.
Cramton to investigate the withdrawn lands and to make recommendations on
how best to resolve the knotty problems of recreation and conservation that the
Boulder Canyon Project posed. Cramton, a former congressman from Michigan
and a strong advocate of the national parks, had helped the NPS in the ﬁght
to prevent irrigators from tapping the waters of Yellowstone National Park.38
Following Cramton’s re-election defeat in 1930, Wilbur appointed him “Special
Attorney to the Secretary” and entrusted him with special projects. One of his
ﬁrst tasks had been to devise a system of commercial permits for Boulder City
to ensure orderly development rather than the “boomtown” atmosphere typically
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associated with construction camps.39 Cramton’s commitment to the national
park idea and his practical familiarity with the Boulder Canyon Project made
him a good choice to lead the recreation investigation. In May 1932 Cramton
led a study team into the ﬁeld to assess the withdrawn lands, gauge their scenic
and recreational potential, and determine how best the area could be protected
and developed. The study team included Roger W. Toll, superintendent of
Yellowstone National Park, Minor R. Tillotson, superintendent of Grand Canyon
National Park, Preston P. Patraw, superintendent of Zion National Park, and W. R.
F. Wallace, an engineer from the Bureau of Public Roads.40
Cramton reported that the withdrawn lands upstream of the dam site
were recreationally valuable, highly scenic, and worth protecting. Yet no single
solution could be successfully applied to the entire area. Accordingly, he divided
the withdrawal into two separate sections and proposed different treatment for
each. The eastern section, encompassing the lower Grand Canyon and bordering
Grand Canyon National Park, appeared to be of national park quality and
deserved to be added to the National Park System. Cramton recommended that
the president establish a Grand Canyon National Monument to protect the area
until Congress could enact legislation expanding the park’s boundaries to include
it.41
But the western section of the withdrawal, including the dam and
reservoir, required a different approach. The scenery here was attractive but not
to a superlative degree. More importantly, the presence of the dam, and other
land uses like mining and grazing, would conﬂict with the National Park Service
mission of preserving its lands unimpaired. In spite of these problems, however,
the area did present outstanding recreational opportunities. The area ought not
to become a national park or national monument, yet it should not simply be
returned to the public domain, undifferentiated from the millions of other acres
of Nevada and Arizona desert. To resolve the problem, Cramton innovated and
proposed a new category, one ﬂexible and expansive enough to accommodate the
philosophical contradictions the area posed. He recommended that the Boulder
Dam area be designated a recreational area in which recreation and scenery would
coexist with regulated utilitarian development.
In a memo to Secretary Wilbur, Cramton attested to the national
signiﬁcance of the area’s recreational potential. The Boulder Canyon Project’s
spectacular dam and enormous reservoir would stimulate such interest among
tourists, Cramton wrote, that “every transcontinental traveler” would want to see
it. Moreover, apart from its appeal as a visual spectacle and engineering marvel,
Cramton said, the
recreational use of this area is an important byproduct… which
should not be neglected. It will meet the desires and confer direct
beneﬁts upon the many thousands of visitors who will annually
come here from the majority of the states of the Union who
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have no direct interest in the ﬂood control, irrigation, and power
possibilities of the project.
For these reasons, the reservoir area was of national importance and deserved
federal protection and management.42
Despite its recreational value, however, Cramton recommended that the
area “not be given a national park or national monument status.” First, although it
was remarkable and interesting, the area’s scenery was not “outstanding” enough
to meet the exacting standards of national park quality. Second, the mission of the
National Park Service was to protect scenery, natural features, historical objects,
and wildlife from impairment by development. But the dam would be a “recent
man-made work” that would be “changed as the necessities of man may from
time to time require” and thus did not belong in a national park. Third, allowing
the presence of a dam and reservoir as the “central feature” in a national park or
monument would undermine the Park Service’s efforts to keep dams out of the
other parks. “Conservationists have for two generations fought to protect our
national parks from becoming incidental or subordinate to irrigation and water
supply uses,” Cramton wrote. “To deliberately bring into the national park chain
and give national park status to such a dam and reservoir,” he warned, “would
greatly strengthen the hands of those who seek to establish more or less similar
reservoirs in existing national parks.” Finally, livestock grazing and mining were
important established uses of the area, and neither would be appropriate in a
national park or monument. Cramton concluded that the reservoir area should be
added to the national park system, but with a name—a “recreation reservation,”
he called it—that reﬂected its primarily recreational purpose.43
Cramton proposed the creation of a “Boulder Canyon National
Reservation” that would place the area’s “recreational administration in the
National Park Service while the primary jurisdiction is left with the Bureau of
Reclamation.” Although the NPS internally referred to the area as a “recreation
area,” Cramton’s decision to use the term “reservation” was deliberate. Cramton
argued that such a designation ﬁt the NPS mission, which—according to the
National Park Service Organic Act of 1916—was to “promote and regulate the
use of Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations
hereinafter speciﬁed.” He also pointed out that Section 2 of the act referred to
“such national parks and reservations of like character as may be hereafter created
by Congress.” Thus, he argued, it would be “entirely consistent with history
and with principle, as well as with efﬁciency, for the National Park Service to
administer the recreational use of a reservation even though another organization
might have a primary interest in such an area.”44
The Hoover administration acted on Cramton’s recommendations. On
December 22, 1932, President Hoover signed a proclamation creating the
273,000-acre Grand Canyon National Monument, which provided protection
for the spectacular Toroweap section of the western Grand Canyon.45 With the
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monument established, action was now needed on the recreation area. Cramton
believed that the project could proceed under Secretary Wilbur’s authority without
an immediate need for authorizing legislation. At the secretary’s direction, the
Park Service could advise the Bureau of Reclamation on developing recreation
policies and drawing up model agreements for concessionaires. Still, Cramton
recommended that the project be placed on a ﬁrmer foundation for the long
term by seeking legislation to formally grant the NPS jurisdiction over the
recreation area.46 To that end, Cramton provided Secretary Wilbur with a
draft bill that deﬁned the roles and responsibilities of each agency. Within the
nearly 1.2-million-acre proposed reservation, the Bureau of Reclamation would
administer the dam and its appurtenant works, while the Park Service would
manage the recreational use of the reservoir and its surrounding lands. The
purposes of ﬂood control, irrigation, and hydropower, deﬁned in the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, would remain the primary uses of the area under Bureau of
Reclamation jurisdiction. The Secretary of the Interior would have the power
to make necessary regulations within the reservation to protect the project’s
utilitarian values. While these values would be primary, the legislation would
establish recreation and conservation as secondary uses under National Park
Service authority. Because they were politically important industries in Arizona
and Nevada—and because the Interior Department did not want to unnecessarily
provoke resistance to its plans—
livestock grazing and mining would
be allowed to continue within the
reservation, subject to Park Service
regulation to make certain that such
activities did not interfere with the
recreational development of the
area. Finally, about 1.25 million
acres of previously withdrawn land,
not needed for recreation purposes,
would be restored to entry under the
public land laws, which would also
help quiet resistance by the mining
19.3. Commissioner Elwood Mead at his desk
and livestock industries in the
in the Interior office building.
affected states.47
In early 1933, National Park Service Director Horace Albright and
Reclamation Commissioner Elwood Mead wrote to Secretary Wilbur, concurring
with Cramton’s recommendations.48 Mead and Albright identiﬁed several
recreational activities that the new reservoir would accommodate, including
boating, scenic boat tours, wildlife observation, and visiting special points
of scenic, archaeological, or historical interest. Fishing, too, would be a new
recreational opportunity, as the reservoir would settle out the Colorado’s thick
and murky silts, making the reservoir a suitable habitat for the trout and bass that
sportsmen desired.49 In general, the development of the reservoir’s recreational
potential would “increase the tourist business” in Nevada and Arizona.50 Such
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beneﬁts would help build support for the project and would certainly generate
good public relations for the NPS, USBR, and the Department of the Interior.
Secretary Wilbur accepted the recommendations and forwarded the draft
legislation to Congress. In February 1933, Representative Samuel Arentz of
Nevada and Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona introduced the Interior Department’s
Boulder Canyon National Reservation bill in the House and Senate.51
Although Secretary Wilbur’s days in ofﬁce were numbered—Franklin
Roosevelt’s inauguration was only a month away—he lobbied on behalf of the
legislation. “This largest artiﬁcial reservoir in the world,” he wrote Congress,
“possesses great recreational and educational possibilities which should be
conserved.” Rather than assigning new responsibilities in the ﬁeld of recreation to
the Bureau of Reclamation, he argued that the Park Service was the proper agency
to carry out that conservation. The legislation would avoid the “building up of
duplicating organizations.” It would also make permanent the areas needed for
“reclamation, power, and park purposes” while restoring excess withdrawn lands
to entry. Passage of the bills, Wilbur told the chairmen, was “urgently desirable”
because it would “replace uncertainty with certainty” regarding NPS authority
to manage the reservoir.52 The American Civic Association, an organization that
considered itself a guardian of the parks, approved of the recreation plan and
submitted a statement to Congress in support of it.53 But the legislation was cause
for concern among other conservation groups. Walter Huber and William Colby,
members of the Sierra Club board of directors, wrote to Horace Albright that
they were “a little fearful” about the area’s potential to “lower the bars” of park
standards and “endanger the areas of strictly National Park caliber” by involving
the NPS in “administering considerable areas devoted in part to commercial uses”
such as mining, grazing, and water resources development. While the Sierra Club
would not “take any part in opposing” the bills, Huber and Colby told Albright
that they did not “look with much favor” upon the recreation proposal. Likewise,
the National Parks Association expressed misgivings about the creation of what
it called “national recreation reservations without standards,” but weakened
by the Great Depression, the association found itself too “enfeebled” to offer
serious opposition.54 Yet it was not these groups but the strong opposition of
Nevada Senator Tasker Oddie—incensed that the federal government had violated
Nevada’s sovereignty in its administration of Boulder City—that blocked action
on the reservation bills over issues unrelated to the concerns of conservation
groups.55 With the bills stalled in committee, the NPS still had no formal role
at the Boulder Canyon Project, leaving the Bureau of Reclamation to respond—
grudgingly—to the public’s recreational demands. The issue would remain for
the incoming Roosevelt administration to resolve.
The second phase in the development of NPS-USBR cooperation began
during the New Deal era and resulted in the formalization of their recreation
partnership through an interagency memorandum of agreement. Taking ofﬁce
in 1933, Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal administration brought renewed
energy and purpose to the National Park Service. Because the national parks
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and monuments were “places for renewing national conﬁdence,” they became
“focal points” for New Deal activity.56 FDR and his Secretary of the Interior,
Harold L. Ickes, strongly supported the expansion of the National Park Service.
In 1933 Roosevelt transferred to the NPS all the national monuments previously
administered by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of War. The
administration declared 1934 “A National Park Year,” seeking to stimulate the
tourist economy by aggressively promoting the park system.57 FDR also backed
the creation of new national parks, including Olympic and Kings Canyon.
The New Deal brought not only the territorial expansion of the National
Park Service but an expansion of its functions as well. In particular, the
administration responded to the national boom in outdoor recreation demand
by supporting the expansion of the agency as the nation’s leader in outdoor
recreation. In 1933 Albright retired, making Arno B. Cammerer the new director.
Cammerer, who served from 1933 to 1940, moved the agency “further along in
the direction set by Mather and Albright,” fully embracing the new emphasis on
recreation and tourism.58 Under Cammerer—and Conrad Wirth, his energetic
assistant director—the National Park Service increasingly provided planning and
development assistance to state and local governments. The NPS operated a state
parks division, which directed the work of
several Civilian Conservation Corps camps
in developing state and municipal parks.
The 1936 Park, Parkway, and Recreation
Area Study Act authorized the NPS to make
a survey of the nation’s outdoor recreation
needs and to partner with state and local
governments to plan for meeting those
needs. The agency’s recreation mission
also expanded through the creation of new
types of National Park System units, which
emphasized recreation rather than signiﬁcant
natural or cultural resources. These new
areas included the national seashores,
parkways, recreation demonstration areas,
and—beginning with Boulder Dam—
19.4. Arno B. Cammerer, Director of
the National Park Service.
national recreation areas.59
In 1935, the Roosevelt administration reintroduced the Boulder Canyon
National Reservation bill. The new NPS Director, Arno B. Cammerer, and
Reclamation Commissioner Mead prepared the legislation, and Secretary of the
Interior Harold L. Ickes forwarded it to Congress. The new bill contained the
same division of powers and provisions as the 1933 version. But now, going
beyond the earlier bill, it authorized the National Park Service and the Bureau of
Reclamation to cooperate in planning and managing recreation at other federal
reservoirs associated with future reclamation projects to be built around the
West.60
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Meanwhile, the USBR and its contractor, The Six Companies, Inc., made
rapid progress on the dam. In February 1935 the diversion tunnels closed, and
the Colorado River—once derided as “too thick to drink and too thin to plow”—
began pooling behind the dam, forming a reservoir of sparkling, clear water that
“for a distance of 25 miles or more” was “a dark emerald green in the canyons and
a deep blue in more open country.”61 In September President Roosevelt visited
Boulder Dam and dedicated it to the American people. In his dedication speech,
he celebrated the area’s recreational potential, describing it as “an immense new
park” for “the enjoyment of all the people.”62
Completion of the dam and the ﬁlling of the reservoir put pressure on
the Roosevelt administration to resolve the recreation issue. As the number of
tourists and recreation seekers visiting the dam continued to grow, it may have
seemed that “all the people” were descending en masse upon their “immense
new park.” The Union Paciﬁc Railroad, now dubbing its route through southern
Nevada “the Boulder Dam Route,” promoted the dam—“the most thrilling sight
in America”—as a weekend destination for western tourists and as a side-trip for
cross-country passengers.63 Even airlines enticed passengers with the promise
that their plane would circle for a close-up aerial view of the “gigantic dam and
lake.”64 Most visitors, however, arrived by automobile. In 1935 Commissioner
Mead noted that tourist travel to Boulder Dam and its reservoir was “greater now
than ever before,” with 365,000 visitors making the trip that year.65
Roosevelt had described the area as a “park.” If so, it was one without
adequate facilities or clearly deﬁned administration. The Bureau of Reclamation
reluctantly found itself having to grapple with managing recreation and tourism.
Much of the early tourism had simply involved watching the dam’s construction
from cliff-side overlooks. But with the dam completed and the reservoir rising,
visitors now expected boat tours offering an opportunity to see the dam and
upstream canyons from water level. The bureau responded by issuing temporary
permits to “several boat owners of known responsibility,” including those who
now plied the reservoir in motorboats and sailboats, as well as commercial
boat operators—such as the Murl Emery Company and Boulder-Grand Canyon
Navigation Company—which were allowed to operate forty- and ﬁfty-passenger
tour boats on the reservoir.66 “Scores” of swimmers also ﬂocked to the shoreline
near Boulder City and at Las Vegas Wash. Walker Young, the bureau’s
construction engineer in charge of the Boulder Canyon Project, reported, “the
reservoir has become a very popular attraction for those interested in boating and
swimming.” “Every afternoon and evening,” he said, “the reservoir is used by a
large number of swimmers, with a generous portion made up of children.”67
The USBR struggled to manage the inﬂux of recreation seekers. In
addition to managing the tour boat concessions, the agency now needed to
provide boating facilities, including docks, marinas, and launching ramps,
and beach and swimming facilities, such as restrooms, changing rooms, food
vendors, and lifeguards. The bureau fully expected the National Park Service—
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eventually—to assume
these responsibilities,
constructing needed
developments,
administering necessary
concessions, and
regulating visitor use and
safety on the reservoir.
But until Congress
authorized the Park
Service to do so, the
Bureau of Reclamation
had to manage the
problem itself. In the
meantime, Secretary
Ickes approved the
19.5. An excursion boat on Lake Mead before the lake
bureau’s request for NPS rose above the upstream diversion dam.
guidance in developing
its interim recreation policies. Administration fell to the city manager of Boulder
City, Sims Ely. Ely already had charge of issuing business permits there, and so
the bureau simply added the responsibility for recreation-related permits at the
reservoir to his portfolio. Granting concessions and constructing improvements
at the reservoir would take time, but action on safety issues could not be delayed.
“The conditions at Boulder Dam require immediate attention or loss of life may
result from lack of proper safeguards for boating and swimming,” Commissioner
Mead wrote Secretary Ickes. In August 1935 Secretary Ickes approved an
emergency request from the bureau to hire lifeguards and patrolmen to protect
recreationists.68
Although it could not yet step in to manage recreation at the reservoir,
the National Park Service was eager to begin developing recreational facilities
at the reservoir site. It was able to do so by establishing Civilian Conservation
Corps (CCC) camps through its state parks division. NPS Assistant Director
Conrad Wirth worked with the USBR to bring camps to the Boulder Canyon
Project Area.69 The ﬁrst was State Park Camp 1 (SP-1), set up in November 1933
at Overton, Nevada, on the Virgin River arm of the reservoir. CCC enrollees
from Camp SP-1 helped develop Nevada’s Valley of Fire State Park, building
roads, trails, campsites, picnic shelters, and tourist cabins. Enrollees helped
archaeologists excavate the “Lost City” pueblo ruins and other archaeological
sites that would be ﬂooded when the reservoir ﬁlled to capacity. They also built
the park’s Lost City museum, which housed some of the recovered artifacts.70
Although no state park was projected for the lower end of the reservoir,
the NPS state parks division established two CCC camps there. In November
1935 and January 1936 the NPS set up Camp SP-4 and Camp SP-6 at Boulder
City. The mission of the two camps, known as the “Twin Camps,” was to
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construct “facilities for caring for the tourist travel as well as for local residents”
and the “eradication of scars, pits, rubbish, etc.,” that were the result of the dam’s
construction. The camps were needed, the NPS argued, because the USBR and
its contractors had “done nothing in the way of accommodations for visitors.”71
Twin Camps enrollees made impressive contributions to the development at
the reservoir. They worked to build a swimming beach at Hemenway Wash
by clearing and grading the rocky shoreline and spreading truckloads of sand.
They built dressing rooms, restrooms, picnic shelters, and ﬂoating platforms at
the beaches. They built docks and launching facilities for the lake’s tour boat
operators. Enrollees also rebuilt and landscaped the rustic stone observation
point overlooking the dam, and made improvements to the Boulder City Airport,
readying it for use by Grand Canyon-Boulder Dam Tours, Inc., which operated
sightseeing ﬂights. Finally, they cleared the lakeshore of brush and driftwood
logs and also removed logjams and submerged logs—hazardous to boaters—from
the reservoir itself.72
Through the CCC, the National Park Service built recreational facilities it
could not yet operate, while the Bureau of Reclamation, which was responsible
for managing them, did not want the job. The situation demanded a resolution.
Again, however, Congress failed to enact the needed legislation. As recreational
demands mounted, and as the recreation problem became more difﬁcult for the
bureau, the agencies and Secretary Ickes ﬁnally decided to move ahead, ﬁnding
the necessary authority in existing legislation. Citing provisions of the Economy
Act of 1932, which authorized “interdepartmental procurement by contract,”
as their basis for authority, the agencies began negotiating an inter-bureau
cooperative agreement that would grant the NPS control over recreation at the
reservoir.73
During the summer of 1936, NPS and USBR ofﬁcials negotiated a
division of administrative responsibilities at Lake Mead—the new ofﬁcial name
of the Boulder Canyon Reservoir, which had been renamed in honor of the
recently deceased commissioner of reclamation. A special committee, consisting
of representatives from the Interior Department Solicitor’s Ofﬁce, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the National Park Service, met to develop a joint memorandum
of agreement. They recommended that the management authority at Lake Mead
be divided “territorially rather than functionally,” in order to avoid conﬂicts. The
bureau would retain jurisdiction over the administrative and employee community
of Boulder City, as well as Boulder Dam and its associated engineering works.
The Park Service would gain control over both the remainder of the reserved
lands within the Boulder Canyon Project Area and the surface waters of Lake
Mead.74
The two agencies would be territorially separate, but the Bureau of
Reclamation would retain certain rights within the National Park Service area.
While most roads and highways within the area were assigned to the NPS, the
bureau would retain control of the Lower Portal road, which it needed for access
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to construct and operate the dam’s powerhouse. The USBR would likewise retain
other utilitarian facilities running through the NPS area, including telephone
lines, water lines, and the railroad line. In the future, the USBR would have
the authority to construct power transmission lines through the area. The NPS,
for its part, would gain control of the Boulder City Airport, which would be
“an important link in the chain of accommodations to travelers desiring to visit
Boulder Dam and Grand Canyon National Park.”75
The committee also made recommendations to guide the Bureau of
Reclamation’s administration, particularly with regard to visitor services at
Boulder City. The USBR, the committee suggested, should issue permits for
construction of additional privately owned accommodations, such as “auto court”
cabins and a campground or “tourist camp.” At the dam itself, the committee
recommended that the bureau continue to allow visitors to enter the dam.
Although a private ﬁrm had requested a permit to operate a guide service at the
dam, the committee believed that such applications should be denied and that
the bureau should operate its own tours. The bureau, they believed, should have
“close control” over public contact at the dam in order to coordinate visitation
with dam operations. A concessionaire, however, should be allowed to operate a
souvenir shop at the dam.76
The committee had few similarly speciﬁc recommendations for the
National Park Service. “The National Park Service for years has been engaged
in the planning, development, and operation of recreational areas,” the report
declared. “For this committee to make detailed suggestions would not only
be presumptuous, but… unwise.” But they did propose that the National Park
Service request a budget appropriation to purchase the surface rights to a group
of patented mining claims located near the main highway through the recreation
area. They also recommended that the NPS provide ﬁshing and sightseeing
access to the river and canyon below the dam.77
The cooperative agreement also embraced the key ideas of the Cramton
Report. First, the agencies agreed that mining and prospecting could continue in
the recreation area—subject to reasonable NPS regulations—“except where they
will interfere physically and directly with a legitimate recreational development.”
Unsurprisingly, given the economic importance of mining in Arizona and Nevada,
the Bureau of Reclamation had been inundated with protests from residents and
members of Congress from both states, urging that mining not be banned from
the area surrounding the reservoir. The committee determined that allowing
prospecting and mining to continue—which, it believed, would “not result in
injury to the recreational use of the area”— would not only help deﬂect opposition
to National Park Service management but would also “do much to create good
will.”78 Second, livestock-grazing received similar treatment. Although the
National Park Service banned grazing in the parks (or sought to eliminate it where
it existed as a prior use), the committee recommended that the agency authorize
grazing in the new national recreation area. “Grazing should be permitted as a
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gesture of good will toward the project on the part of residents of Nevada and
Arizona,” they concluded, noting that there was not much actual risk to the area’s
environment, since “the project area is largely arid and affords little opportunity
for grazing of stock.”79 The Lake Mead grazing and mining policies, responses to
local environmental and political conditions, would prove to be far-reaching and
signiﬁcant, for they established a precedent of recreation-centered multiple-use
management—rather than strict preservation—for future national recreation areas.
On October 13, 1936, Secretary Ickes signed the memorandum of
agreement. Recognizing that “a large number of visitors use the lands and waters
of the Boulder Canyon Project Area for purposes of recreation,” and further
noting that the National Park Service had substantial experience in “administering
areas devoted to recreational uses,” the memorandum established Boulder Dam
Recreation Area—the nation’s ﬁrst national recreation area.80
In the newly created Boulder Dam Recreation Area, the National Park
Service was charged with planning and building recreational facilities, including
scenic roads and hiking trails. It also had responsibility for negotiating contracts
with the concessionaires who would operate boating marinas, lodgings, visitor
services at swimming beaches, and sightseeing tours. The NPS would also
regulate mining or grazing in the recreation area.81 Meanwhile, the Bureau of
Reclamation would operate the dam and its related facilities for the purposes
speciﬁed in the Boulder Canyon Project Act: ﬂood control, water storage, and
hydropower generation. The bureau would continue to manage Boulder City
and provide space for NPS administrative ofﬁces there. It would also establish
regulations governing public access to Boulder Dam and its related works and
provide for a “skilled guide and lecture service” at the dam.82
With the cooperative agreement ﬁnally in place, both agencies set about
promoting the new Boulder Dam Recreation Area. The Department of the
Interior issued press releases promoting tourism in the region. The Bureau of
Reclamation used its publication, The Reclamation Era, to spread the news as
well. Several articles in the magazine touted Lake Mead’s proximity to other
national parks in the Colorado Plateau region, including Grand Canyon, Bryce
Canyon, and Zion, as well as its suitability as a winter resort.83 The magazine also
ran an article by NPS Director Arno Cammerer that highlighted the recreational
improvements constructed by the Civilian Conservation Corps and described the
various boat tours and lodging opportunities that were available. He wrote, “The
great Boulder Dam…, planned originally to provide power, irrigation, and ﬂood
control, has now added recreation as a ﬁne bonus for traveling America.”84
In 1936 Congress appropriated $10,000 for the National Park Service to
prepare a master plan to guide development of the recreation area. Developed
by Assistant Director Conrad Wirth, the plan laid out proposed roads, trails,
overlooks, overnight accommodations, and day-use recreation areas.85 To carry
out the plan, Congress began making large appropriations to ﬁnance development,
484

and funding soon reached $100,000 per year. The Civilian Conservation Corps
carried out much of the work.86 The work of the Twin Camps—now designated
NP-4 and NP-6—accelerated with the inﬂux of money, and enrollees set about
developing new facilities.87 They built a hiking trail from Hemenway Wash to the
summit of Red Mountain, erected and staffed entrance stations to collect statistics
on visitation, and converted the vacant Six Companies hospital building for use
as the National Park Service’s Boulder Dam Recreation Area administrative
headquarters. The new headquarters also included a museum featuring natural
history and archeological exhibits.88 In 1937 the National Park Service also
entered into an agreement with the Bureau of Biological Survey, to coordinate
wildlife management projects (especially to protect bighorn sheep and waterfowl)
in the recreation area, parts of which had previously been designated the Boulder
Canyon Wildlife Refuge.89
In developing the agreement, the National Park Service had sought
to tailor the recreation project in such as way as to avoid or minimize local
political opposition. But they soon encountered a powerful challenge, despite
their best efforts. In 1939 U.S. Senator Key Pittman of Nevada threatened to
reduce the size of the Boulder Dam Recreation Area. Pittman represented Las
Vegas interests that had opposed continued federal control over the reservoir.
They disliked the NPS policy of strictly regulating the business practices—and
numbers—of concessionaires. The Las Vegas Evening Review-Journal, for
example, called for a wide-open approach to development at Lake Mead,
including allowing gambling and liquor sales within recreation area boundaries.
The paper editorialized that the government should “allow as many resorts to be
built as there are people to build them” and denounced the recreation area plan as
a federal “take over.”90 The paper and its allies no doubt approved when Pittman
introduced legislation to grant 8,000 acres of federal land near Lake Mead to the
State of Nevada for development as a state park. Eighty percent of the land at
issue was located within the Boulder Dam Recreation Area boundaries, in the
vicinity of Las Vegas Wash.
Secretary Ickes strongly opposed the bill. Ickes detested Nevada’s famous
vices and did not want to see them extended to Lake Mead. On a 1939 trip to
Boulder Dam, he brieﬂy visited Las Vegas, which he described as “an ugly little
town where gambling dens and saloons and prostitution run wide open day and
night.” “Three quarters of an hour was all we needed to get the savor of this
rotten little town,” he wrote. Ickes was glad to return to Boulder City, which, in
contrast, he called, “the neatest and most attractive-looking place in Nevada,”
owing to the federal government’s policy of prohibiting gambling, prostitution,
and the sale of hard liquor. Boulder City, rather than Las Vegas, was the model
for what Ickes had in mind for development at the recreation area. Despite
Pittman’s assurances to the contrary, Ickes believed that the state park proposal
was a ruse, backed by “gamblers and saloonkeepers” in order to build lakeside
casinos that would lure Boulder Dam and Lake Mead tourists. When Pittman’s
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bill passed both houses of Congress, Ickes interceded with President Roosevelt,
who vetoed the bill on August 10, 1939.91
In his veto message, FDR afﬁrmed the “national interest and value” of the
Boulder Dam Recreation Area. “All of the people of the United States,” he stated,
“have a paramount interest in Boulder Dam and its related facilities for water
conservation and utilization” as well as “a paramount interest in the outstanding
recreational and scenic attractions of Lake Mead and the surrounding territory.”
Because the area was “worthy of consideration as a possible national park or
monument” and had “attracted thousands of visitors from all parts of the Union,”
it therefore constituted a recreational area “truly national in character.” Pittman’s
bill would have opened the door “to uses which might be at variance with the
national interest in the Boulder Dam–Lake Mead region.” Moreover, to transfer
federal lands from the Boulder Dam Recreation Area to the state would set an
“undesirable precedent” for national parks and national forests, FDR declared.92
Following the veto, the NPS again proved adept at public relations by
accelerating the development of recreation facilities at Las Vegas Wash, the
location nearest to the city of Las Vegas—and the area that Pittman had targeted.
Although the NPS had initially planned to place priority on other areas, such as
Hemenway Wash, Overton, and Pierce’s Ferry, it now hoped to win goodwill
from the city by channeling funding and CCC manpower to build a swimming
beach and campground at Las Vegas Wash.93 By 1941 the National Park Service
had made considerable progress throughout the Boulder Dam Recreation Area.
The area now featured swimming beaches, campgrounds, and boating facilities
at Las Vegas Wash and Hemenway Wash and a new administrative and visitororientation center in Boulder City. The lakeshore was cleared of debris, and trails,
scenic roads, and overlooks were completed or under construction.
Although World War II slowed the pace of construction at the recreation
area, the postwar period brought the promise of both expansion and development.
In 1947 the National Park Service renamed Boulder Dam Recreation Area. It
became Lake Mead National Recreation Area after Congress changed the name of
the dam from Boulder to Hoover.94 Also that year, a new inter-bureau cooperative
agreement renewed NPS management of the recreation area and extended the
area’s boundaries southward to encompass the lands withdrawn for the new Davis
Dam, then under construction downstream. Deeming it to be “in the best interests
of the Government to provide for uniﬁed administration of and jurisdiction over
this entire area,” Secretary Ickes added the Davis Dam’s Lake Mohave reservoir
and thousands of acres of surrounding land to Lake Mead National Recreation
Area.95
Building upon the success of the 1936 Lake Mead agreement, the two
agencies coordinated recreational planning for other new reservoirs the bureau
expected to build in the West.96 Their partnership was cemented in 1941, when
the bureau agreed to fund a major NPS planning study, which resulted in the
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publication of A Survey of the Recreational Resources of the Colorado River
Basin, a key document that guided development of the National Park System in
the region. In return, the NPS agreed “in principle” to the future possibility of
converting Grand Canyon National Monument and Dinosaur National Monument
into “multiple-use national recreation areas”—modeled after Lake Mead—should
the bureau decide to proceed with building its proposed Bridge Canyon Dam and
Echo Park Dam.97 While the National Parks Association and Sierra Club had been
wary but deferential with regard to the Lake Mead issue, both were roused into
full-blown opposition by these plans that threatened to impair existing national
parks and monuments. Joined by the Wilderness Society, conservationists
ultimately blocked both dams in two of the most bruising preservation battles
of the 1950s and 1960s.98 Defeated in its attempt to build the Echo Park Dam,
Reclamation succeeded in building a dam at Glen Canyon, an area outside the
National Park System. But the USBR-NPS recreation partnership again proved
useful: its reservoir—Lake Powell—became the centerpiece of the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area, established by interagency agreement in 1958.99
Between 1945 and 1965 the National Park Service and the Bureau of
Reclamation entered into agreements establishing nine new national recreation
areas: Millerton Lake (1945) and Shasta Lake (1945) in California; Coulee Dam
(later renamed Lake Roosevelt) in Washington (1946); Shadow Mountain Lake
(1952) and Curecanti (1965) in Colorado; Glen Canyon in Utah and Arizona
(1958); Flaming Gorge in Utah and Wyoming (1963); Arbuckle (later renamed
Chickasaw) in Oklahoma (1965); and Sanford (later renamed Lake Meredith)
in Texas (1965).100 When an area’s scenic and recreational opportunities were
deemed to be of national signiﬁcance, the National Park Service retained
management.101 In other cases, however, the NPS later agreed to transfer
management to another agency. For example, Millerton Lake Recreation Area,
at the Central Valley Project’s Friant Dam, near Fresno, California, became a
state park. In other cases, such as Shasta Lake, Flaming Gorge, and Shadow
Mountain Lake, national recreation area reservoirs adjacent to national forest land
were eventually transferred to the U.S. Forest Service to promote management
efﬁciency and to avoid duplication of administration. The NPS also cooperated
with the Bureau of Reclamation at smaller reservoirs that were valuable for
outdoor recreation but that lacked sufﬁcient national signiﬁcance to warrant
federal management. In these cases, the NPS did not manage the recreation
facilities but instead provided design and planning assistance to state and local
agencies. The National Park Service and the CCC developed Lake Guernsey,
on the Bureau of Reclamation’s North Platte Project, as a Wyoming state park.
Cachuma Lake on Reclamation’s Cachuma Project in California, developed with
NPS guidance, became a Santa Barbara County park in 1953.102
The Kennedy administration brought about another shift in federal
recreation policy that marked the third—and culminating—phase in the
development of USBR-NPS cooperation at Lake Mead, which resulted in the
permanent legislative establishment of Lake Mead National Recreation Area. In
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1963 President Kennedy’s Recreation Advisory Council conﬁrmed the success of
the national recreation area experiment. Formed to help guide federal outdoorrecreation policy, the council proposed a “system of National Recreation Areas”
to help solve the problem of meeting the “steeply mounting outdoor recreation
demands of the American people.” To shape the development of this system, the
council issued a set of criteria. According to the council, new national recreation
areas were to be large areas—more than 20,000 acres—and within a day’s drive of
major population centers. They were to possess “natural endowments” that were
“well above the ordinary” but still “of lesser signiﬁcance than the unique scenic
and historic elements of the National Park System.” The new policy echoed the
1932 Cramton Report in its endorsement of multiple-use management, directing
the federal agencies that administered national recreation areas to recognize
outdoor recreation as the “dominant or primary resource management purpose,”
while permitting and regulating uses such as grazing, mining, logging, waterresources development, and hunting, so long as they were compatible with—and
not detrimental to—recreational use. Finally, the council called for future national
recreation areas to be established legislatively by congressional statute rather than
administratively through interagency cooperative agreements.103 In honor of its
role as a model for the national recreation area concept and in recognition of its
signiﬁcance as the ﬁrst area of the national park system set aside for primarily
recreational purposes, on October 8, 1964, Lake Mead National Recreation Area
became the ﬁrst national recreation area established by an act of Congress.104
Comprising nearly 1.5 million acres, Lake Mead National Recreation Area is
the nation’s largest. It is also the one of the most popular, attracting about eight
million visitors per year—mostly from Southern California and the Southwest.105
Lake Mead National Recreation Area, created by interagency agreement
in 1936 as Boulder Dam Recreation Area, plays an important if unacknowledged
role in American environmental history. The ﬁrst of its kind, it pioneered a new
type of National Park System area. It arose out of conﬂicting impulses. The
starkly beautiful desert country surrounding what was then the world’s tallest dam
and largest reservoir needed resource protection, visitor education services, and
recreational planning best provided by the National Park Service. Yet because
of the dam, the area could not be a national park or national monument in the
traditional sense, where nature was to be preserved without impairment. Instead,
it would have to be a new type of area, one that could reconcile mass recreational
development and preservation of outstanding natural and cultural resources
with mining, grazing, and federal water projects—uses typically considered
inappropriate in the National Park System. It also represented a marriage of
convenience, which allowed both federal agencies to serve their own bureaucratic
interests while garnering wide public support. For the National Park Service,
the goal was expansion. The agreement at Lake Mead gave the NPS additional
territory to manage, larger development appropriations from Congress, and an
expanded role in outdoor recreation. For the Bureau of Reclamation, the goal was
to delegate recreation management to another agency so that it could focus on its
water engineering mission without being distracted by other responsibilities that
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fell outside its area of expertise. Both goals depended on winning the blessings
of private interests, conservationists, and the general public. This marriage of
convenience yielded offspring, too. The ﬁrst was an eventual system of some
forty national recreation areas, inspired by the compromises between recreation,
preservation, and development embodied in the Cramton Report. The second,
and most signiﬁcant for American environmental history, was the recreationplanning partnership between the NPS and USBR in the Colorado River Basin,
which resulted in the Echo Park Dam and Bridge Canyon Dam proposals. The
roots of those pivotal conﬂicts—which shaped the course of the environmental
movement—are embedded in the interagency agreement that established Boulder
Dam Recreation Area.
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Hydroelectric Power From Eklutna: Reclamation
Efforts to Develop Southcentral Alaska During the
Cold War Era
By:
John W. Heaton
and Claus-M. Naske
Congress charged the Bureau of Reclamation in the Newlands Act,1 of
1902 with administering a perpetual fund designed to reclaim arid lands for
western farmers to keep the Jeffersonian dream of an agrarian society alive in the
twentieth century. By all accounts, the efforts of the Bureau have been largely
responsible for the development of much of the West’s water resources during
the twentieth century to provide the foundation not only for agriculture in the
region but also the infrastructure for a diversiﬁed modern economy. Historians
have examined the role of this government agency in providing irrigation water,
hydroelectric power, ﬂood control, navigation, and recreation for the beneﬁt of
the public. More recently, scholars have emphasized either the environmental
impact of dams or the role the Bureau played in expanding the inﬂuence of
the federal government in the West over the last century. The Eklutna Project,
thirty-four miles north of Anchorage, Alaska, offers an interesting case study
in Bureau of Reclamation history because it was not implemented as part of a
water resource management plan, and the federal government never intended
to maintain permanent control of the facilities. Indeed, there was never a need
to reclaim arid Alaska lands, and reclamation laws were not extended into the
territory. Alaskan territorial ofﬁcials, at the height of the Cold War, succeeded in
convincing the federal government of the need for a cheap and dependable supply
of electric power to facilitate the development of a remote, but strategically
important, region of the nation. The Bureau of Reclamation planned and funded
this technically challenging project and eventually turned it over to local public
utilities.
Hydroelectric power is not new in Alaska. In the 1930s, although the state
was still thinly populated and little changed in some respects since the days of the
gold rush, larger Alaskan settlements nevertheless enjoyed many of the amenities
of modern living. They had phone service, water systems, and electricity.
Most communities generated power from coal or oil, but occasionally small
hydroelectric power plants were used. One such installation was built by private
interests in 1929 at the mouth of Eklutna Lake, some 24 miles northeast
of Anchorage. The seven-mile-long and one-mile-wide Eklutna Lake,
(elevation 868 feet) lies in a steep-sided, trough-like valley some 23 miles long.
It is headed by a glacier and a snowﬁeld. The lake overﬂowed into Eklutna Creek
below the rock dam, which had been built to provide a water supply for the small
power plant near Eklutna Village, about 8 miles downstream from the dam.
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The initial structure was not overly successful because when the water
level rose four to ﬁve feet above its natural barrier, the slightest leak allowed the
water to escape. To remedy the situation, wood pilings were driven across the
mouth of the overﬂow channel, permitting the storage of water to a depth of three
to four feet above the natural lake level. In the fall of 1934 contractors built an
earth-and rock-ﬁll structure which incorporated portions of the original dam. It
provided a more stable water supply which ensured more dependable generation
of electricity. In 1943 the city of Anchorage purchased the dam from the private
owner, but it grew increasingly clear that the project could not meet the demands
of a growing region.2
The crisis in the availability of electric power hampered attempts to
develop southcentral Alaska and increased in proportion to rising populations
beginning in the 1930s. World War II, of course, brought an inﬂux of people to
Alaska, particularly to Fairbanks and Anchorage where military construction
activities offered employment. But even before the outbreak of war, the
population of southcentral Alaska had been rising mainly due to a federal railroad
project in the region. Anchorage became the headquarters for these operations
in 1914. With completion of the railroad in the early 1920s, which included
numerous maintenance facilities and ofﬁces in Anchorage, many of the workers
chose to remain in Alaska. In the 1930s, the widespread economic fallout of
the Great Depression in “the states” helped to develop the agricultural potential
of lands north of Anchorage. A government program brought 200 families,
displaced by drought conditions in the Midwest, to the Matanuska Valley. With
the outbreak of World War II, as the government increasingly recognized the
strategic importance of Alaska, men and government resources poured into the
territory in unprecedented amounts which helped to boost the population of
Anchorage by 500 percent between 1939 and 1945. Housing, never abundant,
became extremely difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Moreover, services could not keep up with
increasing demands during these years of initial growth and development. By
1945 the demand for power exceeded supply.3
Anchorage Power and Light urgently searched for additional sources of
electricity which led it to use diesel generators and even the boiler and generating
equipment of a wrecked ship (the Sacket’s Harbor). Alaska’s man in Washington,
territorial delegate E. L. Bartlett, attempted to respond to calls for help from
many Alaskan towns.4 The River and Harbor Act of March 2, 1945, had provided
for preliminary examination and surveys of Cook Inlet to improve navigation,
develop hydroelectric power, and provide harbor facilities. A spokesman for
the Corps of Engineers advised Bartlett to introduce legislation which would
authorize the construction of a hydroelectric plant at Eklutna.5
Representative Ben F. Jensen (R, Iowa), chairman of the House Interior
Department Appropriation Subcommittee, became interested in Alaskan
development and was largely responsible for making $150,000 available for
an investigation of the territory’s power resources. An Alaska Investigations
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Ofﬁce was established and under the able leadership of Joseph M. Morgan
and his colleagues, an exhaustive investigation of Eklutna and other potential
hydroelectric sites was made. The investigation determined that, as of 1949,
the utility system serving the Anchorage area and the Matanuska Valley had a
production capacity of only 8,625 kilowatts—far short of actual needs. Total
Alaskan generating capacity from private plants amounted to 35,931 kilowatts
and from public plants amounted to 19,440 kilowatts, for a grand territorial total
of 55,371 kilowatts, woefully inadequate for Alaskan needs. Delegate Bartlett
asserted in Congress that federal policy had actively and long supported the
development of water resources in the West, while not “a thin dime” had been
put into Alaskan water power development. He argued that a “start should be
made now” because plentiful power was a prime necessity for “a self-sufﬁcient
economy,” which, in turn, “was essential for national defense.”6

20.1. Map of Eklutna Project. Map from the 1961 Reclamation Project Data book.
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In 1949, the House Public Lands Committee favorably reported a bill
which called for the immediate construction of the Eklutna project at a cost of
$21,500,000. The Bureau of the Budget gave its approval with the reservation
that Federal Reclamation laws were not to be extended to the territory, nor were
recreational facilities to be developed along with the project.7
The proposed Eklutna facility would replace the old earthen log structure
and consist of a low dam raising the level of the lake by two feet, a four-and-onehalf-mile tunnel leading from the lake through a mountain to the north, a penstock
of 1,250 feet and, at the base of the mountain, a power plant of 30,000 kilowatt
capacity. Transmission lines would carry the electricity to the Matanuska Valley
and to Anchorage. Not until September 22, 1950, did the Bureau of Reclamation
ofﬁcially announce that initial plans and speciﬁcations were being expedited
along with a $1.1 million appropriation to enable construction bids to be received
as soon as possible.8
By February of 1951 the drilling contractor was employing shifts of
workers, seven days a week. In the planning stage were 12 permanent homes
for employees at the power plant as well as two 10-car garages, a warehouse
and water works, roads, general utilities and a 115,000 volt transmission line
to Palmer. Palmer Constructor of Omaha, Nebraska, a three-ﬁrm organization
including Peter Kiewit Sons, Coker Construction Co., and Morrison-Knudsen Co.
had won the bid for building the four-mile long, nine-foot diameter, transmountain
water diversion tunnel and other facilities at Eklutna for $17,348,865. The bid
called for completion of the project within 1,050 days. It was soon apparent,
however, that the cost of the project had been underestimated. Bartlett was
naturally perturbed when several House Committee members advocated
the project’s abandonment and he pressed for money to complete Eklutna.
Certainly, abandonment would have been an extremely effective demonstration
of Congressional displeasure at the cost overrun, but would have meant that
the $11,729,000 already expended would have been wasted, as Goodrich W.
Lineweaver, Acting Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, pointed out.9
On April 2, 1953, after a year’s delay and much political maneuvering,
the Territories Subcommittee of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee
debated the Bartlett bill and made a number of recommendations. These were
that the cost increase be limited to $30,000,000; that the annual operation and
maintenance expenditures be restricted to $120,000; that electricity be sold at
no less that 11.5 mills; and that the Department of the Interior negotiate with the
city of Anchorage for the purchase of existing hydroelectric facilities and water
rights at no more than the original costs minus a reasonable depreciation. Until
these stipulations were met, and the Department of the Interior had negotiated
with Anchorage, the full House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs would
not take up the matter. After still more debate and the adoption of a number of
amendments, among them a cost ceiling of $33,000,000 plus “such sums as may
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be necessary for the operation and maintenance of the project,” the full House
ﬁnally passed the Bartlett measure on July 30, 1953.10
At the Alaskan general election of October 6, 1953, Anchorage voters
approved an agreement between the city and the Department of the Interior that
stated that as soon as power went on line at Eklutna, Anchorage was to transfer
the site of its original hydroplant, together with its water rights at Eklutna, to the
Department. In return, Anchorage was to receive some 16,000,000 kilowatts
of ﬁrm power from Eklutna with monthly credits on the city’s electric bill to
be given until October 12, 1978, the date on which the license from the Federal
Power Commission expired. Eklutna power for Anchorage became a reality when
the ﬁrst 15,000 kilowatt unit went on line in January 1955, and the second in
March of the same year. The total project had cost $30,521,183, approximately
$2,500,000 less than the amount Congress had ﬁnally authorized.11
Alaska
ofﬁcially entered
the union as the
49th state on
January 3, 1959,
and by then it
had become clear
that with the
rapid growth of
the Anchorage
metropolitan
area, power
demand again
far outstripped
available
generating
capacity. Bartlett,
now the senior
20.2. Eklutna Powerplant. Photo from the 1961 Reclamation
U.S. Senator
Project Data book.
from Alaska,
introduced a bill which enabled the Bureau of Reclamation to accept from
Anchorage whatever monies were necessary to raise the dam at Eklutna to convert
20,000,000 kWh annual dump power to ﬁrm power. At hearings held in May
1960 the small rural electric cooperative associations in southcentral Alaska
opposed the Bartlett measure because it allowed Anchorage to purchase extra
power at a discount rate at the expense of other consumers of Eklutna power. The
Bartlett bill subsequently died.12
On March 27, 1964, at 5:36 p.m., an earthquake, registering 8.5 on the
Richter scale, shook southcentral Alaska and devastated several communities.
Eklutna suffered much damage to its power plant. As soon as possible after the
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earthquake, the Bureau of Reclamation performed temporary repairs to restore
the power plant and pressure tunnel to normal operation and ensure an adequate
supply of water. On September 16, 1964, Senator Bartlett submitted a measure on
behalf of Senator Ernest Gruening (D, Alaska) and himself which provided that
any repair money spent on Eklutna would not be reimbursable from its revenues.
The Senator reintroduced the measure in 1965, and the Department of the Interior
reported on it favorably in April 1966. But the Bureau of Reclamation had since
been forced to construct a new dam—for $121,000 more than the estimated repair
costs of the old one. Bartlett asked that the $121,000 be reimbursable while
the estimated repair costs be absorbed by the federal government. His measure
was signed into law on September 26, 1968, saving Eklutna’s power customers
$2,805,437.13
The new dam, an earth and rockﬁll structure 815 feet long and 51 feet
high constructed downstream from the damaged complex, was ﬁnished well
ahead of schedule on November 15, 1965. Beginning in 1967 the Alaska Power
Administration (APA), a federal agency the Department of the Interior had
created, took over operation and maintenance of the facility, a responsibility it
maintained until 1995.14
During these decades APA operated and marketed the power from two
federal hydro projects in Alaska, including Eklutna and Snettisham (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers), a project in southeast Alaska which served the Juneau
region. The APA was one of ﬁve Power Marketing Administrations through
which the federal government marketed power from over one hundred hydro
projects developed by the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers throughout the United States. The government built these structures
for ﬂood control, navigation, irrigation, and recreation. However, the projects
administered by the APA were different in that they were not designed originally
as water resource management facilities, nor, according to a recent Department of
Energy report, were they conceived as projects that the federal government would
permanently control. Instead, the government built Eklutna (and Snettisham) to
“encourage and promote economic development and to foster the establishment of
essential Industries in Alaska.”15
By the 1980s Alaska’s congressional delegation considered this mission
fulﬁlled and raised the question of divestiture, and the DOE concurred. The APArun Eklutna project by this time provided only about 5 percent—47 megawatts—
of the power for its market area. The proposal garnered widespread support,
and in 1997 three local public utilities, Anchorage Municipal Light and Power,
Matanuska Electric Association, and Chugach Electric Association assumed
ownership and control of 53%, 17%, and 30% respectively of the Eklutna
project. The sale of APA assets in Alaska transferred about $80 million to the
U.S. Treasury, about 95% of the value in interest and payments the government
would have received in lieu of the transfer. Although, as critics of the agreement
charged, the government could have received more in an open-market deal, it did
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remove administrative costs of management, operation, and repair at the facilities,
as well as responsibility for damage by potential earthquakes in the future.
Moreover, it preserved the original mission of Eklutna by preserving low rates
to the region’s power users because consumers would have borne the costs of a
market-based divestiture.16
At the beginning of a new century the Eklutna Project, once held out as
a Bureau of Reclamation effort to help power the development of an emerging
territorial economy and key component of the nation’s strategic defense, now
serves as a small cog in a much larger regional energy system. With the Eklutna
Project, the Bureau of Reclamation played a key role—one unique in the Bureau’s
history—in providing the power for the emergence of a modern Alaska. Once
the local southcentral population and economy reached critical mass, it was
able to generate funds locally to build on the foundation provided by the federal
government and to eventually assume control of this source of power.
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The Central Valley Project: Controversies
Surrounding Reclamation’s Largest Project
By:
Eric A. Stene
Abstract
The Central Valley Project differed from many Bureau of Reclamation
projects because it began as a state project in an already agriculturally developed
region of California. The Central Valley Project (CVP) was a multipurpose
project intended to provide irrigation water to farmland, electrical power for
large populations, and ﬂood control protection for the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta and low-lying areas near the Sacramento River. It was intended for the
CVP to accomplish these tasks with a combination of dams, pumping and
pumping-generating plants, off-stream reservoirs, and canals. The successes of
the CVP came at a cost of controversy about the acreage limitations declared
in the Reclamation Act of 1902, environmental concerns, and incomplete
structures. This paper will look at the debates surrounding the acreage
limitations and the environmental disasters which occurred as a result of CVP
construction.
The history of the Central Valley Project is the story of evolution
from a state water project to a Reclamation project. Politics and competition
for the project stirred between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps
of Engineers. Information about the battle over acreage restrictions will be
gathered from interviews conducted in the late 1940s, at the request of the
Bureau of Reclamation; Reclamation’s project histories about the Central Valley
Project; the laws enacted to confront the issue of acreage limitations; and books
concerning the Central Valley Project. Proponents and opponents of acreage
limitations argued for and against the policy as Reclamation attempted to resolve
the controversy surrounding the issue which continued for decades.
A more recent, but often more emotional issue surrounding the
CVP, was the project’s effect on the environment. Environmental advocates
frequently castigated the CVP facilities’ effect on the environment. The
environmentalist view conﬂicted with those whose views tended toward the
improvement of agriculture, ﬂood control, and electrical power for the human
population. As perceptions and priorities changed, so did Reclamation’s policies
and operations as the Bureau worked to halt damage to the environment while
continuing operation of the CVP.
The Central Valley Project was hardly an unqualiﬁed success.
However, the CVP accomplished many of Reclamation’s goals regarding ﬂood
control and agriculture. In the process, the natural environment was severely
damaged, possibly irreparably so. Politics tended to dictate Reclamation’s
activities and responses. This had a direct impact on Reclamation’s success or
lack thereof in its efforts.

The Central Valley Project began as the crown jewel for the Bureau of
Reclamation. It became a complex Gargantua of technology and controversy.
As the project grew in size and scope, the debate expanded as perspectives
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and priorities changed. The Central Valley Project became a complex of water
projects as Reclamation and the state of California assumed the posture of
campaign managers and attempted to make the project all things to all people.
The Project accomplished many of the goals set forth by Reclamation and
California, but fell short of others as expectations exceeded abilities. Arguments
ranging from acreage limitations to environmental damage plagued the project
from its beginning. Many of those arguments still have not been resolved, and,
depending on each person’s perspective, the project is everything from a savior
of the arid agricultural lands of the Central Valley and a ﬂood control success to
corporate welfare and environmental Armageddon for California.
The Central Valley Project encompasses a large section of California. It
is approximately 450 miles long and from forty to seventy miles wide. The warm
climate encourages agriculture, but runoff comes in uneven quantities.1 The
Sacramento River watershed receives two-thirds to three-quarters of northern
California’s precipitation though it only has one-third to one-quarter of the
land. The San Joaquin River watershed occupies two-thirds to three-quarters
of northern California’s land, but only collects one-third to one-quarter of the
precipitation. The Sacramento Valley suffers from ﬂoods, and ﬂoods and droughts
alternately afﬂict the San Joaquin Valley.2
As early as the 1870s plans appeared to transfer excess water from the
Sacramento River to the often parched tracts in the San Joaquin Valley, but most
early efforts concentrated on ﬂood control along the Sacramento River. After
years of planning and debate about the proposed project led nowhere, California
appealed to the Federal government for assistance. The Bureau of Reclamation
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) vied for the opportunity to
construct the facilities on the colossal project, which came to be called the Central
Valley Project.3
History and Construction
California’s history encompasses several hundred years of habitation by
various groups of Native Americans. European settlement of the state began with
the Spanish in the seventeenth century. The Spanish established Roman Catholic
missions and other settlements along the California coast, but they rarely ventured
to the interior of the territory. Citizens of the United States began immigrating
into California in the 1840s. Increasing migratory pressure by settlers on many
north Mexican provinces and political machinations by the United States sparked
the Mexican-American War in 1846. The United States defeated Mexico in
1848, and the resulting Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo gave Mexico’s northern
states, including California, to the United States for $10 million. The acquisition
of California alone brought the United States riches the country did not know
existed, and more problems to go along with them.4
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The discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in 1848 brought a ﬂood of
Americans into the area, and in 1850 California became a state. The ﬁrst
California Legislature in 1850, immediately enacted laws to deal with the state’s
most precious resource, not gold, but water. The California Legislature adopted
English Common Law’s riparian water rights. According to that law, owners of
land bordering streams or bodies of water had a right to a reasonable amount of
that water. Owners, whose land did not border bodies of water, had no rights to
any of the water.5 The laws severely restricted the number of landholders who
had access to California’s water supply.
The 1850 California Legislature gave the State Surveyor General
responsibility for water development. In 1878 the California government created
the ofﬁce of the State Engineer, which then became responsible for state water
planning. William Hamilton Hall, the ﬁrst State Engineer, conducted a broad
study of California’s water problems, on a $100,000 budget. Hall planned to
appropriate more money and conduct a more detailed study, but for unspeciﬁed
reasons the legislature abolished the State Engineer position in 1889.6
The California Legislature passed the Wright Act in 1887, forming
irrigation districts. One Reclamation ofﬁcial considered the Wright Act a model
for irrigation legislation in the West.7 Others claimed it was a good idea, but
badly implemented. The districts encountered problems in selling their bonds,
ﬁlling their reservoirs, and allocating water in
a fair manner. Wyoming State Engineer, and
future Reclamation Commissioner, Elwood
Mead declared the Wright Act, “a disgrace
to any self-governing people.”8 California
amended the Wright Act in 1897, stopping
the establishment of irrigation districts until
the formation of the Irrigation Districts Bond
Certiﬁcation Commission.9

21.1. B. S. Alexander, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. Courtesy of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The Federal government also became
interested in California water during
the nineteenth century. Lt. Colonel
B. S. Alexander studied the Sacramento and
San Joaquin Rivers in 1873. In a report
to President Ulysses S. Grant, Alexander
visualized a system of canals to complete
an exchange of water from the Sacramento
to the San Joaquin Valley. A report on
the “Sacramento Project” in 1904, ﬁrst
connected the U.S. Reclamation Service
to water problems in the Central Valley,
but that connection remained limited.
California created the State Reclamation
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Board in 1911 and authorized it to spend $33 million on a ﬂood control project
in the Central Valley. The Reclamation Service reported on the possibility of
storing Sacramento River water at Iron Canyon near Red Bluff in the Sacramento
Valley. In 1920 Homer J. Gault, a Reclamation engineer, and W. F. McClure, the
California State Engineer, wrote another report on Sacramento River storage in
Iron Canyon, but Reclamation involvement remained nonexistent.10
In a 1919 letter to California Governor William Stephens, Colonel Robert
Bradford Marshal, Chief Geographer for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
proposed a plan to build storage reservoirs along the Sacramento River system,
and transfer water from the Sacramento Valley to the San Joaquin Valley via
two large canals lying on both sides of the Sacramento River. The plan earned
Marshal the nickname, “The Father of the Central Valley Project.”11
California’s government became interested in a comprehensive water
plan for the state in 1921. The state legislature directed the State Engineer to
come up with such a plan. They wanted it to accomplish conservation, ﬂood
control, storage, distribution, and uses for all California water. The legislature
directed the State Engineer to estimate total costs for the reservoirs, dams, and
any other facilities needed to institute the state water plan. The legislature then
appropriated $200,000 to investigate this state water plan and received the report
in 1923. Further legislation and appropriations raised the bill to one million
dollars. Between 1920 and 1932, approximately fourteen more reports detailed
water ﬂow, drought conditions, ﬂood control, and irrigation issues in California.
State Engineer Edward Hyatt used the reports to create the California State Water
Plan.12
Salinity control, especially in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta, became a major concern for northern California water users, and a
major component of the California State Water Project. The Delta frequently
experienced salinity intrusion, which caused problems for Antioch and Pittsburg.
Unless water ﬂowed past Antioch at a minimum of 3,300 second-feet, salt water
from San Francisco Bay moved into Suisun Bay and the Delta during high tide,
making the water unusable for crops and industry. Between 1919 and 1924 the
salt water in Suisun Bay allowed sufﬁcient growth of teredo, a woodboring worm,
to destroy wharves and pilings in the Bay valued at $25 million. In 1924, the
water reached its lowest recorded stream ﬂow. The maximum salt water content
at Pittsburg reached 65 percent. In 1926 Pittsburg and Antioch stopped using
water from Suisun Bay for crops and industry. Both communities had used the
bay water since the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1930 the state water
plan called for construction of a 420 foot dam at Kennett to maintain a regular
ﬂow to Antioch, keeping salt water out of Suisun Bay. The California Legislature
authorized the future Central Valley Project as a state project in 1933. The act
authorized the sale of “revenue” bonds not to exceed $170 million.13
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Even with the authorized revenue bonds, California found itself unable
to ﬁnance the project. Further hampering revenue collection was the inability
of the state to get the project approved for loans and grants under the National
Recovery Act. Reporting to Reclamation on the upper San Joaquin Relief Project,
Harry W. Bashore said that the State Engineer considered Kennett Reservoir
the cornerstone for the entire Central Valley Project. California applied to the
Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works (FEA) for grants and loans,
and created the Water Project Authority. The Committee on Rivers and Harbors
of the House of Representatives recommended $12 million of Federal money
for construction of Kennett (later Shasta) Dam because of the national beneﬁts
to navigation and ﬂood control on the Sacramento River. After reviewing the
investigations, the California Joint Federal-State Water Resources Commission,
the United States Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers approved and recommended the
plan.14
California amended its application to the FEA in 1934, and the Water
Project Authority became effective. On September 10, 1935, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt issued an executive allocation of $20 million under the Emergency
Relief Appropriation Act, later reduced to $4.2 million, for construction of the
Central Valley Project. Apparently ofﬁcials assumed the approval was valid under
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, but the Supreme Court case of
the United States vs. Arizona (295 U.S. 174) brieﬂy threatened that assumption.
Before 1935 the government sometimes started irrigation projects using relief
funds without conforming to the Reclamation Act, but the court’s decision said
the Secretary of the Interior and the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public
Works did not have the authority to construct Parker Dam, on the Colorado River,
without the consent of Congress. The Supreme court ruled that such an approach
violated reclamation laws.15
Technically, authorization of the Central Valley Project could not take
place at the time because there were no executive branch ﬁndings and approval
of feasibility. The technical problems, however, did not stop authorization of the
project. Active participation by
Reclamation, in matters relating
to the Central Valley started in
September 1935 at meetings
in Sacramento and Berkeley.
Reclamation Commissioner
Elwood Mead, Chief Engineer
Ray Walter, Construction
Engineer Walker R. Young,
and State Engineer
Edward Hyatt attended the
meetings. Secretary of the
21.2. Shasta Dam, Powerplant, and Lake at the
Interior Harold Ickes sent the
location originally proposed for Kennett Dam.
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feasibility report to the President on November 26, 1935. Roosevelt approved
the Central Valley Project, including Kennett (later Shasta), Friant, and Delta
Divisions, on December 2, 1935.16
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937 reauthorized the Central Valley
Project, and authorized $12 million for construction. The Rivers and Harbors act
listed improvement of navigation, regulation, and ﬂood control of the Sacramento
and San Joaquin Rivers as the ﬁrst priorities of the Central Valley Project.
Reclamation’s primary purpose, supplying water for irrigation and domestic use,
followed these priorities and power generation ended up the last priority on the
list.17
The Central Valley Project continued largely unscathed through the late
1940s and 1950s. The government authorized new divisions of the project,
with economic feasibility the only necessary criteria. The project became a
conglomeration of various Federal and state government agencies by the end of
the 1960s. The Army Corps of Engineers built several dams in California under
the Flood Control Act of 1944, several of which became integrated into CVP.
Meanwhile, California continued with its State Water Project.
The Corps of Engineers (COE) completed Folsom Dam in 1956, turning
over operation and maintenance to the Bureau of Reclamation after completion.
Congress integrated more COE projects into CVP during the 1960s and 1970s.
The Corps of Engineers continued to operate and maintain several dams in the
Central Valley and the Corps often found itself holding surplus water at the dams.
As a result, Reclamation drew up contracts for releasing the surplus water for
irrigation because COE specialized in ﬂood control, not irrigation water supply.
The California State Water Plan, published in 1957, proposed immediate
construction of a project on the Feather River. Development on the Feather River
marked the inauguration of the California State Water Project, strongly supported
by California Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown who realized the seriousness of
California’s water situation. Unlike the CVP, which only compelled repayment
for its irrigation projects, the State Water Project required water users to pay all
project costs for the $1.75 billion in bonds. According to the Water Education
Foundation, although a little more than 50 percent complete in 1994, the State
Water Project then consisted of twenty-two dams and reservoirs and the North
Bay, South Bay, and California Aqueducts. Approximately 30 percent of the
water supplied by the State Water Project irrigated the San Joaquin Valley, while
the other 70 percent supplied water for residential, municipal, and industrial use,
most of it in southern California.18
The Acreage Limitation Battle
One major stumbling block for Reclamation Service involvement in a
water project in the Central Valley was the 160 acre limitation imposed by the
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Reclamation Act of 1902. According to Norris Hundley, Congress intended for
the Act to promote family farms, reclaim arid land, and prevent speculators and
large landowners from proﬁting at government expense. Because of California’s
history, much of the land was already held in farms the acreage of which greatly
exceeded the 160 acre maximum. In 1920, 60% of the land in the Central Valley
was held in farms of 1,000 or more acres. This increased to 70% of the land by
1935. Furthermore, much of the land was owned by absentee landlords. Early
on, the large landowners in the Valley feared imposition of the acreage limitation,
encouraging them to rebuff Reclamation’s assistance and look for alternative
solutions to their irrigation woes.19 The acreage limitation controversy only
provided the ﬁrst seeds of dissension, soon followed by the debate over public
versus private power and environmental concerns.
Construction on the Central Valley Project started in the late 1930s, and
controversy bloomed toward the end of World War II. The ﬁrst blow to the large
landowners came in 1943, when Reclamation ceased its policy of not enforcing
the acreage limitation. Following the war, advocates of small farmers formed the
Central Valley Project Conference (CVPC) to counter the inﬂuence of the Central
Valley Project Association (CVPA). George Sehlmeyer, Master of the California
Grange, led the CVPC, which extolled the virtues of acreage limitations and
public power. The CVPA viewed the two policies as anathema. One of the
CVPC’s biggest victories came on September 8, 1945, as 200 delegates gathered
to attend the Conference’s California Water Conference.20
The California Water Conference of 1945, with Governor Earl Warren
presiding, revealed a large amount of support for the CVP among small, working
farmers; though the year’s Project History reported,
Paid mouthpieces of the vested interests, such as the Paciﬁc Gas and
Electric Company, the Irrigation Districts Association, the California
Farm Bureau Association, the State Water Project Authority, and others,
without exception, opposed the Bureau’s program of wide distribution of
beneﬁts resulting from the expenditure of public funds.21

Several issues arose at the conference, including: state vs. federal operation
and control; public vs. private distribution of power; and COE vs. Reclamation
construction of multipurpose projects; and controversy over the 160 acre
limitation in the Reclamation Act of 1902. In “Water, Power, and Politics in the
Central Valley Project,” Charles E. Coate said, “The Army faced a decidedly
hostile audience, and the bureau [sic] won the meeting’s endorsement”—
apparently in spite of the “paid mouthpieces.”22
Not everyone felt the same fondness for the CVP. Robert Franklin
Schmeiser, elected president of the Associated Farmers of California, Inc.,
in 1947, adamantly opposed Reclamation involvement in the Central Valley.
Mainly he opposed Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes but aimed his wrath
at Reclamation. Schmeiser railed against the 160 acre limitation expressed in
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the Reclamation Act of 1902. He supported COE construction of the Project,
believing the Corps would supply irrigation water at a lower rate than the Bureau.
Schmeiser did not like Reclamation’s “propaganda organization,” and argued
against “the dictatorial powers they possess over the public.”23 Using the popular
vernacular of the time to deal with opposition, Schmeiser called Reclamation
ofﬁcials “Communists” because of the acreage limitations and public power
policy, always combustible topics in the CVP.24
Others supported the 160 acre limitation. Joseph Claude Lewis strongly
supported Reclamation’s policy. Lewis, a pro-labor member of a farmers’
cooperative in the 1940s, expressed his support for the acreage limitation and low
cost public power. He dismissed accusations that Secretary of the Interior Julius
A. Krug and Reclamation Commissioner Michael Straus were Communists, a
label often placed on himself.25
During the mid-1940s, several attempts were made to exempt the CVP
from the acreage limitation requirements, but these failed. Even irrigation
water released from dams built by the Corps of Engineers became subject to the
limitation, but the pendulum soon swung in favor of the large landholders. The
death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1945, was followed by the resignation
of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Shortly thereafter Straus curtailed
enforcement of the acreage limitation when he ran into opposition in Congress
as farms came to be viewed as businesses. One of the strongest opponents was
Sheridan Downey of California, who had been Upton Sinclair’s running mate
for Lieutenant Governor in 1934. Straus remedied the situation politically by
defending acreage limitations while creating loopholes for the large landowners—
methodologies of bypassing the limitations collectively labeled “technical
compliance.”26
One method open to corporate farms aimed at circumventing the acreage
limitation was for each stockholder to obtain water for 160 acres of the land.
Often large growers deeded land to children and other relatives while continuing
to work the acreage and proﬁt from it. Large landowners also deeded land to
employees and then leased back the acreage. In still another scheme, wealthy
landowners made accelerated payments. In this process, they paid back the
Bureau of Reclamation in a lump sum before the ten-year deadline. This theory
operated under the premise that Reclamation could not force the landowners to
sell the land once the Bureau had received repayment.27
The strategies devised to bypass the acreage limitations placed the issue
on the back burner where it silently festered until the 1980s. The Reclamation
Reform Act of 1982 recognized the large landholdings of many California
farmers. Even though two-thirds of California farms consisted of less than
100 acres, 80 percent of the farmland existed in holdings of over 1,000 acres.
Furthermore, 75 percent of California’s agricultural production came from
10 percent of the farms. The Reform Act increased the limitation to 960 acres and
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eliminated the residency requirement for farmers, which Reclamation never really
enforced in the Central Valley because most contracts were with water districts,
not individual farmers.28
Even with Congress’ concession on the acreage limitation, those in
possession of more than 960 acres pressed to resume circumvention of the law.
The pressure paid off as the Westlands Water District received a waiver from
the Bureau of Reclamation to continue receiving a subsidized water rate until
2007. This meant payments of $17 per acre-foot rather than $42 per acre-foot.
Reclamation went further in 1987, by declaring that farms in excess of 960 acres
could continue receiving subsidized water as long as they were part of a farm
management system.29
Environmental Crises
The 1960s marked the end of the era of large dam building, and caught the
CVP in a political and economic whirlpool with no apparent end. All divisions of
the Central Valley Project and the features of the State Water Project supply water
to the Central Valley, and they all contribute to the environmental problems. One
high proﬁle problem which grew out of the CVP was the declining population of
Chinook salmon in the Sacramento River. Most attention focused on the winterrun Chinook salmon, listed as threatened species by the Federal government and
an endangered species by California. The estimated population of the winterrun Chinook in 1969, reached 117,000. In 1991, only 191 adults returned to the
Sacramento River to spawn.30
The environmental movement entered the mainstream in the early 1970s.
Soon, along with the Endangered Species Act of 1973, signed by President
Richard Nixon; the movement created more controversy for the Central Valley
Project. The Act established criteria for listing endangered species and protecting
them from harm by federal agencies or private concerns. The Central Valley
Project felt the consequences of the Endangered Species Act because of project
features’ impacts on migratory ﬁsh species. The Shasta Division dams primarily
affected Chinook salmon and steelhead trout.31 Shasta and Keswick Dams
blocked a large number of streams, tributary to the Sacramento River, that
were formerly used for spawning by the migratory ﬁsh. To solve the problems,
managers used ﬁsh traps and hatcheries to move the migrating ﬁsh upstream
or artiﬁcially breed them, but they could not keep pace with the decreasing
populations. Shasta Dam not only blocked migration upstream, but it blocked the
ﬂow of cool water downstream, keeping water temperature above the maximum
ﬁfty-six degrees Fahrenheit necessary for the spawning salmon. Beginning in
1992, Reclamation bypassed the turbines in Shasta Powerplant, and released
water directly into the Sacramento River to improve conditions for endangered,
winter-run Chinook salmon.32
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The population of winter-run Chinook salmon peaked in 1969, numbering
about 118,000 at Red Bluff Diversion Dam. After 1969, populations of salmon
and steelhead trout at the dam steadily declined. By 1990 the salmon population
dropped to less than 5 percent of their 1969 total. The situation elicited
outcries against the Project from environmentalists and commercial ﬁshermen.
Reclamation instituted policies to alleviate the impact on the declining salmon
population.33
Fish ladders and subsurface openings in the dam alleviated the migration
problem, but led to another—predatory ﬁsh. Environmentalists equated salmon
traveling through the subsurface openings, downstream through the dam, to
putting the ﬁsh in a washing machine, disorienting the salmon when they get clear
into the river. The disoriented ﬁngerling salmon became easy prey for squawﬁsh,
which often lined up on the downstream side of Red Bluff Dam to feast on the
small ﬁsh.34
In 1987 Reclamation began opening Red Bluff Dam’s gates yearly, from
December 1 until April 1, for the winter-run salmon returning to spawn at Shasta
Dam. Inclusion of the winter-run Chinooks on the listing of threatened species
by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), prompted Reclamation to
take further action. Reclamation completed a $17 million renovation of the
dam in March 1990. The improvements included a temporary ﬁsh ladder in the
center of the dam for passage when the gates remained closed. Renovations
did not immediately boost the Chinook population. In 1991 the adult, winterrun Chinook count reached a record low of only 191 at Red Bluff Diversion
Dam. The population gained in 1992 and 1993 with counts of 1,180 and 341
respectively. The NMFS designated the winter-run Chinook as endangered in
December 1993.35
Red Bluff Diversion Dam diverted irrigation water into Tehama-Colusa
and Corning Canals. The diversion capacity of the ﬁrst sections of the two canals
totaled 3,030 cubic feet per second. A drum and ﬁsh screen structure, constructed
in the period 1969-1971, prevented ﬁsh passing through the headworks from
entering the canals. A bypass system returned the ﬁsh to the river. In accordance
with an agreement with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Reclamation placed
gravel beds along the upper 3.2 miles of the Tehama-Colusa Canal to simulate
natural spawning beds. The artiﬁcial spawning beds failed to work as planned,
and the canal headworks still trapped young ﬁsh.36
Reclamation developed several alternatives to protect salmon at Red Bluff
Diversion Dam. Alternative 4A (Large Pump) would essentially end usage of the
dam. The plan called for utilization of a pumping plant to make water diversions,
and leave the dam’s gates open, to make the river free ﬂowing again. Alternative
4B (Small Pump) would close the gates during the peak summer months, midMay to mid-July, keeping them open the rest of the year, and using a small pump
to assist in diverting water to the canals. Alternative 3A4 (Small Ladder) planned
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to increase the ﬂow capacity of the left and right ﬁsh ladders and add a permanent
ﬁsh ladder to the center of the dam. Alternative 3C4 (Large Ladder) called for
modiﬁcation of the right ﬁsh ladder for greater ﬂow capacity and addition of a
permanent center ﬁsh ladder. The plan would replace the left ﬁsh ladder with a
“state-of-the-art ﬁsh ladder.”37 By the end of 1994, Reclamation had not decided
on which plan to use. Residents of Red Bluff became concerned that some of
the proposed alternatives for protecting the salmon, would alter the recreation
potential of Lake Red Bluff, behind Red Bluff Diversion Dam, and discourage
travelers along I-5 from stopping at the city of Red Bluff, thereby affecting the
community’s recreational revenue.38
The powerful pumping plants in the Delta Division had a major, and
often detrimental effect, on stream ﬂow in the Delta and the San Joaquin River
Basin. During periods of low water ﬂow and high quantities of exports, the
Delta pumps actually reversed the ﬂow of the San Joaquin River, taking it back
upstream. Through the Delta’s transport system, water normally traveling to the
west, toward San Pablo Bay, instead moves back toward the east and south. The
“reverse ﬂows” disorient migratory ﬁsh, often luring them to the pumps, and draw
salty ocean water into the San Joaquin River and other waterways.39
In 1944 Reclamation ofﬁcials realized the salinity problem in the Delta
was more pronounced than they previously thought. Charles E. Carey, the
Region Two Director in 1944, believed Shasta Dam could not entirely control the
salinity problem, precluding use of the Delta as a reservoir as planned at one time.
Carey announced some possible alternatives to alleviate the salinity problem:
build a closed conduit through or around the Delta to carry Sacramento River
water directly to the other side without letting it mix with Delta water; change
the Water Exchange Contract to make the water quality requirement less extreme
(Carey believed this unlikely, but others claimed it was possible); control the
Sacramento River tributaries to control salinity and assure water quality; build
Folsom Dam.40 The proposed closed conduit foreshadowed later plans for the
Peripheral Canal.
In the course of Delta Division development, though not built, the
Peripheral Canal became one of the most controversial elements of Division
planning. Reclamation proposed the Peripheral Canal to the Interagency Delta
Committee (IDC) in early 1963, as an alternative water transfer system. By early
1965 the proposed canal had almost universal acceptance in the Delta region.
California wanted Reclamation to design and construct the Peripheral Canal,
then the state would assume control of the feature. Reclamation did not want
state control of the canal, but did not have the authority to build it. California’s
Department of Water Resources (DWR), on the other hand, did have the authority
to construct the canal.41
The IDC pointed out that much of the Peripheral Canal route would
parallel Interstate 5, and material excavated from the canal could be used as
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highway ﬁll. In January 1968 the California Departments of Water Resources
and Public Works executed an agreement under which Public Works advanced
$2 million to purchase rights of way in San Joaquin County for the canal. DWR
agreed to repay the money when canal construction began, or no later than
January 1, 1976.42
Changing attitudes in the United States, toward the environment and a
myriad of other issues, soon infected perceptions of the Peripheral Canal. Contra
Costa County opposed the canal because residents viewed it as another way to
transport fresh water, out of their locale, to southern California. About the same
time, questions arose about the environmental impact of the Peripheral Canal on
ﬁsh populations in the Delta and the Central Valley. Environmentalists believed
the canal’s outlets would draw ﬁsh to them. They also believed the nitrogen-rich
water from agricultural drainage could foster algae growth, stagnating waters and
suffocating the ﬁsh.43
In a December 4, 1969, speech to the Irrigation Districts Association,
William Gianelli, Director of DWR, responded to the environmental arguments,
contending, “Californians must not ‘fall into the quagmire trap of Chicken Little
emotionalists.”44 The draft environmental impact report of 1974 received such a
negative response, DWR decided to take some extra time to prepare an acceptable
ﬁnal report. Early in 1975, with construction of the Peripheral Canal scheduled
to commence that summer, Director of DWR John Teerink announced a one year
delay.45
The Department of Water Resources “proposed an amalgam of joint statefederal programs and facilities,” including the forty-two mile Peripheral Canal,
in 1977.46 DWR contended the canal would circumvent the Delta channels and
carry water more efﬁciently from the Sacramento River to the pumping plants
of the CVP and the State Water Project. The canal could release fresh water
into the Delta at certain points along its reaches to support irrigation, to beneﬁt
ﬁsh and wildlife, and to combat salt water intrusion. Supporters, including the
Metropolitan Water District of southern California and various agribusinesses,
argued the canal would help end the reverse ﬂows caused by the south Delta
pumps. Opponents continued arguing against on the basis of the environmental
impact of the canal and further exports to southern California. A referendum
on the entire project went before California voters as Proposition 9 in 1982.
Proposition 9 failed because of cost (an estimated $3.1 billion) and environmental
concerns. Other alternatives surfaced after the defeat of Proposition 9, but none
went forward.47
Studies link several factors to the decline of the Chinook population
including predation by two species introduced into the Delta, striped bass and
Colorado River squawﬁsh; lack of water ﬂow in the rivers because of upstream
dams; and disorientation and destruction by the Delta Division pumping plants.
The striped bass population also experienced large declines. Another species
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facing declines and possible extinction was the three inch long delta smelt. A
ﬁsh found only in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, the smelt faced destruction
by the same forces as the Chinook salmon. The California Fish and Game
Commission rejected the smelt for a state listing as a threatened or endangered
species, but in March 1993 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the smelt as a
threatened species under the Federal Endangered Species Act.48
Reclamation developed the Delta Division in an area ripe for controversy,
before and after construction of the Central Valley Project. Special interest
groups competed to use the Delta and its water for their own special interests.
Some groups argued for land use zoning areas strictly for municipal purposes,
recreational development, ﬁsh and wildlife enhancement, or maintaining the
Delta in its “natural” state. Returning the Delta to its natural state seems the least
likely, and indeed the most farfetched, idea. The Delta’s true natural state began
disappearing over a century ago as river diversions, hydraulic mining, industrial
development, agricultural development, and the building of state and Federal
water projects transformed the region.49
The Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA) started
the CVP in a new direction. President George H. W. Bush signed the bill as part
of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, over the
objections of California Governor Pete Wilson and Central Valley legislators.
Environmentalists considered the act a victory, while California agricultural
leaders considered it a disaster. The CVPIA reallocated 800,000 acre-feet of CVP
water (600,000 in dry years) from Valley farmers toward the restoration of Central
Valley ﬁsheries. CVPIA limited renewed agricultural water contracts to twentyﬁve years with no long-term renewals. The Central Valley Project Improvement
Act opened a new political pandora’s box in California.50
In another area of the Central Valley Project, Friant Dam was blamed
for the extinction of a large run of Chinook Salmon on the San Joaquin River.
The Bureau of Reclamation is also faulted for not exercising its responsibility
to wildlife concerns. In Overtapped Oasis, Marc Reisner argued that several
amendments were passed concerning ﬁsh and wildlife, but Reclamation supplied
less than 100,000 acre-feet of fresh water for state and federal refuges.51
The most traumatic environmental consequence of the Central Valley
Project proved to be the Kesterson Reservoir disaster. Reclamation began
construction of the San Luis Drain in 1968, to transport wastewater to the west
Delta. The Drain terminated at a series of twelve manmade ponds collectively
called Kesterson Reservoir. Kesterson was planned as a regulating reservoir to
hold drainage from lands irrigated by San Luis Dam until the water could be
ﬂushed into the Delta during winter.52
Kesterson was designated a national wildlife refuge, and in the early
1980s Californians learned the price wildlife paid for using it. Pollution
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entering Kesterson Reservoir in drainage from the San Luis Unit via the San
Luis Drain was discovered to have caused deaths and deformities in waterfowl
in the refuge. The pollutants included salts, pesticides, and trace minerals, most
notably selenium. Reclamation responded by closing the refuge. This action
brought protests, forcing Reclamation to change its stance. The Bureau then
announced it would end irrigation supplies to the farmers Reclamation deemed
most responsible for the runoff. It was then the farmers’ turn to protest. They
successfully forced Reclamation to rescind its order.53
In the mid-1980s, California ofﬁcials warned pregnant women and
children not to eat waterfowl from Kesterson. By the end of the 1980s, sirens
warned the birds away and fences kept others at bay. Reclamation ﬁlled the
reservoir in with dirt in 1988, and the ground was kept level to prevent the
accumulation of standing water. Later studies showed that the amount of
selenium present still exceeded safe levels. The pollutants’ effects were not
limited to the wildlife at Kesterson Reservoir. Farmers affected by the runoff
sued Reclamation for alleged damages to ﬁelds that the farmers claimed resulted
from Kesterson leakage. After closure of the San Luis Drain, the Westlands Water
District received 38 damage claims from farmers and landowners claiming the
action diminished property values and resulted in lost crops.54
The internal battle over water in California evolved with the onset of the
environmental crises. Early in the twentieth century, battle lines formed between
northern California (extending north from the borders of Ventura and Los Angeles
Counties) and southern California. By 1990 the opposing forces realigned into
agricultural, urban, and environmental interests. Gaining the upper hand came
through various alliances between the conﬂicting groups.55
Overview
The Central Valley Project is a complex operation of interrelated divisions.
Shasta Dam, at one time considered the key to the Central Valley Project, acts as
a ﬂood control dam for the Sacramento River. Shasta stores water for controlled
releases downstream. The Trinity River Division diverts surplus water from the
Trinity River, in the Klamath River Basin, into the Sacramento River. Water
from the Trinity River Division enters the Sacramento at Keswick Reservoir in
the Shasta Division. Downstream from Shasta Division, the Sacramento River
Division supplies Sacramento River water to Tehama, Glenn, Colusa, and Yolo
Counties for irrigation. Releases from Shasta Division help control salinity in the
Delta Division
The American River Division provides ﬂood control on the American and
the Sacramento Rivers. The division supplies irrigation water along the Folsom
South Canal. The American River Division’s Sly Park Unit, essentially operates
independently from the rest of the Division, irrigating parts of Placer County.
The Friant Division impounds or diverts the entire ﬂow of the San Joaquin River,
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except for ﬂood control and irrigation releases. Friant Dam sends irrigation
water south through the Friant-Kern Canal, and north through the Madera
Canal. The Army Corps of Engineers built New Melones Dam and Powerplant
on the Stanislaus River from 1966 to 1979. The COE turned the dam over to
Reclamation in 1979. The dam primarily operates as a ﬂood control and power
facility, but Reclamation has contracts to supply water to two water districts in the
area.
The Delta Division is the hub around which the Central Valley Project
rotates. This Division contains the facilities for transporting water from the
Sacramento River to the San Joaquin Valley and for controlling salinity in the
Delta Division. The Delta Cross Channel diverts water from the Sacramento
River to the Tracy Pumping Plant, the Contra Costa Pumping Plants, and the
intakes of the Contra Costa and Delta-Mendota Canals, sending the much needed
water south into the San Joaquin Valley.
The San Luis Unit provides storage for the Central Valley Project for dry
seasons. The Unit is a joint venture between Reclamation and the California
Department of Water Resources. The Gianelli Pumping-Generating Plant, one
of the joint facilities, pumps surplus water from runoff and melting snow from
the Delta-Mendota Canal and the California Aqueduct into San Luis Reservoir,
the largest offstream storage reservoir in the United States. When water ﬂow
through the Delta Division becomes too low, water is released from San Luis into
the Delta Mendota Canal and the California Aqueduct. The San Felipe Division
diverts water from San Luis Reservoir into lands west of the Coastal Mountain
Range, south of the San Francisco Bay.
Congress authorized the Allen Camp Unit of the Pit River Division on
September 28, 1976. The Allen Camp Unit in Lassen and Modoc Counties of
northeastern California, was to consist of Allen Camp Dam on the Pit River,
Hillside Canal stretching 25 miles to the east, and Pilot Canal branching off
Hillside to the southeast. The Concluding Report of 1981 determined the Unit
was infeasible and the project was canceled.
The Central Valley Project plans encompassed thirty-ﬁve counties in
an area about 500 miles long and 60 to 100 miles wide, making it the largest
Reclamation project.56 The CVP contained some of the country’s largest dams,
Shasta and San Luis among them. Reclamation intended Auburn Dam, on the
American River, to be the largest on the Central Valley Project, but political
turmoil left the dam incomplete and in limbo.
In spite of the social, environmental, and political controversy surrounding
the Central Valley Project, it remains an impressive accomplishment. The Central
Valley contains three-quarters of the irrigated land in California, and one-sixth
of the irrigated land in the United States. The Central Valley’s annual farm
production exceeds the total value of all the gold mined in California since 1848.
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The Central Valley Project ranks ﬁrst among Reclamation projects in value of
ﬂood damage prevented between 1950 and 1991. During that time period the
Central Valley Project prevented more than $5 billion in ﬂood damage.57
Conclusion
The Bureau of Reclamation received a large amount of criticism over the
Central Valley Project and indeed the application of the Reclamation Act to the
Central Valley proved inconsistent with most other Reclamation projects. The
later environmental impact of the project also created a storm of controversy. So
much so that in recent years the Central Valley Project became a political and
environmental bombshell, and a victim of changing times. California politicians
soon avoided dealing with the CVP and the State water projects, viewing both
as machines of political suicide. With these thoughts in mind it is important to
understand the Bureau of Reclamation’s role and position in order to understand
the Bureau’s actions.
The Bureau of Reclamation is a Federal Government agency, subject
to the whims of a parade of politicians who make their way in and out of
government ofﬁce. The Bureau depends on the good graces of these politicians
for funding and for it’s very existence. The Central Valley Project placed the
Bureau in a position in which, in a highly politicized environment, it struggled to
balance the wants of politicians with the requirements of the Reclamation Act and
the environment.
The initial controversy involved acreage limitations. The Reclamation
Act required that farms receiving water could not be larger than 160 acres.
The Central Valley had been settled and the acreages established long before
Reclamation entered the scene, unlike most other Reclamation projects. The
large landholders also held considerable political clout in northern California.
Furthermore, the acreage limitation was viewed by many in the mid to late 1940s
as un-American and possibly Communist, a grave label to deal with at the time.
Finally changes in the country’s leadership affected how the Interior Department’s
leadership viewed the acreage limitation, from the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to George H. W. Bush.
The other controversy involved the impact of the CVP on the environment.
In the early decades of the project, the environment was not an overriding concern
in the country, so it was not a factor in the initial design and construction of the
CVP. The environmental movement gained momentum with the Endangered
Species Act. From then on, politicization of the environment impacted operation
of the CVP and pressed the need for modiﬁcation of the Project’s facilities.
Like the acreage limitation controversy, the amount of concern about the
environment depended on the political concerns in Washington and the political
necessities of the Interior Department and the Bureau of Reclamation. When
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environmental concerns became apparent and paramount, Reclamation moved
to deal with them, although not as quickly as many would have liked. Whether
it was Kesterson or Chinook salmon, much of the damage had been done before
most people became concerned.
The Bureau of Reclamation is run in accordance with the wishes of
Congress and the President, and much of its efforts are geared toward remaining
a viable entity and surviving in a political arena. These variables dictate
Reclamation’s activities. The Central Valley Project certainly had its drawbacks.
There is no argument against that. It is also important to realize that the CVP
achieved many of the goals set for it. Irrigation, electrical power, and ﬂood
control all serve mankind, as was important at the time construction began.
Contemporary values aside, the Project was a success in those terms. Success of
the Central Valley Project also exacted a terrible price.
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College in Ogden, Utah, in 1988 and his Master of Arts in History from
Utah State University in Logan in 1994, with an emphasis in Western U.S.
History. Stene’s thesis is “The African American Community of Ogden, Utah:
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Bumpy Road For Glen Canyon Dam
By:
W. L. Rusho
Basic Concept and Purpose
Probably no dam built in America has been so controversial as Glen
Canyon Dam. Built in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the dam was planned and
designed to be a contributor in a long dream to subdue and conquer the earth,
or as was often heard in pioneer days, “to make the desert blossom as the rose.”
Its basic purpose was to allow increased irrigation and other water development
in the entire Upper Basin of the Colorado River, including Colorado, Utah,
Wyoming, and New Mexico.
My experience with the dam is intensely personal, as I had been
employed during its construction as Public Affairs Ofﬁcer for the Bureau of
Reclamation (BR). For over ﬁve years I rode the monkeyslides, conducted tours
for reporters and dignitaries, wrote articles and news releases, drafted speeches,
conducted ceremonies, produced motion pictures, and directed the guide service
and all photography. In late 1963, when the dam was virtually ﬁnished, I was
transferred to the Salt Lake City BR Regional Ofﬁce, which had jurisdiction
over Glen Canyon Dam. From that time on I continued to be regularly involved
in developments at the dam, both by many personal visits and by reports from
others. Even after my retirement in 1988, I worked as a contractor producing
motion pictures concerning operation of the dam.
Considered as a lineal descendant of the many dams constructed by the
Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam was not unusual. Designed to be a
storage dam—rather than a ﬂood control structure—its purposes were to hold as
much water as possible, release only what was necessary, and ﬂuctuate releases
as drastically as required to maximize revenues from hydropower production.
After the last of eight generators came on the line in 1966, virtually the only
restrictions on its operation derived from the 1922 Colorado River Compact,
the 1944 Treaty with Mexico, as well as a number of related laws, all of which
comprised what was loosely termed “The Law of the River.”

Early History of the Glen Canyon Dam Concept
Actually, lower Glen Canyon, near where the dam was built from 1956 to
1964, had been eyed many decades earlier by hydrologists and engineers, not for
a water storage dam, but for a ﬂood control dam.
In 1906 and 1907 a tributary ﬂood on the Salt River caused the Colorado
River to break through an irrigation gate south of Yuma, Arizona, and to ﬂow
unchecked for two years into the Salton Sink of California, thus greatly enlarging
the Salton Sea. After the gap was ﬁnally closed by dumping huge amounts of
rock into the breach, the river returned to its original course toward the Gulf of
California. But the need for a ﬂood control dam and reservoir was made apparent
to all.
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In 1921, U.S. Geological Survey engineer Eugene C. LaRue proposed,
to an obsession that Glen Canyon should be the logical site for the needed ﬂood
control dam. A reservoir there would hold a vast amount of water, and, even
more important, its upstream location would allow all locations downstream to
be free of ﬂoods, allowing river ﬂows to be available for irrigation and municipal
developments.
While the engineers were looking at possible dam sites, politicians, water
managers, and lawyers were scheduling meetings with representatives of all
the states within the Colorado River Basin to divide up the obviously limited
(except during rare ﬂoods), ﬂows of the river. Agreed upon and signed in 1922,
the Colorado River Compact substantially divided the ﬂows of the river between
what was termed the Upper and the Lower Basins of the river, to be measured
at Lee Ferry, Arizona, (a point one mile below the river gauge at Lee’s Ferry).
Furthermore, as a concession, the Upper Basin agreed to guarantee 75 million
acre feet delivery to the Lower Basin in any ten year period, amounting to an
average ﬂow of 7.5 million acre feet (m.a.f.) annually.
E. C. LaRue was frustrated in his campaign to have Glen Canyon made
the site of the ﬂood control dam. During the 1920s, the focus for a ﬂood control
dam shifted instead, ﬁrst to Boulder Canyon, and then to Black Canyon, both
within a few dozen miles of the then small town of Las Vegas, Nevada. A dam
at Black Canyon would be much closer to the major hydropower markets of
southern California. It would require less concrete for its V-shaped canyon,
compared to Glen Canyon’s U-shape. Also, a dam in Glen Canyon would be
in the Upper Basin, which might be administratively difﬁcult for Lower Basin
ofﬁcials to handle. The Boulder Canyon Project Act, passed in 1928, authorized
the construction of what we now know as Hoover Dam.
Although the Bureau of Reclamation had ofﬁcially reserved Glen Canyon
as a possible dam and reservoir site soon after World War I, construction of
Hoover Dam in the early 1930s seemed to obviate the need for another main
stem dam. In 1936, therefore, the National Park Service, encouraged by Interior
Secretary Harold Ickes, proposed an Escalante National Monument, to cover
6,968 square miles of southeastern Utah—twice the size of Yellowstone National
Park.1 The proposed monument would have included all of Glen Canyon as well
as considerable public land then used for grazing.
In 1938 combined opposition from ranchers forced the Park Service to
reduce the size of the proposed monument to 2,450 square miles, eliminating
most of the grazing areas, but leaving Glen Canyon. Then the State of Utah
weighed in, undoubtedly with Bureau of Reclamation’s covert urging—favoring
continued reservation of Glen Canyon as a possible reservoir site rather than part
of a National Monument. Stalemated, the Escalante National Monument proposal
slowly died of inaction as the Nation turned its attention to World War II.
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For many years after the 1922 Compact was signed, water use in the
Upper Basin was so small that there was no problem delivering the required
average of 7.5 m.a.f. yearly to the Lower Basin. In 1944 when the United States
agreed, by treaty, to deliver 1.5 m.a.f. of Colorado River water annually to
Mexico, plenty of water still ﬂowed by Lee’s Ferry for that purpose. But water
demands were continually growing, not only in the rapidly expanding economy
of California, but also in the Upper Basin, where farmers and water managers
envisioned a number of possible projects that would consume available water.
The Colorado River Storage Project Plan (CRSP)
Soon after World War II, Bureau of Reclamation ofﬁcials printed a report
entitled The Colorado River—A Natural Menace Becomes a National Resource,2
in which a large number of potential projects were outlined for both the Upper
and Lower Basins. Key to enabling several water projects in the Upper Basin
was to be large storage capacity reservoirs that would help meet the Compact
commitments to the Lower Basin. For this role, a large dam at Glen Canyon would
be vitally important, as its potentially huge pool of water would insure that, in case
of a severe drought, such as occurred in 1933 and 1934, irrigation and municipal
projects upstream would not be denied their regular allotment of water. Other,
much smaller, storage reservoirs were also envisioned on tributary rivers upstream
from Glen Canyon Dam. In 1946, however, this “wish list” of projects was not yet
a fully developed plan.
Eight years later, the Bureau of Reclamation published a report, actually
a proposal for legislation, for what was to be termed the Colorado River Storage
Project.3 Essentially, this was a reﬁnement of the 1946 list of potential projects,
all integrated into a comprehensive plan incorporating storage dams and
reservoirs to meet downstream commitments and to produce hydroelectric power.
“Participating Projects” would then be built to develop water for irrigation and
for municipal and industrial uses, while revenue from the sale of hydropower
would fully repay the costs of the storage projects. Although it was not called a
subsidy, the hydropower revenue would also materially assist the repayment of
Participating Project costs. Altogether, it appeared to be a neat package—except
for one particular feature—the proposed Echo Park Unit.
Congressional Authorization
Along with the Glen Canyon Unit (dam, reservoir, and powerplant), the
Echo Park Unit was designed as a storage unit. Compared to Glen Canyon’s
potential storage of 26 million acre feet of water, Echo Park would hold only
about one-fourth as much, but Echo Park received the major portion of attention
during Congressional hearings for one reason—the dam and reservoir were to be
located in Dinosaur National Monument, a segment of the National Park System.
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Leading the campaign against Echo Park Dam was David Brower,
Executive Director of the Sierra Club. By his ability to locate arithmetic errors
in the Bureau of Reclamation’s estimate of reservoir evaporation and through
his public interviews, speeches, writings, and advertisements, the dam fell into
disfavor with Congressmen, and it was eliminated from the CRSP bill. In his
campaign, however, Brower linked Echo Park Dam with Glen Canyon Dam,
stating that Echo Park Dam would not be necessary if the height of Glen Canyon
Dam was built higher to allow more water storage. In the early 1950s, therefore,
Brower raised no objection to construction of Glen Canyon Dam.
Many years later, during 1999 and until his death in 2000, Brower
maintained that if, in the 1950s, he had known how beautiful Glen Canyon was,
he could have eliminated Glen Canyon Dam from the CRSP proposal by using the
Congressional backing that he then possessed. Considering the political power
in Congress then available to Upper Basin interests, ﬁgures such as Congressman
Wayne Aspinall of Colorado and Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, it is doubtful
that Brower was correct in his half-century latter-day second-guessing. Even
Lower Basin legislators, such as Representative Stewart Udall and Senator Barry
Goldwater, both of Arizona, and to their later regret, supported the CRSP.4
Brower’s verbal association of proposed dams in Echo Park and Glen
Canyon has led many newspaper reporters, writers, and other casual observers
to conclude that a dam in the latter was a substitute for the former. Actually,
nothing could be further from the truth. The Bureau of Reclamation had
estimated that something over 30 million acre feet of storage would be necessary
to meet downstream needs should a drought such as that of 1933-1934 recur.
Since a reservoir at Echo Park would have held only 6.4 m.a.f., compared to
Glen Canyon’s 26 m.a.f., obviously, a dam in Glen Canyon was the key to the
feasibility of the entire CRSP plan. Had Brower actually tried to and succeeded in
eliminating Glen Canyon Dam, the entire CRSP would have been killed.
Furthermore, Brower’s late-in-life contention that the defeat of Echo Park
Dam forced the Bureau of Reclamation to raise the height of Glen Canyon Dam
is incorrect—the 1954 Bureau design shows the dam crest at elevation 3,711 feet
above sea level—the level of the dam as it was actually built.
This is not to say that there was no opposition to the building of Glen
Canyon Dam. Contrary to the later contention of Brower and the Sierra Club,
Glen Canyon was not the “place no one knew.” While it was not nationally
famous, it had been visited often, particularly in the 1950s, by Utah Boy Scout
groups and others who simply enjoyed boating down the calm, scenic river.
According to the late historian C. Gregory Crampton, Glen Canyon was the most
accessible, and therefore the most visited—at least by boat—of all the canyons of
the Colorado River.5 Although most people who had boated through the canyon
were opposed to the dam, they were generally unorganized and their opposition
was no match for the steam roller of proponents pushing for water development.
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Construction of the Dam
Many observers, both within and outside the Bureau of Reclamation, have
marveled at the speed with which construction began on the CRSP. At the time
there was no need for any detailed economic or environmental studies. Following
the authorization of the CRSP (Public Law 485–84th Congress; P.L. 84-485) on
April 11, 1956, engineers and surveyors were rushed to the site by July, and on
October 15, of that year, the ﬁrst ceremonial blast was set off on the canyon wall.
During 1956 and on
into 1957 design engineers
in the Denver Ofﬁce were
still hard at work producing
speciﬁcations for the dam.
One might wonder then why
the Bureau was already doing
site work when the design for
the dam was not yet ﬁnished.
The answer is two-fold. Some
work on site could be done,
such as road building and
planning the city of Page.
Perhaps the main reason for
22.1. Glen Canyon Dam. Photograph by the the author in
1969.
the haste, however, was a
desire to follow a well-known,
time honored—and usually successful—construction strategy, which states that
when an agency starts a job that depends on appropriations from a legislative
body, funding is much more assured if it seeks to continue, rather than start, a
project.
According to Glen Canyon Project Construction Engineer, Lemuel F.
Wylie, the principal dilemma confronting him in 1956 had nothing to do with
the dam, but rather with the questionable location for the construction town,
later to be named Page. Since the dam site was in a remote area, in a yet
unbridged canyon, completely in Arizona, but quite near the Utah-Arizona state
line, political interests of both states considered it desirable to have the town
established on their side of the canyon, since economic and transportation ties
would probably develop early with adjoining cities. Delegations from both states
repeatedly visited Wylie at his temporary Kanab, Utah, ofﬁce, all requesting
favorable consideration.
Years later, in 1969, former Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona publicly
stated that Page had been so located because of his request to place it on the
Arizona side.6 Considering that in 1956 Hayden was Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, it was a foregone conclusion that the Bureau would
agree. A large spring of good water had been located on the Utah side, leading
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some engineers to recommend that location,7 and a perfunctory examination was
made there. But considering Senator Hayden’s expressed preference, the only
real question was precisely where on the sandy Arizona side the town would
be placed. Wylie reported in an interview that he and Louie Puls, Chief of the
Concrete Dams Section of the Chief Engineer’s Ofﬁce, hiked along the sandy
Arizona side in July 1956, found nothing suitable, then decided to examine a low
plateau about a mile to the east. After hiking to the top, the two looked around,
and then Puls said, “Lem. What’s the matter with this?” Wylie replied, “Not a
thing—not a thing.”8
So the town of Page was situated on the Arizona side, on Manson Mesa.
But the selected town site had another difﬁculty—it was located on the Navajo
Indian Reservation. To resolve this, Wylie and Department of the Interior lawyers
met with tribal ofﬁcials several times without conclusion, until one of the lawyers
suggested a land trade. This idea met with favorable response, resulting in the
Government’s obtaining 55,000 acres of land for Page and for the Navajo side of
the future reservoir in exchange for a like amount of land on McCracken Mesa in
southeast Utah.9
When asked about problems encountered while building the dam, Wylie
could think of nothing major. “It was mostly mechanical”, he said. “The
contractor knew what to do, I knew how to handle day to day problems, and I had
a competent staff to insure quality construction.”
A labor strike shut down construction of the dam for six months, from
July to December 1959. The dispute arose when the prime contractor, MerrittChapman and Scott, curtailed making extra housing payments, up till then paid to
employees for the remote location of the job, after determining that housing was
available in Page and in company dormitories. The strike was ﬁnally settled near
Christmas 1959, and by January 1960 the work was again well underway. No
event delayed construction from that point on, and the dam and powerplant were
ﬁnished on schedule.
Archaeology and History Investigations
Today, with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in effect,
no project can be undertaken on Federally-owned land without preliminary and
thorough archaeological and historical investigations (as well as many other
studies), of the area to be impacted. In 1956, however, no NEPA rules were
in effect, so Glen Canyon received no studies prior to inundation that would
be considered as counter to authorization of the dam. What it did receive was
what was called simply the Glen Canyon Archaeological Salvage Project. In
compliance with the Historic Sites Act of 1935, the National Park Service
obtained funding and let two contracts for the work. The largest was awarded to
the University of Utah to investigate the right bank of the Colorado, the triangular
area between the Colorado and the San Juan, and the left bank of the Colorado
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above the conﬂuence with the San Juan. The Museum of Northern Arizona was
authorized to examine the south side of the Colorado and the San Juan.
Even before 1956, Glen Canyon and the San Juan River Canyon were
known to have substantial numbers of archaeologically signiﬁcant sites, including
dwelling areas, granaries, trails, petroglyphs, and pictographs. Several private
or institution-sponsored research expeditions had ventured into the region,
particularly in the 1930s. Prominent among these was the Rainbow Bridge–
Monument Valley Expedition, (RBMVE), a cooperative effort by the National
Park Service and several universities, which operated from 1933 to 1938.10
Although the RBMVE only touched on Glen and the San Juan River Canyons, its
crews found numerous archaeological sites, although few were excavated at that
time.
Initiating the Salvage Project in 1957, with the dam already under
construction, both the University of Utah and the Museum of Northern Arizona
sent qualiﬁed crews, consisting of archaeologists, helpers, students, horse
wranglers, boatmen, and cooks, into the canyons and onto the surrounding areas.
To obtain base data for regional comparison, they also surveyed archaeological
sites on highland areas, such as the Kaiparowits Plateau and Cummings Mesa.
Dr. Jesse D. Jennings, director of the University of Utah effort, devised
special techniques to help speed the project. For instance, he enjoined crew chiefs
to “use the coarsest tool that will do the work” i.e., recover the data. A shovel
can be as useful as a trowel, a road patrol or scraper as useful as a shovel, or a
dragline as useful as a pick, in the hands of an excavator who is free of ritual
compulsiveness.11 Of course, there was no way to get a road patrol, scraper, or
dragline into most of the canyons, but his philosophical approach had the merit of
accomplishing as much as possible in the time available.
Every form of transportation was tried as a means to get crews into the
main and side canyons, from airplanes, to four wheel drive vehicles, to horses
and mules. But the areas were so rugged and remote that the rivers themselves
became the main travel and communication lines. Small, outboard powered
aluminum boats were extensively used, with occasional recourse to rubber rafts.
According to Jennings, the Survey found and recorded over 2,000
archaeological sites, of which about 80 or 85 were fully or partially excavated.12
In conﬁrmation, Don Fowler, one of Jennings’ crew chiefs during the 1957-1963
survey, estimated that due to lack of time, less than 10 percent of the sites were
examined in any detail. But both Jennings and Fowler agreed that the survey was
adequate to determine the population densities at various stages of pre-historic
cultures. Dispelling earlier rumor, no large ruin, such as at Mesa Verde or Chaco
Canyon, was found. They did determine that Ancient Puebloans (Anasazi) had
occupied the canyons during three periods, the earliest starting about 500 A.D.
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During the last period, about 1250 A.D. the occupants were probably starving and
ﬁghting among themselves.
Writing as a professional archaeologist, Jennings could not praise the Glen
Canyon Salvage Project highly enough, for it ﬁnally provided adequate funding
for substantive research, as opposed to the piddling, poorly-funded studies in
previous years. He wrote that over thirty previous explorations of Glen Canyon
by problem oriented or pot hunting men resulted in no scientiﬁc account.13 He
wrote:
I suggest that in virtually any detail, and certainly in overall results,
emergency salvage archaeology is superior to most other work done in
America.14

Jennings, now deceased, therefore did not lament the drowning of over 2,000
archaeological sites. He proudly pointed to the many volumes of useful and
accurate scientiﬁc data that were recorded in monographs and books. And besides
the data, he and his researchers had accumulated a museum full of small artifacts
available to future archaeologists.
On the personal side, Jennings wrote that
… learning the Glen and working in and near it for six or seven summers
was a rich, emotionally charged period of my life. The vastness, the
isolation, the stillness, the overwhelming beauty of the land, even
(especially) the heat, the still starlit nights, the blue or brassy midday
sky, all combined to make me constantly aware of my good fortune. . .
. millions of vacationers each year ﬁsh, swim, water ski, windsurf, and
camp in the tributaries and some spots on the lake itself see and enjoy
much of the same natural beauty as I once did. But the intimacy of the
river and the side streams is gone, and all my hard won knowledge of the
sandbars, the shoals, and the camping sites is now obsolete, but remain
bright in memory.15

In the original Glen Canyon Salvage Project plan, no separate provision
had been made for historical research, as it was assumed that archaeologists
could record any rare historic site while in the course of their regular tasks. Dr.
C. Gregory Crampton, historian at the University of Utah took it upon himself to
address the lack of historical research as a separate dedicated project by writing
to the National Park Service and convincing them of the omission. Consequently,
Crampton himself was given $25,000, expected to be enough to do the job. With
such limited funds, Crampton could hire no one, but had to do all the research
himself, using only unpaid graduate students (loosely termed ‘slaves’), as
assistants.
During the years 1957 to 1963 Crampton tediously ﬁled through old
mining records, courthouse documents, diaries and manuscripts, and newspaper
accounts. Following written leads, he then made eight ﬂoat trips, each with one
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or two graduate students, to stop at speciﬁc sites mentioned in the written records.
With his funds nearly exhausted, Crampton, with my urging, persuaded Frank
Clinton, Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, to authorize and fund
boat trips down the San Juan River in 1962 and down Cataract Canyon in 1963.
On these last two trips, I traveled along, acting as ofﬁcial photographer, as we
stopped and recorded numerous historic sites.
From 1959 to 1963 Crampton wrote seven detailed monographs,
complete with maps, photographs and documentation, each published as an
“Anthropological Paper” by the University of Utah. Following these works, he
published Standing Up Country: The Canyonlands of Utah and Arizona,16 in
which he brought Glen, Cataract, and San Juan Canyon histories into a regional
perspective. He followed this with Ghosts of Glen Canyon,17 a series of Glen
Canyon historical vignettes and photographs arranged by river mile. In these
books he repeatedly emphasized the point that Glen Canyon, containing hundreds
of historic sites, was the most historic of all the canyons of the Colorado.
The Rainbow Bridge Problem
In Public Law 84-485 authorizing the Colorado River Storage Project are
the words: “That as part of the Glen Canyon Unit, the Secretary of the Interior
shall take adequate protective measures to preclude impairment of the Rainbow
Bridge National Monument.” These words were inserted at the insistence of
environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and the
National Parks Association, with the intention of preserving Rainbow Bridge and
its surrounding 160-acre enclave set aside as a National Monument in 1909, in its
natural state.
Congress also included the following clause:
It is the intention of Congress that no dam or reservoir constructed
under the authorization of this Act shall be within any National Park or
Monument.

This clause was inserted as an afﬁrmation of Congressional opposition to
a dam in Dinosaur National Monument (Echo Park), as well as a desire to keep
Glen Canyon reservoir water out of Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
In regard to Rainbow Bridge, the Bureau of Reclamation faced a delicate
situation, namely, how to keep reservoir water out of the monument without
tearing up the surrounding landscape to build a barrier dam quickly enough so
that the reservoir could be allowed to ﬁll without untimely delay.
By the terms of P.L. 84-485, the Bureau had no choice but to keep water
from the future Glen Canyon reservoir from entering the boundary of the Rainbow
Bridge National Monument. Created by Executive Proclamation in 1909, the
160-acre monument lay about 5.5 winding stream miles southeast of the Colorado
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River. As the reservoir rose, it would enter the monument area at elevation 3,606
feet above mean sea level. and at its planned maximum elevation of 3,700 feet it
would be 45 feet deep in the channel beneath the bridge, but still 21 feet below
the lowest abutment of the bridge itself.18 Therefore, to keep reservoir water out
of the National Monument, as required by law, would necessitate some kind of
downstream barrier dam.
It was obvious to those of us who worked for the agency at the time that
top ofﬁcials of the Bureau would build a barrier dam only after considerable loud
protesting. And the most effective way to ward off building such a dam was
to postpone speciﬁc Congressional appropriations for the endeavor—perhaps
indeﬁnitely. One Bureau publication stated:
Much of the earth materials required for construction of any
possible restraining dams would have to be obtained from
the top of the high mesa [1,200 vertical feet above the stream
channel]. Heavy equipment to work the high mesa borrow area
would have to be lifted to the mesa top by cableways or carried
in by helicopters it would be impossible to build a road on to the
high mesa.… borrow operations would necessarily leave certain
unavoidable and irremovable construction scars.19

One might question why the Bureau would resist building a barrier dam,
since, after all, the agency was in the business of building dams. At least one
author, Hank Hassell, in his book Rainbow Bridge—An Illustrated History, felt
that it was simply pay back to the Sierra Club for having embarrassed the Bureau
in the Echo Park Congressional hearings.
With the beneﬁt of hindsight it now seems clear that the motive of both
Congress and the Bureau was simple one-upmanship. Western states
congressmen had been stung and stung badly by Dave Brower’s success
in stopping Echo Park Dam. The Bureau, too, felt that it had been
publicly humiliated on its own turf, and now both bodies saw a way to
strike back.20

Three possible sites were examined for a barrier dam in the deep, narrow
canyons leading from Rainbow Bridge down to the Colorado River. The middle
site, Site B, preferred by the Bureau, would have required a small dam upstream
from the bridge and a tunnel to divert natural runoff to an adjacent canyon.
Dam site C, further downstream, would not have required the diversion
structures, but would have required a large dam, 365 feet high, with a crest length
of 800 feet. It could have been constructed by building a haul road from the
north, with a bridge over the Colorado River, and much of the construction scars
would have been inundated by the future reservoir, yet it was never seriously
considered by the Bureau. The reason was simple,
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it would have taken too long to build, and was at too low an elevation.
The site C dam would have had to be in place before the gates at Glen
Canyon Dam were closed. Such a situation would have set back the
ﬁlling schedule for Lake Powell and was considered unacceptable.

The Bureau, through the Interior Secretary, in 1960, dutifully asked for
$3.5 million in appropriations (of the projected $25 million ﬁnal price), to begin
construction of the structures to protect Rainbow Bridge. But heavy lobbying
by Senator Frank Moss of Utah, Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado,
and Floyd Dominy, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, convinced the
House Appropriations Committee to delete the line item from the budget with the
words, “No part of the fund herein appropriated shall be available for construction
or operation of facilities to prevent waters of Lake Powell from entering any
National Monument.”
In 1961 Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall, recognizing that building a
dam at site B would leave disastrous construction scars on the landscape, sought
a way out by proposing a new National Park that would encompass, not only
Rainbow Bridge, but also much of the fantastically eroded landscape—all Navajo
land—in surrounding areas. On April 9 he organized a mass visit to the bridge
by environmental representatives, news reporters, and governmental ofﬁcials
to promote what he called Navajo Rainbow National Park, with helicopter
transportation furnished by the U.S. Air Force and by private air services.
Although his concept had merit, it would have been a magniﬁcent National Park,
one key provision of his proposal was to put the boundary of such a park at the
normal high water line of Lake Powell, thus eliminating the need for a barrier
dam. But Dave Brower and others would not accept it. Also, Udall had failed to
consult with Navajo Tribal leaders, who were miffed at the slight and also refused
to go along, thus killing the proposal.
During the 1960s, Congress each year expressly denied funds for a barrier
dam, inserting the same prohibitive clause in the Appropriations Bill. In August
1962 the National Parks Association, the Sierra Club and other conservation
organizations ﬁled suit, asking for an injunction to prevent the closing of the
gates at Glen Canyon Dam until protective works for Rainbow Bridge were at
least under construction. The judge, however, dismissed the suit, ruling that the
organizations had no standing in law as they would not suffer harm by the ﬁlling
of Lake Powell. Upon that note, the Bureau closed most of the diversion tunnel
gates on March 13, 1963, and Lake Powell began a rapid rise.
As lake waters crept up the narrow canyons toward Rainbow Bridge, Dave
Brower, now head of a new organization called Friends of the Earth, enlisted the
Wasatch Mountain Club and Ken Sleight, owner of a river running company, to
join him in a suit to keep Lake Powell away from the bridge. In November 1970
the suit was ﬁled, asking only that Lake Powell be limited to elevation 3,606,
thus keeping it out of the National Monument, in accordance with Section 3 of
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Public Law 84-485. On February 27, 1973, Judge Willis Ritter, in Salt Lake City,
granted the plaintiff’s motion and ordered the Bureau to lower Lake Powell to the
3,606 level. To the Bureau and to Upper Basin water users, this was a disastrous
decision, for the top 94 feet, from elevation 3,606 to 3,700, contained almost half
of the storage volume of the reservoir. Furthermore, the lowered reservoir would
substantially reduce the hydraulic “head” on the turbines, thereby cutting power
production and revenue.
Of course the government appealed and on May 1, 1973, a three-judge
panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals voted 2 to 1 to allow Lake Powell to
enter Rainbow Bridge National Monument while the case was reviewed. Then,
just three months later, the Appeals Court issued its decision. Voting 5 to 2, the
Court held that Congress had indeed repealed Section 3 of Public Law 84-485 by
repeated acts of denying funds for protective works. Chief Justice David T. Lewis
strongly dissented, commenting that the decision “was a deep trespass upon the
prerogatives of Congress and a clear and dangerous violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers. … [and] an equally dangerous judicial aggression.”
Brower and his lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, where the
conservation case was joined amicus curiae by Attorneys General of 16 states,
all of which disagreed with the Appeals Court decision. Out of four required,
however, only three Supreme Court justices agreed to hear the case. Therefore
on January 21, 1974, the Court announced that it had denied the appeal and that
it would not review the case. Thus a new legal precedent, repeal of a law by
implication, and denial of appropriations, had been set. So Lake Powell would
continue to rise. And it rose, faster than almost anyone had predicted.
The Spillway Crisis, 1983-1984
Of course, the lake level ﬂuctuated up and down in accordance with
seasonal runoffs, and in some years it declined more than it rose. Generally,
however, the level was higher each year until the lake actually ﬁlled, to elevation
3,700 on June 22, 1980, an event that was marked by a public celebration on the
crest of the dam. As a demonstration, both spillways were slightly opened for a
short time. Lem Wylie, who had supervised the construction and who was invited
as a guest for the celebration, expressed amazement at the rapid ﬁlling. “I never
expected to see this in my lifetime,” he stated.
Yet the ﬁlling in 1980 was only prelude to a much more dramatic event.
While runoff prediction is an inexact science, predictions are vital for reservoir
regulation. Any storage reservoir, such as Lake Powell, should be kept as full as
possible, with accidental spills kept to a minimum. Therefore, runoff predictions
are necessary early each spring so that sufﬁcient space—but not too much—can
be provided in the reservoir.
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In 1983 nature dealt predictors a bad hand. Accumulated snowfall in the
mountains on April 1 was only a bit above average, but the snow kept falling, in
increasing amounts. By early May it appeared that Lake Powell had insufﬁcient
space for the runoff, so the Bureau opened the wicket gates of the powerplant so
as to operate at full capacity, night and day. Still the water rose steadily toward
the full mark of elevation 3,700 feet. The four outlet tubes, capable of a combined
11,000 cubic feet per second release were also opened.
Early in June one spillway radial gate (a heavy steel gate that is raised
to admit ﬂow from the bottom), was opened to allow water into the left
spillway. When this operation is performed, water roars into the spillway, drops
precipitously through several hundred feet, until it reaches the elbow section,
then ﬂows through the lower end, at that point horizontal, of what had been the
diversion tunnel. Upon exiting, it strikes a “ﬂip bucket” designed to dissipate the
tremendous energy by throwing the water high into the air, allowing it to fall into
the Colorado River. In 1983, the operation worked well—except for the insidious
phenomenon known as cavitation.
All civil and mechanical engineers are familiar with cavitation, a process
where a fast moving liquid is thrown upward by some small obstruction, thus
creating vapor cavities, or small vacuum pockets. These cavities then collapse
with destructive force, digging holes into the surface on which the liquid is
ﬂowing. The holes are rapidly enlarged and deepened. After one hole is formed
a leapfrog action is initiated, causing further cavitation holes to form on down the
surface. One might ask why designers speciﬁed spillway tunnels that were almost
certain to suffer cavitation damage when used. The only answer is that a wellmanaged reservoir should almost never spill, and then only for very short periods,
after which the cavitation damage could be repaired.
A spillway tunnel had been provided on each side of the canyon, but the
right, or west, spillway was not used initially at Glen Canyon so as to conﬁne the
cavitation damage to the left one. As the inﬂow into Lake Powell topped
100,000 c.f.s., the gates were gradually opened until 32,000 c.f.s. were roaring
through the left tunnel. I was one of the witnesses who saw the outﬂow turn
orange, hurling chucks of concrete and sandstone into the Colorado River. Most
of the engineers were somewhat worried, although they knew that most of the
damage would be downward—not laterally into the lake. Yet obviously an
inspection was in order.
With the gates temporarily closed, two intrepid engineers, clad in foul
weather gear, rode a tugger-lowered cart into the dark left spillway. Almost
600 feet down the 60 degree slope they encountered massive holes cut clear
through the three-foot thick concrete lining, and into the sandstone, with
reinforcing bars twisted and broken. Just beyond they could see a series of large
holes further down. At this point they could go no further and were hoisted back
to the daylight.
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By the end of June, when the inﬂow into the lake rose to around
120,000 c.f.s. the gates of both spillways had to be opened. The biggest worry
was not that the lake would top the dam, elevation 3,715, but that the water would
rise above elevation 3700, at which point the water would ﬂow over the top of
the gates, even if they were in closed position. Work crews hurriedly placed
temporary 4’x 8’ plywood panels upright across the top of the gates so as to
increase storage. To a non-engineer, it sounds fantastic to hold back a 186 mile
long lake with plywood panels, but it worked.
For a more permanent and effective ﬁx, heavy steel 8-foot high
ﬂashboards were fabricated and trucked to the dam. Even as a large ﬂow of water
was roaring under the gates, workmen on top of the gates starting installing these
ﬂashboards on July 4th, working around the clock, and within two days they were
in place.
On July 14, the lake level reached 3,708.4, held at that elevation for almost
a day, then began a slow, but measurable, decline. The ﬂood of 1983 was over.
By early August all spillway ﬂows were curtailed.
But the measure of the massive job of spillway repair had yet to be
determined. I was one of a team who, in late July, waded into cold, standing
water of the left tunnel and proceeded up the dark cavern toward the elbow
section. It was an eerie spelunking experience to be entering that awesome
dark underground chamber, not quite sure of what we would ﬁnd. Pulling a
raft laden with battery powered ﬂoodlights, we scrambled and climbed around
and over an amazing array of rock rubble, at least one piece as large as a good
sized automobile. In many places the concrete lining was entirely gone, with
rebar broken off by metal fatigue. Apprehensive of the expected large hole at the
elbow section, we stopped wading short of having to swim, but from our vantage
point we could easily see the series of large cavitation holes just above the elbow
section. Having recorded the damage on ﬁlm and videotape, we retraced our
route to the sunshine.
With the powerplant operating at full tilt, and with all four outlet tubes
shooting eight-foot wide jets into the Colorado River, emergency repairs began
on the spillways. Drained of water, adit tunnels were gouged into the lower
sides of each tunnel, near the outlet portals, to allow access to heavy equipment
and trucks. A contractor hired hundreds of men and women to remove broken
concrete, loose sandstone, and to prepare the tunnels for new rebar-ﬁlled concrete
lining. When the huge hole at the elbow section of the left tunnel—the most
severely damaged—was drained, it was measured to be 32 feet deep, 40 feet wide,
and 150 feet long. It took twenty-ﬁve hundred cubic yards of concrete to ﬁll the
hole.
Meanwhile, in the Denver Engineering Laboratories, engineers were
giving ﬁnal touches to the design for air slots to be incorporated in the upper
portion of the Glen Canyon spillways. Their design called for a four-foot wide,
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four-foot deep, circular trench to be cut and lined about 110 feet down from the
upper portal of each spillway. Tests had shown that when high velocity water
crossed these air slots, a cushion of air bubbles would be introduced, on which
the water would ride through the remainder of the spillway. Cavitation would
therefore be virtually eliminated.
The general principle of using air slots on tunnel type spillways had been
conceived by design engineers during the 1970s, had been tested, and had actually
been retroﬁtted into the spillways at Yellowtail Dam in Montana. Whenever
funds permitted, air slots were planned for all Bureau of Reclamation dams with
tunnel type spillways. Had the 1983 damage not occurred, the spillways at Glen
Canyon Dam would probably have been retroﬁtted with air slots sometime during
the 1980s. But with a large contractor on site, it was logical to build in the air
slots as part of the ongoing spillway repair.
Also, so as to prevent surprise incidents like the 1983 runoff, it was
apparent that runoff forecasting had to be improved. Bureau ofﬁcials in Salt Lake
City, in cooperation with the National Weather Service and the Soil Conservation
Service, devised an improved forecasting model, and ways to quickly reﬁne that
model as snowfall in the mountains accumulated. It was not accomplished too
soon.
As work on the spillways progressed through the fall of 1983 and into the
new year, large amounts of snow continued to fall in the high country, and the
1984 forecast showed that the runoff could be even greater than in 1983. With
the spillways temporarily out of commission, it was obvious that releases of water
through the dam and powerplant had to be kept at a maximum. Through May and
June Lake Powell inched upward until it was only a few inches from the top of the
new ﬂashboards on the spillway gates. Then in early July the lake level began to
recede. The crisis point had been passed.
On August 12, 1984, the left spillway, completely repaired and
incorporating an air slot, was tested with a release of 50,000 c.f.s. The event
was astounding to watch, as huge jets of water arced gracefully from the ﬂip
buckets over 100 feet before plunging violently into the river. Spray ﬁlled the
downstream canyon, refracting rainbows from the bright summer sunlight. After
a few days of testing, the ﬂow was curtailed and the spillway pumped dry for an
inspection. I was fortunate to accompany the team of engineers that went in to
examine the concrete surface. We could see no damage whatsoever. The air slots
had been a complete success in preventing cavitation.
Altogether, the repair of the two spillways had cost around $30 million,
but the steady full operation of the powerplant to release more water had netted
around $34 million in extra revenue. Furthermore, as most of the power was sold
to energy companies in California, it enabled them to save great quantities of oil
that would have been burned in oil-ﬁred generating plants.
537

Glen Canyon Power and the Grand Canyon Ecosystem
Almost simultaneous with the spillway crisis, Glen Canyon Dam hit
another bump in the road. For many years, even before the dam was completed,
biologists, geologists, archaeologists, and river runners had been concerned with
the altered character of the Colorado River ﬂowing from the dam and through
the Grand Canyon. What enters Lake Powell as a warm, silt ﬁlled river emerges
through the dam cold and clear, similar to a mountain stream. It also ﬂuctuated
high and low in accordance with power demands at the Glen Canyon Powerplant,
sometimes very rapidly. No studies had yet been made, but most scientists
predicted damage to the Grand Canyon ecosystem.
What caught the attention of the public, however, was a Bureau of
Reclamation proposal to increase the power producing capacity by adding
generators to the outlet tubes. Since peaking power earns considerably more
revenue than off-peak power, the idea had been to convert the entire powerplant
into a peaking power operation. Outﬂows during off peak would be practically
curtailed, while during peak power demand, all eight generators, increased to
twelve by addition of the four on outlet tubes, would be operated at full capacity.
And to maintain steady ﬂows through the Grand Canyon, a re-regulating dam,
about 30 feet high, built to contain a ﬂuctuating reservoir, was planned for the
canyon a few miles below the dam. To Bureau ofﬁcials intent on ﬁnding ways
to increase revenue the plan was a good one, but it struck a very large obstacle—
public opinion.
In 1981 during public hearings in Page, Flagstaff, and Salt Lake City, the
proposal aroused the ire of many who simply did not want another dam, even
a small one, built in Glen Canyon. To them, the hated concrete dam was bad
enough; they were not going to let the Bureau ﬂood the last 15 miles of Glen
Canyon below the dam. Fishers, in particular, who reveled in those 15 miles
of good ﬁshing, cried foul. Even river runners, who might have been expected
to embrace the idea of a non-ﬂuctuating river below Lee’s Ferry, were vocal in
opposition. Many of these opponents wrote newspaper articles, appeared on
national television, and urged people to write protest letters to their Congressmen.
Within a few months, the Bureau surrendered, giving up the proposal,
but opting instead to rewind each of the eight generators at the dam so as to
increase the power output, which would not change river ﬂow patterns. The
public protests, however, had called attention to possible damage the clear, cold,
ﬂuctuating river was doing to the Grand Canyon ecosystem. Responding to this
pressure, Under Secretary of Interior Robert Broadbent ordered a thorough study
of several scientiﬁc aspects of the riverine environment below the dam. Although
it was ofﬁcially called the Glen Canyon Dam Environmental Studies, (because it
concerned ﬂow releases from the dam), the studies were to be made in the ﬁfteen
miles remaining of Glen Canyon, and in the 275 miles of the Grand Canyon.
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With the Bureau of Reclamation as prime agency, cooperation and
assistance was needed and obtained, under contract, from the National Park
Service, the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the
Arizona Game and Fish Department, several universities, and many Indian tribes.
Researchers from all of these agencies and institutions spent over ten years
investigating every possible change brought about by the ﬂow regimen over the
previous 20 years. For two years, from 1983 to 1985, they were hampered by
the continual high releases, and virtually no ﬂuctuations, required by the spillway
crisis, thus creating an abnormal ﬂow pattern. Most substantive investigations
therefore began after the spillways had been repaired.
Researchers knew, even before they ventured into the Grand Canyon,
that the clear water and ﬂuctuations would be having some effect; the only
question was how much. All of the sand, silt, and many of the minerals that used
to ﬂow though the canyon, nourishing the beaches and riverine life zones are
now continually captured by Lake Powell. Furthermore, clear water accelerates
degradation of the stream bed and shorelines, causing much of the existing sand to
disappear into the river. High ﬂows and rapid and wide ﬂuctuations in river ﬂow
due to changes in power demand at the Glen Canyon Powerplant add substantially
to the degradation.
Before 1963 the temperature of the river in Grand Canyon was
synchronized with the seasons, warm enough to support a warm water ﬁshery
that included pike minnow, formerly known as squawﬁsh, razor backed suckers,
bony tailed chub, and hump backed chub. Researchers suspected that these four
species, having been impacted by cold water ﬂows for over two decades, and all
now listed as endangered, would have all vanished from the canyon.
After ten years of research, at a cost of about $100 million, almost all of
the predicted results were conﬁrmed; however huge amounts of additional data
were obtained concerning the downstream ecosystem. Voluminous reports and
books have been written on the ﬁndings.
Here are a few examples of what was learned. A viable humpback chub
population was discovered in a relatively small estuary where the warm Little
Colorado River ﬂows into the Colorado River. But all the other endangered
ﬁsh species had vanished from the canyon. Rainbow trout, however now live
in the cold river, in reduced numbers as the distance from the dam increases.
Surprisingly, bald eagles have begun to frequent the canyon to ﬁsh in the lower
mile of Nankoweap Creek, ﬂowing into the Colorado River, where trout spawning
occurs.
Tamarisk, tamarix, ramosissima, a water devouring phreatophyte, was
found to have greatly spread along the river banks, largely due to the lack of
high, sand-laden spring runoff ﬂows to uproot them and wash them away. Several
bird species, however, such a Bell’s vireo, summer tanager, hooded oriole, and
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great-tailed grackle, have greatly expanded their nesting range throughout the
dense foliage of the tamarisk and other bushes that now line parts of the river.21
So that left only the question of how the operation of the dam could be
altered so as to minimize deleterious effects on the Grand Canyon ecosystem.
In November 1989 the Secretary directed an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) be prepared on the operation of the dam, with Reclamation again as the lead
agency. Expressly ruled out was the option of removing the dam. So also was
drilling a prohibitively expensive tunnel to convey sediment from an upper part of
Lake Powell around the dam to the canyon. As for the cold water releases from
the depths of the lake, the Bureau agreed to study ways to raise the temperature by
modifying the intake structures.
In early 1991 the Bureau changed the ﬂow regime by raising the
minimum ﬂow, by cutting the peak off maximum ﬂows, and by slowing down
the “ramping,” speed where ﬂows are altered either up or down. The ﬁnal EIS,
completed in March 1995, and the Record of Decision (October 1996) essentially
recommended perpetual maintenance of this pattern, except in emergencies.
Congress passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, requiring
some type of continual monitoring of effects on the downstream ecosystem,
now complied with by formation of a Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Work
Group.
Ironically, what began in 1981 as the Bureau’s desire to produce more
peaking power has resulted in turning the dam and powerplant into a near steadystate power producer, with very little peaking power, and certainly less revenue.
In a separate, but similar incident, Regional Director David Crandall of
the Bureau once told me that, in the early 1970s, he and his staff had tried to
obtain agreement from the Navajo and Ute Tribes to construct another backbone
transmission line through their reservations, parallel to the one built in the early
1960s. To this leaders of both tribes replied ﬁrmly, “Absolutely not, but we would
like you to remove the line that is already there!” No second line was ever built.
Changing Perceptions about Pre-dam Glen Canyon
From the early 1950s onward, opposition to having a dam in Glen Canyon
has been a factor to consider. During the Congressional hearings of 1954-1956,
opponents were vocal but unorganized, and numbered comparatively few. River
running at that time was not widely popular. Boating parties venturing into
Glen Canyon were occasional private parties and often Boy Scout groups. And
of those that did see the main canyon, very few ventured far into the varied and
fantastically eroded side canyons. As late as 1955, the private party of Katie Lee,
Tad Nichols, and Frank Wright bestowed names on several previously unnamed
side canyons.22
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Glen Canyon suffered also by the attention given to the Grand Canyon.
Whereas Grand Canyon was magniﬁcently huge, astoundingly deep, and almost
incomprehensible, “one of the great sights, which every American, if he can
travel at all, should see . . . ,” (Theodore Roosevelt) Glen Canyon was colorful,
intimate, and comfortable. The Colorado River in Grand Canyon was lined with
threatening river rapids; the same river in Glen Canyon had none. A spur rail
line reached the South Rim in 1901 and the ﬁrst automobile arrived at that point
in 1902, but no decent road reached Glen Canyon until 1957. Quite probably,
had Glen Canyon not been overshadowed by the public attention given to the
Grand Canyon, it would have been much better known when engineers and water
managers started talking about a dam.
How indeed is a geological curiosity transformed into a cultural icon?
It is not a simple process of “being there.” As author Stephen J. Pyne points
out, Grand Canyon itself was once just a geological curiosity. Explorer Joseph
C. Ives, writing in 1858, called it a “proﬁtless locality”—but the image of the
canyon was gradually transformed by a cadre of scientists, writers, painters, and
photographers, including John Wesley Powell, Clarence Dutton, William Henry
Holmes, Thomas Moran, and publicity men and women of the Santa Fe Railroad.
In his book How the Grand Canyon Became Grand Stephen Pyne writes:
Among the last of America’s landscapes to be formally explored, the
Grand Canyon had become among the ﬁrst of its natural marvels and,
for a nation that tended to substitute natural monuments for cultural
ones, entered the pantheon of its sacred places. Its valorization offered
as much a cross section through American history as of earth history.
The evolution of that interpretation had, with eerie symmetry, mimicked
the evolution of the Canyon’s features. The spasmodic tectonism of
geographic exploration, the varied tributaries that ﬂowed from the
main currents of American thought—with breathtaking brevity the two
processes had merged, and not merely laid down a course of history
but entrenched it so deeply the Canyon became a permanent feature of
America’cultural lanscape.23

Before the dam, Glen Canyon missed similar scrutiny by scientists as well
as by lyric poets and painters. It had been visited by perhaps hundreds of miners
and prospectors in the 1890s and again in the 1930s.24 Yet to most of those who
had heard the name at all, Glen Canyon was simply another in a long series of
gorges cut by the Colorado River through the Colorado Plateau, probably a good
place for a dam.
All of this began to change after construction began on Glen Canyon
Dam. Realizing that time was running out to see the canyon, private river boating
parties ﬂoated through Glen Canyon in increasing numbers from 1956 to 1963,
when water storage was initiated in Lake Powell.
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One of the most inﬂuential members of these boating groups was David
Brower, Executive Director of the Sierra Club. Brower, who had not objected to
Glen Canyon Dam so long as Echo Park Dam was eliminated from the Colorado
River Storage Project in 1956, was astonished by the beauty and variety of
Glen Canyon. He soon contracted with photographer Eliot Porter to take color
photographs in the canyon, for eventual publication in a Sierra Club book, entitled
The Place No One Knew—Glen Canyon of the Colorado.25 The title of the book,
which came out in 1963, was of course, a misnomer, since Glen Canyon was
historically the most visited by boat of all the Colorado River canyons. What
the title meant, rather, was that writers, painters, and photographers had never
enshrined Glen Canyon sufﬁciently to make it a cultural icon. Understated in the
title was the belief that had the canyon been a cultural icon, such as the Grand
Canyon, Glen Canyon Dam would never have been authorized.
After Lake Powell began to form, most of the publicity centered on the
beauties of the lake and the novelties of boating into narrow side canyons barely
wide enough for passage. During the 1960s very little was said about the loss of
pre-dam Glen Canyon. Gradually, however, more voices were heard decrying
the loss, particularly among young people. Certainly, the loss of conﬁdence in
the Federal government due to the Vietnam War and Watergate had a pronounced
effect, for it caused many of college age to question what else the government
had done wrong. Also, with new equipment and money, this younger generation
was more adventurous than those earlier. Although it would be a mistake to
categorize an entire generation, many of them wanted to climb mountains, hike
trails, camp out, surf in the waves, and boat down wilderness rivers. To them it
was frustrating to learn through books such as Eliot Porter’s and several magazine
articles, what Glen Canyon used to be. At least some of them felt that older
generations had denied to them a moving river and much of the scenery in Glen
Canyon, as well as a great adventure—even perhaps, a soul inspiring mystical
journey. A slow houseboat trip on Lake Powell—or even on a speedy personal
water craft—could hardly compensate. By the early 1980s these discontented
young people were ready to organize against the dam. The vanished Glen Canyon
was indeed becoming a cultural icon—even posthumously.
The Drain Lake Powell Movement
A strong and inﬂuential voice was added in 1968, when Edward Abbey
burst upon the scene with his book Desert Solitaire—A Season in the Wilderness,26
a robust, well-written collection of Abbey’s stories from southeastern Utah. New
Yorker Magazine called Abbey “a good hater.”27 In describing Lake Powell
Abbey wrote:
[Where Major John Wesley Powell] and his brave men once lined the
rapids and glided through silent canyons, two thousand feet deep the
motorboats now smoke and whine, scumming the water with cigarette
butts, beer cans and oil, dragging the water skiers on their endless
rounds, clockwise.28
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Abbey also quipped, “I’m a humanist: I’d rather kill a man than a snake!”
And one of his visions, supposedly written while Glen Canyon Dam was still
under construction, was that
some hero will carry a rucksack full of dynamite into the dam, hide it
carefully, then attach blasting caps to the ofﬁcial dam wiring system so
that when the dam is dedicated by the President and Secretary of the
Interior and Governors from the Four Corner states, a button will be
pushed, igniting the loveliest explosion ever seen, and the new rapids
formed will be named ‘Floyd E. Dominy Falls’ in honor of the chief of
the Reclamation Bureau.

Desert Solitaire was an immediate best seller and has gone through several
editions and reprinting, and is even today, four decades later, still in print. In
1975 Abbey followed this up with The Monkey Wrench Gang,29 a novel about
a small band of self-righteous, do-gooder eco-terrorists who have the dream of
destroying Glen Canyon Dam, but who, in the meantime, whet their destructive
impulses on power lines, road building equipment, and on the train carrying coal
from Black Mesa to the Navajo Powerplant near Page. Again Abbey displayed
his writing talent, as well as his iconoclastic view of economic development and
what he called “industrial tourism”
These two books by Abbey contributed greatly to the anti-dam movement,
both by enhancing the status of the pre-dam Glen Canyon as a cultural icon and
by fanning the ﬂames of discontent with the dam and with Lake Powell which
some referred to as “Lake Foul”, or, at best, “Reservoir Powell.” This said, one
could hardly dispute the fact that around three million people visit Lake Powell
each year, spending millions of dollars on boats, lodging, food, and supplies.
What it does mean rather, is that public perceptions of the lake (or reservoir), were
becoming more polarized. Undoubtedly the boating portion of the public loves
the lake—it is, of course, one of the most scenic lakes in the world—while a vocal
minority now calls for removal of the dam as soon as possible.
On a warm spring day in 1981 Ed Abbey showed up at the dam, ostensibly
to act as high priest for a recently organized group calling themselves Earth First!
A few of its members climbed over a gate leading to the crest of the dam, then
walked to the center point where they unfurled a tapered sheet of black plastic
sheeting 300 feet down the downstream face, meant to represent a terrible crack
in the dam. On the bridge, 350 feet away, Abbey shouted “Earth First! Free the
Colorado!” and the seventy or so people that had accompanied him joined in.30
The Earth First! Mission Statement originally boasted of engaging in
violent tactics, such as ‘cracking’ dams with banners, blockading bulldozers,
sitting in trees, and disabling Earth-destroying equipment (“monkeywrenching”—
as one word) was introduced to the vocabulary of the modern environmental
movement.31
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Soon after this 1981 incident, the Bureau tightened security at the dam.
First workmen installed closed-circuit TV cameras at practically all access points.
Casual visitors, could no longer roam freely on a self-guided basis down the
elevators and onto the west end of the generator ﬂoor, the transformer deck and
the governor gallery. They would now have to ﬁrst obtain a ticket, have all tote
bags inspected, and then proceed in small groups accompanied by a Bureau guide.
Furthermore, accessible areas were reduced by cutting out the sensitive governor
gallery.
Near Moab, Utah, a few rebellious men and women actually tried their
hand at eco-terrorism, monkeywrench style, by chain-sawing down a wooden
transmission tower, thereby disrupting power service. The loud public reaction
against this act seemed to alert the perpetrators that it was self-destructive
behavior, calculated to win no allies. At least three times, studios in Hollywood
have seriously considered turning The Monkey Wrench Gang into an action ﬁlled
movie, but each time they have backed away for fear of inspiring copy-cat acts of
destruction.
During the 1980s until 1996, protests against the dam seemed to
subside, perhaps because of the environmental studies and the preparation of
an Environmental Impact Study then underway. The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, had, however, signiﬁcantly altered the equation by requiring
extensive studies and producing an Environmental Impact Statement prior to
authorization. Congressman Wayne Aspinall, who had played such a pivotal role
in the campaign for CRSP in 1956, was heard to say, in 1981, “We got the CRSP
approved just in time. Today we could never get it authorized—particularly if it
included Glen Canyon Dam.”
Barry Goldwater, set to retire from the Senate in 1986, said that if he could
recast one vote in his entire Senate career, it would have been his vote to authorize
Glen Canyon Dam.32
In 1996 a new group advocating removal of the dam was formed. The
Glen Canyon Institute was led by two men: David Wegner, a biologist who had
served as director of the environmental studies for the Bureau of Reclamation, and
Richard Ingebretsen, a physician in Salt Lake City. In the GCI mission statement
is the following:
Although in 1996 the Bureau of Reclamation completed an EIS on
operations of the dam, decommissioning the dam was not offered
as an alternative to the public. Public comments, which suggested
decommissioning of the dam, were simply rejected as falling outside
the scope of that EIS process. Glen Canyon Institute believes that
the American public should decide whether or not the long term
environmental costs of maintaining Glen Canyon Dam outweigh the
short term beneﬁts provided by Powell reservoir.33
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Goal of the GCI is to produce a Citizens’ Environmental Impact Statement
that would clearly show the beneﬁts of removing, or at least decommissioning, the
dam. Now based in Salt Lake City, the organization has reported a membership
of 1,400 individuals spread throughout the United States. Richard Ingebretsen
readily admits that draining Lake Powell is a long term objective, probably not
achievable for at least twenty years, yet he is optimistic that their effort will meet
with success. While Ingebretsen and his group mention the economic costs of
lake surface evaporation, what they are really striving for is to raise pre-dam Glen
Canyon to the status of a cultural icon, just as David Brower had been trying to do
since 1963.
Brower, probably the most inﬂuential environmentalist in the country,
the man who had almost single-handedly defeated Echo Park Dam, was also a
member of GCI, and spoke at several of the GCI meetings. On his own initiative
in 1997 Brower convinced the National Board of the Sierra Club to unanimously
declare its support for draining Lake Powell, thus making it national policy.
Subsequently Brower wrote even more articles, gave more speeches, always
advocating decommissioning of the dam, while admitting apologetically that he
had tacitly supported the dam during the 1950s. Brower died in 2000, but many
of his followers in the Sierra Club and elsewhere have vowed to carry on his
campaign.
Congressman James Hansen of Utah responded to the movement by
calling for a hearing before his House Interior Committee in September 1997.
His primary purpose was obviously to squash the drain Lake Powell initiative in
the bud. At that hearing, Sierra Club president Adam Werbach and GCI’s Dave
Wegner reportedly “took a beating from politicians and experts who dismissed
the plan as loony,” “impractical,” and “certiﬁably nutty,”34 The hearing somewhat
backﬁred in that it only helped to publicize the concept of draining the lake by
giving it Congressional and media attention.
To counter the threat from the GCI and the Sierra Club, a group of Page
residents, in July 1997, organized what they named Friends of Lake Powell. Its
avowed purpose was and is to discount negative claims against the dam and
reservoir and to promulgate the recognized beneﬁts.
Some people considered that the methods employed by the Glen Canyon
Institute and the Sierra Club were too slow to take effect. A new group was
therefore organized in January 2000 with more radical tactics in mind. Living
Rivers, headquartered in Moab, espouses public demonstrations and media
attention, but not eco-terrorism at the dam or anywhere else. When Living Rivers
announced that its ﬁrst rally would be held at the dam on March 14, 2000, the
Friends of Lake Powell countered that they would hold a demonstration at the
same time and place—the Bureau feared a possible riot. When the day arrived
local police were on hand to separate the groups by the width of the canyon, one
on one side, one on the other. Separate demonstrations and speeches were then
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forthcoming, one group promoting draining the lake and one against it. Visitors
standing on the bridge separating the two demonstrations were watched closely by
the police. No trouble, other than loud public address systems, was reported.
In the future we can look forward to sustained opposition to continued
operation of Glen Canyon Dam, restricted though it has been. And Lake Powell
will continue to provide a Mecca for ﬁshers, boaters, and water oriented sports.
Considering the economic investment in the dam and powerplant, in the city of
Page, in recreation facilities around Lake Powell, and in the Navajo Generating
Station, which draws clean cooling water from the lake, it is not likely that the
drain Lake Powell movement will have success, at least not for several decades.
Emphasizing the need for continued operation of both Glen Canyon Powerplant
and the Navajo Generating Station is the current, and probably long term, demand
for additional electrical energy in the western United States.
Sedimentation
Sediment, of course, continues to settle in the upper parts of the lake,
diminishing its storage capacity and its ability to meet downstream commitments
during times of drought. Although never mentioned in promotional literature,
sediment storage is a vital function of Lake Powell, since it greatly increases the
useful life of Lake Mead, about 300 miles downstream.
The San Juan River arm of Lake Powell, which receives a majority of the
sediment input, is already heavily clogged. The San Juan Marina on that arm had
to be closed in 1988 due to heavy sedimentation. In the early 1990s a sediment
bar built up so ﬁrmly on the San Juan arm that it blocked the inﬂow from the
river, forcing the water to rise up, ﬂow across a section of nearby ﬂat sandstone,
then drop by a 20-foot waterfall into Lake Powell. Although this silt dam later
washed out, it was an indication of things to come.
No one knows when sediment will reach the dam, but it will not be
soon. Anticipating that eventual day, Bureau engineers are considering using
the outlet tubes to ﬂush some of that sediment around the powerplant.35 A
study of sedimentation rates by the Bureau showed that it would be 700 years
before sediment would reach the penstock level, elevation 3,490, where water
is drawn into the turbines. Although the powerplant could, and probably will,
generate power up till that time, no ofﬁcial prediction has been made as to when
the reservoir will be too small to meet downstream commitments—or when
Lake Powell is so diminished in size that water oriented recreation is no longer
practical. Perhaps by then the drain Lake Powell movement will have ﬁnally
achieved success and the stored sediment will be draining around or through the
dam, through the Grand Canyon, and ﬁlling up any remaining capacity in Lake
Mead.
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Drought
Drought is a problem not only to Colorado River water users, but also to
the entire western U.S. The prime stated reason for building Glen Canyon Dam
was to sustain required ﬂows to the Lower Basin and Mexico during drought
periods.
Yet when a severe drought period actually occurred, as in the years 1999
to 2005, both Lake Powell and Lake Mead were drawn down extensively. In
fact, releases from Glen Canyon Dam in 2004 were the ﬁrst in the dam’s 40year history in which extra Lake Powell water was released to meet Compact
commitments. As a Bureau spokesman stated, “Lake Powell releases kept Lake
Mead from going dry.”
Several meteorologists and climatologists are now saying that drought
should be considered usual, and that it may last for long periods. Therefore,
water users and Bureau of Reclamation ofﬁcials have undertaken discussions on
ways to tacitly circumvent the Upper Basin downstream commitment of the 1922
Compact, and to replace it with criteria to keep Lake Powell and Lake Mead at
equal levels, percentage wise and to equalize the shortage of water between the
two basins.
Because of the new criteria essentially considering Lake Powell and Lake
Mead as one storage unit, combined with expected drought years and continuing
increasing withdrawals from Upper Basin users, Lake Powell may never ﬁll again.

Conclusions
The bumpy road that Glen Canyon Dam history has taken in the past
55 years represents a long encounter with scenic values, with cultural antiquity,
with natural processes of ﬂood and sedimentation, and with preservation of
two national icons, the Grand Canyon and Rainbow Bridge. The very rust-red
sandstone landscape that backdrops Lake Powell, making it one of the most
scenic bodies of water in the world, is the same scenery that causes environmental
groups to demand that the lake be drained so that the heart of the scenery—the
canyon ﬂoor and the river can be seen and accessed. Those opposed to the dam
will continue to promote pre-dam Glen Canyon as a national and cultural icon
that should be returned from the depths—the sooner the better. But they will have
little success so long as investments in the dam and lake remain both widespread
and proﬁtable. When the day arrives that maintenance of the dam no longer
makes economic sense—no matter how far in the future that may be—Glen
Canyon Dam will strike the biggest bump of all. We can only guess what future
generations will do with the dam at that time.
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W. L. (Bud) Rusho worked in public affairs for the Bureau of Reclamation
on-site during construction of Glen Canyon Dam and then transferred to the
regional ofﬁce in Salt Lake City. He retired in 1988 and has since been actively
freelancing as a writer, photographer, and movie maker about western topics.
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The Indian Camp Dam Controversy: The Real
Beanfield War
By:
Marilyn J. Koch
Abstract
This essay explores the controversial history of Indian Camp Dam, a
Bureau of Reclamation project authorized under the Colorado River
Storage Project and the San Juan-Chama Diversion Project. The dam
was proposed, but never built, for predominantly Hispanic farmers in the
Taos Valley of northern New Mexico. Using interviews with participants
in the controversy as the basis for her study, the author argues for more
complete and complex histories of intra- and interethnic cooperation and
resistance, histories that embrace “untidy ambiguities.”

“When [we] talk about history we don’t mean what actually happened, do we?
The cosmic chaos of everywhere, all time? We mean the tidying up… into books.
History unravels; circumstances, following their natural inclination, prefer to
remain raveled.”
Penelope Lively, Moon Tiger

As we gather in 2002 for the centennial of the Bureau of Reclamation,
we have set time aside for many events: for the special tour of Hoover Dam; for
our host’s celebratory events; and to meet with friends and fellow historians.
But most importantly, we have set time aside in the most literal meaning of that
phrase, for we will spend most of our time in the Past, recognizing the history of
the past 100 years of the Bureau of Reclamation. As we gather to recognize the
Bureau of Reclamation, we should perhaps ponder that verb: recognize—to look
over again, literally, “to re-know.”
To set time aside and to recognize are also most appropriate deﬁnitions for
what we do as historians. We are also, though, in the broadest sense, storytellers.
I do not mean that historians create ﬁctions nor fantasies, though some do, but that
we place very raveled events and circumstances into a narrative framework. We
unravel and we tidy up. We have to in order to satisfy the necessity for a coherent
work.
My contribution to this Symposium, my ‘looking over again’ a piece of the
history of the Bureau of Reclamation, explores the controversial history of Indian
Camp Dam, a project that Reclamation never built. Because it offers us insight
into the oppositional strategies at work against the Bureau of Reclamation, this
never-built project provides an additional dimension to our re-knowing, perhaps
one that histories of completed projects cannot give. Because historians tend to
emphasize what did happen, rather than what did not, they risk overlooking or
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missing opportunities to examine the meanings that an event had as it unfolded;
they risk holding the past “hostage to an as yet undeﬁned future.”1
Indian Camp Dam, a relatively small dam, was to have been built
near Taos, New Mexico, in the valley about three miles south of Talpa, New
Mexico, as part of the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP). The Bureau of
Reclamation designed Indian Camp Dam to beneﬁt predominantly Hispanic
farmers and ranchers who needed an additional and reliable source of water
for irrigating their lands, many of which were located on Spanish colonial
land grants. Because my essay is not the ﬁrst to look at the Indian Camp Dam
controversy, 2 and because events surrounding the controversy have also been
satirized in the popular novel by John Nichols, The Milagro Beanfield War, I am
‘looking over again’ the story of Indian Camp Dam in a literal, revisionist, sense
as well. Beneath any tidied up narrative of the Indian Camp Dam controversy lie
layers of complex human interactions that comprise the very raveled and very
untidy historical, political, and cultural past of northern New Mexico. I do not
presume that my history will do more than add another dimension, but I hope it
adds a more raveled one.
Toward that goal, I have incorporated interviews conducted with principal
participants in the controversy, in particular Andres Martinez and Rudy Pacheco,
two Hispanic water leaders who ultimately found themselves on opposite sides,
and John Nichols and Paul Bloom, two Anglos who also opposed each other. I
have also incorporated the contemporary perspective of Eluid Martinez (no
relation to Andres Martinez), Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation during
the Clinton Administration. Eluid Martinez became involved in the Indian
Camp Dam controversy in 1971 when he was a young hydrographic engineer
working for the Ofﬁce of the New Mexico State Engineer. As a native of northern
New Mexico, an observer of the controversy, and as former Commissioner of
Reclamation, Eluid Martinez commands a unique vantage point from which to
comment upon the Indian Camp Dam project. I believe the oral histories of these
participants reveal that previous versions of the Indian Camp Dam history have
omitted facts critical to a complete and fair understanding of the controversy.

23.1. Eluid L. Martinez, Commissioner of
Reclamation from 1995-2001, previously
worked in the State Engineer’s office in
New Mexico, where he served as State
Engineer at the end of his career.
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This essay also examines the legal framework proposed for the ownership
and maintenance of the dam, and how this project was inﬂuenced but ultimately
hobbled by the tangled institutional structures, cultures, and organizational
ideologies of the federal and state agencies involved in the controversy, including
the Bureau of Reclamation. Ultimately, this essay questions stereotypical
assumptions of how ethnic boundaries were set, maintained, and crossed during
the controversy–assumptions that have since been further distorted by the success
of The Milagro Beanfield War. This novel, and to some extent the subsequent
movie, have garnered huge popular appeal. To a surprising degree, the novel
encompasses the general public’s entire awareness of northern New Mexico’s
environmental politics. The term “beanﬁeld war” has become synonymous with
any Anglo/Hispanic environmental dispute in New Mexico. The book continues
to be displayed prominently in hotel and airport gift shops, alongside the iconic
red chili ristra lights and howling coyotes, as if to announce “This is New
Mexico.” But “to recognize” the history of Indian Camp Dam is to recognize that
a stereotypical and romantic description of a cliche struggle—Anglo developers
and reclamationists versus earth-loving Hispanic farmers, a struggle that has taken
on the power of legend—can be not only deceptive and unfair, but can also have
long-lasting effects on how we choose to use and conserve natural resources.
Finally, by examining the history of this controversial and never-built
reclamation project using the oral histories of these participants, I hope to show
the validity of Donald Pisani’s statement in To Reclaim a Divided West, that “The
story of the West must begin from the ground up, rather than from the top down.
The parts must be understood before sense can be made of the whole.”3 If we are
to use this centennial to recognize the Bureau of Reclamation, it seems ﬁtting to:
“look over again” one of these parts.
Indian Camp Dam was designed to have been built in the forested canyon
of Rio Grande de los Ranchos, a tributary of the Rio Grande, three miles south of
Talpa, New Mexico. Talpa is one of over a dozen small settlements within Taos
valley lying along eight mountain streams, all making competing demands on the
valley’s watershed. In addition to the competing demands of these predominantly
Hispanic settlements, Taos Pueblo Indians claim Winters rights,4 prior and
paramount rights, to the headwaters of the valley’s tributaries at Blue Lake.
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to detail the complexities of
Indian water rights in New Mexico, an awareness of Winters rights is important
to a theoretical understanding of the context, and perhaps even more importantly,
the subtext, of the Indian Camp Dam controversy. Although Taos Pueblo was
not involved in the controversy in an overt or active fashion, because its Winters
rights were still not fully appropriated, nor yet fully put to beneﬁcial use, and
still theoretically held in trust by the United States, they remained unquantiﬁed.
In 1970, just as the Indian Camp Dam controversy intensiﬁed, Taos Pueblo won
its long battle with the U.S. government for return of Blue Lake. Against this
backdrop the increasing demands for the water, and at least two years of drought,
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served to heighten awareness and competition for water throughout the Taos
valley. In many important ways these tensions were not new. As John Baxter
demonstrates in Dividing New Mexico’s Waters, 1700-1912, conﬂicts over water
had tangled the web of human interaction, resistance, and compromise in the Taos
valley for the past 300 years.5
Indian Camp Dam was originally conceived as one of the hundreds
of projects comprising the Colorado River Storage Project, or CRSP. When
Congress ﬁnally passed and President Eisenhower signed the CRSP into law in
1956, the legislation enabled the Bureau of Reclamation to build the network of
dams necessary to divide up and store Colorado River water among the seven
western states, including New Mexico, that claim it. The ideological framework
for the CRSP grew not only out of the federalism of the Reclamation Era, but also
out of New Deal federalism and its social welfare programs. The CRSP was not
only a project of environmental engineering, but in social engineering as well.6
Beneath this framework lay the powerful symbolism of the Jeffersonian agrarian
ideal of the yeoman farmer, which inﬁltrated and informed everyone’s approach to
Indian Camp Dam.
As originally conceived, the CRSP was one of this country’s largest water
reclamation projects. Its scope was astounding.7 It encompassed scores of small
and medium sized reclamation projects–the dams and reservoirs that ﬁll the
modern Western landscape. It included large and very controversial projects, such
as the infamous and never-built Echo Park Dam, and Glen Canyon Dam, which
created Lake Powell and stores the equivalent of two years’ ﬂow of the Colorado.
The Bureau of Reclamation called Glen Canyon Dam its “cash register.”
Money that Glen Canyon Dam generated from electrical power subsidized the
construction of other CRSP projects. The CRSP was the ﬁrst reclamation project
to link the receipt of power revenues from one location to payment for irrigation
projects in others. This enabled politicians and reclamationists to rationalize
the construction of irrigation projects in places where, until then, the economics
of large scale irrigated farming had been considered impossible or, at best,
marginal—places like Taos, New Mexico.
The CRSP called for water to be transported from the San Juan River,
New Mexico’s only source of Colorado River water, into the Azotea Tunnels
underneath the Continental Divide, and ﬁnally into the Rio Grande Basin via
the Chama River. This transfer, initially a part of the CRSP, is called the San
Juan-Chama Diversion Project (SJCDP). Throughout the 1950s New Mexico’s
Senator Clinton B. Anderson, himself a strong advocate of reclamation and
New Deal ideologies, fought for New Mexico’s share of Colorado River water
and for the SJCDP. As head of the powerful Senate Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee, he helped direct the course of legislation required to enact the SJCDP
pursuant to the terms of the Colorado River Compact. Anderson and most
reclamation advocates believed that in order for New Mexico to use Colorado
River water most effectively, the water had to end up in the Rio Grande, where
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it could then reach and serve the most populated and agriculturally productive
portions of the state. This transfer subjected the imported waters to further
complicated political compromises and to the terms of the Rio Grande Compact.
In 1962 Congress ﬁnally approved and President Kennedy signed into law
the SJCDP and construction of the tunnels began. Senator Anderson had seen
to it that most of the water would go to his constituency in central and southcentral New Mexico, primarily for municipal and industrial use by the city of
Albuquerque.8 New Mexico’s other U.S. Senator, Democrat and Hispanic Dennis
Chavez, supported Anderson’s long battle for the CRSP and the SJCDP. In return,
Chavez won Anderson’s promise that over one-fourth of the water (30,000 acre
feet per year) would go to Chavez’s constituency, the predominantly Hispanic
farmers and ranchers in northern New Mexico.
Taos was too far north and east of the Chama River to receive the imported
waters directly. Instead, by constructing dams, Taos and three other northern New
Mexico communities were to impound waters from their respective Rio Grande
tributaries in the total designated amount. This same amount would then be
substituted with San Juan water ﬂowing into the Rio Grande in order to replenish
the Rio Grande and meet the downstream requirements called for under the Rio
Grande Compact.
Under the terms of the Rio Grande Compact, New Mexico had to meet
certain downstream delivery obligations, both intrastate and interstate. The Rio
Grande Compact divided the New Mexico portion of the Rio Grande above the
Elephant Butte Reservoir and designated the amounts that had to be delivered into
the Reservoir from the upstream section of the river. Similarly, New Mexico also
had delivery requirements and obligations to Texas. The most serious opposition
to the SJCDP had come from Texas and from the Elephant Butte Irrigation
District (EBID) in southern New Mexico. Texas and the EBID jointly questioned
how their rights would be protected, especially in times of drought when they
feared that the additional upstream projects proposed by SJCDP would consume
too much water at the expense of those below Elephant Butte Dam. In return for
dropping their opposition to the diversion, EBID and Texas demanded and were
guaranteed strict compliance with the Rio Grande Compact.
The state of California, through the Colorado River Board of California,
had also mounted vigorous opposition to SJCDP by attacking the feasibility of
the New Mexico projects and questioning how they conformed to the Colorado
River Compact and the pattern of protecting the Colorado River Basin as a whole.
California wanted assurance that none of the Colorado River water would be
made available for consumptive use, “whether by exchange or substitution or use
of return ﬂow, to any state not a party of the Colorado River Compact,”9 that is,
Texas. Thus, under the Rio Grande Compact New Mexico was left to assume
responsibility to the EBID and Texas to limit the use of the water upstream to
the amounts imported and simultaneously, under the provisions of the Colorado
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River Compact, New Mexico was to keep Colorado River water out of Texas by
consumptively using the total diverted volume.
It is critical to an understanding of the Indian Camp Dam controversy
to appreciate the complexity of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers’ water
regimes and their requirements and demands upon the state and federal regulatory
agencies. It is also critical to appreciate the signiﬁcance of the Hispanic water
users’ role in ﬁghting for northern New Mexico’s portion of Colorado River
water. Of the 30,000 acre feet per year allocated to northern New Mexico, almost
half (12,000 acre feet per year) was to beneﬁt a few hundred farmers living on
a few thousand acres of marginal lands high in the Sangre de Cristo mountains
around Taos. These farmers were not passive or unwilling recipients. Indeed, it
is doubtful that this water would have been allocated to Taos, sought as it was by
so many competitors both within and outside of New Mexico, without strong and
collective support of the Taos farmers. Initially, they played not only an active
role in ﬁghting for the water, but in justifying its use as a way of preserving,
perpetuating, and enhancing their pastoral lifestyles.10
In 1954 and again in 1958 Taos water users sent their spokesperson, dairy
farmer Andres Martinez, to Washington to testify before Senator Anderson’s
Interior Committee. He spoke in favor of the CRSP and funding for the San JuanChama Diversion. Martinez delivered a lengthy statement advocating passage
of the CRSP.11 He and the other eight signatories, six of whom were Hispanics,
outlined the history of their county and its people. Martinez testiﬁed that 50
percent of the heads of household in Taos left their homes and families each year
to ﬁnd work “. . . in the beet ﬁelds and mining camps of Colorado or running the
sheep camps of Colorado, Wyoming and Montana. There [were] no jobs in Taos
County.”12
Martinez told the senators that 100 years earlier Taos had been a
prosperous farming community, “called the granary of that part of the world,”
with “great ﬂocks of sheep and great herds of cattle.” But that was before the Rio
Grande Compact required them to send “many thousands of acre-feet of water per
year to Texas.”13 It was also before the creation of the Forest Service, which the
farmers claimed had sharply curtailed or denied grazing permits on what had been
their ancestral and communal lands, and before the Taos Pueblo Indians had come
to have more water rights, including the rights to the best streams in Taos.
In her seminal essay on the history of patterns of ethnic stratiﬁcation in
Taos, anthropologist and Taos native, Sylvia Rodriguez, shows that “appropriation
of community common lands was probably the single most devastating blow
dealt the native agro-pastoral subsistence economy,”14 and that “around the time
of statehood [1912], Taos seems to have gone from a valley of golden promise
to an economically stagnant backwater, awaiting touristic discovery.”15 While
the touristic discovery of Taos is beyond the scope of this essay, its pervasive
economic inﬂuence, as well as that of the luxury home real estate market (nascent
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in Hispanic villages near the Taos Ski Valley at the time of the Indian Camp Dam
controversy), cannot be overlooked as factors contributing to tensions in the
valley and conﬂicts over land and water use.
Andres Martinez’s 1954 Congressional statement advocated a dam to
impound excess runoff waters. The farmers argued that a dam would allow
a more stable water source and prevent the injudicious over-use of the spring
season’s waters, a practice that had grown out of the farmers’ desire to capture as
much water as possible, when possible, from Taos’s highly ephemeral streams.
The extra water would also make possible the irrigation of new lands and local
market gardening would increase, increasing the saleable output from their
farms. In their ﬁnal plea, the farmers proclaimed that the San Juan River waters
and a dam in Taos “would change an area of potential tragedy into one of great
productivity and prosperity.”16 This plea meshed perfectly with the social goals
of reclamation and was exactly the kind that the altruistic rationalizations of the
CRSP were designed to address.
After passage of the CRSP and the SJCDP, the Bureau of Reclamation
determined that two of the four water storage projects planned for the Taos area
could not be built due to geological obstacles. Then, in 1969, Indian Camp Dam
itself appeared endangered as well. Even though Taos was eligible for the huge
power revenues that would pay 96.6 percent of the construction costs of the dam,
Reclamation questioned whether the dam, even with the heavy subsidies, could
meet the government’s cost-beneﬁt ratios. Because the lands to be beneﬁtted
were so marginally productive, Reclamation announced that the project was not
feasible “as a purely agricultural irrigation unit.”17 Farmers mounted a campaign
to ﬁght for the dam. They organized a full scale “Save the Water” effort to lobby
for the water, to endorse the dam, and to “recommend that the ground rules for
water use or even design be changed to make [the dam] feasible.”18 By November
1969 Hispanic ditch commissioners and mayordomos19 from thirty-ﬁve ditch
systems and other members of ditch associations from Arroyo Hondo to Llano
Quemado united to ﬁght for the dam.20
Needing to put the water to beneﬁcial use and fearing political
repercussions if three of the four projects proposed for northern New Mexico
failed to be built, the Bureau of Reclamation did change the ground rules. It
added on a “recreational use” provision, which allowed the Forest Service to
step in to maintain and operate the small lake created by the dam. This use
required the Forest Service to contribute signiﬁcantly to the costs of the dam. But
ironically, this plan, tacked on to help pay for the dam, later became one of the
opponents’ most forceful arguments against it. Hispanics long resented the Forest
Service as the agency that held and controlled much of what had been land grant
common lands during the Spanish and Mexican colonial periods, and they linked
Forest Service development projects to debt and dispossession.21 The Forest
Service had become a powerful symbol of their “stolen” homeland.22
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Another such powerful symbol was the quiet title suit. Such suits were
seen as the means by which Hispanics had lost over 80 percent of their grant lands
by the turn of the twentieth century.23 Because both the Rio Grande and Colorado
River Compacts required stringent accounting of existing Rio Grande waters, the
New Mexico State Engineer believed that these waters had to be measured prior
to the addition of the imported Colorado River waters. The only legal mechanism
for this accounting was stream adjudication, or quieting title to the water. In
1969 New Mexico State Engineer Steve Reynolds, through his Special Attorney
General, Paul Bloom, ﬁled stream adjudication suits along the entire northern
stretch of the Rio Grande, including the Taos tributaries, to determine the nature,
amount, location, and priority of all existing water rights.24
At the initiation of the stream adjudication suits, at least two
interpretations of the Winters reserved rights for Indians prevailed. Water law
historian Ira G. Clark provides a helpful discussion that serves to distill these
two interpretations, one propounded by William Veeder and the other by Paul
Bloom. These two views, both supported by the Winters decision, illustrate the
ambiguity in the law and the conﬂicted position of the federal government’s
reclamation policies viĞ à viĞ Indian reserved rights. Veeder, a veteran ofﬁcial
in the Department of Justice during the Nixon administration, voiced a tenacious
defense of Indian water rights pursuant to Winters, holding that
. . . in signing treaties with the United States the Indians… retained
everything they did not cede including their water rights… Their
rights were therefore ‘immemorial’ in origin and prior in time to
all counterclaims. Development by the Bureau of Reclamation and
other interior department agencies of “surplus” waters originating
on or ﬂowing through Indian reservations was limited in time to the
period during which Indians were unable to use them. Nor could
any appropriator assert rights based on state law because the federal
government had exclusive control over Indian resources.25

Furthermore, Veeder placed Indian reservations in a position “to assert
superior claims to all additional waters as the needs develop.”26 As Clark states,
this interpretation imposed “drastic limitations on the power of state water control
agencies” and threatened non-Indian water users in the vicinity of reservations,
especially Hispanic water users in places like Taos, since their lands and acequias
usually have the oldest appropriated rights in these vicinities. The Indians’
claim of prior and paramount rights could conceivably not only halt further
development within the state, but these claims would “jeopardize the rights of
junior appropriators who were already using the water beneﬁcially.”27
Clark describes Paul Bloom as “a most vocal exponent” of the counterposition to Veeder’s. Bloom interpreted Winters as holding that
…the United States impliedly reserved waters for Indian use at the
time the reservations were created, based on the constitutional power

558

of Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting property belonging to the United States. It did not therefore,
differ materially from the implied reservation of water at other federal
enclaves.28

Clark charges that of the federal agencies, the Bureau of Reclamation was
“the worst offender” in its “purposeful ‘reclaiming’ of Indian waters for use on
federal projects”29 since it and other federal agencies were supposed to protect
Indian water rights rather than preempt and develop them.
The stream adjudication suits exposed the uncertainty of the extent of the
Indians’ Winters claims to Taos valley’s water and thus opened a Pandora’s box
of distrust, competition, and greed, and exacerbated centuries’ old tensions and
ambiguities over unresolved water claims within the communities. Although he
believed it was New Mexico’s duty to initiate the adjudication suits, the State
Engineer underestimated the effect the suits would have on the communities,
and on Taos valley’s response to the dam.30 The State Engineer may have also
miscalculated the extent to which mistrust of the state’s motives in initiating
the suits led to a deeper apprehension and questioning of other legally required
components of the dam.
Both New Mexico law and reclamation law required the water users
to form an entity capable of issuing bonds to contract with the government to
construct the dam, but New Mexico law limited the proponents’ choices for
such an entity to either a conservancy district or an irrigation district.31 Initially
Andres Martinez, as head of the Taos Unit Coordinating Council’s executive
committee, recommended the water users form a conservancy district. The
Council argued that under irrigation district laws, irrigators would bear the full
burden of the dam’s remaining costs, even though others in Taos would beneﬁt
indirectly from the added water. By sharing costs of the dam with non-irrigators
under a conservancy district, the cost per farmer, in the form of ad valorem taxes,
would be halved.32 Yet as tension and misapprehension grew, irrigators began to
suspect that while conservancy district laws favored irrigators in this respect, in
other, more important, respects they did not. Under conservancy district statutes,
members of the conservancy district’s board of commissioners, at that time a
three-person appointed board, did not have to be farmers or irrigators. Hispanic
ditch commissioners and mayordomos, the leaders who oversaw operation of the
traditional existing irrigation system, began to realize they would lose immediate
control over water allocation and management.33 In the summer of 1971 sixteen
mayordomos, led by Andres Martinez, very publicly resigned from the local water
users’ association that had formed to promote the dam, basing their change of
heart on opposition to formation of the conservancy district.34
Conservancy district case law in New Mexico reﬂects that users in
the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, New Mexico’s ﬁrst and largest
conservancy district, litigated over most of the very issues that Taos users
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feared, citing many of the same reasons. Yet a look at the ﬁrst case deciding the
constitutionality of New Mexico’s ﬁrst conservancy act shows that mistrust and
antipathy toward conservancy districts were not unique to New Mexico. In citing
precedents for its decisions, the New Mexico Supreme Court quoted the Ohio
court: “Rarely has a law been found which has been assailed with such frequency
or from so many angles.”35
Conservancy district laws in New Mexico have evolved into an odd hybrid
that reﬂect simultaneously the goals of ﬂood control—the original ostensible
purpose of the act—as well as reclamation, drainage, and irrigation. There is no
doubt that promoters of the original act sought protection from ﬂoods. In fact,
the original act forbade the creation of conservancy districts north of Santa Fe
County, since that section of the River with its deep gorges was not ﬂood prone.
When the act was challenged on the grounds that it was unconstitutional by reason
of being special or class legislation, the court ruled that the differences in natural
conditions along the northern portion of the river justiﬁed the special classiﬁcation
that forbade ﬂood control districts where they were not needed.36
Proponents of the ﬁrst act also convinced the legislature that drainage of
the middle Rio Grande valley was imperative, as aggradation of the river had
waterlogged the entire middle valley and the City of Albuquerque was “hemmed
in by unhealthy marshes and swamps.”37 But in addition to ﬂood control and
drainage, boosters of a conservancy district for the middle Rio Grande valley also
clearly wanted the economic development that reclamation promised to bring. An
Albuquerque editorial on June 4, 1922, proclaimed:
It is difﬁcult to imagine an investment of effort that would yield such
enormous and such certain returns. Nor is it difﬁcult to bring this
development about.… There is not a business in Albuquerque that can
fail of doubled volume from reclamation of the Middle Rio Grande
Valley, because that reclamation will double the tributary population not
once but several times over and add enormously to the ﬂow of wealth to
and through this city.… Why not get up and hustle—while the hustling is
good?38

Most importantly, conservancy district proponents needed the ability
to increase the tax base by bringing municipalities, principally the City of
Albuquerque, and railroads into the district to share in the costs. Conservancy
district laws allowed lands to be classed and assessed according to beneﬁts
received and, unlike irrigation districts that were limited to agricultural lands,
conservancy district laws allowed the inclusion of non-agricultural lands.
In 1923 New Mexico modeled its ﬁrst conservancy act on both the
Ohio act, passed in 1914, and the Colorado act, passed in 1922. Those states
designed their laws solely for purposes of ﬂood control, in response to disastrous
ﬂoods in Dayton and Pueblo, respectively. In its opening remarks determining
the constitutionality of this ﬁrst New Mexico conservancy act, the court In Re
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Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District “made a careful comparison”
of the New Mexico conservancy act with those of Ohio and Colorado and found
that
. . . in the main the provisions of all three acts are the same. The
Colorado act followed the Ohio act, making such changes as seemed
suitable for the conditions prevailing in the Western states, and the New
Mexico act closely followed the Colorado act, occasionally including a
provision which was in the Ohio act and omitted from Colorado law.39

Yet the appellants questioned the title of the act, arguing that it indicated
that the New Mexico legislature had in mind different purposes from those
declared in the Ohio and Colorado conservancy acts, namely irrigation. They
argued that because the title of the New Mexico act included the subject of
cooperation with the federal government in its reclamation policy, “the indications
are that the purposes of our Conservancy Act look to the improvement of the
agricultural conditions of the Rio Grande Valley, and that alone.”40 Appellants
argued that the Ohio and Colorado acts were adopted “solely and exclusively for
the protection of life and property, and not in any sense calculated to interfere
with the industrial pursuits of their people.”41
The New Mexico Supreme Court appeared oblivious to the appellants’
suggestion that the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District would interfere
with agricultural pursuits or engage in reclamation. Replying that “it did not
appear” that the legislature, in passing the conservancy act, “had in mind alone or
principally the reclamation of lands,” the court noted there were already statutes
existing authorizing the formation of irrigation and drainage districts, and these
had been approved on the same day as the conservancy act.42 In closing, the court
noted that if “an attempt should hereafter fraudulently be made to accomplish
a purpose not within the purview of this act, the courts would doubtless give
protection to the complaining parties.”43
But backers of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District appear to
have intentionally “recast and enlarged” their proposed language for the original
act, speciﬁcally to add a provision for reclamation. Notes kept by the membership
committee of the Middle Rio Grande Association, the booster organization formed
to work with the legislature for passage of the conservancy district law, reﬂect that
“changing from drainage to reclamation ha[d] been more or less confusing,” but
“when the people [were] correctly informed,… [the] committee… met with hearty
response from people… ready and anxious for reclamation, some of whom were
opposed to drainage.”44
In 1927, apparently anticipating that the Supreme Court would hold
that under the original act reclamation alone was insufﬁcient to warrant the
organization of a conservancy district, the legislature amended and broadened
the act to allow unambiguously “for irrigation of lands, though they are not
menaced by ﬂoods.”45 This amendment led to another challenge to the act’s
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constitutionality in 1929 when plaintiffs in Gutierrez et al. v. Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District argued that as petitioners for the conservancy district they
had been “moved by a desire only for ﬂood control but that a corporation resulted
with power to make irrigation its principal object.”46 The Supreme Court ruled
that the new conservancy act did not change the character of the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District as a district organized for “the main purpose of ﬂood
control with irrigation and drainage incident thereto.47 By 1940 the Supreme
Court, again noting that New Mexico conservancy district laws closely followed
the Colorado and Ohio statutes, acknowledged ﬁnally that “The provision for
the irrigation system, included with ﬂood control and reclamation, is, however,
peculiar to the New Mexico Act.”48
More importantly though to the discussion and context of the Indian
Camp Dam controversy, the Supreme Court in 1940 for the ﬁrst time examined
the management and control of existing community acequias by the conservancy
district. Noting that the old community ditch laws were not repealed by the
conservancy act, and that water rights were not affected by the act, the court
nevertheless dodged the question of what duties, if any, remained to ditch
commissioners who continued to be elected and operate under the old regime,
independently of the conservancy district. The court termed this question
“intriguing.”49 Ultimately, the court ruled against dual control of the ditches,
stating that “the administration of these [water] rights, so far as the impounding,
diversion, carrying and delivering of… water for irrigation… has now been
placed in the hands of this new and superior authority, plaintiff [conservancy]
District.”50
Taos water users questioned virtually all of the same provisions that
water users in the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District did in appealing
the constitutionality of that district, including their inability to appeal
assessments made by the county treasurer; the appointment rather than election
of the conservancy board; the impingement upon their power to manage and
control their own affairs; and the lack of a requirement that a majority of the
landowners in the district sign the petition for organization of the district.51 All
of these provisions seemed “undemocratic” and “un-American” to opponents
of the district in Taos.52 But most of all, the Hispanics who turned against the
conservancy district feared “this new and superior authority.”
Originally, the proposed conservancy district in Taos included 774 acres
of land lying within the San Cristobal de la Serna Grant. Granted by the King of
Spain in 1710, the La Serna Grant was the oldest non-Indian Spanish land grant
in Taos County (and one of the oldest in New Mexico).53 Having held onto most
of these ancestral lands through the intervening decades of rapid Anglo land
expropriation after New Mexico became a territory, the Hispanic residents of
La Serna were deeply suspicious of the taxes that the conservancy district could
impose.54 To irrigators who owned small plots it “seemed ‘wrong’ to have to start
paying $5.75 an acre for the same water” they had been using for generations.55
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Land tenure patterns in La Serna further compounded the problem for
the La Serna farmers.56 Because of the Hispanic tradition of dividing land
equally among multiple heirs, each tract with access to the river, or acequia,
acreage in the La Serna Grant included many long, extremely narrow plots (in
some cases only a few feet wide and several miles long). Many farmers owned
several narrow but non-contiguous plots, often with rights to different acequias.
The Bureau of Reclamation recognized that farms under ten acres were not
considered economically feasible and recommended that owners of such narrow
tracts consolidate their lands by forming land pools or co-ops. The Bureau of
Reclamation also recommended a change in cropping patterns, away from forage
crops to more cash intensive crops. Not only did the La Serna landowners fear
the loss of their lands if conservancy district taxes for the dam could not be
repaid, they also resented and resisted the pressure to change their traditional
ownership and cropping patterns.57 In the fall of 1971 the La Serna irrigators
petitioned for the removal of their lands from the conservancy district.
State statute required the district court to approve the petition for the
conservancy district, an approval now complicated by the petition for removal
of the La Serna lands. After months of delays (including the self-excusal of an
Anglo judge), District Court Judge Santiago Campos ruled in October 1972 that
the La Serna land grantees’ opposition to the conservancy district constituted an
“insurmountable obstacle to any reasonable ﬁnding of beneﬁt from irrigation to
all the lands within the proposed district.”58 Moreover, he ruled that the exclusion
of La Serna left the costs of the project higher than the resulting beneﬁt, and thus
the necessary statutory justiﬁcation for the formation of the conservancy district
was absent. However, Judge Campos noted the “intense and pressing interest
in the Taos community,”59 as well as the obvious need for the water. He warned
that opposition to the conservancy district could well mean loss of the water that
everyone needed and he warned the opponents of the character in Othello whose
hand threw away a pearl richer than all his tribe. The judge told the remaining
proponents that he would not totally dismiss the petition if they could alter their
plans and substitute other lands for the La Serna lands.60
Judge Campos’s decision proved fatal for the conservancy district,
though that was not his apparent intent. The petitioners, not wanting to lose the
fabled pearl, took Campos’s suggestion and redeﬁned the conservancy district
boundaries. If anything, this move only increased the controversy, since the
newly incorporated lands included large tracts belonging to several prominent
Anglos, including an Anglo developer and his sister, owners of the largest land
holdings in Taos valley. Unlike the neighboring La Serna lands, much of the
newly added lands had not been irrigated previously. This fueled rumors that the
water would not be used for irrigation, but would be converted to commercial
uses and development purposes.61
In April 1973 Judge Campos granted the formation of the revised
conservancy district. The dam’s opponents, now allied under Andres Martinez
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as the “Tres Rios Association,” appealed Judge Campos’s decision. On May 14,
1975, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that Campos’s compromise decision
to allow a reformed district was illegal. The Supreme Court agreed that Judge
Campos had properly excluded the La Serna lands from the district because such
lands would not beneﬁt from the conservancy district. But the higher court ruled
that Campos had exceeded his authority in allowing the petitioners to “amend the
petition so as to create a new and different district, since signers of the original
petition contemplated and intended a different district from the one resulting,
and where the ultimate tax burden upon those remaining in the district would be
deﬁnitely affected.”62
After the 1975 New Mexico Supreme Court decision nulliﬁed the Rancho
del Rio Grande Conservancy District, no one in Taos pursued the project further;
Indian Camp Dam never got off the drawing board. That same year John Nichols
published The Milagro Beanfield War, and the story of the dam’s demise took on
the aura of legend: local nativos and a few concerned, earth-loving Anglos versus
the callous government in cahoots with land-grabbing, usually Anglo, capitalist
developers.
By the time he left New York for New Mexico in 1969, John Nichols
described himself as “strung out, on edge, going down fast.”63 The son of
privilege and wealth, a graduate of private prep schools and Hamilton College
(the setting of his ﬁrst successful novel, The Sterile Cuckoo), he became active in
the anti-war movement in New York City in the late 1960s. But he found New
York relentless and wanted out. Because he found himself “looking at the world
from a much more Marxist or even socialist perspective,” he wanted to come to
New Mexico, which he saw as fertile ground for his political activism.64 Because
New Mexico “approximated a colonial country,” Nichols believed it would be
like “moving to the third world,” and that interested him.65 He also sought “an
environment where [he] could be startled constantly by natural phenomen[a]…
having roots in a special landscape not yet destroyed by progressive human
endeavors.”66 Instead, what confronted Nichols in Taos valley was a community
on the brink of building Indian Camp Dam, a project many would have proudly
labeled a “progressive human endeavor.”
Like other refuge seekers, Nichols saw life in northern New Mexico as
“an antidote to modern mechanization, and land of exotic primitivism and simple
truths.”67 In his memoir, If Mountains Die, Nichols wrote that he was “destined”
to “wind up in northern New Mexico as the semi-Marxist-Leninist propaganda
arm for a group of quixotic Spanish-speaking septuagenarians locked in mortal
combat with the U. S. government over preservation of their water rights, their
land, their culture, their very historical roots.”68
During our interview, Nichols downplayed his own role in the controversy,
calling it a “minor but vocal one.”69 He recalled “speaking out” at meetings
and holding heated exchanges with Paul Bloom, the attorney from the State
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Engineer’s ofﬁce. And although Nichols wrote many articles opposing the dam in
the local weekly independent newspaper, The New Mexico Review, he denied that
he played a signiﬁcant role in changing public opinion.70 This denial is probably
more accurate than his more romanticized written memoirs. The articles Nichols
wrote in 1971 in The New Mexico Review did not receive wide distribution among
Hispanics and, having arrived in Taos only recently, he was not well known
within the community then.
There is also evidence to support attorney Paul Bloom’s observation that
Nichols’ overtly politicized speeches at public meetings offended many Hispanics
“who identiﬁed him either with the Hippies or the crazy environmentalists…
they didn’t like… being told they were barefoot, serape-wearing peasants… [who
needed] to be protected by this political agitator who view[ed] Hispanic culture as
being on a museum shelf for 300 years…”71
Since the publication of Milagro Beanfield War it has become difﬁcult for
even the participants to unravel how much inﬂuence Nichols had on actual events
at the time of the Indian Camp Dam controversy, and how much he has been
credited with, or blamed for, because of the book. In everyone’s attempt to give
coherence, and perhaps meaning, to these events, Nichols’s ﬁctional and satirical
version has somehow become the standard that other versions must meet.
Nichols described to me one heated public meeting about the conservancy
district that he attended, saying it was “just like a ﬁlm set.” He said that the
room was “split in two,” with “100 percent Chicano farmers on one side, and
bankers, lawyers, real estate people, Anglo business people from town and the
developers in the valley on the other side.”72 Nichols claimed that the controversy
“seemed to pretty much break up into what most battles around here do, between
essentially smaller farmers, impoverished people, and the developers of the valley,
which is a cliché struggle all over the world.”73
But neither the historical record of Indian Camp Dam nor the recollections
of the other interviewees reveals a simple two-sided dichotomy, nor do they
reveal a “cliché struggle.” Nichols’s description did seem like something off a
movie set—indeed, it seemed to be right out of the movie version of The Milagro
Beanfield War. A far more intriguing, more ambiguous, more complicated, but
less coherent scenario emerges not only from the legal and political web of the
dam’s history, but from other participants’ memories.
Born in 1898, Andres Martinez grew up poor but relatively well educated
at a Presbyterian mission school in Taos. He lived his entire life in Taos, except
for the many months each year during his youth when he traveled the circuit as
a shearer on the sheep ranching circuit throughout the West. Martinez’s father
had been a shepherd who never owned irrigated land, just a small vegetable plot
and house in Ranchos de Taos. As a child, Martinez supplemented the family’s
income by picking onions from his mother’s garden, loading them onto burros,
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hiking to Elizabeth Town, and selling the onions to the miners who paid him
with little bottles of gold dust.74 Martinez’s depiction of his childhood and early
adulthood mirrors that of the majority of Hispanics in northern New Mexican
villages during the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century, as described by Sarah
Deutsch in No Separate Refuge:
Faced with an increasingly intrusive conquering economy and culture,
the Hispanics could not retreat. They had to formulate new strategies
in order to maintain the viability of their villages… among the options,
seasonal labor proved the most attractive…through the strategy of
work and migration patterns, they retained their control over their own
enclaves, retained for themselves a homeland—both a refuge and a base
for expansion without loss of cultural identity.… The migrants [were]
‘living links’ to the goods, services, and cash of the Anglo economy.75

Martinez managed to save enough money to leave the seasonal labor
system, though it appears he never forgot the lessons of that strategy. In 1950,
he and his wife bought eight cows and a forty-acre dairy farm in Taos. By
the time he sold his dairy and retired, he was on the board of directors of the
local savings and loan and one of its largest shareholders. He was not an
“impoverished farmer”; arguably, he had become a “rico.” Rumors had it that he
had also become a Mormon and had sought appointment to the Interstate Stream
Commission.
Even though he ultimately opposed construction of the dam, Martinez
remained, at age 92 when I interviewed him, ﬁercely proud of the role he and
other Hispanics played in getting New Mexico its share of Colorado water.
Fighting for the water remained a core and deﬁning memory. He described
himself as “ﬁghting for twenty years to get it.”76 Martinez admitted that in the
beginning he and the other Hispanic water users “were all for the dam.”77 That
is, until they learned more about the conservancy district. Martinez claimed that
the conservancy district would have resulted in loss of lands due to its power to
impose property liens and, if necessary, foreclose and sell the property to pay back
taxes.78
Perhaps because of the varied experiences of his youth as a migratory
worker, Martinez became adept at crossing ethnic boundaries. While
maintaining his strong ties and identiﬁcation within the Hispanic community
as a respected leader, he also negotiated and cooperated with Anglo power
brokers when he believed it would beneﬁt Hispanics. His status within the
Hispanic community enabled him to travel out of this ethnic enclave while
simultaneously strengthening it by establishing his own presence and identity
within the predominantly Anglo arena of reclamation politics and interstate water
management.
The most ambiguously positioned participant in this controversy may
have been Paul Bloom, who was, in 1969, a 30-year-old Special Attorney General
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working for State Engineer Reynolds and the Interstate Stream Commission. In
this position, Bloom came to be the point man and spokesperson not only for the
state in its efforts to explain Indian Camp Dam but also for the Interstate Stream
Commission in its efforts to promote the dam—sometimes the latter role was at
odds with his private opinions about the dam.
Bloom denies he ever tried to “sell” the dam, but as the state attorney who
initiated the stream adjudication suits, he was assigned to hold town meetings to
explain why the dam triggered the adjudication suits. Bloom was keenly aware
that the Interstate Stream Commission was “clearly a booster of record [for the
dam].”79 He also understood the “complicated calculus of log-rolling,” and
“jealous intrastate and interstate jurisdictions, communities, and political power
bases… that had constantly traded off and fought each other to get their key
interests taken care of…” and he realized when he was assigned to go to Taos that
“all of these compromises were expressed in years of impatience to get [the dam]
going.”80
Because Bloom was the voice of government, he became heavily involved
in the controversy and was often the focal point of the community’s re-ignited
distrust of the government. While this distrust was historical for the Hispanics,
for Anglos like Nichols who opposed the dam, this distrust was contemporary,
tied to the emerging environmental activism of the late 1960s, and perhaps even
more signiﬁcantly, to anti-Viet Nam War sentiments. John Nichols often conﬂated
his opposition to the dam with militarized rhetoric directed personally against
Bloom. In July 1972 Nichols described Bloom in The New Mexico Review:
Bloom… has been a pivotal ﬁgure in the attempt to erect Indian Camp
Dam over the dead bodies of the poor people in Taos for whom the Dam
is allegedly being built.… And perhaps Bloom, petulant, frowning,
doomsayer here and culture savior there, is wondering why nobody
believes anymore in the magic of his Indian Camp baubles, bangles, and
bright shiny promises.
Well: maybe it’s because some grizzled old brujo was staring through
the smoke of his pinon ﬁre one day, gazing up towards the soft green
hills at the eastern edge of the Little Grande Valley, and on the crest of
one little mountain he saw a strange ﬁgure from the State Engineer’s
ofﬁce with his left hand thrust Napoleonically between the breast button
in his Brooks Brothers tunic, standing proudly beside his Indian Camp
howitzer, grandiosely proclaiming—as it has been the habit of certain
other United States Government landscapers et al. to proclaim: “It was
necessary to destroy the people of Little Rio Grande Valley in order to
save them…”81

Like others, Bloom believed that the issue of the conservancy district
was “the kiss of death” for the dam, not because of the dangers of conservancy
districts but because “it allowed it to be demagogued to death.”82 Bloom claimed
he never saw “a more effective case of demagoguery, of romantic nostalgia, of
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playing on all the nineteenth century fears and agendas.”83 Yet Bloom maintained
that in 1971 he privately believed the dam came 100 years too late. He thought
it was a “somewhat utopian… rather touching… unreal political thing to do.”84
But by the mid-twentieth century the lands the project was intended to beneﬁt
had been divided up into such small tracts that land pooling would have been a
daunting if not impossible task. This, combined with the short growing season,
ﬂood risks, high elevation, and distance from markets, seemed to Bloom to be
problems the Bureau of Reclamation’s optimistic forecasts could not overcome.
But he did not see it as his place to make this judgment because, he said, the
local water users wanted this project. “It had been negotiated by them and for
[them] by their elected representatives, over many years, justiﬁed by their federal
government on certain assumptions, including the beneﬁts from irrigation.”85 He
believed that “[people] couldn’t simply let comparative economics dominate
what [they] do with natural resources or the rich and the big cities would have
everything.”86
Bloom also saw clearly that once Andres Martinez and his group went
into open opposition, the dam “was doomed… at least doomed to an endlessly
long and painful and divisive dispute.”87 Bloom warned State Engineer Reynolds
and the Interstate Stream Commissioners that even if all the hurdles could be
overcome, it would be done at a great price in community discord and division.
Bloom recalled that the Stream Commissioners looked at him “as if they’d heard
Santa Claus had been shot.” 88
In 1971 Rudy Pacheco was a 41-year old cattle rancher and school
administrator and owner of one of the larger tracts of lands in the proposed
conservancy district. Pacheco wanted the conservancy district and the dam.
After Andres Martinez’s resignation as leader of the water users’ organization,
Pacheco led the proponents. Pacheco never wavered in his support of the dam
and remained bitter that it was never built, believing that its loss forced him to
move his ranching operation to Colorado. He believes that now, without the
dam, it is virtually inevitable that each of the eight Taos streams’ ﬂow will have
to be commercialized and domesticated because “they killed agriculture in Taos
County.”89
Pacheco recalled that before the opposition to the dam became overt,
Hispanic farmers discussed the possibility of producing grain for Coors Brewing
Company and raising beans for the Campbell Soup Company because bean crops
had been very cost effective in the Taos area. Campbell’s ultimately located its
operation in Bayﬁeld, Colorado, using irrigated lands from another CRSP project.
“Campbell’s had guaranteed a contract for 6,000 acres of beans for a twenty-year
period. That was a cash crop that La Serna people could have used,” Pacheco
claimed.90 Interestingly, Pacheco blamed John Nichols, rather than Andres
Martinez and the other Hispanics who withdrew their support, for loss of the
water. “Through his ignorance [Nichols] did the valley an injustice by sacriﬁcing
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that amount of water that could have been used forever in the future… and that’s
something you lose culturally and historically and it will never come back.”91
Perhaps because of his relative wealth, but more likely because of his
relative youth, Pacheco was unable to maintain a coalition of water users in
1971 with the same strength as the coalition Andres Martinez previously formed.
Martinez and the other elder mayordomos who defected symbolized Hispanic
tradition melded to American agrarian ideals. Ultimately, this symbol proved too
powerful for younger Hispanic farmers to overcome.
In 1971 one year out of college, Eluid Martinez joined the ofﬁce of the
State Engineer as the ﬁrst Hispanic engineer in the history of that ofﬁce. In
conjunction with the stream adjudication suits, he began learning to conduct
the hydrographic studies that the suits required. While he did not witness the
confrontations between Bloom and Nichols, Eluid Martinez did attend meetings
of local water users as part of his duties to explain the stream adjudication
suits. He perceived that the attention, but not the controversy, had shifted to the
adjudication suits. At his ﬁrst such meeting at a local elementary school, he was
told not to enter the room unless he spoke Spanish. He did not perceive this as
an attempt on the part of the Hispanics to keep Anglos away, but rather a concern
that any explanations of the adjudications be given in Spanish, since many of the
older participants did not speak English.92
Yet Eluid Martinez acknowledged that at the time of the controversy
there was an increased animosity in Taos valley against “outsiders,” primarily the
Hippies, who had ﬂocked to the area in what Rodriguez terms “The Great Hippie
Invasion.”93 As Rodriguez points out, this inﬂux of thousands of people into Taos
between 1968 and 1971 also placed increased pressures on the valley’s resources
since the Hippies, although seeking the “same romantic utopia their bohemian
predecessors had sought,” also came with dreams of “going back to the land.”94
According to Rodriguez, Hippies were:
able to buy up parcels of irrigated land rather cheaply from Hispanos,
who needed the cash and had little inkling of the transformation about to
occur.… within another decade the average price of an irrigated acre had
increased by as much as forty times.95

Signiﬁcantly though, Eluid Martinez did not perceive that there “was
much controversy” in Taos at the time over the matter of the stream adjudications
themselves. “Most of the surveys were completed and brought to closure fairly
quickly in terms of water right offers that were signed and accepted… except for
those lands that had been offered no water rights because of non-use.”96 Here
again the water and land use patterns of Hispanics in northern New Mexico
came into play and worked against them under New Mexico law. According
to Eluid Martinez, “in the traditional way of managing acequias in northern
New Mexico, the land owners would consider that their water rights would be
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protected as long as they paid their ditch dues and ditch assessments.”97 Because
so many Hispanics left northern New Mexico in the decades following World
War II, primarily for economic reasons and in a continuing pattern of outmigration similar to that described by Deutsch above, their lands went fallow
and unirrigated although they continued to pay their ditch dues. When the
hydrographic surveys picked up lands as being non-irrigated, the lands were
deemed to be without water rights. However, by the time of Indian Camp Dam,
New Mexico’s water rights forfeiture laws had been amended to allow for
notice by the State Engineer and a four-year opportunity for the user to cure the
non-use and place the lands back under irrigation. While this change in the law
rectiﬁed the situation somewhat, it could not ultimately alleviate the problem
many absentee Hispanic landowners confronted: how to put their lands back into
production from afar. Similarly, many older Hispanics who stayed on their lands
were unable to irrigate them without the assistance from younger family members
who no longer lived nearby.
Upon the death of State Engineer Steve Reynolds, who had held that
ofﬁce for thirty-ﬁve years and become one of the most powerful men in the state’s
history, Eluid Martinez stepped into the position in November 1990. He went on
to serve as Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation under President Clinton.
With the perspective he gained throughout those years of state and federal water
administration, Eluid Martinez now believes that opponents of Indian Camp
Dam “might have made a mistake, in terms of water supply.” Because of the still
unresolved Winters claims of the Indians, “[holders of] the existing irrigated lands
that would have been supplemented by the San Juan-Chama replacement waters
are today ﬁghting for their very existence in the adjudication that’s taking place.…
In hindsight, if that project would have been constructed, in my opinion it would
have provided the water supply necessary to address all these concerns.”98
Yet despite this opinion Eluid Martinez, like Bloom, also conceded that as an
irrigation project Indian Camp “even if proposed today, would probably not be
economically feasible,” primarily due to the obstacles of the land tenure system.99
According to Eluid Martinez, the Bureau of Reclamation was accustomed
to building projects for farms of 160-960 acres. Moreover, Indian Camp Dam
was not a project that Reclamation could build, as it usually did, from the ground
up on lands to be newly irrigated, at least not primarily. The project was hobbled
by ineffective attempts, from all sides, to make it ﬁt into an existing and foreign
irrigation framework. “It was something new to them,” Eluid Martinez said,
referring to the existing acequia irrigation system in Taos and the Bureau of
Reclamation. 100 But this “foreign-ness” was not one-sided. The complicated
history of Indian Camp Dam illustrates profoundly the collisions that can occur at
cultural intersections, where indeed, in hindsight, it can be said of the actions of
almost all the resisting participants, “it was something new to them.”
Other researchers tend to rely on Nichols’s nonﬁctional accounts of the
Indian Camp Dam controversy as the basis for their ﬁndings that Indian Camp
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Dam and the related SJCDP projects exemplify “top down planning,” and they
conclude this reveals that “Hispanic participation, at least at the grass roots level,
was not effective.”101 These interpretations overlook or downplay the importance
of the Hispanic water users’ very active and effective participation in obtaining
the allocation of the SJCDP water. In Water and Poverty in the Southwest, Brown
and Ingram outline the complex problems facing rural Hispanics in northern New
Mexico and examine Hispanics’ attitudes about water rights and their preferences
for water use and economic alternatives. But ultimately, and ironically, Brown
and Ingram see the “lack of water storage as a continuing problem,”102 and they
end up recommending some of the same changes that were proposed by the
Bureau of Reclamation for the Indian Camp Dam project, namely a change in
cropping patterns, land pooling (in the form of cooperative grazing programs),
reservoirs (“water storage capacity”), and permanent diversion structures.103 In
Acequia Culture: Water, Land, and Community in the Southwest, Rivera extols
traditional acequia culture and examines the stream adjudication suits, but he fails
to place the suits in the context of the Hispanics’ ﬁght for SJCDP, in fact he never
mentions SJCDP. By consistently stressing the acequias’ “traditional” culture,
he misses the opportunity to view acequia users as dynamic agents of change
themselves.
Sylvia Rodriguez argues that in Taos the “ongoing process of
expropriation [of Hispanic land and water bases] and the recent acceleration
[of this process] has… intensiﬁed Hispano resistance to further usurpation and
displacement…”104 These resistant reactions represent, she says, “strategies of
ethnic boundary maintenance.”105 Rodriguez believes that whereas speciﬁc ethnic
cultural content can change more or less continuously, “boundary maintenance
through time is the essential feature of ethnic persistence.”106
While I agree with Rodriguez that boundary maintenance through time
is an essential, if not the essential feature of ethnic persistence, I believe that
the entire history of Indian Camp Dam controversy reveals that the boundaries
themselves are not constant or predictable. In northern New Mexico, I see a kind
of ever-changing shoreline where ethnic boundaries shift with the tides of certain
events. Cultures selectively borrow from one another, in complex processes of
cooperation, negotiation, accommodation, assimilation, and acceptance, even
amidst processes of resistance and rejection.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Indian Camp Dam history is the
extent to which it exposes not only obvious inter-ethnic strategies for boundary
maintenance and accompanying tensions and conﬂicts, but also the intra-ethnic
contradictions and conﬂicts, such as those between Anglos John Nichols and
Paul Bloom and between Hispanics Andres Martinez and Rudy Pacheco. The
controversy blurred ethnic boundaries even as it revealed and deﬁned them.107
Beneath these blurred boundaries lies the deep irony that everyone involved—
from the politicians, to the Bureau of Reclamation, to Anglos John Nichols and
Paul Bloom, to Hispanics Andres Martinez and Rudy Pacheco—everyone claimed
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to be ﬁghting to save, each in his own way, the dying Hispanic agro-pastoral
lifestyle in Taos.
We all struggle to deﬁne ourselves in the world and to give our lives,
our stories, meaning and emotional satisfaction. In telling our stories and our
histories we too often resist or omit the confusion of untidy ambiguities, even
though experientially we ﬁnd them commonplace. In an attempt to order and
explain the past, too often we simplify it. I would argue that our histories should
be layered, multifaceted, and multi-voiced. They need complexity, perhaps even
confusion and cacophony. They should embrace rather than shun the untidy
ambiguities.
The more we learn of Indian Camp Dam “from the ground up,” these
“parts before the whole,” the more we grasp the incredible inclination of these
events to remain untidy and raveled. Yet we also recognize the incredible
obligation we have to respect the right of these events to be properly represented,
especially when the past, raveled though it may be, can give us not only
meaningful insights into how we interact and negotiate with one another for the
use of our natural resources, but also give us informed ways to choose our own
local futures.
Marilyn J. Koch is an independent scholar who lives in Bernalillo, New Mexico.
A version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the American
Society of Environmental Historians in April 1999. Ms. Koch is grateful for
the comments, suggestions, and advice from Dr. Donald Pisani following that
presentation, all of which have informed and beneﬁtted this essay. She is also
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Hydropolitics in the Far Southwest: Carl Hayden,
Arizona, and the Fight for the Central Arizona
Project
By:
Jack L. August, Jr.
According to former U.S. Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt, we are
now approaching the last phase of a productive century of federally sponsored
reclamation in the American West. With the development of a few remaining
authorized dams and delivery systems, the era of the construction of the great
reclamation projects will come to an end. A major contributor to the process
of water resource development in the American West was longtime senator
Carl Hayden of Arizona (1877-1972). A native of Arizona’s Salt River Valley,
Hayden, in his earliest years, experienced the often-cruel vicissitudes of ﬂood and
drought in the arid Southwest. He saw Arizona grow from a raw territory of a few
thousand hardy pioneers to a desert oasis of millions. Central to his efforts in the
service of his Arizona constituents was the development and use of the Colorado
River, the controversial interstate stream that serves the needs of the seven
basin states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Nevada, California, and
Arizona). And, while he devoted his public career to the residents of his state, the
man who became known as the “Silent Senator” had an impact and signiﬁcance
far beyond the borders of the Grand Canyon state.1
The most striking feature of Hayden’s political career was its longevity.
He spent sixty-seven of his ninety-four years of life in public ofﬁce. Between
1900 and 1912 he learned the art of politics by serving in a variety of local
and county ofﬁces; Tempe town councilman, Maricopa County treasurer; and
Maricopa County sheriff. When statehood was achieved in the latter year, voters
elected their native son to the House of Representatives, kept him there for seven
terms, and in 1926 promoted him to the U.S. Senate where he remained until his
retirement in 1969. During his ﬁfty-seven years in the federal government, he
served with ten presidents, beginning with William Howard Taft and ending with
Lyndon Baines Johnson.
As Secretary Babbitt, a former Arizona governor, and other elected
ofﬁcials from the Grand Canyon State quickly learned upon the outset of their
government service, Hayden’s lengthy tenure in ofﬁce beneﬁted Arizona in a
multitude of ways, and to catalogue his accomplishments would require volumes.
In 1912, when he ﬁrst stepped into the House of Representatives, Arizona was one
of the most sparsely settled states in the union. When he retired from the Senate
in 1969, Hayden returned to one of the fastest growing states in the country.
Today, dams and reservoirs, thousands of acres of reclaimed farmland, powertransmission lines, highways that helped create Arizona’s important tourist trade,
a healthy commercial and industrial economy, Indian and veterans’ hospitals, and
aircraft and military bases stand as testaments to the public career of Carl Hayden.
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Fellow lawmakers who spent time with and around Hayden commented
on his kindness, humility, and modesty. Indeed, in what became a biennial ritual
for senate newcomers, Hayden evinced amazement among newly elected senators
for never sitting in the front row of the Democratic side of the Senate, as he was
entitled. Instead, he maintained the seat he took in March 1927, on the aisle,
one row removed from the back. Another well-known Hayden quality that cut
against the grain of conventional political wisdom was the Arizonan’s propensity
for silence. Especially in the Senate, a political body notable for its oratory,
Hayden stood out as the soul of brevity. His remarks in the Congressional Record
consumed less space, perhaps, than any other senator in recent history. Yet, as any
careful observer of western politics knows, the absence of Hayden verbiage gave
no hint of his power, knowledge, or effectiveness. Upon his ﬁftieth anniversary
in Congress, the New York Times declared, “few individuals in the history of
Congress have done so much with so little talk.” Furthermore, when Hayden
chose to appear before a committee with a project or a request, most members
were certain it was justiﬁable. If Hayden wanted something, it needed little
persuasion or rhetorical advancement. In a great political incongruity, Hayden
fashioned silence into a form of legislative power.2
At the same time, Senator Hayden, arguably, was one of the most powerful
senators in U.S. history. As Marc Reisner suggested in his critical volume,
Cadillac Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water, “Senator Carl
Hayden of Arizona [was] the most powerful man in legislative government” in
the 1960s. Besides emerging as a ranking member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee in the late 1920s and early 1930s and chairing this powerful
committee from 1954 to 1969, he served as president pro tempore of the Senate
and was third in line for the presidency. Although he held vast political power,
one of the Arizonan’s most useful attributes, according to President Johnson, was
the high degree of affection in which his colleagues held him. Moreover, Hayden
chose most often to use his inﬂuence behind the doors of committee rooms or in
persuasive conversations in the cloakrooms of Congress. At the same time he
did his homework with consummate care until he knew, as one of his Republican
senate colleagues recalled, “the front, back, and middle of everything.” Perhaps
fellow Arizona senator Barry Goldwater said it best shortly after his return to the
Senate after his run for the presidency: “Let me put it this simple way, whenever
my service in the Senate is terminated I hope that my service to my country and
my state equals a small fraction of what Carl Hayden has provided in both areas.”3
While Hayden developed a renowned legislative expertise in the area of
federal reclamation, he could also boast of several other areas of proﬁciency that
added to the growth and development as well as the conservation and preservation
of the American West. Hayden, for example, was one of the great leaders in
federal highway legislation, coauthoring the New Deal measure, the HaydenCartwright Act of 1934, which established the formula for distribution of federal
aid for highways to the states on the basis of area rather than population. This
legislation helped tremendously in providing transportation links between the
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West’s far ﬂung cities. Hayden introduced and supported measures that advanced
mining operations throughout the country. His efforts provided for fair prices,
protection against unfair imports, and subsidies for strategic metals.
Notably, he was the sponsor, in 1919 of the Nineteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, extending the right of suffrage, and he sponsored and managed
the House bill to establish Grand Canyon National Park. He worked for social
security legislation and in 1950 fostered an amendment to that law that allowed
American Indians to be included within its framework. Other broad areas of
federal legislation attracted his attention: forest conservation, national parks,
labor, public lands, agriculture, and veterans’ affairs, to name a few.
Water, however, and its use and distribution, more than any other issue,
lay at the heart of Hayden’s public career. He became most famous as a statesman
who helped bring water and life to a vast region of the country. Unquestionably,
the fortunes of his Arizona pioneer family were tied to water, or more speciﬁcally,
to its diversion onto land. As a local politician he lobbied for one of the ﬁrst, and
most successful, federal reclamation projects, the Salt River Project. During his
ﬁrst term in the House he further displayed his understanding of the importance
of water to his home state by obtaining authorization of an engineering study that
led to the construction of Coolidge Dam on the Gila River and the San Carlos
Reclamation Project. He also helped shape federal reclamation policy in its early
years by writing and securing passage of the provision that allows local wateruser associations throughout the country to take over the care, maintenance, and
operation of federal reclamation projects. In nearly six decades in Congress,
reclamation issues occupied more of his attention than any other legislative
subject, and Colorado River development took up a signiﬁcant portion of that
time.
On February 14, 1962, the ﬁftieth anniversary of statehood, Hayden, in
an exceedingly rare instance of public self-evaluation, commented on his most
important contribution to Arizona—bringing federal reclamation to the Grand
Canyon State. “The basic factor in making Arizona’s spectacular agricultural
and industrial development was the Reclamation Act of 1902 sponsored by that
great and energetic president, Theodore Roosevelt,” he told the Arizona Republic.
That law made possible the use of federal funds to develop water for irrigation
and hydroelectric power, both of which were essential to the state’s prosperity.
“Needless to say,” Hayden added, “I have helped that basic program move
forward.” The then-eighty-four year-old senator concluded his comments, not
dwelling on the past but rather by urging Arizonans to look toward their future.
“I hope to see the day when central Arizona and other important areas of the state
have the water required to continue the pattern of growth and progress attained in
the ﬁrst half-century,” he challenged his constituents.
Hayden alluded to Arizona’s decades-old obsession, the Central Arizona
Project (CAP), which today channels Arizona’s hard-won share of Colorado
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River water to the central portions of the state, including the rapidly growing
metropolitan areas of Phoenix and Tucson. The recently completed project not
only will shape the nature of federal reclamation in the American Southwest in
the twenty-ﬁrst century, but also will impact the delicate desert environment in
countless ways. Today Arizonans take for granted CAP, yet know little of its
historical and legislative origins, many of which reach deep into the early history
of the far Southwest. Indeed, Hayden, who had tried unsuccessfully to fashion
some sort of central Arizona diversion project since the 1920s, persisted in his
efforts through years of jousting with California and the other basin states and
won his ﬁnal and most gratifying legislative battle between 1963 and 1968 when
CAP was authorized through passage of the Colorado River Basin Project Act.
Signiﬁcantly, this last, successful phase of the process began in the U.S. Supreme
Court, where it took nearly eleven years to resolve a host of complex issues
surrounding the use and distribution of Colorado River system water.4
At 1:30 P.M. on August 13, 1952, Senator Carl Hayden welcomed a small
group of somber-faced Arizonans to his ofﬁce on Capitol Hill. After a brief
exchange of pleasantries he stuck a battered white straw hat on his bald head,
strode to the door and beckoned, “Come on boys, let’s get this done.” Together
the group walked to the U.S. Supreme Court building. Among them was
J. H. “Hub” Moeur, chief counsel for the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission
(AISC), who ﬁled a bill of complaint against California, asking for a judicial
apportionment of the waters of the lower Colorado River basin. After witnessing
the ﬁling the seventy-four-year-old senator issued a short statement to the
press. “I believe this action,” he told those gathered on the steps of the Supreme
Court, “will make possible the settlement of a most serious controversy which is
delaying the development of the Colorado River basin.” “If the Californians are
sincere in their oft-repeated demands for court action,” he added, “then they will
welcome the opportunity to present their side of the case.” With that, Arizona
launched the monumental Arizona v. California Supreme Court case.5
As several students of the case have noted, it was one of the most complex
and ﬁercely contested in the history of the Court. Before its completion,
340 witnesses and ﬁfty lawyers had produced 25,000 pages of testimony before
a special master. The case took nearly eleven years and cost nearly $5 million.
And, when a sharply divided Court announced its opinion on June 3, 1963,
followed by the decree on March 9, 1964, the river possessed a greatly modiﬁed
legal framework governing its apportionment and use among the lower basin
states.6
Arizona’s contentions had changed little since the late teens and early
twenties, when the basin states focused their attentions on Colorado River
development. She asserted that California had made contracts for delivery of over
5.3 million acre feet of water annually in spite of laws limiting it to
4.4 million acre feet. The limitation notwithstanding, Arizona’s attorneys argued
that California had constructed reclamation works capable of diverting 8 million
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acre feet of water annually thereby posing a threat to Arizona and other basin
states. According to Arizona’s attorneys, for the state to sustain its existing
economy it required 3.8 million acre feet of Colorado system water per year.
Furthermore Arizona relied on and asserted its rights to water under a variety
of federal and state actions including the Colorado River Compact; the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, the California Limitation Act of 1929, and, additionally, the
state had entered into a water delivery contract with the federal government.7
California registered no objection to Arizona’s motion. Her substantial
team of attorneys, led by the brilliant and indefatigable Northcutt “Mike” Ely,
agreed with the U.S. Solicitor General, who advised the Supreme Court that
the federal government had an interest in the case and would move to intervene
if Arizona’s motions were granted. On January 19, 1953, the Court granted
Arizona’s original motion and the bill of complaint was ﬁled. Hayden hoped for
prompt action because he knew that no further progress could be made on CAP, or
any other lower-basin project, until the Court reached its decision.8
On May 20, 1953, California responded to Arizona’s bill of complaint.
In nearly 500 pages of narrative and supporting documentation, California’s
attorneys contended that it had a right to the beneﬁcial and consumptive use of
5,362,000 acre feet of Colorado River system water per year under the terms of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act and her contracts with the Secretary of Interior.
Moreover, she claimed prior appropriative rights to the use of that amount of
water and that these rights were senior to Arizona’s and therefore superior.
Finally, California argued that Arizona, by failing to ratify the Colorado River
Compact within the speciﬁed six months when the other six states had done so in
1923, as well as her subsequent attempts to have the agreement declared invalid
and the Boulder Canyon Act declared unconstitutional, precluded her right from
interpreting this statute.9
For the next four years California conducted a campaign of judicial delay.
A blizzard of motions and ﬁlings delayed the start of proceedings, while the
number and complexity of issues raised prompted the Court to appoint a special
master to hear arguments. On January 1, 1954, George I. Haight assumed the
position. After ruling on several preliminary motions, Haight died suddenly
before formal hearings began. Judge Simon Rifkind, a sharp-witted federal jurist
from the southern district of New York, replaced him. Finally, on January 14,
1956, hearings on Arizona v. California began.10
In the meantime, Hayden, on September 14, 1955, and nearing the end
of his ﬁfth term in the Senate, announced at a Phoenix Press Club forum that he
intended to seek reelection in 1956. The election, however, posed new challenges
for the seventy-eight-year-old senior solon. Besides the election taking place
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court case, Arizona, during the 1950s, was
undergoing an unprecedented spurt of population growth, industrial development,
and overall economic expansion. Indeed Arizona boomed during the post-war
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years, attracting people, industry, and capital. Much of this new money ﬁnanced
urban and agricultural expansion in the state’s heartland embracing fast growing
Phoenix and Tucson. Moreover, the distinctive technological, commercial, and
urban dimension of this growth brought forth heightened expectations from an
increasingly afﬂuent electorate. Longtime politicians like Hayden took careful
notice when the youthful conservative Republican upstart, Barry Goldwater, won
a stunning upset victory over the well-entrenched Democratic incumbent Ernest
McFarland in the race for the U.S. Senate in 1952. The conservative victory not
only shattered the Democratic party’s domination of state politics-which dated
from the territorial period-but also signaled the onset of a new era of conservative
hegemony in Arizona. Furthermore, Arizonans old and new expected the
economic boom to continue and the key to sustaining this growth was the
continued expansion of water supplies and affordable power.11
By the mid-1950’s, however, the rivers of Arizona were fully developed
and irrigators had turned increasingly to groundwater supplies. In their efforts
to keep pace with the boom, they pumped with such intensity that water tables
dropped and aquifers were exhausted. Thus the stakes were high in 1956, with
Arizona v. California and the apparent pressing need for expanded water and
power supplies. Much like his election campaigns for the U.S. Senate in 1926,
Hayden’s efforts at reelection in 1956 centered on water resource development
generally, and the use and distribution of waters of the Colorado River system
speciﬁcally.12
Hayden’s 1956 election campaign was noteworthy for other reasons as
well. His advancing age, questions about his health, and rumors of incipient
senility emerged during the course of the primary campaign and carried over in
the general election. His Democratic primary opponent, Robert “Doc” Miller, a
forty-eight-year-old Phoenix-area druggist, suggested that “youth must be served
and age must be retired,” adding that Hayden, at age seventy-nine and with
ﬁfty-two years on the public payroll was desperately seeking another six years
in ofﬁce. To these charges, Hayden and his staff responded to the anticipated
criticism with resolve and innovation. Hayden’s administrative aide, Roy Elson,
assessed the claims: “A lot of people, particularly as he got older and his hearing
got bad, thought he was senile. There was nothing senile about Carl Hayden.
You’d think he was up there asleep, and then he’d ask the most penetrating
questions. He’d cut all the shit out and get to the heart of the matter. He was
superb at doing that. I mean people would marvel.”l3
After careful deliberation, Hayden agreed to make his ﬁrst television ﬁlm
for use in a political campaign. His appearance on “Personalities in Government”
featured the veteran senator’s views of various presidents and congressional
leaders with whom he had served during his forty-four years in Congress. The
show, and subsequent radio and television appearances, not only helped Hayden
dispel rumors about his poor health and failing mental abilities, but also raised
public awareness of his considerable accomplishments. Moreover, during the
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course of the campaign Hayden convinced voters that McCarthy-era VicePresident Richard Nixon’s charges that he was a dangerous left-leaning ideologue
out of touch with modern American values were ridiculous and unfounded.
Additionally, the new technology reached the growing numbers of new Arizona
voters who were made aware that Hayden, in December 1955, had advanced to
head the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee thereby giving the Grand
Canyon State unprecedented inﬂuence in federal affairs.14
Hayden’s inﬂuence and stature in Congress were emphasized in the
1956 campaign as well as in his ﬁnal campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1962. An
especially ﬂattering portrayal by former U.S. Senator and Assistant Secretary of
State William Benton, published in the New York Times Magazine on July 24,
1955, was adapted and utilized by Hayden campaign strategists in a variety of
ways. Benton sought to praise the unsung or unappreciated heroes on Capitol
Hill who rarely received “a stick of news type for their pains.” Chief among
them were those senators and representatives who were committee specialists.
They mastered the detailed and complex problems of legislation, worked long
hours in solitary study, and attended faithfully often-tedious committee sessions
that lay behind the construction of appropriation bills, tax measures, and major
substantive legislation in all ﬁelds. This was the non-glamorous drudgery,
which was the heart of effective work in Congress and without injustice to
anyone, Benton, ventured, Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona was the person who
symbolized those in Congress who had “performed magniﬁcent services for years
on end while remaining virtually unknown to the general public.”l5
Benton continued that, although Hayden spoke seldom and never with a
tinge of rhetoric or passion, his inﬂuence within the Senate was enormous. He
marveled also that his advice was sought and heeded by members of both parties
and was trusted by everyone. Indeed Hayden’s handlers used this and other
laudatory pieces to full advantage, effectively countering political attacks from
the right and questions about Hayden’s age and mental acuity. On election night,
November 6, 1956, Hayden, as usual, won every county in the state, defeating his
Republican opponent, Ross F. Jones, 170,816 to 107,447.16
The central issue of Hayden’s ﬁnal election campaign-the election of
1962-remained CAP and the Colorado River. Despite the senator’s age, state
leaders convinced him to run for a seventh term. A Phoenix Gazette editorial
of September 21, 1962, put Hayden’s reelection in perspective for its readers:
“The U.S. Supreme Court’s impending decision on a master’s report favorable
to Arizona in the Colorado River controversy puts CAP just around the corner.
Every ounce of California’s political clout will be brought into play. It will take a
unique combination of power to beat the project’s enemies. Such a combination
rests in the hands of Carl Hayden.” On the same day, the Arizona Republic
elaborated upon these themes: “Arizona’s congressional delegation is vastly
outnumbered by California which wants the Colorado River for itself. Only
the parliamentary skill of Senator Hayden supported by the universal esteem
585

in which he is held in Congress will secure passage of CAP.… Senator Hayden
stands above party politics. He should be reelected by overwhelming non-partisan
support.… Senator Hayden deserves the vote of every citizen who wants Arizona
to prosper.” Clearly, Arizonans saw their hopes tied to Hayden and his seniority
in the Senate.17
In spite of his distinguished record, his acknowledged leadership in
Arizona’s water struggle, and support from newspaper editors throughout the
state—including conservative publishing mogul Eugene Pulliam—Hayden
faced several serious challenges in his 1962 campaign for reelection. His bright,
aggressive, thirty-two-year-old assistant Roy Elson, who managed the campaign,
acknowledged that the Arizona electorate had grown and changed since 1956,
adding that “there must have been a ﬁfty percent increase in voting population”
during the six-year period. Moreover, Hayden’s aide later recalled that in 1962
“forty percent of the people in Arizona didn’t even know who Carl Hayden
was because he didn’t put out press releases.” Elson, described by Capitol
Hill colleagues and newspapermen as Hayden’s “Rasputin or Machiavelli,”
knew that most of these newcomers had never heard of Hayden and still others
questioned the wisdom of voting for an eighty-four-year-old man. Moreover,
in the fall of 1961 his wife of ﬁfty-three years, Nan, passed away, leaving many
wondering whether the elderly senator would not have the strength, emotionally
or physically, to conduct his public responsibilities effectively. Meanwhile,
the Republican Party continued its unremitting growth in the state, building a
powerful and well-ﬁnanced organization. Indeed, Hayden’s staff knew the senator
was politically vulnerable in 1962.18
Elson took decisive action in early 1961, preparing a ﬁfteen-page
conﬁdential memorandum for Hayden that detailed the difﬁculty ahead if the
senator chose to run for reelection. As the administrative aide put it, “I wrote
to the senator on what we had to do if he was going to win, because this whole
change in the demographics of the population.… We couldn’t rely anymore on his
old organization, we had to do more press, get things into the can, do television
spots.” Throughout the year Elson, who for the ﬁrst time in Hayden’s electoral
career hired a press secretary, executed a well-organized and effective campaign
strategy.19
He convinced the new Democratic administration to visit Arizona to
honor Carl Hayden. Indeed, one of the highlights of the campaign occurred on
November 17, 1961, when President John Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon
Johnson attended a $100-per-plate fundraising dinner in Phoenix. Billed as a
bipartisan tribute to the aging senator, it garnered intensive media coverage.
Newspaper, radio, and television reporters competed aggressively for the best
photo or an interview with visiting political luminaries. President Kennedy told
the dinner audience at the Hotel Westward Ho, “Every federal program which
has contributed to the development of the West, irrigation, power, reclamation,
bears his mark. And the great federal highway program which binds this country
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together, which permits this state to be competitive east and west, north and south,
this in large measure is his creation. In one well-orchestrated stroke of political
handiwork, Elson had accomplished his goal of reintroducing and redeﬁning
Senator Hayden, under the most favorable of circumstances, to a rapidly growing
electorate.20
In addition to the November gala, during the fall of that year the Hayden
campaign traveled throughout Arizona shooting newsreel footage of the senator at
Glen Canyon Dam and at various military bases—ﬁlm that proved crucial to the
success of the campaign.21
Beginning in early 1962, however, Hayden experienced a series of
nagging bouts with ﬂu, and infections which threatened to derail the reelection
effort. First the senator contracted a stubborn ﬂu, and then a urinary tract
infection struck. Elson recalled that Hayden convalesced in his apartment at the
Methodist building across from the capital, and “for a long time we had some
people sitting in our ofﬁce, some John Birchers, demanding to see the senator.”
As a result of these pesky ailments, during the fall of 1962 rumor spread that the
senator had actually died; prompting a somewhat feeble Hayden to assert publicly
that news of his death was simply not true.22
It was during this critical period that Elson’s earlier campaign strategy
came into play. The newsreel footage shot the previous year, along with help
from local television station executives willing to air the footage, aided the
faltering campaign. Also on the Saturday before the 1962 general election, Elson
orchestrated a media event that put to rest rumors surrounding Hayden’s mortality.
Vice-President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Richard Russell of Georgia arrived
at Bethesda Naval Hospital—where Hayden spent the ﬁnal thirteen days of
the campaign—to brief the ailing senator on the Cuban Missile Crisis. While
photographers shot pictures, Hayden got out of his bed and three veteran
Democrats held a press conference. The newsmen quickly drafted stories that
although Hayden was not well, he was nevertheless alive and alert.23
On the night of the election, Hayden, still at Bethesda, asked Elson
what he thought was going to happen. The senator expressed concern that the
Republicans nominated the mercurial and oddly charismatic Glendale car dealer
and prominent conservative, Evan Mecham, to run against him. Elson told his
mentor that although the future governor of Arizona had run a vigorous campaign,
“I think you’re going to win by twenty-six or twenty-seven thousand votes.”
Elson’s prediction was on the mark as Hayden won the election by a count of
199,217 to 163,388—a small margin for him. Then that night, before the polls
closed, Hayden phoned all his key campaign workers in Arizona and personally
thanked them for their help. Many were in tears over the emotional victory as
Hayden had been elected for an unprecedented seventh term to the U.S. Senate.24
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Senator Hayden took little time to celebrate as he quickly refocused
his energies on the Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California. When
the opinion was ﬁnally announced on June 3, 1963, Hayden considered it a
tremendous victory for Arizona while local newspapers considered it “a personal
triumph for Carl Hayden.” The Court, Hayden was pleased to note, centered
its opinion on the Boulder Canyon Project Act rather than the Colorado River
Compact. Moreover Congress, the justices reasoned, in passing the legislation
“intended to and did create its own comprehensive scheme for… apportionment.”
In addition Congress had authorized the Secretary of Interior to utilize his contract
power to implement a lower-basin agreement. Importantly for Arizona, each state
retained exclusive rights to its tributaries, which meant exclusive rights to the
Gila. Concerning mainstream apportionment, the Court gave Arizona what it and
Hayden had argued for since the 1922 negotiations over the compact: “4,400,000
acre feet to California, 2,800,000 acre feet to Arizona, and 300,000 to Nevada.”
“That formula,” wrote Ben Cole of the Arizona Republic’s Washington Bureau,
was “a personal triumph for Carl Hayden because the decision referred back
twenty-ﬁve years to the December 12, 1928, debate in which Hayden pointed out
that the Boulder Canyon bill and its allocation formula settled the dispute over
lower basin waters.” After reading the ninety-ﬁve pages of opinion and dissent,
Hayden informed newsman Cole,
naturally I am pleased that the Supreme Court has in general followed
the Special Master’s recommendations with reference to the division of
the waters of the Colorado River. This is especially gratifying because it
makes possible at last for us to put our rightful share of our waters to use
in the Colorado River Basin.25

Underlying the decision favorable to Arizona was a deeply divided
Supreme Court. The ﬁve justices upholding the recommendation of Special
Master Simon Rifkind were Hugo Black, author of the opinion, Byron R. White,
Arthur J. Goldberg, Tom C. Clark, and William Brennan, Jr., Justice William 0.
Douglas wrote a tart dissent, and Justice John Harlan drafted a separate dissent
which had the concurrence of Justice Potter Stewart. Chief Justice Earl Warren,
who was governor of California at the time the suit was ﬁled, did not participate
in the decision. Douglas, whose dissent was extremely sharp, wrote in part:
Much is written these days about judicial lawmaking, and every
scholar knows that judges who construe statutes must of necessity
legislate interstitially… the present case is different. It will, I think, be
marked as the baldest attempt by judges in modern times to spin their
own philosophy into the fabric of law in derogation to the will of the
legislature. The present decision, as Mr. Justice Harlan shows, grants
the federal bureaucracy a power and command over water rights in the
seventeen western states that it has never had, that it always wanted, that
it could never persuade Congress to grant, and that this court up to now
has consistently refused to recognize.26
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Understandably, Californians reacted with anger and apprehension to the
decision. They charged the Court with misreading the intent of Congress, eroding
the rights of the states, and argued that the ruling represented the ﬁrst time that the
Court had interpreted an act of Congress as apportioning water rights to interstate
streams. Previously, rights had been determined only by interstate compact or
by the Supreme Court itself. Thus this untoward judicial innovation threatened
California, and Hayden and his senate staff quickly concluded that Golden State
leaders would try to regain in the political arena what they had lost in the judicial
decision. Elson described the situation on the heels of the ruling, “We knew
that California and Northcutt Ely would try some way to stop this through the
legislative process, even though they had lost… What they couldn’t accomplish in
court they would try to do in the ﬁeld of politics.”27
Other aspects of the decision reﬂected a departure from previous judicial
renderings. The Secretary of the Interior would allocate future surpluses and
shortages among and within states. The later feature marked, as one expert on
the Colorado has written, “an especially sharp break with tradition.” Moreover,
the Court ruled that Congress could invoke the navigation clause of the U.S.
Constitution as well as the “general welfare” clause to divide the waters of
non-navigable and navigable streams. This dimension of the ruling, as Justice
Douglas wrote in his scathing dissent, increased drastically federal control over
the nation’s rivers. For Hayden and Arizona, nevertheless, the ruling appeared to
clear the way for legislative action on CAP.28
Besides the positive implications for CAP, Arizona v. California proved
a victory for American Indians as well. As noted earlier, when Arizona ﬁled
suit in 1952, the federal government intervened not only to protect its interests
on the river, but also to defend the rights of the Native Americans living on the
twenty-ﬁve reservations within the lower basin. U.S. attorneys petitioned for
adequate water for all irrigable lands on Indian reservations as well as national
parks, forests, recreation areas, and other federal lands. In their decision the
justices ruled in favor of the government although limiting their decision to ﬁve
reservations abutting the mainstream of the river—Fort Mohave, Chemehuevi,
Cocopah, Yuma, and Colorado River. Basing its reasoning on Winters v. United
States (1908) the Court held that the ﬁve reservations were limited not just to
their land but their rights also extended to water. The justices concluded that
“It is impossible to believe that when Congress created the… Colorado Indian
Reservation and the Executive Department of this Nation created the other
reservations they were unaware that most of the lands were desert… and that
water from the river would be essential to the life of the Indian people.”29
Especially noteworthy was the fact that in determining the amount of
water the Indians were to receive, the Court adopted the government’s position.
Thus the Indians were awarded water based upon irrigable acreage. And in a
supplemental decree, the Court added that the Indians were not restricted in
the uses to which they could put their water. As one scholar wryly observed,
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“Reason, rather than agriculture, seemed to emerge as the ultimate test.”
Although he agreed in principle with the Court’s ruling pertaining to the affected
tribes, Hayden expressed concern that Indian uses were to be charged against the
state in which the reservation was located. Arizona, where most of the Indian
land under the ruling was located, therefore, bore the majority of the burden of
this “Indian water.” Moreover, the justices ruled that these rights dated from
the establishment of the reservation and were superior to later non-Indian rights,
including those rights based on uses initiated before the Indians had begun
diverting water from the Colorado or its tributaries. The Court thus reafﬁrmed
Winters asserting that American Indian rights existed whether or not they were
actually using the water and continued unimpaired even if they should cease their
uses. Some of the lands along the lower reaches of the Colorado had been set
aside as early as 1865 and none later than 1917. Clearly, Arizona v. California
left the tribes in a much stronger legal position than they previously maintained.30
Upon the announcement of the Supreme Court decision Hayden phoned
Don Smith, a reporter for U.S. News and World Report, to issue a rare public
statement. “The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on the division of Colorado
River water,” he told Smith, “is the most signiﬁcant federal action in history
affecting the state of Arizona. This adjudication must now be followed by the
construction of the long-awaited CAP.” During his recent reelection effort,
Hayden made authorization of CAP the centerpiece of his campaign, promising
to work for the project’s prompt authorization after the Supreme Court’s decision.
Toward this end, the aging dean of the Senate sought and won a seat on the Senate
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee as a very “junior” member. In addition to
this parliamentary positioning, Hayden, in April 1963, prepared and sent a draft
bill and strategy memo to the Arizona delegation in order to foster unity in the
state’s approach to Congress. He wrote: “I feel that our bill should be as simple
as possible, and as similar as practicable to the bill considered by Congress in the
late 1940s and early 1950s and twice passed by the Senate.” And on June 4, 1963,
one day after the Court’s ruling, Arizona senators Hayden and Goldwater and the
three House members of Arizona’s delegation introduced legislation
(S. 1658; H.R. 6796, H.R. 6797, and H.R. 6798) to authorize CAP, one of the
largest water project proposals ever to come before Congress.31
Hayden’s bill authorized a diversion of 1.2 million acre feet of water
annually out of the Colorado River to provide supplemental irrigation and
municipal water to central and southern Arizona. To do this, it provided for the
construction of ﬁve dams and reservoirs, two power plants, and transmission and
distribution facilities on the Colorado and its tributaries in Arizona and western
New Mexico. A key feature of this ﬁrst bill was a 740-foot-high-dam at Bridge
Canyon on the Colorado River at the headwaters of Lake Mead. If built, Bridge
Canyon Dam promised to be the highest dam in the western hemisphere. The
Bridge Canyon power plant would have an installed capacity of 1.5 million
kilowatts, and one-third of its capacity would be transmitted south to pump water
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over a canal and aqueduct system from the existing Parker Dam on the Colorado
219 miles to the Phoenix area and 341 miles to Tucson.32
Shortly before introduction of S. 1658, the Bureau of Reclamation
completed a supplemental feasibility report on CAP in January 1962. It estimated
that CAP would provide additional water to irrigate 880,000 acres of land in
Arizona and would provide 303,000 acre feet of municipal and industrial use
water for 1.1 million people, primarily in the Phoenix-Tucson areas. In the
ﬁfteen-year period that elapsed between the two bureau reports on CAP, Arizona’s
population had grown from 700,000 to approximately 1.4 million, and lands under
irrigation in central Arizona from 566,000 to about 1 million acres. In addition,
U.S. Geological Survey data indicated that Arizona had “mined its groundwater
basins in the state at an alarming rate. According to the survey, the groundwater
level was dropping at a rate of ten feet per year in the Phoenix area and twenty
feet per year in Pinal County, south of Phoenix. In some areas wells were going
dry or saline water was seeping into them, making them unusable, and the ground
was subsiding from over-pumping. C. A. Pugh, area engineer for the Bureau of
Reclamation at Phoenix, estimated that the overdraft of groundwater basins in the
state totaled 2.2 million acre feet annually. The net delivery of water from CAP
would amount to only 1,070,000 per year, so it could not possibly replenish more
than half the water deﬁcit in the state at that rate of use. If these statistics were
accurate, Hayden reasoned that Arizona appeared to be heading into a water crisis
that could be only partly addressed by CAP.33
Hayden knew well that in spite of Arizona’s obvious need for additional
water, Congress historically delayed ﬁnal action on reclamation projects until
leaders and all sections of the state and region were uniﬁed or had arrived at a
general consensus. Thus looking for the broad support necessary for his bill
he made known past support for several big packages of upper-basin projects
including the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, which led to the
construction of Glen Canyon Dam. He also played a prominent role in backing
numerous individual state proposals such as New Mexico’s San Juan-Chama
Project, which passed Congress in 1962. In light of these and other previous
efforts in support of regional water resource development, Senator Hayden
believed he deserved the same kind of consideration for CAP within his state
and throughout the region. Beyond these arguments, the extent of Arizona’s
legislative effort for CAP was commensurate with the perceptions within the state
of the beneﬁts to be gained from the proposed project. This was based partly on
the felt need for additional water in some parts of Arizona, but in large part, the
belief in CAP was, as political scientist Helen Ingram aptly put it, “emotional and
symbolic.”34
Yet between 1960 and 1963 the anticipation of a Supreme Court decision
favorable to Arizona prompted federal administrators and representatives in the
basin states to begin formulating a regional plan acceptable to the entire basin—
not just Arizona. In January 1962, for example, Secretary of the Interior Stewart
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Udall, an Arizonan and former congressman, encouraged Congressman Wayne
Aspinall (D -Colorado), Chairman of the inﬂuential House Interior and Insular
affairs committee, to request the Interior Department to conduct a comprehensive
study on water development in the Colorado River in preparation for the expected
pressure for authorization of individual state projects—including CAP—as soon
as the decision in Arizona v. California was handed down.35
Indeed several studies were already underway and in November 1962
Aspinall asked Udall for an outline of the Interior Department’s plans for a
regional approach to water development in the basin. In an effort to practice
“constructive water statesmanship,” Secretary Udall, and his undersecretary
James Carr of California, adopted this regional approach and by January 1963
he revealed a huge $8 billion plan which included projects in ﬁve western
states. In announcing his regional program—the Pacific Southwest Water Plan
(PSWP)—Udall hoped to “erase the outmoded concept limited by state lines,
and concentrate on meeting the total water needs of a region.” In addition to this
lofty goal, he also sought to reconcile diverse interests and several multiple use
water projects into one harmonious and comprehensive plan. In August 1963,
after Hayden had introduced his CAP bill, the PSWP was sent to the seven basin
states and to ﬁve federal departments for review and comment. No state with
water entitlements below Lee’s Ferry was left out of the scheme and seven of
the proposed seventeen projects beneﬁted Arizona, California, Nevada, New
Mexico, and Utah. PSWP, moreover, sought to unify the interests of Arizona and
southern California, with several programs aimed at easing California’s concern
over mainstream withdrawals by CAP. Water transfer from northern to southern
California, water salvage projects, and several new reclamation programs were
included in the plan to mitigate other California concerns. Beyond this, Udall
tried to exploit common interests in PSWP by proposing two huge hydroelectric
dams, Bridge Canyon and Marble Canyon, to be located near the Grand Canyon
National Park. Revenues derived from these cash register dams would underwrite
the cost of the entire plan, and guarantee the future growth and development of
the Southwest.36
To Hayden PSWP and the comparatively simple CAP bill were competing
legislative initiatives, and the senator and Arizona’s political leadership were
particularly incensed with the Kennedy administration in general and Secretary
Udall in particular. During 1963 and 1964, in several exchanges of letters and
memos between Hayden’s ofﬁce and Interior, an agitated Hayden let it be known
in vivid and uncompromising language that he considered the overdrawn PSWP a
method for delaying consideration of CAP that played into the hands of California
and upper basin opponents of CAP, particularly Colorado. Then-governor of
Arizona Paul Fannin added that he considered PSWP “a plot against Arizona
born in California and formalized in the Interior Department by California’s
undersecretary.” Fannin advocated the Senator’s approach: “We must and will
go it alone with the CAP as proposed by Hayden in S. 1658.” In numerous
correspondences through the next two years, Udall suggested to Hayden and other
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state leaders that the CAP ﬁt into his broader regional program. To one of these
missives, dated December 19, 1963, in which Udall alerted the senator that he
could not ﬁle a favorable report on a separate CAP bill, Hayden shot back,
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I vigorously protest your failure to keep your commitment to me and
to other ofﬁcials of this state. I insist that language be included in the
PSWP which will be a clear endorsement of the CAP as embodied in
S. 1658 and/or as a separate ﬁrst segment in any regional program.

According to Elson, “it irritated the hell out of Carl Hayden because there was
nothing incompatible with a simple CAP to any regional plan.”37
Several CAP supporters offered other, more politically-sinister
explanations, for the legislative standoff in 1963-1964. Although not discussed
openly, several Capitol Hill insiders suspected that an understanding had been
struck with President John F. Kennedy and Secretary Udall. As Hayden aide
Elson described the unwritten agreement: “Let’s not rock the boat with anything
that’s going to cause a big problem with California, particularly southern
California, at least until after the 1964 elections.” The Yuma Daily Sun of June
16, 1963, seconded Elson’s musings concerning the politics of PSWP. “There
is also the task of getting the approval of the Kennedy administration. Which
will be ardently courting California’s 40 electoral votes in 1964, an election
year.” California was now the largest state in the nation; it counted thirty-seven
more electoral votes than increasingly Republican Arizona and was doubtlessly
a prize in the 1964 presidential sweepstakes. Many CAP proponents realized
that Kennedy, as leader of the entire nation—and a practical and politically savvy
person as well—would not simply brush aside the arguments of Democratic
Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown or the forty-member congressional delegation.
Whether valid or not, the notion that Kennedy did not want Udall appearing to
take sides with his state of Arizona and its small electoral vote as opposed to
California and its substantial electoral vote was a topic of discussion during the
early phase of CAP’s legislative journey.38
Not surprisingly, Stewart Udall took a great deal of editorial abuse within
Arizona over his “federalized regional project” that “placed all water and power
of the Colorado under control of his department.” One highly charged and
exaggerated editorial in the Arizona Republic of August 18, 1963, asked “Udall,
Where Are You?” suggesting that the grandiose plan (PSWP) meant that he
had written off Arizona for his political future and that he had come under the
inﬂuence of the California water lobby headed by Undersecretary of the Interior
James Carr. Younger brother and Arizona congressman Morris Udall was the
focus of similar harsh and unfair criticism. Observers questioned whether he
supported CAP or the “empire-building plan” unveiled by his brother. As the
inﬂuential Arizona Republic editorialized,
Voters know where Stewart Udall stands-he’s against the Central Arizona
Project.… Will Morris Udall align himself with the rest of the Arizona
delegation, which unanimously supports the project? Or, will he, in
deference to his brother, sit on the sidelines and refuse to help Arizona?39
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To an unsympathetic Hayden, Secretary Udall conﬁded that “he had taken
his daily horsewhipping from the Phoenix newspapers,” but he resented what he
termed a personal attack by Senator Goldwater and the unwarranted attacks on his
younger brother by powerful publisher Eugene Pulliam. He explained:
From this point on I intend to give Goldwater and Pulliam blow for blow
if that is what they want. I may be 1000% wrong but on the basis of my
knowledge of the art of the possible in the House and my conversations
with Chairman Aspinall and others, it has been my best judgment that
some kind of regional approach will be absolutely essential if a Central
Arizona Project is to pass in the House.

Furthermore, the Secretary told Hayden,
Governor Fannin and the Arizona water people have made a grievous
mistake in failing to have any consultation whatsoever with the members
of the House concerning basic strategy. The Pulliam-Goldwater tactics
of attempting to bludgeon my brother and Representative [George]
Senner (D-Arizona) into line with their strategy is outrageous and
indefensible.

Clearly, the administration’s preference for a regional approach to
Colorado River development in the form of PSWP posed unforeseen challenges to
Hayden and his staff. In spite of the uncharacteristically harsh rhetoric between
the two distinguished Arizonans and among state interests, Hayden agreed with
Udall’s notion that “It is largely up to the two of us to hold the whole thing
together.” As a result of the need to make progress on CAP both camps made a
frosty pledge to confer at any time on strategy matters.40
Nevertheless, as Arizona’s quest for CAP shifted to Congress, and as
several proposals and counterproposals made their way through the maze of
subcommittee and committee hearings, Hayden knew that his accumulated power
and inﬂuence in the Senate bode well for the legislation. In 1966, moreover, an
Arizona “Task Force” arrived in Washington to lend support to the legislative
effort, drawing staff and expertise from the state’s water establishment: Arizona
Interstate Stream Commission, Arizona Public Service, the Central Arizona
Project Association, and the Salt River Project. Additionally, Hayden chaired the
Senate Appropriations Committee, and he could, if he wanted, hold up every other
water project in the country.41
As usual he appeared before a variety of congressional committees adding
to his already considerable record of testimony in behalf of the project. Typical
of his statements between 1963 and 1968 was his testimony in support of his
bill, S. 1658, before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on August 27, 1963. “Arizona’s
efforts to obtain her full share of Colorado River water have been frustrated by
the deliberate delaying tactics of California,” he told the subcommittee, and “after
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ﬁfteen years of separate consideration by Congress, the effort is being made to
absorb the simple and readily understood Central Arizona Project into one of the
most controversial, complex, and confusing water resource development plans
ever presented to Congress.” Hayden told this and other groups of legislators
in subsequent testimony that he believed in a regional concept of water resource
development, that he could support any features of a regional plan which were
sound, but that he was opposed to anything that would complicate and delay
authorization of CAP. The senator expressed serious concern for Secretary
Udall’s PSWP because if the plan was never constructed, the beneﬁts to California
would be greater than if the plan were constructed. Hayden posited that in the
end it would be cheaper for California to use Arizona’s water than it would be to
participate in any comprehensive plan.42
The Arizona senator did not want the urgently needed and completely
feasible CAP to be stalled because of controversy over a master plan. Nor did
he want other worthy projects, like Utah’s Dixie Project or California’s AuburnFolsom South Project, hindered because they would have to be included in the
collection of separate projects, which Secretary Udall called PSWP. Hayden
correctly predicted that senators and representatives would hear testimony that
there would be insufﬁcient water in the Colorado River to sustain CAP. In
anticipating these arguments he pointed to previous statements by Commissioner
of the Bureau of Reclamation Floyd Dominy, who stated that despite rumors to
the contrary “there is certainly enough water in the river for the CAP of
1.2 million acre feet” under the Arizona v. California ruling.
Hayden also criticized the portion of the PSWP proposal to import
1.2 million acre feet of water from northern California to southern California at a
cost of billions of dollars while ignoring an equal amount of water that could be
developed at a minimum cost through adequate conservation practices within the
area. “This committee,” he inveighed, “is being requested to provide funds for
the import of water from northern California at a great cost to protect the right of
southern California to waste water.”
What especially irked Hayden about PSWP or other “regional” initiatives
that emerged over the four-and-one-half years of legislative wrangling in
what became the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, was the obvious
efforts of certain interests within California to delay CAP or nullify Arizona v.
California. Later he recalled that “it appeared a lifetime of labor was approaching
fruition.” The Court decision, combined with solemn assurances of California’s
former governor Earl Warren who in 1948 told Hayden, “whenever it is ﬁnally
determined that water belongs to Arizona, it should be permitted to use that water
in any manner or by any method considered best by Arizona,” seemed to clear
the way for authorization of CAP. Moreover, shortly after the opinion, Governor
Edmund G. “Pat” Brown announced that California, having lost the Supreme
Court case, would not try to accomplish by obstructionism what she had failed
to accomplish by litigation. As Hayden stated on August 4, 1963, and reiterated
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on several occasions thereafter: “For forty years I have witnessed the thwarting
of Arizona’s effort to put to use its share of Colorado River water. At every turn
Arizona has encountered the deliberate delaying tactics of California and there
is every reason to believe that his plan of obstructionism will continue.” To his
dismay, he found that “a small group of Californians, notwithstanding previous
commitments, continued to nullify, by delay, the Supreme Court’s decision.”
Although California employed the politics of delay throughout the process of
legislative consideration of the bill, Hayden ﬁrmly believed that the concept of
equity would prevail in the end. Indeed, California had its water, Nevada had its
water, the upper basin was developing its water, and Arizona had nothing. Thus
as he told lawmakers at the outset of legislative consideration of CAP, “I think all
of you know that I have always attempted to help in any way possible with every
project of our western resources—even when I was being fought on my own
project—but quite frankly my patience has been exhausted.”43
In spite of California’s continued opposition, Hayden had powerful
allies in the Senate. His close and respected friend, Senator Henry Jackson
(D-Washington), chaired the Senate Interior Committee. Jackson, whose state
owed much of its post-war prosperity to Hayden-supported federal reclamation
programs, monitored carefully natural resource development and federal
reclamation. Moreover, Jackson’s valued relationship with Senator Hayden
and ﬁrm alliance with President Kennedy served Arizona well throughout
CAP’S various journeys through the Senate between 1963 and 1968. During
the course of arriving at a measure suitable to all contending and conﬂicting
interests, however, California and the upper basin looked to the Northwest and
the Columbia River system to import and augment Colorado River water supplies
in an effort to avoid water shortages made worse by CAP. At one point during
the process, several senators and congressmen contemplated the importation
of 8 million acre feet of water per year from the Columbia River Basin and
even as far north as Canada. Naturally, Jackson saw ﬁt to protect the interests
of his region and took actions to eliminate transbasin transfers of water during
ﬁnal consideration of the CAP bill. In its ﬁnal form the legislation contained a
provision that provided for a ten-year ban on interbasin feasibility studies.44
Hayden also counted on support from Senator Clinton Anderson (D-New
Mexico) who served as chairman of the Power and Reclamation Subcommittee of
the Interior Committee. Anderson held considerable stature in the Senate as well
as with groups concerned with water resource development and, besides, he had a
stake in the bill as it pertained to protecting and extending water entitlements for
his state. Moreover, his especially close relationship with Senator Jackson made
Anderson an important ally in the CAP ﬁght. Indeed, throughout his last term in
ofﬁce, Hayden relied on these two powerful senators to counter the opposition
arguments of California’s two senators, Thomas Kuchel (R-California), the
ranking Republican member of the Senate Interior Committee, and Claire Engle
(R-California), who helped engineer the 1951 defeat of CAP in the House of
Representatives.45
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Thankful for the support he maintained in the Senate, Hayden and his
staff nevertheless knew the real ﬁght for passage remained in the House of
Representatives. Between 1963 and 1968 Arizona, fortunately, had capable
and bipartisan representation in the House. John Rhodes, a Republican, was
a respected and inﬂuential leader among House Republicans who served on
the House appropriations subcommittee which would ultimately provide
money to build the project. George Senner, a northern Arizona Democrat from
Arizona’s then-newly created third district, was untested and soon lost his seat
to the inimitable Sam Steiger of Prescott, a Republican. And Morris Udall, a
member of the key Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, maintained special
responsibilities over the bill. Importantly for Arizona, her three-man team in the
House worked well together during the ﬁnal four and one-half year legislative
history of the bill.
Although Arizona’s House delegation introduced CAP bills identical to
Hayden’s the day after the Supreme Court’s decision, passage was another issue.
Indeed nine out of ten bills introduced and referred to committee never saw a
ﬂoor vote. The power of congressional committees in the House, moreover,
could not be overstated and of special importance were the committee chairmen.
Bills opposed by the chairman rarely emerged from committee for a ﬂoor vote.
The chairman controlled the schedule of hearings on legislation, and undecided
members often followed the chairman’s lead. Since the principal obstacle to
passage of CAP was in the House, the House Interior Committee-and its Irrigation
and Reclamation Subcommittee where the CAP bill was referred-held vital
importance for CAP proponents.46
For Hayden this meant CAP passing through the gauntlet of the House
Interior Committee, chaired by Wayne N. Aspinall. According to most observers
of Colorado River Basin affairs, Aspinall, the former schoolteacher with a testy
disposition who had climbed from a small western Colorado town to chairman of
this all-important committee, distrusted expansionist California and felt similarly
about Arizona. In fact, the river ran under the window of his home on Aspinall
Drive in Palisade, Colorado, and he sought to conserve every acre foot of water
before the lower basin states would take it and never give it back. Mo Udall
considered the sixty-seven-year-old chairman who had served in Congress since
1948 “a superb legislative tactician.” Of utmost concern to Aspinall was the
obvious fact that although entitled to 2.8 million acre feet of water, Arizona’s use
of this amount through CAP might cut sharply into water destined for upper-basin
use but not yet developed. During one crucial phase of CAP’s consideration in
the House Interior Committee in 1967, Hayden, in an uncharacteristic display
of power, threatened to eliminate funding for construction of the Frying PanArkansas Project in Colorado and allowed that he would hold up other projects
important to the House Interior chairman if Aspinall did not move the bill
forward. Therefore, as Hayden knew from the outset of legislative consideration
of his bill, if CAP was going to get past Aspinall and his committee, Colorado
must be satisﬁed.47
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In addition to Aspinall, John Saylor of Pennsylvania, ranking Republican
on the House Interior Committee, continued to frustrate Arizona as he had in the
1950s. Described by one colleague as a “dynamic, hard- hitting protagonist,”
who had earned respect in the House, Saylor was an ardent conservationist who
supported the growth and expansion of the National Park system and advocated
programs for outdoor recreation. Saylor, moreover, backed a strong wilderness
bill, the “integrity of the national parks,” and complained vigorously about the
Bridge Canyon Dam provision of CAP because it threatened to back water into
Grand Canyon National Park. While not opposed to sound reclamation projects
he opposed increasing public power development and spotty ﬁnancing and poor
planning in “marginal reclamation projects.” He voted against the upper Colorado
project in 1956 thereby gaining recognition and support among environmentalists
for his efforts.48
Indeed in 1966 and 1967 environmentalists’ opposition to the construction
of dams in and around Grand Canyon brought nationwide attention to CAP
and threatened to derail the entire project. Environmentalists waged a spirited
campaign against the dams reminiscent of the great battle over Echo Park. By
1966 virtually everyone involved in the legislation—through hearings, meetings,
and “conﬁdential” parlays—knew that the river was over-allocated and most
wanted to see augmentation from the Northwest, so they generally favored the
Grand Canyon dams. As expressed in his ﬁrst Supreme Court CAP bill, Hayden
still advocated construction of Bridge Canyon Dam, as he had since 1947, and
indicated that he also supported Marble Gorge Dam if indeed revenues were
needed to ﬁnance augmentation and other development. Yet the previously
fragmented environmentalist movement, representing diverse interests and a
wide array of organizations, brought signiﬁcant pressure to bear on Congress and
the Johnson administration. They contended that the dams would ﬂood scenic
areas and inundate portions of Grand Canyon National Park and Grand Canyon
National Monument. A few groups, including the Sierra Club, the National Parks
Association, and the Arboretum, saw a great deal to lose with the inclusion of
hydroelectric power dams in the bill.
The California-based Sierra Club, with a national membership of about
40,000 at the time of the battle, was the most prominent and well organized
of the anti-dam environmental groups. Led by its energetic and controversial
director, David Brower, the Sierra Club spearheaded a broadly gauged effort to
ﬁght construction of dams in the vicinity of the Grand Canyon. An impressive
letter writing campaign and an effective public-relations program, underscored
by the strong emotional and symbolic appeal of “saving” the Grand Canyon from
proﬁt-mongering developers, accomplished much for their cause. Brower wrote
President Johnson, Secretary Udall, and other members of the administration
directly, protesting the dams. Soon Johnson administration ofﬁcials, members
of congress, and Arizona’s leaders began receiving thousands of letters daily
from individuals and groups as diverse as the social science faculty at Dartmouth
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College in Hanover, New Hampshire, to ﬁrst grade public school classes in
Sandusky, Ohio.49
In the course of the advocacy campaign, a series of highly publicized wellattended addresses brought further attention to the issue. In Denver, for example,
Brower, speaking before an anti-Grand Canyon dams audience, quipped that he
did not oppose dams in the Grand Canyon as long as the Bureau of Reclamation
built a comparable canyon somewhere else. As one chronicler put it, “Never
before had conservationists challenged the collective will of seven states.”50
By early 1966 the public was suitably convinced that the most
controversial aspect of the legislation involved the two proposed dams. And in
the spring of that year, after Reader’s Digest, Life, and even My Weekly Reader
ran stories attacking the Grand Canyon dams, Hayden realized they posed
insurmountable political obstacles. By early 1967 Hayden, as he met with
senate leaders in efforts to further revise CAP, knew that an alternative source of
energy would be required to pump CAP water to central Arizona. In a July 1967
memorandum to President Johnson advising him that the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs had overwhelmingly recommended passage of
S. 1004, the CAP bill-for the fourth time-he added that this legislation contained
“no new Colorado River dams.” As Elson interpreted the outcome of the antidam ﬁght: “Most people in the East and other places were for CAP, but they were
against the dams because they had been informed by Brower and his operatives
that within the region there existed adequate amounts of alternative energy
sources, notably low-grade coal.” As a result Hayden and Arizona were forced
to accept an alternative to hydroelectric power. Yet, as historian Donald Worster
explained in his analysis of this environmentalist victory, they lost something as
well. In exchange for Grand Canyon dams, energy required for CAP was derived
instead from coal strip-mined on Hopi lands at Black Mesa and burned in the
Navajo Generating Station near Page “polluting crystalline desert air with ash and
poison gas.” As one Reclamation ofﬁcial explained the paradox, “it didn’t solve a
damn thing except it gave us power to pump water to central Arizona.”51
If acquiescing on the dam issue, incorporating aspects of Secretary Udall’s
regional plan, and jousting with Congressman Aspinall’s upper basin demands in
the House proved difﬁcult but tolerable, Hayden had great difﬁculty with another
necessary compromise. From the start of congressional negotiations California’s
senators made it clear that its central demand for dropping opposition to CAP
would be a ﬁrst priority of 4.4 million acre feet awarded it in the CAP legislative
battle, Roy Elson recalled: “For California...it all became an argument about what
to do about the shortages in the river… we got into these early difﬁculties mainly
over that issue.” Hayden knew immediately the implications of the demand;
California wanted Arizona to regulate their mainstream diversions so that
California would never receive less than 4.4 million acre feet out of the
7.5 million acre feet lower-basin allocation. At ﬁrst an intransigent Hayden
refused to negotiate the issue with California senator Kuchel. By 1965, however,
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as time seemed to get shorter and the issue more complex, the bill in the Eightyeighth and Eighty-ninth congresses carried provisions for twenty-ﬁve-and twentyseven- year guarantees for California’s 4.4 priority. In the ﬁnal version of the bill,
however, Arizona promised California that CAP diversions “shall be so limited as
to assure the availability” of 4.4 million acre feet annually in perpetuity.52
As Hayden neared the last year of his ﬁnal term in ofﬁce and CAP
remained stalled in the House Interior Committee in spite of the numerous
concessions already made, a frustrated and impatient state leadership triggered
another minor complication for the senator. Rumor of an Arizona “Go-It-Alone”
CAP, promoted by the state conservatives and elements within the Arizona Power
Authority (APA) ﬁrst surfaced in 1963. A prominent feature of the state-ﬁnanced
and operated plan included the successful application of the Arizona Power
Authority to the Federal Power Commission to ﬁnance, construct, and manage a
hydroelectric power dam on the Colorado River. Hayden quickly thwarted this
untimely effort by shepherding through Congress a bill (S. 502) that preserved
the jurisdiction of Congress over the construction of hydroelectric power works
below Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River. With the passage of S. 502 on
June 23, 1964, those Arizonans calling for a state-owned and operated CAP were
effectively prohibited from taking action though they lobbied the senator and
threatened continuously to take action as late as 1967. While the state “Go-ItAlone” plan reﬂected the lack of consensus within Arizona over CAP strategy, it
was more accurately an illustration of the high degree of frustration over repeated
legislative delays in the CAP bi1l.53
By the end of 1967, after seemingly endless negotiations among and
within states, implementing selected provisions from over thirty Department
of Interior studies and discarding others, crafting suitable and appropriate legal
language, and including the time-honored pork barrel beneﬁts for those politicians
who needed to “bring home the bacon,” CAP was ﬁnally ready to move. Key
in breaking the political logjam in California was newly-elected Republican
governor Ronald Reagan, who began direct and productive negotiations
with Arizona’s Republican governor Jack Williams. Reagan informed his
administrators that he had “become increasingly concerned over the serious
impasse… relative to the Colorado River legislation and with the adverse impact
this stalemate is having on other programs in California and on reclamation
throughout the West.” Another crucial element in prompting ﬁnal action was
Hayden’s pressure on House Interior chairman Aspinall, who in the fall returned
from a “vacation” in Colorado and was virtually forced to hold ﬁnal hearings
on the bill and report it out of committee. The legislation, depending on one’s
perspective, was either light enough or heavy enough to move. During the spring
of 1968, as Hayden and his staff participated in fashioning the ﬁnal compromises
and details in conference committee, most of the key players who participated in
creating the measure that emerged from Congress—even opponents of CAP like
California’s Thomas Kuchel—could not disguise their profound pleasure that
Senator Hayden came away from the momentous struggle with one last political
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victory. On September 12, 1968, when the Senate agreed to the House version
of the Colorado River Basin Project Act, the ninety year-old Hayden received
glowing tributes for his persistent efforts. The senator quietly acknowledged the
accolades with nods of appreciation. On September 30, 1968, President Johnson,
at a ceremony attended by Senator Hayden and other Arizona dignitaries, signed
CAP into law.54
Besides CAP, the legislation included authorization of several other
controversial reclamation projects as well, including Hooker Dam in New
Mexico, an aqueduct from Lake Mead to Las Vegas, the Dixie Project in Utah,
and the Uintah Unit of the Central Utah Project. The Act also authorized the
San Miguel, Dallas Creek, West Divide, Dolores, and Animas La-Plata projects
in Aspinall’s state of Colorado. Additionally, it authorized the establishment of
a Lower Colorado River Development Fund to build a still-yet-to-be-deﬁned
augmentation project. Finally, the bill made delivery of Mexico’s 1.5 million acre

24.2. President Lyndon Baines Johnson hands the pen with which he signed the
Colorado River Basin Projects Act on September 30, 1968, to Senator Carl Hayden.

feet of water a national, not regional, responsibility. This legislation, signed into
law two days before Hayden’s ninety-ﬁrst birthday, was—at the time—the most
expensive single congressional authorization in history, containing $1.3 billion for
implementation of the program.55
On May 6, 1968, shortly before the ﬁnal touches were being completed
on CAP, Hayden was led into the Appropriations Committee chamber jammed
with senators, friends from Arizona, and a few representatives from the media.
President Johnson arrived bearing a pair of walnut bookends and issued a short,
grandiloquent tribute. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, Hayden’s best friend
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in the Senate, then chaired a brief ceremony and introduced Hayden. The Arizona
senator walked slowly to the dais and announced,
Among other things that ﬁfty-six years in Congress have taught me
is that contemporary events need contemporary men. Time actually
makes specialists of us all. When a house is built there is a moment
for the foundation, another for the roof, the walls, and so on. Arizona’s
foundation includes fast highways, adequate electric power, and
abundant water, and these foundations have been laid. It is time for a
new building crew to report, so I have decided to retire from ofﬁce at the
close of my term this year.

Then, as cameras clicked, Hayden burst into tears, as did nearly everyone else in
the crowded room. With the typically brief announcement, Hayden signaled the
end of his congressional service.56
Most accounts of the political and legal history of CAP dutifully
acknowledge Hayden’s preeminent role in bringing water to central Arizona. Yet
the veteran senator’s inﬂuence has been obscured by the length of the process, the
legendary Arizona v California Supreme Court case, and the thousands of pages
of mind-numbing technical and ﬁscal testimony in the Congressional Record.
Hayden, more than any other CAP proponent, fashioned the legislative strategies
that shaped CAP’s conﬁguration in the public mind. His actions and statements
before innumerable congressional committees not only provide an important
perspective for assessing CAP’s broader economic, social, and environmental
signiﬁcance, but also reveal Arizona’s profound role in fashioning solutions to
vexing regional and national issues. Indeed, the hundreds of miles of canals,
pumping stations, and water-delivery systems that today wind their way through
miles of desert stand as a testament, for better or worse, to Hayden’s towering
public career.57
The realization of Carl Hayden’s dream—the CAP—at the end of the
twentieth century raises some fundamental questions. Will the desert bloom in the
twenty-ﬁrst century with renewed agricultural activity and urban expansion? Or,
is this water-based civilization in a fragile ecosystem doomed to ﬂourish brieﬂy—
then disappear? Will Las Vegas and southern California, both pressing against
their environmental limits and desperately seeking a greater share of lower-basin
water, succeed in forcing Arizona back to the federal bargaining table? Certainly
Hayden foresaw these questions and sensed their implications even as he fought
mightily for the beneﬁcial implementation of federal reclamation in the arid West.
Put another way, Hayden focused much of his considerable energy on
the single, most important factor confronting his arid constituents—the search
for large quantities of fresh water. Throughout his congressional career he
represented the “heart of the West,” which was to historian Walter Prescott Webb
“a desert unqualiﬁed and absolute… a gigantic ﬁre” that deﬁed human settlement
and economic development, yet vividly deﬁned the region as a unique place on
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the American landscape. From Hayden’s perspective, Arizona and the Southwest
were deﬁcient in comparison with other parts of the country, and the most notable
deﬁciency was water. Much of his public career, as exempliﬁed in the legislative
ﬁght for CAP, was devoted to rectifying that deﬁciency.
Underlying the mad scramble for Colorado River water was the peculiarly
western obsession with economic growth and development. This almost myopic
quest in the environmentally sensitive central Arizona desert has come under close
scrutiny in recent years. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have revisited the
era of the western water wars and orgy of dam building, and have come away with
profound questions regarding the long-term effects of environmental manipulation
and the ultimate fate of the Colorado River, which one interpreter describes as “A
River No More.” As scholars and politicians reassess and revise their economic
and environmental interpretations of federal reclamation, Carl Hayden will stand
out as one public ﬁgure that in many ways symbolized this critical movement
in the American West. Without question water has been among the region’s
most critical concerns in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. No doubt the
environment will continue to inﬂuence the direction of public policy in the region
in the twenty-ﬁrst century as well.58
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Federal Reclamation in the Twentieth Century:
A Centennial Retrospective
By:
Donald J. Pisani
Abstract
The Reclamation Act of 1902 dedicated proceeds from the sale
of public lands in the western half of the United States to the construction
of irrigation works. Proponents of the legislation promised on the ﬂoor of
Congress, that “worthless” lives trapped in the tenements of eastern cities could
be reclaimed along with “worthless” desert land in the West. Congress required
the farmers who beneﬁted to repay the cost of irrigation works over ten years,
so the program was expected to be self-supporting. By the time Theodore
Roosevelt left ofﬁce in 1909, two dozen projects had been launched, at least
one in every state and territory, but none had been completed. With notable
exceptions, those projects did not live up to expectations. Federal reclamation
never became self-supporting, and some projects came to resemble rural slums.
Not until the 1930s, when the “High Dam Era” gave the bureau responsibilities
for providing water and power to cities as well as farms, did it become the most
important federal agency in the West. From 1930 to 1970 the water and power
provided by the bureau transformed the region, but since 1970 the bureau has
been but a shadow of the robust agency that once dammed the West.
This paper focuses mainly on two periods of bureau history, its ﬁrst
decade and the quarter-century from the end of World War II to about 1970. I
make three basic arguments: ﬁrst, that in 1902 the Reclamation Bureau and its
leaders were motivated more by nineteenth than by twentieth-century values;
second, that the Reclamation Bureau did as much to decentralize power over
water as to consolidate it in Washington; and, third, that federal reclamation died
as much because it failed to sustain its original ideals as because it ran out of
places to build dams, suffered from the constraints of economic retrenchment, or
fell prey to the environmental movement.

When Congress adopted the Reclamation Act in June 1902 it launched
potentially the biggest public works program in American history. Harper’s
Weekly proclaimed that
the bill aims at substantial and enduring effects upon the broader
economic development of the nation. There was and still is in some
quarters an ill-judged disposition to regard it as of merely sectional
interest: but in the true analysis its signiﬁcance is national not local. … A
hundred million [irrigated] acres will give homes for a million families,
and afford sustenance for many times that number.

New York City’s Christian Work applauded the new national program as
one of the stupendous tasks of the opening century.… The ﬁrst year of
the Roosevelt administration has been rendered not more notable by the
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determination to build the Isthmian Canal than by the passage of the bill
to water the dry lands of the great American West.

Philadelphia’s Inquirer lamented that “the only ultimate regret will be
that so beneﬁcent a work was not sooner undertaken,” and the New York Times
applauded the bold new legislation as the last phase in the conquest of a continent:
The irrigation plan is but adding to the general resources of the nation
in furtherance of the impulse which has carried our vigorous race from
the little fringe along the Atlantic to the shores of the Paciﬁc and far into
Asian waters. 1

To be sure, the opponents of the legislation quickly reined in the bureau’s
grand ambitions. Eastern and Midwestern farm organizations feared that the rapid
expansion of irrigated land in the West would return the nation to the agricultural
depression of the 1890s. Inevitably, they argued, adding 100,000,000 acres to the
nation’s farmland—an area roughly the size of California—would depress crop
and land values. Why not reclaim abandoned land in the East, they asked, land
closer to the nation=s major cities? Why should prospective farm families have
to pay the cost of moving two or three thousand miles to deserts far removed
from agricultural markets? Farm organizations such as the National Grange
found a strong ally in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which consistently
opposed the national reclamation program. And many easterners within Congress
feared that even though the Reclamation Act promised that reclamation would
be paid for from sales of public land, and from reimbursement of the cost of the
hydraulic works by the farmers who beneﬁted, the day would come when the
West demanded money from the general treasury, following the precedent of
nineteenth century river and harbor bills. Another concern was that the program
would beneﬁt established farmers and private landowners in the West more
than those who settled on “virgin land.” Few large tracts of arable public land
remained, even within the deserts of the West, so the bureau would have to make
accommodations with private landowners. In short, even in 1902 support for
federal reclamation was thin and brittle.2
The misconceptions of the bureau itself compounded the lack of
widespread support for the new program. At ﬁrst, Reclamation Service engineers
assumed that all desert land was fertile, given enough water. So strong was
this conviction that on many projects the soil was not tested until years after the
project had opened. Much of that soil—20 or 30 percent on some projects—had
to be abandoned, at great cost to individual farmers as well as to the nation. Then,
too, Reclamation Service ofﬁcials assumed that most desert land would require
only one acre-foot of water a year—a supply of water sufﬁcient to cover the land
irrigated a foot deep—while most land required three to ﬁve times that amount.
On many projects, farmers complained that the government could not deliver the
water they needed. Another misconception was that the appetite for land within
government projects would remain strong for decades to come. After all, the
nation had absorbed over 400,000,000 acres of new farm land in the decades after
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the Civil War as the Great Plains were opened to agriculture. The Reclamation
Service could not anticipate changes in technology, agriculture, and the sheer cost
of farming that would make virgin land far less attractive in the twentieth century
than it had been in the nineteenth. Nor could it foresee how the standard of living
of those who lived in America=s large cities would increase. Federal reclamation
had been launched with the expectation that it would provide a subsistence to
small farmers. But by the 1920s, the new consumer economy had redeﬁned the
“good life” in the United States, and farm families began to emulate the living
standards of urbanites.
Let me begin by challenging the idea that, as part of the Progressive Era’s
conservation movement, the Reclamation Act represented the ethics of “science,”
or helped to create the “modern” American state. These are important arguments,
foundation blocks of the “organizational synthesis” popularized by historians
such as Samuel Hays and Robert Wiebe in the 1960s, and an interpretation that
still has considerable appeal to historians of the United States. “The modern
American conservation movement grew out of the ﬁrsthand experience of
federal administrators and political leaders with problems of Western economic
growth,” Hays wrote in Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, “and more
precisely with Western water development.”3 Like silviculture, hydrology was a
new science that promised the rational, orderly use of natural resources. It also
promised to promote bureaucratic planning by experts and reorder a constellation
of political institutions around the executive branch of government.
Yet this interpretation fails to recognize the strong links between the
Reclamation Act and nineteenth century laws and values, particularly the
Homestead Act (1862). In 1800, Congress had permitted settlers and speculators
to purchase public land on credit, with up to four years to pay. That law proved
to be a disaster. Those who purchased the land quickly fell in arrears on their
payments. Congress granted many extensions before it excused their debt
completely. A century later, in the four years that preceded adoption of the
Reclamation Act, most westerners favored using river and harbor appropriations,
or proceeds from the sale of grazing permits or timber on the public lands, to pay
for the construction of dams and canals. Using proceeds from public lands, and
requiring farmers to repay construction costs, was a compromise. In a 1914 letter
to Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, George H. Maxwell, the publicist
most responsible for pushing the Reclamation Act through Congress, admitted:
“We accepted… repayment from the land because it enabled us to get our bill
through. Those who understood political conditions never believed the money
would be paid back.” From the beginning, federal reclamation was regarded
by many westerners as what we would today call an “entitlement program.”
Government farmers, and the many private landowners who owned land within
government projects, resisted repaying their debt to the government long before
the hard times of the 1920s and 1930s hit the West.4
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Federal reclamation looked to the
past in many other ways as well. The
most fateful early decision made by the
Reclamation Service was to launch too
many projects too soon. This typiﬁed
distributional politics: no public works
program could be launched that did not
distribute beneﬁts as widely as possible.
The Reclamation Act required that
51 percent of the proceeds of public land
sales be spent within the state or territory
in which that land had been sold. Yet
the Reclamation Act did not require that
so many projects be launched so soon.
That was a political decision made by
President Theodore Roosevelt. Late
in 1901 or early in 1902, Roosevelt
warned against undertaking too many
25.1. Secretary of the Interior Franklin K.
Lane.
government projects at once:
It would be unwise to begin by doing too much, for a great deal will
doubtless be learned, both as to what can and what can not be safely
attempted, by the early efforts, which must of necessity be partly
experimental in character. At the very beginning the Government should
make clear, beyond [any] shadow of doubt, its intention to pursue this
policy on lines of the broadest public interest. No reservoir or canal
should ever be built to satisfy selﬁsh personal or local interests.5

Yet Roosevelt soon changed his mind. When the Reclamation Act passed
Congress in June, 1902, Democrats as well as Republicans took credit for the
legislation. Indeed, it was Francis G. Newlands, a maverick Congressman
from Nevada but nominally a Democrat, who sponsored the bill in the House
of Representatives. The Republican Party was dominant in most parts of the
West, but Roosevelt expected that Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma would
soon join the union, and he wanted to maintain the West as a stronghold of his
party. Therefore, two weeks after passage of the Reclamation Act, TR advised
the Secretary of the Interior that “instead of starting on a few large [model]
enterprises, I should think it would be best to divide up the work among the
different States as fairly [that is, widely] as possible.” Smaller projects could be
completed more rapidly, insuring that the beneﬁts of federal reclamation would
be felt before TR left the White House. The greatest public works program
undertaken in the history of the United States would be indelibly associated with
Theodore Roosevelt and his party.6
Perhaps the strongest link to the past was in the attitudes Reclamation
Service ofﬁcials exhibited toward the farmers they served. The ﬁrst director
of the Reclamation Service, Frederick Haynes Newell, had never designed an
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irrigation system when he assumed that
job. The ethics of science and efﬁciency
did not dominate Newell’s thinking,
and he regarded federal reclamation
as an experiment in social Darwinism.
Some had to fail so that others could
succeed. Newell’s chief rival to head
the reclamation program, Elwood Mead,
deeply believed in social planning,
but Newell did not. Few of the ﬁrst
settlers on government projects lasted

25.2. President Theodore Roosevelt.

a decade, but Newell denied that
the Reclamation Bureau had any
responsibility for their failure and
lack of success. The fault lay with
the settlers. “The characteristics of
present settlers are in many respects
entirely different from those of the
older pioneer communities,” he
25.3. Francis G. Newlands while senator
complained in 1912. “[T]here is
representing Nevada.
not the spirit of cooperation which
ruled the early pioneers.” In his 1916
textbook on irrigation, written just after he left the Reclamation Service, Newell
noted that more than 75 percent of the ﬁrst settlers on federal irrigation projects
had ﬂed the land within a few years of entry. He concluded:
The irrigators as a body are not only inexperienced, but many of them
are disappointed in that they have expected easier things. Thus they do
not always appreciate the efforts made in their behalf. There has been
attracted to the locality [the arid West] a considerable number of men
who have never made a success elsewhere; these attribute their failure
to make good under the new conditions not to their own inability, but
largely to the faults of the country or system.… He is attracted usually
by glowing accounts of the relative ease of acquiring wealth in the West,
and with erroneous ideas concerning the conditions to be met… There
has thus arisen a class which has been called the “professional pioneer,”
always seeking for something a little better or for conditions where life
will be easier; staying in any locality only a few months and then again
seeking El Dorado.
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And in 1922 Newell proclaimed that “The reasons for success or failure lie not
so much in climate, soil, or markets, but rather in the character of the landowner,
his experience, strength, health, and especially the ‘will to win,’ or possession
of qualities which distinguish the pioneer.” The biggest problem with federal
reclamation, in Newell=s mind, was that the virile rural population had gone
soft. Newell’s ideas—and they were shared by many of his lieutenants—were
anachronistic in an age when the cost of setting up a new farm had soared and
when city life looked increasingly attractive to the nation=s rural residents.7
Another part of the organizational synthesis is the argument that
conservation and federal reclamation helped to centralize power in Washington.
In 1906, the publication Forestry and Irrigation, which largely spoke for the
bureau, editorialized that “There is probably no law on the statute books which
puts in the hands of a single ofﬁcial of government such unlimited powers of
expenditure as the [Reclamation Act.]”8 The Reclamation Act gave the secretary
of the interior power to select projects, determine the size of farms, withdraw
from entry the public lands needed for farms or towns, purchase or condemn
existing dams and canals, approve construction contracts, and set the amount
each farmer owed the government as well as operation and maintenance charges.
During the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, however, most important
decisions were made by the president or in the ofﬁces of the Reclamation Service.
Neither the secretary of the interior nor the director of the U.S. Geological Survey,
of which the service was a part until 1907, ever vetoed a project proposed by the
Reclamation Service.
Most historians look at conﬂicts between Congress, the secretaries of
the interior, and settlers on government projects as dominant themes in the
Reclamation Bureau’s history over the ﬁrst three decades of this century. The
bureau’s relationship with the states has been largely ignored, in part because
that relationship does not square with the pervasive view that the bureau simply
imposed its will on the West. Yet after 1910 or 1911 the Reclamation Service’s
chronic lack of funds persuaded it to seek assistance from the states, and more
often than not resistance to cooperation came from the states rather than from
ofﬁcials within the Reclamation Service. One of the most important amendments
to the original Reclamation Act, the Warren Act of 1911, allowed the Reclamation
Service to sell surplus water to owners of land outside the government projects,
blurring the lines between federal and private water projects. Proponents of the
legislation argued that the West=s major rivers contained few ideal reservoir sites
and that the Reclamation Service could often build a dam that would serve twice
as much land as could be irrigated within a government project for little more
money. Therefore, the Warren Act permitted the Reclamation Service to contract
with private companies, water user associations, or irrigation districts to pay
either for part of the dam, or part of the water stored behind the dam. In either
case, since the money would be paid into the reclamation fund, providing water
to private irrigation projects would produce another source of income. This law
proved enormously important to the Reclamation Bureau, and by the 1950s the
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federal government watered nearly as much land outside its projects as within.
In the Snake River Valley, for example, the Jackson Lake Dam at the head of the
river provided water to privately irrigated land as far west as Twin Falls, as well
as to the government’s Minidoka Project near Rupert.9
As early as 1904 William Ellsworth Smythe, Francis G. Newlands,
and other friends of federal reclamation proposed using irrigation districts to
supplement the funds available to the Reclamation Service, particularly in states
like California, which offered few opportunities to construct government projects
on the public domain. Irrigation districts, which were institutions created by the
state with the power to tax the land within their boundaries and issue bonds to
pay for hydraulic works, would turn the Reclamation Service into a construction
agency responsible for reducing the cost of construction and ensuring the quality
of dams and canals—or so Smythe hoped. However, the Reclamation Act of
1902 gave the Interior Department no authority to build such hybrid projects, and
within Congress easterners and midwesterners balked at expanding the scope of
the law. Moreover, many westerners feared that federal reclamation meant federal
control over their surplus water.10
In 1915 a Reclamation Service ofﬁcial drafted a plan to create a second
reclamation fund exclusively to construct dams and canals within private
irrigation projects, but nothing came of it.11 World War I offered the best
opportunity for cooperation. At the end of the war, in anticipation of post-war
unemployment, Secretary of the Interior Lane proposed a massive program to
put 50,000 returning veterans to work clearing stumps, leveling land, laying out
townsites, and building houses, barns, and roads. His bill proposed a partnership
between the states and central government. The states could donate unimproved
land to the federal government, leaving reclamation and settlement to the
Reclamation Bureau, or they could pay at least one-fourth of the entire cost,
from purchasing the land to building houses, barns and roads. The legislation
required the states to create soldier settlement boards to screen applicants and
to administer the completed projects. The states would also provide returning
soldiers with agricultural training, sharing that cost with the federal government.
Particularly after crop and land prices began to fall in 1919, the Lane legislation
fell victim to the post-war economic slump and the absence of grassroots support
for reclamation or planned settlements.12
Throughout the 1920s, the Reclamation Bureau encouraged the western
states to play a larger role in federal reclamation, but the states refused. State
politicians argued that providing irrigated land was a national responsibility, that
there was no demand for more irrigated land, that hybrid projects would threaten
state control over water rights, and that constitutional debt limitations prevented
the states from buying land, preparing it for cultivation, or constructing irrigation
and drainage works. Oddly enough, hybrid projects had the greatest appeal in the
state’s rights South, not the West. Since the early years of federal reclamation,
the Reclamation Bureau had wanted to extend its operations to include swamp
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and cutover, as well as arid lands. In 1918 Secretary of the Interior Franklin
K. Lane, with the encouragement of the Reclamation Service, persuaded
Congress to appropriate $100,000 to study the reclamation of wastelands in
the South. President Woodrow Wilson heartily endorsed the plan. Additional
expenditures followed in 1926, 1927, and 1928. In 1926 a committee consisting
of representatives from the federal and state governments, along with private
interests, selected four potential project sites. Congress, however, balked at
opening new farmland during a time of agricultural depression.13
Congressional appropriations for public works increased dramatically
during the 1930s, and as the bureau’s budget soared its appeals for state aid
all but disappeared. Power did increase in Washington as a result of the high
dam projects undertaken in the 1930s, but state and local institutions of water
management also proliferated. Boulder Dam is a case in point. The Metropolitan
Water District (MWD), formed to carry water and power to Los Angeles from
the Colorado River, used the irrigation district—a state and local institution—as
a model. Even though the Reclamation Bureau operated Parker Dam—the origin
of the aqueduct from the Colorado River to Los Angeles—it used funds provided
by the MWD. The MWD was also a bridge between the federal government and
private utility companies. Apparently, the bureau got the idea of using power
revenue to ﬁnance Boulder Dam from William Mulholland and E. F. Scattergood,
the latter of whom had designed and supervised the water and power systems of
Los Angeles. Homer Hamlin, who served as Los Angeles City Engineer during
the 1920s, was one of the ﬁrst to conceive of a multiple-purpose dam in Boulder
or Black Canyon, and in 1929 F. E. Weymouth, who had been chief engineer
of the Reclamation Bureau under A. P. Davis, was chosen to head the MWD.
Weymouth hired many former employees of the Reclamation Bureau who had left
government service during the Harding scandals of the 1920s. Here again, the
line between federal, state, and private institutions is very blurry.14
Thus far I’ve focused on federal reclamation in the ﬁrst few decades of
the twentieth century. The conventional wisdom among professional historians
is that Boulder Dam and the other great dam projects conceived during the
1930s, including Grand Coulee and Shasta, resurrected the bureau’s reputation
at the expense of the family farm and the rural West. During the 1930s, this
interpretation runs, the bureau turned its attention to western cities, and World
War II increased the importance of the urban West. But that interpretation is at
best misleading. The bureau did much more than build high dams during the
1930s. By 1941 there were forty-six Bureau of Reclamation irrigation projects
in the West and another twenty-seven under construction. That was more
than double the number of projects in 1920, and preliminary surveys had been
completed on an additional forty-eight projects. There was a surprising growth in
irrigated land after 1935. From 1920 to 1935 the amount of land irrigated by the
bureau increased only modestly—from 1.2 million acres to 1.6 million. By the
end of World War II, however, the bureau irrigated twice as much land within the
government projects as in 1920.15
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The Reclamation Bureau had good reason to publicize the glamorous
high dams more than its irrigation projects because the chronic and intractable
problems it had encountered during the Progressive Era remained. Farmers
everywhere suffered from the depression of the 1930s, but nowhere were times
harder than on most of the government projects. There were big differences
between such successful projects as the Yakima and Salt River and those in
Montana. But a 1940 survey of the projects settled between 1931 and 1940
revealed desperate poverty. Sixty percent of the original settlers on the ValeOwyhee Project in eastern Oregon had left their farms, or leased their land to
others. Seventy-ﬁve percent of the homes on that project cost less than $350, and
half had two rooms or less—even though the average-size farm family numbered
ﬁve. Forty percent of those Oregon families could not afford to dig a well, so
they carried their drinking water ﬁve miles or more, and many common diseases,
including typhoid fever, went untreated because the settlers were too poor to hire
a doctor. On the other hand, many conditions remained beyond the Reclamation
Bureau’s control. A 1936 study of 136 farmers who had settled on the Klamath
Project along the California-Oregon border in 1927 revealed that most who left
their farms had homesteaded for speculative reasons, fully expecting to sell out, or
they were lured away by the city, or pushed away by old age, illness, or divorce.
Not all farmers who abandoned government projects did so because they had
“failed,” or because they lacked experience or capital.16
Nevertheless, for all its problems, the dream of the family farm remained
strong in the years following World War II. Most historians who have written
about the bureau after the war have failed to recognize the idealism that animated
its leaders, at least from 1945 to 1953. In those years, the Interior Department
was ﬁlled with New Dealers who wanted to build a better world, including Harold
Ickes, Abe Fortas, Oscar Chapman, Michael Straus, Arthur Goldschmidt, and
Stephen Rauschenbush. Many smaller irrigation projects were designed as much
to provide supplemental water outside government projects—to farmers who
irrigated but suffered from inadequate water supplies—as to open new land to
cultivation. However, the Interior Department hoped to settle 45,000 returning
veterans and their families on the government projects—the biggest of which
would irrigate one million acres of Avirgin land@ within the Columbia Basin—
opening nearly as many new farms as had been settled from 1902 to 1945.17
But the bureau’s objectives were not always consistent, and jobs, power,
and water for cities often worked at cross purposes with the homestead ideal.
At the end of the war, as during the 1930s, the paramount concern was jobs.
Ofﬁcials in the Interior Department concluded that a permanent increase in public
works spending would not just prevent the United States from lapsing back
into the depression as the nation converted to a peacetime economy, but would
provide sustained economic growth and serve as an antidote to the boom and bust
cycles inherent in capitalism. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes predicted
that 14,500,000 would lose their jobs at the end of the war. Such agencies as the
Reclamation Bureau, Corps of Engineers, Forest Service, and Soil Conservation
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Service had plans for plenty of worthy projects that they could begin within
three months of the war’s end. In April 1945 the bureau proposed to Congress
415 irrigation and multiple-purpose water projects in seventeen western states.
State-by-state the number varied, from a modest ﬁve projects in Washington to
ninety-six in Montana, and from 101,000 acres in Utah to 2.2 million acres in
California. These projects were expected to add 11,000,000 acres of new land to
cultivation and provide supplemental water to nearly as many acres of old land.
That was twice the amount of land irrigated in 1945. Secretary of the Interior
Harold Ickes—who had headed the Public Works Administration during the New
Deal—estimated that the post-war work would provide one year’s employment
for at least 1.5 million returning veterans.18 The bureau’s budget went from 50
million in 1946, to 120 million in
1947, to 200 million in 1948, to over
300 million in 1950. Gone was the
idea that dams and canals should be
built using the proceeds from land
sales or oil leases. Reclamation had
become a symbol of national economic
growth, and a method to avoid future
depressions.19
But federal reclamation
meant much more than jobs. Interior
Department ofﬁcials argued that
federal reclamation could help win the
Cold War, just as the power it produced
had helped to win World War II.
Nevertheless, Secretary of the Interior
Oscar Chapman feared, in his words,
25.4. Secretary of the Interior Oscar L.
Chapman.
that the United States ran
a grave danger of saddling ourselves with a straight military economy.
If that happens we shall ﬁnd that the old economic freedoms which give
American life so much of its richness have disappeared. We shall be
supporting an enormous budget, with a huge proportion for defense, and
yet ﬁnd ourselves poor as church mice where our great basic programs
are involved. Yet those programs—irrigation and land development
projects, proper care for our national park system, intelligent
development of our river systems, and so on—are the things which make
the difference between the rich cultural society we are used to and a
pinched, Spartan existence which is inevitable under a straight military
economy. For instance, we are nearing the ceiling on the growth and
stability that can be achieved by our Western States without increased,
broad-scale irrigation and related water resources development.20

Since 1920 a dramatic demographic change had occurred within the West.
Parts of the region lost population during the 1930s, but overall the eleven states
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of the Far West gained 60 percent as compared to a 24 percent increase in the
entire population of the United States. During World War II, the difference was
even more pronounced. The population of the Far West increased by nearly
18 percent while that of the nation as a whole increased less than 1 percent. Much
of that increase occurred within California, Oregon, and Washington, and those
states continued to grow at a rapid rate after the war. From 1940 to 1950, their
population increased at a rate three times faster than the nation as a whole.21
The West’s population boom promised to prevent the Reclamation
Bureau from returning to the dark years of the 1920s. But most of the region’s
population growth during World War II was due to war industries, and ofﬁcials
within Interior feared that as those industries disappeared the West would return
to an extractive economy, one that attracted raw material producing companies
that could proﬁt the cheap power no longer used in such defense industries
as ship or plane building. Arthur Goldschmidt, who headed the Interior
Department’s Division of Power at the end of the war, thought that the region
held a disproportionate number of “rural, low income groups.” People who
lived at or near the subsistence level, in his judgment, “do not contribute to the
national welfare or to a healthy economy in any region.” He wanted to use cheap
hydroelectric power to decentralize industry in the United States so that every
part of the nation, in his words, contained a “balanced economy, a combination
of agriculture and industry based upon the natural resources of the region itself....
Colonies are out-of-date as mere sources of raw materials and as markets. They
are economic anachronisms.” During World War II, many British economists
and sociologists traveled to the United States to inspect the Tennessee Valley
Authority. One visitor, Julian Huxley, likened the American South and West to
the colonial problem of the British in Nigeria.22
Arthur Goldschmidt called for large-scale planning in the West. At the end
of the war, however, powerful opposition surfaced within the West to expanding
the “TVA-idea” or river basin planning. While the Reclamation Bureau often sold
large water projects as part of the defense effort during the Cold War, they also
deepened suspicions about planning and “big government.” The 1948 Republican
platform called for sharp reductions in foreign and domestic spending, and it
opposed the creation of “all-powerful Federal socialistic valley authorities.” By
1952 the New Deal had become “creeping Socialism” to conservatives within
the Republican Party, and planning had become associated with Communism.
In September 1950 on the ﬂoor of the United States Senate, Senator William
Knowland of California charged that Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman,
Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Straus, and Assistant Secretary of the
Interior William Warne, “have a scarlet left-of-left record that extends back many
years, even to the early years of the New Deal.” As early as 1938 Knowland
charged, Chapman belonged to the American League Against War and Fascism.
“This outﬁt,” the senator proclaimed, “has been ofﬁcially branded as a simon-pure
and unchallenged transmission belt of the Communist Party in America.” Another
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employee of the Interior Department, H. Stephen Rauschenbush, was, according
to Knowland, “probably the chief prophet of modern American Marxism.”23
Senator Knowland notwithstanding, no federal bureau had greater
prominence in the West during the 1950s than the Reclamation Bureau, and it
is interesting to consider why such a powerful agency faded from the limelight
so rapidly during the last few decades. Several explanations have been offered,
each of which has merit. The environmental movement certainly played a part.
In the post-war years, many members of the Sierra Club, Audubon, and other
environmental groups considered themselves conservationists. Their battle was
over where dams should be located, not the construction of dams per se. Dams
should not ﬂood land in national parks or national monuments, nor should they
imperil the West’s scenic wonders. Some historians think that the battle against
dams in Echo Park, the Grand Canyon, Glen Canyon and other parts of the West
played a large part in creating the modern environmental movement.24
Later, in the 1960s and after, environmentalists began to oppose all
dams. On some rivers, particularly the Columbia and Snake, massive numbers
of ﬁsh perished because dams depleted oxygen, reduced water temperatures
upstream in reservoirs, increased temperatures in the sluggish water downstream,
and limited the ability of rivers to dilute sewage and other contaminants in the
water. At the least, dams contributed to the proliﬁc growth of algae, at the most
to eutrophication. Water projects also had a profound effect on the habitat of
terrestrial animals, contributed to the buildup of alkali, salts and other dangerous
elements in the soil (including selenium) and to groundwater depletion. Yet
the environmental movement did not kill dam-building in the West. More
signiﬁcant than opposition to water projects from groups outside government was
opposition to new dams and canals from federal agencies concerned with water
quality and wildlife habitat. In the 1970s, R. L. Coughlin of the Federal Water
Quality Administration publicly charged that the Bureau of Reclamation was the
prime source of water pollution in the Far West. While the U.S. Department of
Agriculture and the Corps of Engineers had been strong critics of the Reclamation
Bureau during the early decades of the twentieth century, by the 1970s many
other agencies opposed the bureau, notably the Fish and Wildlife Service and the
Environmental Protection Agency. In the battle over the Garrison Diversion Unit
in North Dakota, they were joined by the President’s Council on Environmental
Quality, the State Department, the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, and the
General Accounting Ofﬁce.25
Marc Reisner has provided another answer to the question of what
happened to federal reclamation. To Reisner, the collapse of the Teton Dam
in 1976, built on a tributary of the Snake River in 1975 despite warnings from
U.S. Geological Survey engineers of unstable rock and earthquake hazards
in the region, symbolized the end of the dam-building era. When sections of
that structure dissolved and washed away, eleven people died, 15,000 were left
homeless, 13,000 cattle drowned, the ﬂood stripped topsoil from 100,000 acres
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of prime farmland, and property damages reached one billion dollars. The
Reclamation Bureau had built 240 earth ﬁll dams west of the Mississippi, and
this one was the ﬁrst to fail. A commission of nine engineers spent six months
investigating the causes of the disaster and concluded that the bureau had been
at fault for using a highly erodible soil for the dam’s core and for failing to
seal the structure to the rock at either end properly. The wisdom and justice of
building dams had been questioned many times before 1976, but seldom had
the engineering skills and judgment of the Reclamation Bureau been called into
question.26
The Teton Dam rested on an earthquake fault, which meant that bedrock
was far below the surface debris and sediment. Dam safety was a serious matter
because many streams had been plugged so many times that the collapse of one
dam would take out a series of structures, producing massive ﬂoods, extensive
damage, and thousands of deaths. The entire Columbia River had been dammed,
except for a ﬁfty-mile stretch near the Hanford nuclear power plant, and in
California every major stream save one had been dammed at least once. If Glen
Canyon Dam gave way, for example, the resulting ﬂood would destroy Boulder
and Davis dams as well—with devastating results to southern California. To be
sure, the Teton Dam collapse did not persuade Congress to reexamine wasteful
expenditures on public works. If it had, President Jimmy Carter would not have
compiled his famous “hit list” of water projects in 1977. Yet this episode did
demonstrate a fundamental hydrologic truth: since the deep canyons of the West
had all been dammed, new projects had to be constructed at far less desirable
sites. And safety was not the only issue. Once the deep canyons were gone, new
dams threatened to ﬂood as much farmland as they irrigated. Reisner concluded:
As Fontenelle [on the Green River in southwestern Wyoming] was an
inferior site compared with Flaming Gorge, as Glen Canyon was inferior
to Hoover, as Auburn was vastly inferior to Shasta (but six times more
expensive, even allowing for inﬂation) the Bureau was now being
forced to build on sites it had rejected forty, ﬁfty, or sixty years earlier.
It was building on them because while the ideal damsites had rapidly
disappeared, the demand for new projects had not.

The Teton Dam failure raised questions and doubts about many of the projects
the Bureau had on the drawing boards, particularly Auburn Dam, which had been
authorized for the North and Middle forks of the American River thirty miles
north of Sacramento. Less than a year before the collapse of Teton Dam, a
5.9 earthquake hit near Oroville on a seismic fault thought to be dormant. Bureau
of Reclamation studies required by the State of California estimated that complete
failure of a dam at the Auburn site would ﬂood 750,000 people, inundate the state
capital, and close ﬁve military bases. Even though more than 200 million dollars
had been spent on the project, work was stopped and President Carter added the
Auburn Dam to his list of rejected projects.27
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It is wrong to suggest that all, or even many, of the dams built by the
Bureau of Reclamation in the 1960s and 1970s were unsafe. It is not wrong,
however, to suggest that the cost of those dams greatly exceeded their economic
beneﬁts and that bureau personnel consciously doctored the ﬁgures to make each
dam look as attractive as possible. The Teton Dam was not just built in a bad
place. Its cost far outweighed its beneﬁts, and like many projects built during the
1960s and 1970s, it beneﬁted relatively few water users. When the bureau ﬁrst
proposed the project, it used an interest rate of 3¼ percent in calculating beneﬁts
even though the rate that prevailed when work began was 5Ǫ percent. Yet even at
the lower rate, the beneﬁt to cost ratio was less than one—meaning that taxpayers
spent more money building the project than it could return to water users.28
The Reclamation Bureau manipulated ﬁgures in many ways, as did
the Corps of Engineers. Not surprisingly, most projects cost far more than
original estimates. To reduce construction costs on paper, the bureau used
prices that had prevailed ﬁve or ten years earlier. It also added “write off”
beneﬁts not recognized during the pre-World War II years, such as recreation,
habitat improvement, or pollution abatement. Then, too, the bureau often stated
power revenue from dams as constant, even though revenue from that source
generally declined over the life of the dam. In 1964 Senator William Proxmire
of Wisconsin examined 380 pending water projects in the United States, some
of them Corps of Engineers projects. He found that more than half had beneﬁt
to cost ratios of less than two, and he noted that “I have consistently found that
projects with an alleged beneﬁt-cost ratio of less than 2 to 1 provide returns less
than their cost. Costs of public works are invariably much greater than originally
estimated because of poor estimates and inﬂationary pressures.”29
The most common method of padding beneﬁts, however, was to use an
artiﬁcially low interest rate. For most of the 1960s the bureau used 3ǩ percent,
which Congress had set as a benchmark in 1962. However, the actual rate at
which the government borrowed money in the middle to late 1960s was closer
to ﬁve percent than three, and the difference between the two ﬁgures became
enormous when a project was amortized over ﬁfty or sixty years. As Richard
Berkman and Kip Viscusi noted in the inﬂuential Ralph Nader study of the
bureau, by 1969 the cost of all the projects constructed by the bureau ran nearly
three times the original estimates.30 Nevertheless, despite creative accounting
techniques, by the 1960s many large projects still had a cost to beneﬁt ratio of
less than one. The Garrison Diversion Project in North Dakota and the Central
Arizona Project were glaring examples.31
One reason that damage to the environment did not play a larger role in
bringing the high dam age to an end was that environmental groups attracted more
public support by attacking waste and subsidies than by trying to protect nature.
The economist Paul Taylor estimated that within the Central Valley Project the
federal subsidy amounted to $92,320 for a farm 160 acres in size, and in parts
of the San Joaquin Valley many farms were 2,000 to 3,000 acres in size. The
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Westlands Water District was formed in 1952. The San Luis Dam, part of the
Central Valley Project, was authorized by Congress in 1960 and completed in
1968, but the Westlands project served almost exclusively corporate landowners,
including the Southern Paciﬁc Railroad and Standard Oil Company. According to
Marc Reisner, district farmers paid only one tenth of the actual cost of the water
they used, and 70 percent of the proﬁt they received from crops came from federal
water subsidies.32
Federal subsidies to land served by the Bureau of Reclamation increased
dramatically from 1902 to 1968, tipping the scale of beneﬁts from national water
projects away from the East and upper Midwest. Federal reclamation had been
sold to Congress partly as compensation to the West for river and harbor bills that
mainly beneﬁted states around the Great Lakes and along the eastern seaboard.
But the historian Tim Palmer estimates that from 1950 to 1976, the Northeast
received only six percent of the money spent on water projects by the Corps of
Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation while the South received 28 percent and
the West about half. In effect, residents of the East and Midwest subsidized the
growth of cities in the West at the expense of those in the northeast, as crops
grown in California and Arizona received greater per acre subsidies than crops
raised in other parts of the nation.33
Yet the waste of bureau projects, the cost overruns, the environmental
damage, the disproportionate beneﬁts to the West and South, and the bureau’s
arrogance in responding to criticism do not alone explain why the era of dambuilding came to an end in the 1970s. To some extent, of course, the Reclamation
Bureau suffered from the deep public cynicism produced by the Vietnam War and
Watergate. Few institutions of government escaped the crisis in moral authority.
Still, the bureau’s fall from grace was more signiﬁcant because it had been built
on such high ideals. The Corps of Engineers had never promised to transform
society, but the Reclamation Bureau had inspired grand dreams—not just the
dream of conquering forbidding deserts but of building a new society there. Often
lost in the day-by-day operations of the bureau, these ideals remained the soul of
federal reclamation.
Homemaking was the bureau=s only mission that appealed to citizens
outside the West. As long as the bureau paid homage to the family farm ideal,
many of its blunders and failures were forgiven. In many parts of the West, farm
size had increased dramatically during the agricultural depression that extended
from 1920 to 1940. In Montana the average leaped from 480 acres to 821 acres,
and in Wyoming from 749 to 1,866 acres. Tenancy also increased. In 1946,
Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Straus promised that within ﬁve years
the bureau would have opened more than 45,000 family-sized farms on
4,000,000 acres.34 The bureau’s magazine, Reclamation Era, promised that the
bureau would provide as many homes to returning veterans and their families as it
had created on all its projects during the four decades prior to World War II. The
ﬁrst farms would be on the Klamath, Yakima, Minidoka, and Shoshone projects,
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but the single largest project would be in the Columbia River Basin, where the
bureau hoped to have at least 400,000 acres ready for settlement by 1950 or 1951.
“The ultimate objective of the Bureau of Reclamation and its staff,” Reclamation
Era reported, “is to develop the West through the creation of permanent family
farms on Federal Reclamation projects.”35
By the end of the 1950s, however, it was clear that the Columbia Basin
Project would not resurrect the bureau’s mission to create rural homes in the
West. At the end of World War II, the Reclamation Bureau had hoped to create
10,000 to 20,000 new farms in the Columbia Basin, but only 2,300 had been
opened by 1958. Nor was that land settled by young men looking for a fresh
start; the median age of those who took up farms in the Columbia Basin Project
was 40. Nor did it provide homes for those who had abandoned farms on the
Great Plains; most settlers came from Washington or Utah. These were not rural
poor. Over half had family assets of $20,000 or more, and one-third did not live
on their farms. In 1968 the Reclamation Bureau turned the project over to three
irrigation districts. According to the historian Paul Pitzer, had the bureau ﬁnished
the project, the results would have been even worse. “It would be a collection
of family farms ranging from forty to eighty acres, none of them capable of
supplying their owners with a satisfactory living. The area would be a rural slum.
It is for the best that this aspect of the project failed.”36
It was not just that the bureau failed to create new family farms; it also
failed to enforce older restrictions on farm size. By the 1970s the hallowed
160-acre limitation on the cheap water each farmer could secure from the bureau
became a mockery. From the beginning of its life, the Reclamation Bureau
had little choice but to accommodate to large private landowners within the
boundaries of its projects. Those landowners consistently opposed bureau efforts
to control the sale of their surplus or “excess” land, and the bureau lacked both the
staff and the inclination to monitor the sale or title transfers to private lands within
projects. The Interior Department gave private landowners plenty of warning
before it acted, and sometimes it did not act at all. A married couple could acquire
water for 320 acres, and by signing a contract with the Secretary of the Interior
to dispose of surplus land, any person who owned more than 160 acres was given
cheap water to irrigate all the land for a decade or more before he was required to
sell it. Moreover, if landowners paid all the construction charges imposed on the
excess lands in advance, the Interior Department usually permitted them to sell
that land at any price they wished.37
The 160-acre limitation had never been enforced, but before the 1930s the
vast majority of farms within the reclamation projects—well over 90 percent—
were that size or smaller. Nevertheless, new projects undertaken by the bureau
in the 1930s and after catered more and more to large landowners, particularly
in California, and they were the projects that captured the public imagination.
During the 1930s the bureau, with congressional approval, waived the 160-acre
restriction on several large projects, including the Central Valley Project (CVP),
626

Imperial Valley Project, and the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. The CVP was
the biggest battleground, in part because the Corps of Engineers was ready to
build some of the reservoirs within that project as ﬂood control structures that
did not require repayment, and that was an attractive option to large farmers. In
the south San Joaquin Valley, 700,000 acres were divided into 600 farms and
800,000 acres were divided into 12,300 small holdings. But that pattern of land
distribution changed dramatically after World War II. By the time Congress raised
the 160-acre limitation to 960 acres in 1982, and waived many other restrictions
on large landowners, the family farm seemed more and more of an anachronism.
Even more of an anachronism was the notion that federal reclamation should
attempt to reform American society and distribute wealth as widely as possible.
As Donald Worster has noted, the 1982 law tacitly acknowledged that the
economic marketplace should decide the size of farms and the distribution of
wealth, not government.38
Although the Reclamation Bureau continued to serve many small farms,
particularly outside California, the 1982 law convinced many critics of the
bureau that it had abandoned its original mission and sold out to agribusiness.
Even more serious, by the 1980s the Reclamation Bureau had lost its reputation
as the exemplar of new technology. During the 1930s Boulder Dam stood as
a monument to human ingenuity, and the dams the bureau built were seen as
thoroughly modern—the latest in the technology of managing nature. Boulder
Dam was more than a piece of concrete. Among other things it symbolized a
powerful idea that had been around since the Progressive Era, the concept of
“multiple use.” The biggest dams built by the bureau, including Boulder, Shasta,
and Grand Coulee all provided ﬂood control and power, as well as irrigation and
water for towns and cities. But those were exceptional, not typical dams. The
West contained few places to build such dams, which is why small dams were
so much more common than large ones. Not only were the sites for large dams
limited, but most dams were constructed to serve a particular purpose. It was
not easy to use a dam designed mainly to generate power for ﬂood control or
irrigation as well.
During the 1930s part of the appeal of high dams was that they would last
as long as the pyramids. But after World War II that very “permanence” became
a liability. One of the strongest arguments against building dams had always been
that it made more sense to move people to water than water to people. Far more
water was lost in transit, through seepage and evaporation, than was delivered
at the end of the pipeline or ditch. The Cold War raised new concerns. Dams
contributed to the concentration of people in large cities, making those cities more
attractive targets, and while high dams were very strong, they could not resist
a direct hit from a thermonuclear bomb. Many of the West’s cities could be as
easily paralyzed by disrupting their water and power systems, or by the ﬂoods that
would result from bringing down one of these dams, as from the detonation of a
thermonuclear bomb within the city itself. Even more important was the promise
of nuclear power. As a writer in the Sierra Club Bulletin observed in 1948,
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we may live to see the regulated use of atomic power a few years from
now. If we learn to use it properly… we won’t need to harness all the
rivers of the land.… At least we might wait a little while and see what
happens before we drown our greatest canyons and destroy forever so
much natural beauty.

David Brower suggested that atomic energy might make high dams
obsolete long before they ﬁlled with silt. “Is it not time to reverse the trend of
centralization—of concentrating tremendously remunerative strategic targets: of
building larger projects to enable more people to live in less space[?]”39 Silt was
not just something that clogged dams; it was a symptom of bad land management.
“[T]he real management of rivers begins in the headwaters and on the hilltops...
through good land management,” a writer observed in 1950 in the Sierra Club
Bulletin. Yet neither the Corps of Engineers nor the Bureau of Reclamation
cooperated with the Soil Conservation Service or the Forest Service in their
attempts to ﬁght soil erosion. In the middle of the 1960s, during debate over the
proposed Rampart Dam in Alaska, a Corps of Engineers structure that would have
created a reservoir larger than Lake Erie, a writer in Living Wilderness pointed out
that any one of ﬁve atomic generators produced by the General Electric Company
could produce as much power as the proposed hydroelectric plants at Rampart
Dam at half the installation cost. And, she estimated, the price of the power to
consumers would be no higher.40
But most important was that hydroelectric power no longer seemed as
attractive after World War II as it had during the 1920s or 1930s. California was a
prime example. In 1910 falling water produced most of the electricity used in the
state. Steam power was used mainly to meet peak demands. But the increasing
efﬁciency of steam generators, the falling prices of petroleum and natural gas, and
the fact that such plants could be located near large cities, made steam turbines
increasingly attractive. In 1920 hydroelectric power constituted 37 percent of the
power generated within the United States. That ﬁgure fell to 33 percent in 1940,
and despite the large hydroelectric plants opened during World War II, only
36 percent of the nation’s power came from falling water in 1945.41
New technology also reduced the need to expand the supply of water for
irrigation. Insecticides, pesticides, and sophisticated farm machinery permitted
farmers to raise much more food and ﬁber on the same land, irrigated or not.
Leveling land with lasers, lining canals with concrete, delivering water directly to
the roots of plants through underground pipes, utilizing computers to determine
exactly the amount of water needed when it was needed in different soils,
and raising plants that required less water were just a few of the changes that
permitted farmers to stretch their water supplies. Conservation promised to free
up a large part of the West=s water. And as the cost of irrigating land rose, it made
little sense to build new dams and canals.42
In retrospect, President Jimmy Carter=s famous “hit list” of water projects
seems far less signiﬁcant than it did at the time. Dams had been under ﬁre
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throughout the 1970s, and many critics of western water policy argued that there
was no need to open any additional land to irrigation. On February 21, 1977,
Carter released a revised version of the 1977-1978 budget prepared by Gerald
Ford’s staff. At a time of growing budget deﬁcits and inﬂation, Carter wanted to
balance the budget, and eliminating wasteful spending would help. He deleted
nineteen water projects that he deemed improvident, unnecessary, or damaging to
the environment. He also launched a review of 320 projects already authorized
by Congress. Even such staunch environmentalists as representatives Moe
Udall of Arizona and Gary Hart of Colorado came out against the cuts. Initially,
environmental organizations strongly supported the president in the hope that
Carter would abandon such projects as the Auburn Dam in California and the
Garrison Diversion Project in North Dakota, but that support dissipated when—
under strong pressure from Congress—Carter compromised so that only nine
projects were eliminated. His support for raising the 160-acre limitation to
1,260 acres and for continuing the subsidies to the Westlands Irrigation District
also dismayed environmental groups.43
The cuts in spending on water projects were more apparent than real. In
1980 Carter approved four billion dollars for water projects, though relatively
few of those projects were located within the West. On the advice of his chief
economic adviser, David Stockman, and with the support of such disparate
groups as the American Tax Reduction Movement, the National Taxpayers
Union, Common Cause, the Americans for Democratic Action, and the League
of Women Voters, President Ronald Reagan went considerably beyond Carter.
Reagan reduced spending on water projects and signed the ﬁrst bill in American
history to “deauthorize” water projects—eight projects that would have cost
2.5 billion dollars. Even more important, Reagan added the requirement that
those who beneﬁted from new water projects share in paying for them. Since
few water users were willing to use their own money to help pay for water
projects, this—and the Astagﬂation@ and deﬁcits that characterized the Carter and
Reagan years—did more to end the dam-building era than anything else. No
new major Bureau of Reclamation projects were authorized during the 1980s
or 1990s. In the 1970s and after, the greatest expansion of irrigation was on the
Great Plains, where farmers mined underground water far faster than it could be
returned by nature to the aquifers. Nebraska irrigated less than one million acres
in 1959, but seven million acres in 1980.44
By way of conclusion, what has the experiment in reclamation meant
to the West and the nation? Most professional historians have regarded
federal reclamation as a disaster, and there is plenty of evidence to support
that conclusion. During its ﬁrst few decades of life, the Reclamation Bureau
did not succeed in placing “surplus” human beings on surplus land, it did not
succeed in reforming rural institutions in the West, it did not succeed in curbing
land speculation, and it did not succeed in producing a more virtuous society.
By the 1930s only two or three million acres had been irrigated by the federal
government, a far cry from the 30 to 100 million acres promised by various
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proponents of federal reclamation in 1902. The bureau became a much more
popular institution within the West after World War II, but by the 1960s it would
be blamed for encouraging rampant urban growth, for squandering tax dollars, for
deceiving the public, and for being the region’s biggest polluter.
That said, the contribution of the bureau to the West depends on one’s
perspective. Until the last two decades, most appraisals of federal reclamation
focused on economic beneﬁts. In 1919, encouraged by the agricultural boom
of World War I, Arthur Powell Davis, then director of the Reclamation Bureau,
stated ﬂatly that “national reclamation has amply justiﬁed all [that] its exponents
declared for it [in 1902].” He estimated that the 122 million dollars spent on
federal reclamation had generated 550 million in new wealth. Within the federal
projects land that had sold for ﬁve or ten dollars an acre in 1902 fetched as much
as $200 an acre, and 600,000 westerners lived on or near a government project.
In ﬁscal year 1920 the crops raised on the Salt River Project returned more than
twice the cost of constructing that project. To be sure, the poorest states in the
West, such as Nevada and Arizona, beneﬁted more than the wealthiest. For
example, the population of Phoenix increased more than 400 percent from 1905 to
1917, and much of that growth derived from the Salt River Project. In 1920 as in
1980, the farms and cities of the West were much more closely related than most
historians have recognized.45
Historians have rarely considered what federal reclamation can teach us
about government.46 Yet there are powerful lessons in the bureau’s story. First,
the bureau suffered from a split personality from the beginning of its life. It
could not reconcile the dream of the autonomous family farm with the goal
of promoting regional economic development, as Boulder Dam demonstrates.
Repeatedly, it was forced to choose between the two and in the end it did far more
to shore up the status quo than to reform western society. Second, as a recent
study by the political scientist Daniel Carpenter reminds us, the personalities and
vision—or lack of vision—of bureau chiefs matters for as much or more than
“bureaucratic culture.”47 The ﬁrst head of the Reclamation Service, Frederick
Haynes Newell, may have been a ﬁne engineer, but he was also blinded by a
nineteenth century vision of agriculture that was anachronistic by 1902. Elwood
Mead, Newell’s chief rival to head the new program, had blind spots of his own,
but there is little doubt that from 1902 to 1924 the bureau would have pushed a
very different agenda in Congress had Mead been responsible for the program.
Third, federal reclamation exempliﬁes federalism more than the expanding
power of the central government. In the United States, power can ﬂow two
ways simultaneously. The powers of state and local institutions often increase
as federal agencies become more powerful in Washington. As one political
scientist has put it, our system of government is more a marble cake than a layer
cake. It has to be considered in its entirely. From the beginning of its life, the
Reclamation Bureau was forced to accommodate itself to local interests and
local institutions. We need to pay as much attention to how the bureau deferred
and cooperated with state and local institutions of government, and attempted
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to fashion new institutions of government, as with how it tried to compete and
dominate. Finally, federal reclamation demonstrates the power of sectionalism—
within the West as well as the United States. The leaders of the Reclamation
Bureau attempted to avoid the pitfalls of public works in the nineteenth century,
but Americans have always expected the beneﬁts of government to be spread as
widely as possible. In 1902 that meant that 51 percent of the proceeds from the
sale of public lands should remain within the state or territory where that land was
located, and that decision had dire consequences for federal reclamation. And
it is interesting to note that when Jimmy Carter issued his “hit list,” he received
the strongest opposition from Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arizona, whose
political representatives thought that California had received far more than its fair
share of federal water appropriations. Whether the water projects they voted for
were wasteful or inefﬁcient was beside the point. They wanted to catch up with
California by capturing a share of the Colorado River for upstream interests.
It is important to note that the Bureau of Reclamation is still a very
important federal agency. The masthead of its website announces that the
bureau=s mission is “Managing Water in the American West,” not constructing
water projects. The brief history tells us that the bureau has created “more than
600 dams and reservoirs including Hoover Dam on the Colorado River and Grand
Coulee on the Columbia River.” Today the bureau supervises or oversees the
distribution of water to more than 31,000,000 urban and rural residents in the
West, including one-ﬁfth of the region=s irrigation farmers, and, we are told, that
land produces 60 percent of the nation=s vegetables. It is the “Largest wholesaler
of water in the country,” and the second largest producer of hydroelectric power
in the West, after the Corps of Engineers. How times have changed is reﬂected in
the concluding paragraph in the “What We Do” section of the website:
Today, Reclamation is a contemporary water management agency with a
Strategic Plan outlining numerous programs, initiatives and activities that
will help the Western States, Native American Tribes and others meet
new water needs and balance the multitude of competing uses of water
in the West. Our mission is to assist in meeting the increasing water
demands of the West while protecting the environment and the public’s
investment in these structures. We place great emphasis on fulﬁlling
our water delivery obligations, water conservation, water recycling and
reuse, and developing partnerships with our customers, states, and Indian
Tribes, and in ﬁnding ways to bring together the variety of interests to
address the competing needs for our limited water resources.

The historian can only smile at those words, both because the mission of the
bureau has changed so dramatically over the last few decades, and because the
bureau has come back from its deathbed before, particularly during the 1930s.
If an agency that generated so much conﬂict over water in the past is now the
region=s negotiator and peacemaker, this surely is a brave new world.48
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A Tale of Two Commissioners: Frederick Newell
and Floyd Dominy
By:
Donald J. Pisani
Tonight1 I’d like to survey some highlights of the history of the Bureau of
Reclamation by looking at the lives and times of two of the agency’s most notable
directors, Frederick Newell and Floyd Dominy. A principal architect of the
Reclamation Act of 1902, Newell directed the federal reclamation program from
1902 to 1914, supervising the construction of 28 irrigation projects—one or more
in every state and territory within the American West. Dominy was commissioner
of the Reclamation Bureau from 1959 to 1969, during what Marc Reisner has
called “the Go-Go years.” By that time the high dam symbolized the bureau more
than the family farm, and it paid as much attention to the urban as to the rural
West. In any one year of the 1960s, the bureau’s construction budget exceeded
all the expenditures by the Bureau of Reclamation from 1902 to 1933. Yet for all
its wealth, I would argue that by the 1960s time had passed the bureau by: it was
an agency without a rudder. For reasons largely beyond its control, it had lost the
ideals that sustained it through the ﬁrst six decades of the twentieth century. By
the 1970s two fundamental changes had occurred in the West: the family farm had
declined dramatically in importance, and the region could no longer claim to be
an economically backward province of the East. It could no longer contend that it
had a special right to federal aid, a right that transcended the claims of other parts
of the nation.
Frederick H. Newell
Frederick Haynes Newell was born on March 5, 1862, in Bradford,
Pennsylvania, a small lumber and mining town in the northwest part of the state,
just south of the New York border—a town far-removed from major cities, the
closest of which was Erie, 100 miles to the West. “The people [in Bradford] were
what might be called typical mountaineers and laborers in the lumber camps,
rough, illiterate and with many queer old country habits and superstitions,”
Newell recalled in his unpublished memoirs, written in 1927. Newell’s mother
died in childbirth the year after he was born, and so did the child she carried.
So young Frederick grew up without siblings, and for most of his youth lived
with relatives. As he put it, “I attended many public schools in different
parts of the country not staying very long at any one as I moved from place
to place.” Nevertheless, Newell was a good student, and after attending high
school in Newton, Massachusetts, where he lived with an uncle, he entered the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1880, in part so that he could live at his
grandfather’s house in Brookline, Massachusetts.
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Not surprisingly, Frederick Newell
would exhibit a curious distance and
detachment when he wrote about his
father, who at various times tried the feed
and grain business in Chicago—and got
“skinned,” as Frederick put it—then sold
boilers, machinery, and safes in Detroit;
then made furniture; until in mid-life he
returned to Bradford, where he found oil
and ﬁnancial success after many failures.
Frederick described his father as “always
sanguine, full of entrancing schemes.…
He was surveyor, engineer and general
all around man.… He bought and sold
coal and timber lands and went into
various ventures, characteristic of the time
and place.” In short, his father was an
American type: wanderer, dreamer and
speculator—the kind you ﬁnd in so many 26.1. Frederick H. Newell while Director
of Reclamation.
American novels, including Mark Twain
and Charles Dudley Warner’s The Gilded Age. The life of Frederick’s father
drove home to the boy a Darwinian lesson he would carry with him through life:
for many success did not come easily. It comes only to those who are persistent
and tenacious, and how people bear hardship is as important as whether or not
they achieved success.
In addition, Newell’s upbringing produced in the young man a versatility,
resourcefulness, and a strong sense of independence. On vacations from high
school, Newell became deeply involved in his father’s business ventures, and after
graduation he returned to Bradford from Massachusetts and plunged
again into a wide variety of occupations including surveying, printing,
bookkeeping… generally for my father. The experience I now appreciate
was valuable as it was necessary for me to take the initiative and use
my own judgment continually as my father was never a man who
would bother with details but who wanted results immediately and
economically. There was nothing that I would not undertake… whether
laying gas lines, plumbing, designing houses or straightening out the
books of some company and discovering blunders or worse on the part of
people with whom he [that is, his father] was doing business.

Newell ﬁrst went west during the summer of 1881, after his father and a few other
residents of Bradford invested in mineral land in southern Colorado. Frederick
helped organize the Columbia Gold Mining Company, and he became secretary
and treasurer—a formidable job for a boy just out of high school.
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After Newell graduated from MIT in 1885, with a B.A. in mining
engineering, he ﬁrst returned to Bradford and worked for his father—who hadn’t
wanted him to go to college in the ﬁrst place—then caught on with the Ohio
Geological Survey studying oil-bearing rocks. At the time geology was in its
infancy, and those who knew the most about the subject were more likely to work
for the federal or state governments than teach at a university. So Newell’s big
break came in 1888 when he met John Wesley Powell, the head of the United
States Geological Survey in Boston, and later in that year, in Washington, he
met two other prominent ﬁgures in the USGS, G. K. Gilbert and Henry Gannett.
At the time, Powell was organizing the Irrigation Survey within the USGS to
investigate and map potential dams and canals in the West, and Powell asked
Newell to take charge of a crew of 14 recent engineering graduates from Harvard,
Yale, and Troy to study the characteristics and volume of streams in the West.
This was far-removed from petroleum geology, but Newell jumped at the chance.
The training camp at remote and isolated Embudo, New Mexico, on the
Rio Grande, changed Newell’s life. However, Congress cancelled the Irrigation
Survey in 1890, and it cut the USGS appropriation by half in 1892. Powell
resigned as director of the Survey in 1894, and Newell learned another valuable
lesson: western politicians cared little about science but everything about
economic development. It was a lesson he would long remember.
Frederick Newell was not a hydraulic engineer, and he never designed an
irrigation project—either before or after 1902. He knew a lot about the nature
of rivers, and he also prepared the census of irrigation for the United States in
1890 and 1900, but he had little experience with desert agriculture. More than his
adaptability, and more than his raw intelligence, what Newell had was the right
political and scientiﬁc connections. In 1890 he joined the Cosmos Club, which
until he found a house in Washington, served, he recalled in his memoirs, as his
“main refuge.” Within a year he became a regular member of the “Great Basin
Lunch Mess,” which included G. K. Gilbert, Henry Gannett, W. J. McGee, and
Gifford Pinchot. The group met over lunch to discuss the critical natural resource
issues facing the nation in the 1890s. In the next few years he became active in
the National Geographic Society, the American Geographical Society, and the
American Forestry Association, and he gave frequent lectures before scientiﬁc
and engineering societies—more often on forestry than hydrology. Newell and
Gifford Pinchot frequently discussed the need to improve the administration of the
national forests, in part to protect the ﬂow of the many streams that originated on
the public domain. Through Pinchot, Newell met the then governor of New York
in 1900, Theodore Roosevelt. Newell and Pinchot became Roosevelt’s closest
advisors on natural resources, and it was only natural that when the Reclamation
Act passed Congress in 1902, the United States Geological Survey would
administer the new program and Frederick Haynes Newell would take charge.
Federal reclamation was such a bold program that it was almost inevitable
that those who designed and administered it would make mistakes. In 1800 the
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Harrison Land Act had sold land on credit. Farmers quickly fell into arrears on
their payments—and ﬁnally, after attempting to use the United States Army to
evict those who refused to pay, Congress excused those payments entirely. Those
who settled the land thought that they were entitled to it for nothing. It was they
who gave the land value, they reasoned, not the federal government. As you
know, the same thing happened to federal reclamation. By the 1920s, and in some
parts of the West long before that, farmers considered the program an entitlement,
and so did many of its sponsors. After all, easterners got river and harbor
improvements for nothing, why shouldn’t farmers who had the courage to try to
settle the desert wilderness get their land and water free? Equally important was
the massive depression of the 1890s. Congress passed the Reclamation Act with
the expectation of jump-starting the western economy. Federal reclamation, it was
hoped, would encourage private capital to invest in the region— which it had not
done since the early 1890s. Then, too, in 1902, there were three states expected to
join the Union before Theodore Roosevelt stepped down as President: Oklahoma,
Arizona, and New Mexico. TR wanted to maintain the Republican support he
already enjoyed in states like Wyoming and Montana. Therefore, in consultation
with Charles D. Walcott, the director of the USGS and the Reclamation Service,
and Chief Engineer Newell, Roosevelt made a fateful decision: the Reclamation
Service would not build one or two model irrigation projects so that it could
learn from experience. Nor would it build the large projects beyond the means of
private enterprise that A. P. Davis, J. D. Lippincott and others had favored for the
Colorado and Sacramento rivers. Instead, within a few years of 1902 it launched
smaller irrigation projects in every western state and territory to spread the wealth
of the reclamation fund as evenly as possible. To be sure, Congress required in
the Reclamation Act that 51 percent of the money raised from public land sales be
spent on reclamation within the state or territory in which that land was located.
But that did not mean that the Reclamation Service had to launch 28 projects
within a few years. So fast did the Service undertake these dams and canals that
it could not proﬁt from mistakes and misconceptions. And by 1915, when Newell
left the Reclamation Service, the mistakes were all too obvious: the soils—which
had not been tested prior to opening the original projects—were uneven and often
of poor quality, inadequate attention had been paid to ﬁnding transportation and
markets for the crops raised, and those crops were likely to be low value alfalfa
rather than the high value citrus fruits or vegetables that promoters of government
irrigation had hoped would be raised on the projects in 1902.
By 1909 the Reclamation Service was bombarded with complaints from
the projects and from Congress, and Newell had become defensive and evasive.
He tried to hide the seriousness of the problems on the projects from the president,
from the secretaries of the interior, and from Congress. A. P. Davis remembered
a meeting in 1914 with Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane and the socalled “father of the Reclamation Act,” Francis G. Newlands, then a United
States senator from Nevada. Newlands had long been a friend and supporter of
Newell, but at this meeting, according to Davis, even Newlands lost his patience.
Davis was a team player and he had gone out of his way to defend Newell. But
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Newlands—who was generally mild-mannered—asked “almost savagely,” or so
Davis later remembered, what Newell’s faults were.
I told the Senator that Mr. Newell’s principle weakness was his inability
to say “No,” and that his principal mistake was in taking up too much
work which was the result of his yielding to pressure in various regions,
for the sake of avoiding antagonism and criticism, but that it had had
the reverse effect. I told him I had often protested against taking up
so many projects beyond the capacity of funds to properly push, and
that I could prevent this when in the Washington ofﬁce, but when I was
absent in the ﬁeld… commitments were made to new work which had
tied up the funds and made it necessary to ask Congress for additional
appropriations. It had also led to delay of the work on all of the projects,
so that settlers were exposed to great hardships in waiting for water.…

Newell accomplished a great deal. By 1906 twenty-eight government
projects had been selected. When completed, they were expected to irrigate as
few as 8,000 acres on the Garden City project in Kansas to as many as 200,000
acres on the Salt River Project in Arizona and the Truckee-Carson Project
in Nevada. In all, more than 3,000,000 acres would be reclaimed from the
desert and 62,000 farms created. As head of the Reclamation Service, Newell
supervised the construction of 100 dams, twenty-ﬁve miles of tunnels and some
1,300 miles of canals and ditches that supplied water to 20,000 farmers. At 328
feet, the Shoshone Dam in northeastern Wyoming, completed in 1910, was the
highest dam in the world, and Roosevelt Dam, built on the Salt River between
1906 and 1911, was the largest masonry dam in the world. By 1916 Arrowrock
Dam, which was 385 feet high, had eclipsed the Shoshone Dam.
Nevertheless, Newell had many blind spots, and for a partial explanation
we can go back to his childhood and the decades he was growing up. Newell
shared the same faith in Social Darwinism that many Progressives held, and the
experience of his father must have suggested to him that the natural order of
human existence included failure and uncertainty. What most hampered Newell’s
judgment is that he refused to recognize how vastly different agriculture was in
the United States in 1900 or 1910 than in 1860 or 1880. In one of his annual
reports, when he was under heavy ﬁre from Congress, Newell acknowledged
some of the “fallacies” that had retarded federal reclamation. The most important,
he said, was that “it was not anticipated how difﬁcult it would be to secure the
right kind of farmers to handle the reclaimed land, and utilize it to advantage.”
Newell was right. Many penniless and inexperienced farmers ﬂooded
onto the government projects before water was available, and they were doomed
to fail. Nevertheless, those settlers had been encouraged to take up land on
the projects by the Reclamation Bureau, and one wonders whether Newell’s
own versatility—remember that he was neither a hydraulic engineer nor a soil
scientist—played some part in the decision to open the projects to all comers. Of
course, when those settlers proved less resourceful than he had hoped, Newell
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quickly lost faith in them. In 1912 he suggested that the problems on the federal
reclamation projects were due mainly to character faults in those who settled the
government projects, not in the administration of the Reclamation Service or even
in limitations imposed by Congress. “The characteristics of present settlers are
in many respects entirely different from those of the older pioneer communities,”
he wrote. “[T]here is not the spirit of cooperation which ruled the early pioneers;
the class of people now attracted to the lands are not as capable of adapting
themselves to existing conditions and initiating the building of distributing
works.” Disgruntled farmers, Newell believed, had blamed the Reclamation
Service for their own weaknesses. If anything, the Reclamation service had done
too much. In a 1913 letter to Gifford Pinchot, Newell observed that the more the
federal government did, the more dependent on government assistance farmers
became. “On the whole,” he concluded, “we have done too much in taking the
initiative and in trying to expedite development.” Newell drew a sharp distinction
between the self-reliant pioneer farmer of the nineteenth century and the twentieth
century farmer who refused to work as hard.
He [the would-be twentieth century farmer] is attracted usually by
glowing accounts of the relative ease of acquiring wealth in the West,
and with erroneous ideas concerning the conditions to be met.… There
has thus arisen a class which has been called the “professional pioneer,”
always seeking for something a little better or for conditions where life
will be easier; staying in any locality only a few months and then again
seeking El Dorado.

Newell admitted that more than 75 percent of those who ﬁrst settled an irrigation
project were gone within three or four years. “This is naturally to be expected,”
he observed, “as the ﬁrst-comers were usually the more restless members of a
community, men who were always on the lookout for something new and when
they discovered it were anxious to dispose of their acquisitions and move on to
a still better opportunity.” In a 1919 address Newell called for a return to the
old values: “Let us try to get back to more of the real spirit of democracy, of
Americanism, of self reliance, of doing those things for ourselves and for the
public which we can best do, not waiting for some governmental bureau, which in
turn waits on Congress.…”
Newell was forced to resign from the Reclamation Bureau in 1915 by
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, and soon thereafter he became head of
the Civil Engineering Department at the University of Illinois. He remained very
active in national engineering societies, but in the years that followed showed
little interest in science or conservation, and he was not in demand as a consultant.
He enjoyed academic life but riding herd over nine academic engineers provided
little challenge. As he wrote after he left the University of Illinois in 1920:
“everything seemed too easy in the sense that there was not enough stimulus to
keep an active man from becoming a typical college professor emersed [sic] in
petty routine.” In 1918 the American Geographical Society, of which Newell had
been a prominent member, awarded him its Cullum Gold Medal. One side of the
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medallion bore the inscription: “He carried water from a mountain wilderness
to turn the waste places of the desert into homes for freemen.” Yet, ironically,
Newell died in 1931 convinced that federal reclamation had been unnecessary
and unwise. Congress, Newell argued at the end of his life, had paid too much
attention to the arid West; the farms of the humid United States were more than
adequate to feed the entire nation. The crops produced on government projects
represented less than 1 percent of the value of all farm products raised in the
United States and only 6 percent of the value of the arid region’s output. There
was no demand for new homes and—given farm mechanization, the labor-saving
value of electricity, and the continuing migration to cities—the family farm had
no future in the West. Newell died an embittered man.
Floyd Dominy
Floyd Dominy has gotten a bad rap from historians. Those of you
who have read Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert: The American West and its
Disappearing Water (1986) know what I mean. In that book, Reisner likened
Dominy to “a Maﬁa shakedown artist running a recalcitrant store owner out of the
neighborhood,”
“A terrorist” who “ended his term [as commissioner] as a zealot, blind
to injustice, locked in a mad-dog campaign against the environmental
movement and the whole country over a pair of Grand Canyon dams
[Bridge and Marble Canyon].”

Dominy spent many hours talking with Reisner, and one would expect that
Reisner would have developed some respect for the former commissioner’s
honesty and accessibility, if not his policies and values. But Cadillac Desert
is ﬁlled with asides like the following: “At eleven o’clock one morning in the
spring of 1980, Dominy, ﬂoating on three gin and juices and powered by two
cigars, was in a mood to talk.…” Historians are no less given to the love of
salacious details than the public at large—perhaps because we are so immersed in
the “petty details” that Newell found distasteful as chair of the civil engineering
department at the University of Illinois. In any case, Reisner knew that sex sells
and that Floyd Dominy had huge sexual appetites. And, in fairness to Reisner, he
thought that Dominy’s sexual exploits had a bearing on the policies he followed
as commissioner. “In the end, it wasn’t any of this that did Dominy in,” Reisner
wrote.
It was his innate self-destructiveness, which manifested itself most
blatantly in an undisguised preoccupation with lust. His sexual exploits
were legendary. They were also true. Whenever and wherever he
traveled, he wanted a woman for the night. He had no shame about
propositioning anyone. He would tell a Bureau employee with a bad
marriage that his wife was a hell of a good lay, and the employee
wouldn’t know whether he was joking or not.
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Well, my purpose is not to deny these charges, only to say that while
historians have the obligation to look at the seamy side of people, they also have
the obligation to look at them whole. Tempting as it is to turn people into cartoon
ﬁgures, and history into a series of simple morality plays, the past is much more
complicated than that. So let me show you another side of Floyd Dominy, a
part of his life that inﬂuenced the decisions he made just as much as Frederick
Newell’s childhood turned him into a man who couldn’t say no and led him to
treat farmers on government irrigation projects with disdain and contempt.

26.2. Floyd E. Dominy at Hoover Dam in 1963 during his term as Commissioner of
Reclamation.

Unlike Newell, Dominy was born on a farm near Hastings, Nebraska. In
1958 in hearings before Congress on the 160-acre limitation, Dominy talked about
what it was like to grow up on such a farm.
I want you to know that… it took [my grandfather] from 1876 to 1919
to pay off the $2,000 that he borrowed to make the trek to [Nebraska
from Illinois] to provide his home on a public land homestead.… [W]hen
my own father reached maturity he took a homestead in the same area,
160 acres. On that farm 6 of us children were born and 6 of us reached
maturity on the subsistence of that 160-acre homestead. We had outside
plumbing. We did not have deep freezers, automobiles, [or] school
buses coming by the door. We walked to school in the mud. We had…
one decent set of clothes to wear to town on Saturday. Otherwise we
wore overalls. We didn’t have the modern things that a farm today must
provide.
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Dominy attended the University of Wyoming, but unlike Newell he
majored in agricultural economics, not engineering. He graduated in 1933, not a
good year to begin a career, and after a brief stint at teaching school he became
a county agricultural extension agent in Campbell County, Wyoming, which was
grazing country.
I saw there the [bitter] fruits of the 640-acre Homestead Act.…I want
everyone in this room and I want this committee to know that most
of those 640 acres could not sustain a family under any reasonable
economic conditions that have prevailed then or now.

In short, by the time he became commissioner, Dominy’s experience growing up
in Hastings, Nebraska, and his later experience in Wyoming suggested that the
small farm was a thing of the past, given the standard of living of most Americans
in the 1950s and 1960s. (Ironically, he ran a family farm himself in Virginia,
twenty miles from the capitol, after he came to Washington in 1938. He started
with 32 acres and eventually secured 380 acres, but thought that even that was
inadequate to make a living.) Soon before he left ofﬁce in 1969, he observed in a
speech that
The general trend now is… the abandonment of family-sized farms and
the deterioration of small communities into ghost towns. In our modern
mechanized and high-speed civilization, I see no major changes likely in
this trend.

Floyd Dominy was the ﬁrst commissioner to make this admission, at least
publicly. Contrary to what some historians have suggested, the Reclamation
Bureau did not abandon the family farm in the 1930s and 1940s. To be sure, the
agricultural depression of the 1930s, the growth of cities like Los Angeles, and
World War II contributed to the decline of the rural West. But the bureau built
many small water projects during the 1930s and 1940s, and at the end of World
War II the twin goals of federal reclamation—promoting the family farm and
encouraging economic growth—remained intact.
In 1946 Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Straus predicted that
within ﬁve years the bureau would open more than 45,000 family-sized farms on
4,000,000 acres. This was no small undertaking. The bureau promised to provide
as many homes to returning veterans and their families as it had created on all
its projects during the four decades prior to World War II. The ﬁrst farms would
be on the Klamath, Yakima, Minidoka, and Shoshone projects, but the single
largest project would be in the Columbia River Basin, where the bureau hoped to
have at least 400,000 acres ready for settlement by 1950 or 1951. “The ultimate
objective of the Bureau of Reclamation and its staff,” Reclamation Era reported,
“is to develop the West through the creation of permanent family farms on Federal
Reclamation projects.”
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The Columbia Basin Project had many objectives, perhaps too many. It
was designed both to provide new land for farmers driven off the Great Plains by
the dust storms of the 1930s and to prevent a post-war drain of population away
from the Paciﬁc Northwest during the reconversion to a peacetime economy.
Not only would the construction of dams and canals in central Washington state
provide jobs, but the farms might provide homes to displaced workers. By the
end of the 1950s, however, it was clear that the Columbia Basin Project would
not resurrect the bureau’s mission to create small farms in the West. At the end
of World War II, the Reclamation Bureau had hoped to create 10,000 to 20,000
new homesteads in the Columbia Basin, but only 2,300 had been opened by 1958.
Nor was that land settled by young men looking for a fresh start; the median
age of those who took up farms in the Columbia Basin Project was 40. Nor did
it provide homes for those who had abandoned farms on the Great Plains; most
settlers came from Washington or Utah. And these were not poor people. Over
half had family assets of $20,000 or more, and one-third did not live on their
farms. In 1968, the Reclamation Bureau washed its hands of the project, turning
it over to three irrigation districts. According to the historian Paul Pitzer, had the
bureau ﬁnished the project, the results would have been even worse. “It would
be a collection of family farms ranging from forty to eighty acres, none of them
capable of supplying their owners with a satisfactory living. The area would be a
rural slum. It is for the best that this aspect of the project failed.”
Little wonder, given his background, that Floyd Dominy showed scant
interest either in the family farm or in maintaining the 160-acre limitation on
cheap water. When federal reclamation began in 1902, Dominy recognized, it
was a subsistence program, but by the 1960s, the rural standard of living had
changed dramatically. “[In 1902] Those guys didn’t think a farmer should have
indoor plumbing or electric lights, for heavens sakes,” Dominy observed in his
oral history. “They didn’t think their kids should go to college or to the dentist.
They were subsistence farmers. That’s all a farmer was supposed to do in 1902
was live, exist. Not prosper, but exist. That’s the origin of the 160-acre limit and
all that crap.”
There were, of course, other forces working to end the era of dam-building
besides the decline or erosion of the traditional family farm ideal. Those who
have studied Dominy’s reign as commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation have
focused on the debate over the construction of Glen Canyon, Bridge, and Marble
dams and the Paciﬁc Southwest Water Plan. They have regarded the Reclamation
Bureau as far more powerful, and certainly far more autonomous, than it really
was. Like all institutions of government, the bureau was subject to historical
trends over which it had little or no control.
To begin with, big dams looked far less attractive to Americans—and
even to many Americans living in the West—by the 1960s. Traditionally, one of
the strongest arguments against such dams had been that it made more sense to
move people to water than water to people. Far more water was lost in transit,
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through seepage and evaporation, than was delivered at the end of the pipeline
or ditch. Now many critics of dams began to question whether they represented
conservation at all. The Sierra Club regarded silt as more than something that
clogged dams; it was also a symptom of the Reclamation Bureau’s refusal
to cooperate with those agencies that tried to protect the land. “[T]he real
management of rivers begins in the headwaters and on the hilltops…through good
land management,” a writer observed in 1950 in the Sierra Club Bulletin. For
example, both the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation refused to
cooperate with the efforts of the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service
to ﬁght soil erosion.
In the 1950s and 1960s, environmental organizations did not simply argue
that dams were bad for the environment, they also argued that dams represented
an outmoded, expensive technology. In the 1930s, part of the appeal of high
dams was that they would last as long as the pyramids. But that changed during
the Cold War, when the very dams that provided the power to run many of the
nation’s defense industries became potential targets for Russian missiles and
bombs. Many of the West’s cities could be as easily paralyzed by disrupting their
water and power systems, or by the ﬂoods that would result from bringing down
one of these gigantic structures, as from the detonation of a bomb over the city
itself. And even more important than the danger from the destruction of dams was
the promise of nuclear power. As a writer in the Sierra Club Bulletin observed in
1948,
we may live to see the regulated use of atomic power a few years from
now. If we learn to use it properly… we won’t need to harness all the
rivers of the land.…At least we might wait a little while and see what
happens before we drown our greatest canyons and destroy forever so
much natural beauty.

David Brower suggested that atomic energy might make high dams
obsolete long before they ﬁlled with silt. He asked, “Is it not time to reverse the
trend of centralization—of concentrating tremendously remunerative strategic
targets: of building larger projects to enable more people to live in less space[?]”
In the middle of the 1960s, during debate over the proposed Rampart Dam in
Alaska, a Corps of Engineers structure that would have created a reservoir larger
than Lake Erie, a writer in Living Wilderness pointed out that any one of ﬁve
atomic generators produced by the General Electric Company could produce
as much power as the proposed hydroelectric plants at Rampart at half the
installation cost. And, she estimated, the price of the power to consumers would
be just as cheap.
By the 1960s and 1970s, hydroelectric power no longer seemed as
attractive as it did during the 1920s or 1930s. California was a prime example.
In 1910 falling water produced most of the electricity used in the state. Steam
power was used mainly to meet peak demands. But the increasing efﬁciency of
steam generators, the falling prices of petroleum and natural gas, and the fact that
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such plants could be located near large cities, made steam turbines increasingly
attractive. In 1920 hydroelectric power constituted 37 percent of the power
generated within the United States. That ﬁgure fell to 33 percent in 1940, and
despite the large hydroelectric plants opened during World War II, even in 1945
only 36 percent of the nation’s power came from hydroelectric plants.
Neither waste nor the growing cost of water projects explain the end of
the dam-building era any more than the declining number of good dam sites.
After all, water projects had always been wasteful, and nineteenth century river
and harbor improvements had been a method to distribute surplus federal money
as much as a way to improve transportation. Nor did this change. Many of the
water projects undertaken during the 1930s were “wasteful” by nature because
their primary purpose was to provide jobs. Nor were agricultural subsidies new.
But after World War II the West and South beneﬁtted more from water projects
than other parts of the country. In 1902 federal reclamation had been sold to
Congress partly as compensation to the West for river and harbor bills that mainly
beneﬁtted states around the Great Lakes and along the eastern seaboard. But the
historian Tim Palmer estimates that from 1950 to 1976, the Northeast received
only 6 percent of the money spent on water projects by the Corps of Engineers
and Bureau of Reclamation, while the South received 28 percent and the West
about half. In effect, residents of the East and Midwest subsidized the growth
of cities in the West at the expense of those in the northeast, as crops grown in
California and Arizona received greater per acre subsidies than crops raised in
other parts of the nation.
By the late 1960s, it was very difﬁcult to argue that the West
needed or deserved more federal aid than other parts of the country. The region’s
economy may not have been as diversiﬁed as that of the East, but the importance
of grazing, mining, lumbering and other extractive industries had declined as the
West urbanized. Moreover, the Vietnam War cut into the budgets of virtually all
domestic programs, and the lessening of tensions between the United States and
Soviet Union reduced the appeal of building dams to power the defense industries
of the West.
During the 1960s Dominy
was extremely effective in squeezing
money out of Congress. But he was
successful not just because western
politicians were effective at winning
the pork, but also because Dominy
used a wide variety of effective
arguments when he testiﬁed before
Congressional committees. Federal
reclamation projects, Dominy argued,
produced many of the nation’s
vegetables, particularly during
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26.3. Loading cantaloupes in a field on the
Yuma Project in 1958.

the winter months when crops could be grown only in the warm and sunny
Southwest. In 1965 he pointed out that 95 percent of the lettuce, 70 percent of the
cantaloupes, 52 percent of the sweet corn, 50 percent of the carrots, and
44 percent of the cauliﬂower came from land watered by the Reclamation Bureau.
After the war, nutritionists argued that Americans should diversify their diet,
and by providing fruits and vegetables grown in the winter, federal reclamation
improved the health of all Americans. Moreover, in testimony before Congress
Dominy repeatedly pointed out that reclamation ministered to the health of the
soul as well as the body. The ten most-visited bureau reservoirs attracted more
vacationers per year than the ten most heavily used national parks and thus took
much of the pressure off the parks. In 1967 he observed that in the previous
year more than four million “visitor days” had been spent on Lake Mead and
only two and one-half million at the most heavily visited National Park, Grand
Teton. Dominy also claimed that irrigating land drove up its value, along with
crop values. Increasing wealth expanded the tax base of communities and the
quality of their schools and other public services. “[T]he income tax increases
as a result of our project growth is greater each year than the total investment in
reclamation,” he noted.
Above all, Dominy warned that the nation had to prepare to feed a
much larger population. The nation’s population increased by 15 percent in
the 1940s and another 20 percent in the 1950s, and the number of people in the
West increased even faster than that. Meanwhile, millions of acres of marginal
farmland in the South and Midwest were retired from production after World War
II, and Dominy estimated that half the nation’s farms were “marginal.” In any
case, at the end of his term as commissioner Dominy predicted that
by 1980, the Bureau of Reclamation will be able to go it alone,
continuing the program solely out of income. But as in any business
venture, it is necessary to spend money to make money. And to get
back on schedule, it will be important… to step up the program as the
committee has indicated just as soon as the present budget emergency is
over.

From 1903 to 1950 the Bureau of Reclamation spent two billion dollars
on its projects. It spent another two billion from 1951 to 1961, and the bureau’s
construction appropriations peaked at $300 million in 1964. In ﬁscal year 1965,
the budget began to shrink and when Dominy stepped down as commissioner
in 1969 he observed that “water development is being slighted.… I think our
national priorities are not being assessed properly, and that we are spending far
too much on space and other elements. If we need to cut back, we should not cut
back on the one thing that keeps America strong, its development of resources.”
The last major project authorization came in 1968, a year before Dominy
left ofﬁce. That was for the Central Arizona Project, the aqueduct that stretches
from the Colorado River to Tucson, via Phoenix. For a man who grew up on
the plains of Nebraska, a man who knew rural poverty ﬁrst-hand, the American
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West of 1969 was a far better place to live because of the Bureau of Reclamation.
Dominy genuinely believed that the dams and canals built by the bureau had
improved the living standards of the region’s rural and urban residents. Many of
us would argue that that economic growth came at a high, even an intolerable,
price to the environment, Native Americans, and to other groups that did not
share in the wealth produced by the projects. But that story has been well-told.
What I’ve tried to suggest is that while the personalities and values of individual
commissioners certainly helped shape the policies they followed, neither Newell
nor Dominy had the power or autonomy attributed to them by many historians.
Sometimes the bureau responded effectively to change, as it did in building the
high dams in the 1930s and 1940s, but much was beyond its control, from the
emergence of a consumer economy and increasing living standards in the 1920s
to the Vietnam War and the stagnant American economy of the 1970s. Just as
Newell and Dominy were men of a particular time and place, so was the dambuilding impulse that drove the bureau during the ﬁrst seven decades of its life.
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Dr. Pisani gave this talk to a plenary dinner session of the history symposium at the
University of Nevada—Las Vegas.
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One Hundred Years of the Bureau of Reclamation:
Looking from the Outside In
By:
Patricia Nelson Limerick
The Bureau of Reclamation is a federal agency very much identiﬁed with
the American West, thanks to its focus on water management in arid lands. This
situation offers wonderful opportunities to historians. A review of the agency’s
annual reports over the last century offers its own ﬁne microcosm of changes in
Western life, economy, and ideology. The ofﬁcials who have written the Bureau’s
ofﬁcial reports have been something close to seismic monitors for changes in the
settlement patterns of the West, as well as in American attitudes toward the West.
As many others have observed, the rise of urban and suburban populations in the
West registers clearly in the changing mandate of the Bureau, as hydroelectric
power and municipal and industrial water supply have steadily pushed irrigation
to the side. Similarly, shifts in popular attitudes toward nature are expertly
mirrored in the Bureau’s reports, even if they are not always as well reﬂected in
the Bureau’s practice.
If we look at the most recent report, for the year 2000, the words “water
conservation” are used repeatedly. Quite a number of passages discuss the
Bureau’s efforts to aid wildlife and preserve or restore its habitat. The Bureau
reafﬁrms its commitment to act in support of the goal of “no net loss of wetlands”
(though this might be considered by some to be a textbook case of closing
the barn door after departure of the horses). It declares an enthusiasm for the
“watershed approach,” incorporating “the ecology and interests of an entire basin
rather than using a piecemeal approach.” The phrase “environmentally and
economically sound” is also a popular one.1
I suppose one could say that we could and should see the Bureau of
Reclamation’s rhetorical streak of born-again environmentalism as proof that
“even the Devil can quote Scripture” (a proposition that hardly needed any more
proof). Still, I would rephrase the proposition slightly, to reﬂect the constraints
under which federal agencies have operated and still operate: “The Devil had
better quote Scripture, and quote it often, if He doesn’t want any more litigation,
or any more trouble with Congress, the electorate, and environmental groups than
He already has.”
And yet the change in the Bureau’s operations has been as enormous
as the change in its ofﬁcial rhetoric. As the 1979 Report said, “the Service’s
[the Bureau had been brieﬂy renamed the Water and Power Resources Service]
mission has evolved from a single-purpose irrigation function to a multipurpose
water resource development program.” The 1989 Report declared that “emphasis
is now shifting to activities that respond to the West’s current water needs—
such as environmental protection, water quality and salinity control, wetlands
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management, water conservation, groundwater management, drought relief,
system optimization, and related research work.” As the 1997 Report said, the
Bureau’s mission has “moved from development to management” of water. All
of these remarks can be read as coded ways of saying, “We don’t build big dams
anymore, though we still have responsibility for quite a few of them.” Bureau
employees have taken up the use of the term “mission creep,” a phrase that
could produce many amusing guesses as to its meaning among those who do not
frequent agency circles (images of Father Serra on a stealth approach might come
to mind), to summarize the proliferation and spread of their activities: the dambuilding and irrigation-water-supplying agency has “evolved” into furnishing
cities and suburbs with water, providing hydroelectric power, managing recreation
sites, designing techniques to restore water quality, trying to accommodate the
needs of wildlife, and monitoring and shoring up old dams. In fact, rather than
the creeping approach of new missions, the bigger story of change for Bureau
staff has involved the mission that crept away from them: the building of big
dams.2
The shift from construction to maintenance is, itself, one of the most
poignant dimensions of the Bureau’s “change over time” (and yes, I do think that
federal agencies have poignant dimensions—plenty of them). Ofﬁcial discussion
of dam safety accelerated after the 1976 collapse of the Teton Dam, and the
passage of the 1978 Dam Safety Act. In many recent reports, this observation
has appeared: “More than half of Reclamation’s facilities are now more than 50
years old.” As the 2000 Report summed this up, “Reclamation has 457 dams and
dikes. Of these 358 would endanger lives if a failure occurred.” In the agency’s
early years, Reclamation Service ofﬁcials liked to use the adjective “permanent”
and the adverb “permanently.” “The works to be built by the Government,” the
Third Annual Report declared, “should be permanent in character,” and thus “in
striking contrast with those built by private enterprise, since the latter are largely
temporary in character.” But earth shifts; concrete wears away; silt accumulates;
ditches and canals leak and seep; hydroelectric production facilities become
obsolete. The fact that reclamation structures come with such constrained life
spans makes one wonder exactly what meaning the word “permanence” held for
Reclamation engineers a century ago. But the fact that the structures that Newell
and his immediate successors built now need regular examination and restoration
is its own poignant testimony that, even if the founders of the Bureau of
Reclamation did not do much to reckon with the passage of time, the passage of
time has been pretty merciless in its reckoning with them. (One striking historical
irony involves some dams that are now in need of repair and reconﬁguration, but,
since they are now on the Historic Registry, they can only be rehabilitated in ways
that visually match their appearance at the time of construction.)3
When it comes to a reckoning with time, centennials, sesquicentennials,
quincentenaries, and all the other “metric moments,” to use Greg Dening’s
phrase, do provide a distinctive opportunity. Given the ways in which the history
of the Bureau of Reclamation echoes and mirrors the history of the American
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West, this particular centennial offers a particularly rich opportunity for metric
reﬂection. Richard White’s famous phrase, describing the American West as “the
kindergarten of the state” (the place where historians can watch the process as
the federal government invented and deployed its domestic powers) provides a
useful framework for considering the origins of this particular agency. While I
have a few reservations about the use of the human life cycle as a metaphor for
federal agencies, its value and applicability are also unmistakable. The phase we
call “adolescence,” for instance, is as wild a ride for federal agencies and their
associates as it is for young people and their associates. And even people who are
not fond of metaphors and analogies would have to admit that the Reclamation
Service had something that seems well-characterized as a “rough childhood.”
For the last decade or so, I have watched federal resource management
agencies the way other people watch sports teams. Watching a federal institution
maneuver through time and changing contexts has a fascination that may escape
others, but it still captivates and enchants those who are susceptible to it. On a
number of occasions, I have had the opportunity to speak to employees of federal
agencies, reﬂecting on the relationship between their organization’s history and
their own, poignant contemporary dilemmas. To prepare for these occasions, I
have read ofﬁcial newsletters and reports, and thus I have come to believe that
you can learn a lot about an organization by reading, with critical intensity, its
ofﬁcial publications. What to others may seem boilerplate often provides a very
useful and revealing orientation for a speaker or presenter who wants to invite an
audience into an exploration of the connections between an organization’s past
and present. At the least, ofﬁcial publications display what the agency’s ofﬁcials
were willing to put on public record. While there is always some chance that
this material will consist of ﬂuff and self-promotion, there is also the fact that
federal agencies are in the business of courting public approval, and thus these
texts reveal the leadership’s assessment of public mood and preference. So, at the
very least, these ofﬁcial publications tell us about the organization’s perception
of changing constituent or electorate tastes; when, for instance, mantras of
environmental sensitivity move into publications of the Bureau of Reclamation,
you know that an ofﬁcial bow toward preserving the earth and its resources has
become very mainstream indeed.
Now it is also true that I rarely have other historians in the room when I
am engaged in these exercises in the “applied humanities,” and so the occasion
today is a somewhat unnerving one. And yet it is also a valuable occasion; as
Don Pisani and I anticipate the Reclamation Centennial Conference in Las Vegas
this June, this OAH session offers itself as a useful strategy session, or maybe a
dress rehearsal or trial run. Most important for me, it provides an occasion for
appraising the “social utility” of looking at the past, in this case at an agency’s
origins, as a foundation for thinking productively and freshly about our current
dilemmas in Western resource use. At the core of what I have been trying to
do, when speaking to professionals in various federal resource management
agencies, is to try to come up with a “better quality of hindsight,” to see if there is
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a way to bring the past to bear on the present in a way that suggests possibilities
and encourages ﬂexibility. Our discussion today should provide me with an
illuminating consideration of the question of whether this idea of “a better quality
of hindsight” is more (or less) than a pipedream.
Reading annual reports from the Bureau of Reclamation may not strike
everyone as the most promising way to explore possibilities or encourage
ﬂexibility, but I found the experience often engaging, and sometimes hypnotizing
and entrancing. It is true that people’s literary tastes can change over time; I
used to read a lot more novels, or at least want to read a lot more novels, until I
had to face up to the fact that what we call “nonﬁction” is entirely oversupplied
with improbable characters and wild plot twists. Is there any reason why I would
need to rely on a novelist’s efforts at creativity and originality, when I can simply
compare and contrast the “change over time” represented, for instance, in the
Bureau of Reclamation’s late twentieth century desires to increase “diversity” in
its work force in contrast to its Mongolian–excluding origins?4
The success of the Reclamation Service, its founding Chief Engineer
Frederick Newell said, required men—speciﬁcally, “an excellent class of welleducated, efﬁcient, and energetic young men,” and the word “white” was the
understood and implicit additional adjective in that phrase. While it is true that
one would not welcome the assignment of explaining to Newell or any other time
traveler what a turn-of-this-century federal agency really means by its desire for
“diversity,” nonetheless, early twentieth century Reclamation records are their
own exemplary case studies in “white maleness” as the unmarked category, the
category entirely conceived of as the norm. The 1902 Act banned the use of
“Mongolian labor”; three Reclamation projects were sufﬁciently short of settlers
that they were made into Japanese American relocation camps during World War
Two; and Indian tribal resources sometimes ﬁgured in Reclamation projects, but
otherwise race and ethnicity did not register in the reports, because the category of
“human beings of signiﬁcance to Reclamation’s mission” so clearly came with an
exclusive racial deﬁnition.5
Review the reports of the early Reclamation Service, and no reason
presents itself to doubt the racial exclusivity of the newly founded agency and its
intended beneﬁciaries. But the reports do lead one to question an equally wellestablished assumption: the assumption that the agency’s founders were men of
arrogance, over-conﬁdence, and swaggering self-congratulation.
“The engineers who staffed the Reclamation Service tended to view
themselves as a godlike class performing hydrologic miracles for grateful
simpletons who were content to sit in the desert and raise fruit”: that is Marc
Reisner’s characterization of the agency in his famed 1986 book, Cadillac Desert.
Here is Donald Worster’s portrait in 1985 of the Bureau’s powers: “In its ﬁrst few
embryonic [a word that offers an interesting variation on the life-style metaphor]

654

years, when thanks to Congressman Newlands’ efforts it was free to use the
money from western land sales as it saw ﬁt, the Service was a power unto itself.”6
To read these characterizations and then to turn to the ﬁrst reports of
the Service is to engage in an episode of general puzzlement. “Godlike class
performing hydrologic miracles”? OK, maybe this was a very, very clever
godlike class, cleverer than most of the sort, who made a strategic choice to write
ofﬁcial reports that would throw readers, past and present, off their trail. Too
much swaggering and boasting might conﬁrm hostile judgments and unmask
excesses of power; would not an intelligent and foresighted godlike class choose,
instead, to put on a show of manifestly unfelt modesty and humility? Well,
maybe, but the tone, style, and content of the
ﬁrst decade or two of Annual Reports simply
do not bring the words “godlike” or “power
unto itself” to mind.
Anyone who has ever founded an
organization, and tried to report positively on
its beginnings, must surrender to empathy on
the very ﬁrst page of the First Annual Report.
The Newlands Act passed on June 17, 1902; a
few days later, some men who worked for the
Hydrographic Branch of the U.S. Geological
Survey became the Reclamation Service; a
few months passed, and it was time to report
to Congress. Here is what Secretary of the
27.1. Official Portrait of Secretrary
Interior E. A. Hitchcock said in his letter of
of the Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock.
transmittal for the report:
In view of the short time that has elapsed since the passage of said
act, it is impossible to show in this report “the quantity and location
of the lands which can be irrigated” from the various projects under
consideration, or “the cost of works in process of construction, as well as
those which have been completed,” for the reason that no works are now
in process of construction or have been completed.

I like this passage for a couple of reasons: it is honest; no one could call
it arrogant; it has the kind of Lewis Carroll quality that sometimes characterizes
federal communications (“we are writing to report that we have nothing to
report”); and anyone, with responsibility for an institution or organization, who
has received a grant and almost immediately received instructions to report on the
outcomes and results of the grant, simply has to know how Secretary Hitchcock
and Chief Engineer Newell felt. Under these circumstances, “hitting the ground
running” can easily feel like the equivalent of “hitting the ground tottering.”7
And so the report for 1902 is ﬁlled with descriptions of ﬁeld work
undertaken, surveys under way, and investigations of prospective projects, as well
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as apologetic statements on the order of this one: “The fact that it is impossible to
state in advance the plans which ultimately may be recommended for reclamation
will result in great disappointment to many persons.” When it came to the
selection of sites for projects, the Reclamation Service and land-and-proﬁtoriented members of the western public were engaged in a great competitive
guessing game, with the one certain outcome that a lot of people were going to
be angry at the agency. There was, for example, the problem of people who were
trying to anticipate rising land values from reclamation:
The fact that lands have been temporarily set aside is, in the eyes
of many, an indication that these lands will be reclaimed; and
although every attempt has been made to warn individuals of the
futility of ﬁling upon these lands under the homestead law, yet they
persist in taking up the land on the bare possibility that the surveys
and examinations will show their lands to be reclaimable…It is
an unfortunate condition which apparently cannot be corrected at
present.
What this passage, along with many others in the First Report, makes clear is that
from the time of its creation, from before the time of its creation, the Reclamation
Service was ensnarled and entangled in history, tied up in the consequences
of actions that preceded any effort on its part to take control of western water
development.8
The Service began as a unit within the U.S. Geological Survey, which had
already had twenty years of complicated institutional life itself, and its ﬁrst Chief
Engineer, Frederick Newell, had been a career employee of the USGS himself.
As Newell put it,
The operations were greatly facilitated by the fact that the work
was not new to the men in charge, and that they were able to
follow the methods and precedents established by the Geological
Survey during twenty years of ﬁeld work.
“The plan,” Newell said further, was “to gradually enlarge and increase the
number of parties in the ﬁeld without otherwise disturbing the current operations.”
[“To gradually enlarge” is totally par for the course; it is a plain and simple
historical fact that the Reclamation Service has, throughout its century of
existence, led in the national campaign to eliminate active verbs and to fearlessly
and shamelessly split inﬁnitives, though I do not believe that this mission was
spelled out in its enabling act.]9
Maybe I romanticize the charms of the true “fresh start” or “blank slate,”
but the Reclamation Service never had such a thing. If the Reclamation Service
was an “infant” bureaucracy, its cradle was another bureaucracy. From the
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beginning it was living with its in-laws, operating within existing protocols, never
having a clear moment of launching itself into the stream of time.
In a similar way, the Reclamation Service was going to inherit a burden
from history in the form of a tangle of land and water claims already imposed
on the West’s resources. As Newell said in the ﬁrst report, many western lands
had “passed, in whole or in part, into the hands of private owners.” Grants to
railroads, as well as Spanish land grants, divided up the land; “homesteads and
other entries” had been made “along banks of rivers or around springs or other
sources of water supply.” “The problem of reclamation,” as Newell summed it
up, “is therefore not simply one of dealing with public land, but is complicated by
private ownership.” “Complicated” puts it mildly.10
Here we get to the territory of greatest interest in this First Report,
and perhaps in the whole history of Reclamation. The results of irrigation, as
conducted by private enterprise, Newell said, were “not wholly satisfactory, as far
as the larger interests of the country are concerned”; “the larger public interests
have not been guarded, and the making of homes has not been carried on to the
extent which the wisest statesmanship requires.” Here is the very interesting
dynamic present from the start: at the foundation of federal reclamation was a
stern critique of private enterprise, and especially of the speculative element of
American capitalistic practice. And yet federal reclamation was itself supposed
to run like a business (the repayment provision was the keystone of that idea),
and it was, moreover, supposed to serve the mission of creating and sustaining
entrepreneurial family farms. If you took the leash off and let Newell’s line of
thought proceed, he was on his way to a very forceful statement that private
enterprise had made a mess of land and water development in the West.
Reclamation would, in the words of the Report, have to “accommodate earlier
private developments,” but in the muddle these developments had created, even
such seemingly simple matters as distinguishing, in order to allocate water rights,
“between bona ﬁde and ﬁctitious landowners” was “extremely difﬁcult.”11
So take the restraints off Frederick Newell, and you’d have a recruit for
socialism, or at the least, for Henry George’s Single Tax campaign against the
“unearned increment”? Maybe. But there is no question that the ﬁrst Chief
Engineer of the Reclamation Service had good reason for ambivalence about the
workings of American private enterprise. And yet his agency and its staff would
be judged by the success with which they served, supported, and won the approval
of practitioners of the very economic system that had created the problems they
were trying to rectify. This was a tension that would persist through the agency’s
history; during the Clinton years, for instance, the reports are well-supplied with
declarations that the Bureau must be more “business-like” in its operations, and
provide “customer” satisfaction to the American people, and the big question,
of the trustworthiness and efﬁciency of private enterprise in water usage and
management, remained securely stored under the carpet.
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The crypto-critique of private enterprise in the early reports catches the
attention, but what strikes the reader most intensely is how poorly Newell’s stance
in his ten years of reporting ﬁts the word arrogant or even the word conﬁdent. Of
course, six months after the passage of the Reclamation Act, having to report that
there was nothing yet to report would hardly provide the occasion for a display of
pride and institutional self-congratulations. Still, over the next ten years, the annual
reports retained a quality of modesty and even humility, culminating in the Eleventh
Annual Report summing up the Reclamation Service’s ﬁrst decade and setting some
sort of record for frank admission of mistakes and misconceptions in a governmental
statement.
In the Second Report, Newell described, with considerable frankness,
the very big difference between passing a law and creating an agency: “In an
undertaking of this kind there must be encountered many unforeseen contingencies
and complications when the general law is applied to actual conditions.” In the
Third Report, Newell took his admission of these difﬁculties a step further: “Nearly
all the projects under consideration here are relatively large and involve engineering
difﬁculties or have complications arising from private or vested interests. Nowhere
is it possible to go forward untrammeled.” It is possible to read this as merely a
statement of frustration, rather than one of modesty and honest admission of
limitation, and it is also possible to read it as the quintessential bureaucratic defense:
“Don’t blame us; we’re trying hard; we may not have accomplished much; but
our circumstances have been very difﬁcult.” Still, it would be hard to describe the
statement as arrogant, over-conﬁdent, self-congratulatory, or “godlike.”12
In the Third Report, a substantial list of decisions made by the Secretary of
the Interior involving the interpretation of the 1902 law indicated that, just three
years into the agency’s operations, the complexity of managing human beings was
entering into the picture as the equivalent in challenge to managing rivers. Within
another year or two, the annual report had added a section called “Litigation,” listing
all the lawsuits ﬁled against the Reclamation Service, giving another indication that
the complications of dealing with human beings were adding signiﬁcantly to the
challenge of dealing with rivers. “The engineering side,” Newell acknowledged
in the Third Report, “does not offer usually as great causes of delay as the legal or
human element. There are almost everywhere land titles to be adjusted, rights of way
to be secured, and claims to water to be considered.”13
By the time of the Eleventh Annual Report, summarizing the ﬁrst ten years of
the Service’s experience, perplexity over how best to deal with “the human element”
produced a remarkably frank report, cataloguing the misapprehensions that had
characterized the beginnings of Reclamation. “The most difﬁcult of the problems are
not those of engineering nor of construction,” the opening of the report said clearly,
“but those having to do with the human side—namely, the attracting or securing of
the type of farmer who can and will make a success by intensive agriculture.” As
many others have noted, Newell was mad at the project settlers, and indeed held them
responsible for most of his agency’s problems.14
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But not solely responsible—here, again, the frankness of a section of
the Report called “Fallacies Entertained” gives one a new respect for the underutilized possibilities of federal reporting. “The ﬁrst, and perhaps the most
striking” fallacy embraced by the Service at its founding, Newell reported, was
the under-estimating of the cost of reclamation, basing estimates on low-budget
and unreliable pioneer enterprises. “Another of the fallacies,” he said, “was in
the assumption that as soon as water was provided this [would be the] end of
necessary expenditures.” On the contrary, once the water was available, there
was still “the large cost of leveling, subduing, and cultivating the soil.” “It was
assumed,” moreover, “that the soil was necessarily fertile, not appreciating the
fact that it frequently lacks the essential elements common in humid regions.”
And “another oversight…was the neglect of full consideration of drainage and
the importance of providing this to prevent much of the more valuable land from
being destroyed by swamping or alkali.” And then there was a complex of underrecognized factors involving the production and marketing of crops:
It was not appreciated also that markets could not be had immediately
for the crops raised and that much time must be required in developing
good markets and in discovering those crops or varieties which are
most proﬁtable under the existing conditions of soil, climate, and
transportation facilities.

Altogether, the Eleventh Report offers quite a prolonged and searching admission
of error, and I do not think it has many counterparts in federal reports. In a
number of ways, it anticipates the critical appraisals offered by historians like
Donald Worster and Mark Fiege.15
The admitting of error does shift, at the end, to Newell’s anger at the
“human element.” “Perhaps most important of all, it was not anticipated how
difﬁcult it would be to secure the right kind of farmers to handle this reclaimed
land, and to utilize it to advantage.” It was not simply a problem of recruiting,
though it was certainly that, too. “When the act was discussed in 1901 and
1902, it was generally assumed that the principal operations would be those of
constructing the larger reservoirs and main-line canals, leaving to the farmers the
business of building the distribution system. . . .” Well, no such luck, and Newell
resorted to pioneer nostalgia to explain what had gone wrong. Earlier pioneers
had been capable of making their own arrangements to get the water to their
ﬁelds, but
the characteristics of present settlers are in many respects entirely
different from those of the older pioneer communities; there is not the
cooperation which ruled the early pioneers; the class of people now
attracted to the lands are not as capable of adapting themselves to the
existing conditions and initiating the building of distribution works.

Submitting to this post-frontier failure of vigor and enterprise, the Bureau had
to “dig canals and laterals aggregating thousands of miles in length,” and to
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face the fact that “a great number of structures must be provided which were not
anticipated—for example, bridges and road crossings.”16
Like many others, Frederick Newell had learned that the agrarian dream
was tough on its believers. In many ways, his complaints anticipated the question
Richard Hofstader would raise: why would we think of American farmers as
people driven by the intrinsic moral virtue of laboring in the earth, when so
much of their actual behavior revealed them to be a variety of petty bourgeoisie,
considerably more committed to market values and “unearned increments” in land
values, than to moral virtue?
In his peevishness over the project settlers’ default on pioneer virtue,
Newell offered his own version of a lament that would become a familiar one
for many engineers in the twentieth century, whose training had left them illprepared to deal with the human dimensions of the systems they designed. “The
problem is largely one of human nature,” Newell said in an archetypal version of
the Engineer’s Lament. “The problem, as now presented, is not so much one of
engineering, or of soil or climate, as it is of purely human elements.”17
One could say that the Eleventh Annual Report was its own exercise
in justifying and rationalizing the expenditure of public resources to produce
underwhelming results. But the Eleventh Annual Report is still a remarkable
document for an agency to reckon with in its heritage. In this report,
Reclamation’s leadership acknowledged and admitted a lot of problems, and
thereby got the jump on their latter-day critics. Cost over-runs, problems of
drainage, market uncertainties, difﬁculties in crop selection, wasteful applications
of water, tensions with settlers: all these matters got their “public record”
exposure barely ten years after the agency’s creation. If you return to the “roots”
of the Bureau of Reclamation, you ﬁnd quite an unusual ofﬁcial act of admission
of error and misconception. The tone of the Eleventh Report was so entirely the
opposite of bluff and bravado that one almost wishes it could be made available
as a kind of example, template, or role model for organizations today, both
governmental agencies and non-proﬁts. Rather than a demonstration of excesses
of conﬁdence, the Eleventh Report recorded an awareness, not of problems
foreseen, but problems already manifested and acknowledged.
“Better quality hindsight” could remind both Reclamation’s employees
and its critics of this component of the agency’s heritage. The swaggering
and boasting came later—beginning with the Hoover and Grand Coulee
dams, and continuing through Floyd Dominy’s time as commissioner. By a
certain interpretation of chronology, the era of arrogance was the anomaly—
though, heaven knows, an enormously consequential anomaly for the Western
environment. By that interpretation, when the Bureau shifted in the last decade
and a half to a more modest agenda, making a degree of peace with the end of
the era of big dam building, it actually returned to its roots, repossessed its
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pre-imperial heritage, and recaptured an older willingness to face up to its
limitations.
Of course, this was not the preference of many of its career employees.
These changes have been matters of political expediency, responses to changing
moods among voters and members of Congress. In fact, the hundred years of
the Bureau of Reclamation offer their own focused case study in the American
West’s awkward relationship with the engineering profession. Engineers—mining
engineers, dam engineers, electrical engineers, highway engineers, construction
engineers, civil engineers, automotive engineers, chemical engineers, foresters
(for some reason not called “forest engineers”)—have played an enormously
important role in setting up the material circumstances of our comfortable and
complacent lives. From the point of the view of the engineers themselves, the last
century of history could be summed up in these terms: for several decades, society
said to the engineering profession, “Create an infrastructure that will supply us
abundantly with food, water, electricity, fossil fuels, and roads,” and, when that
product was delivered, a growing segment of society declared, not its appreciation
and gratitude, but its disgust with the injuries done to ecosystems, landscapes,
and environments. Engineers, with their minds on technical matters, have been
understandably “challenged” when it comes to ﬁguring out society’s mandate.
It is easy to understand their frustration with the stance of many of the West’s
contemporary water and power users, a stance that seems to add up to “Make it
possible for us to live in comfort, but keep any ugly impacts out of our sight.”
The terms of an honest and fruitful relationship between a democratic society
and the engineering profession remain, in 2002, very much on the drawing board.
Lessons drawn from the ﬁrst hundred years of the Bureau of Reclamation should
surely play a part in the redesign of that relationship.
Patricia Nelson Limerick heads the Center of the American West at the
University of Colorado in Boulder. She has co-edited several western history
volumes; written an inﬂuential book Legacy of Conquest, and many articles; and
she is a sought-after speaker both at professional history meetings and outside
history circles. This paper was originally presented at the annual meeting of the
Organization of American Historians in April of 2002.
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From the Colorado River to the Nile and Beyond:

A Century of Reclamation’s International Activities
By:
Richard H. Ives
and Robert M. Bochar
Since the earliest days of the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation),
there has been an international component to what essentially has been a
domestic program. The development and management of the water resources
in the western states have been the primary mission of Reclamation since 1902,
although we have routinely ventured outside our borders to learn from and assist
other countries.
Just as the map of the world has changed dramatically over the course
of Reclamation’s lifetime, so has the nature of Reclamation’s international
involvement. Reclamation employees have worked in more than eighty countries,
either on short-term temporary assignments or as part of longer-term resident
teams.
Most of Reclamation’s international activity has been in the semi-arid
or arid regions of the world, primarily in developing countries. Reclamation’s
overseas presence has also mirrored America’s international experience, with
the bulk of the activities occurring since World War II (War). Following the
War, many large-scale foreign assistance programs emerged for both post-War
reconstruction and Cold War efforts to combat the spread of communism.
Like the domestic program, Reclamation’s international activities have
evolved to meet changing economic, environmental, and political realities.
Sometimes dramatic or day-to-day changes have occurred in the International
Program due to sudden shifts in U.S. foreign policy, the vagaries of funding,
and rapidly changed political conditions in host countries. While we refer to an
International Program (Program), this may conjure up an image of an orderly
package of interrelated international activities, however, for the most part, that
is not the case. The Program comprises an ever-changing array of unrelated
international activities and projects which are quite diverse in their nature and
objectives.
This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive list of Reclamation’s
international activities; rather, its focus is to highlight some of the important
trends, key initiatives or projects, and a few of the noteworthy people who have
been involved with the Program. Although Reclamation has been involved in
many hundreds of international activities, a list of some of the larger ones is
available at http://www.usbr.gov/international. Finally, Reclamation’s activities
related to the international rivers shared with Canada and Mexico are largely
components of the domestic program and will not be included here.
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International Water Resources—Why and How Reclamation is
Involved
The primary goal of Reclamation’s current Program is designed to provide
reimbursable technical assistance and training to assist other nations to better
manage their water resources, while supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives,
help in the acquisition of new or improved technologies from other countries, and
assist American private sector ﬁrms in competing internationally.
The Program consists of three main parts: technical assistance, technical
cooperation and exchange, and training and visitor programs.
•

Technical assistance activities are designed to address speciﬁc needs
that have been identiﬁed by the requesting country. Funds for these
activities are generally provided by either the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the World Bank, or the requesting
country. Reclamation’s technical assistance activities have comprised the
largest share of the Program, but they almost always include an important
training component which has been designed to upgrade the technical
skills of foreign counterparts.

•

Through technical cooperation and technology exchange, Reclamation
seeks to improve its own capabilities through the exchange of technical
staff and joint cooperative projects with international counterparts.
Technology exchange activities beneﬁt both partners and each side
normally pays for its share of the activities.

•

Reclamation also assists water resource agencies from other countries by
providing training and visitor programs for their staff. Training programs
are tailored to ﬁt speciﬁc needs, and all costs are fully reimbursable to
Reclamation. Additionally, Reclamation facilities are visited by more than
800 international water resource counterparts on an annual basis, and there
is no charge for these short term visitor programs.

Individual activities comprising the current Program cover a wide range of
topics, including dam safety, desalination, river basin management, construction
supervision (for irrigation projects), water conservation, sedimentation,
transboundary water resources cooperation, and integrated water resources
management.
The Early Years
A movement to secure Federal funding for the development of irrigated
lands in the West emerged at the close of the nineteenth century. It was
recognized that some countries were signiﬁcantly farther along in this arena, and
efforts were made to learn from their experience. An engineer named
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Herbert M. Wilson from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), traveled to Egypt
and India in 1889 to inspect large-scale irrigation development and to obtain basic
information that would be useful for establishment of an irrigation service in the
U.S. This appears to be the ﬁrst recorded international activity associated with the
Reclamation program. Wilson, who had considerable experience conducting land
surveys in the West, assessed the vast and sophisticated Indian irrigation works,
with some 25 million acres (10 million hectares) of irrigated lands. He recorded
the construction, operation, and maintenance costs for these projects, and noted
the increased agricultural returns and opportunities for settlement provided by
these vast projects. He also studied problems of drainage, salinity, silt, as well as
transboundary water resources issues. With the passage of the Reclamation Act
of 1902, Congress created the Reclamation Service which the Secretary of the
Interior placed within the USGS, virtually assuring that Wilson’s ﬁndings would
be incorporated into the Reclamation program in the West.
In the ﬁrst few years of the Reclamation Service, some twenty-ﬁve water
projects were authorized for construction. Consumed by its own ambitious
domestic program agenda, and lacking authority to venture into the international
arena, Reclamation was involved in minimal international activity during its
ﬁrst few decades. As a side note, however, most of Reclamation’s earliest
Commissioners were extremely active internationally, before, during, and after,
their tenures as Commissioner. However, absent legal authority, Reclamation
employees were required to secure a leave of absence to undertake foreign
consulting work.
Frederick Newell, who directed Reclamation from 1907 to 1914, traveled
to the Isthmus of Panama in 1908 to assist in the engineering details of the
Panama Canal. The large earthﬁll dams being planned by the Isthmian Canal
Commission were very similar to those being constructed by Reclamation. His
deputy, Arthur Powell Davis, who later became Commissioner of Reclamation
(1914–23), had been involved in the Panama Canal investigations prior to his
arrival at Reclamation in 1902, and he continued to serve on a board reviewing
the feasibility of building the canal. In 1911, at the request of the Russian
Government, Davis took a leave of absence to inspect a proposed irrigation
project on the Amudarya River in Turkestan. Elwood Mead, Reclamation’s
Commissioner from 1923-36, spent eight years in Australia (1908-15) where he
inaugurated a comprehensive water conservation and reclamation plan. During
Mead’s tenure as Commissioner, he took several extensive leaves of absence in
order to provide assistance to other countries (i.e., Haiti, Cuba, and Palestine) on
irrigation-related matters.
Several other Reclamation employees, including Chief Design Engineer
John L. Savage, who became world renowned and highly sought, would also
take leaves of absence to travel overseas to consult with foreign governments on
various water projects.
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While Reclamation was only minimally involved in providing direct
assistance to others, the early exploits of Reclamation did not go unnoticed.
A stream of foreign visitors came to the West to see Reclamation projects.
Reclamation’s 1911 Annual Report indicated:
There have been an almost continual series of investigations of the work
and its results by men both from this country and abroad. Nearly every
foreign country having large areas of arid lands has been represented by
visitors who have studied the works on the ground, and particularly the
methods and analyses of cost. Ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial representatives
from Great Britain and its colonial possessions…from various portions
of the German Empire, from Austria, Russia, Spain, and other European
countries, and from Mexico and South America. These men have been
interested not only in irrigation but in the control and conservation of
ﬂood waters.

And from Reclamation’s 1920 Annual Report:
Irrigation development of hitherto largely unused lands is becoming
more and more prominent in Australia, South Africa, Canada, Brazil,
Argentine [sic.], Russia, and other countries, and the works of the
Reclamation Service have for many years attracted engineers and
economists from all over the world. There can be no doubt that much of
the stimulus for extended reclamation development of the arid regions of
the world has been the direct result of ﬁrst-hand study of the irrigation
problem in the United States, and particularly that as exempliﬁed by the
work of the Federal Government.

The construction of Boulder (Hoover) Dam gave impetus to increased
worldwide recognition for the skill and resourcefulness of Reclamation engineers.
The year 1930 saw the ﬁrst signiﬁcant indication that engineering experts were
looking to the United States for leadership in matters pertaining to water resource
development. Some Reclamation engineers published technical articles that were
picked up by newspapers abroad and Reclamation was overwhelmed by requests
for additional information. Many who wrote were not content with simply
reading about our dams and requested the opportunity to see these structures for
themselves. This resulted in a steady stream of visitors who came to marvel at
Hoover Dam and other Reclamation facilities. Between 1935 and 1941, more
than 500 foreign engineers visited Reclamation projects. Visitors from India,
England, France, Egypt, Germany, The Philippines, Thailand, and South Africa,
came for varying lengths of time to learn Reclamation practices and procedures.
Reclamation’s domestic program was continually evolving through
the advancement of large dam design and construction, as well as establishing
sustainable rural economies based upon irrigation. Its string of accomplishments
in water resources development had encouraged others to want to follow in its
footsteps, but the War would intervene and plans would be delayed.
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World War II—A Catalyst for Change
The War resulted in restrictions on travel and strict security regulations,
effectively curtailing virtually all of Reclamation’s international activities.
Reclamation’s wartime effort focused on work conducted at the Denver
laboratories where scientists, engineers, and technicians, who were ordinarily
engaged in work on dams and canals, were called upon to design new ordinance
and equipment, expedite production and delivery of war materials, and uncover
evidence of sabotage in support of the U.S. war effort.
World War II, however, would also serve as a milestone for Reclamation
in several important ways. It had diverted attention and funding away from
Reclamation’s water development activities in the West. The War had also left
much of Europe, as well as other parts of the world, in need of reconstruction.
The U.S. was moving forward to assume a leadership role in the international
arena, a dramatically different position from its pre-War days of isolationism.
In another part of the world, Reclamation’s international work began
with assistance to China on the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River. Long
discussed by the Chinese, Reclamation agreed to assist the Chinese Government
with the project, and sent John Savage to China in early 1944. During his
six-month stay in China, Savage studied the hydroelectric and ﬂood control
possibilities for the Yangtze River and its tributaries. At the end of the War, a
large number of Chinese engineers traveled to Denver to begin working with
Reclamation staff on the design of the Three Gorges Dam. However, as a result
of the ongoing Chinese civil war, the engineers were required to return to China in
1947, and work by Reclamation personnel on the Three Gorges Dam stopped.
Post-War Emergence of International Activities
The movement of Reclamation into the international arena was largely
facilitated by broad changes in America’s thinking about its international role. To
a great extent, the changes were driven in the late 1940s by the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Plan, which outlined America’s strategy to ﬁght the spread
of communism and a plan for the reconstruction of Europe, respectively. Of
particular importance was the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of
1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), which authorized reimbursable technical assistance and
training.
President Truman articulated his Doctrine in the Point IV Program, as
an afﬁrmative assistance program to help under-developed countries develop
their natural resources as a means to resist threats to their freedom. Point IV,
implemented in June 1950 by P.L. 535, was largely the beginning of today’s
foreign technical assistance program. P.L. 535 required Federal agencies to
establish ofﬁces for the purposes of directing international activities. It also
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marked the establishment of the administering agency, a predecessor agency to
USAID.
These instruments not only provided the legal authority for Reclamation
to assist others, but provided goals and funding as well. Given this new mandate,
it was apparent that guidelines would be needed for increasing Reclamation’s
international involvement. Thus, several key decisions were made, including the
creation of a Division of Foreign Activities in March 1951, which would shape
the Program in a form that has endured to this day.
Reclamation’s domestic program would always have priority over
international activities, unless the
State Department (State) had indicated
that a particular international activity
would be in the national interest as
part of the U.S. foreign policy. If
that were the case, then consideration
would be given to engaging in such
activity, even though an adverse effect
on the domestic program might occur.
Reclamation continues to acknowledge
the importance of meeting U.S. foreign
28.1. John L. Savage on the Yangtze River.
policy objectives.
Reclamation was required to receive reimbursement for costs associated
with undertaking international technical assistance and training since, lacking
authorization, no funds could be sought from Congress.
While Reclamation strongly supported the notion of assistance to other
countries, it determined that it would be inappropriate to initiate such activities,
largely because it would raise concerns about private sector competition. In
addition to requests for assistance from foreign governments, Reclamation has
the wherewithal to respond afﬁrmatively to requests from the Department of
State (State), USAID, the United Nations, or an international ﬁnancial institution
such as the World Bank. (Note: In the late 1980s passage of various laws to
permit technology transfer between United States Government (USG) agencies
and the private sector authorized Reclamation to assist U.S. ﬁrms in competing
for international work. However, in spite of numerous partnership attempts with
American ﬁrms, Reclamation has seen only limited success here.)
The Flood Gates Opened—Dramatic Post-War Expansion
In the years immediately after the War, State received dozens of requests
from other countries for assistance in irrigation and water resources development.
While State would typically turn to Reclamation for assistance, it retained the
lead role. Thus, Reclamation employees served as members of State-led teams
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addressing irrigation and power-related needs. By the late 1940s, a handful of
Reclamation personnel were on long-term assignments in Afghanistan, Ceylon
(Sri Lanka), Venezuela, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.
A full-ﬂedged Reclamation-wide Program, with a budget of nearly $2
million (roughly equivalent to $13.5 million in today’s dollars) emerged in 1952,
after substantial amounts of Point IV funding had materialized. For the next few
decades, Reclamation, with its characteristic zeal, contributed to the cause of
providing for more food security for the free world. Commissioner Michael W.
Straus (1945-53) stated, “wherever it can, Reclamation will continue to cooperate
and contribute knowledge to the free world’s warfare against want.”
(See Reclamation’s Golden Jubilee in the bibliography at the end of the paper.)
By 1952 Reclamation was working on planning studies involving projects
in twenty-one countries, covering some seventeen million acres (6.8 million
hectares) of irrigated land, and hydropower of more than 4,200 megawatts of
installed capacity. The growth of the Program was so dramatic that the quantity
of Reclamation’s international work in 1952 exceeded the sum total of all that had
occurred in the past. (Reclamation’s Golden Jubilee)
Reclamation’s early Post-War international work was characterized
by some of the same basic features that are present in today’s program.
Reclamation’s international activities always responded to the needs that were
reﬂected in the incoming requests for assistance. The work covered a wide range
of topics related to water resources development and management, including
project planning, design and construction; irrigation management; drainage
and land classiﬁcation; sedimentation; and other topics. In addition, there was
a tremendous difference in the level of effort between the individual projects
involved, ranging from a temporary assignment of one employee for several
days to Reclamation teams assigned overseas for a year or more. In some cases
Reclamation would provide advisory assistance and merely assist counterparts in
executing an activity, while, at other times, Reclamation personnel would perform
speciﬁc tasks such as preparing a project appraisal report.
For the next two decades much of the focus of the Program was on
planning studies in numerous countries, for entire river basins as well as
individual water projects. Some of the larger or better known planning efforts
focused on the Litani River Basin in Lebanon (1954-1958), Blue Nile River Basin
in Ethiopia (1958-1964), Helmand Valley in Afghanistan (1960-1971), Han River
Basin in Korea (1966-1971), Sao Francisco River Basin in Brazil (1964-1973),
and the Mekong River Basin and the Pa Mong Project in Thailand and Laos
(1964-1974). In Australia, Reclamation participated in the planning, design
and construction of the Snowy Mountains Scheme (1951-1961). Each of these
activities entailed the assignment of teams of Reclamation technical specialists
overseas for several years.
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28.2. Report covers from Resident Team Programs.

Reclamation’s involvement with the Nile River goes back to the early
learning years when we sought information on Egyptian irrigation systems. In the
intervening century, Reclamation has provided technical assistance and training
at varying times in the Nile River Basin to Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Sudan.
Reclamation’s Nile River experiences exemplify the nature of our international
work, in that we have expended enormous effort over many years in assisting
others, but we have had little control over the outcome. Ethiopia and the Sudan
both experienced devastating civil wars and enormous political change after we
had completed our technical assistance and training programs, thereby largely
negating our efforts.
Reclamation has
contributed to a wide array of
project planning studies, however,
many countries have undertaken
only a limited amount of water
infrastructure development due,
in part, to the lack of funding,
political changes, and changing
environmental values. In addition,
the inability of many countries
to secure agreement with their
neighbors on the use of water
in shared international river
basins has also greatly hindered
28.3. Ethiopia land classification work in Blue
development.
Nile. (Old Ways Meet the New)
Winds of Change—Foreign Policy Shifts and New Paradigm
By the mid-1970s the focus on broad-scale river basin planning efforts
and large projects had waned in the Program. USAID’s movement away from
infrastructure development in the 1970s was probably the major cause of this
shift in Reclamation’s international activities, since USAID had been a major
source of funding. Emphasis on water project development was being replaced
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by greater diversity in the types of
international projects and activities
undertaken by Reclamation.
U.S. foreign policy shifts
have also had direct impacts on
the Program. The oil embargo of
1973 led to the establishment of a
joint economic commission with
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
1974, with multiple USG agencies
participating. Reclamation was
28.4. Reclamation advisors assist Pakistani
soon engaged in a substantial
counterparts in drainage work.
technical assistance effort there
with a resident team in the Kingdom. The focus was initially upon irrigation but
it ultimately moved into the ﬁeld of seawater desalination.
With the signing of the Camp David Peace Accord in 1979, foreign policy
emphasis shifted to the Middle East, and Reclamation was soon engaged in
several substantial efforts in Egypt. The massive American foreign aid program
in Egypt resulted in a return to infrastructure development projects. Reclamation
was asked to spearhead a twelve-year, $140 million effort funded by USAID to
replace the Soviet-built turbines and electrical equipment at the power station of
the Aswan High Dam on the Nile.
Following resumption
of normal relations and
scientiﬁc protocols between
China and the U.S. in the late
1970s, the Chinese would
again request assistance from
Reclamation with the design of
the Three Gorges Dam. Due
to changes in the U.S. policy,
Reclamation in 1984 agreed to 28.5. Aswan High Dam in Egypt.
provide only limited reviews of
some project studies and designs. Work continued off and on until late 1993 when
other changes in domestic policies and priorities (i.e., environmental concerns)
resulted in Reclamation deciding to cease its assistance to China on the Three
Gorges Dam.
Imparting Knowledge—International Training Activities
Reclamation’s international training has likely had the most lasting impact
upon those who have received our assistance. Training began in 1920, when
Reclamation opened its doors for formal training opportunities. The ﬁrst ofﬁcial
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trainee was a South African engineer who spent one year with Reclamation before
returning to a senior position in his irrigation department. When Mexico was
embarking upon an extensive program of water development in the mid-1920s, it
turned to Reclamation for technical assistance and training. One of the Mexican
trainees would become head of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources in 1946
and send many trainees to Reclamation after the War (Pratt, p. 3). Similarly, a
young engineer from Afghanistan, M. K. Ludin, was a trainee for one year with
Reclamation in the late 1930s. When he returned home and created the Afghani
Bureau of Reclamation, he adopted many of Reclamation’s policies with regard
to repayment, acreage limitation, and multipurpose projects. He later became the
Minister of Public Works and was instrumental in securing Reclamation’s PostWar involvement in Afghanistan.
The phenomenon of young engineers who trained with Reclamation and
later rose to senior positions back home was to become commonplace. This
greatly contributed to the forging of close long-term relationships between
Reclamation and other water agencies. While it is not always readily discernible,
there are tangible foreign policy beneﬁts to these relationships. The State
Department, particularly during the Cold War, strongly endorsed the building of
these bridges between nations and, even today, State continues to fund modest
technical exchange programs for foreign visitors.
Reclamation’s early involvement with Turkey was notable largely because
a young trainee, Suleyman Demirel, who came to Denver in the late 1940s,
was destined for greater things. He returned to become head of the Turkish
Directorate for Hydraulic Works in the early 1950s, and he was soon instrumental
in securing a resident team from Reclamation that assisted him in moving forward
with an ambitious water development program. However, Demirel did not stop
there, and later became Prime Minister on seven occasions, starting in 1965,
and later he became President of Turkey (1993). Undoubtedly our most famous
trainee, a Reclamation delegation in 1996 visited Turkey at his behest to witness
his country’s water-related accomplishment.

28.6. Suleyman Demirel (middle row–
center) with Reclamation Resident Team
(kneeling in front).
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Our formal training programs,
which focus upon on-the-job
instruction, have played a critical role
in imparting Reclamation experience
to others. Training programs have
also been changing in recent years
due to the high costs associated with
providing long-term training. Thus,
Reclamation has been transitioning
to technical seminars and workshops,
which have proven to be a costeffective means of providing programs
to a large number of trainees.

Reclamation has been offering international workshops and seminars related
to speciﬁc technical topics, including dam safety operations, integrated water
resources management, and canal automation techniques.
Technical Cooperation and Exchange
While assisting others has largely held the spotlight in the Program,
especially through long-term technical assistance and training programs,
Reclamation has also sought to broaden its own horizons through contact with
others since Wilson traveled in 1889. There are numerous documented instances
where Reclamation has acquired improved technical capabilities for application
in the domestic program through international cooperation. For example, several
Reclamation engineers recently traveled to Sweden to review new power-related
technologies and to South Africa to observe Israeli-made evaporative devices for
potential application in the Salton Sea Restoration Project.
While Reclamation has been involved in several formal technical
cooperation and technology exchange programs (e.g., Israel and Spain), in most
cases these activities are carried on informally. Formal programs usually entail
an agreement between Reclamation and a counterpart water agency setting
forth mutually-agreed-upon activities and goals. Even in the arena of technical
cooperation, where Reclamation usually seeks partners on an equal technical
footing, foreign policy objectives can play a dominant role. Reclamation’s
involvement was solicited by State some years back in technical exchange
programs involving the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.
These programs were designed by State in order to keep lines of communication
open and facilitate cooperation between the participants.
The U.S.-South African Binational Commission (BNC) is another, more
recent example of a technical cooperation program with strong foreign policy
overtones. The BNC was initiated in 1995 by State to bolster the ﬂedgling
South African Post-Apartheid Government. Water quickly emerged as an area
of interest for the South Africans, and Reclamation was tapped to coordinate
the USG effort. There have been a series of exchanges between Reclamation
and the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry focusing upon a variety of water
management topics, many of which have been funded by State.
A New Game Plan—Water as a Means to Promote Cooperation
At the ﬁrst meeting of the Working Group on Water Resources (WGWR)
in the Middle East Peace Process in April 1992, State and its USG water agency
partners, including Reclamation, became involved in an interesting and uncharted
odyssey that is now almost a decade old. From the outset, State chaired the
WGWR and requested Reclamation’s assistance to help move technical activities
forward. The well-established relationships between Reclamation and water
agencies in other key countries involved in the WGWR, and Reclamation’s
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credibility, were useful to State. Reclamation was tasked by State, in 1995, with
taking the lead to support an Arab (Omani) WGWR initiative in desalination. For
several years, Reclamation technical experts played a pivotal role in virtually
every phase of the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center
(MEDRC).
The success of water-related activities in the Middle East Peace
Process led State to the conclusion that water can be an effective catalyst to
promote cooperation between nations. State recently embarked on a program
to reduce potential international transboundary conﬂicts in selected river
basins. Reclamation was asked to take the lead in three State-funded initiatives,
including ones focused on: the Okavango River Basin in Southern Africa; the
Senegal and Niger River Basins in West Africa; and Lake Malawi in East Africa.
Reclamation has also been requested to assist in several other activities relating to
international water resources-related cooperation involving several countries. In
each case Reclamation will offer short-term programs designed to demonstrate
the principles of water-related cooperation and integrated water resources
management.
The Future—New Challenges
Will there be a need for Reclamation in the international arena in the
future? The data regarding water, that is, water scarcity, water for population
growth and food security needs, water quality degradation, and others, are bleak.
Water is a resource that is in extremely short supply in many regions of the
world. Readily available and affordable new water supplies are simply absent.
Reclamation continues to be a world leader in a variety of areas related to water
resources development and management, and we have a broad array of skills and
experience to share that could help make a difference.
So what will the future Reclamation International Program look like? It
is likely to look both similar to and nothing like the past! It will be similar to the
past in that there will be wide variety of ever-changing external inputs impacting
the nature and size of the program. Foreign policy shifts are likely to continue
whereby foes can become friends and vice versa. A few years ago we were
prohibited from cooperating with the Government of South Africa. Thus, it is
difﬁcult to predict the Program’s future landscape because dramatic geopolitical
changes occur overnight and with these changes, new needs and opportunities
emerge. As an example, drought-stricken Afghanistan, where Reclamation had a
resident team (1960-1974), is in desperate need of reconstruction and water issues
are of major concern. With our broad range of expertise and previous experience
there, Reclamation would be well-suited to assist, if funds were to become
available.
Certainly Reclamation will continue to provide technical assistance and
training to those in need, and to cooperate with others to address our needs.
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We can say with certainty that we will fulﬁll the obligations set forth in our
current agreements and commitments with our international counterparts, and
we will move forward with activities already planned. We will need to continue
to develop programs that are responsive to the needs of our international
counterparts and consistent with the requirements and direction of Reclamation’s
domestic program and U.S. foreign policy.
While the horriﬁc events of September 11, 2001, have caused considerable
disruption in the Program, it is likely that it is only a temporary situation. Clearly,
we must now address new topics such as security and heightened travel concerns
that had not previously been considered, along with the continuing need for
funding. History shows that we have adjusted and adapted to new ways of doing
business that did not compromise the Program. We will need to be innovative,
alert to the winds of change, and responsive to help meet some of the world’s
water resources challenges in the future.
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Farms for Veterans: Reclamation Settlement
Policies and Results Following the World Wars
By:
Brian Q. Cannon
Abstract
Between 1946 and 1964 the Bureau of Reclamation opened over
2,800 farms on federal reclamation projects in Wyoming, Idaho, Washington,
Oregon, California, and Arizona. In 1944 Congress had granted veterans a
90-day preference right in applying for homesteads on reclamation projects.
Thus, most who ﬁled on these lands had served in the armed forces. In an effort
to maximize the veterans’ prospects for success as homesteaders, the Bureau
drew upon over four decades of experience in creating irrigated homesteads in
the West. Particularly the lessons learned by the Bureau in offering farms to
veterans following World War I provided a springboard for the Bureau’s postWorld War II efforts.
Barely sixty percent of the 1,311 settlers who homesteaded on
reclamation projects following World War I obtained title to their farms. Of
those who did prove up, 75 percent (or about 45 percent of all 1,311 original
claimants) retained their farms until 1944—an impressive rate considering the
economic volatility of the 1920s and 1930s. However, nearly half (46 percent)
of those who had gained title to their homesteads no longer farmed the land
themselves in 1944. Persistence rates were greater on the highly productive
Klamath Project, where 65 percent of the homesteaders who had proved up
continued to farm their land in 1944, than on the North Platte Project in western
Nebraska and eastern Wyoming, where only 19 percent still farmed their land.
Bureau employees identiﬁed a lack of capital, defects in the farms
themselves, inexperience or lack of commitment on the part of the homesteaders
and poor health as key reasons for the high attrition rates among post-World
War I homesteaders. In an attempt to surmount these obstacles Congress in
1924 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to screen applicants for homesteads
on the basis of industry, experience, character, and capital. It also required
the Bureau to conduct more careful surveys of the land itself before projects
were approved. Both in the 1920s and the 1940s Congress rejected proposals
from the Bureau for greater technical assistance and monetary assistance to
homesteaders.
Working within the limitations imposed by Congress, the Bureau
endeavored to improve economic opportunities and increase residential stability
on lands that it opened to homesteading following World War II. In many cases,
local examining boards undercut the effectiveness of the screening process for
prospective settlers, opting to award homesteads to veterans who possessed
very little capital. The screening process did insure that most homesteaders
possessed some agricultural experience. Thanks to more careful preliminary
studies, veterans generally enjoyed superior farming opportunities on the
Bureau’s projects in the 1940s and 1950s than their counterparts had received in
the 1920s.
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Notwithstanding the Bureau’s more careful preliminary investigations,
enough poor units were included in the post-1945 projects that Congress enacted
Public Law 258 in 1953, providing for exchange of submarginal homesteads on
reclamation projects. The law was largely inspired by the Bureau’s most glaring
postwar failure, extensions of the Riverton Project, where seepage and alkaline
soils made it impossible for over one-third of the postwar settlers to support
themselves.
Despite the Bureau’s intent to award farms to individuals who planned
to spend their lives on the farm, many who obtained land actually regarded it as
a speculative investment. Others who may have intended to reside permanently
on the farm became discouraged by the rigors of homesteading or were enticed
to leave by the prospect of higher wages or a higher standard of living off the
farm. For a variety of reasons, then, many post-World War II homesteaders
quickly moved away from their farms.
The percentage of homesteaders who retained their lands roughly two
decades after they had been homesteaded was actually higher for the post-World
War I cohort on the Klamath and North Platte projects than for the post-World
War II group on the Minidoka, Klamath, or Yuma projects. Absentee ownership,
however, was less common among the post-1945 cohort than among the 1920s
homesteaders. Whereas only 15 percent of all the veteran homesteaders at
North Platte and 37 percent of the veterans who homesteaded in the 1920s on
the Klamath Project continued to occupy their lands 20 years later, 44 percent
of the post-1945 homesteaders on the Klamath Project and 30 percent of the
post-1945 homesteaders on the Yuma Project still resided on their farms 20 years
after they had ﬁled upon their lands. In this sense at least, the Bureau’s efforts to
reduce speculation and tenancy by screening settlers and improving the quality
of opportunities on its projects had succeeded.

Shortly after World War II ended, 1,305 veterans applied for 86 irrigated
homesteads on a federal reclamation project in northern California. One
applicant, a Japanese American who had sustained 105 shrapnel wounds on the
battleﬁeld in Italy, aptly articulated the allure of a homestead for many veterans.
“My entire life up to this moment has been spent on a ranch and it is my wish
to keep on being a bona ﬁde farmer,” he wrote. “Farming is all that I know.…
With a ranch of my own I would have complete freedom of doing as I please…I
have much to work for, and the will to succeed is urging me ahead. Obtaining a
homestead site will greatly reduce the strain on me. Let me assure you that my
utmost desire is to make this project a success and to be one of the many who are
planning to make this home community one to be proud of.”1
This young veteran hoped to win the opportunity to participate in a
belated, little-known ﬂurry of homesteading; between 1946 and 1964, an era
when homesteading was generally no longer permitted, the Bureau of
Reclamation opened over 2,800 farms on federal reclamation projects to veterans
in Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona. In an effort to
maximize the veterans’ prospects for success as homesteaders, the Bureau drew
upon over four decades of experience in creating irrigated homesteads in the
West. Particularly the lessons learned by the Bureau in offering farms to veterans
following World War I provided a springboard for the Bureau’s post-World
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War II efforts. This paper examines the Bureau’s efforts to improve its
homesteading program from the 1920s to the 1940s and to counteract or surmount
obstacles that had plagued veterans homesteading on its projects following the
First World War. It surveys key differences between the Bureau’s post-World War
I homesteading program and its counterpart following the Second World War and
traces some of the reasons for those differences.
Following World War I the Department of the Interior received
196,000 inquiries regarding settlement opportunities on western reclamation
projects. In February 1920, responding belatedly to the demand for farms,
Congress through Public Resolution 29 granted a 60-day preference right
to veterans in applying for homesteads on public lands, including federal
reclamation projects. The preference period was later increased to 90 days.
Although most veterans who had written to the Department of the Interior were
no longer interested by the time that Congress belatedly acted, 10,875 wouldbe homesteaders applied for 1,311 farms that were opened to settlement on
reclamation projects over the next 20 years. Particularly from 1920 to 1922 lands
opened to entry were awarded almost exclusively to veterans. Most of these
new farms were located on the Klamath Project in California and Oregon and the
Shoshone and North Platte projects in Wyoming. The farms were awarded by
lottery.2
The post-World War I homesteading frontier had its share of impressive
success stories. Take the case of Frank Vancluira, one of eighty veterans who
took up homesteads on the North Platte Project’s Fort Laramie Division early
in 1920. A Bohemian immigrant who had moved to the United States in 1911,
Vancluira farmed in New York and Nevada and worked in a sausage factory
before joining the Army in 1917. One of his legs was severely injured during the
war. With $2,000 in capital and a monthly pension from the Veterans Bureau as a
result of his wartime injury, Vancluira managed to develop his farm and construct
a home without having to borrow money. His knowledge of irrigation as a result
of his previous farm work in Nevada, combined with his industriousness and good
fortune in receiving an exceptionally fertile homestead, allowed him to prosper.
Within four years his farm was valued at $10,000—far beyond the amount of
money he had invested in the place.3
Despite the success stories, barely sixty percent of the 1,311 homesteaders
on reclamation projects during the inter-war years obtained title to their farms.
Of those who did prove up, 75 percent (or about 45 percent of all 1,311 original
claimants) retained their farms until 1944—an impressive rate considering the
economic volatility of the 1920s and 1930s. However, nearly half (46 percent)
of those who had gained title to their homesteads no longer farmed the land
themselves in 1944. Persistence rates were greater on the highly productive
Klamath Project, where 65 percent of the homesteaders who had proved up
continued to farm their land in 1944, than on the North Platte Project, where only
19 percent still cultivated their land.4
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The high percentage of homesteaders who departed without proving up,
coupled with the failure of many veterans to farm the land after they gained title
to it, concerned the Bureau of Reclamation. Andrew Weiss, superintendent of the
North Platte Project, was assigned by Commissioner Elwood Mead to investigate
the reasons for the homesteaders’ difﬁculties, focusing upon the Shoshone and
North Platte projects. Weiss found that most veterans had arrived on the projects
with insufﬁcient funds. For instance, Sam Monaco, an industrious immigrant
and World War I veteran, had come to the North Platte Project in 1920 with
practically no capital. Monaco “made a very courageous trial for three years,
being obliged to undergo every privation to get along.” Unable to afford lumber
for a pig pen or a hen house, he had sheltered the hens in his own shack and had
dug a clay pit for the hogs. Despite his pluck, Monaco was eventually “forced
to quit.” No amount of ingenuity or hard work could compensate for his penury.
Many homesteaders had rented out their farms after proving up, Weiss reported,
because they needed more money than their farms could furnish. For instance,
E. G. Phelps, a homesteader in southeastern Wyoming, who was described by
the project manager as “a very ﬁne type farmer” and a “splendid type of man”
who was “intelligent and anxious to learn” had tried to farm and work part-time
elsewhere but he had found he “could not make it” ﬁnancially. Finally he opted to
rent his farm and work full time as a power house operator in order to support his
family. Weiss estimated that over half (53 percent) of the veterans, like Monaco
and Phelps, who homesteaded on the Fort Laramie division in 1920 were poorly
prepared ﬁnancially for homesteading. Only about one in four had arrived with
sufﬁcient money for “the necessary ﬁxed improvements” and the “necessary farm
equipment and livestock.”5
On the Frannie Division of the Shoshone Project in northern Wyoming,
Weiss discovered that in 1924 only ﬁve of the 57 veterans who had taken up lands
there in 1920 remained. Even on better farms that had been opened to settlement
the following year, only one in ﬁve homesteaders remained. Weiss identiﬁed their
principal impediment as “the lack of capital.”6
In addition to insufﬁcient capital, defects in the land itself such as poor
soil, drainage problems, or unrealistically small farms handicapped some veterans.
Hundreds of veterans took up lands in the Goshen Irrigation District in southern
Wyoming between 1921 and 1927, and roughly one-ﬁfth “had very little chance
of success” because of “poor or submarginal” farms, project superintendent Frank
Roush estimated in hindsight. Farming conditions were worst on the Frannie
Division of the Shoshone Project, where 95 farms were opened in 1920 and 1921.
In 1924 the president of the local water users’ association reported that nearly
two-thirds of the lands on the division were “practically valueless” because of
seepage, alkaline soil and other problems. Draining the lands adequately would
cost an estimated $30 per acre, but the land itself was valued at not more than
$25 per acre. A commission appointed by the Secretary of the Interior to study
reclamation concluded in 1924 that “the lands on the Frannie Division are of
such low agricultural value as to make it impossible for them to pay the cost
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of operation and maintenance of the irrigation works much less to return the
construction costs.”7
Weiss reported that inexperience, coupled with underestimation of the
rigors of farm life, had driven others from their farms. Roughly one in three
veterans who homesteaded on the North Platte Project in 1920 had never lived or
worked on a farm. “Too few of us knew much about irrigated farming when we
started here,” observed homesteader George “Doc” Haas, one of only nineteen
remaining homesteaders in 1947 out of 130 who had come to the Goshen
Irrigation District in 1921. “We had every kind of ex-soldier, from piano tuners to
paper hangers.…We did not realize that there was no let-up in work, season after
season.”8
Other veterans quickly sold or rented out their farms after proving up
because they had always regarded their homesteads as speculative property.
Weiss’s report showed that 35 percent of those who homesteaded on the Fort
Laramie Division of the North Platte Project in 1920 had no interest in farming,
preferred some other occupation, or disliked the country and therefore never
intended to remain there. For instance, Paul J. Hall, a 30 year old veteran, was
characterized by the project superintendent as “not hav[ing] much energy.” He
lacked capital, farming experience and had “no desire to farm.” Moreover, his
wife disliked farm life. Willard Wertman, a 35 year old homesteader who had
grown up on a farm in Milford, Nebraska, only farmed his unit for one season.
He “always seemed to dislike the country and was dissatisﬁed with nearly every
thing in connection with his farm, the community and the government.” F. W.
Bosse, had been raised on a farm and was a “good worker” but by disposition
“not a farmer.” Similarly, T. J. Burchell, a railroad engineer and a druggist, “had
no desire or qualiﬁcations as [a] farmer.” Some had homesteaded largely for
speculative reasons. A. R. Baker, who had constructed a 10x12 shack on his
homestead, had come from a wealthy family but invested little if any capital on
the place and engaged only in “poor and nondescript farming.” A graduate of
the Washington School of Finance, he worked as a ﬁnancial expert and had only
resided on the land long enough to acquire title. He had retained the land, though,
“with hopes of higher values and oil boom.”9
Poor health dogged other homesteaders like L. C. Anstine, a veteran with
a fair education, farming experience, and a “good personality,” who suffered from
a wartime injury. The project manager gauged his prospects for success in 1924
as “poor” because of his “physical handicap” although he noted that Anstine had
“made a creditable effort.” Likewise, Bruce Morton, a 40-year-old veteran with
farming experience, had made only “fair” progress as a farmer although he knew
how to farm, was “industrious,” and possessed a “good personality.” Having
been “gassed” while ﬁghting in the trenches, he labored under a “severe physical
handicap.” The project manager believed Morton would “no doubt make a
success if he were able-bodied and had sufﬁcient capital.”10
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In Weiss’s view, then, insufﬁcient capital, defects in the land itself,
inexperience, lack of commitment, and poor health largely explained the lackluster
performance of most veterans who homesteaded following World War I. Twenty
years after Weiss ﬁled his report, his successor as project manager, Fred Roush,
identiﬁed ﬁve reasons postwar homesteaders had abandoned their units on the
North Platte Project. Roush believed the most important factor to be “poor and
submarginal units,” followed by “lack of ﬁnancial aid” to the homesteaders during
the farm development phase, the agricultural depression of the 1920s and 1930s,
lack of managerial ability or ambition on the part of the veterans, and insufﬁcient
instruction of the settlers in irrigation and farming techniques by county agents or
other qualiﬁed personnel.11
Shortly before Weiss completed his investigations of veteran homesteading
and two decades before Roush offered his evaluation, the Fact Finders’, a blue
ribbon commission appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, had identiﬁed many
of the same problems with homesteading in general on reclamation projects. In
their report they had recommended that “new projects or extensions of existing
projects should be authorized only after full information has been secured
concerning the water supply, engineering features, soil, climate, transportation,
markets, land prices, probable cost of development and other factors upon which
the success of the project must depend.” They had also advocated screening
applicants for homesteads on the basis of their “industry, experience, character,
and possession of a part of the capital needed in improving their farms.”
Additionally, they had recommended that the government provide agricultural
and economic advisors and short-term, low-interest loans to settlers for livestock,
equipment, and farm development.12
A conservative Congress in 1924 rejected the Fact Finders’ calls for loans
and agricultural advisors for settlers. In what became known as the Fact Finders’
Act, Congress did stipulate that “no new project or new division of a project
shall be approved for construction…until information in detail shall be secured…
concerning the water supply, the engineering features, the cost of construction,
land prices, and the probable cost of development.” After gathering the requisite
data, Congress instructed, the Secretary of the Interior must “ma[k]e a ﬁnding
in writing that it is feasible, that it is adaptable for actual settlement and farm
homes, and that it will probably return the cost thereof to the United States”
before construction could proceed. Congress also authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to appoint examining boards to review the qualiﬁcations of prospective
homesteaders and to establish minimum qualiﬁcations for homesteaders on
reclamation projects in terms of “industry, experience, character, and capital.”
After touring reclamation projects the following year, the Secretary, Hubert Work,
concluded that “settlers should have enough capital to enable them to improve and
equip their farms.”13
Following passage of the Fact Finders’ Act, the veterans’ preference law
remained in force through 1940, but the Fact Finders’ Act now required all
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would-be homesteaders, including veterans, to meet minimum standards
regarding industry, farming experience, character and capital. Examining boards
consisting initially of the superintendent of the project, the county extension
agent, and a prominent farmer or businessman residing in the area were appointed
by the Bureau to review each applicant’s qualiﬁcations. The Bureau required
applicants to have at least two years of farming experience and to possess $2,000
in capital or assets such as livestock or farming equipment that would be as useful
as cash on a farm. Examining boards were required to rate each applicant on the
basis of character and industry, and the boards could require applicants to submit
medical evidence of good health.14
From 1925 to 1937 the four variables—industry, character, farm
experience, and capital—were weighted equally. After 1937, though, farm
experience was weighted most heavily, followed by capital and then industry
and character. While veterans continued to enjoy preference rights in all land
openings, as veterans of the World War grew older and became better established,
they no longer applied for all available lands. Extensive homesteading almost
exclusively by veterans would not again occur until after another World War.15
Soon after the veterans preference legislation expired in 1940, western
Congressmen including James Scrugham of Nevada and John R. Murdock of
Arizona discussed the possibility of extending these beneﬁts for veterans over
another two decades. In 1944, with national interest in the returning veterans
crescendoing rapidly, Murdock believed the time had come to publicize the
desirability of reclamation for veterans. As the House Committee on World War
Veterans’ Legislation held hearings in the Spring of 1944 on Senate bill 1767, the
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (G.I. Bill of Rights), Murdock capitalized upon
Congress’s interest in the future of America’s soldiers and scheduled a meeting
with the committee. He reminded them that “after every war our veterans have
been taken care of in the public domain, lying in the West.” Murdock proposed
an amendment to the GI Bill which would entitle veterans to preference over all
other applicants for homesteads on reclamation projects. The amendment also
sought to enhance the veterans’ chances for success by waiving over half of each
homesteader’s share of the Bureau’s cost of constructing the irrigation system.
After discussing Murdock’s amendment to the GI Bill, the committee discarded
it. Some felt that Murdock’s amendment had merit but should be considered as a
separate bill because it dealt only with the West; others believed the proposal was
“too generous.”16
Three months after Murdock’s abortive attempt to amend the GI Bill, J.
Hardin Peterson, a representative from Florida who chaired the House Committee
on Public Lands, introduced H.R. 5025 in June of 1944, granting preference to
veterans in applying for public lands “under the homestead or desert land laws” or
under a 1938 law which permitted citizens to ﬁle on 5-acre parcels of land. Partly
because it made no mention of either the Bureau of Reclamation or the West
but applied, in theory at least, to any public lands across the nation that might
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be opened to settlement, the measure attracted little attention or controversy.
One day after H.R. 5025 had been referred to the Committee on Public Lands,
Murdock as a member of that committee referred the bill without amendment
to the House, recommending its passage and noting that a representative from
the Department of the Interior had appeared before the committee to endorse it.
Four days later the House approved the bill and submitted it to the Senate. Later
that summer the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys recommended
passage of the bill and on August 13 the Senate acquiesced. On September 27
President Roosevelt signed the bill into law.17
With veterans preference for homesteading on public lands in place, the
Bureau of Reclamation and its friends in Congress pushed for more. From their
perspective based upon the experiences of post-World War I homesteaders, the
veterans’ preference law was defective. One defect was that it failed to provide
for ﬁnancial or technical assistance for the veterans. Warned one representative
from the Bureau, “We feel that a man should be assisted sufﬁciently to increase
to the optimum point his chances of success on the land.…I think we have had
some failures on our projects that could have been avoided if we had given a little
additional attention to getting the farm into production quickly and seeing that the
farmer was properly coached in the methods of using his water.”

29.1. Alfred Fincher and his family arrived on their veteran’s homestead on the Vale
Project nine days before this picture was taken in September 1936.

In tandem with John Murdock, ofﬁcials in the Bureau worked to draft
H.R. 520. Murdock introduced the bill in the Spring of 1945. Among other
things, the bill authorized the Bureau to extend technical assistance to farmers
on reclamation projects, permitted the Bureau to contract with settlers or with
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water users’ associations for clearing and leveling land to prepare it for irrigation,
and authorized “necessary” appropriations for these activities. The bill proposed
other mechanisms for assisting the veterans ﬁnancially: it permitted governmental
agencies “authorized to make provision for the reestablishment of veterans
in civil life” to become involved “to the fullest extent” that was legally and
administratively feasible in extending “ﬁnancial assistance” to the veterans “for
the acquisition or erection of housing, farm buildings and adjuncts, improvements,
equipment, chattels, and operating capital, and for transportation to the project.”18
Referred to the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, with
Murdock as the chair, the bill was made the committee’s ﬁrst item of business.
Through the committee’s hearings, stretching from April 12 to May 22, Congress
probed the relationship of veterans to federal reclamation.
Ultimately representatives of the Department of Agriculture expressed the
most inﬂuential opposition to the bill. Praising the idea of veterans’ preference,
Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard sharply criticized the second section of
the bill. That section authorized the Secretary of the Interior to purchase and sell
lands within or near projects, to predevelop project lands including clearing and
leveling them, and to provide technical and agricultural guidance and advice to
settlers. Such provisions, warned Wickard, would “duplicate machinery already
set up for the whole of agriculture in the Department of Agriculture” and would
therefore be a “wasteful” use of governmental resources. As Representative J.
Will Robinson put it, section 2 appeared to be “setting up some super-agency to
take care of the veterans.”19
As a result of these objections, the committee, in concert with
representatives from the Bureau, altered the bill somewhat. The amended bill
differed from the original in the sense that it extended veterans preference to
those who had served during the First as well as the Second World War and
speciﬁed the Veterans Administration as the government agency authorized to
loan funds to the homesteaders. In response to concerns from the Department of
Agriculture, the amended bill authorized the Secretary of the Interior to “obtain
through or in cooperation with the State colleges and appropriate agencies of
the Government guidance and advice for settlers on lands within the projects
in matters of irrigation farming; and to disseminate information by appropriate
means and methods,” whereas the original bill had authorized the Secretary “to
extend guidance and advice to settlers…and to disseminate information,” without
any reference to cooperation with other government agencies.20
Three months after receiving the committee’s report, the House turned its
attention to H.R. 520. President Truman had urged Congress to approve the bill
in order to give “outstanding opportunities for returning veterans.” As had been
the case in the committee hearings, no one voiced opposition to the concept of
veterans’ preference. For instance, John W. Flannagan of Virginia, chair of the

685

House Committee on Agriculture, claimed, “We are all in accord that the veterans
should be given preference in the purchase of this reclaimed land.”21
Although rewarding the veterans seemed to be desirable to all,
representatives voiced several arguments against other features of the bill. The
foremost argument was that the bill, even as amended, authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to become involved in agricultural training and technical assistance
although the Department of Agriculture already had similar programs in place.
The House Committee on Agriculture, which had met to review the bill that
morning, had drafted an amendment eliminating all key provisions of the bill
aside from the granting of preferential rights to veterans and the provision of
information and ﬁnancial assistance by the Veterans Administration. Irrigation
and Reclamation Committee member Robert Rockwell noted that the committee
had not even consulted with the new secretary of Agriculture, Clinton Anderson,
who had opposed the bill in writing on the same grounds as his predecessor.
Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois charged the bill unduly broadened the activities
of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of the Interior, duplicating
services which were already being furnished by the Department of Agriculture.
Similarly, Clarence Cannon of Missouri opposed the duplication of services of
two bureaus.22
Others objected to the bill’s focus upon western lands, arguing that few
genuine opportunities awaited the veterans on reclamation projects in the rural
West. The bill would play “a dirty trick on the veterans,” claimed Jessie Sumner
of Illinois, forcing them into unwinnable pioneering situations rather than
loaning them funds so that they could buy improved farms. Chester Gross of
Pennsylvania questioned the wisdom of veterans’ homesteading in the West.
It induces them now to go out into the West on new lands, where
rattlesnakes might bite their children and coyotes and wolves endanger
the lives of their wives, and where their greatest asset is sunshine, which
never pays mortgages or educates their children and where foxes will kill
their chickens and crows pick the eyes out of any livestock that is born
outside,

he claimed, concluding, “It is just not right.” Rising to the challenge William
Lemke of North Dakota retorted that “in many places east of the Mississippi River
nothing worthwhile grows even if they have water.”23
Committee members who favored the bill attempted to refute the
criticism of their colleagues. The new Secretary of Agriculture clearly had
not taken occasion to compare the former bill with the newly amended one,
some insisted; he had merely repeated the objections of the former secretary,
which had been addressed and resolved by the committee in redrafting the bill.
Strenuously opposing the proposed amendment which would excise most of
the bill, committee members argued that it would reduce veterans’ preference
to a meaningless gesture. Antonio Fernandez of New Mexico maintained
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that a veterans’ preference law which contained no provisions for ﬁnancial or
educational assistance to homesteaders would be “nothing but an empty shell,”
similar to the preference right that veterans received after the First World War.
John Murdock called the amended bill “a mockery” and Will Robinson of Utah
warned that those who wanted to strike most of the bill and claimed to be “so
strong for the veterans” were actually “leav[ing] a hollow shell for the veterans,…
helping them with one hand but…taking everything away [with the other] that
was given them by a committee that studied this bill for 3 or 4 weeks.” Murdock
agreed that “the powers of the Bureau of Reclamation are somewhat extended
by the terms of this bill,” but he maintained that this was necessary because
the projects to be developed were “more difﬁcult” ones with more “difﬁcult
engineering problems” than the ﬁrst projects that had been developed.24
At length, opponents of the bill carried the day, although the vote was
close. The House voted 76 to 68 to approve the ﬁrst section of the bill, with its
provision for veterans preference, but to jettison most of the other provisions,
including any expansion of the Interior Department’s jurisdiction. The amended
bill was sent to the Senate where it was referred to the Committee on Irrigation
and Reclamation, but the amended bill had no strong supporters in the House;
after all the lip service that had been paid to the veterans, no one, it seemed,
was very interested in this watered down bill’s fate in the Senate. Certainly
Murdock and his associates on the Irrigation Committee, along with the Bureau
of Reclamation, saw no charm in such a limited bill. Perhaps their disinterest
stemmed from their belief that the amended bill offered nothing substantial to
veterans, although it still did confer preference rights and instructed the Veterans
Administration to assist the homesteaders ﬁnancially. Certainly the bill did
nothing for the Bureau or for development of western lands. Preoccupied with
other matters, the Senate committee never held hearings on the bill and never
referred it back to the full Senate, and so the bill died.25
Despite the fate of H.R. 520, the principle of veterans preference still
applied to public lands being opened for homesteading, including reclamation
projects, due to H.R. 5025, the measure that had been approved without debate
in the preceding year. Although Congress had refused to furnish the types of
economic and educational assistance advocated by Murdock and the Bureau in the
1940s and the Fact Finders’ Commission in the 1920s, strides had been made in
terms of screening applicants for homesteads and requiring more rigorous reviews
of the agricultural potential of proposed projects. Would these factors improve
the quality of economic opportunities for World War II veterans on reclamation
projects? Would a higher percentage of homesteaders gain title to their lands and
personally cultivate them than had been the case following World War I?
The demand for farms following the Second World War was not as great
as pundits during the war had forecast it would be. Nevertheless, the demand for
farms, as reﬂected in applications, remained far greater than the Bureau could
satisfy. Despite the fact that the general trend in American society involved
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leaving the farm behind, farm life, even on raw lands with the risks that it
entailed, remained attractive to many veterans. On all projects excluding the
mammoth Columbia Basin Project where most of the lands were offered for sale
rather than as homesteads, the Bureau received a total of 66,296 applications
(many veterans applied for a farm on several projects) for 1,422 farms between
1946 when the ﬁrst postwar drawing was held and 1957 when 145 farms were
awarded on the Northside Pumping Division of the Minidoka Project in Idaho.
The ratio of farms to applicants in these drawings was nearly 47 to 1. The ratio
of applicants to farms ranged from 8.5 applicants per farm in a drawing on the
Riverton Project in Wyoming in 1947 to a high of nearly 309 applicants per farm
on a block of land with 11 farms in the Columbia Basin in 1952. Desire for lands
actually increased with the passage of time. Whereas the ratio of applicants to
farms never topped 100 in the immediate postwar era, beginning in 1951 ratios of
over 150 applicants to each farm were commonplace.26
With such high numbers of applicants, the Bureau seemingly possessed
an ideal opportunity to weed out candidates who possessed insufﬁcient capital
or insufﬁcient farming experience. Shortly after the war ended, however, local
examining boards were given greater leeway in determining the amount of capital
and degree of farming experience that would be required for those applying
for homesteads on individual projects. Inasmuch as letters of recommendation
submitted by the applicants regarding their character and industry were
“invariably… favorable in tone” and “overworked such words and phrases as
honest, reliable, morally above reproach, etc.” capital and farm experience were
the most objective and reliable criteria for determining the ﬁtness of applicants
for homesteading. While the policy of allowing local boards to adjust minimum
requirements made the process more decentralized and democratic, it also
imperiled the original purpose of the somewhat elitist and exclusionary standards:
selecting homesteaders with the sufﬁcient capital and experience to virtually
insure their success.27
On the Klamath Project, site of the ﬁrst land opening following World
War II, representatives of local civic, veterans’, and agricultural organizations met
with Bureau ofﬁcials to determine the prerequisites for would-be homesteaders.
Under a system implemented by the Bureau in 1936, applicants for homesteads
were rated on a scale of 100 points. Those with more than $2,000 in assets could
receive as many as 10 points more than those who possessed only the minimum
amount. Representing the interests of young, predominantly poor, land-hungry
veterans the members of a nearby American Legion post protested, “The whole
deal stinks, especially the ten thousand dollar clause.” F. D. Rockbice, a World
War I veteran who had homesteaded on the Klamath Project in the 1920s,
expressed the prevailing sentiment. Rockbice argued that the capital requirements
were “not…fair.” “Because a man has 10 or 50 thousand does not make him a
better farmer, a better man, or a better citizen than the little fellow who wants
a home for himself and family and a chance to better himself,” he maintained.
Rockbice conceded that someone with lots of money would have “very little
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chance” of “fail[ing] to make good.” But he believed the government should
be more concerned with preserving the homestead law’s intent, which was “to
give the man that did not have a home a chance to make one.” Ultimately those
responsible for ﬁxing standards for the 1946 applicants on the Klamath Project
voted to scrap the ﬂexible points system for capital requirements, although they
decided by a margin of only one vote that it was “not only fair but necessary
in order to assure the success to the entrymen” to require at least $2,000. By
refusing to boost capital requirements beyond the level that had prevailed for two
decades, though, the examining board increased the likelihood that homesteaders
would fail; $2,000 in 1946 would buy far less than it could have bought ten years
earlier. In 1948 on the Klamath Project, the examining board went even further,
voting by a margin of 26 to 3 that applicants be permitted to substitute a credit
rating for capital.28

29.2. In December 1946 Frederick Lehman congratulated Mr. and Mrs. Robert Metz on
winning a drawing for a homestead on the Klamath Project.

The examining board on the Klamath Project nearly decided to scrap
the farm experience requirement as well as the requirement for capital. At a
meeting prior to a 1948 land opening on the project, a group of veterans who had
constituted a local Veterans’ Independent Action Committee opposed any attempt
to exclude applicants on the basis of farm experience. Those with appropriate
“intention, willingness and ability to learn” should not be penalized for their lack
of actual farming experience, their spokesman maintained. Others attending the
meeting agreed in principle but wondered how one could gauge intent accurately.
One member of the examining board, Nelson Reed, believed that someone who
had previously farmed and applied for a homestead would be more likely to
“stick on the homestead,” knowing in advance what they were getting into. “If
he farmed before” and chose to apply for a homestead it was a good sign that he
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“ha[d] intentions of remaining on the farm.” On the other hand, “if he ha[d] no
previous farming experience,” he would not be able to anticipate the rigors of
farm life. How could the board “tell if he [was] sincere” enough to persist in the
face of adversity? In “tough years,” those without experience might not even
“be able to stick it out” without the requisite agricultural skills, a representative
from a local chapter of the Veterans of Foreign Wars suggested. At length, those
attending the meeting chose by a slim majority to retain the requirement of at least
two years of farming experience.29
Examining boards on other projects followed similar procedures in
establishing minimum qualiﬁcations for applicants. The result was that the capital
requirements varied considerably. On the Yuma Project, the examining board
insisted upon $1,000 in cash and $1,000 in operating capital or assets. Applicants
for farms on the Shoshone Project were only required to possess $1,000 in cash or
assets and two years of farming experience, but those who possessed more capital
(up to $2,500) or more experience (up to ﬁve years) were given priority over
others. The examining board for the Boise Project required applicants to possess
$3,500 in cash or assets that could readily be converted into cash, and stipulated
that an applicant’s automobiles and household goods could count for no more than
$1,000 of that amount. Applicants for lands in the Columbia Basin near Pasco
were required to have a net worth of at least $3,700.30
Although Congress had rejected calls for the Bureau of Reclamation
to provide technical assistance to homesteaders, the Bureau did furnish some
assistance and coordinated other assistance with other local, state, and federal
agencies through its project land use or settlement specialists. The Bureau
cooperated with Washington State College in producing a Farmer’s Handbook
for settlers in the Columbia Basin. The booklet contained information on a
variety of topics including farm life, housing, climate, erosion, irrigation, weed
control, and pest control. On the Shoshone Project, the Bureau arranged for
settlers to use its machines, hand tools, and concrete forms free of charge in a
laboratory to pour their concrete drops for irrigation ditches, with supervision
from Bureau employees. Under development contracts, the Bureau also furnished
prefabricated irrigation structures. Settlers could also borrow equipment such as
portable sprayers from the Bureau for tasks such as eradicating weeds. In 1948
Bureau personnel on the project assisted forty-eight homesteaders on their farms
with irrigating, surveyed and staked farm ditches on sixty farms, contracted with
sixty-eight farmers for farm development work such as land leveling and land
clearing, located fence lines on thirteen farms and worked up farm development
plans for all 111 farms. Most settlers felt the technical assistance they received
was sufﬁcient. In a systematic sampling of 208 settlers on the Columbia Basin
late in 1954, only 4 percent identiﬁed lack of advice or incorrect advice from
public agencies as a major problem they had encountered, and only 6 percent
perceived inexperience or uncertainty regarding the proper course to pursue as a
major handicap.31
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Whereas the Bureau succeeded in furnishing technical assistance and
disseminating information it was unable to proffer settlers on its projects the
capital they desired, although many settlers did obtain loans from the Farmers
Home Administration. The level of capital needed by farmers had never been
higher. On the Northside Division of the Minidoka Project the cost of clearing
land, leveling it, constructing farm ditches, drops and other irrigation works and
applying fertilizer averaged $57 per acre. Additionally the government estimated
the cost of a modern home; farm buildings; machinery such as tractors, disks,
grain drills, checkers, hay mowers and rakes; and domestic water supply at
$17,500.32
With the exception of settlers on the unusually productive Klamath
Project, most veterans found it difﬁcult to secure ﬁnancing from local banks. In
a survey of farmers in the Columbia Basin, over one-ﬁfth cited inadequate credit
or capital as a key problem. The experiences of individual veterans illustrate their
problems with insufﬁcient capital. In their ﬁrst year of farming in the Coachella
Valley, Pearl and Wayne Mayﬁeld “needed fertilizer bad[ly]” but could not obtain
a loan for it because they “didn’t own the land” and therefore could not use their
farm as collateral. A banker in Moses Lake, Washington, told one veteran that he
expected “the ﬁrst three farmers on these farm units were gonna go broke before
one made it…so they weren’t gonna have anything to do with [the] farmers at
all.” The fact that many homesteaders were young and had no credit rating also
made bankers suspicious of them. When Jake Colvin applied for a loan from a
bank in Yuma, the banker inquired about his credit rating. “I said, ‘Best in the
world; I’ve paid cash for everything I ever bought in my life.’ ‘Well that’s not
credit. You’ve got no credit,’ they said. ‘We just can’t loan money to somebody
that doesn’t have a credit rating.’” To establish a credit rating Elliott Waits
borrowed a small amount from one bank in Yuma, deposited it in another, drew
some interest, paid the remaining interest on the loan and then repaid the bank in
six months.33
Alongside settler selection and provision of credit and technical assistance,
critics of the Bureau’s post-World War I homesteading program had pointed to the
need for more rigorous evaluation of actual farming opportunities on the projects
including water supply, soil quality, climate, and accessibility to markets. As
evidence of the Bureau’s more careful preparatory work, settlers in the 1940s
and 1950s received contour maps for their farm units showing optimal locations
for irrigation structures and detailed classiﬁcations of their soils. Reclamation
Commissioner Michael W. Straus boasted in 1949 that “almost 100 percent of the
new settlers make good.” Straus was exaggerating, but veterans did generally
enjoy superior farming opportunities on the Bureau’s projects in the 1940s and
1950s than their counterparts had received in the 1920s.34
Notwithstanding the Bureau’s more careful preliminary investigations,
enough poor units were included in the post-1945 projects that Congress enacted
Public Law 258 in 1953, providing for exchange of submarginal homesteads on
691

reclamation projects. The law was largely inspired by the Bureau’s most glaring
postwar failure, extensions of the Riverton Project where seepage and alkaline
soils made it impossible for over one-third of the postwar homesteaders to
support themselves. Assistant Commissioner H. F. McPhail admitted in 1953,
“The facts clearly show that large amounts of money have been expended for
construction of irrigation facilities on the newer portions of the project without
reasonable certainty that the soils were irrigable.” Reporter Morton Margolin
quoted an anonymous Bureau employee as saying that ofﬁcials in the Bureau
had disregarded warning signs and rushed ahead because “Congress and the
Administration were alike in their desire to provide new farm lands as soon
as possible” following the Second World War. “Political pressures dictated an
expediting of construction, which prevented as thorough an investigation as the
Bureau usually makes.”35
Despite the desire of the Bureau and of local examining boards to award
farms to those who intended to spend their lives on the farm, many homesteaders
actually regarded their homestead as a speculative investment. Others who may
have originally planned to make the farm their home became discouraged by
the hardships of homesteading or were enticed by the prospect of higher wages
or a higher standard of living off the farm. Turnover rates were lowest on the
Klamath Project where the soil was richest. Ninety percent of the homesteaders
there remained on their farms at the end of the ﬁrst four years, and 43.5 percent
remained in 1968, 20-22 years after the homesteaders had arrived. On other
projects fewer settlers stayed. On the Minidoka Project by the end of 1960, seven
years after the ﬁrst settlers had arrived on the project, 72 percent of a cluster
sample of 83 veterans who had acquired a farm prior to 1959 retained their land.
Within 20-22 years of the veterans’ arrival, 31 percent still owned the land. At
Yuma Mesa, where the summertime heat was nearly unbearable, 75 percent of the
ﬁrst group of 54 homesteaders remained on their farms after two years. Ten years
after the ﬁrst settlers had arrived, 44 percent of them were still there, and after
twenty years one-third of them remained.36
Looking back upon outcomes of homesteading by veterans following the
First and Second World Wars, how do they compare? Of all the areas opened to
homesteading following 1945, only the Riverton Project witnessed an extensive
exodus of homesteaders during the ﬁrst decade of settlement comparable to
veterans’ abandonment of the Shoshone Project in the 1920s. However, the
percentage of homesteaders who retained their lands roughly two decades
after they had been homesteaded was actually higher for the post-World War I
cohort on the Klamath and North Platte projects than for the post-World War
II group on the Minidoka, Klamath, or Yuma projects. Absentee ownership,
however, was less common among the post-1945 cohort than among the 1920s
homesteaders. Whereas only 15 percent of all the veteran homesteaders at
North Platte and 37 percent of the veterans who homesteaded in the 1920s on
the Klamath Project continued to occupy their lands 20 years later, 44 percent
of the post-1945 homesteaders on the Klamath Project and 30 percent of the
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post-1945 homesteaders on the Yuma Project still resided on their farms 20 years
after they had ﬁled upon their lands. In this sense at least, the Bureau’s efforts to
reduce speculation and tenancy by screening settlers and improving the quality of
opportunities on its projects had apparently succeeded.
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From Water to Water and Power: The Changing
Charge of the Bureau of Reclamation
By:
Jay Brigham
The United States Congress did two signiﬁcant things in 1902, which at
the time must have seemed completely isolated from one another. After great
debate, Congress passed landmark legislation that established what we now know
as the Bureau of Reclamation. Much less fanfare accompanied congressional
authorization that instructed the United States Census Bureau to conduct the ﬁrst,
rudimentary, electrical census of the United States. It seems unlikely that many of
those in Congress in 1902 who voted on these two authorizations foresaw the day
when the Bureau of Reclamation (BR) and electrical generation would become
closely intertwined.
Undoubtedly, establishment of the Bureau of Reclamation was the more
important of these two congressional acts. For the next 100 years the Bureau
brought water to many parts of the otherwise arid West. When the formation
of the BR and the 1902 electrical census are considered together, however, they
present an interesting interplay. Arguably, in 1902 irrigation and reclamation
represented the nation’s pastoral ideal and the Jeffersonian notion of the yeoman
farmer. Irrigation would open new farmland for Americans to own and cultivate
thus giving them a stake in society. Electricity, on the other hand, to many people
represented modernity, if not urbanization, at the dawn of the twentieth century.
Although some believed that electrical energy would result in decentralization,
most people clearly associated electricity with cities and towns and such images
as streetcars and great white ways. Electricity generated from water power
became the source of much hope and debate in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth
century leading to passage of the Federal Water Power Act in 1920 after years of
intense political debate. The growing dichotomy between urban and rural after
the beginning of the twentieth century resulted, in part, because of the growing
use of electricity and the images associated with such use. This ﬁrst occurred
in public places with developments such as electric streetcars and street lighting
systems and then in private settings through household lighting, heating, and
appliance usage.

30.1. Grand Coulee, Hoover, and Glen Canyon Dams and their powerhouses.
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The 1902 electrical census revealed that the total generating capacity of
commercially- and municipally-owned central electrical stations hardly exceeded
1.2 million kilowatts for the entire United States. Five years later, the same
generation capacity had increased nearly 125 percent to more than 2.7 million
kilowatts.1 By comparison, in the year 2000 the total capacity of BR dams in the
seventeen western states that the Bureau serves surpassed 14.7 million kilowatts.
That generation capacity included electricity from the federal government’s
largest hydroelectric dam, Grand Coulee (6.8 million kilowatts), from perhaps the
most famous federal dam, Hoover Dam (2.1 million kilowatts), and from one of
the most controversial federal dams Glen Canyon (almost 1.3 million kilowatts).
Not all BR dams have such tremendous output. The power plant in the Bureau’s
project at Lewiston, Idaho, has a listed capacity of 350 kilowatts.2
Originally charged with watering the arid West, the Bureau of Reclamation
has become one of the country’s largest generators of electricity. While water
certainly remains the BR’s primary objective, electrical generation provides
considerable revenue. Examining the ﬁrst three decades of the Bureau’s history,
from its formation through the passage of the Boulder Dam Act reveals how the
Bureau’s mission changed from water to water and power. The Bureau’s concern
with generation resulted not only from the need to have electricity to pump water,
but also out of the emerging belief that the public should retain control of at least
some of the nation’s hydroelectric development. It also soon became apparent
to Bureau ofﬁcials that electrical generation could result in signiﬁcant revenue.
The Bureau’s role in the construction of Hoover and later Grand Coulee Dams
also ﬁt well with the emerging view that the federal government should inﬂuence
the development of the nation’s development of electrical resources through the
ownership of at least some large federal projects. Federal inﬂuence in this regard
was exerted in other parts of the country through the Tennessee Valley Authority
and later the hydroelectric development of the Saint Lawrence River. Only
in the West, however, did reclamation and hydroelectricity become so closely
intertwined.
Viewing the early history of BR electrical generation as ﬁve concentric
circles drawn around a project provides an analytical model for understanding
the growing role that electricity played in Bureau projects. Each new circle
incorporates the existing circles, plus signiﬁcant new functions. The innermost
circle represents power projects built to facilitate dam construction. In those
instances, electricity might have been used to power shovels, drills, and cement
mixers. Such generation might have been water or steam power. The next circle
represents electricity used for pumping water. Using electrically powered pumps
resulted in a signiﬁcant increase in the distance that the Bureau could move water.
Electrical pumps meant that the Bureau was no longer dependent on gravity
to irrigate land. The next circle, the third, represents electrical sales to parties
that lived close to the dams. Although many of these sales involved relatively
small amounts of electricity, they are important because the Bureau was selling
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surplus electricity. Dams were generating more power than projects required for
operation.
By the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century, electrical engineers had
solved the impediments to the long distance transmission of electricity by using
transformers and alternating current. Such breakthroughs were especially
signiﬁcant in the West where great distances often separated hydroelectric sites
from population centers. These technological advances gave the Bureau the
capability to transmit power beyond the immediate vicinity of dams. The ability
to transmit power more than several miles, often over rugged terrain, resulted in
the sale of Bureau power to municipalities and private power companies. Such
sales represent the fourth concentric circle. By the mid-1910s, the Bureau’s
power sales had surpassed $500,000 per year. The ﬁfth circle represents power
generation and sales to larger cities with electrical generation being nearly
as much of a factor in the political debates regarding project authorization as
irrigation. Hoover Dam best represents the ﬁfth concentric circle. Although
an irrigation and ﬂood control project, signiﬁcant and divisive political debate
concerning electrical generation, transmission, and distribution preceded
Congressional authorization of the project. It is noteworthy that Pelton water
wheels generate electricity for use at Hoover Dam, while the Bureau transmits
electricity generated from the banks of turbines on each side of the river to distant
cities. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to examine the Bureau’s
activities during World War II, during the war Bureau of Reclamation power
developed a sixth circle, the interconnection of Bureau generated power into the
developing western power grid.3
Congress passed legislation creating what became the Bureau of
Reclamation on June 17, 1902.4 The provisions of the law are well known and
hardly need repeating. In ten relatively brief sections, Congress laid out the basis
to provide water to the arid west. The act gave the Secretary of the Interior broad
power to withdraw land and to authorize projects. The reclamation fund would
ﬁnance projects. Landownership could not exceed 160 acres, and residency
was required. Issues associated with electrical generation, transmission, and
distribution do not appear in the law. The word electricity does not even appear in
the statute. That all began to change within a few years.
The Salt River Project in Arizona was among the ﬁrst reclamation projects
that the Secretary of the Interior authorized on March 14, 1903.5 The First Annual
Report of the Reclamation Service, which covered the period from passage of the
law to December 1, 1902, recognized the nascent power potential of the proposed
project. The report stated, “[i]n the construction of a great dam one of the most
important elements is power.” Further discussion followed that included a brief
description of the proposed power plant. This represents the ﬁrst concentric
circle. The writer reported that the power house would have a generating capacity
of 1,200 horsepower with a fourth of that amount devoted to the cement mill.
Bureau ofﬁcials estimated the total cost of the power house at $215,260.6
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30.2. Theodore Roosevelt Dam and
Powerhouse.

30.3. A 1911 view of the Minidoka
Powerplant.

The following year electricity appeared even more prominently in the
Bureau’s annual report. In discussing the Minidoka Project, another of the
Bureau’s original endeavors, on the upper Snake River in Idaho the report stated
that the site presented an “unusually favorable” location for power development.
The Bureau was considering three different plans for the project. The ﬁrst had an
estimated generation capacity of 9,545 horsepower, the second plan’s estimated
capacity was 11,820 horsepower, and the third plan could generate up to
17,500 horsepower (more than 13,000 kilowatts). The report stated that the
Bureau could use electricity to pump water “above the gravity line” south of
the river. If the Bureau did not electrically pump water, ofﬁcials thought that
a gravity system could only irrigate about 66,000 acres. Electricity greatly
increased that potential. The Bureau estimated that under the ﬁrst plan, it could
irrigate 116,000 acres, while under the second plan an additional 10,000 acres
could be irrigated. Finally, under the third, 17,500 horsepower plan, upwards of
172,200 acres would receive river water.7
The Bureau’s second annual report also contained a section describing the
proposed Shoshone Project on the North Fork of the Shoshone River in northwest
Wyoming. Jeremiah Ahern, who conducted the project investigation, estimated
that at two sites 9,000 horsepower might be generated.8 The next several Bureau
of Reclamation Annual Reports continued to discuss hydroelectric potential. The
third and fourth annual reports reviewed the power potential on the following
projects: Salt River, Klamath, Minidoka, Crow Reservation, Sun River, and Priest
Rapids.9
During these early years of the Bureau of Reclamation some prominent
national ﬁgures began to express concern over what they considered a waterpower
monopoly. Gifford Pinchot, James Garﬁeld, Franklin Lane, and others believed
that the nation’s waterways should be publicly developed to serve the greatest
good. These individuals, usually considered as part of the growing progressiveconservationist movement, expressed alarm over what they thought was the
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purchasing and holding of water power sites for speculative purposes. In 1904 the
Bureau of Reclamation addressed the problem in this statement:
One of the difﬁculties encountered in putting the reclamation law into
effect is the fact that speculative interests have ﬁled upon, or are seeking
to ﬁle upon, all possible sites for developing power.… The fact that
the persons who ﬁle upon these water power sites are not compelled
to utilize them or expend any considerable amount of money in their
development enables a monopoly of this kind to be created at a small
expense.10

At issue for the Bureau was the possibility that private power interests would
monopolize the best dam sites, thereby securing water rights and effectively
preventing new reclamation projects.
The same report contained a section titled “Power Development and
Pumping,” that discussed both hydropower and steam generated electricity for
pumping purposes. An electrical engineer in Denver was responsible for making
the studies of power possibilities of each project. The report then gave a stateby-state breakdown of the pumping and power possibilities thus far investigated,
which included projects in Arizona (Salt River); California (Owens Valley, Yuma,
and King River); Colorado (Uncompahgre Valley); Idaho (Minidoka); Nebraska
(North Platte); Nevada (Truckee-Carson); New Mexico (Rio Grande); North
Dakota (steam generated power); South Dakota (Belle Fourche); Utah (Utah Lake
and Bear Lake); Washington (Priest Rapids); and Wyoming (Shoshone).11
These early annual reports indicate that a new reality was setting in at
the Bureau of Reclamation that recognized electricity as an integral part of any
proposed project. A circular letter dated February 2, 1904, discussed the changing
situation. The letter stated that
[t]he feasibility of a project may depend upon the possibilities regarding
power development and use, and as much time should be allowed for
studying this phase of the undertaking as for the investigation of other
engineering questions.

The letter instructed consulting engineers to state in their reports if power
development was possible, and if so, how much and for what uses. By issuing
these engineering instructions, the Bureau had put electricity on the same
engineering level as irrigation and ﬂood control. A circular letter in May of 1904
addressed the concern about speculative withdraws of water power sites. The
letter gave the Bureau’s approval for withdrawal of potential hydroelectric dam
sites if any “reasonable prospect” existed that the Bureau may use the site.12
Effectively, the Bureau decided to make preemptive claims to protect potential
project sites from speculative claims.
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Numerous factors caused
the Bureau of Reclamation to
reassess the importance of electricity.
Independent of the Bureau, electricity
was becoming a political, social, and
technological issue in America. As
increasing numbers of people used
electricity, the need for additional
generation became paramount.
This, in part, led to the speculative
purchases of potential water power
30.4. Bell type 116” turbine runner (Unit 1)
locations. Water power itself seemed
at the Siphon Drop Powerplant on the Yuma
Project in 1926.
to represent an energy panacea since
it did not require the transportation
of fuel and once a dam was built supply seemed unlimited. Internally, the Bureau
realized that electricity would allow it to irrigate more land then envisioned only a
few years earlier. Technology would thus help promote the Jeffersonian yeoman
farmer ideal. Bureau projects, especially Salt River and Minidoka, would soon
generate electricity in excess of the requirements for pumping water. Surplus
electricity meant dollars for the Bureau of Reclamation. Congress addressed
the changing circumstances when it amended the reclamation law in April 1906.
Section ﬁve of the 1906 law gave the Secretary of the Interior the right to lease
surplus power for not more than ten years with a preference given to leases for
municipal purposes. The government would place revenue from such leases
in the reclamation fund and credit the money to the project that generated the
electricity. Irrigation remained paramount, however, as a power lease could not
“impair the efﬁciency of the irrigation project.”13 Fourteen years later, when
Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act, it also contained a clause giving
preference to municipal power systems.14
For the remainder of the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century electricity
continued to increase in importance at Bureau projects. During these years, the
Bureau also authorized construction of steam generating plants for pumping
purposes at several projects. In May 1906, for example, the Bureau started
receiving bids for construction of two steam turbines with a total capacity of 600
horsepower to pump water at the ably named Garden City Project in western
Kansas.15 Steam-driven generators later pumped water on the Williston Project in
North Dakota.
Electrical power proved indispensable in the construction of another
early project that featured a hydroelectric dam. After several years of study, the
Secretary of the Interior authorized the Strawberry Valley Project in December
1905. Located southeast of Salt Lake City, the Strawberry Valley Project evolved
out of the agitation of people in the area for irrigation water. Besides water,
the project eventually supplied power to several small Utah towns. The project
diverted water from the Colorado River watershed into the Great Basin through an
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18,500-foot tunnel that carried
water from the Strawberry
River to the Spanish Fork
River.16
The project involved
two dams: a retention dam on
the Strawberry River with a
capacity of 250,000 acre feet
and then a diversion dam on
the Spanish Fork River. The
Spanish Fork River dam
30.5. In 1906 Reclamation had the exciters in place
diverted water into a threeand ready for operation in the powerhouse on the
mile long power canal before Strawberry Valley Project.
the water ﬁnally entered the
irrigation works. Electrical energy proved crucial in construction of the tunnel.
Initially workers used electric drills powered by gasoline burning generators to
tunnel through the limestone rock. After workers had excavated 1,565 feet of the
tunnel, work stopped to await installation of a more sophisticated electrical plant.
Work resumed in December 1908 and workers used compressed air drills driven
by electrically powered air compressors. Electricity lit the tunnel and helped with
ventilation. The project’s machine shop was equipped with electrically powered
tools and equipment, and an electrically powered locomotive helped clear debris.
A power line transmitted excess power to the town of Spanish Forks, which used
it for electric lighting. The Bureau planned to move another transmission line
built during the construction phase into the valley upon completion of the project
and to use the line to carry power to pumping stations. The electrical system went
online in January 1909 with a capacity of 3,000 horsepower.17
The year 1909 also was eventful in an electrical sense on other Bureau
projects. During construction of the Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River Project, the
Bureau had installed a temporary power plant that could generate
1,300 horsepower of electricity. Even before the temporary generator began
generating electricity, engineers had made plans to install six 900-kilowatt
generators in the permanent power house. The ﬁrst three units began generating
electricity in 1909 (unit one in June, units two and three in August). Although
designed to power pumps, municipal and industrial customers bought Roosevelt
Dam power most notably the privately owned Paciﬁc Gas and Electric
Company.18
While the permanent generators began producing power at Strawberry
Valley and on the Salt River Project, the Minidoka Project on the Upper Snake
River in Idaho also began generating electricity in 1909. Power possibilities were
among the considerations when the Bureau conducted initial project studies in
1903. The Bureau later sold excess power for lighting, commercial, and industrial
uses. In 1909 the Bureau had developed 6,000 horsepower of electricity on
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the Minidoka Project with another 4,000 horsepower under consideration. The
power plant began operation in May 1909, generating power for the project’s ﬁrst
pumping station. Water from electrically powered pumps irrigated 3,600 acres on
the project in 1909.19
The Salt River, Strawberry Valley, and the Minidoka Projects all reveal
the changing charge of the Bureau of Reclamation within the ﬁrst ten years of its
existence. Although on all three projects irrigation remained supreme, electricity
has assumed an important position. The Bureau and Congress recognized this
through new regulation and statute. On all three projects electricity allowed for
the pumping of water in greater amounts and over greater distances. Electricity
was especially crucial in the construction of the Strawberry Valley Project and
to a slightly lesser degree the Salt River Project. In subsequent years, the sale
of electricity, especially on the Salt River Project, would result in substantial
revenue. In varying degrees, the ﬁrst three concentric circles had developed
around these projects: electricity for construction, electricity for pumping, and
electrical sales to individuals and small municipalities. The foundation for the
fourth circle, sale to municipalities had clearly been laid with installation of the
permanent generating facilities at Salt River, Minidoka, and Strawberry Valley.
As the Bureau entered its second decade of existence, it continued
to expand as it constructed more projects, some of which could generate
hydroelectricity. The thirteenth annual report, which covered ﬁscal year
1913-1914, reﬂected a degree of contradiction in how the Bureau viewed
power development. The report noted that projects on large rivers often had
hydroelectric capability. Pumping underground water or surface water above
the gravity line remained the Bureau’s primary reason for power development.
Beyond pumping water, the Bureau’s interests in electricity, in order of
importance, were dam construction, transportation of construction material, and
then commercial sales of power. Having stated the Bureau’s interest, the report
then discussed the rates charged for commercial sales from the Minidoka Project,
which were less per kilowatt hour than the rates charged for Niagara Falls power.
This statement is of interest because, during the long debate over ownership of
electrical systems, public power advocates often used rates at the governmentowned plant at Niagara Falls as a yardstick to measure the rates of privately
owned utilities in the United States. The report contained the Minidoka Project’s
rate schedule and noted the Bureau usually sold power nearly at cost.20
Data contained in the Sixteenth Annual Report shows the extent of the
Bureau’s electrical development. The Bureau operated thirteen power plants on
nine projects. As shown in Table 30.1, those plants generated in excess of
100 million kilowatt hours of electricity. Power sold to customers approached
80 million kilowatt hours and resulted in revenue exceeding $623,000.
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Table 30.1. Bureau of Reclamation Power Plants Operated during fiscal year 1916-1917.
Project

Plant

Kilowatt
Hours
Kilowatts Generated

Capacity

Salt River

Roosevelt

10,000

48,112,800

“

Cross Cut
South
Consolidated

5,000

9,612,000

2,000

6,148,400

“

Kilowatt

Power Sales Kilowatt

Hours Sold Revenue

Hour Cost.

60,964,565 $495,049.56 $0.01

Boise

Boise

1,875

4,228,720

Minidoka

Minidoka

7,000

40,762,730

“

Arizona Falls

1,000

2,745,660

17,009,555 $41,529.57 $0.00

Truckee-Carson

Lahontan

1,875

4,758,320

1,023

$16,331.86 $15.96

Rio Grande

Power plant

150

59,100

1,200

$52.21

$0.04

Strawberry Valley

Spanish Fork

850

1,043,661

939,365

$9,756.10

$0.01

187

6,870

6,870

$140.00

$0.02

187

11,310

11,310

$440.00

$0.04

943,050

$60,561.00 $0.06

Okanogan
“

Power Plant
No. 1
Power Plant
No. 2

Yakima-Sunnyside Rocky Ford

187

North Dakota
Pumping

1,150

1,222,310

31,461

118,711,881 79,876,938 $623,860.30 $0.01

Total

Williston

Source: Bureau of Reclamation, Thirteenth Annual Report, 1916-1917 (Government
Printing Office, 1917), 23.
Notes: For Salt River and Minidoka generation totals and revenue are project wide.
Salt River units one, two, and three were not in service during fiscal year 1916-1917
according to the report. All plants were hydroelectric except Williston, which was steam.

Although the size of many of the plants listed in Table 30.1 is small by
contemporary standards, many towns had similar size plants during the
1910s. The Bureau continued to look for additional sources of electricity. The
information in Table 30.2 is also drawn from the Sixteenth Annual Report.

705

Table 30.2. Undeveloped power on Bureau Projects during fiscal year 1916-1917.
State(s)

Project

Kilowatts

Kilowatt

Minimum Maximum
ArizonaCalifornia

California

Colorado

Idaho

Yuma

Drop in CA Canal

895

895

Araz

6,714

6,714

Laguna

2,984

2,984

26,110

26,110

506

506

6,714

8,952

Iron Canyon

Iron Canyon

Orland

Drop, highline to South Canal

“

Hat Creek

“

Fall River

5,222

29,840

“

Big Bend

111,900

111,900

Grand Valley*

Main Canal

2,238

2,238

Uncompahgre*

Various Sites

29,840

29,840

Boise

Arrowrock Dam

7,460

14,920

“*

Various Sites

1,417

1,417

Minidoka

Minidoka Dam

7,460

7,460

“

Head of Walcott Lake

22,380

22,380

Flathead

No. 1 Newell Tunnel

96,980

96,980

“

No. 2 Buffalo Dam

28,348

28,348

“

No. 3

14,174

14,174

“

No. 4

52,220

52,220

“

No. 5

11,190

11,190

Huntley

Second Drop, Main Canal

205

205

Montana-North
Lower Yellowstone*
Dakota

Lateral K.K. drop

234

234

Nebraska

North Platte*

Pathfinder Dam

12,682

44,760

Nevada

Truckee-Carson

Lahontan

3,730

3,730

“

26-foot drop

2,163

2,163

New MexicoTexas

Elephant Butte

Elephant Butte Dam

8,952

8,952

Oregon

Columbia River

Celilo Falls

373,000

596,800

Deschutes

4 sites

67,140

74,600

Silver Lake

Silver Creek

2,163

2,163

Umatilla

Drainage Outfall

Warner Valley

Deep Creek

Willamette Valley
“

Montana
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108

108

1,492

1,492

Santiam River and Marion Lake

10,444

10,444

McKenzie River, 2 plants

22,753

22,753

“

Middle Fork Willamette and
Waldo Lake Storage

OregonCalifornia
Utah
Washington

Wyoming
Total

48,490

48,490

Klamath

Various Sites

7,460

7,460

Strawberry Valley

Spanish Fork

1,119

1,119

Columbia River

Priest Rapids

149,200

149,200

Okanogan

Salmon Creek No. 1

1,492

1,492

“

Salmon Creek No. 2

1,902

1,902

Yakima-Sunnyside

Mabton

98

98

“

Main Canal

206

206

Yakima-Tieton

Lateral E

2,544

2,544

Yakima-Wapato

Drop 0

2,186

2,186

“

Drop 1

3,046

3,046

“

Drop 2

1,822

1,822

“

Drop 3

1,110

1,110

Shoshone

Shoshone

29,840

29,840

1,190,335 1,487,989

Source: Bureau of Reclamation, Thirteenth Annual Report, 1916-1917 (Government
Printing Office, 1917), 28. Notes: Asterisk indicates generation from irrigation flow only.

Several things are notable about the data in Table 30.2. Perhaps most
signiﬁcantly is the number of projects, twenty-eight, and the number of possible
power plants, at least forty-six. The maximum capacity the Bureau thought
these plants could generate (1,487,989 kilowatts) dwarfed the capacity of those
plants already generating electricity (Table 30.1: 31,461 kilowatts). The Bureau
was certainly thinking big, and that thinking was nowhere more evident then on
the Columbia River. Estimates of a dam at Celilo Falls ranged from 1,190,335
to 1,487,989 kilowatts and the estimate for Priest Rapids was almost 150,000
kilowatt hours. The Bureau never did build dams at either of those Columbia
River sites. The Grand County, Washington Public Utility District, with ﬁnancial
backing from public and private utilities, built a dam at Priest Rapids in the 1950s.
The Army Corps of Engineers built The Dallas Dam ﬂooding Celilo Falls, also
in the 1950s. The Bonneville Power Administration transmits power from both
projects on its lines.21 A notable omission from the Bureau’s list of potential
waterpower sites was the lower Colorado River near Black and Boulder Canyons.
That would soon change, leading to ever further expansion of the Bureau’s
hydroelectric capacity.
Calls for a dam on the lower Colorado River began shortly after the turn
of the century from residents of California’s Imperial Valley. People in the valley,
who wanted a dam for irrigation and to help control the Colorado’s devastating
ﬂoods, began calling for a dam. In time, their demands coincided with the Bureau
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of Reclamation’s plan to establish a comprehensive development program for the
Colorado River Basin. Initial discussions usually centered on ﬂood protection
and irrigation as the primary reasons for such an undertaking.22 Yet, many people
were beginning to focus more attention on the river’s hydroelectric potential.
In 1916 the Department of the Interior through the United States
Geological Survey released Water-Supply Paper 395 titled, “Colorado River
and Its Utilization.” The report was a comprehensive study of the entire river
and its watershed. The report contained extensive discussions concerning water
supply, irrigation, river control, and water power. Overall, the river’s short fall
on many parts made much of it unfavorable for generating cheap energy. In some
canyons, however, the river fell as much as ﬁfteen feet per mile making those
areas suitable for hydroelectric production. The report’s author estimated that
dams could generate nearly 1.5 million kilowatts of electricity without interfering
with irrigation. An elevation proﬁle of the Grand, Green, and Colorado Rivers
in the study included a notation that read “Boulder Canyon power site.”23 Within
a few years, interest in the river’s power potential had spread beyond the federal
government.
City ofﬁcials in Los Angeles announced in 1921 their intention to secure
future water and power supplies from the Colorado River, even if it the city had
to build a dam on the river. Southern California Edison (SCE) and Southern
Sierra Power joined the battle when they agreed that SCE would sell power to
Southern Sierra from proposed SCE dams. Southern California Edison ﬁled four
applications with federal and state ofﬁcials to build dams on the river.24 E. F.
Scattergood, the chief electrical engineer of the Los Angeles Bureau of Power and
Light, later wrote public power stalwart Senator George Norris that a dam was
“necessary to the continued growth of the southwest.”25
In the early 1920s the Bureau of Reclamation again entered the picture.
Congress had directed the Bureau to examine “possible irrigation development of
the Imperial Valley in California.”26 The Bureau had done previous investigative
work over the years regarding the Colorado River and Bureau Director Arthur
Powell Davis used that material in writing his report. A map that followed Davis’
transmittal letter to the Secretary of the Interior listed thirteen undeveloped power
sites on the river, including the Boulder Canyon site. Also listed were twenty-ﬁve
dams already built in the Colorado’s watershed. In his proposed development
program, Davis called for a high dam to generate electricity in addition to ﬂood
control and irrigation. Davis thought that the federal government should build the
dam and then sell power for compensation. If that proved unfeasible, he thought
the government should solicit public or private groups about constructing the
dam. Davis’ call for a high dam was important since irrigation and ﬂood control
did not require a high dam, such as the dam ultimately built.27
The river’s hydroelectric potential received nationwide attention
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throughout the 1920s. William Randolph Hearst, for example, repeatedly used
his nationwide newspaper chain to blame private power companies for blocking
passage of Colorado River legislation. In 1924, during congressional debate
over the second Swing-Johnson bill, the Hearst press claimed that a dam in
Boulder Canyon could generate 600,000 horsepower of electricity.28 The Hearst
newspaper chain, with papers in eighteen major cities, recognized ﬂood control
and irrigation as the principal reasons for building the dam, but said that electrical
production remained the major point of contention.29 In 1928, when Congress
ﬁnally passed the fourth Swing-Johnson legislation, the Hearst press called
Boulder Dam the “billion dollar dam site”–and one of the biggest congressional
prizes since Congress allocated railroad land tracts in the nineteenth century. If
private power companies had won the prize, the Hearst papers said, they would
have dictated the industrial development of the entire southwest.30
The discussions regarding potential Colorado River electricity must have
been especially pleasing to businessmen in Los Angeles. By the 1920s electricity
had become a focal point of the city’s business community. Beginning in 1922
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce began publishing Southern California
Business. Throughout the decade, magazine articles associated the continued
growth of Los Angeles and the entire Southwest to the construction of a Colorado
River dam. Commenting on the Colorado River Compact signed in 1922, one
article said “few of us hoped for agreement between these seven great states
whose future growth and expansion are intimately connected with and totally
dependent upon the development of the Colorado river, both in hydro-electric
power and waters for irrigation.” An accompanying map showed nine potential
power markets in Nevada, Arizona, and California.31
In the fall of 1925, Southern California Business featured articles that
discussed the proposed dam site. “The truly important fact is this…Boulder
Dam will guarantee adequate water and cheap power to the cites of Los Angeles,
Pasadena, Glendale, and Riverside-and to the entire Colorado River Basin.”32 The
Chamber of Commerce’s president issued a statement presenting the Chamber’s
views on the proposed dam. The organization favored a high dam to prevent
ﬂooding, provide water, and to “make available a large volume of hydroelectric
energy, an important necessity for agricultural, industrial and community
development in the Southwest.”33
During the years preceding authorization of Hoover Dam, the Bureau
continued to develop hydroelectricity on other projects. In 1925 the Bureau
operated twenty-two power houses on thirteen projects, as compared to thirteen
power houses on nine projects in 1917. In addition to those projects and plants
listed in Table 30.1, the Bureau operated the Lingle Plant on the North Platte
Project, the Pilot Butte Plant on the Riverton Project, the Shoshone Plant on
the Shoshone Project, and the Tieton Number One Plant on the Yakima Storage
Project. These plants had a combined capacity of 4,020 kilowatts.34 For
the remainder of the decade only one more project, Yuma, began generating
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electricity. The Bureau did build several more plants on projects with existing
hydropower generation that included the Guernsey Plant on the North Platte
Project and the Mormon Flats, Horse Mesa, and Stewart Mountain Plants, all on
the Salt River Project.35
Power sales remained proﬁtable for the Bureau in the 1920s. In 1926
the Bureau placed the total amount spent on reclamation power development at
$46,077,649. Gross earning in 1925 equaled $1,067,135 and net earning were
$442,619. The Bureau said that the real beneﬁt, however, was not ﬁnancial, but
the advantages that resulted from electrically driven pumps and draglines that
improved irrigation. Home use of cheap Bureau power was another beneﬁt to the
projects.36 The larger projects provided considerable income. On the Minidoka
Project in 1928 revenue from electrical sales surpassed $150,000. For the same
year, electrical sales on the North Platte Project exceeded $220,000.37
The Bureau’s 1925 annual report listed the “principal” power contracts as
of June 25, 1925. On some projects, power went to a single customer such as the
Boise Project, which sold power to the Idaho Power Company, and the Newlands
Project, which sold electricity to the Canyon Power Company. Power from the
Minidoka Project, however, went to at least seventy-three customers that included
the cities of Burley and Rupert, and the villages of Albion, Declo, Heyburn, and
Minidoka. Minidoka power also went to several power companies and ﬁftynine “small contracts” with revenue less than $1,000 a year. The Utah towns of
Spanish Fork, Payson, Salem, and Springville bought electricity from another of
the Bureau’s original power projects, Strawberry Valley.38
Returning to the analytical idea of concentric circles focuses attention on
the degree of electrical development on Bureau of Reclamation projects by the
mid to late 1920s. Electricity was an integral part of dam construction and used
for pumping water throughout the West; the ﬁrst and second circles. The third
and fourth circles, electrical sales to parties close to dams and to towns and cities
some distance from power plants also had occurred. These sales provided the
Bureau with substantial revenue by the mid 1920s.
People fought over issues that the ﬁfth circle represents, sales to large
cities with electricity a major part of dam authorization and construction, through
much of the 1920s. The United States Geological Survey report in 1916 and
the Bureau’s report in 1921 both identiﬁed enormous hydroelectric potential in
the areas around Black and Boulder Canyons on the lower Colorado River. The
transmission of large amounts of Hoover Dam electricity to Southern California
upon completion of the project clearly represents the ﬁfth concentric circle. The
change in the Bureau of Reclamation’s mission from water to water and power
is evident in the fourth Swing-Johnson legislation that became law in December
1928.
Whereas “electricity” did not appear in the 1902 law establishing the
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forerunner to the Bureau of Reclamation, “electricity” was prominent in the
“Boulder Canyon Project Act” as it is ofﬁcially titled.39 The ﬁrst sentence of the
act read, in part, “and for the generation of electrical energy as a means of making
the project herein authorized a self-supporting and solvent undertaking . . .”
Another part of the ﬁrst section required construction of a power plant at or near
the dam “suitable for the fullest economic development of electrical energy from
the water discharged from said reservoir . . .” Electricity was clearly an important
aspect of the entire project. Electrical generation was not only a legally mandated
part of the project, it was the means to pay for the project. This represented a
dramatic departure from the Bureau’s organic law and from the 1906 amendment
allowing electrical sales and contracts. Instead of revenues from land sales
ﬁnancing project construction, electricity was the ﬁnancial agent for the dam’s
construction and completion. Section 5(d) of the act reﬂected the realization that
the power plant would generate great amounts of electricity for transmission to
distant cities. In part, the subsection gave any agency with a contract for
25,000 “ﬁrm horsepower” or less the legal right to use the transmission lines
of any agency with a minimum contract of 100,000 “ﬁrm horsepower,” the
equivalent of 74,600 kilowatts.40 Essentially, the law said that smaller power
users could use the transmission lines of the larger power users. This avoided
duplicate power lines and saved money. More revealing is the anticipated size
of the contracts, more than 74,000 kilowatts. By comparison, the Bureau’s four
original hydroelectric plants on the Salt River Project had a rated capacity of
18,000 kilowatts.41
In the years following congressional authorization of Hoover Dam the
Bureau has built numerous other projects with tremendous hydroelectric capacity,
most notably Grand Coulee and Glen Canyon Dams. Those are just a few, today
the Bureau operates ﬁfty-eight power plants in eleven states making it the second
largest generator of electricity in the United States, second only to the Army
Corps of Engineers. Those numbers do not include dams on projects such as
Salt River that the Bureau no longer operates. Authorization and construction
of Hoover Dam represented the completion of the Bureau’s transformation
from water to water and power. The intellectual and legal foundations of that
change date back to the very ﬁrst years of the Bureau’s existence. By 1909 those
foundations were well in place when the Salt River, Minidoka, and Strawberry
Valley Projects all began to generate electricity in excess of what was needed for
pumping purposes. While irrigation will always remain the central feature of the
Bureau of Reclamation’s ﬁrst 100 years, electricity has been a part of that history
for nearly as long.
Jay Brigham, Ph.D., works as a research associate for the Washington, D.C.,
consulting ﬁrm Morgan Angel & Associates, L.L.C., public policy consultants, and
he has written Empowering the West: Electrical Politics before FDR (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1998).
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Just Add Water: Reclamation Projects and
Development Fantasies in the Upper Basin of the
Colorado River
Stephen C. Sturgeon
Abstract
The history of the development of the American West is full of countless
examples of promoters seeking to encourage outside investors to buy land, invest
in mines, and build railroads. The history of water projects in the region is no
different. Residents of communities such as Grand Junction, Colorado, recognized
early on the two-fold dilemma that they faced: irrigation and reclamation projects
would be critical to the economic growth of the area, and the funding for these
projects would have to be obtained from sources outside the region. The promoters
of such projects relied upon booster literature in order to entice investors with
alluring (and often false) descriptions of the potential wealth to be had in these
“irrigated Edens.”
While some parts of the American West quickly developed into largescale irrigation areas, other regions, such as the Upper Basin of the Colorado River,
languished. The small population, remote location, and marginal land in this
area sharply limited its political and economic clout. These limitations, however,
became less problematic following passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, when
the federal government became the funding source of last (or increasingly ﬁrst)
resort for water projects in the American West. Since the federal government had
access to larger ﬁnancial and construction resources than other entities, and federal
projects merely had to break even rather than turn a proﬁt, it was now much easier
for Upper Basin projects to secure funding.
The advent of federal funding, however, did not eliminate the role of local
promoters and booster literature. In fact, their role became even more important
because now instead of simply trying to impress a single investor, or even a
handful of investors, it was necessary to convince a whole federal bureaucracy
as well as Congress about the merits that a particular water project had to offer.
Gradually, over time, the scale and nature of these projects began to change.
Instead of simple stand-alone irrigation projects, local and regional boosters, with
the active support of the Bureau of Reclamation, began to promote massive, multiphased projects that covered entire river basins.
This essay will examine the booster literature that was used to promote
the largest such plan—the Colorado River Storage Project. This six state project
received congressional approval in 1956, and the arguments made on its behalf
by supporters indicate how much the scope and nature of reclamation projects
changed over time. Rather than simply serving irrigation needs, the Colorado
River Storage Project was intended to promote rapid and massive industrial
development in the Upper Basin region. Instead of touting the beneﬁts this project
would have for agriculture, which would have been the norm for promoters in the
past, the booster literature also touted the potential for industry, as well as other
diverse goals such as increased recreational opportunities and even improved
national defense.
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Just as promoters in the past often over-hyped the projects they were
supporting, the booster literature for the Colorado River Storage Project also raised
unrealistically high expectations. Instead of becoming the new industrial heartland
of America, the Upper Basin today still remains a rural, agricultural region. In
some instances, such as oil shale, industrial development actually backﬁred,
leading to an economic setback for the region. Thus large-scale water development
in the Upper Basin did not ultimately turn out to be the total panacea that local
residents had desired.

In the northwest corner of the state of Colorado, straddling the border with
Utah, is a 325 square mile federal preserve called Dinosaur National Monument.
Although the monument encompasses the scenic canyons of the Green and Yampa
Rivers, most tourists visit Dinosaur to see the preserved remains of the prehistoric
creatures that give the area its name. The main dinosaur exhibit is located at the
visitors’ center on the Utah side of the monument, where a modern glass and steel
building encloses the uplifted remnant of a prehistoric riverbed that contains the
fossils of various ancient reptiles.
Most tourists never journey past the visitor center, but the road does continue
on for several more miles. After crossing over the Green River, drivers reach the
end of the asphalt pavement and continue on a narrower dirt track. Just to the left of
the road are carved petroglyphs, which serve as reminders of the ﬁrst settlers in this
area. Around the next bend in the road is a site that preserves the memory of a more
recent one.
A woman by the name of Josie Morris settled here about 1914. Like
many things about Morris (her exact age, how many husbands she had—legal or
otherwise) this date is open to question. Park historians do know that she lived here
until her death in 1964, most of the time on her own, leading a fairly self-sufﬁcient
life which she occasionally subsidized through poaching or producing moonshine.
The site that Morris chose to homestead was a particularly good one because a
natural spring bubbled up out of the ground near her cabin, which provided plenty of
water for her own use as well as for irrigating her orchard and garden. She also used
nearby Cub Creek for watering her livestock.
Not long after Morris settled at this site a neighbor challenged her use
of the water in Cub Creek. He did so, not in the stereotypical Western way of a
gunﬁght, but by taking her to court. Under the legal doctrine of prior appropriation,
the downstream neighbor claimed he had ﬁrst rights to use any water in the
creek. Citing this doctrine the judge ruled that Morris could not continue to draw
water from Cub Creek. However he then went a step further by ruling that if any
water from the spring on her property drained into the creek, the spring could be
considered a tributary of Cub Creek; and therefore the neighbor would be entitled
to claim that water as well. In order to comply with the court’s decision and still
preserve her option to use the spring, Morris built several small ponds to catch the
water and even ﬂooded some of her own pastures to prevent any spring water from
washing into the creek. Only by impounding the water (and in the case of her ﬁelds,
wasting it) was she able to preserve her right to use it.1
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Morris’s struggle to maintain control of her water supply offers an example
in microcosm of the larger struggle over the control and development of water in the
American West. In a region that is in large part deﬁned by the absence of high levels
of precipitation, this struggle is not just limited to feuds between neighbors but also
involves conﬂict between cities, states, and whole river basins. The effort to control
water has typically focused on two issues: determining who has the legal right to use
the water, and determining how best to put that water to use. It was this second goal
that led to the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902—legislation which allowed
the federal government to assist (as well as subsidize) directly in the development of
water resources in the West.
As the title of the legislation might suggest, the primary focus of early
federal reclamation projects was on irrigating new crop land. Over time, however,
the scope of these federal projects grew and shifted away from being primarily
agricultural. Instead they began to include such diverse elements as hydroelectricity,
mining, recreation, industrial development, and regional planning. This shift away
from agriculture to industry was particularly noticeable in the Upper Basin of the
Colorado River over the course of the twentieth century. The Upper Basin also
provides a clear example of how this shift, made with the best of intentions, could
end up having unintended (or even disastrous) consequences.

31.1. Federal and state representatives at a meeting of the Colorado River Compact
Commission, north of Santa Fe, New Mexico, at Bishop’s Lodge. Left to right: W. S.
Norviel, Commissioner for Arizona; Arthur P. Davis, Director, Reclamation Service;
Ottamar Hamele, Chief Counsel, Reclamation Service; Herbert Hoover, Secretary of
Commerce and Chairman of Commission; Clarence C. Stetson, Executive Secretary of
Commission; L. Ward Bannister, Attorney, of Colorado; Richard E. Sloan, Attorney, of
Arizona; Edward Clarke, Commissioner for Nevada; C. P. Squires, Commissioner for
Nevada; James R. Scrugham, Commissioner for Nevada; William F. Mills, former Mayor
of Denver; R. E. Caldwell, Commissioner for Utah; W. F. McClure, Commissioner for
California; R. F. McKisick, Deputy Attorney General of California; Delph E. Carpenter,
Commissioner for Colorado; R. J. Meeker, Assistant State Engineer of Colorado; Stephen
B. Davis, Jr., Commissioner for New Mexico; J. S. Nickerson, President, Imperial
Irrigation District of California; Frank C. Emerson, Commissioner for Wyoming; Charles
May, State Engineer of New Mexico; Merritt C. Mechem, Governor of New Mexico; T. C.
Yeager, Attorney for Coachella Valley Irrigation District of California. November 24, 1922.
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Like many facets of western water law, the Upper Basin of the Colorado
River is a legal ﬁction. Created during negotiations over the Colorado River
Compact of 1922, the basin is deﬁned as that portion of the drainage area for the
Colorado River which is located upstream from Lee Ferry.2 The basin includes
portions of ﬁve states: Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona. The
legal concept of the Upper Basin and Lower Basin was created in part to help divide
the ﬂow of water in the river between the various competing states, and especially to
give the other river basin states protection from California’s steadily growing water
consumption and political power. Despite assurances and visions that the Lower
and Upper Basins would be developed at the same pace, the Lower Basin quickly
absorbed the majority of federal reclamation spending. As a result, it would be more
than thirty years after the compact was signed before the Upper Basin would see the
construction of larger-scale federal reclamation projects.
Reclamation development in the Upper Basin, both public and private,
has long suffered from a series of limitations: limited arable land, limited funding
sources, and limited local skill and equipment. What the region did not suffer from
was a limited desire for reclamation. An examination of the history of reclamation
development in the area around Grand Junction, Colorado, shows that almost as
soon as the ﬁrst outside settlers arrived, they identiﬁed reclamation development as
crucial to the economic potential of the area. The stages of reclamation development
in Grand Junction followed a pattern similar to what took place in other parts of the
West: small, locally-controlled projects gave way to larger-scale efforts that required
outside funding. In the early 1880s farmers near Grand Junction began developing
a series of irrigation projects on the banks of the Colorado River (then known as the
Grand River). These projects soon proved to be unviable on their own and were
consolidated into a larger valley-wide canal project (known as the Grand Valley
Canal) designed not only to irrigate land on the banks of the river, but also further
away. This more ambitious project exceeded the ﬁnancial resources available in the
Grand Junction area, so a series of outside investors ended up funding construction
of the canal. The process eventually culminated in the canal company being owned
in 1885 by the Travelers Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut.3
Even outside, private-sector ﬁnancial resources, however, were not enough
to construct and maintain a viable canal project, and in 1894, following a series of
reorganizations, foreclosure auctions, and court challenges, the Grand Valley Canal
switched from being a for-proﬁt corporation to a not-for-proﬁt mutual company.
This, of course, left project supporters with the same problem as before: how to
secure ﬁnancing for further irrigation development in the valley when such projects
appeared unlikely to turn a quick proﬁt. At this point the federal government and the
Reclamation Act of 1902 played a key role in changing the direction of development
in the West. By merely requiring that projects eventually had to repay their costs
(with a liberal deﬁnition of repayment), rather than generate immediate proﬁts, the
Reclamation Act transformed hundreds of previously uneconomic projects into
potentially viable ones.4
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In the ﬁrst two decades
of the twentieth century, the
federal Reclamation Service
undertook to build a series of
projects in the region around
Grand Junction. The most
ambitious of these was the
Gunnison Tunnel (1909),
which diverted water from
the Gunnison River through
a six-mile tunnel into the
Uncompahgre Valley. While
federal involvement did allow
31.2. The east portal of the Gunnison Tunnel during
for the construction of largerconstruction.
scale projects, it did not always
improve the ﬁnancial success of these ventures. The Grand Valley Project (not to
be confused with the Grand Valley Canal), located on the Colorado River upstream
from Grand Junction, was approved by the federal government in 1911 with a
projected three-year repayment period once the project was ﬁnished. Although
it was completed in 1917, repayment did not start until 1928, and only after the
government changed the repayment period to 40 years, wrote off $812,000 in
construction costs, and instituted a reduced payment plan for the ﬁrst ﬁve years.
Similarly, the Uncompahgre Project (of which the Gunnison Tunnel was part)
originally had a repayment period of 10 years, which the government then extended
to 20 and later 40 years. Despite the extensions, however, local farmers proved
unable to meet the revised repayment schedules, so in the early 1950s Congress
approved an extension for the project that spread the repayment period out over 106
years, and wrote off $1 million of the original $10 million cost.5
While these federal projects were much larger in scope than the previous
private-sector ones, they remained much smaller than the development occurring in
the Lower Basin of the Colorado River. Early projects there included Laguna Dam,
Roosevelt Dam, and Coolidge Dam. Additional projects, such as the All–American
Canal and Imperial Dam, followed the completion of the Colorado River Compact in
1922. Despite the seeming success of the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency
actually had severe ﬁnancial difﬁculties during its ﬁrst thirty years of existence,
owing in large part to the chronic cost overruns on projects and the inability of
farmers to pay back construction costs in a timely manner. The turning point for the
Bureau was Hoover Dam.6
Standing 726 feet high, Hoover Dam at the time of its construction in
1935 was the largest reclamation project in the world. The dam, however, not
only represented a physically larger project for the Bureau of Reclamation, it also
represented a new kind of project. Whereas past efforts had typically focused on
irrigation and ﬂood control beneﬁts for the immediate surrounding area, Hoover
Dam offered little to the sparse populations of southern Nevada and northern
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Arizona. Instead the bulk of the beneﬁts literally ﬂowed down the river to Southern
California in the form of improved ﬂood control for the Imperial Valley, and, more
importantly, hydroelectricity for Los Angeles.7
The advent of hydroelectricity had a two-fold impact on the Bureau: one,
it transformed the agency from a ﬁnancially-troubled program into an economic
powerhouse; and two, it encouraged the Bureau to start planning more, and larger,
integrated regional projects rather than continuing to concentrate on traditional,
stand-alone initiatives. In particular, the ﬁnancial boom from hydroelectricity led
Reclamation ofﬁcials to start planning for so-called “cash register” dams, which
sometimes had no merit other than generating electricity. The proﬁts from these
dams were used to offset the losses typically incurred by irrigation projects.8
Hoover Dam was the beginning of the so-called “golden age of reclamation,”
which lasted for the next forty years. The Boulder Canyon Act of 1928, which
authorized construction of Hoover Dam, ushered in this era by also authorizing the
Bureau of Reclamation to investigate feasible projects in the Upper Basin of the
Colorado. In 1946 the Bureau issued its preliminary plan for the region, a wish
list of over one hundred proposed dams—one for virtually every river in the Upper
Basin. There were so many proposed projects in the plan that to build all of them
would have required more water than existed in the basin. The Bureau demonstrated
the high level of political power it now had by announcing that it would not consider
any projects in the Upper Basin until the states in the area had reached a formal
agreement on dividing the Colorado River’s water among themselves. The states
quickly complied, and the Upper Basin Compact was formally signed in 1948.9
Following ratiﬁcation of the compact by Congress a year later, the Bureau
of Reclamation released a revised plan in 1950 entitled the Colorado River Storage
Project (CRSP). The CRSP called for the construction of ten major dams and
reservoirs on the Colorado and its tributaries. These reservoirs, however, would not
serve any irrigation or ﬂood control purpose. Instead they would regulate the ﬂow
of the river in order to help maximize the production of hydroelectricity. In turn, the
proﬁts from the sale of this electricity would help offset the cost of building a dozen
smaller regional irrigation projects.10
While the stated core goals of the Colorado River Storage Project may
have been water and light, the Bureau and its boosters actually had a much larger
agenda in mind: to transform the Upper Basin of the Colorado River from a desert
wasteland into a new industrial and recreational center for the United States. Clearly
inﬂuenced by the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which during the New
Deal had helped to promote the development of one of the most impoverished
regions of the South, the promotional literature supporting the CRSP stressed the
broad cornucopia of beneﬁts that would ﬂow from the project—not only for the
Upper Basin but the entire nation.11
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31.3. Signed into law in 1956, the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) authorized a
broad range of projects in the Upper Colorado River Basin.

Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the major potential beneﬁts the promotional
literature touted about the Colorado River Storage Project was that it would unleash
the vast untapped wealth of natural resources in the Upper Basin. Pamphlets
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featuring maps of the region speckled with various resource symbols described
the region as the “treasure chest of the nation.” Others called it a “yawning
giant.” Estimates varied about how many valuable minerals were located in the
area (ranging between 42 and 200), but among those mentioned were lead, copper,
iron, zinc, phosphates, gold, silver, oil, natural gas, gilsonite, gypsum, tungsten,
molybdenum, and vanadium. Promoters were quick to emphasize that the Upper
Basin was the chief domestic source for such strategic minerals as uranium, and
contained the world’s largest reserves of oil shale. All that was needed to unleash
these potential riches was power and water. Failing to do so, warned a pamphlet
produced by the mining industry, “can hurt our entire national economy and our
national defense program.”12
Another beneﬁt that the literature promoted was the potential for industrial
development from the CRSP. This industrial growth was directly linked to the
expanded use of natural resources. Regional boosters expressed frustration over the
fact that while mining took place in the Upper Basin, the extracted raw materials
were shipped elsewhere for processing and manufacturing. With power and water
from the Colorado River Storage Project, plants could potentially be built within
the area to use these materials instead. This in turn would help to diversify the local
economy. These same boosters, however, stressed that industrial growth would
require “fabulous amounts of water,” not just for the manufacturing process but also
for the workers who would relocate to the area seeking employment.13
Boosters did not just expect
growth in rural areas; they also
anticipated that there would be
growth in the cities of the Upper
Basin as well. Arguments in support
of the need for more urban water
took two contradictory forms. Much
of the promotion literature claimed

31.4. Glen Canyon Dam and
Powerhouse.

that due to “the continued shift of
population from East to West,”
western cities such as Salt Lake
City and Albuquerque had reached
the limits of their growth owing
to a lack of new water supplies.
Denver in particular was held
up as a dire warning because it
had instituted water rationing.
31.5. The scroll case in unit 5 of the Glen Canyon
(This, however, was a somewhat
Powerhouse during installation in 1963.
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misleading example since the rationing was due to a severe, multi-year drought
which hit Colorado in the early 1950s—a fact that the literature did not mention.)
In contrast to the literature that claimed more water was needed to catch up with
existing growth, others argued that the water was needed to spur on additional
growth. These promoters freely admitted that their population growth estimates
were “based on the assumption that additional water can be secured,” and that “if
no additional water is to be obtained only a relative small increase in population can
logically be expected.”14
When examined together these two arguments reveal a clear ﬂaw: if urban
growth in the region had reached a limit due to the lack of additional water, then the
Colorado River Storage Project, which would introduce a larger but ultimately ﬁnite
amount of water, could at best only delay this problem but not solve it. The day of
reckoning would be merely deferred, not eliminated. The promotional literature also
ignored the fact that the CRSP was not designed to serve urban water needs. The
cities cited as examples, in fact, are located outside the Upper Basin watershed. The
only way for the CRSP to serve these cities was to provide new sources of water
for agriculture so that existing water supplies could be diverted out of the basin.
The literature also never addressed the question of whether additional growth was
necessary or even desirable. (Such a question would undoubtedly have struck the
promoters as completely irrational.) Instead promoters argued that the CRSP was
necessary so the West “can keep pace with the rest of the nation.”15
Supporters of the Colorado River Storage Project were quick to point to how
the economic beneﬁts of all this anticipated growth would ripple through the region,
particularly in the form of increased tax revenue. One promotional publication
argued, “[t]he claiming of arable land areas out of desert wastes would add millions
to taxable land values in Utah and the Upper Basin. And the adding of supplemental
water in areas restricted to early maturing crops would further expand the tax base.”
Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, a strong proponent of the CRSP, stressed
how the project would lead to the development of new industry and “the money that
those industries pour into our State in tax revenues will help to support our schools.
. . .” These rosy tax scenarios, however, failed to mention the fact that the inﬂux
of a larger population to provide the work force for these new industries would
necessarily lead to increased public expenditures for more roads and schools, thus
raising the question of whether or not the increased revenue would even be sufﬁcient
to cover the new expenses. As if to deﬂect this question, one promoter argued that if
the CRSP was not approved “the property values adjacent to the Colorado River in
the Upper Basin will diminish in value and waste down the river with the water.”16
While many of the potential beneﬁts predicted for the Colorado River
Storage Project, such as an enhanced agricultural infrastructure and an improved
tax base, were similar to those that nineteenth century reclamation boosters had
touted, some of the beneﬁts were distinctly new. One such new potential beneﬁt
was increased recreational opportunities. Promoters were quick to point out the
fact that the bulk of the proposed reclamation projects would be located between
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“two transcontinental
highways and much nearer
to the eastern populations
desiring” recreational
opportunities. The CRSP, it
was promised, will “greatly
expand the nation’s existing
facilities for ﬁshing,
boating, camping, waterskiing, swimming and other
recreational activities. It
will open up new scenic
areas, now inaccessible.
31.6. Flaming Gorge Dam and Powerplant in 1984.
Colorful natural bridges,
spectacular canyons and historic sites will be made available to the people of the
nation.”17
However, promoters were also quick to stress that the full recreational
potential of this region would only be realized if all the proposed projects in the
CRSP were built, because it was these individual projects that would allow for
access to recreational areas. The construction of Glen Canyon Dam would create
Lake Powell, which in turn would allow people to reach Rainbow Bridge National
Monument
by means of a scenic short boat trip. In its current isolated status, Rainbow
Bridge is accessible only by an arduous pack trip by horseback or by a long
river trip and a 10-mile hike. As a result, comparatively few people have
seen this wonder of the world.

Flaming Gorge Dam promised to “make accessible the awesome scenery of the
deep gorge of the Green River….” The Echo Park Dam promised to open the
Lodore Canyon, which currently is “dangerous for boat trips, even with experienced
guides,” “to people who love true beauty.” Additionally promoters claimed that
these projects even had scientiﬁc value because they would enable “[s]cientists and
naturalists [to] have new access to the primitive area.”18
Clearly much of this rhetoric was aimed at countering the attacks being made
on the Colorado River Storage Project by environmentalists (or as they were called
then, conservationists). Promoters of the project sought to combat these attacks
in a variety of ways, one of which was by labeling environmentalists as elitists.
The rhetoric proponents used suggested that reclamation projects had the potential
to make nature more democratic. A few examples are enlightening. “Without
the projects, there will be no development, and only a few men with means and
with physical stamina and courage to endure dangers will ever be able to see and
appreciate the grandeur of these Rocky Mountain canyons.” “[T]he Colorado River
Storage Project will provide full enjoyment of areas that are now open only to a
few––the people who can afford expensive river trips and the people who care to
724

risk these trips.” “It will make available this area to the people instead of restricting
it to a few.”19
Another angle of attack was to claim that development would make nature
more family friendly. “The projects will open new vistas for conservationists,
tourists, ﬁshermen, nature lovers and the American family.” “With development of
the dams, many of these areas will be accessible. A few roaring rapids will be turned
into placid lakes where a man can take his family for a boating or ﬁshing outing.”
However, lest promoters be accused of taming too much of the wilderness they were
quick to add, “[a]nd there are still a hundred miles of river rapids in the same general
area, for those who like this sport.”20
Promoters even went so far as to claim that the Colorado River Storage
Project had the potential to improve nature. CRSP reservoirs promised to “provide
numerous havens for ducks and other migratory birds.” These havens were “not
now present but vitally needed.” Additionally,
the project will turn silt-laden rivers into clear streams. The Green and
Yampa rivers now are muddy most of the time because of heavy deposits
of silt. Dams to be constructed will hold this silt in check, turning brown
rivers into clear and sparkling streams.

“Navajo Dam will turn the muddy, sluggish San Juan River into a clear reservoir.”
These clear streams in turn would offer new recreational opportunities. “Flaming
Gorge Dam will make a clear water ﬁsherman’s stream out of the lower Green River
now too clouded with mineral deposits to be a game stream.” What promoters did
not know was that the process by which these rivers became clear would destroy the
local river ecology and drive out the native ﬁsh. The new ﬁshing holes would be
world famous and strictly artiﬁcial.21
Another group for whom the Colorado River Storage Project would offer a
mixed legacy was the Navajo. Promoters, however, promised that the CRSP would
be a supreme blessing for the tribe. In order to make this promise, promoters had
to take the unusual gambit of attacking the past actions of the federal government
and the white settlers in the region. Pro-CRSP literature argued that the Navajo
“often go hungry because they have been shunted aside onto marginal lands with
inadequate water supplies. They also lack clothing and shelter.” The newspaper in
Farmington, New Mexico, which published a special supplement in support of the
CRSP featuring the plight of the Navajo on the cover, claimed that the reason “30
per cent of the tribe” lived at subsistence levels was because “we Americans have
broken so many solemn treaties.”22
In contrast to this history of past abuse, supporters of the Colorado River
Storage Project maintained that reclamation was the key to helping the Navajo.
One source of help would be the construction of Navajo Dam on the San Juan River
in New Mexico, which promoters claimed would lead to industrial development
in the area and therefore provide jobs to tribal members. The second source of
help was the proposed Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, which aimed to irrigate
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up to 125,000 acres of land on the reservation. A third source of help, though one
with no obvious link to the CRSP, was the promise that “this project will help
provide educational opportunities for the children of the Tribe,” by leading to the
construction of schools for sixteen thousand Navajo. More broadly, promoters
stressed that the CRSP would help in the “rehabilitation of this long-neglected
segment of the original American society,” and offer “partial fulﬁllment of promises
made to the Navajo people in the treaty of 1868 and never lived up to.” Project
supporters also offered a more tangible reason than honor for non-Navajos to
support these initiatives.
This project will help the Indians help themselves. In the long run, it
will save the government money because it helps the Navajos to become
self-supporting, instead of having to be supported by government
expenditures.23

Promoters, however, seemed to have set a low threshold for success. One
document claimed that the construction of Navajo Dam “would give a decent
standard of living to one–ﬁfth of [the tribe]. . . .” Unfortunately these lowered
expectations proved correct. The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP) ultimately
turned into a political boondoggle. Unlike other component projects of the Colorado
River Storage Project, which were developed and administered by the Bureau of
Reclamation, the NIIP was quickly turned over to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
where it became a ﬁnancial black hole, “which yielded few beneﬁts to the tribe
and provided far less employment of tribal members than originally negotiated.”
Perhaps it was this unproductive experience that led the Navajo to oppose further
federal reclamation projects on the Colorado River when they were proposed in the
1960s.24
Just as the promoters of the Colorado River Storage Project pointed out the
ways that the Navajo had suffered injustice, project supporters also pointed out the
ways that they perceived themselves to have also been treated unfairly. Ironically,
even though promoters argued that the CRSP would create new recreational
opportunities and help Indians, they also complained that these two factors had
hindered development in the region.
In the four Upper Basin states, and particularly in Utah, there are expansive
areas taken up by Monuments, Parks, Forest Service, Grazing Service,
Indian Reservations, and other reserves of various kinds, all tax free. And
now some would deprive the common people of this area of one of the few
resources which is available for development and use.

Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah expressed jealousy about the economic growth
occurring in other parts of the country. “Our Detroits and our Pittsburghs seem
to grow ever larger, while the industrial have-not areas content themselves with a
few industrial handouts.” He later expanded his complaint to include foreign aid
projects.
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We have spent 300 millions to help Italians build reclamation projects, yet
the Italians are under no obligation whatsoever to repay any of the costs of
those projects. We are willing to repay in dollars and cents for the capital
on irrigation, and dollars and cents, with interest, for municipal uses and for
power.

Senator Frank Barrett of Wyoming took a different tack, borrowing from
the states-rights rhetoric of southern politicians. “Overpowering and vital
interest [sic]of these Western States are involved, and after all, people of
the West ought to have the major right to make the decisions affecting their
welfare.”25
While some promoters argued that “justice” required that the
Colorado River Storage Project be built, others warned of the regional
devastation that would ensue if the CRSP did not receive congressional
approval. George Clyde, the Commissioner of Interstate Streams for Utah,
offered a legal doomsday scenario. “If the project is not authorized, the
rights of the Upper Basin states to their share of the Colorado River will
be effectively destroyed.” He continued, “Failure of Congress to authorize
this project will be the equivalent of their conﬁscating these rights in the
Colorado and making them available to the Lower Basin and Mexico.”
Others warned that this was the “last watering hole” for the Interior West.
“The Colorado River is the last water resource available in many parts of
the area to supply additional water for municipal and industrial purposes.”
“Testimony given . . . left no doubt that the future of [these] states is
dependent upon the plan.” Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado
offered an even direr scenario.
[S]tand on a canal bank as it winds its way over the land. On the uphill
side, you have virtually a barren desert with but scrub growth and little
green. On the downhill side you have green and growing crops, houses,
cities and life. That is the choice in the West, irrigation or desolation;
abundance or scarcity.

Sometimes the apocalyptic predictions promoters used would end up undermining
the very argument they were trying to make. “When [the Colorado River’s] waters
have been used, there is no other substantial supply on tap. The future of the
Southwest will have dropped back with its past.” Thus, it seems, whether or not the
CRSP was built the West was doomed to economic collapse.26
An unusual variation on this doomsday theme was the plea by promoters
to build the Colorado River Storage Project not for their sake but for the sake of
“our best crop, our children.” Senator Arthur Watkins in a letter to Secretary of
the Interior Oscar Chapman complained, “For many years the young people of
my state have been migrating in large numbers to other states where there would
be opportunities for homes and livelihoods. The limiting factor in Utah has been
lack of water and power.” Utah’s other Senator, Wallace Bennett, echoed these
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sentiments but conjured up images of the old orphan trains when he predicted, “We
shall have to continue to export our children to other states because opportunity for
them is lacking.” George Clyde complained, “Utah has long been a feeder state. Its
raw materials have been shipped to other centers for processing. Its children have
had to seek employment elsewhere.” One promoter cited the plight of the children
in his attack on efforts by environmentalists to block the CRSP.
Natural scenery is a beautiful thing, but economic security can also be very
attractive. Approximately 30% of the native born population of Utah must
seek employment outside the state, after the state has educated and trained
them in the art of making a living. Power and water for irrigation would
unlock many of Utah’s natural resources and enable more [of] the people of
the state to remain home.

The Republican Party of Utah endorsed this focus on the future when it passed a
resolution supporting the Colorado River Storage Project and claiming that among
its many beneﬁts the project “will provide new homes and opportunities for our
children and their children. . . .” As another promoter put it, with the CRSP “[o]ur
young men and women can build their destiny here.”27
While much of the promotional rhetoric surrounding the debate over the
Colorado River Storage Project focused on local concerns, supporters also were
quick to claim that the nation as a whole would beneﬁt in a variety of ways. One
area of emphasis was how the national economy would grow as a result of the
CRSP. Promoters claimed that the industrial development of the Upper Basin
would lead to a higher standard of living in the region. As a result of this, “[t]he
people of this reclamation area…will want and need new products—cars, tractors,
stoves, refrigerators, household items and equipment. Thus new markets will be
created for products manufactured in other parts of the country.” Even during the
construction phase for the CRSP the country as a whole would beneﬁt “because an
estimated 81 per cent of the construction costs will be spent in markets outside the
Upper Colorado River Basin.” The project was even touted as a ﬁnancial boon for
the federal government due to the increased income tax that would be generated in
the newly prosperous region, not to mention the revenue the government would gain
from the sale of hydroelectricity generated by the CRSP dams.28
While many of the supposed beneﬁts that promoters claimed would
come from the Colorado River Storage Project seemed fairly straightforward and
conventional, there was one set of beneﬁts that was quite different. Supporters
claimed that in addition to all the various economic rewards from the CRSP, this
project was vitally necessary in order to increase the security of the United States
from the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union. Some promoters emphasized the
untapped reserves of strategic minerals, such as uranium, oil shale, gilsonite, and
bentonite, among others, located in the region—minerals that could only be fully
developed with water and power from the CRSP. Others claimed that the country
needed to develop all of its potentially irrigable land. Senator Wallace Bennett
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warned that recent history had shown that the United States could not rely on foreign
supplies during wartime, and that we must develop domestic sources.29
Supporters of the Colorado River Storage Project also argued that the
project would strengthen the nation’s industrial capacity in the event of an atomic
war. There were two aspects of this argument that promoters set forth. One was
that the CRSP would allow for industrial dispersion into the interior of the United
States. Senator Bennett warned how “[t]he overwhelming bulk of our productive
capacity could be obliterated by a few well–placed bombs or missiles, for our
key industries are concentrated in just a few areas.” A group lobbying on behalf
of the CRSP produced an entire brochure quoting the testimony of national Civil
Defense Administrator Val Peterson on why the project was necessary for national
security. In it, he expressed concern about the “[t]he potentially fatal vulnerability
of concentrations of industry . . . .” Peterson went on to call “attention to the work
that Russia is reported to have done in developing a second line of industry behind
the Ural Mountains.” Senator Arthur Watkins took this idea a step further when
he suggested that “the United States, too, should build its own industrial defense
bastion behind the protective peaks of our own ‘Urals,’ the great Rocky Mountain
Range.” Local promoters in Utah further suggested that not only was Utah “made
up of many valleys, each protected by high and rugged mountains on all sides giving
industries the best form of strategic protection,” but also that “Utah’s geographical
position is such that it is a distributing point and has excellent transportation
facilities to all the West Coast’s harbors, the nation’s railroad systems, and/or air
bases.” Promoters, however, were careful to not present themselves as a threat to
the industrial welfare of other parts of the country by clarifying that “[n]o one is
advocating that our industries be relocated,” rather that they simply be duplicated in
the interior.30
The second argument concerning industrial security that supporters of the
Colorado River Storage Project made was that the Upper Basin not only offered
geographic security, but geologic security as well. In comments that seemed to
foreshadow the dialogue from Dr. Strangelove concerning “a mine shaft gap,” Civil
Defense Administrator Peterson warned that “the balance of victory between two
military powers may well rest with the nation whose civilian population can best
minimize the effect of an atomic attack and get up off the ground organized and
ready.” To help facilitate this, Peterson pointed to the examples of “underground
defense plants and military installations in Scandinavia,” which he said were cheaper
to build “under the rock” than on the surface. Project supporters, seizing on these
comments, were quick to point out that “[d]eep gorges abound in the project area.
Power plants and industrial plants could be tunneled into the sheer rock walls at
canyon ﬂoor level, providing protection from atomic blast.” Senator Watkins went a
step further, envisioning a whole network of underground installations.
[T]he Mountain West has thousands of feet of solid rock in mountain
and canyon walls which can be utilized to protect vital industries and
government installations from atomic attack. These natural bomb shelters
can be located in the ribs of the aptly named Rocky Mountains. Tunnels
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and caves could be developed in these mountains at widely separated
locations to give this nation an impregnable industrial bastion that would
be secure even against the awesome weapons of the atomic and hydrogen
bombs.

All of this could be possible, CRSP promoters promised, just by developing water
and power in the region.31
Supporters of the Colorado River Storage Project did not simply worry about
the impact of an atomic war upon American industry; they also stressed how the
project would beneﬁt civilian evacuations. Senator Bennett pointed out that “[i]f we
don’t have water for our present needs in some areas, it will obviously restrict our
ability to meet our civil defense responsibilities. . . .” Civil Defense Administrator
Peterson warned what those responsibilities might be. “In this nuclear age, if
an attack is made . . ., it will be necessary, ﬁrst, to get our people away from our
critical target areas, . . . and if a city is hit by a hydrogen bomb, we will not be able
to re-enter for some time, and possibly never.…” “It would be fortunate if we had
areas with water and power facilities far removed from our vulnerable and heavily
populated urban centers to which these people could go.” “The Upper Colorado
Development, by providing water and power, would pave the way for taking care of
those who by necessity may be forced to evacuate our West Coast cities.” The chief
thrust of all these various defense arguments was that an opponent of the CRSP was
an opponent of national security.32
Despite the “un-American” taint, opponents of the Colorado River Storage
Project did manage to get some aspects of the project changed. Chief among
them was deletion of the proposed Echo Park Dam that was scheduled to be built
inside Dinosaur National Monument. When Congress agreed to drop the dam,
environmentalists agreed to drop their opposition to the overall project. (A decision
that many of them later came to regret when Glen Canyon was subsequently ﬂooded
as part of the project.) As a result of this compromise, the Colorado River Storage
Project ﬁnally received congressional approval in 1956. Passage of the project,
however, did not mean that booster efforts in support of the CRSP came to a halt.
Although Congress had agreed to the project in principle, federal reclamation
ofﬁcials still had to obtain annual ﬁnancial appropriations from Congress in order
for the project to continue.
To help secure this on-going funding, project promoters continued their
publicity campaign on behalf of the Colorado River Storage Project. Just as
the promotional literature in the 1950s had tried to demonstrate how the CRSP
addressed various local and national concerns, the new literature evolved over time
to reﬂect changes in those national concerns. By the 1970s the communist threat
had been replaced by the energy crisis. Instead of talking about strategic minerals,
promoters now focused on the potential fuel sources located in the Upper Basin.
Developing these sources would help the United States to meet “our national goal
of freedom from reliance on foreign oil.” Among the resources waiting to be fully
developed in the area were coal and oil shale. As in the past, however, promoters
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stressed that water was the key component to developing this material. Now,
however, they went even further with their water pitch by announcing that
“[s]ince the natural supply of the Colorado River will someday be inadequate,
ways of augmenting the ﬂow of the river are being investigated.” Thus promoters
continued to dream about even bigger and more grandiose reclamation projects for
the Upper Basin.33
When examining the literature that promoters used in support of the
Colorado River Storage Project it is clear that the size, scope, and ambition of
the CRSP exceeded anything ever envisioned by local boosters in the nineteenth
century. One question that comes to mind, however, is whether the boosters in the
1950s were any more accurate in their predictions than the boosters had been in the
1880s? Did the development they foresaw come to fruition with the construction of
the CRSP? The quick answer would be “no,” but a more complete answer would
suggest that the outcome of the CRSP stands as a model for the law of unintended
consequences.
Charles Wilkinson, in his book Fire on the Plateau, discusses the “Big
Buildup” on the Colorado Plateau (a region that substantially overlaps with the
Upper Basin) between 1955 and 1975. While there is no doubt that massive
development took place in the region during this time period, it was not the type
of development that Colorado River Storage Project supporters had envisioned.
Instead of extracting and processing natural resources on-site, companies continued
the practice of hauling materials away to be processed elsewhere. Virtually no
large-scale industrial development took place in the region—even after the CRSP
was completed—nor did substantial urban growth occur in the area either. While
cities such as Salt Lake City, Phoenix, and Denver, located outside the Upper Basin,
have grown exponentially, there continues to be no major urban presence within the
region. The Upper Basin instead remains a “plundered province” providing raw
materials to other parts of the country.34
Ironically, the economically most promising natural resource in the area
proved to be the most ﬁnancially devastating one. Oil shale had long been touted as
an energy source that would potentially make the Upper Basin one of the wealthiest
regions of the country. The process required to extract the oil from the rock,
however, is an expensive and inefﬁcient one, which requires large amounts of water
and produces large amounts of spent shale. Promoters of the CRSP proclaimed that
the reclamation project was vital to ensure that sufﬁcient water would be available
to allow the oil shale industry to grow. When the sharp rise in oil prices took place
in the 1970s it appeared that these predictions would, indeed, come true. Major oil
companies began buying up property in the area around Grand Junction, Colorado,
in anticipation of this new boom. Instead, things suddenly went bust. In May
1982 Exxon, the dominant company in the oil shale business, suddenly shut down
its operation, triggering a regional economic depression that lasted for nearly a
decade.35
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The demise of the oil shale industry should not, however, be taken as an
indication that the Colorado River Storage Project failed all the objectives that
promoters proclaimed for it. The CRSP did result in the Bureau of Reclamation
becoming a major hydroelectric producer in the region (although the chief
beneﬁciary has been the Lower Basin rather than the Upper). Perhaps the one
area where the CRSP has had the greatest success, however, has been in creating
a massive recreation industry in the Upper Basin. The tourist revenue generated
in 1997 at Lake Powell alone was $455 million, derived from approximately 2.5
million visitors. While environmentalists have never forgiven the building of
Glen Canyon Dam, it is obvious that its construction has had a sizable, long-term
economic impact on the region. This is clearly another instance of unintended
consequence because, while the promoters did talk about the recreational
enhancements that the CRSP would produce, recreation was clearly not the primary
beneﬁt they were looking for from the project. Promoters, however, are nothing if
not ingenious when it comes to reinventing themselves and their claims. A recent
tourist slogan for the man-made Lake Powell is a prime example of this, “Lake
Powell: America’s Natural Playground.”36
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The Bureau of Reclamation and the Civilian
Conservation Corps: A Legacy Revealed
By:
Christine Pfaff
Abstract
Between 1934 and 1942 the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) played
a vital role within the Bureau of Reclamation. From one initial CCC camp
assigned to Reclamation in 1934, the program expanded to a peak of forty-six
camps at the height of the CCC program during the summer of 1935. From then
on the number of Reclamation camps operating ﬂuctuated between thirty-four
and forty-four up until May 1941. Thereafter camps were closed in response
to national defense needs. By June 30, 1942, only seven camps remained on
Reclamation projects, and they were discontinued shortly thereafter.
The contributions of the CCC to Reclamation are not well known.
Though the number of CCC camps operating on Reclamation projects was
small in comparison to other agencies, the program had a signiﬁcant impact
and assisted in furthering the goals of Reclamation during the devastating years
of the Great Depression. At a time when ﬁnancially stricken farmers were
unable to adequately maintain older Reclamation irrigation facilities, CCC
enrollees were instrumental in rehabilitating them. The enrollees also provided
the necessary labor to develop supplemental water supplies and construct new
irrigation projects. Lastly, CCC assistance afforded Reclamation the opportunity
to expand on its primary mission of irrigation to develop recreational amenities
at a number of its reservoirs.
This paper explores the contributions and role of the CCC within
Reclamation and within the larger context of the national CCC program.
Origins of Reclamation’s camps, the project work accomplished, the public
perception of the camps, the impact on enrollees, and the success of the program
are addressed.

Introduction1
As dry winds and dust storms blew across the western High Plains in
the early 1930s leaving devastated farms in their wake, newly elected President
Franklin D. Roosevelt was formulating sweeping plans in the nation’s capital
for emergency disaster relief. The entire country was in the grips of the Great
Depression and jobless men everywhere struggled to earn enough money to
buy food for their families. For the country’s youth, the situation was equally
desperate. Hundreds of thousands of young men from economically stricken
households were unable to ﬁnd work. Against this backdrop, Roosevelt outlined
his concept for a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) during his inaugural address
on March 4, 1933. He proposed creating a new program aimed at conserving the
nation’s depleted natural resources and putting unemployed youth to work. The
president told the American people:
Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. This is no unsolvable
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problem if we face it wisely and courageously. It can be accomplished
in part by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as
we would treat the emergency of war, but at the same time, through this
employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate and
reorganize the use of our natural resources.2

Within a short time, CCC camps had been established across the country
and young men were recruited to work on a myriad of conservation projects
overseen by various federal agencies including the Bureau of Reclamation
(Reclamation). At the height of CCC enrollment in the summer of 1935,
over a half-million men were scattered in 2,652 camps. Of all the New Deal
programs instituted by Roosevelt to combat the economic hardships of the Great
Depression, probably none was as popular and successful as the CCC.
Those familiar with the accomplishments of the CCC inevitably think
of handsomely crafted rustic stone and log structures, walls, picnic shelters
and other facilities within National Forests or National Parks. Indeed roughly
75 percent of all CCC camp enrollees worked on projects administered by the
Department of Agriculture, the majority of them being on U.S. Forest Service
lands. Almost all of the remaining camps were allotted to the Department of the
Interior with the National Park Service (NPS) being the greatest beneﬁciary.
The association between the CCC and Reclamation, also within Interior,
is far less well known. As the Federal agency responsible for designing and
building large-scale irrigation projects in the western United States, Reclamation
was vitally involved in the allocation and use of two natural resources, namely
water and soils. Even though the number of Reclamation CCC camps was much
smaller than that of other agencies, the program had a signiﬁcant impact and
assisted in furthering the goals of the agency during the devastating drought
years of the 1930s. CCC assistance also afforded Reclamation the opportunity to
expand on its primary mission of irrigation to develop recreational amenities at a
number of its reservoirs.
Creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps
By the close of Roosevelt’s ﬁrst month in ofﬁce, Congress had acted upon
the President’s ambitious jobs-creation proposal and passed “An Act for the relief
of unemployment through the performance of useful public works and other
purposes.” On March 31, 1933, the President signed the bill into law (Public
No. 5, 73rd Congress) thus creating the CCC (initially called the Emergency
Conservation Works or ECW).
With legislation in place, Roosevelt wasted no time in transposing his
vision into action. In April 1933 he appointed Robert Fechner director of the
CCC and established an advisory council comprised of representatives from
the Departments of Labor, War, Interior and Agriculture. The purpose of the
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council was to coordinate oversight
of the program and create a forum
for discussing policy issues. The
Department of Labor was assigned
responsibility for recruiting youths
and the War Department (Army) was
in charge of enrollee administration,
transportation, housing, food, clothing,
supplies, medical care, education,
discipline, and physical conditioning.
The Departments of Agriculture
32.1. ECW winter camp at Belle Fourche
and Interior had the task of locating
Dam in 1934.
the conservation work camps and
supervising the actual work.
At the president’s urging, the CCC enrolled its ﬁrst 25,000 young men by
April 6, 1933. The initial camp, appropriately called Roosevelt, was established
on April 17 on George Washington National Forest near Luray, Virginia.
Less than three months after the program=s inauguration, about 300,000 men
from throughout the country were settled in almost 1,500 camps. Each CCC
installation typically housed about 200 men. According to Fechner, Ait was the
most rapid large scale mobilization of men the country had ever witnessed.3
Initial enrollment in the CCC was limited to unemployed single men between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-ﬁve who were U.S. citizens. For the most part these
were discouraged men, unsuccessful in securing jobs because they had no work
experience. They were described as “a weaponless army whose recruits came
from broken homes, highway trails and relief shelters … ”4 American Indians
were at ﬁrst not eligible but this restriction was soon lifted because of the dire
conditions on many of the reservations.
Enrollment was also expanded to include “local experienced men” who
served as technical foremen on work projects, and a limited number of World War
I veterans. The latter were selected by the Veterans Administration and assigned
to special camps operated less stringently than regular ones. Although racial
discrimination was ofﬁcially forbidden in accordance with the CCC legislation,
blacks and other minorities did not escape prejudice within the program.5 The
number of blacks enrolled was limited, and they were for the most part restricted
to segregated camps.
Reclamation’s CCC Program
Due to its role in planning and constructing irrigation projects throughout
the arid and semi-arid West, Reclamation was vitally concerned with farmers’
welfare during the Depression. Beginning in 1902 the Federal government had
invested heavily in construction of dams and water conveyance facilities to
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provide farmers with essential water. Irrigators who beneﬁtted from Reclamation
facilities were required to repay their construction costs over a period of years.
Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems were also supported by fees paid
by the water users. By the mid-1930s, Reclamation had constructed a network of
some ﬁfty small and large projects across the West.
The combined effect of drought and poor agricultural practices exacted
a terrible toll on Western farmers during the Depression. Crop prices were
low, water supplies had dwindled, and valuable topsoil was swept off of ﬁelds
in blinding dust storms. The ﬁnancial hardships faced by farmers meant that
irrigation systems were not adequately maintained. Many aging water control
structures had deteriorated beyond repair; canals were silted and clogged with
vegetation; weeds and gophers infested canal banks; and crop yields dropped
drastically with the decrease in water supplies. By 1934 it had become critical for
the Federal government to address the plight of western farmers and to safeguard
its hefty investment in irrigation projects. The CCC program provided a perfect
mechanism for doing both while meeting its objectives of protecting natural
resources and aiding unemployment.
The ﬁrst CCC camp to open on a Reclamation project was established in
May 1934 at Lake Guernsey, a reservoir of the North Platte Project, in Wyoming.
Designated originally as RS-1 (Reclamation Service No. 1), the camp became
known as BR-9. It was obtained under a cooperative agreement with the NPS
and along with BR-10, established in July 1934, was responsible for transforming
the reservoir shores into a showplace of recreational development. Sturdy log and
stone picnic shelters, trails, and a handsome rustic-style museum complete with
interpretive displays were built by CCC enrollees. The outstanding signiﬁcance
of their contributions at Lake Guernsey resulted in the designation of Lake
Guernsey State Park as a National Historic Landmark on September 25, 1997.
In early September 1934 a second camp was established on a cooperative
basis with the NPS at Elephant Butte Reservoir on the Rio Grande Project in
New Mexico. Designated BR-8, the camp enrollees, along with those from
BR-54 occupied in August 1935, greatly improved the recreational facilities at the
reservoir. They also transformed the landscape by building a variety of structures,
terracing the hillsides, and planting hundreds of trees. The CCC component is a
major feature of the Elephant Butte National Register Historic District, listed in
the National Register of Historic Places in February 1997.
In July 1934 six drought-relief camps were also assigned to Reclamation.
These were essentially the same as regular CCC camps but were restricted to
states suffering severely under the drought and were authorized for one year,
rather than the normal six months. Additionally, they were ﬁnanced under
different appropriations.6 Assigned numbers beginning with DBR (Drought
Relief Bureau of Reclamation), the six camps were DBR-1 at Lake Minatare,
Nebraska, on the North Platte Project; DBR-2 at Fruitdale, South Dakota, on the
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Belle Fourche Project; DBR-3 at Carlsbad, New Mexico, on the Carlsbad Project;
DBR-4 at Ysleta, Texas, on the Rio Grande Project; DBR-5 at Heber, Utah, on
the Strawberry Valley Project; and DBR-6 at Ephraim, Utah, on the Sanpete
Project. The improvements completed on Reclamation irrigation projects by the
drought-relief camps were of tremendous value in combating the acute water
shortages plaguing farmers. The camp at Lake Minatare can also be credited with
construction of a unique Reclamation CCC ediﬁce that still exists: on a point of
land extending into the lake, the enrollees built a ﬁfty-ﬁve-foot-high native rock
Alighthouse@ containing a circular staircase. From the observation deck at the top
can be seen Scotts Bluff and Chimney Rock, both landmarks of the Oregon Trail.
Initially, work accomplished at Reclamation CCC camps focused on
rehabilitating the storage, distribution, and drainage systems of older projects that
had been seriously affected by the combination of drought and depressed farm
prices. Efforts consisted of returning weed- and silt-ﬁlled canals and laterals to
a proper cross section; replacing decaying wood structures with concrete; adding
new water control structures; building bridges over canals; eradicating weeds
and rodents; reconditioning operating roads; placing riprap on canal and lateral
banks, and sealing porous canals with earth or concrete linings. Much of the work
accomplished was of a seemingly mundane and unspectacular nature but it had
far-reaching beneﬁts.
As Reclamation’s CCC program expanded from its small beginnings in
1934, the types of project work undertaken by the enrollees grew more varied and
broadened to include developing supplemental water supplies and constructing
new irrigation projects. The acute water deﬁciencies experienced during the
Depression indicated that a few of the project storage facilities, though adequate
under ordinary conditions, were insufﬁcient during drought periods. To remedy
this situation, CCC forces were used to build supplemental storage facilities.
Examples are Midview Dam and dike on the Moon Lake Project in Utah (BR-11)
and Anita Dam on the Huntley Project in Montana (BR-57). Clearing reservoir
areas of timber and debris in preparation for new dam construction was another
labor intensive task assigned to the enrollees at various camps. The physically
demanding work involved felling trees, piling, and then burning them. Utilizing
heavy equipment such as tractors and bulldozers provided the enrollees an
opportunity to learn new skills. The most prominent of this type of work was
accomplished at the Shasta Dam site on the Central Valley Project in California.
Enrollees of BR-84 and BR-85 cleared 2,597 acres in the reservoir area during
the camps’ existence. Similar work was undertaken at Wickiup Reservoir on
the Deschutes Project (BR-75, -76, and -77), Deer Creek Reservoir on the Provo
River Project (BR-91), Pine View Reservoir on the Ogden River Project (BR-12),
Island Park Reservoir on the Upper Snake River Project (BR-28) and Parker Dam
Reservoir on the Parker Dam Project (BR-17 and BR-18).
Building new feeder canals to bring additional water to existing reservoirs
was another effort to increase water supplies. Examples include the Duchesne
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Feeder Canal on the Moon Lake Project (BR-11) and the Strawberry Reservoir
Feeder Canal on the Strawberry Valley Project (BR-5). Enrollees cleared the
canal right-of-ways, excavated the trenches, trimmed the canal slopes, and, in
some cases, poured concrete linings. The CCC also completed improvements to
numerous existing storage facilities such as Orman Dam on the Belle Fourche
Project (BR-2), Clear Lake Dam on the Klamath Project (BR-41), Moon Lake
Dam on the Moon Lake Project
(BR-11), and the South Diversion
Dam on the Orland Project
(BR-78).
Another type of work
undertaken by the CCC was
ﬂood control. Many areas of the
West under Reclamation projects
were subject to intense localized
rainfalls of short duration that had
caused severe damage to irrigation
systems. The CCC built a number
of ﬂood control structures such as
Apache and Box Canyon Dams on
the Rio Grande Project (BR-39).

32.2. CCC crew placing and finishing concrete
at a new Kingman check on the Owyhee Project
in 1940.

As noted earlier, among the most visible contributions of the CCC
enrollees assigned to Reclamation projects were the recreational improvements
completed. Several of the projects had lands adjacent to rivers, reservoirs, or
lakes, which were ideally suited for use as parks, campgrounds, or picnic areas.
Some of these lands were developed by the CCC through construction of tables,
benches, stoves, ﬁreplaces, water systems, latrines, sewage disposal plants, and
landscaping. Swimming, boating, and ﬁshing facilities, and hiking trails built by
the CCC provided park visitors
with additional amenities. The
improvements greatly enhanced
public appreciation for the
CCC and made Reclamation
projects more accessible. The
prime examples of recreational
development occurred at
Elephant Butte Dam on the
Rio Grande Project (BR-8 and
BR-54), at Guernsey Lake on the
North Platte Project (BR-9 and
32.3. CCC forces lined small community ditches
BR-10), and at Lake Walcott on
in Las Cruces, New Mexico, on the Rio Grande
the Minidoka Project (BR-27).
Project in 1937.
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Auxiliary to these main classes of work, the CCC enrollees were engaged
in improvements to wildlife refuges at reservoirs, rodent control operations,
weed eradication experiments, and emergency work. In cooperation with the
Bureau of Biological Survey (now the Fish and Wildlife Service), Reclamation’s
CCC enrollees developed wildlife refuges at the Deer Flat Reservoir in western
Idaho (BR-24), Tulelake Wildlife Refuge in northern California (BR-20), at Lake
Walcott, in southern Idaho (BR-27), and at the Pishkun Reservoir in Montana
(BR-33). At Elephant Butte Reservoir, CCC forces constructed a 12-pond ﬁsh
hatchery (BR-8 and BR-54).
The elimination of troublesome rodents along canal banks and in
farm ﬁelds was an ongoing endeavor at many camps and was viewed as an
“undertaking of major importance to many Reclamation projects.”7 Damage
caused by rodents was twofold: in canal banks their burrowing resulted in canal
collapses and in ﬁelds their activities resulted in substantial crop loss. Pocket
gophers and ground squirrels were the primary targets and, in cooperation
with the Biological Survey, eradication was accomplished either by trapping
or poisoning or both. The work was well suited to the CCC program because
it was labor intensive. Small crews performed the task as an adjunct to larger
construction projects. By June 1941 CCC enrollees treated 2,510,100 acres for
rodent control.
Weed eradication was another activity performed at many Reclamation
CCC camps. The presence of noxious weeds, such as Canada thistle, bindweed,
and Johnson grass, was increasing on Reclamation projects, and the available
labor of CCC recruits was applied towards eliminating this menace. Canals
provided easy transportation routes for seeds to all parts of the irrigated lands,
and controlling and eradicating weeds was a complex problem. Enrollees did not
enter on private property to conduct weed control, but the farmers were shown,
by demonstration on government tracts, the methods of attacking various kinds of
invasive plants. Sample demonstrations were also performed on the Government
canals and laterals for the beneﬁt of the operating personnel. Experiments with
different types of grasses that could crowd out weeds on canal banks and that
might be useful as a pasture crop were undertaken.8 On the Belle Fourche Project
(BR-2), CCC enrollees demonstrated to farmers the use and methods of growing
strawberry clover and brome grass as valuable pasture. Experiments to eradicate
noxious weeds using blades and chemicals were carried on at test plots. On the
Rio Grande Project (BR-4), considerable effort was expended on that objective.
Different methods tried for the control of bindweed included chopping plants out
by hand, spraying them with oil, and then burning them.
While the CCC program received a lot of attention for its role in ﬁghting
forest ﬁres and assisting in ﬂood disasters, emergency work conducted by CCC
enrollees on Reclamation projects attracted little recognition in spite of its great
value. The most common emergencies were canal breaks usually resulting from
the tunneling activities of rodents. Such breaks, if not repaired promptly, had
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the potential to cause serious
damage by ﬂooding some
ﬁelds and drying up others. A
1937 Reclamation Era article
described various emergencies
that had been attended to by
CCC enrollees. On the Klamath
Project in California and Oregon
(BR-20 and BR-41), ten recent
breaks in canal banks had been
repaired. On the Salt River
32.4. CCC forces placing steel reinforcement on
Project in Arizona (BR-14 and
the Stinkingwater Siphon, Belle Fourche Project,
BR-19), a serious break in the
in 1938.
South Canal occurred in April
1937 and was tended to by enrollees. Early in May 1937 CCC men from the
Deaver Camp on the Shoshone Project (BR-7) were called out to help reconstruct
300 feet of the inclined drop below the Ralston Reservoir.
The hazards of winter created numerous emergencies where the help of the
CCC was invaluable. The snow season of 1936-1937 was particularly severe in
parts of Utah and Nevada, and the CCC youths effectively carried out emergency
work to save human lives and livestock. In January 1937 about 50,000 head of
sheep were marooned by heavy snows in Pleasant Valley in the Uintah Basin of
eastern Utah. A CCC tractor, with a bulldozer attachment, was loaned to the Utah
State Road Commission to open a 26-mile road on which to lead the animals out.
CCC enrollees from BR-11 on the Moon Lake Project accompanied the tractor to
perform any unexpected repairs. Mining and farming districts in western Nevada
were particularly hard hit by snowstorms in early February 1937. CCC men and
equipment were made available for rescue work. In cooperation with the county,
they cleared 380 miles of road, dug out ten towns and outlying ranchers and
miners, and permitted feed to be hauled to many isolated cattle herds.
All CCC men at Carlsbad, New Mexico, (BR-3) were called out in early
June 1937 to perform emergency ﬂood protection work at McMillan Dam brought
about by extreme ﬂood conditions of the Pecos River. A leak caused by the high
waters was discovered at the dam on May 31, and for the next six days CCC
crews placed sandbags on the reservoir face of the dam to hold back water from
any leaks that might occur. The superb efforts of the CCC enrollees were praised.
When a small dam failed on June 13, 1937, near Austin, Colorado, and partially
ﬂooded the town, CCC forces from the camp in Montrose (BR-23) were brought
in to help restore sanitation facilities and repair damaged irrigation ditches.
At the height of the CCC program in the summer of 1935, there were
forty-six camps operating on Reclamation projects throughout the West. In
addition to and in association with the main camps, side camps also known
as spike camps, were sometimes established. These were usually smaller and
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made up of tents that could easily be
dismantled. Typically, camp structures
were standard plan, simple frame
buildings. Side camps were created
when a job was at such a distance
from the main camp that it made
sense to station a work force in closer
proximity. Examples of side camps on
Reclamation CCC projects were the
ones at Alamagordo Dam (BR-3, main 32.5. CCC men working on McMillan
Spillway No. 2, Carlsbad Project, New
camp) where enrollees constructed
Mexico, in 1938.
improvements for recreational use of
the reservoir; on the Hyrum Project
(BR-12, main camp) where enrollees constructed a diversion dam on the Little
Bear River and built a parapet and curb walls on the Hyrum Dam; and at the river
portal to the Gunnison Tunnel (BR-23, main camp) where enrollees worked on
widening and reconstructing the old road leading from the top of the canyon down
to the East Portal.
Some CCC camps established on Reclamation projects were seasonal for
climatic reasons. Those at high elevations, such as BR-5 on the Strawberry Valley
Project, were summer camps and enrollees were relocated to lower elevations in
the winter (BR-11). BR-50 on the Yakima Project was only occupied during the
summer because of heavy winter snows and severe weather. Due to the intense
summer heat in Yuma, Arizona, enrollees of BR-13 and BR-74 did not occupy
the camps during that season for the ﬁrst few years. The two Salt River Project
camps in the Phoenix area, BR-14 and BR-19, operated similarly.
Job Training in Reclamation CCC Camps
When CCC camps were assigned to Reclamation, the agency assumed
responsibility for supervising and training the enrollees while they were engaged
in project work. The latter was scheduled for ﬁve days a week, eight hours a
day except in the event of emergencies. Oversight of work activities was carried
out by Reclamation ﬁeld engineers and by project superintendents in charge of
the Reclamation projects on which the camps were located. The ﬁeld engineers
directed surveys, inspections, and other ﬁeld engineering work. They also
supervised and approved the construction of the various physical features. The
CCC project superintendents, also designated by Reclamation as CCC Regional
Directors, had immediate charge of the work activities and directed the CCC
supervisory, facilitating, and enrolled personnel in carrying out the work.
During the lifespan of the CCC, Reclamation dedicated an increasing
amount of attention to the job-training aspects of the CCC program. Even before
a national requirement for ten hours of weekly general education or vocational
training was instituted in June 1937 by CCC headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
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Reclamation recognized the valuable
skills that enrollees were developing
on the job. Constructing canals, roads,
dams, and water control features as
well as building recreational facilities
afforded enrollees a perfect opportunity
to gain practical experience. Building
concrete structures involved teaching
the young men the fundamentals
of earth excavation, form building,
32.6. Yuma Project. CCC enrollee offreinforcement, concrete mixing, concrete the-job-training class in blacksmithing on
ﬁnishing, and curing concrete. Other
the Yuma Project in 1939.
training included working with rock,
both in quarrying and the construction
of masonry walls; the use of burners and chemicals for weed control; and the
shaping of lumber for timber structures. Enrollees became expert at operating all
types of heavy equipment such as tractors, trucks, and draglines. In addition to
acquiring construction skills, enrollees at Reclamation camps participated in the
cooking and clerical operations of the camps.9
The opportunity to attend classes in the evening was another component
of the educational experience offered at CCC camps. Some of the young men
enrolled in nearby schools to further their knowledge. With the increased
emphasis on education, starting in June 1937 Reclamation expanded its own
classroom programs. During the day, foremen were assigned to supervise and
explain to enrollees the proper method to do their assigned tasks. One or two
evenings a week, the foremen held classes in camp to supplement the practical
work with related training. For example, an enrollee whose duty it was to refuel
tractors with diesel fuel might learn the essential difference between diesel fuel
and gasoline. A standard CCC truck driver’s course taught truck drivers how to
reduce the cost of vehicle maintenance, to be more efﬁcient operators, and to be
safety conscious. Visual aids such as miniature models and motion pictures were
often used to enhance the classroom instruction. Foremen attended leadership
courses to learn effective teaching methods. Regular Reclamation employees
assisted by teaching technical subjects and clerical skills such as property
accountability and cost-keeping. Courses mentioned in some of the camp reports
include spelling, blueprint reading, bee culture, warehousing, and shorthand.10
All sorts of training materials were also available through the CCC
education ofﬁce in Washington. Handbooks containing lists of available ﬁlms
and manuals were sent out to the camps. Manuals ranged in subject from “Brick
and Stone Work” to “Common Range Plants” to “Signs and Markers” to “Job
Training is a Business Proposition.” All camps had libraries supplied with
textbooks, reference works, and a selection of daily newspapers. Books useful for
on-the-job training as well as for advancing personal skills were available. Titles
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ran the gamut from “Accountancy as a Career” to “Electricity in the Home and on
the Farm” to “Elements of Forestry” to “Amateur Machinist.”
Towards the end of the CCC program, Reclamation directed all of
its camps to furnish new enrollees with a series of publications intended to
familiarize them with the agency and its role in conserving resources. The list
included Reclamation Home Creating—Wealth Producing—Self Sustaining,
Grand Coulee Dam, Boulder Dam, and the Central Valley Project. Reclamation
had plans to prepare its own pamphlet on the agency’s CCC program, but it is
unknown whether this ever occurred.
The training and education paid off for Reclamation’s CCC enrollees. In
February 1937 it was reported that CCC men from Reclamation camps had been
successful in securing a range of jobs upon leaving the Corps. These included
farmer, farm hand, ranch hand, miner, railroad worker, skilled labor helper,
lumberjack, highway worker, factory worker, and painter among others. Much of
the success of the enrollees was attributed to the experience gained while in the
CCC camps. Records indicated that enrollees who served at least a year or longer
in the CCC ended up with higher paying jobs than those who served for just six
months. Enrollees who were offered positions while in the Corps were honorably
discharged to start their employment. It was found that the young men leaving
the CCC to accept jobs usually returned to their home state or region. Eastern
boys assigned to western camps nearly all returned to the East and western youths
preferred to stay in the West. Even before leaving the CCC, individuals who
performed outstanding work had opportunities for advancement. They could be
promoted to responsible positions as foremen on the technical supervisory staff at
camps when vacancies occurred.
From information included in Reclamation’s CCC regular camp reports
and in journal articles, it appears that the training offered to enrollees was wellreceived by them. In fact, with few exceptions the morale of the enrollees was
noted as good. For example, at BR-5 on the Strawberry Valley Project, the
“enrollees exhibited a ﬁne cooperative spirit and high morale” despite the remote
locality of the camp. At BR-20 on the Klamath Project, the enrollees were praised
for their hard work in the camp’s ﬁrst annual report:
The manner in which the men in both camps (BR-41 as well)
applied their efforts was truly remarkable, and it was not long before the
camps became well established and the work program began to show
signs of progress … The men wanted to work, to prove their worth and
better themselves, when given the opportunity. Moreover, they proved
this when offered the facilities of the buildings and teaching personnel at
the Merrill and Tulelake high schools for evenings.

In addition to the emphasis on developing “strong minds,” CCC camps
also promoted building “strong, healthy bodies.” Physical conditioning,
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in addition to educational training, was considered important for character
improvement and for maintaining good camp morale. Planned athletic and
recreational activities were part of all camp schedules. Enrollees participated in
sports such as baseball, basketball, swimming, ping pong, or tennis. Many camps
also offered regular recreational outings to nearby towns and attractions.
A number of the camps produced their own newsletters in which
upcoming activities were announced or the results of sports competitions were
reported. The newsletters provide a more personal view of daily life at the camps.
A column in the October 1937 “Stanﬁeld Echo” (BR-44) advised new enrollees
on proper behavior. Among the twenty items listed were the following: “Be
careful of the type of language you use around camp and in public;” “Do not
smoke or ﬂip cigarettes, or talk after the lights are out;” “The wasting of food is
considered serious misconduct and will be punished accordingly;” and “Watch
your actions while you are in town, you will be judged accordingly.”
Although Reclamation’s CCC program was not without its critics, overall
it appears to have been viewed as very beneﬁcial by the public. Their initial
concerns about having unemployed youths living nearby dissipated over time.
Annual open houses at the camps gave outsiders a perfect opportunity to learn
of the accomplishments of the enrollees and to better understand the program.
Camps participated in numerous local events such as parades and county fairs.
Reclamation even produced a ﬁlm in 1937 entitled Reclamation and the CCC
which showed enrollees engaged at work on a number of projects. Unfortunately,
no copy of the ﬁlm has been located.
Strong community support is evidenced in newspaper articles published
in early 1938 when President Roosevelt contemplated closing all Reclamation
camps in response to the criticism that they beneﬁtted private irrigators rather than
the interests of the public. In Wyoming, the Powell Tribune wrote:
As to the CCC in reclamation work, we have regarded the camp at
Deaver as of great beneﬁt to the general farming community there … We
need more CCC camps and fewer jails; we need more CCC camps and
less unemployment; we need more CCC camps for the improvement in
mind, morals and body of the boys themselves—that is more important
and more of value to us all than the work they do.11

In February 1938, to counter the accusations lodged against it, Reclamation
restricted CCC activities to Federally owned lands, and the government had to
have a direct ﬁnancial interest in all work performed, or it had to be developing
recreational facilities for public beneﬁt.
Termination of Reclamation CCC Camps
The outbreak of World War II brought an end to the CCC. As the United
States geared up the production of arms and ammunition, the unemployment
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problem dissolved. The number of CCC camps nationwide dwindled from a peak
of 2,652 in the summer of 1935 to 1,500 by April 1939.
With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the country’s attention was riveted on a
new front. Some six weeks after the bombing, on January 27, 1942, CCC director
James L. McEntee announced the immediate reorganization of the CCC on a war
basis. He directed the termination of all CCC camps as quickly as possible unless
they were involved in war-related construction activities or in the protection of
war-related natural resources.
Reclamation justiﬁed its continued need for CCC camps during the war on
the basis of the urgent need for a reliable and adequate food supply. The effect of
the war on Reclamation=s CCC program was thus described:
The defense program and later the all-out war program
emphasized the responsibility of the Nation’s food growers, and a
portion of that responsibility was thus imparted to the camps helping
in this work. Meeting the needs of the armed services and industry,
the bureau’s camps provided one of the sources of supply for trained
construction equipment operators. All phases of the training program
were emphasized and especially those skills which could augment the
supply of needed trained workers.12

During the last full ﬁscal year of the CCC program, 1942, there was a
reduction in the number of camps assigned to Reclamation from forty-three
camps on July 1, 1941, to seven camps on June 30, 1942. In general, the CCC
work activities previously initiated were continued through ﬁscal year 1942,
with impetus added by the war. In planning for the annual CCC “open house”
celebrations in 1941, a memo was sent out from Reclamation Commissioner John
Page to all CCC ﬁeld ofﬁces urging them to highlight activities contributing the
most to the national defense program. Page quoted from a letter that the Director
of the CCC had sent out:
It should be emphasized that the entire pattern of camp life—the daily
routine, the training and educational programs, the work projects—all
contribute to national security by developing in youth character,
discipline, good work habits, health, love of country and the ability to
achieve economic independence.13

Eight new camps were assigned to Reclamation at the beginning of Fiscal
Year 1942. They were established for the purpose of constructing small water
conservation and utilization projects (BR-93, -94, -95, -96, -97, -99, -101, -102).
Sometimes referred to as Wheeler-Case Projects, they were conﬁned to the Great
Plains and other western areas subject to drought and water shortages. As one of
several agencies participating in the program, Reclamation’s role was to construct
irrigation facilities to help meet local water needs. By the end of the year,
considerable progress had been made.
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Although President Roosevelt urged continuation of the CCC as a
means of accomplishing critical defense work, Congress sealed the fate of the
program on June 30, 1942, when it voted to liquidate the CCC and allocated
$8 million to help cover closing costs. Steps were immediately taken to
release the remaining 60,000 enrollees and to discontinue all work programs.
Reclamation’s remaining camps were shut down the following month. Some
of Reclamation’s terminated camps were transferred to the Army or Navy for
military use. In a number of cases, closed CCC camps were used to house
conscientious objectors (BR-75, -76, -77, -93, -95, -97, -99), war prisoners
(BR-39) or Japanese evacuees (BR-42). Where no future uses could be
contemplated, camp structures were relocated or demolished.
Conclusion
During the life of the CCC program, Reclamation operated camps at
eighty-three separate locations on forty-ﬁve Reclamation projects in ﬁfteen
western states. Even though the agency was but a minor recipient of CCC
beneﬁts (in April 1937 Reclamation was assigned thrity-four camps which
represented only 1.7 percent of the total number), Reclamation continually touted
the positive results attained by the enrollees. The assignment of CCC camps to
Reclamation occurred at a time when western agriculture was in critical straits.
Work completed by the enrollees helped revitalize an array of existing irrigation
projects and brought new water to other areas.
A few ﬁgures illustrate the impressive volume of accomplishments of
CCC forces on Reclamation facilities: over 60,000,000 square yards of canals and
drainage ditches were cleaned or cleared; 1,800,000 square yards of canal were
lined with impervious material and 2,800,000 square yards were riprapped for
protection against erosion; 3,000 miles of operating roads had been constructed
along canal banks; 39,000 acres of reservoir sites were cleared of brush and trees;
and 15,800 water control structures had been built. The contributions of the CCC
were summarized in Reclamation’s ﬁnal report on the program as follows:
The ﬁne work of the Civilian Conservation Corps by 1942 had
brought the Federal irrigation projects back to a high standard of physical
excellence. The irrigation systems are now in generally good condition,
able to deliver required amounts of water and by the permanency of their
rehabilitation they are insured against interruptions of consequence.14

For the enrollees at Reclamation camps, the experience provided
invaluable skills, training, and opened new doors for a more promising future.
The CCC offered an opportunity “To learn in the great outdoorsChow to work,
how to live, and how to get ahead.”15
Christine Pfaff is a Bureau of Reclamation historian who formerly
worked in Reclamation’s Technical Service Center and has since moved
to the historic preservation program of Reclamation where she uses her
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skills as an architectural historian. She has published several articles on
the history of Reclamation, a book on Reclamation’s historic buildings,
and a book on the CCC at Reclamation.
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Lee’s Ferry, the Colorado River, and the
Development of the Bureau of Reclamation
By:
Douglas E. Kupel
Abstract
The 100-year anniversary of the Newlands Act, which created the U.S.
Reclamation Service, now known as the Bureau of Reclamation, will be
celebrated in the year 2002. This occasion marks an appropriate time to reﬂect
on the development of the Bureau over time. As the prime focus of Federal
activities on the Colorado River, events at Lee’s Ferry have made a decided
impact on the direction of the Bureau. This paper examines the role of Lee’s
Ferry as a concrete location and spiritual center for the reclamation movement in
a paper prepared for the Bureau’s Centennial Symposium.
Established as a refuge from Federal authorities for exile John D. Lee, Lee’s
Ferry is now the physical and spiritual center of the Federal contribution to
Western water history. As scholars look back on the centennial of the Bureau
of Reclamation, an examination of the history of Lee’s Ferry and the turf battle
between the Bureau and the USGS over the future development of the Colorado
River provides needed insight. It adds a valuable perspective for westerners
concerned with the next hundred years of water history. Known today primarily
as the departure point for thousands of white-water rafting thrill-seekers and
world-class trout anglers, the future of Lee’s Ferry will be every bit as signiﬁcant
as its past.

Introduction
Lee’s Ferry is both the physical and spiritual heart of water history in the
arid West. As a physical place, Lee’s Ferry is the crucial dividing point between
the Upper and Lower Basin states as deﬁned by the Colorado River Compact of
1922. Measurements taken at Lee’s Ferry govern the amount of water credited to
each of the basins, as well as allocations between states within each basin.
As a symbol, Lee’s Ferry represents the pivotal position of the Colorado
River in the development of the Bureau of Reclamation. First settled as a
remote place of exile for fugitive Mormon leader John D. Lee as he sought to
escape Federal authorities, Lee’s Ferry is now the true “ground zero” for Federal
inﬂuence on the West. As the focus of Federal activities on the Colorado River,
events at Lee’s Ferry have made a decided impact on the direction of the Bureau.
Despite its key role in history, the history of Lee’s Ferry itself had been
left relatively unexamined. Recent work by historian P. T. Reilly and others have
only now added new chapters to the complex saga of Lee’s Ferry. This new
research provides support for the contention that Lee’s Ferry is one of the most
signiﬁcant locales in the landscape of Federal water policy.1
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Lee’s Ferry is located between the two largest dams on the Colorado
River. Just upstream of Lee’s Ferry is the massive Glen Canyon Dam, which
creates Lake Powell. Downstream from Lee’s Ferry and on the west side of the
Grand Canyon is Hoover Dam, which backs up the waters of the Colorado to form
Lake Mead. Glen Canyon was constructed in the 1950-1960s and represents the
last of the giant concrete dams completed by the Bureau of Reclamation. Hoover
Dam, completed in the depression decade of the 1930s, represented the beginning
of a new era for Reclamation.
What few people realize today is that there was considerable debate about
the relative merits of the two dam locations in the twenties. This vigorous debate
pitted representatives of two Federal agencies against each other: the venerable
U.S. Geological Survey, tracing its heritage back to the nineteenth century ideals
of John Wesley Powell, and the upstart U.S. Reclamation Service, representing a
twentieth century conception of water use. Reclamation Service ofﬁcials lobbied
hard for construction of a dam on the lower Colorado to provide needed ﬂood
control for Southern California and Arizona while producing hydroelectric power
for ready customers in Los Angeles. USGS ofﬁcials, notably hydrologist E. C.
LaRue, argued for the construction of a dam at Glen Canyon to regulate the ﬂow
of water between the Upper and Lower basins.
The Bureau won this skirmish between the two agencies, and construction
of Hoover Dam sent Reclamation on a path of growth and achievement
unparalleled in modern history. Eventually, the Bureau would return to the site
of its earlier triumph. Construction of Glen Canyon Dam capped a long era of
achievements.
The location of Lee’s Ferry carries with it a touch of irony. John D.
Lee was sent there by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon
Church) as an exile to build and operate a ferry. He built the Lonely Dell Ranch
for Emma Lee, his seventeenth wife, a few miles below Glen Canyon Dam. By
1873 Lee had built a ferryboat named the Colorado and established the ﬁrst ferry
service across the river. Lee was captured by Federal authorities and executed in
1877 for his part in the Mountain Meadows Massacre. The ferry ran continuously
until 1928. It was replaced by Navajo Bridge, which was completed across
Marble Canyon in 1929.
Geology
The spectacular landscape dominating the canyon country of Northern
Arizona is the product of eons of geologic activity: shifting of continents,
global rising and falling of sea levels, and creation of highlands now worn and
redeposited. At times, deserts dominated the landscape; sometimes freshwater or
saltwater seas invaded, leaving rivers to erode the most recently deposited layers.
Prevailing winds abetted the process. Periods of erosion account for missing rock
strata, layers appearing elsewhere in sequence. Two geologic processes are most
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responsible for the canyon of the Colorado Plateau: 1) an uplift of the ground
itself, and 2) erosion of the rock by many years of constant water ﬂow.
The last uplift of the Colorado Plateau began about sixty million years
ago. Uplift made the land rise. The meandering streams of the Colorado River
ran faster and faster. As the land rose, the constant erosion of the water cut the
canyons that today dominate the Colorado River. This erosion sliced through
many geologic layers, which are now visible. Navajo sandstone, the dominant
formation, is made of sand dunes hardened by pressure from deposits above
them. The deposits eventually wore away and exposed today’s sandstone. Other
layers contain sea- deposited sediments; still others hold fossils of land or marine
organisms that lived millions of years ago. Petriﬁed wood and fossils of dinosaur
bones, seashells, and small sea creatures are found in several rock strata in this
area.
The deep canyons left by uplift of the Colorado Plateau and the downward
force of erosion made access across the vast chasm of the Colorado River very
difﬁcult. Only at a few locations from its conﬂuence with the Green River in
Central Utah to the lower valley near Topock, California, does the Colorado open
its banks to easy access. For hundreds of miles the canyon of the Colorado is an
insurmountable barrier, isolating the lands of the Arizona strip north of the river
and placing them with easier access to Utah than to the state capitol at Phoenix.
One of the few places along the canyon where the Colorado River can
be reached with relative ease is at its conﬂuence with the Paria River. Here,
between the depths of Glen Canyon on the upstream side and Marble Canyon on
the downstream side, is a break in the canyon walls for a stretch of two miles that
allows a difﬁcult and dangerous crossing of the river. Now Anglicized, the word
Paria derives from the Indian name Pahreah, meaning a stream of water having
willows growing along its banks.2
European Discovery
Early Spanish explorers traveled the northern frontier of New Spain
(today’s Mexico) looking for an overland route to California. Some of these
explorers left us detailed accounts of their expeditions. In 1776 two Spanish
priests began an expedition that provided the ﬁrst written record of Lee’s Ferry.
Father Francisco Atanasio Dominguez and Father Silvestre Velez de Escalante
set out from Santa Fe in July to pioneer an overland route from New Mexico
to Monterey on the California coast. After three months, the party reached the
vicinity of today’s Cedar City in Utah, where they encountered an early snow.
The inclement weather inﬂuenced a decision to turn back to Santa Fe before the
full onset of winter. Following the advice of Paiute Indians, Dominguez and
Escalante searched for a shallow ford of the Colorado.
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Inadvertently turning too far south, the two priests reached what is today
known as Lee’s Ferry. On October 26 the party reached the Colorado River
at the mouth of the Paria River. Here, the river proved too deep to ford on
horseback, and too swift to swim across. The men christened their camp Sal si
Puedes (get out while you can) and they did just that by moving upstream along
the Paria River canyon until they reached the Colorado Plateau. The explorers
climbed out of the river bottom and made camp near what is today’s Wahweap
Marina on Lake Powell. They spent four more days searching for a way across
the river. Finally, on November 7, they chopped steps in the sandstone wall at a
location now called Padre Creek and safely led their pack stock to the banks of
the Colorado. Here the crossing was wide but shallow. The site known as the
“Crossing of the Fathers” today lies beneath the waters of Padre Bay in Lake
Powell.3
Mormon Crossing Era
The early development of Lee’s Ferry is closely associated with the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormons or LDS). The river
crossing is named for Mormon pioneer John Doyle Lee. The crossing was a key
location on the major transportation route for Mormon immigrants to Arizona and,
after 1877, for travelers returning to Utah along the “Honeymoon Trail” to the
LDS Temple at Saint George to solemnize their unions.
The establishment of the Mormon Church dates to an event in American
history known as the “Second Great Awakening,” a period of religious revival and
evangelicalism in the late 1820s and early 1830s. This revival was national in
scope, but had two centers: in the south and in western New York state. In 1830
Joseph Smith received a revelation and a new type of Christian church began.
Because of some unusual tenets of the religion, its practitioners were subject
to opposition and distrust from more traditional, established religions. One of
these early tenets of the LDS Church was polygamy, the practice of men taking
more than one wife. From its original location in New York, members of the
LDS church moved to Ohio, then to Illinois, and ﬁnally on the long trek to the
Great Salt Lake in what would become the Territory and later the State of Utah.
Members arrived at the present-day location of Salt Lake City on July 24, 1847.
John D. and Emma Lee, 1871-1879
John D. Lee was born in Kaskasia, Illinois, on September 12, 1812,
and converted to Mormonism at the age of twenty-six. Lee joined Joseph
Smith in western Missouri in 1838, then moved with other church members to
Nauvoo, Illinois, after violence forced them to relocate. Lee was a leader in the
community and constructed a substantial house in Nauvoo. After further violence,
including the murder of Joseph Smith, Lee and the rest of the Mormon faithful
began a westward trek. During the move Lee was a leader and able assistant to

756

Brigham Young on the trip to Utah. After establishing a home in Salt Lake City,
Lee heeded his church’s call to settle in the southern portion of Utah. Lee and his
wives settled and built houses at Parowan, Harmony, and Panguitch in southern
Utah.4
While living near Harmony, Lee participated in a massacre of immigrants
en route to the Paciﬁc Coast. In the summer of 1857 a wagon train under the
command of Captain Charles Fancher set up camp at Mountain Meadows, a
popular resting spot on the trip west. At the time, leaders of the LDS Church were
in a bitter struggle with the Federal government over control of the Utah Territory
and were anticipating armed intervention at any moment. The immigrants,
many of them from Missouri, taunted the Mormon settlers with tales of how
Smith’s followers had been driven from the state. On September 11, 1857, local
Mormon leaders and Ute Indians joined forces in an attack on the wagon train.
Viewed ostensibly as a military campaign against a hostile force, the attack was
a massacre from which only seventeen children escaped death. While in many
ways a payback for tremendous mistreatment over the years, the Mountain
Meadows Massacre of 1857 forever marked its antagonists with the taint of
bloodshed and violence.5
The massacre opened southern Utah to additional Mormon settlement.
Called Utah’s “Dixie,” because of its comparatively warm climate and southern
location, this portion of the territory included the communities of Saint George,
Harmony, Panguitch, and Cedar City. This process of colonization was an integral
part of church expansion. In addition to southern Utah, church leaders began to
look southward into Arizona. Of particular interest for Mormon proselytizers
were the sedentary and urban Hopi Indians.
In 1858, 1859, and 1860, Mormon leaders sent expeditions to the Hopi.
Led by pioneer Jacob Hamblin, the missionary parties crossed at what would
later become Lee’s Ferry. These early efforts toward converting the Hopi to the
Mormon religion proved disappointing. In time, Mormon leaders directed their
attention to the neighboring Navajo. In contrast to the Hopi, who received the
Mormon missionaries with indifference, the Navajo were openly hostile to those
they considered intruders in their land. By 1860 the Navajo were in a state of
open conﬂict with the U.S. Government, a situation which ended only with the
Navajo’s defeat at the hands of Kit Carson. While many Navajo lost their lives
during the conﬂict, many more died during the infamous “long walk” to the
Bosque Redondo reservation in New Mexico.
The relationship between the Mormons, the Navajo, and the Hopi took on
the form of an uneasy truce after 1865. Mormon missionaries remained anxious
to convert additional souls, but they also coveted the few well-watered locations
in Arizona for settlements. Resident American Indians looked to protect their
lands.
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As one of the few locations where the Colorado could be crossed, the
Paria River conﬂuence served an important military purpose to the Mormons.
Control of the crossing prevented incursions by Native Americans north of the
river while providing a base of operations for Mormon colonizing to the south. In
October of 1869 Hamblin posted guards at the river crossing to control access at
this strategic point. Hamblin christened the post “Fort Meeks” in honor of camp
leader William Meeks. By 1870 Hamblin had cleared a patch of land along the
Paria and planted wheat. As historian A. Gary Anderson has noted, “this crossing
on the Colorado River was not unknown when John D. Lee arrived, nor was the
idea of a ferry new.”6
Although U.S. President James Buchanan had issued a general pardon
for acts of rebellion arising from the Utah War in 1858, for John D. Lee and
other Mormon leaders associated with the Mountain Meadows Massacre the
passage of time could not wash the stain clean. In 1870 LDS church ofﬁcials
excommunicated Lee and others for their participation in the event. While
church ofﬁcials were outwardly preparing to ﬁx the entire blame for the
affair on Lee, inwardly they still considered Lee as one of their own. Despite
the excommunication, for Lee, a faithful member of the ﬂock since 1838,
relinquishment of his loyalty to the church would come slowly if at all.
To Lee and the Mormon leadership, the conﬂuence of Paria Creek with the
Colorado River served two important purposes. For Lee, it provided a remote and
isolated area free from the watchful eyes of Federal authorities. For the church, it
was an important link in the Mormon colonization of Arizona.
Lee and two of his families set out for the remote location, arriving shortly
before Christmas in 1871. Mormon historian Juanita Brooks credits Emma
Lee with naming the locale “Lonely Dell” based on the pioneer wife’s initial
observations. Wives Emma and Rachel took up residence, one in a dugout and
one in a rock structure. In May of 1872 Rachel moved to a location today known
as “Jacob’s Pools,” leaving Emma Batchelder Lee as the woman in charge of
Lee’s Ferry. Emma was indeed the driving force behind the ferry and the Lonely
Dell Ranch, as Lee himself was often absent.7
The arrival of Lee created two centers of activity at the conﬂuence of
the Paria and Colorado Rivers. The ferry across the Colorado operated from the
water’s edge, downstream from the juncture of the two rivers. The residential
area, starting with some rough cabins and corrals, was upstream along the Paria.
This sheltered location back from the Colorado gave the residents some protection
from storms that frequently passed through the canyon.
During December of 1871 Lee constructed crude shelters for his two
wives and their children. Based on accounts from Lee’s diaries, Mormon
historian Juanita Brooks described these early structures:
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By January 12 they had ﬁnished building two small rooms. One was a
dugout with its back and two sides set into the hillside. It had a ﬂagstone
ﬂoor, and a willow and sod roof. Later, this would be a cellar, and a
place where the children could sleep during the scorching midday hours.
The larger room was of rock laid up with mud and lime mortar, and had a
dirt ﬂoor and roof, but two small windows and a solid door.8

These ﬁrst dwellings were mere shelters from the elements. As time went
on, Lee constructed a more presentable cabin of driftwood for Emma. He had the
assistance of Tommy Smith who arrived in 1872 with lumber for a new ferryboat
and considerable carpentry skills. Professor Harvey C. DeMotte, a member of
John Wesley Powell’s 1871-72 expedition down the Colorado, left us with a
description of the building as it appeared in 1872:
The house of logs and innocent of ﬂoor, whose foundations were not laid
with square and compass, stood with gable pointing toward the south of
east; along one side a shade, composed of leafy boughs, served well the
purpose of verandah, from the outer edge of which suspended blankets
hid the sun’s rays from the evening meal.9

John Wesley Powell’s trips down the Colorado have received well-justiﬁed
attention by historians through the years. While Powell and his men achieved
a signiﬁcant accomplishment by being the ﬁrst to travel downstream on the
Colorado River through the Grand Canyon, the records of Powell’s exploits also
give us some insight into conditions at Lee’s Ferry. Powell took two trips through
the Colorado, one in 1869 and a second in 1871 and 1872. The second trip was
actually undertaken in two parts, with a break at Lee’s Ferry.10
Powell ﬁrst visited Lee’s Ferry on August 4, 1869. His crew spent the
night there, noting the remains of Indian and Mormon campﬁres. Powell returned
on September 30, 1870, during a reconnaissance trip in preparation for his second
voyage. Accompanied by Jacob Hamblin, Powell and his men constructed a ﬂat
boat called the Cañon Maid to use as a ferryboat to cross the river. Recognizing
that Lee’s Ferry was an important access point on the river, Powell used it as a
location to split his second trip down the Colorado. In 1871 the party left Green
River, Wyoming in May and arrived at Lee’s Ferry in October. The men cached
one boat on each side of the river and disembarked. The Powell party returned to

33.1. This 1871 image of John
Wesley Powell’s second expedition
down the Colorado River was captured
at the jumping off point in Green River,
Wyoming.
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Lee’s Ferry in the summer of 1872 to resume their trip.11
The main difference between the two trips was that John Doyle Lee
had arrived at the mouth of the Paria to establish his residence. Frederick S.
Dellenbaugh, a member of Powell’s party, noted that in addition to constructing
a cabin, “Lee had worked hard since his arrival early in the year and now had his
farm in fairly good order with crops growing, well irrigated by the water he took
out of the Paria. He called the place Lonely Dell, and it was not a misnomer.”12
With a good knowledge of Lee’s predicament, members of the Powell
expedition were not above having some fun with Lee. Dellenbaugh describes one
incident:
Our camp was across the Paria down by the Colorado, and when Brother
Lee came back the following Sunday he called to give us a lengthy
dissertation on the faith of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), while
Andy, always up to mischief, in his quiet way, delighted to get behind
him and cock a riﬂe. At the sound of the ominous click Lee would wheel
like a ﬂash to see what was up. We had no intention of capturing him,
of course, but it amused Andy to act in a way that kept Lee on the qui
vive.13

In addition to constructing lodging, Lee quickly turned his attention to the
establishment of a garden patch. One of his ﬁrst tasks was to complete a dam on
the Paria River to impound water for irrigation. Thus began a continual battle
to maintain the dam in the face of frequent ﬂoods and to keep the crops watered
during times of drought.14
In 1872 church authorities desired to open Arizona to colonization and
assigned Lee to operate a ferry. A boat was completed by January of 1873. In
April of 1873 church ofﬁcials sent Joseph W. Young, James Jackson, and twentyﬁve others to improve roads to and from the ferry site. Jackson assisted Mrs. Lee
during the frequent absences of John D. Lee from the site.
In 1874 conﬂict between Mormons and the Navajo led church ofﬁcials to
fund construction of a “Fort” on the banks of the Colorado River. In January of
1874 three Navajo men were killed by settlers in Grass Valley, Utah. Although
the protagonists were not Mormons, the incident escalated tensions between
Mormon settlers and the Navajo. In May of 1874 Jacob Hamblin suggested that
the Mormons construct a Fort at Lee’s Ferry to protect the river crossing.
Marshall William Stokes captured Lee in Panguitch on November 7, 1874.
It took two trials for Federal authorities to convict Lee of participation in the
Mountain Meadows Massacre. Lee was executed at the site of the massacre on
March 23, 1877.
Following Lee’s capture and execution, his wife Emma operated the ferry.
Warren M. Johnson took over operation of the Ferry from Emma on November
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30, 1879. Johnson operated the ferry for sixteen years, until 1896. James S.
Emett then took over. One of Emett’s improvements was the introduction of a
cable-ferry in 1899 and the construction of a new access road. Emett continued to
operate the ferry until it was purchased by Coconino County in 1910. Custodians
for Coconino County ran the ferry until the construction of Navajo Bridge made it
obsolete. The last ferry run was in 1928. Navajo Bridge opened in 1929.
Lee’s Ferry and Charles H. Spencer, 1909-1912
These three years were ones of rapid change at Lee’s Ferry. The Grand
Canyon Cattle Company purchased the Lonely Dell Ranch from James S.
Emett in 1909, and Coconino County owned the ferry location after 1910. But
the greatest change originated from former teamster, bullwhacker, and expert
yarn-spinner Charles H. Spencer. Spencer had convinced himself, and soon
proved very adept at convincing others, that small amounts of very ﬁne gold
could be found in the depths of the geologic strata uncovered by centuries of the
Colorado’s relentless erosion. The only problem, for Spencer and others, was
how to recover it. The Spencer mining operation endured for only a short time,
until February of 1912, but it left a lasting mark on Lee’s Ferry.15
Spencer arrived at Lee’s Ferry in May of 1909. He listened carefully as
Jerry Johnson, Warren Johnson’s son, related the exploits of Robert B. Stanton’s
early attempts at gold mining along the Colorado. Spencer developed enthusiasm
for his project and sent a member of his party to Flagstaff to record several mining
claims. He lured ﬁnancial backers in Chicago to join the operation, incorporated
as the Black Sand Gold Recovery Company. By June Spencer and his crew
had established a camp on the left bank of the Colorado, near the location of the
original ferry and across the river from the Fort.
After several unsuccessful attempts to recover gold from the sands
along the left bank of the river in August and early September of 1910, Spencer
decided to move his operations to the more developed and spacious right bank.
On September 10 and 11, 1910, Spencer and his crew moved to the right bank,
making over the old Fort as a mess hall and erecting two tents nearby to serve as
the cook’s commissary.16
After establishing his foothold on the right bank, Charlie Spencer regrouped to obtain more capital from his Chicago backers. He returned at the
ﬁrst of the year in 1911 and embarked on a massive building program that would
change the appearance of Lee’s Ferry dramatically. He formed a new company,
called the American Placer Corporation, to serve as a holding company for the
operation.
Buildings erected by Spencer in 1911 included: an ofﬁce building to the
west of the Fort (American Placer Corporation Ofﬁce); an addition on the west
end of the old Fort; a new mess hall and cook’s house; three bunkhouses (west,
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center, and east); a blacksmith shop; and a laboratory (assay ofﬁce). Other
Spencer contributions included smaller features such as root cellars, chicken
coops, outhouses, and a powder storage magazine. The powder magazine, a large
dugout excavated out of the right bank, was located up the Colorado River past
all other improvements. The most unusual Spencer addition was the construction
of a steamboat, christened the Charles H. Spencer, that lowered its anchor in the
Colorado.17
Despite the ability of Charles Spencer to convince others that there was
gold in the deposits at Lee’s Ferry, he was unable to actually locate any mineral
wealth. His talents lay in the area of promotion, not production. The ﬁnal blow
came when his steamboat could not buck the forceful current of the Colorado.
It had been constructed to transport coal for the boilers of the gold operation.
Without a fuel source, not withstanding the lack of gold, the operation was
doomed to failure.18
After the Charles H. Spencer failed in its maiden voyage in December
of 1911, the workers began to drift away. When the investors cut off the money
supply, even Spencer himself abandoned his project. Although Spencer would
continue to return to Lee’s Ferry many times over the next forty years, he never
matched his construction efforts of 1910-1911.
USGS/Reclamation Controversy over Dam Construction (1921-1933)
The next scheme of big dreamers that concerned Lee’s Ferry centered on
a resource that appeared to be plentiful: water. Since the great ﬂood that created
the Salton Sea in 1905, plans had been circulated for a dam on the Colorado to
provide ﬂood control, generate hydroelectric power, and impound water for use
in California and Arizona. Engineers, politicians, and developers in California
and Arizona vied to be the ﬁrst to lay claim to the vast water resources of the
Colorado.19
Eugene Clyde LaRue of the U.S. Geological Survey played a key role
in the development of dams on the Colorado. Although LaRue’s ideas were
discredited by the politicians of the day, his observations about the ﬂow of the
Colorado proved prescient. LaRue began a comprehensive study of the Colorado
in 1912. His ultimate conclusion, published in 1916, was that the ﬂow of the
Colorado was not sufﬁcient to irrigate all of the lands available for agriculture. To
conserve water, LaRue advocated construction of a series of comparatively small
dams. This would reduce the total water surface exposed to evaporation, thus
conserving stored water for irrigation in both California and Arizona.20
Ofﬁcials at the U.S. Reclamation Service, once a part of the USGS,
pursued a different vision for the Colorado. The Reclamation Service conducted
its own studies, relying on the work of J. B. Lippincott. The Californiabased engineer advocated construction of a large dam on the lower Colorado.
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Lippincott explained that the advantage of the lower Colorado River dam is that it
would be closer to power and water use in California. This idea did not set well
with Arizonans who hoped to divert water from the Colorado for use in the desert
state.21
As it turned out, the Californians were better prepared and ﬁnanced. They
struck ﬁrst, in 1921. The Southern California Edison Company entered into a
cooperative agreement with the United States Geological Survey to conduct a
survey of the Colorado River with a view toward determining potential dam
sites. Like other travelers before and after, the Edison men selected Lee’s Ferry
as the base of their operations because of its easy access to the river and land
transportation.22
In addition to surveying the river for possible dam sites, the Edison and
USGS party erected a stream gaging station at Lee’s Ferry. Placed in operation
in 1921, the stream gage represented the ﬁrst ﬁrm Federal foothold at the ferry,
an ironic addition to a location selected by John D. Lee to hide from U.S.
government authority. The Federal presence at Lee’s Ferry had begun.23
Another irony in the Edison program was that the USGS hydrographer
E. C. LaRue worked closely with the California company. Because of his prior
experience, LaRue was a logical choice to head the survey of potential dam
locations upstream and downstream from Lee’s Ferry. Both the USGS and
the Edison Company provided funds for the project. Although LaRue would
later come to a conclusion regarding dam locations that was at odds with the
electric company, this association was used by his enemies to discredit LaRue’s
objectivity.24
The Edison Company leased land from the Navajo Nation on the left
bank of the Colorado for their headquarters. In 1922 the Edison men erected a
boathouse there that served as the base of their operations. This work coincided
with meetings of the Colorado River Commission conducted by Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover. These discussions in Santa Fe led to agreement
on a compact that divided the waters of the Colorado between the upper and
lower basin states. However, Arizona refused to ratify this Compact of 1922.
The Compact had the effect of splitting the Colorado River drainage into two
basins, the upper and lower. The location of the division between the basins was
speciﬁed in Article V of the Compact as a hypothetical point one mile below the
mouth of the Paria River.25
Separate Reclamation Service investigations of the Colorado culminated
in 1922 with the publication of the Fall-Davis Report, named for Secretary of the
Interior Albert Fall and Reclamation Service chief A. P. Davis. The Fall-Davis
report recommended construction of a high dam at Boulder Canyon that would
serve several purposes: ﬂood control, generation of hydroelectric power, river
regulation, and storage of water for agriculture. The report essentially followed
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the earlier Lippincott plan.26
Despite the assistance of the Edison Company, LaRue and the USGS
pursued a vision of Colorado River development that differed from the
Reclamation Service. LaRue compared the two plans in his second report on the
Colorado, published in 1925. LaRue stated that the USGS plans “are based on the
theory that major regulation of ﬂow by storage can be developed by dams at or
above Lees Ferry.” With a large dam at Lee’s Ferry as its centerpiece, LaRue then
called for a series of smaller dams and reservoirs downstream. These would allow
for the generation of hydroelectric power while conserving water for agriculture.
The smaller dams would reduce water loss from evaporation. According to
LaRue, building a dam at Lee’s Ferry would regulate the ﬂow of the river and
allow for a comprehensive development of the Colorado’s resources.27
The Bureau of Reclamation pursued a different vision. Davis and other
Reclamation ofﬁcials preferred the recommendations of the Fall-Davis report
which called for the construction of a large dam in Boulder Canyon on the lower
Colorado. Accompanying the large dam was a second dam, downstream, that
would recapture power releases and allow for agricultural diversions. The large
dam was eventually named Hoover Dam, and the smaller was christened Davis
Dam.
The Davis plan had the strong backing of the California congressional
delegation. The basic elements of the plan were introduced as the Swing-Johnson
bill in Congress, named for Representative Philip Swing of San Diego and
cosponsored by Senator Hiram Johnson. The bill eventually became law as the
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928. Construction of Boulder Dam (later Hoover
Dam) began in 1930 and was completed in 1936.
Despite the rejection of LaRue’s idea for an upstream dam, the USGS
soon developed Lee’s Ferry into a signiﬁcant scientiﬁc outpost. With the arrival
of stream gagers at the ferry, the old Spencer era mining buildings began to see
new use. Edison gager Irving Cockcroft and his wife Margery moved into the old
Fort on August 20, 1921.28
The Cockcrofts established a post ofﬁce in the American Placer
Corporation Ofﬁce building. The place opened for business on August 12, 1922,
and Irving Cockcroft erected a sign stating that the building was the “Lee’s Ferry
Post Ofﬁce.” Since that time, the building has frequently been referred to as the
“Post Ofﬁce.” Another change was the conversion of the east Spencer Bunkhouse
into a school. This was done in 1921 under the impetus of Jerry Johnson, but it
beneﬁtted the children of the river gagers working for Southern California Edison
as well as children of the Mormon residents of Lonely Dell Ranch. The building
served as a school for about four years. 29
The United States Geological Survey assumed complete control for the
stream gaging operation at Lee’s Ferry on November 1, 1923. On that day Edison
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gager Irving Cockroft turned over the equipment to USGS employee Jim Klohr.
The new man brought his family and the small group soon settled into the old
Fort, using the Spencer addition as a bedroom.30
Another result of the USGS activity on the Colorado was the designation
of the spring at Lee’s Ferry, located in the bluff behind the cable ferry, as a public
water reserve. The experience of the Edison crew and the USGS men showed
the importance of this water supply. By order of the Secretary of the Interior,
numerous springs in Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,
Wyoming, and New Mexico were designated as “public water reserves” in order
to protect the water supply in isolated and arid locations for the public use. Public
Water Reserve No. 107, issued on April 17, 1926, included:
All land within a quarter of a mile of a spring on the north bank of
Colorado River near the old site of Lees Ferry east of the mouth of
Paria River, and located approximately in what probably will be, when
surveyed, Sec. 13.31

Charlie Spencer resumed operations at Lee’s Ferry early in 1931, sending
several laborers to begin sluicing operations on the Chinle Formation. Spencer’s
men treated the buildings and grounds as if they were their own, resulting in
conﬂict with USGS hydrologist Charlie McDonald. The two groups, USGS
gagers and Spencer miners, eventually agreed on exclusive use of separate
buildings. While this solved the problem for the moment, it soured the USGS
on any further dealings with Spencer. Ofﬁcials in Washington, D.C., began to
contemplate how they might prevent any further trespass by Spencer on the
stream gaging operation. After Spencer’s backers ran out of money in April of
1931, the brief mining boom came to an end.32
USGS Outpost at Lee’s Ferry, 1933-1945
The United States Geological Survey consolidated its control over the
old ferry site in 1933. On January 18, 1933, President Herbert Hoover issued
an executive order setting aside lands near the existing gaging stations on the
Colorado and Paria Rivers as an administrative site. President Hoover declared
that Section 13 and lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Township 40 North, Range 7 East and an
unsurveyed portion of what, when surveyed, would be Section 18 in Township 40
North, Range 8 East, were reserved “for occupation and use by representatives of
the Geological Survey.”33
The USGS soon undertook an improvement campaign on the property.
It erected a fence to the east of the Fort, west of the westernmost Spencer
Bunkhouse (demolished 1943) to demarcate its administrative zone. The Survey
also considered demolishing several of the Spencer buildings at this time. These
included the old schoolhouse (east Spencer bunkhouse), the chicken house (center
bunkhouse, a.k.a. feed and storage room; demolished 1967), and the saddle barn
(west bunkhouse, demolished 1943), and the Spencer addition to the Fort.34
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After 1933 the center of USGS residential activity shifted from the Fort to
Spencer’s old mess hall (demolished 1967). The USGS converted the mess hall
into a residence for its stream gagers. This building became known as the “stream
gager’s residence.”35
The depression decade led itinerant hydrographer Frank Dodge to become
more of a permanent resident at the ferry site. A fairly frequent visitor to the
ferry since 1919, Dodge secured part-time work with the USGS as an assistant
hydrologist in 1932. The decision to hire Dodge was justiﬁed on the basis that
a second person was needed to make readings during periods of high water.
Dodge upgraded Spencer’s old laboratory (assay ofﬁce) building (converted into
sediment lab 1947; demolished 1967) into a makeshift residence. Over the years,
this building became known as “Dodge’s Cabin.”36
A reunion of Mormon pioneers held at Lee’s Ferry in 1935 gave the USGS
an incentive to clean up its buildings and grounds. The event took place over
three days in October. The reunion marked a turning point for Lee’s Ferry. A
sense of the passage of time and the growth of historical perspective gave rise to a
sense of history about the old place.37
However, recollections of the past did not always prove accurate. In 1936
historian Frank Kelly visited the area with former resident Robert B. Hildebrand
who reminisced about his boyhood at Lee’s Ferry. Hildebrand posed for
photographs in front of several buildings, one of which he called the original Lee
cabin. Other visitors, struck by the apparent age of the Samantha Johnson Cabin,
incorrectly began to associate the old building with John D. Lee. Kelly gave these
memories a stamp of approval when he described Lee’s Ferry in a 1943 article:
Although some of the old buildings have been destroyed, Lee’s original
one-room log cabin fortunately has been preserved. Behind it stands
his old blacksmith shop, where horses were shod and emigrant wagons
repaired, with giant leather bellows still in working order.38

As the years passed, and as additional visitors arrived at Lee’s Ferry, the
story of the Lee cabin and blacksmith shop took on all the elements of truth from
constant retelling. With the departure of Jerry Johnson from the property in 1934,
no one remained on site that had direct knowledge of the earlier period. Lee’s
Ferry had now entered the realm of history, but that history took on aspects of
myth. As tales were told and retold, some of the stories were embellished.39
As part of the USGS operations in the thirties, Government Land Ofﬁce
(GLO) surveyors returned to the Lee’s Ferry area in 1937 to survey Township 40
North, Range 8 East. The GLO surveyors noted eight stone buildings and one
mine shaft at the old Ferry site. The surveyors described the area in their notes as
follows:
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In section 18 there is a strip of land on the north side of the river about
one-fourth mile wide and one-half mile long, whereon there are a group
of stone cabins, a part of the settlement known as Lee’s Ferry. This
strip of land is covered by proclamation to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Geological Survey, and a representative of this government bureau
occupies one of the cabins. The remainder of the cabins were not
occupied at the time of the survey… There is an old mine shaft in section
18 near the group of stone buildings near the base of the canyon wall,
but no operations are being carried on at the present time and there is no
evidence of valuable mineral deposits.40

The land survey coincided with an improvement to the grounds by the
USGS late in 1937. The Survey built a water tank and pipeline to convey water
from a well to the stream gager’s residence (demolished 1967). The engineers
added a septic tank, to complement a six-foot by nine-foot bathroom they
attached to the building. The arrival of indoor plumbing at Lee’s Ferry was not
the most dramatic event which ever took place at the site, but it was a signiﬁcant
improvement.41
In 1942 the USGS undertook another clean-up of the property. Many of
the remaining metal objects from the Spencer mining era were collected as part
of a war-effort scrap drive. The only items that remained after the operation were
those that were too large to move, such as the boilers Spencer had freighted to the
site in 1910. In 1943 the west Spencer Bunkhouse, closest to the ravine and in the
worst shape, was razed for stone used to refurbish other buildings.42
Change of Tide: World War Two
A number of factors came together during World War Two which brought
an end to Arizona’s opposition to the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and started
its battle for authorization of the Central Arizona Project. The ﬁrst was the war
itself. World War Two generated a tremendous demand for food and ﬁber raised
in Arizona, resulting in an increase in agricultural production and a corresponding
rise in water use. Combined with the arrival of defense industries and workers
into the state, Arizona experienced an increased demand for water. The need for
improved relations with Mexico, spurred by the war, started treaty negotiations
in 1941 that resulted in an agreement on water use from the Colorado in 1944.
The election of Governor Sidney P. Osborn (who started the ﬁrst of his four
consecutive terms in January of 1941) brought a mature political leader to the
executive chair, one who understood that Arizona must change its tactics in order
to move forward.43
As one of his ﬁrst legislative efforts, Governor Osborn requested approval
of a combined “Water and Power Authority” that could take charge of the state’s
efforts to develop its resources. In 1941 and again in 1943, during the 15th and
16th Legislatures, Osborn asked for approval of this initiative but was refused
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each time. In 1943 he received permission from the Legislature to create a State
Land Department that would meet some of his goals for more centralized resource
planning.44
Also in 1943 Osborn persuaded the Legislature to give permission for
a committee to negotiate a contract with the Secretary of the Interior for water
from the Colorado River. As a condition, the Legislature reserved its prerogative
to approve the actions of the committee. This ﬁrst step opened the door to a
ﬁnal solution in 1944. Governor Osborn convened a special session of the 16th
Legislature on February 15, 1944, to consider the ratiﬁcation of the Compact
and the authorization of a contract with the Secretary of the Interior for the
use of Arizona’s 2.8 maf (million acre feet) designated in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act. The legislators responded, and by the end of the special session
on February 24, 1944, had passed both measures. In addition, the Sixteenth
Legislature allocated $200,000 for use in a cooperative study with the Bureau of
Reclamation to devise plans for bringing the water to Central Arizona. Governor
Osborn signed the measures ratifying the Compact and authorizing the contract
on February 24, and “ended the most controversial issue in the state’s history, and
marked the beginning of Arizona’s ﬁght to put the waters of the Colorado River to
beneﬁcial use.”45
Reclamation Service Arrives at Lee’s Ferry, 1946-1962
The postwar period saw a renewed level of activity at the USGS
compound. In 1946 a survey crew from the Bureau of Reclamation arrived to
investigate possible dam sites and rights-of-way associated with the proposed
Central Arizona Project. In 1947 the USGS turned Frank Dodge’s old
residence—Spencer’s assay ofﬁce—into a new sediment laboratory. That same
year the Survey constructed a new hydrographer’s residence, measuring 18 by 30
feet (demolished 1967). The Survey followed this by constructing a new building
for guest housing (USGS Residence) in May of 1950. Many of the stones for the
new buildings were salvaged from old Spencer buildings, contributing further to
the deterioration of the mining legacy at the ferry.46
The contract between the State of Arizona and the Bureau of Reclamation
facilitated studies of potential routes to bring Colorado River water to Central
Arizona. The Bureau of Reclamation, spurred by the contribution of $200,000
from Arizona into its study fund, turned its attention to examining plans for
the project. During the summer of 1944, U.S. Senator from Arizona Ernest
McFarland chaired hearings on the Colorado. On June 6, 1944, the Bureau issued
a report which discussed the possibility of diverting water to Central Arizona.
The Bureau continued to study the matter, trying to resolve a controversy over the
route the water would take.47
John T. Sanders made the ﬁrst Reclamation mark on Lee’s Ferry. He
arrived on March 21, 1946, and began to take stream ﬂow measurements in
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anticipation of constructing Glen Canyon Dam upstream from Lee’s Ferry. On
October 25, a large party of Bureau of Reclamation employees from the Salt Lake
City ofﬁce arrived at Lee’s Ferry. Their ﬁrst order of business was to improve
the road from State Highway 89 to Lee’s Ferry. Most of this work had been
accomplished by November 7.48
More Reclamation employees arrived in December of 1946. They brought
boats and barges to facilitate their work on Glen Canyon Dam. Reclamation
workers established a base camp at Lee’s Ferry. Surveyors fanned out from Lee’s
Ferry to begin the preliminary survey work for the new dam. Workers drilled a
well in January of 1947, and by the end of March the operation resembled a small
city.49
The studies convinced Reclamation ofﬁcials that E. C. LaRue’s old plan
of a large regulating dam at Glen Canyon was still a solid one. It took additional
work to convince politicians in Washington, D.C., and the West that it was a
good idea. The plan eventually reached fruition as the Colorado River Storage
Project Act. The measure passed Congress on March 28, 1956. President Dwight
Eisenhower signed it into law on April 11.
President Eisenhower touched off the ﬁrst blasts signaling the start
of construction of Glen Canyon Dam by telegraph from the Oval Ofﬁce on
October 15, 1956. The long-deferred dream of USGS Hydrographer E. C. LaRue
was about to become reality under the auspices of the Bureau of Reclamation.
Construction of the dam, completed in 1966, resulted in the creation of Lake
Powell, a water recreation wonderland. Glen Canyon Dam also tamed the
Colorado through the Grand Canyon, allowing for the development of a white
water rafting industry headquartered at Lee’s Ferry. The cold water released
from the bottom of the dam turned out to be perfect for trout, resulting in the
development of a stretch of world-class trout ﬁshing river at Lee’s Ferry.50
In 1959 USGS personnel apparently burned at least one of the two
cabins at the cable ferry site, and possibly both. The burned cabin was the Frank
Johnson Cabin, used by Johnson as a residence while he tended the ferry. A
second cabin, christened the “Louse House” by travelers who picked up some
unwanted companions there, had already lost its wooden upper walls and roof by
1959. According to Crampton and Rusho in their 1965 report, “The cabins were
burned by the U.S. Geological Survey for the alleged reason that the agency had
neither the men nor the funds to police the buildings against an increasing number
of careless tourists.” C. Gregory Crampton photographed both structures on
September 20, 1959, and reported that the Frank Johnson “Cabin had been burned
and was still smoldering when visited.”51
The Glen Canyon Dam construction project resulted in a number of
scientiﬁc studies of the history and archaeology of the Glen Canyon region. In
June of 1960 C. Gregory Crampton of the University of Utah published his study
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33.2. Eugene C. LaRue’s dream of a Glen Canyon dam was finally realized in the 1960s.

of historical sites in Glen Canyon from the mouth of the San Juan River to Lee’s
Ferry. These studies represented some of the ﬁrst professional historical work
at Lee’s Ferry. Unfortunately, due to the pressure of completing the studies in
a short amount of time, errors crept into the text of these early reports that have
confused the history of Lee’s Ferry to this day.52
The Consortium at Lonely Dell, 1964-1974
In 1964 a group of investors decided to purchase the Lonely Dell Ranch
property, the location of Lee’s original cabins on the Paria. Known casually as
“the consortium,” the group shared a vision of turning the place into a destination
resort for vacationers. Heading the group was Phoenix architect Denver “Dee”
Evans and his wife Jean. Evans, son of noted architect Robert F. Evans who
had developed the Jokake Inn and the Paradise Inn in the Phoenix area, hoped
to duplicate his father’s success with the construction of a resort at Lee’s Ferry.
Included in the investment group was E. Reesman Fryer, descendant of Mormon
immigrants who had crossed at the Ferry in the nineteenth century. Fryer and his
wife Ione had a different vision for the Lonely Dell Ranch, one of preservation of
its rich heritage.53
Five other individuals or married couples formed the consortium: Allen
Luhrs and Alma Luhrs, John and Alta Luhrs (both couples doing business as
Luhrs & Luhrs, a partnership), Robert L. and Charlotte Brown, Joseph Louis
770

Refsnes, and Jack and Edythe Whiteman. All were wealthy Phoenix residents.
John and Alta Luhrs later sold their share to the partnership, which then created
six undivided interests.
According to historian H. Lee Scamehorn, the group acquired the property
“to produce unadulterated seed. The site was sufﬁciently isolated that plants
grown there would not be contaminated by vegetation from other agricultural
lands.” While this explanation seems plausible, it is more likely—given the
interest of Evans and Fryer in history—that the property was acquired primarily
for its historic attractions. In 1987 Fryer described his labor of love: “I replanted
orchards and rebuilt ditches…I think I worked every bit as hard as John D. Lee
and Warren Johnson ever did.”54
The consortium made a large change in the landscape of the property. On
June 9, 1965, the new owners began construction of two large holding ponds
into which Paria River water could be diverted and impounded. These irrigation
facilities served a large orchard of fruit trees that the owners planted south of
ranch buildings.55
According to historian Scamehorn, the consortium had a large amount of
work to do. Years of neglect and deferred maintenance left the Lonely Dell Ranch
in poor condition. Scamehorn observed:
Lee’s Ranch showed obvious signs in 1964 of advanced deterioration
caused by prolonged neglect…The condition of the property demanded
a heavy expenditure for what the partners called “salvage” operations…
The ranch buildings also needed extensive repairs. The stone house
[Weaver Ranch House] was described by the partners as “primitive.” It
had to be rebuilt, expanded, and modernized to make it habitable. The
so-called Lee cabin and other buildings required refurbishing. Hand-split
shingles were put on the cabins, and in other ways they were restored to
the appearance they might have had in the 1880s.56

The ambitious “salvage” program of the partners was cooled a bit in
1967 when the National Park Service expressed an interest in acquiring the
property. The two sides, Park Service and partners, began extended discussion
about acquiring the Lonely Dell Ranch property. The main sticking point in the
discussions was price. Events reached a climax in 1971 when the Park Service
ﬁled suit to condemn the property. This lawsuit was dismissed on a technicality in
1973, opening the way for renewed negotiations.57
National Park Service at the Ferry Site, 1962-1974
In 1962 the National Park Service took over administrative control of
the Lee’s Ferry property from the USGS. However, USGS stream gaging work
continued. The NPS presence began with periodic ranger patrols to the site
approximately once per week. Permanent duty began on May 19, 1963, with
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the appointment of Ed Mazzer as the Sub-District ranger. Improvements which
accompanied permanent status were the installation of two trailers, one of which
served as the Ranger’s residence and the second as the Ranger’s Ofﬁce. That
same year the Park Service constructed a new bridge across the Paria River,
ensuring better access to the Lee’s Ferry site.58
The acquisition of the old ferry site by the Park Service led to increased
development for recreational use. It also led to additional historical investigations
and the ﬁrst steps toward preservation of the historical buildings at the site. On
October 6, 1964, NPS Ranger Phil Martin and historian P. T. Reilly conducted a
survey of the stone buildings at Lee’s Ferry.59
The Park Service then issued a contract to historians C. Gregory Crampton
and W. L. Rusho to examine the historic buildings at Lee’s Ferry. The two men
undertook a ﬁeld visit to the site on December 10 and 11, 1964. The two scholars
completed the report in January of 1965, noting:
It should be stressed that this paper has been put together quickly to meet
an early deadline and it is therefore not complete in factual detail nor
is it a work of thorough-going scholarship which would have required
a longer time to produce. Indeed, the history of Lee’s Ferry is amply
signiﬁcant to justify a complete and scholarly study.60

In October of 1965 the Park Service sponsored additional research at Lee’s
Ferry. Architect Walter A. Gathman and draftsman Donald A. Krueger, working
for the Park Service’s Division of History Studies, surveyed the 1874 Fort at Lee’s
Ferry. On the basis of the Crampton and Rusho report, Park Service ofﬁcials felt
that the Fort was the most signiﬁcant building in the old Ferry area.61
In March of 1966 the Park Service took action on the studies. After NPS
regional historian Bill Brown examined the Fort in person, the Park Service
undertook a stabilization treatment. Under the direction of HABS architect
Charles Pope, workers sprayed the interior wooden features of the Fort with an
epoxy preservative.62
Differences between the Park Service and the USGS over the future of the
property led to an unfortunate incident in 1967. On February 7 and 8, 1967, the
USGS demolished nearly all of the remaining Spencer buildings at the Ferry site.
Both the Park Service and the USGS failed to provide an adequate explanation
for the destruction. As best as can be surmised, the Park Service and the USGS
felt that the Spencer buildings lacked historical signiﬁcance. However, William
E. Brown, NPS Regional Historian for the Southwest Region based in Santa Fe,
admitted that:
Review of the record on the Spencer Buildings indicates that it
would be less than candid to avoid a conclusion that a mistake
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may have been made. If so—let it be noted—it was one of
omission, not of commission.63

In the fall of 1967 the Park Service returned to address the remaining
historic buildings at Lee’s Ferry in a more positive manner. The condition of the
north wall of the American Placer Corporation Ofﬁce had deteriorated to such a
point that immediate stabilization work was needed. Roland Richert of the NPS
Ruins Stabilization Unit examined the building on August 30, 1967. Richert
returned to Lee’s Ferry and between September 18 and 22, worked with skilled
mason Willie Yazzie.64
NPS personnel returned to Lee’s Ferry in 1969 to complete the job of
historic building documentation begun in 1965. During the intervening years,
many of the Spencer Buildings had been demolished by the 1967 action, leaving
representatives of the Division of Historic Architecture, part of the Ofﬁce of
Archaeology and Historic Preservation, to document the remaining buildings.
These included the American Placer Corporation Ofﬁce, the Chicken Coop, the
Lee’s Ferry Fort Root Cellar, and the Spencer Bunkhouse.65
While history continued to be a big draw for tourists at Lee’s Ferry,
the introduction of trout into the now-frigid waters of the Colorado River that
emerged from the depths of Glen Canyon Dam began to lure increasing numbers
of tourists starting in the sixties. Many ﬁshed from the banks at the river’s edge,
while others ventured forth in boats. Still others eschewed ﬁshing entirely. Lee’s
Ferry developed into the prime point of embarkation for raft trips through the
Grand Canyon. By 1969, more than 3,000 people were making the river run
through the Grand Canyon each year. The change even captured the attention
of a writer for the New York Times, who described the bustling scene in 1969 as
follows:
A lively, year-round outdoor recreation center has sprung up at this
scenic and history-saturated spot in the shadow of the Vermillion Cliffs.
The development, situated along the Colorado River at the northern
end of the newly created Marble Canyon National Monument, consists
of a motel, a store, a service station and a marina alongside the river
and a 28-unit public campground on a bluff nearby. The campground
is operated by the National Park Service, and is complete with roofed
shelters, tables, ﬁrepits, trailer turnouts and toilet facilities.66

National Park Service at Lee’s Ferry and Lonely Dell Ranch,
1974-present
The National Park Service consolidated its ownership of Lee’s Ferry and
the Lonely Dell Ranch in 1974 when it acquired the interest of the consortium in
the ranch property. This acquisition resulted in full Federal control of the area. It
is also signiﬁcant as the ﬁrst time since 1909 that both properties had been in the
same ownership.67
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In 1976, in conjunction with the Nation’s bicentennial and in preparation
for rehabilitation work at the property, the Park Service undertook several
examinations of the property. This included an environmental assessment of
improvements to the roads, boat ramps, parking lots, and proposed raft boarding
jetty. The Park Service issued the assessment in January of 1976. In March the
Park Service forwarded a completed National Register nomination of the Lee’s
Ferry portion of the property to ofﬁcials in Washington, D.C. The National
Register accepted the nomination on May 15, 1976.68
Later in the year, the Park Service contracted with University of Colorado
historian H. Lee Scamehorn to prepare a historic structure report for the combined
property. Scamehorn completed his report in August of 1976. The Scamehorn
report is valuable for its detailed analysis of events leading to the purchase of the
property from the consortium. However, the report’s description of buildings at
the Lonely Dell Ranch portion of the property contained several errors. These
errors were repeated in later works. Scamehorn noted that questions have been
raised about the authenticity of the claims that buildings on the ranch were
constructed by Lee, but he did not offer a deﬁnitive conclusion.69
The historic structure report paved the way for Park Service improvements
to the property in 1976-1977. Additional rehabilitation work took place in 1983
and 1984. In 1986 the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit of the National Park
Service began investigations of the Spencer mining era historic features at Lee’s
Ferry.70
The project resulted in a report published in 1987 that documented both
the vessel and the mining remains. While the report is an excellent and detailed
account of the Spencer operation, the authors noted that “much of the physical
evidence of an important chapter in regional history was removed with the
structures” during the 1967 destruction of the Spencer buildings by the USGS.71
The historical evaluation program of the 1990s ended with the completion
of a revised National Register of Historic Places nomination in July of 1997.
Prepared under the direction of Ann Hubber of Historical Research Associates in
Missoula, Montana, the 1997 nomination was an attempt to reorganize and correct
the two previous National Register nominations, completed in 1976 for Lee’s
Ferry and in 1978 for the Lonely Dell Ranch.72
Today, visitors to Lee’s Ferry are struck with the isolation and desolation
of the area. While a thin veneer of civilization has been applied in the form of
improved roads and tourist facilities, even those who arrive in modern motor
homes and automobiles recognize the sacriﬁce made by the pioneers who arrived
in wagons to cross the mighty Colorado. The buildings that remain at Lee’s
Ferry and the Lonely Dell Ranch offer mute testimony to that earlier era, an era
in which pioneers and settlers clung closely to life at this crucial transportation
outpost. Above all, visitors are reminded that it is the Colorado River that
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made Lee’s Ferry such a needed link in the development of Arizona. The river
today still retains some degree of its menacing quality, captured in the words of
historian Sharlot Hall during her 1911 visit:
This wild river takes its toll every few months; the very waves as they
pass look ﬁerce and tameless and hungry…It was this same wild current
that Father Escalante feared to cross in 1776; he turned back after
coming down and riding into the river twice. I don’t blame him. Death
sits mighty close to the bank here.73

Established as a refuge from Federal authorities for exile John D. Lee,
Lee’s Ferry is now the physical and spiritual center of the Federal contribution
to western water history. As scholars look back on the centennial of the Bureau
of Reclamation, an examination of the history of Lee’s Ferry and the turf battle
between the Bureau and the USGS over the future development of the Colorado
River gives us a better understanding of the mission of the two agencies. The past
activity at Lee’s Ferry provides a valuable perspective for westerners concerned
with the next hundred years of water history.
Dr. Douglas E. Kupel works for the City of Phoenix Law Department where
he does research in support of water rights and environmental litigation. He
is the author of Fuel for Growth: Water and Arizona’s Urban Environment
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2003.), and he is active in the history
community as a speaker and program participant.
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Memoirs of a Bureau Curmudgeon: Unabridged
Version—Politically Incorrect
By:
Thomas J. Aiken
A book has been written and Hollywood has made a movie about a
family’s history where central to the story is the reverence a father and his sons
have for ﬂy ﬁshing in a western river. It is titled, A River Runs Through It. I grew
up during the ﬁfties and my father and I held the same reverence for ﬂy ﬁshing on
the Gunnison River in Western Colorado. Our personal paradise extended from
the western edge of the Gunnison River Canyon near the mouth of Steuben Creek
to the bridge that led to Iola, which I think was a remnant of a coaling station for
the old narrow gauge railroad long since abandoned. The River was lined with
tall willow and cottonwood trees as it meandered through a vast hay meadow.
Rifﬂes were full of rainbow trout and slow deep holes were full of lunker German
browns just waiting for the perfect presentation of a white winged royal coachman
or ginger quill dry ﬂy. The rolling river and the willow brush and grasses on the
bank created an aroma that was intoxicating, I could not imagine anything more
wondrous or beautiful, there was no place else on earth I would rather be.
Then something terrible happened. This paradise began to fall to the
woodman’s axe in 1960 as a government agency cleared the area for a large
reservoir. Reservoir? What kind of no account ﬁshing would that be? Flat
water—oh, puleeze! I was to learn that this diabolical agency’s name was the
Bureau of Reclamation. What did that mean? Reclamation of what? It was
destroying paradise, not reclaiming it! It was an outrage! I vowed that some how,
some way, some day, I would even the score.
As a business major at Colorado State University (CSU) a few years
later, I was in need of another economics class. Without any conscious thought
I found myself in “Water Resource Economics E-201.” At the bookstore I recall
thumbing through the book recommended for the course and there before my very
eyes was that despicable name once again “Bureau of Reclamation.” What have
I done? Now I have to spend three months reading about the “Bureau of Wreck
the Nation”! But wait just a minute, on second thought, this might be good.
Better to know something about the despoiler than remain ignorant of it and its
evil ways. While I did gain some knowledge of the importance of this agency to
the economic growth and well being of the Western United States, not to mention
how to calculate a beneﬁt cost ratio, I could not begin to forgive it nor think kind
thoughts about it.
After college and a stint in the Army, I was back home in Colorado
Springs working as an accountant for the City Utilities, but looking for a better
job, one offering more challenge and excitement (okay one offering more pay and
earlier retirement). I took the old Federal Service Entrance Exam one cold spring
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day and later found my scores were high enough to qualify me for employment at
the GS-5 and GS-7 levels. I sat back waiting for the job offers to roll in. I waited
and waited and waited, ﬁnally giving up, concluding a Federal job was not in
my future (believe it or not, in those days a Federal job was a coveted prize and
people respected Federal employees). Then one late summer day (a dog day of
August as it were), three job offers arrived in the mail. How exciting! Ripping
into the envelopes, the ﬁrst offer was for a GS-5 in the Army Material Command,
Texarkana, Texas (yeah right!—Army—Texarkana???), the next was for a GS-5
with the National Park Service in the Grand Canyon (Hmm …), the last was, oh
no!…a thousand times no! … the enemy, despoiler of paradise, the disgusting
Bureau of Reclamation. But wait, what is this? … a GS-7? … in Denver? … a
few miles north …Hmm … My practical intuitions were kicking in. It was more
money and since in those days the government did not pay for your ﬁrst move, it
would cost less to move to Denver than say the Grand Canyon (where do you live
at anyway in Grand Canyon? … a lodge miles from anywhere? … a rickety cabin
on the edge of the canyon?).
The interview took place in
an ofﬁce on the fourteenth ﬂoor of
a brand new fourteen story gray
concrete building west of Denver,
the one that still sticks out like a
sore thumb. Bill Schlichting and
Dale Raitt, the two Branch Chiefs
in the Program Coordination
Division, conducted the interview.
Expecting heinous ogres I was
on my best defenses, but hey,
these were regular, normal guys!
(Well, Raitt was an engineer …).
Anyway, the job was for a budget
analyst reporting to Schlichting.
It seemed like something I could
handle. Besides, I reasoned
30.1. Building 67 on the Denver Federal
that once inside I could seek my
Center was completed about the same time that revenge. I really, really wanted
Tom Aiken reported to work at the Bureau of
that job now!
Reclamation.
The call from Schlichting came early in September. The job was mine and
Bill’s question to me was when could I report? I quickly thought—two weeks
notice to the City Utilities and, most importantly, a week for my dad and I to
make our annual fall trip to the mighty Gunnison. Yes, paradise was lost, but we
had found another location upstream at a collection of rustic cabins called Sleepy
Hollow. It wasn’t the same, but it wasn’t bad, and the ﬁshing was good. We
could not bear nor force ourselves to even drive down to see paradise lost, now
lying under a body of ﬂat water called Blue Mesa Reservoir.
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On October 2, 1967, I embarked on a career that I didn’t comprehend for
one minute would span more than one third of Reclamation’s ﬁrst one hundred
years of history. Throughout those many years (that moved far too quickly), I’ve
been excited, bored, frustrated, angry, happy, satisﬁed, dissatisﬁed, but most of all,
continually mesmerized by the day to day happenings of the United States Bureau
of Reclamation. The following is an account of the names, places and events as
I recollect and interpret them to be. Whether history agrees or not doesn’t really
matter to me, this is how I saw it and lived it. I use “Reclamation” and “The
Bureau” interchangeably because I always have and at my advanced age, I feel
I’m entitled.
If I could have scripted my career, I could not have arranged for a greater
start or ﬁrst boss than Bill Schlichting. He was one of the most honorable and
forthright people I have ever met, and he had a genuine interest in getting me
off on the right path in Reclamation. He remained a very good friend until
his untimely death. I was the new kid on the block in an ofﬁce of ﬁve budget
analysts. In addition to Bill, there was Rudy Mezner, Bob Cope and Tom
Bumgartner. The rest of the Program Coordination Division, located on the other
side of Division Chief George Powell’s ofﬁce, were the program analysts; Dale
Raitt, Bill Hilmes, J. R. Smith, Harry Menzel, John Childress, Jim Moomaw,
Denby Peeples, and Bill Wiley to name a few. As I mentioned, the ofﬁces were
in the top ﬂoor of the new building, the ﬂoors were shiny tile, carpeting was
only allowed on “Mahogany Row” (top management), the desks were gray
steel and only the big cheeses had ofﬁces, the rest of us were in an open bullpen
arrangement–probably accounting for my total lack of sympathy for those later in
my career who bemoaned the onset of systems furniture and cubicles as opposed
to walled ofﬁces. As an interesting aside, Congress authorized and appropriated
$6 million to The Bureau to construct this new building. After moving in,
someone (no doubt a Harvard grad) decided Reclamation should turn it over to
the General Services Administration (GSA) to manage. GSA promptly began to
charge The Bureau $2 million annual rent. This may explain why Harvard has
more prestige than CSU because I haven’t yet ﬁgured out why this was good
for the taxpayers or the farmers and power customers who repay most of what
Reclamation spends.
Mezner, Cope, Bumgartner, and particularly Wiley were the ﬁrst bonaﬁde
curmudgeons I met in The Bureau (a curmudgeon is an irascible cantankerous
old goat who has tremendous knowledge about the organization, who gets very
irritated at those who only think they know everything and who will be damned
if they will share this knowledge unless you pay proper homage and appreciate
that knowledge). In all of my experience, I have never seen a more concentrated
collection of curmudgeons and reprobates in one location. But they were just
as critical to my early education as was the formal and “on the job” training
Schlichting was providing.
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I didn’t, of course, recognize it then, but it was the last of the “glory years”
of Reclamation. We were truly the shining knights on the white horses. We
walked with a swagger that would make John Wayne proud (stone-cold Steve
Austin for those too young to remember John Wayne). Our constituency, the
water and power users, loved us as we kept providing them with bigger and better
facilities. We kept spreading the cost of these facilities over more and more years.
Water and power were cheap and plentiful. All was right with the world. A new
kid on the block could not be in a more central and advantageous place for an
education than in the budget shop, wedged in “Mahogany Row” on the fourteenth
ﬂoor of the most respected engineering organization in the world, bar none.
As I embarked on this government career, my only source of knowledge
about government was the tidbit that stuck in my pea brain from Mr. Heidtsmith’s
9th grade Civics class at good ol’ North Junior High School in Colorado
Springs. I remembered there were three branches of government, the executive,
legislative, and judicial. Further, there were two Senators from each State and
a bunch of Congressmen and they made up the legislative branch who made up
the laws. The President was the executive and he had a bunch of people helping
him called the Cabinet and they carried out the laws and ran the government.
Finally, there was a bunch of judges called the Supreme Court who interpreted
the Constitution and laws. Pretty good, huh! Well, soon enough I learned that
things aren’t exactly as they are laid out by academia. There is a dynamic called
politics that tends to shape, warp, and distort. This is something that has been and
will continue to be a tremendous inﬂuential force on the policy and day to day
activities of Reclamation. In those days The Bureau seemed to me to be more
of an agency of the Legislative Branch than of the Executive Branch. I learned
the names of the powerful water bloc in Congress—Senators Carl Hayden and
Alan Bible and Congressmen Wayne Aspinall, “Bizz” Johnson, Berne Sisk,
and John Moss, long before I knew
who the Secretary of the Interior was.
Commissioner Floyd Dominy seemed
way more dialed into the powerful
Congressional water bloc than he
was anyone in the Executive Branch,
particularly Interior Secretary Stuart Udall.
The ﬁrst Secretary I actually met was
Rogers Morton. One day, unannounced, he
walked into our ofﬁce and shook my hand.
I was stunned. First of all that it happened
to a lowly new kid on the block (my desk
being nearest the door might have had
something to do with it) and secondly by
the size of his hand, it engulfed mine and
made all two hundred and twenty pounds of 30.2. Official Portrait of Secretary of
the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton.
me feel downright dainty, it was one huge
hand! I have since met and shook hands
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with every Interior Secretary until Bruce Babbitt, who ironically has held the
ofﬁce longest. Our paths just never crossed.
Those were heady days, days of bigger than life people conceiving
bigger than life projects—the world’s largest double curved thin arch dam, the
California undersea aqueduct (taking fresh water entering San Francisco Bay and
piping it undersea to Los Angeles) controlling the very weather itself, Project
Skywater—to name just a few. Floyd Dominy was the Commissioner and was,
in fact, a legend in his own time. Enough has been written about his prowess
and importance to The Bureau on the political front. Equally important and
in some sense more important was the person overseeing the technical front,
Chief Engineer Barney Bellport. One day very soon after I started my career,
happenstance found me getting on the elevator after lunch—followed by (gulp!)
“Mahogany Row.” I watched Bellport, his deputy Harold Arthur, Jack Hilf,
overseer of design and construction, and Hank Halliday the business manager
step in behind me. My instinct was to bolt out and catch another elevator—too
late the door had closed. By the time we reached the fourteenth ﬂoor, there was
absolutely no doubt in my mind as to who was in charge. Bellport was mightily
displeased with those present and spent the entire ride climbing up one side and
down the other of their collective frame. I wanted to disappear into thin air, turn
into a bug and crawl out, become invisible, be anywhere but there. In reality,
my presence was probably only noticed by me. Participative management and
employee input were concepts whose time had not yet come.
In simplest of terms, the function, budget and organization of The Bureau
followed a very logical process in those days. Projects were conceived, triggering
a planning process that took the idea through a reconnaissance investigation,
appraisal study and, in the early days, a basin survey. This early work was
done by planning ofﬁces that were funded through the General Investigation
appropriation. Generally, the next step would be to provide this information
to the Congress, and if they authorized the project, a Feasibility and Deﬁniteplan Report were prepared and construction was started with the funding of the
Construction and Rehabilitation appropriation. At completion of construction,
the project was brought on line and an operation and maintenance ofﬁce was set
up. All future funding would then be through the Operation and Maintenance
appropriation. It was interesting that funds for the General Investigation and
Construction and Rehabilitation appropriations were much easier to come by
than for the Operation and Maintenance appropriation. Why? Politics. The local
Congressman could brag to his/her constituency about this new project he/she is
delivering to them. There isn’t much glamour or glitz in maintaining something
that already exists. Ho hum.
Working in the budget shop in the Chief Engineer’s ofﬁce allowed me
to see and learn about virtually every thing that was going on in The Bureau,
something that paid off in later years as I left new kid status and gained rising
star status moving up the food chain to bigger and better jobs. One issue that
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became more and more apparent to me was that the Chief Engineer’s ofﬁce was
over staffed even considering the large workload. This was, of course, no secret
to most, but it certainly wasn’t discussed by the curmudgeons gathered at the
coffee urn every morning as they whined about their condition in life and longed
for the good old days. Being the outspoken and inquiring minded person I’ve
always been (smart aleck), I once asked my curmudgeon educators, “If you are
so miserable, why don’t you retire?” Ashen silent faces, the new kid had uttered
the forbidden “R” word. That part of my education soon enough dried up. What
was happening, however, was The Bureau was starting to feel a pinch brought on
by a once incredibly large staff resulting from the post World War II repatriation
program (provide jobs for the returning GIs) and a more scrutinized budget,
ironically because of the ongoing Vietnam War. Thus, the stage was set for a
deﬁning moment in my career and the decade that changed Reclamation forever.
By the early 1970s things were becoming more and more clear to me. In
spite of the tremendous knowledge about The Bureau working on the budget
afforded me, it was becoming routine and boring. Every year same old thing
just different numbers. The bread and butter part of my duties was to put out a
monthly budget summary report to the Commissioner’s ofﬁce and to put together
another quarter inch thick budget report for all the big and medium cheeses in
the Denver ofﬁce. Once, while on a detail to the Commissioner’s ofﬁce (getting
all of $8 a day per diem), I looked into what happened to the report I sent back
there each and every month. What I found didn’t surprise me. The budget
secretary received it and ﬁled it, nobody used or even looked at it. I related this to
Schlichting and asked if I could prepare it but not send it for a couple of months
to see if anyone noticed. He agreed. We never heard a word, not even from the
secretary. I quit preparing it. A unique survey method came to my mind for the
other report. I would occasionally selectively slip an interesting article from the
pages of Playboy into one or two of the reports sent to the medium cheeses whom
I suspected might discretely enjoy reading. I never heard a single comment and,
believe me, some of the articles were really interesting, not to mention really
big. My conclusion was that this report got limited review. I never related this to
Schlichting and continued to crank out the report. Now, I would not recommend
this survey method today, but if someone is so inspired, I would strongly suggest
articles from Field and Stream magazine. Many things were swirling in my
head, the curmudgeons who were eligible to retire had no intention to do so,
thus slowing any advancement possibilities, the most important aspect of my job
was of little interest to anyone, and intuition told me that those denizens I saw
scuttling to and fro in the hallways carrying stacks and stacks of computer punch
cards would soon enough ﬁgure out how to replace me, my one hundred key
Marchant calculator (WWII surplus), and ten key adding machine (Korean War
surplus). Where did Personnel keep the vacancy announcements?
Before moving on, it would be ﬁtting to show the character of some of
the aforementioned curmudgeons. I’ll start with Rudy Mezner. Rudy was one
of those people who was a lot older than they look. He had worked for The
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Bureau since long before WWII and his deﬁning characteristic was his dapper
look. Rudy was about 5’ 5” and always dressed in various tailored pin striped
suits with monogrammed shirts and a fedora, something on the order of a James
Cagney gangster. In those days everyone wore coat and tie, but most came
out of the Sears catalog or the rack at J. C. Penney’s—government pay being
what it was (is?). Bob Cope and Tom Bumgartner were WWII vets with stories
to tell. Bob was on a mine sweeper that sank outside San Francisco Bay, and
Tom was a bombardier on a B-17 stationed in England. Bill Wiley was a gruff
old codger with a black patch over one eye, I pretty much steered clear of him.
Denby Peeples was one of the more interesting of the bunch. He was probably
at or near seventy years old and as one of the senior analysts, he had a coveted,
newfangled, mechanical Friden calculator. Somehow, Denby had ﬁgured out the
right combination of numbers and the right formula that when he triggered the
calculation, the Friden churned out a tune one could dance to. John Childress was
a pipe smoker who started more than one ﬁre in waste baskets with his discarded
match. Bill Hilmes kept the ﬁre extinguisher between their desks. Bizarre folks
were all around the building. The curmudgeons used to talk about one of the
engineers who dyed his hair with shoe polish or lamp black. I was later to bear
witness to this fact when one rainy day I was on a crowded elevator standing
directly behind this person, watching inky black rivulets ﬂowing off the back of
his head and down his erstwhile white collar. There was another gent who wore
fuzzy earmuffs because he didn’t like sound when he worked. I ought to write a
book about the characters I’ve run across in The Bureau.
Ed Hawk, perhaps the most notorious and mysterious of all the
curmudgeons deserves his own paragraph. Even though I never met Ed, it was
obvious that he carried considerable weight, because I saw his name in several
letters as head of various committees—the Ed Hawk Committee. I was later to
learn that Ed was a ﬁgment created by that now piece of Americana called the
Steno-Pool. In those days most of the correspondence was dictated on recording
machines and sent to the pool for typing. Ed’s real name was “ad hoc.” In
retrospect, it was amazing how many letters were surnamed and signed without
being read. Another piece of correspondence that was signed and sent out made
reference to “the source of the scriptures.” What the author intended to say was
“thesaurus of descriptors.” The letter made for some interesting reading.
One more side track and I promise to move on. Earlier I alluded to the
$8 daily per diem, let me explain. In those days the bureaucracy was incredibly
miserly. The per diem rates were on a sliding scale that reduced the amount
allowed the longer you were in detail status. I don’t remember exactly what
the rates were when I started that particular detail in Washington, probably
around $20, but I do remember the $8 I was paid during the last couple of weeks
of this training detail in the Commissioner’s Ofﬁce. I stayed in the old Park
Central Hotel, it was closest to the Interior building and, for D.C., the rates were
reasonable (something in the range of $20). Old timers reading this may recall
the Park Central. After the ﬁrst couple weeks you were on ﬁrst name basis with
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the mice and roaches that shared your room. There was no air conditioning, but
the window did open. Mine had a nice view of a dirty brick wall about ten feet
away. The risk you ran opening the window was letting the rats in with the cooler
air. My mice and roach friends did not appreciate sharing the room with rats, so I
left the window closed most of the time. Another point to be made on the miserly
scale had to do with vehicles. In those days government vehicles were strictly no
frills; no radio, no air conditioning. A motor, four wheels and a steering wheel
was about it. It wasn’t until the ‘70s that radios and air conditioning started to
show up on vehicles.
In 1972 a GS-12 Administrative Ofﬁcer position in the Durango Planning
Ofﬁce was advertised. Max Stodolski, a friend of mine, had just recently
transferred there and a quick call to him convinced me to apply. When I went
for the interview with Project Manager Ed Wiscombe, I was armed with budget
knowledge of the projects they were studying: San Miguel, Dolores, Paradox
Valley, and Animas-La Plata. It must have helped because Ed offered me the job.
I reported to Durango, Colorado, in September. My star was on the rise. As a
footnote, I should mention my Denver job was abolished after I left (keep track
of this). While I was still back in Denver, I was vaguely aware of a law that had
recently been passed called the National Environmental Policy Act which meant
little to me at the time, but in Durango it was brought up in conversations in staff
meeting on a regular basis. It didn’t appear to me, or many others at the time, that
it was that big a deal. A few more papers to prepare and ﬁle. Other events that
didn’t seem terribly signiﬁcant at the time were also occurring. Ellis Armstrong
became Commissioner, and according to the curmudgeons, there was bad blood
between him and Bellport. Bellport retired, moved to California and hung out
his consultant’s shingle. The Chief Engineer’s ofﬁce became the Engineering
and Research Center (ERC) and Harold Arthur assumed the helm. Soon after,
Arthur named Donald Duck as his deputy. I kid you not. Donald was married to
Dolores and, to my knowledge, they did not have nephews named Huey, Dewey
or Louie. Shortly after my arrival in Durango, the ERC was in the middle of a
reorganization that saw the ﬁrst postwar brain drain as its numbers were reduced.
Many of the curmudgeons could no longer not think about nor not utter the “R”
word. Many reluctantly embraced it. On another front, the members of the
water bloc in Congress began to retire or lose elections and our legislative power
base began to erode. In 1973 another law was passed that caused the planners
to scratch their heads, it was called the Endangered Species Act. What did it
mean? How does it relate to that other law? What does it mean consult with the
Secretary? Sounds like more paperwork—job security for the planners.
At this point I have to digress to tell you about one man’s hog heaven.
The Animas River ﬂows right through Durango, it looks to be a clone of the
Gunnison AND the then State record German brown trout had been caught under
the Main Street bridge. With nostrils ﬂared and ﬂy rod in hand I began to ﬁsh and
catch ﬁsh—all the while eyeing the prime stretch south of town. I was aware I
was looking at the Southern Ute Indian Reservation lands, and since I never saw
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anyone ﬁshing there, I assumed it was not allowed. Imagine my elation when I
found out that for ﬁve bucks you could get an annual reservation pass, imagine
further my pure bliss that, for reasons I never ﬁgured out, nobody did. I was truly
in hog heaven for the two years I lived in Durango. For all intents and purposes
I had a private ﬁshing preserve for a measly ﬁve bucks! The ﬁshing was the best
I have ever experienced and I never saw another living being, except my dad
and a few deer, the whole time I ﬁshed there. Hog heaven was to last only two
years, however. In the fall of 1974 a decision was reached to consolidate the
Durango and Grand Junction ofﬁces. My position was to be abolished and I was
to be transferred to Grand Junction as the Budget Ofﬁcer—Enos Stone was the
Administrative Ofﬁcer there and he had about thirty years seniority on me.
Where did we keep the vacancy announcements?
One more story, if it survives the editors cut. While in Durango, I was
driving a senior Reclamation manager for a visit to Navajo Dam to investigate a
pesky leak that had developed in the abutment. He was a rotund and stoic man of
little humor and few words. As we started to leave for the drive back, he shouted
“STOP!” Startled to hear his voice, I slammed on the brakes and watched him
slide forward to become tightly wedged between the seat and the dash. As he
dropped off the seat, he … ah … broke wind with a sonic resonance that would
make an Arabian stallion proud. I ran around, opened his door and tugged on his
shoulders until he popped out and landed on the berm of the road. With all the
dignity he could muster, he stood up, picked up his sunglasses from the ﬂoor (the
reason he wanted me to stop in the ﬁrst place) and got back in the car. I had my
upper lip clenched tightly between my teeth to maintain composure on the long
drive back.
Timing and, in the case of rising stars, contacts and mentors are
everything. A GS-13 Administrative Ofﬁcer position was open in Auburn,
California, at the construction ofﬁce for what was to be the world’s largest double
curvature thin arch dam. I called two people I knew from Denver who were now
in the Sacramento Mid-Paciﬁc regional ofﬁce, Paul Olbert and Hank Masterson.
Paul was the Assistant Regional Director for Administration and Hank was a
branch chief in Personnel; they both suggested I apply. The interview took
place with Project Construction Engineer Don Alexander and, still armed with
the knowledge about Auburn Dam I had gained in the budget ofﬁce, I was able
to convince him that I was the man for the job—I suspect with some help from
Olbert and Masterson. I reported for duty the week between Christmas and New
Years in 1974. What a contrast with the genteel and studious ways of a planning
ofﬁce. I was now in the world of clod kicking, hard hat wearing he-men smoking
cigars the size of which would downright impress a Presidential Intern. Gaylord
Hay was the soft-spoken Ofﬁce Engineer, Rod Somerday was the outspoken Field
Engineer, and Lou Frei was the ranting Project Geologist. One of the interesting
things to observe was the jockeying for position between Lou and Rod to be the
“daddy rabbit” for construction operations. Many Auburn employees went on to
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hold important jobs in The Bureau, mainly in Denver and on the Central Arizona
Project.
Auburn Dam’s Environmental Impact Statement was one of the ﬁrst
prepared and the ﬁrst challenged for adequacy. After a rewrite, a judge declared
it adequate and, in 1974, work on the massive foundation began. In August 1975
an earthquake occurred some forty or ﬁfty miles north of Auburn that brought into
question the seismic safety of the dam being built. A massive seismic/geological
investigation began. Then, less than one year later, the deﬁning moment for The
Bureau occurred in Idaho at about 7:45 A.M. June 5, 1976, when a survey party
noticed a small leak near the right abutment of a newly constructed dam on the
Teton River. By noon the crest had collapsed and the embankment was breached.
Reclamation’s swagger turned into a stagger, and we started to second guess
ourselves on everything, including Auburn Dam. Our conﬁdence was rocked.
To compound the Auburn situation, President Carter, soon after coming to ofﬁce,
listed Auburn on his “Hit List” of water projects he felt were unneeded. Further
construction contracts were put on hold. Hit lists, seismic investigations, no new
contracts—where are the vacancy announcements?
I should mention that the 1976 Carter/Ford presidential campaign was
the ﬁrst in my memory (and the ﬁrst of many to come) where the candidates
openly attacked the bureaucracy, in many instances placing blame for the woes
of the world on the Federal employee’s back and painting us as underworked
and overpaid slow moving sloths. We unfairly lost prestige that we have never
recovered. The Carter Administration was the ﬁrst in my experience to place
a pure political appointee with no prior Reclamation experience in the role of
Commissioner, the former State Engineer in Idaho, Keith Higginson. Although
it only lasted the length of his Administration, Carter also gave us a new name,
“Water and Power Resources Service” which to me made eminent sense then and
now as being a more contemporary, descriptive name for Reclamation–unless
anyone wants to argue that we are reclaiming the environment from the family
farm (is that a snicker I hear?). One other thing Carter did that has had a role in
reshaping The Bureau was to form the Department of Energy (DOE) and transfer
the power distribution and marketing function from Reclamation to the newly
formed Western Area Power Administration. What were regional divisions
under Reclamation became virtual dynasties with ﬁefdoms spread far and wide
under DOE. Many in Congress continue to question the wisdom of that action.
Commissioner Higginson began the shift in Reclamation’s public policy by
placing more emphasis on environmental protection, economic justiﬁcation and
dam safety. Auburn survived the “Hit List,” but Carter did not survive his bid for
reelection. Some say his attempt to eliminate or curtail the Congressional pork
barrel system (Hit List) undermined the effectiveness of his Presidency. At any
rate, as the Carter Administration left ofﬁce they declared that a safe dam could
be built at Auburn, but no new construction contracts were to be let until new ﬂow
standards on the lower American River were addressed.
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The Mid-Paciﬁc Region GS-14 Program Coordination Division Chief’s
vacancy announcement hit the streets in the fall of 1978. The position reported
to Paul Olbert and I was concerned that all the times I called him a blithering
idiot when we argued over administrative matters would haunt me. He must
have agreed that he was a blithering idiot or he appreciated someone who stood
his ground in an argument because I began my new duties right after Christmas.
My old job at Auburn was abolished (you’re probably catching onto this). In this
new job, I was once removed from a Bureau legend that had held the Program
Coordination job for many years prior. Remember the story of meeting Rogers
Morton when I was a new kid? At about the same time another individual walked
into the old budget shop. He was wearing a fedora and a trench coat and my
reaction wasn“Wow, the Godfather!”. I nearly fell out of my chair when he shook
my hand and said “Hi! I’m Mike Catino from Sacramento.” Mike went on to be
the Regional Director in Sacramento and a lot of us affectionately referred to him
as the Godfather.
In those days the Program Coordination Chiefs had status in Reclamation
and held one of the most powerful positions in their Regions. We met formally
as a group at least four times a year, twice with the Commissioner and all the
Regional Directors. We also had a close camaraderie that served The Bureau
well. Managing the budget was handled on the phone. If we had surplus funds,
I would call Gordon Wendler in Denver or Que Quigley in Boise and move the
money around. Conversely, if we had a short fall, a quick call to Dwayne Wynia
in Amarillo or Darrel Hogg in Salt Lake City would usually bear fruit. When all
else failed, a call to Chuck Lewis in Boulder City would always save the day,
simply because he had the Central Arizona Project construction budget under
his purview (big bucks). Of course once Mid-Paciﬁc Region’s own San Felipe
Project got underway, Bill Klostermeyer, The Bureau’s Program and Budget guru
in the Commissioner’s Ofﬁce, referred to me as the “CEO of the First National
Bank of San Felipe.” We seemed to always have surplus money thanks to the
local beneﬁciaries continually getting Congressional write-ins added to the
budget, even when we didn’t need it. This “green eyeshade” team received many
kudos from the Department of the Interior and the Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget (OMB) for budget presentation and performance over the years.
Billy Martin was the Regional Director at the time I went to the Region
and he was perhaps the most pragmatic Regional Director I have worked for.
To illustrate, Billy assigned me to represent the Region before the California
Water Commission whenever he was invited to one of their meetings. Those
were the days of Governor Jerry “Moonbeam” Brown, and to get a clue as to the
makeup of the Commission, I refer you to pages 350 and 351 of the September
1977, edition of the National Geographic. The lady living in the tree house on
a redwood stump was a member of the Commission. I’m dead serious and if
you cannot ﬁnd the issue, I do have a copy. Needless to say, defending water
projects to this group was a character builder. Many who attended the public
meetings of the Commission had an aura of burnt rope and rancid bacon grease
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about them. As this group railed against dams and canals and subsidized water
to farmers, I wondered if it occurred to them where bacon came from or, for
that matter, what they could personally do with a little water? I feel that, to a
large degree, subsidized water for farms occurred because the early estimates
on farmers’ ability to repay were overly optimistic and later it helped preserve
the small family farmer suffering in the Great Depression on their 160 acres.
But, it is important to remember that affordable water for family farmers was a
public value of the time. In later years corporate (albeit sometimes disguised)
farms were becoming the rule. The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 was passed
ostensibly to recognize their existence and to begin to address the subsidized
water issue through higher prices for water on excess acreage (something the Act
also increased was the acreage that could receive water from 160 acres to
960 acres). Existing long terms (40 years) contracts were a shield around most
of the subsidy. However, as these contracts reached their term, new contracts
were written to address subsidies.
Throughout this era, The Bureau fought the good ﬁght to keep Auburn
Dam on track. The beneﬁciaries of the project were behind us all the way
shouting words of encouragement. Those of us in The Bureau were encouraged
when the Carter administration declared a safe dam could be built at Auburn,
and we had every conﬁdence in the world when the Reagan administration took
ofﬁce that we would complete the project. Reagan gave Auburn a tentative
green light, but insisted on up front cost sharing by the beneﬁciaries. Not a
problem, we thought, until we turned around to ﬁnd that our supporters knees
had turned to jelly in the face of this new bully. Auburn Dam is still in a state
of suspended animation and water supply contracts written in anticipation of the
yield from Auburn have compounded Reclamation’s inability to meet obligations
for water throughout the CVP. There are more and more Reclamation projects
where enhanced cost sharing has been negotiated; parts of the Central Arizona
Project, the Buffalo Bill Modiﬁcation Project and the Shasta Temperature Control
Device come to mind. Also, power users have begun to fund more power related
maintenance items on Reclamation powerplants.
The Reagan Administration gave The Bureau its ﬁrst pharmacist as
Commissioner— Robert (Bob) Broadbent. In actuality he was a respected
politician from Las Vegas who soon gave the Mid-Paciﬁc Region its ﬁrst
politically oriented and youngest regional director, David Houston. Dave was
unquestionably one of the brightest individuals I have ever met. I can remember
more than once brieﬁng him on an issue totally new to him while walking down
the hall to a meeting, and as the meeting took place he knew more about the topic
than I did. In 1984, my friend and mentor, Paul Olbert retired, leaving open the
Assistant Regional Director for Administration job. I applied for the position and
Dave picked me. You are probably way ahead of me on this by now, but a few
years after I left the Program Coordination position, it was abolished.
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The decade of the ‘80s saw two major realignments of The Bureau.
Regions were consolidated from the original seven, which incidentally were
referred to by number when I ﬁrst started, to ﬁve. In 1985 the Lower Missouri
Region (Region 7 to curmudgeons) was consolidated with the Upper Missouri
Region (Region 6). Later, in 1988, most of the Southwest Region (Region 5) was
folded into the aforementioned region to create the vast Great Plains Region. A
small piece of the Southwest Region was added to the Upper Colorado Region
(Region 4). Rumors persisted for some time that Mid-Paciﬁc Region (Region
2) and the Paciﬁc Northwest Region (Region 1) would be combined and that
the Lower Colorado Region (Region 3) would join the Upper Colorado Region.
Neither rumor has panned out—at least not yet. Now, having said all of that, the
change from numbers to names, I suppose, was because names were more lyrical
and prettier sounding than numbers. Curiously, bureaucrats being bureaucrats,
we’re not satisﬁed until we’ve assigned everything an acronym, we now refer to
the regions by letters; GP, MP, UC, LC, PN. Alas . . .
With notable exceptions like the massive Central Arizona Project, and a
few smaller projects like Dolores, Paradox Valley and Dallas Creek in Colorado,
and San Felipe in California, Reclamation’s construction program was starting to
wane. One by one, The Bureau construction stiffs began to snuff out the cigars
and hang up their hardhats. The exodus in the MP Region was accentuated with
the retirement of Bill Hart who managed construction of the San Felipe Project.
Bill, a genuine curmudgeon, used to show his disdain for things not speciﬁc
to construction by wearing bright red Mickey Mouse socks to Regional Ofﬁce
management meetings. Even I picked up on the social comment. Looking back,
I think the only overarching authorizing legislation we have had since the ‘60s
involving construction was the “Reclamation Safety of Dams Act of 1978.” We
have had a few speciﬁc authorizations like the temperature control device at
Shasta Dam, but the construction heartbeat has become a mere murmur of its
former self. In addition to Auburn, other construction projects were stopped
midway. Construction on the San Luis Drain in California was halted because
of environmental concerns with having the outfall in the Delta. In the interim,
drain water was spread in an area designated as the Kesterson Wildlife Refuge.
An environmental alarm was sounded when three eyed, four legged birds were
found in the refuge, a result of selenium build up from farm drainage. The decade
could be deﬁned as a paper decade as volumes of reports on the environment were
written and, in the second half, a time of self examination for Reclamation.
The transition between the Reagan and Bush administrations, even though
both were Republican, brought on a whole new cast of characters in the politically
appointed positions (which seems to be ever expanding). Let me take a moment
to illustrate what I have observed during these times.
As the loyal campaigners (or donors) are rewarded with appointments
to high-level government jobs, it seems like they all will have stopped at the
nearest shopping mall bookstore and bought the latest management technique du
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jour book—Management by Objectives, Zero-based Budgeting, Total Quality
Management, ad nauseam—as they charge in to show the careerist how they
are going to improve our productivity. Swell. Fittingly, they have unwavering
loyalty to the administration they helped elect, but they often assume (or demand)
the careerist do likewise. It is my experience that except for the chameleon
careerist, most careerists ﬁrst loyalty is with the United States and the agency they
work for, otherwise why be a civil servant? Careerists have their own political
preferences and occasionally have developed good working relationships with
Congressional members and their staffs. I wonder if it occurs to the political
appointee just where some of the occasional really dicey questions they are asked
at congressional hearings come from? Loyalty is a personal thing.
Most political appointees are decent folks with our Nation’s interest at
heart and after a few months in ofﬁce realize that the careerists do actually know
a thing or two about what they are doing and a mutual respect begins to develop.
However, with every Administration there are the political peacocks who never
show respect for the civil servant because, in their minds, they alone hold all
of the answers and the careerists are lower caste drones there simply to do their
bidding. I have noticed with some level of alarm that in recent years more and
more career managers are becoming more and more concerned with “politically
correct” than they are with following the letter of the law and accomplishing good
public policy. I read once, and believe it to be true, that the career civil servant,
the “bureaucracy” if you will, has served as the ballast in the “Ship of State”
that keeps it from swinging too far to the right or to the left every time there is a
change in the Administration. As more and more politically appointed positions
are established further and further down in the hierarchy of an agency the more
wildly the “Ship of State” will veer. I truly believe that the Congress should put
ﬁrm limitations on the number of political appointees to one or two per agency
and eliminate the “burrowing in” efforts of political appointees during changes in
Administrations. One saving grace is that the strutting and crowing of any given
political peacock usually lasts less than twenty-four months and there is always
the chance that they will be replaced by an appointee that can develop a mutual
respect with the careerist.
Now that I’ve wound myself up real tight on politics, I’m going to digress
to tell you about an interesting near miss I had with politics. During my tenure
at the Auburn project, I was befriended by a gentleman by the name of Wendell
Robie. Among other things, Wendell was the driving force behind the Winter
Olympics at Squaw Valley, owned a bank with branches throughout Northern
California, owned a lot of Northern California and was the most powerful
man in the Republican party in Northern California. We became friends while
I was a member of the Lions Club he chartered in the 1930s when I was the
Administrative Ofﬁcer at Auburn Dam where I worked closely with Wendell on
relocating the Western States Trail, another one of his interests. (Allow me an
interesting sidebar in this digression)—Wendell once took me for a ride in his
car to check out possible trail sites along the canyon of the Middle Fork of the
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American River. We wound our way down the canyon wall on a poor excuse
of a single lane mining road at a place called Ruck-a-Chucky. We got to the
bottom of the canyon and stopped at the edge of the water. While I was nervously
pondering how we were going to back all of the way out of this predicament,
Wendell gunned the engine and we plunged into the river! Somehow I stiﬂed
the scream of terror in my throat, drawing courage from Wendell’s nonchalant
demeanor as water began ﬂowing through the ﬂoorboards of his family sedan. We
bounced and drifted and ﬁnally bounded up on the remains of the mining road on
the other side whereupon Wendell opened his door and suggested I do the same
to drain out the part of the river that we had captured during the crossing. When
the color returned to my face, I thought “That was weird.” I was later to learn that
we were just ahead of the pulse ﬂow released daily for power production from the
upstream dams. Apparently Wendell did this frequently and somehow I ﬁgured it
was pointless to ask him why he didn’t own a jeep.
To get me back on the real point of this digression, it was during one of
my many encounters with Wendell that he asked if I wanted a career in politics.
He stated that “they” would get me on the Placer County Board of Supervisors
and then look to the State Assembly and, in time, national politics. This was not
to be taken lightly, because Wendell controlled the GOP in that part of California.
I asked him why Bizz Johnson, a Democrat, held the Fourth Congressional seat.
Wendell smiled and responded that they had an “understanding” and that when the
time was right, he would put his man in. His man was Gene Chappie, a colorful
member of the State Assembly that I had met and came to know. The time was
right very soon after that, and Gene became the next Congressman to represent
the Fourth District. I thought about Wendell’s offer, but ultimately thanked him
and said no.

30.3. C. Dale Duvall while Commissioner of
Reclamation.

In 1987 Commissioner
Dale Duvall asked Reclamation
to examine the direction of its
programs. That examination,
“Assessment ‘87,’” pointed out
the need for water conservation,
improved management of
projects, and the need to address
environmental values. The hiring
of people with biological science
degrees was almost reaching a par
with hiring engineers launching
yet another metamorphosis of
The Bureau. The last decade
of the twentieth century was
kicked off with an initiative of
Commissioner Dennis Underwood
entitled, “The Strategic Plan.” It
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used “Assessment 87” as a base and laid out a new long term “A big picture” for
Reclamation with speciﬁc goals and action plans. The Bureau was beginning to
turn greener and greener as the world was presented with the “Strategic Plan” in
1992. That year also saw the passage of one of the most signiﬁcant laws to affect
and change the course of Reclamation, the “Reclamation Projects Authorization
and Adjustment Act of 1992”. It was a far-reaching law with forty titles
impacting almost all of Reclamation, but nowhere so dramatically as California’s
Central Valley Project with Title XXIV, the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act (CVPIA). The CVPIA assigned environmental protection and restoration a
priority equal to that of water and power deliveries. Implementation of the law
has been a difﬁcult process because it so radically changed a paradigm that had
existed for over a half a century.
In 1993 Regional Director Roger Patterson suggested that I take the
vacant Project Superintendent’s job at Folsom Dam. I at ﬁrst resisted because
it was yet another job at my same grade level (my mentors had long since left
The Bureau and my rising star had long since stalled—I guess the other potential
mentors I had called blithering idiots had taken the words personally), besides,

34.4. Folsom Dam spillway in 1998. The dam is a composite structure with a concrete
spillway and earth wing dams on the American River above Sacramento, California. The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built the dam between 1948 and 1956, but Reclamation
manages the dam in cooperation with the Corps.

the only thing I knew about electricity was that it could shock you (I was later
to learn that a turbine runner was not an Olympian from India). I was aware of,
and Patterson pointed out, that we had some real personnel and administrative
issues at Folsom that needed attention. Additionally, he indicated he was going
to assign more responsibility and consolidate ﬁeld ofﬁces into Area Ofﬁces (ours
became the Central California Area Ofﬁce [CCAO]). Silly me, I thought under
those circumstances there would be a grade raise someday. Alas. Twenty four
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years as a GS-14 must be a record. Am I starting to sound like the coffee urn
curmudgeons of so long ago? Oh well, it was a much better commute; half the
distance, no freeway, dodge deer and count road kill. You probably guessed, but
Patterson abolished the Assistant Regional Director-Administration position. For
those of you who have not kept score, every Bureau job I have held has been
abolished after I’ve left it (I’m sure that is a record). A record that I might share
with a handful of others is that I have worked under ten Commissioners, seven
acting Commissioners and eight Presidents.
Another event occurred in 1993 that impacted all of Federal Government.
It was a vice-presidential initiative to change the way the government works
called the National Performance Review (NPR). “More with less” became the
battle cry to “cut red tape, put customers ﬁrst, empower employees to get results,
and get back to basics” (if you are tempted to say “yada, yada, yada” at this
point, feel free). Commissioner Dan Beard outlined his plan for the Bureau that
ﬂattened management, implemented the Area Ofﬁce concept and to “ …
focus on: operating our projects with greater environmental sensitivity …”
Impacts on staff were felt throughout the organization, but nowhere as severe as
the Denver ofﬁce, which I think by this time was being called the Reclamation
Service Center—I admit I’ve lost track. Its direction was to de-emphasize design
and construction and to provide support to all Reclamation ofﬁces at the lowest
possible cost. The Denver workforce was reduced and realigned accordingly.
A challenge to Denver’s new direction occurred a little after 8:00 A.M.
Monday morning, July 17, 1995. I was at my ofﬁce at Folsom Dam loading my
briefcase for a trip to the Regional Ofﬁce for a round of meetings when Dennis
McComb, our O&M Chief, stuck his head in my ofﬁce and dead panned, “Gate 3
just failed.” My reaction was—“what the hell is he talking about?” He repeated
and still unbelieving, we jumped in a car and headed for the dam. The sight
that unfolded as we came around the bend was
incredible. Water was spewing a hundred feet
in all directions from the center of the dam—I
hope to shout “the gate had failed!” We quickly
assembled a team consisting of experts from
our Denver Ofﬁce, the Corps of Engineers,
McClellen Air Force Base, and California
Department of Transportation, among others to
immediately go to work on ﬁguring out how to
plug the hole and design a long term ﬁx. The
bell had been tolled that Reclamation’s aging
infrastructure is in need of attention. Still,
sufﬁcient budgets to address these problems
have been hard coming. You can see why Area
Managers sometimes feel like Quasimodo trying
34.5. Gate 3 at Folsom Dam
to get Esmeralda’s attention ringing and ringing
after failure July 17, 1995
the bells of Notre Dame.
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The ‘90s saw a renewed effort toward bringing about a more diverse
workforce. In retrospect we have come a far way during my career, albeit
not far enough in the eyes of many. If I could take you back to 1968 and the
curmudgeons at the coffee urn and had I told them then that at that very moment
there was a grammar school girl on Long Island, New York, named Maryanne
Bach who will go on to get an advanced degree in ecology and will become a
Regional Director, or that Felix Cook, the black engineer toiling in the catacombs
of their building, will go on to head the technical side of Reclamation, they would
have looked at me funny and thought to themselves “This poor kid must have
suffered a head wound when he was in Vietnam. … what the hell is ecology?”
I take personal pride in the small level of career help I’ve been able to provide
to some of the women I’ve had the privilege of working with over the years.
Donna Darr was a supply clerk in the Auburn Ofﬁce when we ﬁrst met. She
went on to become Mid-Paciﬁc Region’s most successful liaison ofﬁcer in the
Commissioner’s Ofﬁce. Dee Winn was my secretary and Marcy Turner was a
budget clerk when I became the Program Coordination Chief. By the time I left
the position, both were professional graded budget analysts and Marcy went on to
be a Branch Chief. Susan Hoffman’s career has proceeded from soil scientist to
Mid-Paciﬁc Region’s Planning Ofﬁcer. On the other hand, try as I might, I was
not able to get the grade the CCAO Administrative Ofﬁcer, Joni Ward, deserved.
It is locked in at GS-12. It is particularly a concern because I was a GS-13
Administrative Ofﬁcer at Auburn and my duties were no greater than Joni’s were
when she had the job. Does a glass ceiling exist? Do we have a way to go?
At the turn of the millennium those of us with a part of the CVP were
wrapped up in renewing the long term contracts our users had held for forty years.
The changes brought on by the CVPIA made the process a contentious one. First
of all, the contracts could only be renewed for twenty-ﬁve years. A situation
that made it more difﬁcult for farmers to get long term loans for farm operations.
Additionally, less water was available to the users as more was committed to
environmental restoration. And, of course, the water that would be available
would have a much higher price. It was a blow felt most severely by smaller
family farms and those with marginal lands. The values of the ﬁrst part of the
century, symbolized by the famous picture of the H. J. Mersdorf “Desert-Ranch”
with the sign stating “HAVE FAITH IN GOD AND U.S. RECLAMATION,”
had been reversed by the end of the century. Because of delays in ﬁnalizing the
environmental documentation, interim contracts were negotiated to bridge the
expired contracts and the new long term contracts. The whole process took over
a decade to complete. In the early part of the contract negotiations, I had the
privilege of working with The Bureau’s quintessential curmudgeon, Cliff Quinton.
Cliff was a repayment specialist and the Central California Area Ofﬁce’s chief
negotiator who had a scowl and demeanor that would make a middle linebacker
weak in the knees. He was extremely knowledgeable and was never tripped up in
negotiations. For years after his retirement, I was able to keep contractors in line
with the mere threat of bringing Cliff out of retirement.
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30.6. This image showcasing the Mersdorfs’ hopes is an iconic image to Reclamation.

By and large, John Q. Citizen takes water for granted and why shouldn’t
he? Isn’t it always there when he turns on his tap? Isn’t there abundant food in
the grocery store? Doesn’t the air conditioner kick on when the temperature gets
above 78 degrees? Aren’t all of his favorite golf courses a verdant green? Few
people outside of the industry have a clue as to how complex the water world
is. As the twentieth century rolled into the new millennium, those who read
newspapers and watch the news should have been getting the message that they
better start paying more attention to the many faceted water issue. For example,
story after story has been in the news about the plight of the West Coast salmon.
The ﬁshermen blame the farmers and the dams that supply them, the farmers
say the ﬁshermen are over-harvesting the sea, the environmentalists blame the
loggers, ﬁshermen, and farmers, and they all blame the sea lions. Who is right?
Who is wrong? Is the answer to stop ﬁshing? Put farms out of production? Stop
logging? No, of course not, people still value plentiful food and good homes!
When I ﬁrst started my career, nearly one third of John Q’s disposable income
went for food, today it is more like one tenth. John Q. has grown up without
being hungry or doing without. He is focused on “me” and “now.” More and
more of his dollars are spent on entertainment and “toys.” He apparently isn’t
taking time to think about the long term as his parents and grandparents did. By
his parents ‘and grandparents’ standards, his decisions probably seem downright
goofy. Thus, as Reclamation’s second hundred years begin, the stage is set for
water related decisions that would confound the decisionmakers of one hundred
years ago. One would hope that John Q. will become aware of the water world
and let the elected ofﬁcials know what his values are. As it stands now, John Q.
is complacent to let the special interest or advocacy groups dictate his values for
him while he remains in blissful ignorance. I wonder if John Q. understands that
as we put more and more farms out of production for environmental values, we
become less adaptable to droughts that occur across the nation, and we become
more dependent on foreign food. I wonder further if he understands that our
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growing dependency on foreign foods, in many cases, is leading to massive
environmental destruction as more and more rainforests are leveled to make
farmland. Whether it is triggered by drought, the West Coast salmon, or the
Sandhill Crane in Nebraska, or rolling brownouts throughout the Reclamation
West, the issues with water are basically the same; there are more and more
diverse demands for water, and not everyone’s demands can be met without
impacting someone or something else.
Reclamation attempts to inform John Q, but it wasn=t always so. Prior
to the Teton collapse, The Bureau had a high and mighty self image and public
relations was not much more than simply setting up tours for various facilities.
The public image of Reclamation continued to erode throughout the late ‘70s and
early ‘80s. The late ‘80s and ‘90s saw Reclamation make concerted efforts to at
least respond to negative press and in more and more instances, get ahead of the
media on issues through improved media relationships. Press releases are issued
on all major issues and events and Reclamation managers are being trained in how
to deal with the media. Jeff McCracken, Mid-Paciﬁc Region’s Public Information
Ofﬁcer came to Reclamation with an extensive background in the news industry.
He fostered good relationships with the various editors, reporters, and news
directors by keeping them informed on issues and being forthcoming when they
had questions. Because of this, he was able to successfully guide the Mid-Paciﬁc
Region through some potential public relation disasters. With the public outreach
throughout Reclamation now in place, John Q. has no one to blame but himself
for not being informed on water issues.
As Reclamation steps boldly into it’s second century we have a new
President, a new Secretary of the Interior and a new Commissioner who is one
of us, a person who came up through the ranks, John Keys, former Regional
Director of Paciﬁc Northwest Region and a pretty good college football referee.
For all the curmudgeons, this is a welcome sign; for those who have not worked
for a Commissioner with a Bureau background, they will appreciate the depth of
understanding of their issues from the start.
A few months after this screed
was submitted as part of the Reclamation
History Symposium, our nation was
attacked by terrorists. Here and elsewhere
I have amended my original manuscript.
Uncertainty has become the norm as
Reclamation struggles to protect the very
facilities that the western United States relies
upon for water, food production, power and
ﬂood protection. Much has changed and
more will change in our employees’ daily
lives and how business is conducted. Already 30.7. John W. Keys III as
Commissioner of Reclamation.
armed guards patrol critical infrastructure
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and other security measures have been brought to bear. Security is a new factor
to be budgeted for and executed. Secrecy has entered Reclamation’s world. Yet
politics are still part of the picture. Two events occurred in 1995 that prompted
me to start the ball rolling to get a bridge authorized that would take the public
trafﬁc (over eighteen thousand cars a day) off the top of Folsom Dam. They
were the Oklahoma City bombing and the failure of the spillway gate which
made obvious the vulnerability of Sacramento to a man made ﬂood. At least
six separate security reviews before and after 9/11 indicated that public access
to the top of the dam presents a serious security risk. Duh! At Congressman
Doolittle’s request for data, I had an appraisal level study completed so that he
might use the data to draft a bill to get a bridge authorized. With the events of
9/11, I thought getting the bridge authorized would be a slam dunk—it was such
obvious good public policy. To my great surprise, however, the Department of
the Interior came out in total opposition to the proposed legislation, stating that
it was a local transportation issue. Never mind that Reclamation over the years
allowed the road to become a major artery for two of the fastest growing counties
in the United States. Never mind the many vulnerabilities and danger to the
lives of hundreds of thousands of people immediately downstream that the dam
poses by allowing clear access to the top of all eight spillway gates. How the
political people could keep a straight face and say it is a local transportation issue
is really beyond me. I had arranged for non-Federal cost sharing, but the bill was
written for full Federal funding, which apparently had stuck in somebody in the
Department’s craw. Congress controls the Federal purse strings and if they say
fully Federal, then so be it. The important thing is the safety and security of the
structure and the many people who live in immediate harm’s way; it is simply
good public policy.
To summarize the last third of The Bureau’s history, I would make
reference once again to the shining knight on the white horse. He was still
charging hard in the late ‘60s, but the noble steed was starting to get winded. The
‘70s turned out to be an unexpected low hanging branch that knocked him head
over heels; squarely to the ground. The ‘80s found him staggering in search of
his steed, but a storm of paperwork and environmental problems buried him and
allowed his now dented armor to tarnish and rust. As he laid there, he began to
ponder his place in the world. In the ‘90s, he was propped up and told that the
Water Kingdom has changed, the throne was being shared by many rival kings in
an uneasy truce. The image of the damsel in distress and the ﬁre breathing dragon
was becoming blurred in his eye, “which was which?,” he asked. Where does he
go from here? The answer most likely is to become gatekeeper and arbiter, like
other aging knights of old, to resolve differences and attempt to equitably divide
the waters of the Water Kingdom.
On a personal note, I don’t know precisely when I became a curmudgeon,
but it happened. I suppose it was inevitable. I didn’t recognize it until more
and more people started to ask me when I was going to retire, and it was driven
home when Betsy Rieke, a fellow Area Manager, made that particular reference
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to both herself and me during one of our manager’s meetings. Have I exacted my
revenge on The Bureau? Well, I don’t know—some probably think so. I do know
that I’ve made The Bureau pay, though, something in the order of $2 million
to do something I=ve had some fun doing. And, I wrangled a GS-15 out of the
powers to be. Although it wasn’t my intention, I’ve made a couple of Regional
Directors uncomfortable with actions I’ve taken in the interest of good public
policy albeit politically incorrect at the time. I know there will be a sigh of relief
in some quarters when I soon announce my retirement. Do I still ﬁsh? I can=t say
I do. The days on the Southern Ute Reservation spoiled me. That coupled with
the large crowds and small trout in California lessened the enjoyment. Besides,
I rediscovered another passion from my frivolous youth, building hot rods. I get
great enjoyment buzzing around town in my ‘34 Ford with its chopped top and
327 engine, leaving every Harry Highschool, who thinks his Honda is hot stuff, in
the dust when the light turns green. Like it or not, things change, people change,
values change. As The Bureau proceeds through the next one hundred years,
these things are certain; the values we hold today will change, public policy will
continue to change, and Reclamation=s mission will continue to change. As the
Beatles once sang, “O bla dee, O bla dah, life goes on.”
Heraclitus was right, you know, you can’t step into the same river twice.
Thomas J. Aiken, at the time of the history symposium, was the area manager of
the Central California Area Ofﬁce in Folsom. He has since retired.
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The World Commission on Dams: A Case Study on
Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia River Basin
Project: Process and Lessons Learned
By:
Paul C. Pitzer
Except for the Great Wall of China, dams are the largest man-made
objects on this planet. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) states that there
are around eight hundred thousand of them scattered across six of the seven
continents. Most are comparatively small in volume, but an estimated fortyﬁve thousand are higher than a ﬁve story building, and a few are monumental
exceeding ten or more million cubic yards of material.1 These dams are
responsible for about 30–40 percent of the irrigated land worldwide and dams
generate 19% of the world’s electricity.2
Various studies have looked at individual dams—their histories, their
politics, their technological achievements, their environmental and cultural
impacts.3 From these it is clear that dams can and have dramatically altered
their surroundings. Those changes have brought both positive and negative
results and spirited debate continues about which might outweigh the other.
Speciﬁcally, government bodies, civil society organizations, private contractors,
and ﬁnancial institutions have debated the costs and beneﬁts of dams, large and
small. Large dams have come under especially close scrutiny. Proponents point
to power production, ﬂood control, irrigation, domestic water supply, navigation,
and recreation as worthy enhancements resulting from their construction—this
reﬂecting the nature of many dams as multipurpose projects. Opponents decry
adverse environmental, social, and economic impacts that generally follow in
the wake of dam construction—with some of those impacts being unanticipated.
There is apparently no exact way to determine if the beneﬁts of a dam outweigh
the costs, and the heated debate over this has accelerated and continued without
resolution. People on both sides of the issue agree that the polarization of
opponents and proponents has resulted in a virtual breakdown of constructive
dialogue.4
One aspect of the argument is the degree to which large dams collectively
have successfully accomplished the goals initially projected for them. There
have been few comprehensive studies of all large dams on a worldwide basis.
“Cooked” ﬁgures often cloud the ability to weigh the value of beneﬁts against
those of costs. The estimated values of those costs and beneﬁts are generally
based on subjective judgments complicated by rapidly changing social priorities.
While large dam building in the Industrialized World peaked in the twentieth
century and now has more or less stopped, Third World Countries continue to
project and build large dams; for example, the Three Gorges Dam on the
Yangtze River in China currently nearly completed. The question is whether or
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not this is wise, and if so, under what conditions and guidelines future large dams
should be built to maximize their beneﬁts while minimizing their costs and their
detrimental impacts, and guaranteeing achievement of the goals projected for each
structure.
In Third World countries many dams have been and are ﬁnanced by
the World Bank.5 In April 1997 the World Bank, together with the World
Conservation Union (IUCN), held a meeting in Gland, Switzerland, to discuss a
recently completed World Bank study of ﬁfty Bank-funded dams.6 Participants7
agreed that an independent commission should review the “performance of
large dams and set guidelines for the future.”8 After subsequent meetings, the
result was the recommendation that the World Bank and World Conservation
Union create, by November 1997, a World Commission on Dams (WCD) which
would work (following a ﬁve month preparation period) for two years.9 It would
function under two “overarching goals.” First “to review the development
effectiveness of dams and assess alternatives for water resources and energy
development,” and second “to develop internationally-accepted standards,
guidelines and criteria for decision making in the planning, design, construction,
monitoring, operation, and decommissioning of dams.”10 These goals were
elaborated in six objectives:
1. To assess the experience with existing, new and proposed large
dam projects so as to improve (existing) practices and social
and environmental conditions.
2. To develop decisionmaking criteria and policy and regulatory
frameworks for assessing alternatives for energy and water
resources development.
3. To evaluate the development effectiveness of large dams.
4. To develop and promote internationally acceptable standards
for planning, assessment, design, construction, operation, and
monitoring of large dam projects and, if the dams are built,
ensure affected peoples are better off.
5. To identify the implications for institutional, policy and
ﬁnancial arrangements so that beneﬁts, costs and risks are
equitably shared at the global, national and local levels.
6. To recommend interim modiﬁcations—where necessary—of
existing policies and guidelines, and promote “best practices.”11
The planners and stakeholders immediately recognized a few signiﬁcant
problems. First, they needed to insure objectivity and second, they needed to
involve representatives of all “stakeholders” in each aspect of the work.12
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To that end, they recommended an independent commission composed of a
chair and eleven commissioners with a “secretariat” appointed by the chair. In
addition to the goals and objectives, the ﬁnal report of the WCD was to include
“recommendations on policies, standards, guidelines, best practices and codes
of conduct” as well as an “understanding of the accuracy of predictions of costs
and beneﬁts used in the dam planning process and of their overall development
effectiveness and the need for restoration and reparation where necessary.”13
A third problem was the fact that every dam, regardless of size, is unique in
its technical conﬁguration, its effects, and its economic and social/cultural
surroundings. The planners recognized that drawing meaningful conclusions
from many different and distinct sources and studies would be a formidable task.
Finally, there was the problem of paying for the study. The World Bank
agreed to arrange funding in the amount of just under ten million dollars. By
June 2000 ﬁfty-one contributors had pledged more than seventy-ﬁve percent of
that amount.14 Signiﬁcant contributions came from the governments of Germany,
Norway, Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, South
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Guidelines for selection of the commissioners included the need
for eminent persons with appropriate expertise and experience, objectivity,
and integrity, and independence with the ability to represent the diversity
of stakeholders and their points of view including various affected regions,
communities, and both public and private sectors.15 Selected as Chair of the
WCD was Professor Kader Asmal of South Africa (Minister of Water Affairs and
Forestry).16 Vice-Chair was Lakshmi Chand Jain of India (High Commissioner
to South Africa). The remaining commissioners were Donald J. Blackmore of
Australia (Chief Executive, Murray-Darling Basin Commission), Joji Cariño of
the Philippines (Executive Secretary, International Alliance of Indigenous-Tribal
People of the Tropical Forest based in London), José Goldemberg of Brazil
(Professor and Director of the Institute for Electro-technical Energy, University
of São Paulo), Judy Henderson of Australia (Chair, Oxfam International), Gran
Lindahl of Sweden (President and CEO, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.—a
global engineering ﬁrm), Deborah Moore of the United States (Senior Scientist,
Environmental Defense Fund), Medha Patkar of India (Founder, Struggle to Save
the Narmda River), Thayer Scudder of the United States (Professor, California
Institute of Technology), Jan Veltrop of Norway (Harza Engineering Company
and Chairman of the United States Committee on Large Dams), Shen Guoyi of the
People’s Republic of China (Director General of the Department of International
Cooperation in the Ministry of Water Resources), and Achim Steiner as SecretaryGeneral and ex-ofﬁcio Commissioner.17
On 16 February 1998 in Cape Town, South Africa, Professor Asmal
ofﬁcially launched the World Commission on Dams with an address to
its commissioners, members of the press, and other interested parties. He
emphasized the diversity of the commissioners and the unanimity ﬁnally achieved
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by the stakeholders in their selection—this apparently after some difﬁculty and
disagreements. He emphasized the overarching goals for the WCD and added,
At a time when dam building is increasing in some countries, in
others, dams are already reaching the end of their useful lives. Clearly
consideration may have to be given to the mechanisms, both with
existing dams and those being contemplated, for the effective and
efﬁcient decommissioning of dams. Indeed this reality now confronts the
owners of a number of large dams in the United States.18

The WCD hosted the ﬁrst of its many public meetings on 21 and 22
September 1998 in Bhopal, India. That meeting focused on “Large Dams and
Development in South Asia: Experiences and Lessons Learned.”19 Seemingly
having had a successful beginning, the Commission went on to a variety of large
and smaller meetings during which announcements identiﬁed the representative
large dams that it would study in depth. Speciﬁcally, the Commissioners
identiﬁed seven individual large dams and river basins for detailed case studies.
These were the Tucurui Dam and Amazon/Tocantins River in Brazil, the Glomma
Dam and Lagen River Basin in Norway, the Tarbela Dam and Indus River Basin
in Pakistan, the Pak Mun Dam and Mekong/Mun River Basins in Thailand, the
Aslantas Dam and Ceyhan River Basin in Turkey, the Kariba Dam and Zambezi
River Basin in Zambia/Zimbabwe, and the Grand Coulee Dam (GCD) and
Columbia Basin Project (CBP) and the Columbia River Basin in the United
States. In addition, the WCD would complete country reviews of China and
India. A pilot study would ﬁrst be done on the Gariep/Van der Kloof Dams and
Orange River in South Africa.20
For each individual case study, the following questions were to be
addressed:
1. What were the projected versus actual beneﬁts, costs, and
impacts of the dam?
2. What were the unexpected beneﬁts, costs, and impacts?
3. What was the distribution of costs and beneﬁts—who gained
and who lost?
4. How were decisions made?
5. Did the project comply with the criteria and guidelines of the
day?
6. What were the lessons learned?
Questions three and six were of greatest signiﬁcance.
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In addition to the seven in-depth studies, the WCD announced that it
would also do a limited analysis of an additional 150 dams using existing data
from as many sources as possible. The WCD urged interested parties to make
contact with speciﬁc study groups to contribute information and views.
For the following two year period, the WCD established subgroups that
began the indicated studies. Commissioners and designated group leaders held
extensive meetings and workshops to that end, adhering as much as possible
to its “multistakeholder process”—that is, involving representatives of every
identiﬁable aspect connected with that speciﬁc project.21 It is not the purpose of
this paper to explore all of those studies but rather to focus speciﬁcally on the
Grand Coulee Dam study and its ﬁndings. Some attention, however, will be given
to the ﬁnal report since the Grand Coulee study contributed to it.
The WCD announced that selection of Grand Coulee Dam for study was
based on the dam’s size and because of the ongoing debate about its positive and
negative impacts. The WCD added that Grand Coulee Dam was also of vital
interest since it is a mature dam in a mature democracy where debates about relicensing, decommissioning, protection of endangered species, and recreational
demands on water resources are more advanced than elsewhere in the world.22
WCD senior advisors Sanjeev Khangram and Jamie Skinner traveled to
Seattle, Washington, in February 1999 to begin work on the Grand Coulee study.
To guide and complete the study, the advisors selected Dr. Leonard Ortolano of
the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department at Stanford University.
Assisting Ortolano was Dr. Katherine Kao Cushing from the University of
California at Berkeley.23
On 20 May 1999 ﬁfty-six stakeholders met with Ortolano, Cushing,
Commissioner Jan Veltrop, and WCD Senior Advisor Sanjeev Khagram (an
assistant professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University) at Cavanaugh’s Inn at the Park in Spokane, Washington.
The stakeholders represented government agencies, farmers, industry, and Native
Americans. Most of those attending were from the United States but there was
some representation from Canada. The meeting was at times contentious as
various stakeholders had strongly held views and agendas. Some feared that
the whole thing was an attempt by environmentalists to remove more dams—
speciﬁcally Grand Coulee Dam. In fact, a column in the Davenport Times of
Spokane had called the Commission an “upstart group of pseudo scientists”
who would “come down on the side of removing, abandoning or breaching
the mighty Grand Coulee Dam.”24 Columbia Basin Project farmers wanted to
redress decades-old grievances concerning cost of the water delivered to them
and their desire to expand the project. Native Americans were anxious to discuss
their cultural losses resulting from dam construction. Regional politicians were
disturbed at the prospect of somehow losing local control. Some questioned the
origins of funding for the WCD, wondering who was behind the study and to what
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end? Bureau of Reclamation Public Affairs Ofﬁcer Craig Sprankle reported later
that after listening to Professor Ortolano and looking at and commenting on the
issues and questions to be studied, there was less suspicion.25
Antagonisms between project farmers and others involved with irrigation
projects is an on-going saga. Farmers, who often pressured the government
to build dams and irrigation facilities, later complained bitterly about the cost
of the water. Such had been the case on the Columbia Basin Project. Early
on in the project’s history, many farmers balked at land ownership restrictions
and withdrew from the project. In the late 1950s and early 1960s farmers and
the Bureau of Reclamation carried on an especially acrimonious debate about
renegotiation of costs. The need to raise charges stemmed to some degree from
high unanticipated costs needed to install drainage facilities.26 Easing of land
ownership restrictions during the Reagan years has led farmers to want project
expansion, but they balked at the anticipated cost which in the 1990s was
estimated at about two billion dollars.
In the 1990s the Bureau of Reclamation conducted two environmental
impact studies concerning project expansion and concluded that it was not
practical at that time.27 Area farmers dispute the ﬁndings and challenge ﬁgures—
especially the allocation of moneys collected from the sale of power generated
at the dam.28 Many of the “old-timers” remember promises made in the 1920s
and 1930s that the water would actually be free, and that power sales would pay
all of the costs.29 All of the deeply held opinions among the participants made it
difﬁcult for participants to achieve consensus.
The purpose of the Spokane meeting was to draft a scoping paper
delineating the issues to be addressed within the framework of the case study
procedure. Eventually the stakeholders divided into breakout groups and
addressed the task. Under the headings of Irrigation, Hydropower, Flood Control,
Project-Affected People, Ecosystems/Anadromous Fish, Recreation, Distribution
of Beneﬁts and Costs, and Basin-Wide Issues, the participants identiﬁed 114
issues. These were later arranged into three categories:
•

Issues to be addressed in the study

•

Interesting background information, and

•

Issues of less direct relevance

Forty-three issues were listed as primary for the study, ﬁfty-eight were
background information, and eleven were of less direct relevance.30
The WCD Grand Coulee team also held a meeting on 4 October 1999
in Castlegar, British Columbia, Canada, to gather additional input. Seventeen
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stakeholders attended representing BC Hydro, Canadian First Nations, and others.
They discussed and added to the results of the Spokane meeting.
In the area of irrigation, the stakeholders directed Ortolano to concentrate
on technological changes since the start of the project—speciﬁcally increased
efﬁciency, altered attitudes concerning the environment (with emphasis on ﬁsh,
waterfowl, and groundwater quality), and factors obstructing expansion of the
project. Concerning hydropower, the stakeholders urged focus on distribution
of low-cost beneﬁts (speciﬁcally, the stakeholders pointed out that availability of
low-cost power in the region had drawn new industry creating a growing market
for power which was resulting in increased costs to all including farmers). There
were no concerns aimed at ﬂood control. In the category of project-affected
people, stakeholders directed the WCD team to detail the “displacement” of
Native Americans, reparations for such displacements, disruption to their cultural
lives, and destruction of such culturally signiﬁcant items as burial sites. With
ecosystems and anadromous ﬁsh, there was a range of opinions. In general, the
stakeholders urged consideration of impacts of Grand Coulee Dam on native
species as well as those introduced to mitigate anticipated damage. Concerning
recreation, conﬂict between the need for occasional drawdowns of Franklin D.
Roosevelt Lake and the desires of locals for consistent lake levels drew attention.
Distribution of beneﬁts and costs led the stakeholders to urge reexamination of
the “relationship between hydropower revenues and cost of providing irrigation
works and water.” In addition, stakeholders pointed to the Columbia Basin Treaty
between the United States and Canada, and wondered, “Who pays for what?
Who beneﬁts and who loses?” Finally, under basinwide issues, the Canadian
stakeholders felt that “. . . basin-wide management system, in some instances, led
to a transfer of beneﬁts from Canada to the U.S. (For example, there used to be
orchards upstream, now there are none. But there are orchards downstream).” In
short, the stakeholders urged the WCD committee to explore fully the Columbia
Basin Treaty.31
It is signiﬁcant to speculate, at this point, that the comments of the
stakeholders and the degree to which at least some of them pursued their
individual agendas rested on a measure of misunderstanding on their part about
the nature and authority of the World Commission on Dams. Although none of
the stakeholders said as much at the Spokane meeting, or at any other meeting,
there was in their comments an implication that they felt the WCD had the
power and authority to redress their grievances. Lost was full appreciation of the
WCD’s charge to examine the dams in question only with the hope of presenting
information about past experiences and develop guidelines for future large dam
development elsewhere. At no time did the WCD studies intend to inﬂuence
existing conditions nor did it have the authority to correct problems and injustices
however lamentable.32
Based on their study so far and the results of the Spokane meeting, in June
1999, Ortolano and Cushing issued their scoping report for the
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Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project case study.33 It presented a précis
that would act as the guide for the eventual ﬁnal report. Divided into eight major
sections, that ﬁnal report would contain an introduction explaining the study and
naming the participants, an overview of the nature of the Columbia Basin Project,
historical analysis of the project’s development, discussion of costs and beneﬁts
including unexpected impacts, a look at distribution of those costs and beneﬁts,
analysis of consistency with planning criteria and norms, basinwide linkages,
and ﬁnally, an assessment of development effectiveness and lessons learned. The
lessons learned would be the heart of the ﬁndings and the most signiﬁcant section
that would move on into the WCD’s overall ﬁnal report.
Over the next six months, Ortolano and his team gathered information,
conducted interviews, drew together detailed background and historical studies
and essays, and began to formulate their ﬁnal report. Early in December 1999,
the team released a circulation draft of the proposed ﬁnal report.34 At over four
hundred pages, the draft report contained detailed histories, charts, maps, and
other ﬁndings including analysis of interviews and conclusions based on the data.
Copies of the draft circulated among the stakeholders who were then invited to a
ﬁnal meeting.
That all-day meeting was held at the Benson Hotel in Portland, Oregon,
on 13 January 2000. Thirty-four persons attended—somewhat fewer than
anticipated.35 Twenty-six were stakeholders; two of the others were WCD
Commissioners Jan Veltrop and Deborah Moore, two observers came from
the World Resources Institute and Harvard University (both of which were
conducting independent investigations of the WCD process), representing the
WCD was Senior Advisor Jamie Skinner, and the others were in some way part of
the Grand Coulee study team.36
After introductions and statements by Commissioners Veltrop and Moore,
Professor Ortolano presented the study’s main ﬁndings. He recited a brief
history of the project and detailed its beneﬁciaries and major cost-bearers. To no
one’s surprise, he listed the beneﬁciaries, in order of signiﬁcance, as Columbia
Basin Project farmers or irrigators, Bonneville Power Administration ratepayers,
downstream residents and businesses, recreators and recreation-related commerce,
and United States residents in the Northwestern states, and Canada.37 Major
cost-bearers were, in order of signiﬁcance, Native American and First Nations
Tribes, environmentalists and environmental non-governmental organizations,
commercial ﬁshermen, sport ﬁshermen, non-Native Americans forced to resettle,
United States taxpayers, Bonneville Power Administration ratepayers, some
United States farmers outside the project area, and Canada.38
At ﬁrst glance, it appears odd that Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
ratepayers appeared on both lists. Grand Coulee Dam is a key component of the
Federal Columbia River Power System which supplies seventy-ﬁve percent of
the power in the region at costs well below the national average. Direct Service
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Industries and large industrial customers beneﬁt from even more generous rates.
On the other hand, the rates could be lower. BPA ratepayers also underwrite
irrigation, ﬁsh mitigation programs, and programs to enhance and recover
endangered anadromous ﬁsh populations. In the area of irrigation, ratepayers
cover eighty-seven percent of the irrigators’ construction costs—a sizable
subsidy which accounts, in large part, for irrigation being the ﬁrst item among the
beneﬁciaries. In fact, there was nearly unanimous agreement among interviewed
stakeholders that the irrigating farmers were the prime beneﬁciaries of the project.
BPA ratepayers would pay even less if they did not subsidize irrigation and ﬁsh
protection. Hence they both beneﬁt and at the same time, bear some of the costs
of the project.
Despite the extensive beneﬁts received by farmers, following in the
tradition of their physiocrat predecessors, representatives of the irrigation districts
felt the study should reﬂect what the farmers pay rather than what they do not pay.
For example, they pay for Operation and Management and equipment
replacement. The subsidy irrigators receive is only for construction.
Irrigation district representatives felt there was no power subsidy because
they pay for primary and secondary pumping costs “at cost.” Professor
Ortolano responded by saying that what the farmers pay does not reﬂect
the value of power in the open market. The irrigators voiced their
objection to the use of the term subsidy.39

At no time did anyone point out that without the government underwriting
the project and the income from the sale of electricity, the cost to farmers
to compensate for the water they receive would be both astronomical and
prohibitive.
Native American representatives felt that modern tribal economies
and the project’s effects on them were not adequately covered in the report.
Representatives of the Colville Confederated Tribes agreed to supply Ortolano
with additional information detailing speciﬁc losses resulting from construction of
the dam, the reservoir, and the irrigation project.
Stakeholders were then each asked to ﬁll out a form dealing with the eight
“lessons learned,” that appeared in section eight of the draft study. Each could
indicate strong agreement (sa), agreement (a), no view (nv), disagreement (d), or
strong disagreement (sd).
Brieﬂy stated, the eight lessons and the feedback on them were as follows:
1.
An open planning process facilitates identifying and resolving
conﬂicts among stakeholders; a closed process serves the opposite
purpose.
sa: 7
a: 6
nv: 0
d: 2
sd: 3
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2. Periodic, planned re-evaluations of project operations provide a
mechanism for incorporating temporal changes in social values into
project operations.
sa: 6
a: 4
nv: 1
d: 2
sd: 5
3. Periodic, planned re-evaluations of project operations provide a
mechanism for incorporating changes in science and technology into
project operations.
sa: 6
a: 5
nv: 0
d: 2
sd: 5
4. While subsidies for water project outputs can accomplish useful social
policy objectives, they can lead to situations where resources are not used
in an economically efﬁcient manner.
sa: 2
a: 9
nv: 0
d: 4
sd: 3
5. There are limits to government planning in a market-driven, capitalistic
system.
sa: 2
a: 9
nv: 2
d: 1
sd: 4
6. In a decentralized resource management decision-making context
such as the one existing in the Columbia basin, failure of stakeholders to
coordinate can lead to major institutional failures.
sa: 1
a: 9
nv: 2
d: 2
sd: 3
7. Decisions that introduce signiﬁcant irreversible effects should only be
taken after very careful study.
sa: 4
a: 7
nv: 1
d: 2
sd: 3
8. Tools for cumulative impact assessment need to be applied to avoid
resource management problems.
sa: 6
a: 6
nv: 0
d: 2
sd: 3
While the minutes of the meeting reﬂected the analysis that stakeholders
mostly agreed with item number one and items ﬁve through eight and were split
on items two through four, it is clear that there was no consensus or general
agreement and that respondents were ‘all over the board.’ Not all stakeholders
responded to each lesson, and one stated later that he had disagreed with all
statements simply because he disagreed with the report in general.
Discussion of the lessons learned took considerably longer than
anticipated and consequently, participants did not complete the full agenda.
Comments included suggestions for an increased list of beneﬁciaries.40 Three
additional lessons learned were suggested:
1.
Once you build a project, there will continue to be debate about
how a project is operated, and a plan should be in place for a process to
manage these debates about operations.
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2.
In large projects, most of which are multi-purpose, it is possible
for the various purposes to be in opposition, and even mutually exclusive
(e.g., foregone power revenues due to irrigation withdrawals).
3.
Mechanisms need to be created to address claims by peoples
adversely affected by projects.
With all of this in hand, Ortolano and his team prepared the ﬁnal report
which they issued in March 2000. It contained eleven lessons learned; three
(number one, number seven—which became number ten, and number eight—
which became number eleven) remained the same or nearly the same as in the
preliminary study. Altered were numbers two, three, and ﬁve and added were ﬁve
entirely new items. The altered and new items are listed below:
1.

Same as #1 above

2.
In a multipurpose water project, it is common for project
purposes (e.g. ﬂood control and recreation) to conﬂict. Because
conﬂicts among various purposes are practically inevitable, a
process for managing stakeholder contributions to debates on
project operations should be institutionalized on future projects.
3.
(which was changed from #2 above) For future projects,
periodic, planned re-evaluations can provide a mechanism for
incorporating temporal changes in social values into project
operations. To meet social policy objectives, it might be necessary
to reduce uncertainties for stakeholders whose decisions would be
inﬂuenced by results of re-evaluations.
4.
(which was changed from #3 above) For future projects,
periodic, planned re-evaluations provide a mechanism for
incorporating changes in science and technology into project
operations. To meet social policy objectives, it might be necessary
to reduce uncertainties for stakeholders whose decisions would be
inﬂuenced by results of re-evaluations.
5.
Substantial inﬂation-corrected cost overruns in GCD and
CBP reﬂect the uncertainties that surround large construction
projects. These uncertainties underscore the need for wide-ranging
sensitivity analyses to ensure that project goals and objectives are
robust and can be met with available resources. Implicit or indirect
subsidies need to be evaluated under alternative market conditions
to ensure that the subsidies are in line with the project’s social
objectives.
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6.
Stakeholders and planners involved in an open planning
process need to work with a common conceptual framework and
vocabulary in making formal project appraisals. Of particular
importance is the distinction between private and social (economywide) perspectives. Failure to develop a shared conceptual
framework and vocabulary can lead to unnecessary acrimony.
7.
In large water resources projects, those who bear the
costs may not receive many beneﬁts. Therefore, mechanisms
for ensuring just compensation are important. In a project that
has impacts that cross international borders, the usual forums for
allowing parties to make compensation claims—for example,
the judicial system in the U.S.—may not be satisfactory, and
alternative forums should be considered. Alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms may also be able to speed up the
settlements of claims normally brought using the court system.
8.
(Which was changed from #5 above) Limits exist on the
extent to which government plans can be implemented effectively
in a market-driven capitalistic economy.
9.
In designing institutions for river basin management,
centralization, and decentralization each have their advantages and
disadvantages.
10.

Same as #7 above.

11.

Same as #8 above.41

The report altered a bit the list of beneﬁciaries and cost bearers and
concluded that the major beneﬁciaries of the Columbia Basin Project (CBP)
were/are, in descending order, the local irrigators and agribusiness people,
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) rate payers (including public utility
districts [PUD]), downstream residents, people using the area for recreation, the
general economy of the Northwestern United States, and British Columbia Hydro
ratepayers. On the distaff side, the cost bearers in descending order were/are
United States and Canadian native peoples, persons concerned with maintaining
ecosystem integrity, commercial ﬁshing interests in the United States and Canada,
sports ﬁshing interests, non-Native peoples who were forced to relocate, United
States taxpayers, some United States farmers outside of the CBP area, and some
upstream residents and businesses.42
No project in American history had been as completely and thoroughly
studied prior to its construction as was the Columbia Basin Project. Through
the 1920s numerous investigations looked into the various plans to irrigate the
Columbia Basin with the deﬁnitive report completed by the Army Corps of
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Engineers in 1932; the so-called
Butler Report or 308 Report.43
That report established the
“grand plan” for development
of the Columbia River, a
blueprint largely followed
through subsequent decades. It
ﬁnally established the physical,
if not the economic viability
of Grand Coulee Dam and the
Columbia Basin Project. In the
1940s, Harlan Barrows of the

35.1. Grand Coulee Dam construction in
1936.

University of Chicago investigated
twenty-eight potential problems that
would guide the development of
irrigation using water from behind
Grand Coulee Dam. Barrows, who
had been instrumental in planning for
35.2. Grand Coulee Dam in 1948 after
the Tennessee Valley Authority, took
construction.
four years and used over three hundred
people to scrutinize every aspect of the project then imaginable with the hope
of yielding a planned and orderly development free from signiﬁcant difﬁculties.
The resulting Columbia Basin Joint Investigations (CBJI) ﬁlled many books and
acted as the guide for building not only the irrigation works, but also planned
communities, industry, and laid out the whole economic and physical strategy for
the area.44 The overarching ideal was to create a “planned promised land” where
the economy and the environment were controlled eliminating both ﬁnancial
depression and drought. A holdover from the New Deal, the concept of planning
would have been applied as fully as possible.45
Repeatedly, the ﬁndings of the WCD report indicate the failures of
particularly the Joint Investigations.46 For example, farmers were scheduled to
repay ﬁfty percent of the cost of irrigation but they actually pay only about ten
to ﬁfteen percent. The CBJI dramatically underestimated productivity per acre
on the project. Crop production in 1998 was $637 million, over twice what had
been predicted, even with dollar values adjusted for inﬂation. The investigations
projected 80,000 families living in created towns and on something in excess of
10,000 farms of about 160 acres each. The average farm size now of about ﬁve
hundred acres is much greater than the planners recommended as prodigious
changes in farm technology have thwarted the goal that would have fostered the
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growth of small family farms and rural communities.47 None of the anticipated
planned communities/cities have materialized. Farmers tended to locate in
already existing towns rather than in new communities or on their farms.
The CBJI did not envision a third powerhouse at Grand Coulee Dam or
any of the large upstream dams that now regulate the ﬂow of the Columbia River.
When dollar values are adjusted for inﬂation, the cost of the original and the
newer power generating facilities at the dam have run about thirty percent higher
than estimated.48 On the positive side, among other things, the CBJI in no way
anticipated the atmospheric pollutants avoided through the use of hydroelectric
power rather than fossil fuel alternatives, a beneﬁt which has a high value but one
difﬁcult to calculate.
The WCD report concluded that it would be impossible to assess the
success or failure of the Grand Coulee Fish Management Project (GCFMP) which
set a target rate of 36,500 salmon passing up the river to spawn annually. In the
1930s, over 70,000 ﬁsh were caught annually by commercial ﬁsheries alone.
Nobody knows the total number of ﬁsh that utilized the river in those days. Today
there is no viable commercial ﬁshery as little or no commercial ﬁshing is allowed.
This change in conditions renders meaningless any attempts at evaluation.49
If nothing else, the case of Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin
Irrigation Project demonstrates the difﬁculties encountered in trying to plan a
large project with multiple and varied impacts existing in a dynamic and rapidly
changing society. Anticipating the future with its shifting values and goals is
impossible. This author clearly remembers one of his teachers in the early 1950s
telling our elementary school class that the large dams on the Columbia River
were “conservation projects.” Few knowledgeable teachers would make that
statement today.
“At the time GCD was planned, assessing ecological effects of proposed
federal projects was neither a requirement nor a priority.”50 “The state of
knowledge of ecosystems at the time was such that virtually no consideration
was given to the maintenance of genetic biodiversity.”51 In addition to the most
obvious damage to the salmon (anadromous ﬁsh), the project caused dramatic
changes in the plant and animal populations of the project area while at the same
time creating new wetlands and habitat areas. Little of this was anticipated, and
only minimal care is taken now of the new wildlife areas.
In the 1930s and 1940s there was no process for including input from the
Colville and Spokane tribes in any aspect of the decision making process. This
matter was not addressed for decades and was only somewhat remedied in the
mid-1990s when the government ﬁnally reached a settlement with the affected
peoples.52
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Trade-offs also exist between regional development and objectives related
to equity and the environment. This is clearly shown by the way GCD affected
indigenous peoples in the upper Columbia River Basin. In the view of many
Native Americans and members of First Nations in Canada, GCD was nothing
short of catastrophic. For them, the project had a disastrous effect on their
culture.53
The WCD report stresses the need to have all stakeholders involved in
decision making from the outset, and this is reﬂected in the lessons learned listed
above; especially lesson number one.
The WCD report gave considerable attention to the economic viability
of Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Project. Because an economic
efﬁciency objective (the condition that economic beneﬁts exceed costs) for water
resources projects developed by Reclamation and the Corps did not come about
until the late 1930s and early 1940s, this objective had little formal inﬂuence on
the planning of GCD and CBP. However, concerns about what would now be
termed economic efﬁciency were raised in the context of GCD and CBP. For
example, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers both used economic efﬁciency arguments to support their opposition
to the project.54
The WCD report concludes that due to the need for projects to increase
employment during the economic depression of the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt’s
promise to honor campaign commitments in the Northwest, and the strength
and effectiveness of local project supporters, concerns about whether or not
the undertaking would be economically viable were ignored or overridden.
Furthermore, at the time, there was minimal concern, if any, for the feelings
of and cultural stability of the Native Americans involved. The WCD report
continues,
...the consensus of the 12 individuals we interviewed representing
irrigators, PUDs, and local governments in the CBP area was that the
net positive impacts of GCD and CBP for the region far outweighed the
costs to Native Americans [sic.]. Such regional development arguments
frequently ignore the subtleties involved in making arguments related to
economic efﬁciency. Indeed, some of those who trumpet the economic
signiﬁcance of the project do not recognize either the failure to pay
interest on the capital cost of irrigation or the lost power revenues
associated with providing below-market price energy to pump irrigation
water as signs of economic inefﬁciency.55

If judged in terms of only regional development goals, the CBP must
be considered a success. Indeed, the WCD report admits that the hydroelectric
facilities have had an overwhelmingly positive beneﬁt-cost ratio.56 However, there
have been considerable power cost subsidies to local users such as Public Utility
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Districts (PUDs). In other words, had the market price been charged to all, the
beneﬁts would have been even greater.
The report’s executive summary concludes,
The regional development objectives of GCD and CBP have, to a
considerable extent, been achieved. But they have come at a substantial
cost to the rest of the economy, both in terms of direct construction
subsidies and in revenues foregone from indirect subsidies in the form of
below-market energy prices.57

As for the cultural impact of the project, the WCD report states,
There is no calculation procedure that allows a balancing of these
negative social impacts and cultural losses against the substantial
regional development beneﬁts that the US Northwest has enjoyed as a
result of GCD and CBP.58

The report also commented on the irreversible elimination of anadromous
ﬁsh runs in the hundreds of miles of habitat upstream from Grand Coulee Dam,
and the damage done to wild stocks of salmon and steelhead in the mid-Columbia
River tributaries with the introduction of hatchery and transplanted ﬁsh.
Today, U.S. citizens rely on an open planning process tied to NEPA
(National Environmental Protection Act) to help decision-makers become aware
of trade-offs: how much of one objective, such as the quality of the environment,
must be sacriﬁced when attempting to augment another, such as regional
development. However, nothing equivalent to NEPA existed in the time that
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his administrators decided to proceed
with construction of GCD. Moreover, even the open planning prescribed by
NEPA has limitations. For example the NEPA process does not necessarily
address the consequences of unequal power among stakeholders, a problem that
still plagues the anadromous ﬁsh recovery and recreational jurisdiction issues
associated with GCD and CBP.59
Finally, the WCD report summary concludes:
After nearly 60 years of project operations, those who have beneﬁted
from GCD and CBP have, quite naturally, become focused on maintaining
the advantages they have enjoyed as a result of the project—mainly
low-cost irrigation water, low-cost electricity, and beneﬁts from ﬂood
control and recreation. At the same time, groups that were disadvantaged
by the project (i.e., Native Americans and First Nations) are continuing
their struggles to obtain compensation for what they perceive as broken
promises and grave injustices of the past. It is possible that individuals
who gain or lose from future water resources projects will be just as
tenacious in defending their gains or seeking compensation for their
losses many years after basic project decisions have been made.60
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The overriding objective of the WCD was to provide guidance for future
large dam projects. The preceding quote was aimed toward that end, and it
provides a convenient segue into comments about the completed ﬁnal overall
report of the WCD which would assess and meld the ﬁndings of all of the regional
studies including the GCD and CBP study.
With some fanfare, Nelson Mandela and the WCD Commissioners
unveiled the ﬁnal report at a luncheon held in London on 16 November 2000.
Over three hundred invited dignitaries attended including World Bank President
James D. Wolfensohn and World Conservation Union Director General, Maritta
von Bieberstein Koch-Weser.61 That report incorporated ﬁndings of the worldwide
studies of large dams including those from Grand Coulee Dam.62
The Final Report found that worldwide sixty to eighty million people
have been displaced by dams while sixty percent of the world’s rivers have been
affected by dams and diversions.63 The study found the use of water worldwide to
be more than twice what it was ﬁfty years ago. The report listed eight signiﬁcant
conclusions:
1. Large dams display a high degree of variability in delivering
predicted water and electricity services—and related social
beneﬁts—with a considerable portion falling short of physical
and economic targets, while others continue generating beneﬁts
after 30 to 40 years.
2. Large dams have demonstrated a marked tendency towards
schedule delays and signiﬁcant cost overruns.
3. Large dams designed to deliver irrigation services have
typically fallen short of physical targets, did not recover their
cost and have been less proﬁtable in economic terms than
expected.
4. Large hydropower dams tend to perform closer to, but
still below, targets for power generation, generally meet
their ﬁnancial targets but demonstrate variable economic
performance relative to targets, with a number of notable
under- and over-performers.
5. Large dams generally have a range of extensive impacts on
rivers, watersheds and aquatic ecosystems—these impacts are
more negative than positive and, in many cases, have led to
irreversible loss of species and ecosystems.
6. Efforts to date to counter the ecosystem impacts of large dams
have met with limited success owing to the lack of attention
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to anticipating and avoiding impacts, the poor quality and
uncertainty of predictions, the difﬁculty of coping with all
impacts, and the only partial implementation and success of
mitigation measures.
7. Pervasive and systematic failure to assess the range of
potential negative impacts and implement adequate mitigation,
resettlement and development programmes for the displaced,
and the failure to account for the consequences of large dams
for downstream livelihoods have led to the impoverishment
and suffering of millions, giving rise to growing opposition to
dams by affected communities worldwide.
8. Since the environment and social costs of large dams have been
poorly accounted for in economic terms, the true proﬁtability
of these schemes remains elusive.64
The report continued,
…the WCD Global Review documents a frequent failure to recognize
affected people and empower them to participate in the process. As the
Global Review of dams makes clear, improving development outcomes
in the future requires a substantially expanded basis for deciding on
proposed water and energy development projects.65

The report made recommendations and commented,
Social, environmental, governance and compliance aspects have
been undervalued in decision-making in the past. It is here that the
Commission has developed criteria and guidelines to innovate and
improve on the body of knowledge on good practices and add value to
guidelines already in common use. Seen in conjunction with existing
decision-support instruments, the Commission’s criteria and guidelines
provide a new direction for appropriate and sustainable development.

Bringing about this change will require:
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•

planners to identify stakeholders through a process that
recognizes rights and assesses risks;

•

States to invest more at an earlier stage to screen out
inappropriate projects and facilitate integration across sectors
within the context of the river basin;

•

consultants and agencies to ensure outcomes from feasibility
studies are socially and environmentally acceptable;

•

the promotion of open and meaningful participation at all
stages of planning and implementation, leading to negotiated
outcomes;

•

developers to accept accountability through contractual
commitments for effectively mitigating social and
environmental impacts;

•

improving compliance through independent review; and,

•

dam owners to apply lessons learned from past experiences
through regular monitoring and adapting to changing needs and
contexts.66

The WCD congratulated itself by pointing out that it had conducted
“the ﬁrst comprehensive global and independent review of the performance
of essential aspects of dams and their contribution to development.”67 But the
recommendations, while commendable, are somewhat utopian. It is clear that
consideration of all “stakeholders” in the decisions affecting any given large dam
would have meant that few, if any, would ever have been built. Identiﬁcation of
stakeholders itself presents a problem. In the 1930s, at the time of Grand Coulee
Dam construction, for example, who could have predicted the advances in power
transmission that would make the entire trans-Rockies West a market for the
dam’s electricity? And if that had been anticipated, would (or should) power
interests in California or Nevada have been allowed the same input as those in
Oregon and Washington? This is a question of particular signiﬁcance at this
writing (March 2001) as power shortages and brown-outs plague California.
When a government agency implements its act of “taking” through
eminent domain, not many feel adequately compensated, and changes in lifestyle
or culture are beyond replacement or adjustment. All large dams have involved
tradeoffs, and in most cases, the power of government and/or industry have
overshadowed the desires of those adversely affected. There is little reason
to believe that this will not continue, and in fact, it continues today with the
formidable Three Gorges Project on the Yangtze River in China where over
a million people have been displaced. Where the environment is concerned,
when and where push comes to shove, the demand for power, for example, will
undoubtedly overshadow environmental damage. Few Americans are willing to
keep their homes cooler in winter, do without air conditioning in summer, and
eliminate use of other electrical conveniences.
The studies by the World Commission on Dams were a prodigious and
laudable undertaking. Their main contribution may be amassing and assembling
information about dams, their histories, and their problems all in one place.
Few, if any, of the ﬁndings are new or startling. The report, like the ﬁnal report
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on Grand Coulee Dam, while acknowledging past goals and how they have
changed, clearly reﬂects and emphasizes the values and concerns of the late 1990s
industrialized countries and not those of the times when the various dams were
built or the conditions under which they were built. The recommendations are
praiseworthy, but only time will tell if they have any signiﬁcant impact.
Paul C. Pitzer has published several articles and Grand Coulee:
Harnessing a Dream (Pullman: Washington State University Press,
1994). He has recently retired from teaching American history in the
Portland, Oregon, area, and he served as a consultant to the World
Commission on Dams (WCD). Dr. Pitzer contributed four annexes,
or appendices, to: World Commission on Dams, WCD Case Studies:
Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project, USA, circulation draft,
December 1999 found at http://www.dams.org and in hard copy in the
Bureau of Reclamation’s library at the Denver Federal Center.
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relicensing, something that happens every ﬁfty years, environmental groups are attempting to use
this opportunity to challenge the operations of various dams. At the same time, dam owners and
government agencies are seeking to expedite and simplify the process in order to complete it more
quickly.
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The State of Nature and the Nature of the State:
Imperialism Challenged at Glen Canyon
By:
Kevin Wehr
Abstract
This paper investigates the ways in which the American government has
built an infrastructure on the landscape of the American West, especially through
the discursive construction of a particular nature-society relationship. This
relationship is neither static nor uncontested—as it changes over time, different
social groups are more and less able to effectively challenge the human domination
of nature. I wish to situate this paper in relation to both discourses about nature
(“the state of nature”) and to processes of state building in the American West (“the
nature of the state”). I examine brieﬂy the social and historical context of the high
dams in the West, speciﬁcally Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams, both built in the
1930s. I then discuss in more detail the rise of an effective oppositional discourse
in the late 1950s, centered on the proposal of the Echo Park and Glen Canyon
Dams. I argue that this period marked the end of the “golden years” of dam
building, and that this episode represents a signiﬁcant change in the relationship
between society and nature. This change is marked by the rise of contestation
around Glen Canyon Dam, but its emphasis is more on advocating a shift from a
nature-society relationship based primarily on domination and economic-resource
maximization to one based in part upon aesthetic and other forms of appreciation.
This opposition at Glen Canyon was, I argue, a challenge and an opportunity for
the Bureau of Reclamation. In the last 40 years the Bureau has neglected to take
up this opportunity to improve its relations with nature and environmentalists, as
shown in the rhetoric surrounding the Centennial celebration at Hoover Dam, in
June of 2002.

Introduction
Most of the dams in the West were built during the Progressive Era and
the New Deal, and consequently reﬂect an ideology of rational planning and state
building based in a faith in scientiﬁc progress. State-sponsored infrastructure had
myriad environmental and political effects, but the natural formations1 that the
state worked to overcome also had a profound inﬂuence on how society developed.
Through an examination of the ways that nature, society, and the state have
interacted with and mutually constructed one another, this paper will attempt an
integration of political and environmental sociology.
The theoretical impetus for this paper is to illuminate the relationship
between society and nature. The larger theoretical concerns are twofold. First,
political and environmental sociology have contributed important insights towards
understanding the ways that culture and politics are linked and the way that society
and nature are linked, but rarely are these areas integrated. Through an examination
of dams in the American West, this work makes sense of the ways that a central
concern of political sociology—state-building—inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by the
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nature-society relationship, which is a central concern of environmental sociology.
Second, there were speciﬁc social and environmental effects of this state building
that contributed to a nature-society relationship that dialectically changes over time.
Since the natural environment is not simply a passive object that the state builds
upon, historical discourse analysis can help integrate political and environmental
sociology by contributing to the understanding of the ways that natural conditions
helped and/or hindered state-building. This paper thus asks the speciﬁc question:
what discursive methods were used to justify or contest the building of an economic
and political infrastructure in response to the perceived water scarcity of the
American West?
To address this question, this paper examines the discourse around three
dams of the American West—Boulder, Grand Coulee, and Glen Canyon: how they
were presented to the public by the state and how the public received them. The
physical existence of the dams has no inherent meaning; rather, different social
groups assign meaning to the dams. The ideology that gives support to the naturesociety relationship that is based in domination is one that I, following James Scott,
call high modernism. Scott’s work, Seeing Like a State, argues that high modernism
is a world-view in which the “strong version of the beliefs in scientiﬁc and technical
progress that were associated with industrialization in Western Europe and in North
America from roughly 1830 until World War I” was transcendent. Scott deﬁnes
high modernism as a “supreme self-conﬁdence about continued linear progress, the
development of scientiﬁc and technical knowledge, the expansion of production,
the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and,
not least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate
with scientiﬁc understanding of natural laws.” (Scott, 1998: 89) In this paper I
argue that the dams of the American West represent an important case study of high
modernism. This high modernism that was so well-characterized by the proposal
and construction of Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams, began to crumble in the
1950s. The rise of an environmentalist discourse allowed a successful contestation
of the Echo Park and Split Mountain Dams in Dinosaur National Monument in Utah.
The Social and Historical Context: Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams
Intense battles marked the beginnings of the debates, actual construction, and
even the dedication of Boulder Dam. First proposed by Mark Rose and the Imperial
Irrigation District in 1911, the dam was fought over by western states, debated by
farmers, power companies, media moguls, Congress, and Bureau of Reclamation
engineers. Finally approved in 1928, and constructed from 1931-1935, Boulder
Dam established the foundation for state-building discourses that were infused with
the rhetoric of dominating nature and subordinating it to human ends. The Colorado
River was variously described as a “tyrant,” a “raging river,” and a “natural
menace.” In order to overcome nature-imposed barriers, the Bureau of Reclamation,
Congress, and several Presidents of the U.S. acted (sometimes in concert sometimes
at cross-purposes) to convert the river to a “natural resource.”
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This conversion occurred as much through discursive deconstruction and
reconstruction as it did through the actual building of the dam in the river. The
discursive construction of the Colorado River as a natural resource contained
elements of appreciation for nature as a productive force as well as a deprecation
of nature as “red in tooth and claw.” The discursive construction of the river also
included strong elements of state-building rhetoric that characterized the river as
a potentially useful resource, a key element in the building of an empire in the
American West. Various social groups fought over how this empire was to be
built—and who would beneﬁt from the resources. Private capital battled for control
of the electricity, local farmers and their Congressional delegates fought for water
rights, and the many Depression Era jobless jockeyed for employment while union
activists struggled to organize them. At Boulder Dam, the ﬁrst of the high dams
in the West, it was the state-sponsored plan that won out at Boulder:2 the federal
government would put forward the money and the design, private capital would
contract to build the dam, power would be leased to private utility companies for
distribution, and through several strikes and work actions the job site would remain
non-unionized.
Boulder Dam inaugurated a golden age of dam building in the United States,
dated loosely from 1930 through 1960. In his journalistic style, Marc Reisner called
this time “the Go-Go years” (Reisner 1986), while the more academic Lawrence
Lee calls it the “Second Phase of Reclamation” (Lee 1980). Boulder Dam started
this period as the ﬁrst high dam proposed and built explicitly for multiple purposes.
The legal and technical groundwork established with Boulder Dam determined
the course of the other large dams; similarly, the social and political maneuvering
required to construct Boulder Dam informed the discourses around Grand Coulee
and Glen Canyon.
High dams in the West were also an outgrowth of the changing sociopolitical landscape. Beyond the geographical and physical variation (Grand Coulee
in the Paciﬁc Northwest versus Boulder and Glen Canyon in the southwestern
desert), the dams differ in important respects in the discourse pertaining to their
proposal and construction due to this differing social and political context. Different
groups boosted or contested each project for different reasons. The discursive
legitimation of the dams required different techniques in each area. Similarly, the
solution to political problems of Boulder Dam would set a path for how later dams
were negotiated.
Within the discourse around the proposal and construction of Grand Coulee
Dam, we can hear the echoes of debates over Boulder. Begun just after Boulder
Dam (1931-36), Grand Coulee (1933-41) beneﬁted from popular conﬁdence in such
projects, a positive governmental climate towards public works, and technological
achievements invented at Boulder. Built on the successful legal foundations of
the Colorado River Compact and other enabling decisions, Grand Coulee was also
completed by some of the same construction companies and many of the same
workers who built Boulder. The continuities are certainly strong, but the contrasts
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are also important: local boosters, absent at Boulder, were key to the success of
Grand Coulee Dam.
The discourses at
Grand Coulee are both
competing and overlapping,
but all were built on
particular constructions of a
nature-society relationship
that enabled human
domination of the Columbia
36.1. These U.S. Postage
River, exempliﬁed in Woody
stamps of Boulder Dam (1935)
Guthrie’s lyrics “that wild
and Grand Coulee Dam (1952)
demonstrate the strong interest
and wasted stream.” These
of the government in presenting these iconic structures
discourses about nature were
to the American Public, among whom interest was high at
based in an ideology that
the time.
helped construct the river as
something to be dominated by humans. The river was seen as a wild entity—but one
that could nonetheless be harnessed by human endeavor. High modernist discourses
characterized much of these rhetorical styles used at Grand Coulee. The dam was
part of an imperialist vision and was to be built by the federal government as part
of a plan to settle and build up the West. These typical state building goals were,
under a period of high modernism, implemented using the scientiﬁc and rational
engineering techniques that would carry the region, and therefore the nation, along
the linear path of progress.
The discourses around Grand Coulee Dam are important in two respects.
First, as with Boulder, the lack of an oppositional discourse precluded the possibility
that the dam would not be built. Second, the discourses also expose a set of
constructions of nature and the nature-society relationship.
I call the discourses at Grand Coulee
“imperialistic,” following the terms used
by the boosters themselves.3 Imperialistic
discourses justiﬁed the dam in terms of
building an empire, extending civilization,
and made special use of ideas such as
manifest destiny. Different groups used
this category differently: the national-level
discussions were centered around a fairly
pure imperialistic high-modernist discourse,
while the local proponents fought over
speciﬁc proposals for the dam using differing
styles of imperialistic high modernist
rhetoric and individualistic capitalist
rhetoric. While the elite groups used an
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individualistic capitalist discourse that was suffused with the values of unfettered
competition and a strong opposition to federal intervention, the local boosters
argued from a high modernist perspective that valued the interventions of the state in
building large-scale water systems that could not be achieved by local capital alone.
It is worth noting that all of these discourses were in favor of some form of the dam,
none were opposed to building the dam.
The discourses of the two main adversarial groups precluded any discussion
of not building a dam. The competition between discourses was instead over
who would build the dam and what it would look like. Not only did the statesponsored, high-modernist plan win approval, but those who were opposed to a
state-sponsored plan eventually backed it in order to get their part of the beneﬁts.
Even those one might imagine would protest the dam supported it. Local Indian
tribes, whose land was inundated by the dam’s reservoir, supported the dam due to
the promise of water and hydropower beneﬁts. Farmers, who faced competition
if new lands were brought into production, supported the dam due to its cheap
hydropower. Labor unions, a group that often opposed non-unionized public works,
supported the project because of the need for jobs. Woody Guthrie, erstwhile
opponent of government, church, and
capitalism, supported the dam because
of jobs, power, and irrigation. Like all
hegemonic ideologies, high modernism
was largely successful because it could
absorb resistance and suppress dissent, but
rhetorical techniques are not the only ways
of co-opting dissent of course. Detractors
were curbed in part by practical and
political considerations.
As well as exposing the ability
of high modernism to absorb resistance,
the imperialistic discourses also expose a
particular construction of a nature-society
relationship. The rhetorical strategies
employed at Grand Coulee by Rufus
Woods, James O’Sullivan, and so many
others portray nature in complex ways,
but ways that always reveal an attitude of
domination on the part of humans.
Woods, for example, declared that
“Nature” was on the side of the pumping
plan developers. Nature had provided
the perfect location, and had even built a
canal seemingly just for the purposes of
the human inhabitants of the area. This

36.2. Rufus Woods was a tireless
promoter of Grand Coulee Dam and the
Columbia Basin Project.
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characterization of nature points to the complexity of the nature-society relationship
as understood by many of the proponents of Grand Coulee Dam. The dam was at
once intended by nature, and yet the Columbia River was seen as a mighty force
that was nearly impossible to subdue. Humans could harness the river, but it would
take an awesome effort. Nature was clearly an active force in his plan: nature was
capable of building canals, carving out a reservoir, and providing an ideal dam
site. This characterization of nature points to the complexity of the nature-society
relationship as understood by many of the proponents of Grand Coulee Dam. The
dam was at once intended by nature and yet the Columbia River was seen as a
mighty force that was nearly impossible to subdue. The gendered character of this
relationship of domination is inescapable: it is almost as if nature is inviting humans
(men) to subdue it (her).
Yet nature was also seen as wild, powerful, and a formidable opponent.
Much of the imperialistic rhetoric was obsessed with describing the wild power of
the river, albeit in terms of its potential. The river was characterized as the “wildest
big stream in the civilized world,” and the attempt to harness it would be nearly
impossible, “a waste of time an’ money.” Thus nature was also an active force
as well as one that invited humans to dominate it. What are we to make of this
complexity and near contradiction? In part, it stems from the contradictory character
of the discourses used: imperialism implies domination—both of nature and of
other humans—while locals also tended to see their land as blessed by God, and the
inhabitants (or immigrants) as a chosen people. Thus nature is simultaneously a
resistant force that must be overcome as well as a beneﬁcial force that helps humans
toward their glory and destiny.
If the boosters of the dam manipulated interpretations of empirical facts
regarding nature to make the dam seem blessed (or at least easy to build), then what
does it matter whether nature is a positive or a negative force, whether imperialistic
and Hebraic discourses are contradictory? This is to say, in the end the dams were
built and most of the competing social groups came out ahead. If so, why did the
competing discourses matter? These competing discourses were all self-interested.
The imperialistic and Hebraic discourses were both heavily disposed towards a
society-centered philosophy. In fact, there were no oppositional discourses that
were not self-interested until the rise of the environmentalist discourse during the
Glen Canyon debate. Until this powerful environmentalist discourse emerged, there
was no apparent opposition, or at least no discursive grounds to root opposition in.
Lacking this powerful discursive grounding, the ideology of high modernism was
transcendent
Harnessing the Colorado: The Bureau’s Grand Plan
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Bureau of Reclamation built dams at
an incredible pace throughout the West. Rivers by the hundreds were dammed for
single and multiple purposes as the Bureau rode a wave of public and governmental
approval. This golden age of dam building was overseen by Commissioners of
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Reclamation Michael Strauss and Floyd Dominy, who pursued further construction
with great zeal. One major aim of the Bureau was the total development of the
upper and lower Colorado.
In 1946 the Bureau of Reclamation published its plans for this total
development of the Colorado River. The ponderous title of the document conveys
the enormity of its contents: The Colorado River: A Comprehensive Report on the
Development of the Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin for Irrigation,
Power Production, and Other Beneficial Uses in Arizona, California, Colorado,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. (Bureau of Reclamation 1946) This
report reuses the label given to the Colorado 25 years before when Boulder Dam
was proposed, the epigram printed on the cover of the report reads: “A natural
menace becomes a national resource.” This continuity in discourse is important.
The Bureau, with its comprehensive report, was attempting to continue its successful
development of the Colorado and the West through what had become standard
rhetorical techniques. The discourses used at Boulder and Grand Coulee were
unquestioningly reused to boost the Glen Canyon and Echo Park dams in the upper
Colorado Basin project.4
The report outlined a total of 134 projects (including dams, canals,
diversions, and pumping systems) in the upper and lower Colorado Basin, totaling
$2,185,442,000. Included in these were proposals for dams at Echo Park, Split
Mountain, and Glen Canyon. In the report, the Bureau outlines the justiﬁcations for
such a massive series of projects:
Future development of the water resources of the Colorado River Basin
is needed to relieve economic distress in local areas, to stabilize highly
developed agricultural areas, and to create opportunities for agricultural
and industrial growth and expansion throughout the Colorado River Basin.
(Bureau of Reclamation 1946: 21)

The Bureau used a typical rhetoric of economic progress to justify its proposals.
It emphasized the industrial and agricultural growth that will be spurred by the
projects, as well as the relief of local economic distress. Such arguments had
become, by the late 1940’s, standard techniques for legitimation. The Bureau’s new
projects, however, would be both bigger and, it argued, more beneﬁcial.
For example, in their 1946 proposal, the Bureau claimed that the cost to
beneﬁt ratio was higher than 1.0. “These beneﬁts indicate that a basin-wide plan for
full development of the water resources could return to the Nation $1.30 for each
dollar required to construct, maintain, and operate the projects” (ibid. 1946: 18).
And yet, the Bureau did identify some cause for hesitation. Through a
careful reading of the document it is clear that the Bureau admits “there is not
enough water available in the Colorado River system for full expansion of existing
and authorized projects and for all potential projects outlined in the report” (ibid
1946: 21). So why did the Bureau propose them if there was not enough water?
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The answer may be that the Bureau saw the Colorado River as teetering on
the brink. With just a small ($2 billion) nudge, the Bureau could knock the Colorado
into the realm of completely harnessed. The Bureau argued that:
Yesterday the Colorado River was a natural menace. Unharnessed it tore
through deserts, ﬂooded ﬁelds, and ravaged villages. It drained the water
from the mountains and plains, rushed it through sun-baked thirsty lands,
and dumped it into the Paciﬁc Ocean—a treasure lost forever. Man was
on the defensive. He sat helplessly by to watch the Colorado River waste
itself, or attempted in vain to halt its destruction (ibid. 1946: 25).

The Bureau here was engaged in the discursive construction of the river. The
river was simultaneously a powerful actor (“a natural menace”) and also an entity
that was treasured as a potential economic resource. The justiﬁcation based on an
imperial modernist ideology of expansion and development by the federal state for
the utilitarian beneﬁt of all society was founded in such a rhetorical construction. It
is no mistake that only “villages” populate the area through which this unharnessed
resource travels. The state was interested in building up civilization in these areas—
never mind that Los Angeles, San Diego, and Phoenix were already sprawling
metropolises at the time.
Man was portrayed as defensive against the active river, but through
courageous action, the river can be tamed:
Today this mighty river is recognized as a national resource. It is a lifegiver, a power producer, a great constructive force. Although only partly
harnessed by Boulder Dam and other ingenious structures, the Colorado
River is doing a gigantic job. Its water is providing opportunities for
many new homes and for the growing of new crops that help to feed this
nation and the world. Its power is lighting homes and cities and turning
the wheels of industry. Its destructive ﬂoods are being reduced. Its muddy
waters are being cleared for irrigation and other uses (ibid. 1946: 25).

The river had been tamed and transformed through the beneﬁcent hand of the state.
The Colorado now gave life rather than taking it. It had been put to work, had built
new homes, gardens, and ﬁelds, contributing to national prosperity. The proper role
of the river had been achieved, with a little help from humankind. And yet the job
was not done, according to the Bureau.
The river was only partially harnessed. Given the terriﬁc beneﬁts gained
already, what a shining future the river had before it:
Tomorrow the Colorado River will be utilized to the very last drop. Its
water will convert thousands of additional acres of sagebrush desert to
ﬂourishing farms and beautiful homes for servicemen, industrial workers,
and native farmers who seek to build permanently in the West. Its
terrifying energy will be harnessed completely to do an even bigger job in
building bulwarks for peace. Here is a job so great in its possibilities that
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only a nation of free people have the vision to know that it can be done and
that it must be done. The Colorado River is their heritage (ibid. 1946: 25).

In this amazing nationalistic passage, the Bureau claimed legitimacy for its
state-building proposals through the great prosperity to be gained from further
development. The 134 dams and canals in its proposal were labeled as the heritage
of past Americans, those free frontiersmen who worked so hard to build upon the
vision of manifest destiny. The Colorado River remained a “part of America’s
frontier” (ibid. 1946: 71), the inheritance of all Americans, whom the Bureau
glowingly called “empire builders” (ibid. 1946: 45).
The Bureau’s grand plan had many supporters; most prominent was the State
of Arizona. Ofﬁcials from Arizona used the same discourse of imperial modernism
to boost Glen Canyon Dam. Arguing that although the dam was long overdue, it
was required to bring development to their state. In April 1957, for example, Desert
Magazine described the beneﬁts to arise from Glen Canyon Dam, using similar
rhetoric as the Bureau (Murbarger 1957):
When man erects a mighty dam across the Colorado River at Glen Canyon
. . . a new era will dawn. . . . A city will rise from the desert ﬂoor; new
factories will turn their wheels with power from the impounded water.

The building of the dam was hailed as the start of a new era, one ﬁlled with
prosperity for the population and industry. The article further boosted the dam
with discussions of the beneﬁts of recreation on the reservoir and the huge areas of
shoreline that would be created by the lake for tourists to explore.
The Phoenix periodical Action published an article in its October 1957 issue
boosting the dam, arguing that the long range beneﬁts for Arizona were clear:
No doubt about it, northern Arizona, particularly Flagstaff, will beneﬁt
from the building of the Glen Canyon Dam. Phoenix, because of its
strategic position in the state’s economic pie, will also beneﬁt.

Arizona boosters focused on the economic beneﬁts that the dam would produce,
combined in part with ﬂood control. The discourse they used to do so was strikingly
similar to that of the imperial modernist discourse used at Boulder and Grand
Coulee. Echoing the Bureau of Reclamation’s recycling of a successful discourse,
the Arizona supporters discursively constructed the river as an economic resource
that was ﬁnally being developed so as to bring Arizona what was due.
In what appears to be an attempt to counter protests about the building of the
dam, some periodicals engaged in discourse that constructed the area as a wasteland.
In February of 1957 the magazine Western Construction argued that:
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The entire area is a vast expanse of wasteland, uninhabited except for a few
ranchers on the northwest side of the river and scattered Indian families on
a reservation to the southeast (McClellan 1957: 29).

In fact, the Navajo Nation Reservation (the largest in the U.S.) had thousands of
inhabitants and one of the most developed rangeland economies of any reservation.
The construction of the area as one that could easily be sacriﬁced can be seen as a
response to the environmentalist discourse highlighted in the next section.
The Bureau of Reclamation and its allies in civil society recycled many of
the rhetorical strategies that were successful in the 1920s and 1930s for boosters
of the Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams. This state-building discourse combines
legitimation through the interpretation of history (frontiersmen of vision who built
a foundation for the future) with the rational application of science and technology
to beneﬁt all society (reduction of a ﬂood menace, improvement of an economic
resource). This combination allowed the discursive reconstruction of the Colorado
River into a natural economic resource. The river was tamed and harnessed and put
to work for society.
The only problem with this discourse was its overuse; the Bureau could
have had no idea that this was reducing the efﬁcacy of the discourse, for it had been
so successful in the past. A new way of thinking about nature was growing in the
American West, however, and its rise eclipsed the Bureau’s dominance in western
development.
Chanting down Echo Park
The environmentalist discourse used to oppose Echo Park and Split
Mountain Dams in the 1950s was not actually new. It was a derivation of the
nature-as-aesthetic-resource argument that John Muir unsuccessfully used from 1907
to 1913 in ﬁghting the Hetch Hetchy Dam in California. In fact, elements of its
expression can be seen in works that date back at least 120 years (Nash 1967/1982).
John Muir was one of the ﬁrst advocates of wilderness preservation in the Sierra
Nevada Mountains of California and Nevada. His founding of the Sierra Club in
1892 was partially in response to the conversion of Yosemite State Park into the
second National Park. As stated in a 1911 bulletin, the Club’s goals were primarily
to “take the lead in all matters involving the preservation of the wonderful natural
scenery which California is so fortunate as to possess, and in calling the attention of
the world to these wonders” (Sierra Club 1911).5
In 1908 these goals were threatened by the proposal of a dam in Hetch
Hetchy Valley, adjacent to Yosemite Valley and partially within the Park boundaries.
Muir led the battle to save Hetch Hetchy Valley, arguing in a 1908 letter to Sierra
Club members that Yosemite and Hetch Hetchy held an “unrivalled aggregation
of scenic features” and that it should be “preserved in pure wilderness for all time
for the beneﬁt of the entire nation” (Muir 1908). Muir argued that the government
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should respect the boundaries of Yosemite National Park, or else all such boundaries
would be meaningless. In the end, Muir’s battle was lost, and San Francisco built
a dam for its municipal water supply in Hetch Hetchy Valley. But this oppositional
discourse was resurrected forty years later by very group that Muir had founded—a
discourse that placed inherent aesthetic value in nature.
The 1946 proposal by the Bureau of Reclamation to build a set of dams
at Echo Park and Split Mountain, as part of the grand plan to develop the Upper
Colorado River Basin, would back water into Dinosaur National Monument.
Bernard DeVoto broke this story of a latter-day Hetch Hetchy in the 22 July 1950
issue of the Saturday Evening Post. From his regular Harper’s column “The Easy
Chair,” DeVoto had denounced cattle barons and Bureau of Land Management
grazing leases (Thomas 2000). DeVoto’s article “Shall We Let Them Ruin Our
National Parks?” was a similarly incendiary piece, full of ﬁghting energy and
inﬂammatory rhetoric. Under the large-font title, the piece opens with a mid-sizedfont sentence in offset text asking, “Do you want these wild splendors kept intact
for your kids to see? Then watch out for the Army Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation—because right where the scenery is, that’s where they want to build
dams” (DeVoto 1950:17).
DeVoto challenges the democracy under which we ostensibly live:
No one has asked the American people whether they want their sovereign
rights, and those of their descendants, in their own publicly reserved beauty
spots wiped out (ibid. 1950:17).

DeVoto’s warning cry to Americans not to let the engineers of the Bureau
perpetrate this crime against “unspoiled natural beauty” continued with an
admonition: “No one can doubt that the public, if told all the facts and allowed to
express its will, would vote to preserve the parks from any alteration now or in the
future” (ibid. 1950:17).
DeVoto’s muckraking article argues quite clearly that Americans
would never choose to let this go forward, if only they knew. The piece is a bit
disingenuous, for the Bureau engineers were not trying to pull the wool over
anyone’s eyes. They were in communication with the Park Service throughout
the planning stages, and fully believed that the reservoirs represented a beneﬁcial
recreational opportunity for Americans. DeVoto, however, disagreed with this
assessment. To DeVoto, the area was perfect as it was, and should not be altered in
any way. If given all the facts, DeVoto argued, Americans would not support the
project.
Amidst half-page photographs of Dinosaur National Monument, DeVoto
goes on to describe the scenic quality of the area as well as the ruin that it will
become. Though he never explicitly compares the Dinosaur case to Hetch Hetchy,
DeVoto’s article proved quite signiﬁcant to groups like the Sierra Club. The
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Reader’s Digest reprinted the article later in 1950, and Martin Litton, reporter for the
Los Angeles Times, wrote several articles exploring the case in more depth. It was
this series of articles outlining the imposition on a wilderness area that caught the
attention of David Brower, Executive Director of the Sierra Club (Litton 1992).
Brower took the lead in opposing the dam in Echo Park, seeing in the
ﬁght the possibility of redeeming Muir’s loss at Hetch Hetchy nearly forty years
before. Brower assembled a coalition of individuals and groups committed to
keeping national parks and monuments free from development. He led the ﬁght
by coordinating a massive letter-writing campaign and helping to publish many
pamphlets and several books. Among the many notable ﬁgures involved in the ﬁght
were wilderness photographers Eliot Porter and Ansel Adams, novelist Wallace
Stegner, and publisher Alfred A. Knopf.
Brower was very concerned about the encroachment of a reservoir into a
national monument, and he recruited Wallace Stegner to edit a book on the Dinosaur
situation, in an attempt to bring national attention to the cause, to be published by
Alfred K. Knopf (Thomas 2000: 164). This Is Dinosaur: Echo Park Country and
Its Magic Rivers combined the writing talents of Stegner, Knopf, and several others
with thirty-six striking photographs of the region, six of which took advantage of the
new, and expensive, full-color printing technology. The book’s aim was to introduce
people to this little-visited area, and to convince them that it was worth saving.
Wallace Stegner’s contribution discussed the history of the national
monument, an “almost ‘unspoiled’” wilderness area. With his deep understanding
of the intertwining of human history and natural environment, Stegner notes that
Dinosaur National Monument is a “palimpsest of human history, speculation, rumor,
fantasy, ambition, science, controversy, and conﬂicting plans for use, and these
human records so condition our responses to the place that they contain a good part
of Dinosaur’s meaning” (ibid. 1955: 3).
In describing the area, Stegner talks lovingly of “cliffs and sculptured forms
[that] are sometimes smooth, sometimes fantastically craggy, always massive” that
“have a peculiar capacity to excite the imagination; the effect on the human spirit is
neither numbing or awesome, but warm and inﬁnitely peaceful” (ibid. 1955: 4).
Stegner’s call for wilderness protection came at a time when he was still
relatively unknown as a writer. In 1955 his important early work The Big Rock
Candy Mountain was ten years old, and he had just ﬁnished his nonﬁction novel
on John Wesley Powell’s adventurous exploration of the Colorado, Beyond the
Hundredth Meridian. His Pulitzer Prize winning novel Angle of Repose would not
be written until ﬁfteen years later. Stegner was taking a chance by being politically
outspoken. He was, as Thomas argues, in some ways attempting to ﬁll the role
left empty by the death of his friend Bernard DeVoto in 1955 (Thomas 2000: 166).
Alfred A. Knopf was, in many ways, taking a bigger chance.
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Knopf published This Is Dinosaur and presumably put forward much of the
capital needed for the expensive camera work. His chapter, entitled “The National
Park Idea,” argues forcefully for preservation of wilderness areas for both people
and wildlife. The national park “is not a resort, though there will always be those
who try to make it so. And the very special purposes of recreation, education,
refreshment, and inspiration for which Parks and Monuments have been set aside
prohibit many economic uses which are thoroughly legitimate elsewhere”
(ibid. 1955: 85). Knopf argued that there were many other places where such
economic purposes could be pursued, but that National Parks and Monuments had to
be defended categorically and on general principle, or else all such areas would be
threatened in the future.
After arguing philosophically for the preservation of Dinosaur National
Monument, Knopf argued from logic. Such a threat is not just temporary, but
permanent:
If you ﬂood a canyon, as it is proposed to ﬂood the Dinosaur canyons with
dams at Echo Park and Split Mountain, that canyon is gone forever, buried
ﬁrst under water and eventually under silt (ibid. 1955: 86-87).

Much of the piece is spent arguing against perceptions of the American
public about the southwestern lands (exempliﬁed in articles such as the one
previously quoted from Western Construction). Knopf is at pains to point out that
Dinosaur is not expendable wasteland, not a proﬁtless desert, but a scenic
resource of incalculable value that has been preserved this long precisely
because of its inaccessibility. . . . Dinosaur deserves to be more visited.
. . . That is all it would take, that democratic groundswell, to insure that
Dinosaur and the other superlative places will be passed on, unimpaired, to
our grandchildren’s grandchildren (ibid. 1955: 93).

Knopf ends by calling on the legitimacy of history and the myth of democratic
America. Americans are wise people, and can see value when it is shown to them.
They deserve their heritage, and so do their grandchildren. This treasure can be
saved through the use of our democratic powers to stop the tyrannical exercise of
authority by a faceless bureaucratic agency.
Knopf and Stegner’s book enjoyed quite a good reception. It is styled as
a coffee-table book, and was sold all over the country through Knopf’s powerful
distribution channels. In combination with the massive letter-writing campaign that
Brower organized through the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and the Isaac
Walton League, the ﬁght for Dinosaur ranged from American’s living rooms to
Capitol Hill.
Brower initiated a storm of protest over the proposed dam at Echo Park,
a key element of which was the ﬂooding of the Department of Interior and
Congressional Representatives with letters of outrage. Letters were addressed
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to President Eisenhower, Secretary of Interior Douglas McKay, and individual
Senators and Representatives. Most letters were forwarded to the Secretary of
Interior, who cataloged many of them, now collected at the National Archives and
Records Administration. The catalog for 1954 contained a listing of 2,875 letters
that the department received that year. The letters are signed by individuals writing
as rangers, lawyers, citizens, or members of conservation groups. All of these
letters exhibit some form of an environmentalist discourse, often combined with an
economic argument, such as evaporation problems, cost-beneﬁt arguments, and even
the perception that hydropower was obsolete due to the expansion of atomic energy
(perhaps a very un-environmental argument).
The environmentalist discourse that the proposed dam at Echo Park brought
out was focused on the quality of the place in and of itself. The construction of
the river canyon as an economic resource was resisted vociferously. Instead, the
river, the canyon, and the entire area were discursively constructed as a natural
and aesthetic resource that was of such value for recreation and inspiration that to
destroy it for economic purposes would be a great evil.6 Letter writers sounded this
tone over and over, in many creative ways.
This environmentalist discourse was straightforwardly exempliﬁed by
Edward Thatcher of Eugene, Oregon (8 March 1954), who cited the “magniﬁcent
natural beauty” of Dinosaur National Monument. Thatcher argued that the
proposed Echo Park Dam would inundate the “canyon scenery and rock formations
incomparable in their value to citizens of this country.”7
Russell D. Butcher of Millbrook, New York, spent a bit more time
explicating his position. On 15 January 1955 Mr. Butcher wrote to the President,
saying that he was “greatly disturbed” and that
it is my belief that this country should protect its great parks from
commercial and private developments. . . . I do not consider any one
of these plans to be of great enough importance, or without perfectly
good alternatives, to warrant a breaking away from park principles—of
keeping them “intact and in their entirety for the enjoyment, education,
and inspiration of all the people for all time.” Also, because these park
service areas comprise only about one-half of one per cent of the entire
U.S., I truly believe that we should preserve them as a last remnant of the
once vast primeval America. . . . It is merely opening the way for further
encroachment upon other areas. It is very easy to visualize a slow eating
away of the park system, as one by one they are opened up to commercial
interests. I believe therefore, that we should start thinking about this
problem now before we suddenly ﬁnd ourselves without any of these ﬁne
parks; that we should pass them on to the next generations, unspoiled.

Vera Moran, of Santa Rosa, California, was not nearly as congenial and
circumspect as many writers. Ms. Moran wrote to Secretary McKay saying:
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Those who want to beneﬁt themselves by stealing public resources—
whether forests, parks, national monuments-or however derogated—are
Public Enemies
Of the United States
When they get through with it, America the Beautiful will no longer be
beautiful—it will be stripped and stark.
. . . protect the public and public interests by saying to these predators and
public enemies:
Keep Out!!

Such arguments about the splendid beauty of Dinosaur were clearly
heart-felt. Many writers went even further in their claims about the uniqueness
of the area. A. Weston Niemela, of the Chemketan Conservation Committee, a
conservation group within the Oregon Indian tribe, wrote on 5 March 1955 that
“Many of us in the Chemeketans have been to the Monument and can testify to
its unique beauty; as an area of recreational and spiritual value it could never be
replaced.” In the nuanced version of the Chemeketans discourse, the uniqueness of
this area in terms of its beauty and recreational qualities is combined with a spiritual
element. The spiritual aspect of their discourse makes a larger set of claims that
evokes John Muir’s idea of nature as a cathedral for worship: inundation equals
desecration.
On 28 April 1955 Eleanor Roosevelt Elkott, of Birmingham, Michigan,
wrote to the President, saying
The United States is a big country. The citizens derive spiritual and moral
strength from their land—touring, camping, ﬁshing, golﬁng. It is not fair
for citizens who believe in freedom and democracy to be overuled [sic]
by men sitting in ofﬁces who want to make money. . . . We must not build
Echo Park Dam.

Her association of golﬁng with spirituality not withstanding, Ms. Elkott makes a
case that was echoed by many writers.
The preservationist argument tended to be a popular environmentalist
discourse that cited the spiritual, recreational, and inspirational qualities of
wilderness in general and the American Southwest in particular. The letter writers
intensely resisted the construction of the Monument as a wasteland or as an
economic resource. Instead, they saw the canyons and the rivers as an incomparable
aesthetic resource that should not be squandered in the name of progress and
economic development.
In the face of nearly 3,000 letters, Secretary McKay could respond only
with a formula letter, citing the complexity of the situation. He acknowledged the
“vexing situation” and its complex of contested views and interests. His position,
though, in the face of this ﬁrst wave of letters remained steadfast. It would take a
larger coordination of national groups to sway him. In combination with published
books and letter-writing campaigns, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and
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the National Park Association, continually published updates and excoriations of
the Department of the Interior, the President, and the Bureau of Reclamation in
their house organs: Sierra Club Bulletin, Living Wilderness, and National Parks
Magazine.
Starting in 1954 and continuing without abatement for a full year, in its
Bulletin the Sierra Club published articles, editorials, and photographs of Dinosaur
National Monument. The Sierra Club argued unrelentingly against the dam at Echo
Park, discursively constructing the river as a natural aesthetic resource worth saving.
The Sierra Club called members to action with direct textual requests and by
the presentation of images. The cover of the February 1954 issue of the Sierra Club
Bulletin carried an image of the Yampa River as it ﬂowed through an area called
Rainbow Recess in Dinosaur National Monument. Underneath was the headline in
large font “Trouble in Dinosaur” and some short text describing the
primitive paradise unequalled anywhere . . . a unique gem of the
National Park System . . . are needlessly threatened. You can prevent the
destruction. Men of vision saved this place for us. Now it’s turnabout.

Underneath this text reads a large, underlined font “URGENT: Please read this issue
now—and lend a hand.”
The Wilderness Society, in a coordinated effort, sent the February 1954
issue of the Sierra Club Bulletin to their members with an additional message on
the cover: “The Wilderness Society sends you this issue to stress the urgent need to
act promptly.” The lead article in this issue is entitled “Two Wasteful Dams—Or a
Great National Park?” and argued forcefully against the need for them, contrasting
this with the great inherent value of the place itself. Highlighting the aesthetic value
of the area, the article quoted the National Park Service in saying that “the effects
upon ‘irreplaceable … values of national signiﬁcance would be deplorable’”
(Sierra Club 1954: 3). The article continued by arguing that there were alternative
sites, that the Secretary of Agriculture is currently worried about surpluses, and
most importantly, that the “proposed Echo Park and Split Mountain dams would
destroy the park value of Dinosaur; the unique would give way to the commonplace
and would imperil the entire Park System” (ibid. 1954: 4). To the argument that
the reservoirs would make the area more accessible to tourists, the author responded
by pointing out that this would be true: “you can look at part of the setting
[the highest 100 feet of exposed canyon]—after we’ve lost the priceless gem”
(ibid. 1954: 4). The discourse used to defend Echo Park and Dinosaur National
Monument continually reverted to a defense of the “priceless” aesthetic quality of
the place. Nature, the Sierra Club argued, was irreplaceable, while the reservoirs
had plausible alternatives.
The National Park Service, in an extraordinary conﬂict within the
Department of Interior, fought strenuously against the Bureau of Reclamation plans
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for Dinosaur National Monument, dovetailing its arguments with the Sierra Club
and the Wilderness Society. Though much of this conﬂict remained hidden from
public view, some of it was apparent, and the results of the conﬂict can be seen in
the subsequent restructuring of the National Park Service after the decision to drop
the Echo Park and Split Mountain Dams.
Early in the process of developing the grand plan of the Bureau of
Reclamation, the National Park Service appears not to have been concerned with
the encroachment on the Monument that would occur due to the building of the two
dams in Utah. In fact, a “memorandum of understanding” between the Bureau of
Reclamation and the National Park Service, dated 4 November 1941, indicated that
the “The Dinosaur National Monument region and its water control possibilities”
is a most vital area for study.8 Furthermore, “concerning the Dinosaur National
Monument region, it seems not improbable that a policy similar to that already
agreed to in principle for the Grand Canyon National Monument situation could be
applied. Although legislation would be required in both cases to effect this policy,
i.e., change the status of the areas from monument to recreational areas, the National
Park Service does not believe such legislation would be difﬁcult to secure.” This
change in status would allow development; a recreational area is a lesser category
that does not limit usage the way that a National Park or Monument does.
Even through January of 1954, just before the Sierra Club issued its call
to action, the Park Service was still interested in budgetary allocations from the
Department of Interior so as to improve the section where the reservoirs would
be located. In an internal memorandum, the Park Service estimated a cost of
$21,000,000 needed to improve the recreational facilities, including boating and
swimming.
The Park Service was interested, no doubt, in making the best of a situation.
At this point, the Secretary of Interior and the President were both set on moving
forward with the Bureau’s plans. In the face of this apparent juggernaut, the Park
Service could at least capitalize on these plans by making the area accessible and
developing it for maximum tourism.
Between 1949 and 1954, however, factions within the Park Service became
more and more concerned about the precedent set at Dinosaur. Other Reclamation
projects were being designed in or near National Parks or Monuments in Kings
Canyon (California), Glacier Park (Montana), and the Grand Canyon (Arizona).
Some Park Service ofﬁcials feared a continuing loss of power vis-à-vis the Bureau
of Reclamation. Reclamation already had a budget of more than ﬁve times the Park
Service, and some Park ofﬁcials worried that increasing their budget to develop
recreational opportunities would not be worth the trade off of the precedent of
inundating part of the Monument (Stratton and Sorotkin 1955).
As early as 1949 the conﬂict within the Park Service was apparent in some
memorandums circulated inside the Service and even forwarded to the Secretary
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of Interior. One such memo stated outright that the Monument’s “preservation in
its natural state represents its highest use” (Stratton and Sorotkin 1955: 70). The
Bureau and the Park Service continued attempts to balance their conﬂicting interests,
and contradictory memos such as the 1949 and 1954 examples above must be seen
in this light: they represent negotiations between several interest groups within the
Department of Interior.
Just how much rancor existed between the Bureau and the Service is
apparent in the accusations that the Park Service was behind the publication of
Bernard De Voto’s July 1950 article in the Saturday Evening Post. Michael Straus,
then Commissioner of Reclamation, wrote to Newton Drury, Director of the Park
Service, asking where DeVoto had gotten the photos for his article, as they were
attributed to the Park Service.
These internal confrontations and accusations destabilized the Department
of Interior and to some extent allowed Park Service personnel to coordinate with
outside groups such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. For example,
Park Service Director Drury wrote to a conservationist organization, regarding the
Park Service’s correspondence with the Bureau of Reclamation. This continued
information exchange between the two agencies would, Drury hoped, “enable us
to alert the conservationists of the Nation and more effectively with respect to
remaining threats to national park areas from dam building” (Stratton and Sorotkin
1955: 76).
In 1953, just before the public controversy exploded, some members of
the Park Service also took a long-term view of this controversy. Commenting
in a private correspondence that the conﬂict could actually improve the state of
conservation movement in the United States, one ofﬁcial wrote “I’m beginning to
think the dam controversy will prove a good thing in the long run.” The recipient
replied: “I believe it has done more to bring the various conservation groups together
than anything I can remember” (Stratton and Sorotkin 1955: 75). This assessment
of the national situation was indeed accurate, perhaps even more so than the
writer imagined. For in the next two years the public outcry took the shape of an
oppositional discourse, in part deﬁned by the National Park Service’s defense of its
preserved lands.
The National Park Service had a public sphere group that advocated for
protection and expansion of the Park System: the National Parks Association.
In their quarterly periodical National Parks Magazine, rangers and ofﬁcials
of the National Park Service joined citizens and activists in writing about the
“incomparable” loss that the Park System would suffer from the dam project,
making them “useless for monument purposes” (National Parks Association 1954:
3).
The National Parks Magazine used the same environmental discourse as
the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, with the additional legitimacy provided
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by the liberal inclusion of national and state park ofﬁcials’ statements, as well as
pro-development voices, such as the Manager of Winter Park, Colorado, Stephen
J. Bradley. Bradley wrote of his visit to Dinosaur National Monument in the April
1954 issue of National Parks Magazine, that “we were in a scenic area, the like of
which for sheer dramatic beauty—of color, form, movement and sound—I had never
experienced anywhere, and I have visited one-third of our National Parks.” The
discursive construction of the river canyons as an aesthetic treasure worth preserving
was thus propounded from many sides, public and private.
In addition to their monthly publications and organizing efforts, the Sierra
Club also internally distributed several policy manuals, guides for political action,
and a “Public Relations Primer,” with “how-to” procedures for contacting the press,
making speeches, etc. (Sierra Club 1957).
One section of this primer, entitled “misconceptions frequently encountered”
lists a speciﬁc suggestion for responding to challenges such as “The Sierra Club
opposes progress; it is always opposing dams and roads.” Readers were directed to
respond with
The Sierra Club does not blindly oppose progress, it opposes blind
progress. It opposes dams when it is proposed to build them in, or where
they will affect, dedicated scenic wilderness and wildlife areas, especially
when alternatives exist” (Sierra Club 1957: 9).

Such clear training of its members helped the Sierra Club effectively oppose the
dams at Echo Park and Split Mountain.
Unity of message, along with the
many variants offered by members and
afﬁliates in their letters to government
ofﬁcials, helped convince Secretary of the
Interior Douglas McKay to drop the dams
that would ﬂood portions of Dinosaur
National Monument. In late November
of 1955 McKay announced his decision
not to build the dams.
Regarding the victory, David
Brower noted in his diaries on 1
December 1955: “Recent events prove
that people really believe in preserving
portions of America’s original beauty—
and that the strength of their belief shapes
policy.” The victory, for David Brower,
36.3. Douglas McKay, Secretary of the
Interior during the term of Dwight D.
was sweet. It certainly conﬁrmed that
Eisenhower.
Americans could exercise some form
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of direct democracy, and that enough of them believed strongly in preservation
to sway the government. In short, he was witnessing the birth of a powerful new
discourse—one that would electrify the environmental movements in the United
States. It would, however, turn out to be a hollow victory for the Sierra Club
and environmental organizations in general, and even a personal defeat of great
signiﬁcance to Brower. In order to remove the dams at Dinosaur, the Sierra Club
was essentially locked into not protesting the great storage dam at Glen Canyon.
Though the oppositional discourse at Echo Park focused on keeping Dinosaur as a
Monument in order to preserve the wilderness area, the victory was won in part by
showing how other aspects of the upper Colorado Basin development plan could
substitute for the Echo Park and Split Mountain projects. In a letter to Secretary
McKay on 20 May 1955, David Brower asked about increasing Glen Canyon
Dam by 35 feet, pointing out that this could offset the loss of Echo Park and Split
Mountain: “Would it be physically possible to substitute for some of this storage?
…by adding 35 feet to the present 700-foot height planned for the Glen Canyon
Dam.”
Through this strategy, Brower and the Sierra Club effectively shut
themselves out of protesting Glen Canyon Dam. Many accounts at the time describe
this as an agreement or a trade off, but there is little evidence of any formal pact.
Instead, the Sierra Club had made a political mistake in granting the legitimacy
of the Glen Canyon site and the upper Colorado project as a whole by suggesting
raising the Glen Canyon Dam’s crest height to offset the loss of Echo Park and Split
Mountain. As Luna Leopold commented to Stegner and Brower: “if the Sierra Club
gets into the problem of suggesting alternatives for Echo Park and Split Mountain
Dam you are going to let yourself wide open” (Thomas 2000: 174). By granting this
legitimacy the Sierra Club could hardly ﬁght Glen Canyon Dam.
The Glen Canyon Compromise: The Place No One Knew
The victory at Echo Park was based on Brower’s own presentation to
Congress, where he made the explicit comparison to Hetch Hetchy, and told the
Representatives not to make the same mistake twice. He also went on to show how
Bureau engineers had failed in their math. Brower pointed out that the Glen Canyon
Dam could be raised in height to increase capacity and thereby make up the loss of
storage at Echo Park. The Bureau could thus back down on Echo Park while saving
its upper Colorado development plan. It was a Faustian bargain for the Sierra Club
though, as Brower soon understood, for Glen Canyon was an astoundingly beautiful
place that few people knew about.
Glen Canyon was so remote from Anglo society—there were several rough
roads to it in the Navajo Reservation to the south, but none leading to the river from
the north—that it was virtually unknown even halfway into the twentieth century.
It was in this “place that no one knew” that Glen Canyon Dam was built,
begun in 1956 and ﬁnished in 1964. The Sierra Club mourned the loss with several
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publications, most notable the coffee-table book of Eliot Porter photographs
published by the organization and edited by David Brower, The Place No One
Knew (Porter 1963). In the Foreword to the book, Brower helped to entrench the
environmentalist discourse that constructed the river and its immediate environs as a
remarkable natural aesthetic resource:
Glen Canyon died in 1963 and I was partly responsible for its needless
death. So were you. Neither you nor I, nor anyone else, knew it well
enough to insist that at all costs it should endure. When we began to ﬁnd
out it was too late (ibid. 1963: 7).

The building of a dam is equated with river death, and Brower admits culpability.
After Secretary McKay’s decision was made to remove Echo Park from
development in favor of increasing Glen Canyon Dam’s height, Brower went on
several trips down that stretch of the Colorado, and described the area as some of the
most magniﬁcent scenery he had ever seen. Porter’s camera recorded the beauty for
other Americans to see.
Eliot Porter wrote much of the text that accompanied his photographs.
When combined with the images, his words repudiate the discursive construction of
the river as a “menace” by the Bureau. The river is characterized as “serene” and
“overwhelming:”
The eye is numbed by the vastness and magniﬁcence, and passes over the
ﬁne details, ignoring them in a defense against surfeit. The big features, the
massive walls and towers, the shimmering vistas, the enveloping light, are
all hypnotizing, shutting out awareness of the particular (ibid. 1963).

The superlatives in his text are easily matched by the photographs, printed in
stunning clarity and color. Porter’s images linger on the general features for only
the ﬁrst moments and are soon caught up in the ﬁner details that were originally
overlooked. The photographer turns from the wide-angle to the macro close-up and
an intimacy of the canyon becomes apparent.
Porter continually moves between the macro and the micro in his text and his
photographs. He records what this “place that no one knew” was like before it was
inundated. The larger picture that emerges from the collection of images and text is
that of a tremendous aesthetic asset that has been lost. The work argued forcefully,
if indirectly, against the discursive construction of the river as a menace, a tyrant, or
an agent of chaos.
Another author who experienced the river before the dam was put into place
was Edward Abbey. The book that brought fame to Abbey was Desert Solitaire,
which contains a chapter called “Down the River.” This piece describes Abbey’s raft
trip through Glen Canyon all the way to the site of the dam, just as the foundation
was being poured. It opens with Abbey’s characteristic acerbity:
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The beavers had to go and build another goddamned dam on the Colorado.
Not satisﬁed with the enormous silt trap and evaporation tank called Lake
Mead (back of Boulder Dam) they have created another even bigger, even
more destructive, in Glen Canyon (ibid. 1968: 173).

Abbey’s chapter continues on, using corrosive sarcasm, to belittle the Bureau of
Reclamation and the federal government in general. In the midst of this rant, Abbey
ﬁnds time to describe the scenery in the canyon, which will be submerged under
400 feet of water in a matter of months: “white sands,” “green willows,” “a
sculptured landscape.”
The Navajo Indians also bore witness to the damming of Glen Canyon. The
Navajos were not politically well organized in the mid-1950s. They had recently
suffered a great deal of hardship due to Bureau of Indian Affairs herd reduction
programs in the late 1930s (White 1983: 313). This social disarray led to an ofﬁcial,
but essentially meaningless, approval of Glen Canyon Dam by the Navajo Tribal
Council. The Council, a group that was formed at the behest of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to handle the sale and leasing of rich oil lands on the reservation in 1927,
had very little legitimate governing power over the diverse and widespread peoples
of the reservation. They did, however, pass motions approving proposals from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (such as herd reductions) and the Bureau of Reclamation
(Glen Canyon Dam). Raymond Nakai, the Chairman of the Tribal Council at the
time that the dam was built, said “A conservationist is one who is content to stand
still forever. Major Powell would have approved of this lake. May it ever be
brimmin’ full” (McPhee 1971: 196).
Nakai’s comments notwithstanding, many Navajos did not approve of the
dam, though little of this contestation made it into the historical record. There was
signiﬁcant disagreement about the beneﬁts that would ﬂow to the Navajo. There
were many who, gesturing to history, asked what the Navajo had ever seen of other
promises made by the government. Others believed the Bureau of Reclamation
promises of hydropower and irrigation water (John 2000). In the end, the dam was
built, based in part on the approval of the Tribal Council. The Navajo have, forty
years later, not received any beneﬁts from the dam aside from increased tourism in
the area.
Though Abbey and the Navajos did not directly attack the Bureau’s
discourse, Brower, in the Foreword to The Place No One Knew, did argue against
the discursive construction of the Colorado as an economic resource:
Good men, who have plans for the Colorado River whereby “a natural
menace becomes a natural resource,” would argue tirelessly that the
Colorado must be controlled, that its energy should be tapped and sold
to ﬁnance agricultural development in the arid West. But our point here
is that for all their good intentions these men had too insular a notion of
what man’s relation to his environment should be, and it is tragic that
their insularity was heeded. The natural Colorado—what is left of it—is a
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miracle, not a menace. The menace is more likely the notion that growth
and progress are the same, and that the gross national product is the
measure of the good life (ibid. 1963: 7-8).

Brower met the Bureau’s arguments head-on. The river was not, Brower contended,
a menace. The menace instead was that constellation of forces that push for what
Brower called “blind progress”—those that rate value only by economic measures.
Brower clearly showed his bitterness in this work: his comments regarding “what
is left of” the river, the selling of energy to ﬁnance agriculture, the argument for
storage that Brower asserts is “absolutely not needed in this century, almost certainly
not needed in the next” (ibid. 1963: 7).
In the years to come, Brower and the Sierra Club would indeed have
occasion to wage battle against the Bureau’s developmentalist mindset. They fought
hard to lower the storage level of Glen Canyon so as to avoid the inundation of
Rainbow Bridge National Monument. The original height of Glen Canyon Dam
was to be 580 feet, but with the compromise it was raised to 730 feet. When it was
found that this would bring the water level to the base of Rainbow Bridge, one of
the natural wonders of the world, the Sierra Club lobbied for protection. Many
schemes were put forward, including a check dam below Rainbow Bridge to keep
the reservoir water out. Eventually the Bureau accepted a proposal to keep the water
level of the reservoir at 3700 feet above sea level, and to build the dam to just 710
feet high.
The Sierra Club’s loss at Glen Canyon may have been a high price to pay,
but the failure in many ways galvanized the new environmentalist discourse in the
United States. Since the building of Glen Canyon Dam no more high dams have
been built in the U.S. The Sierra Club was successful in stopping several more
dams on the Colorado, including two in Grand Canyon. The Club has continued to
grow in strength and purpose over the nearly four decades since the “death of Glen
Canyon.” In 1993 the Club attempted to avenge its loss of Glen Canyon by helping
to write legislation to breach the dam and restore Glen Canyon. The legislation
remains stalled, but the discourse continues to be a powerful force in America.
Conclusion: Challenging Imperialism and Avoiding the Challenge of
Environmentalism
Through the struggle to save Dinosaur National Monument, and in the
mourning of Glen Canyon, a new oppositional discourse became established. This
oppositional discourse, which I have labeled environmentalist, constructed nature as
a priceless treasure that needed to be protected from blind progress. Drawing on the
lessons learned from Muir’s failed Hetch Hetchy battle, activists successfully fought
against the intrusion into the National Park System by the Bureau of Reclamation.
They were able to discursively reconstruct a river—as an entity that had value in and
of itself, not simply something that could be economically beneﬁcial to society.
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In a dramatic shift from the lack of oppositional discourses regarding the
proposal of Boulder and Grand Coulee, a powerful new discourse was born in the
struggle over the proposal of Echo Park and the building of Glen Canyon Dam. This
discourse highlighted an inherent value that existed in nature and wilderness, a value
that was worthy of preservation over exploitation.
This shift in the valuation of nature points to a larger transformation of the
relationship between nature and society. This transformation is certainly something
that is in process, unevenly completed, and perhaps will never be as hegemonic as
imperial modernism was. This new view of the nature-society relationship, a view
based on preservation and inherent natural value, has destabilized the hegemonic
imperial modernist ideology. In offering an effectual foundation for oppositional
discourse, the environmentalist ideology has stopped the damming of the rivers
of the West, and forced society to re-examine its relationship to growth, natural
resources, and state building.
Some commentators have identiﬁed the Echo Park-Glen Canyon episode as
a signiﬁcant moment of the development of environmentalism in the late twentieth
century. Though the discourses used were not new, they were mobilized on a
massive level and in an effective way for the ﬁrst time. Gottlieb (1993: 41) notes the
historic signiﬁcance of this battle over wilderness in his book on the origins of the
modern environmental movement, and Mark Harvey (1994) picks out Echo Park as
a “symbol of wilderness” that was “a great test to the sanctity of the park system.”
(Harvey 1994: xiv) Though the use of the singular “movement” by Gottlieb
should be questioned, the importance of Echo Park and Glen Canyon for the set of
environmental movements that have blossomed in the last 40 years is clear.
The imperialistic modernist discourse about the domination of nature and
the building of a state infrastructure in the West was transcendent from at least the
early 1920s through the middle 1950s. This hegemonic discourse brought together
aspects of state building and the domination of nature (control of nature, control
of the population, and the boosting of economic development) into a monolithic
discourse that deﬁned the relationship between nature and society. With the rise of
an oppositional discourse at Echo Park and Glen Canyon, this hegemony was ﬁrst
successfully contested.
The emergence of an oppositional discourse can be seen as both a challenge
to the Bureau of Reclamation (surely this is how David Brower and Floyd Dominy
saw it), but it can also be viewed as an opportunity. The Bureau of Reclamation
could have picked up on this new and powerful social movement and taken its
concerns to heart. Indeed, there has been some change within the Bureau, but the
Bureau has hardly “gone green,” and could embrace environmental ideas to a much
larger extent than it has.
Instead, the Bureau still uses the old rhetoric of imperialism and triumph
rather than absorbing the environmentalist concerns. At the Centennial celebration
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in June 2002, the several ofﬁcial speakers continued the tone of imperialistic
discourse that was used through the middle of the twentieth century. The
Commissioner of Reclamation declared that “stability, progress and development”
are the cornerstones for the Bureau’s next 100 years. John Keys continued, relying
on notions of nationalism, declaring that “the sounds coming from the generators are
the sound of freedom.”
The Secretary of the Interior kept up the beating of the drum, declaring that
“we can do it before and can do it again.” Just what it is that the Bureau will do
remains to be seen. But it seems clear that what it has not done is take to heart the
challenges of the environmental movements of the last forty years. The Bureau
remains stuck in a discourse of imperialism, and it risks losing legitimacy in the eyes
of those who need it most: the people of the West.
Kevin Wehr is on the faculty of the Department of Sociology at California State
University–Sacramento. At the time this paper was written, he was a graduate
student in sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Routledge
published his book on this topic, America’s Fight Over Water, in 2004.

Endnotes
1.
Throughout this work I will use the term natural to indicate non-human processes, entities,
or characteristics. I counterpoise this to the term social, which exclusively involves human endeavor.
As I will discuss, however, these two realms are thoroughly imbricated in one another through history
and historical recollection and reconstruction. Thus, natural formations such as climate, geography, or
soil composition, should be differentiated from social barriers such as the ways that humans respond to
nature in the built environment. For example what is normally construed as a “natural disaster” such
as a ﬂood destroying a town is more appropriately termed a “social disaster,” for it was social decision
to place a community in a ﬂood plain.
2.
Black Canyon is the name of the site where Boulder Dam was built. The name of the dam
is after the original site, Boulder Canyon, slightly upstream from Black Canyon. In his 1922 report
to Congress, Arthur Powell Davis, Commissioner of Reclamation, suggested a dam “at or near
the vicinity of Boulder Canyon.” (Bureau of Reclamation, Albert B. Fall 1922: 21) Thus in 1928
Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Act, and the project was ofﬁcially named after Boulder Canyon
even though Black Canyon was ultimately chosen as a more appropriate site for the high dam. The
name was eventually changed to Hoover Dam by an act of Congress in 1947.
3.
The boosters of Grand Coulee Dam published many pamphlets and bulletins, gave speeches,
and wrote letters to ofﬁcials. The many documents drawn on for this work are contained in the
National Archives and Records Administration, Denver, RG115, Central Classiﬁed Files, Entry 3,
boxes 228-325, and in the archives at the University of Washington. For more detail, see Wehr, 2004.
All quotations in the following section are drawn from these sources.
4.
This is ofﬁcially known as the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP).
5.
Letters and pamphlets held in the Sierra Club Collection, Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley (Sierra Club 1911-1970).
6.
The idea of the river as an “economic resource” as opposed to a “natural” and “aesthetic”
resource is a false dichotomy. Activists constructed this binary so as to ﬁght the economic logic of
using the river for society’s ends. But what they did not recognize (or chose not to make explicit) was
that the aesthetic use of the river is just as anthropocentric as an economic use, though it may be more
sustainable. Activists did use some rhetoric about the qualities of the river in and of itself, this was
largely understood to be a beneﬁt for humanity in terms of recreation, spiritual regeneration, or simply
aesthetic pleasure. As Cronon (1996) has shown, wilderness is a human creation, a mirror that reﬂects
“our own unexamined longings and desires.”
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7.
All letters quoted in this section are held by the National Archives and Record
Administration, College Park, Maryland, Record Group 48, Central Classiﬁed Files, entry number 4-4;
boxes 360-64.
8.
This memorandum is held by the National Archives and Record Administration, College
Park, Maryland, Record Group 48, Central Classiﬁed Files, entry number 4-4; box 363.
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Writing Water in the West: Reclaiming the Language

of Reclamation
By:
Nancy Cook
My essay examines the language used to write about water in the West.
In this piece, I begin an analysis of discourses about water: ofﬁcial language vs.
literary language, bureaucratic narrative vs. personal narrative, scientiﬁc language
vs. quotidian language, wet vs. dry texts. Through the use of an extended
“glossary,” I work to include western American writers as integral to the conversation about the role of water issues in the West. The Bureau of Reclamation
(USBR) has materially changed the face of the West; yet it has just as certainly
changed the language of water in the West. Within the context of the USBR’s
history, I argue that the languages we use to talk about, write about, and analyze
water in the West are critical components of the water actions taken. How we
say what we say about water is integral to how we think about water and what we
do about it. I claim that creative writers engage water in a way that is crucial to
public policy decisions, and that richer, more dynamic, and more deeply critical
conversations must take place as we face yet another period of hydraulic crisis in
the western United States.
The glossary works to bring various discourses into play with one another,
demonstrating that ﬁrst we need an adequate hydraulic language before any
substantive analysis and change can take place. Throughout my essay, I employ
ofﬁcial discourse from sources such as Bureau of Reclamation and the United
States Geological Survey; the discourse of personal narrative and poetry from
such writers as Wallace Stegner, William Kittredge, Richard Hugo, and Ripley
Schemm; as well as my own observations. Bureaucratic discourse often operates
like an aircraft carrier turning at sea: it takes a long time to alter its course.
Creative discourses, however, respond quickly and sometimes subtly to changes
in an author’s experience, as Ivan Doig, Stegner, and others have so elegantly
shown us. These more intimate voices can articulate the local, the personal, and
the private, offering readers deeply-placed stories that render the complexity and
dynamism of water-use issues in the West. Rather than the exclusively urban,
polemicist, or public policy voices so often heard in discussions of Western water
issues, these are the voices from the West’s outback: experienced on the land,
observant of change, and cognizant of the myriad effects one simple alteration of
water policy can create.
Each of the writers I engage here resists simple binaries, inﬂated rhetoric,
and the pyrotechnics associated with other western writers such as Edward Abbey.
While Abbey’s work remains popular and important, I think we can learn more
about the history of federal land and water-use policy, about water in the West,
and about creative solutions from the more measured voices among western
writers.
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Issues of public vs. private have vexed both policy makers and western
writers for decades, and the friction between them is nowhere more apparent than
in the discourse of water rights. The arid West has more public land than any
other part of the United States, while at the same time, private property rights
have been defended most vigorously in the West. And more than any ofﬁcial
cost-beneﬁt analysis, creative juxtaposition of the language of water reveals other
parameters of any cost-beneﬁt analysis. My essay asks that we try putting varied
discourses into conversation, creating new ways of thinking about aridity, about
public and private, about rights and responsibilities as we manage a dynamic and
complicated set of hydraulic systems.
Plenty of people have claimed that aridity is the great fact of the American
West—John Wesley Powell, Walter Prescott Webb, and Wallace Stegner,
immediately come to mind. What happens if we look at the West, and western
writing using discourses of water as our lens? Instead of close readings of literary
texts, here I offer a glossary, maybe even a primer, of water and words in the
West. Stegner, among many others, suggests that humans, like other species, are
conditioned by climate and geography. What’s western about westerners? For the
moment, let’s imagine it’s our relationship to water and its words.
Ablation:
1. “The process by which ice and snow waste away owing to melting and
evaporation” (USGS website).1 2. Look up in June from any of a thousand
parched valleys, and imagine the gift of iciness. Look up again in July
from the same task and the same valley, and your dreams have evaporated.
It’s easier to imagine evaporation than melting, for your sweat has dried,
leaving a salt line that marks your labor as clearly as the snowline retreats,
recoiling from your parched and thirsty glare.2
Acre-foot.
1. “A unit for measuring the volume of water, is equal to the quantity of
water required to cover 1 acre to a depth of 1 foot and is equal to 43,560
cubic feet or 325,851 gallons. The term is commonly used in measuring
volumes of water used or stored” (USGS website). 2. How many acre-feet
for Las Vegas golf courses, fountains, the lushness of even the median
strips in San Diego, alfalfa crops, water slides, swimming pools, restaurant
water glasses, full ﬂushes, long showers, head lettuce, clean towels, car
washes? Who uses more water, one of William Kittredge’s eastern
Oregon buckaroos, or the actor who plays the cowboy on screen?
3. After the movie people leave our ranch in New Mexico, the wind takes
the porta potties and knocks them down, spilling life-giving moisture and
death-dealing disinfectant onto the parched earth. Math teaser: How many
twelve-ounce plastic bottles, half full of water from France, rolling with
the winds, taunting jackrabbit and coyote alike, does it take to cover one
acre in one foot of water?
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Arid.
1. “A term describing a climate or region in which precipitation is so
deﬁcient in quantity or occurs so infrequently that intensive agricultural
production is not possible without irrigation” (USBR website).3 2. The
deﬁning fact of the inter-mountain West. Perpetually in the rain shadow.
When I hang clothes on the line, they snap in the wind and are nearly dry
before I ﬁnish hanging them. The downpour of yesterday is invisible
today. 3. “Aridity, and aridity alone, makes the various West one. The
distinctive western plants and animals, the hard clarity (before power
plants and metropolitan trafﬁc altered it) of the western air, the look
and location of western towns, the empty spaces that separate them, the
way farms and ranches are either densely concentrated where water is
plentiful or widely scattered where it is scarce, the pervasive presence of
the federal government as landowner and land manager, the even more
noticeable federal presence as dam builder and water broker, the snarling
states’-rights and antifederal feelings whose burden Bernard DeVoto once
characterized in a sentence–‘Get out and give us more money’–those are
all consequences, and by no means all the consequences, of aridity.”4
Backwater.
1. “Water backed up or retarded in its course as compared with its natural
condition of ﬂow” (USGS website). 2. “A small, generally shallow body
of water with little or no current of its own. Stagnant water in a small
stream or inlet” (USBR website). 3. Any of the places off a state or county
road, with no stoplight to impede the ﬂow of children and dogs, sheep and
cattle, pick-ups and tractors. The places of the heart for Wallace Stegner,
Ivan Doig, William Kittredge, and Deirdre McNamer.
Claim.
1. “Asserts one’s right to.”5 2. Water claims, mining claims, proving up
a homestead claim. 3. The West does create a type, different from your
garden-variety easterner. 4. See “reclamation.”
Condensation.
1. “The process by which water changes from the vapor state into the
liquid or solid state. It is the reverse of evaporation” (USGS website).
2. A matter of faith when digging in a desert wash, visqueen sheeting in
hand, praying water will collect, that evaporation can be reversed. It takes
a long time to get a drink. 3. The process by which the ﬂood of memories
becomes words–nouns, verbs, landforms. See also Ivan Doig, Mary
Austin, and John Muir.
Consumptive waste.
1. “The water that returns to the atmosphere without beneﬁtting man.”
(Thomas, 1951, p. 217, in USGS website). 2. Virga. You watch it rain
a mile away on the valley’s western slope, and here, where cacti, not
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timothy reign, you see the atmosphere take back the rain, even as it tries
to fall your way. 3. Where snowpack goes when the river remains low,
where your alfalfa crop goes when you can’t pump from the river.
4. When your canoe runs aground every two minutes, scraping away your
conﬁdence. At least you don’t hear the irrigation pumps when the river is
low.
Control.
1. “A natural constriction of the channel, a long reach of the channel,
a stretch of rapids, or an artiﬁcial structure downstream from a gaging
station, that determines the stage-discharge relation at the gage” (USGS
website). 2. John Wesley Powell’s struggle on the Colorado, to keep the
men on the river, to reach long into the future with a watershed-based law
of ownership. 3. Glen Canyon Dam, and the lake that bears his name.
4. Edward Abbey’s Hayduke and a jeep full of dynamite. 5. The great sin
that William Kittredge writes penance for in Hole in the Sky, Taking Care,
Who Owns the West?, and here, in Owning It All:
I saw the beginnings of my real life as an agricultural manager.
The ﬂow of watercourses in the valley was spread before me
like a map, and I saw it as a surgeon might see the ﬂow of blood
across a chart of anatomy, and saw myself helping to turn the
fertile homeplace of my childhood into a machine for agriculture
whose features could be delineated with the same surgeon’s
precision in my mind.6

6. The central debate in John McPhee’s Encounters with the Archdruid.
Dam.
1. “A barrier built across a watercourse to impound or divert water. A
barrier that obstructs, directs, retards, or stores the ﬂow of water. Usually
built across a stream. A structure built to hold back a ﬂow of water”
(USBR website). Example: As children we made toy dams in the eroded
ﬁssures after a big rain. We imagined we had equipment like our father
had. We chanted “keyway, spillway, cat, riprap, carryall, scraper,” hoping
to conjure the kind of power the Connecticut Yankee had in that book
by Mark Twain. 2. The epithet used to conjure Floyd Dominy into his
appointed circle of hell.
Dominy.
The damned great Floyd, Satan in Mark Reisner’s Cadillac Desert,
dominated and controlled river ﬂows throughout the West, married reclamation to recreation, and gave us houseboats in place of “the place no one
knew,” Glen Canyon. For Dominy, Glen Canyon Dam:
Is food for growing America, drinking water for dwellers in an
arid country, electric energy to provide the comforts of life and
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to turn the wheels of industry. It is jobs and paychecks—in the
West and across the nation—and it is also taxes for the United
States Treasury.
Most significant of all, however, it is health and fun and the
contentment of contemplating Nature’s beauty for thousands who
might never experience these thrills of the outdoors if engineers
had not inserted between the steep walls of Glen Canyon a
mammoth concrete slab to control and clear the erratic river that
used to be known as the “Big Red.”7

This April Fool’s Day speech of 1965 promises that control is an absolute
good, that nature’s messy and erratic processes should follow government
interests, that the dirty “Big Red” will be cleansed, made “fun” for those seeking
the “thrills of the outdoors.” Examples: As a teenager, I jumped boat wakes on
Lake Powell, happy for the warm water and the miles of uninterrupted water
skiing. The roar of the outboard motor covered the sound of wakes slapping
the “steep walls” of sandstone, and almost covered the great echoing crashes
as the water-weakened sandstone broke off in slabs and sank into the placid
waters of Lake Powell. Glen Canyon Dam has begun to silt in, as many said it
would, water allocations exceeded “streamﬂow” and sometimes leave the Central
Arizona Project—hundreds of miles of open concrete canal—dry as bones in
the desert. Abbey’s characters seek to void the Dominys, blast the “mammoth
concrete slabs” to smithereens, and stop the Catherine “wheels of industry.” John
Pfahl’s photographic series of submerged petroglyphs inscribes the erasure of
those remnants of a culture (see “traditional cultural property” [USBR website])
that dwelled in arid country without beneﬁt of houseboats, air conditioning, or
paychecks. Dominy has survived his foes–Brower, Reisner and Abbey all dead,
while Floyd sips bourbon in a Vegas hotel, feted by an acre-foot of Water Board
ofﬁcers.
“There was this nice old man,” my mother drawls in her Tennessee
accent, “His late wife was Southern, you know. I think he was a
big deal…He got an award. He used to work for the government.”
“Floyd Dominy?” I asked, incredulous.
“How did you know his name? There was some book,” she
continues, “that made him angry. He said he would have sued for libel
if his wife had been alive to read those lies. People told him the
author was dead, and he just laughed.
‘Survived ‘em all,’ he said.”

Would Dominy have sued in Federal Court, in Water Court? Will
Floyd survive Glen Canyon Dam?
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Domination.
See Dominy.
Drainage.
1. “Process of removing surface or
subsurface water from a soil or area. A
technique to improve the productivity of
some agricultural land by removing excess
water from the soil; surface drainage
is accomplished with open ditches;
subsurface drainage uses porous conduits
(drain tile) buried beneath the soil surface”
(USBR website). 2. What westerners call
canyons, arroyos, deep indentations in
mountains or hills, because sometimes they
contain water. Is there water in the La Jara
drainage? Will it water the cattle in the
37.1. Floyd E. Dominy while
Commissioner of Reclamation.
section 7 pasture? Do we have to improve
the water? Can we divert it without a
permit? 3. What William Kittredge’s family did to reclaim swamp land for
agriculture:
The most intricate part of my job was called ‘balancing water,’ a
night and day process of opening and closing pipes and redwood
headgates and running the 18-inch drainage pumps. That system
was the ﬁnest plaything I ever had (60).

Drawdown.
“Lowering of a reservoir’s water level; process of depleting a reservoir
or ground water storage. …The amount of water used from a reservoir”
(USBR website). Example: The drawdown of the Snake River, as
discussed by Mary Clearman Blew and Ripley Schemm in Schemm’s
poem, “For Mary, On the Snake”:
“But the most amazing thing of all,”
You continue, “was the reappearance
of the river itself.” I write it back
To you so you hear the poem your words
sing: “Underneath has been a tough
western river all along with sandbars
and a real current. Day by day
it emerged, and it was like gradually
recognizing a lost part of myself.”
But then you tell how they closed
the gates, how you saw the river widen,
hardly stirring again. “Apparently,”
You end, “it’s not possible to have both
Placid surface and mean current.”
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I have to write you back, Mary. Think how
the mean current works, always there,
deceptive, below the surface.8

Feds.
Western term for any employee of the government or collective noun for
any policy makers back east who make stupid decisions, as in “The feds
say I can’t kill coyotes with 1080 anymore. I’d like to show the feds
my dead sheep.” One’s antagonism toward the feds is a key element in
western identity. Bernard DeVoto once characterized westerners’ attitude
toward the feds in one sentence—“Get out and give us more money” (in
Stegner, 9). Urban westerners resent the idea of the West as a dumping
ground for national wastes, while lamenting the lack of federal regulation
of utilities. Rural westerners resent almost all federal policy, but depend
on federal subsidies for roads, telephone service, postal delivery, and
agricultural entitlements. Stegner reminds us that another distinguishing
feature of the West is the high percentage of federally owned land. The
feds are our landlords and our neighbors. Feds are us.
Firn.
“Old snow on the top of glaciers, granular and compact but not yet
converted into ice. It is a transitional stage between snow and ice” (USGS
website). Example: Firn is what John Muir could see and name, but his
fellow travelers could not. Here is Muir from his trip with the Harriman
expedition:
The earnest, childish wonderment with which this glorious
page of Nature’s Bible was contemplated was delightful to
see. All evinced eager desire to learn.
“Is that a glacier,” they asked, “down in the canyon?
And is that all solid ice?”
“Yes.”
“How deep is it?”
“Perhaps ﬁve hundred or a thousand feet.”
“You say it ﬂows. How can hard ice ﬂow?”
“It ﬂows like water, though invisibly slow.”
“And where does it come from?”
“From snow that is heaped up every winter on the
mountains.”
“And how, then, is the snow changed into ice?”
“It is welded by the pressure of its own weight.”
“. . . Are those bluish draggled masses hanging down
from beneath the snow-ﬁelds what you call the snouts of
glaciers?”
“Yes.”
“What made the hollows they are in?”
“The glaciers themselves, just as traveling animals
make their own tracks.”
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“How long have they been there?”
“Numberless centuries,” etc. I answered as best I
could,…while busily engaged in sketching and noting my
own observations, preaching glacier gospel in a rambling
way, while the Cassiar, slowly wheezing and creeping along
the shore, shifted our position so that the icy canyons were
opened to view and closed again in regular succession, like
the leaves of a book.9 (122-123)

Firn, a monosyllable, like Muir’s short afﬁrmatives. “Welded by the
pressure of its own weight,” as desertiﬁcation is welded to the West by
the weight of urbanization, irrigation, and recreation. Muir’s snouts of
glaciers nose smaller and higher reaches of the mountain West, receding
like the animals—bears, wolves—whose habitat shrinks as we reject
the doctrine of “consumptive waste,” responding to the call of Muir’s
“glacial gospel” with mining and petroleum efﬂuvium. “How long have
they been there?” ask Muir’s companions. “Numberless centuries,” etc.
Western writers attend to the “etc.,” asking us to consider “numberless
centuries” against a diminished present and an evaporating future. The
glaciers of Glacier National Park suffer ablation, taking “ﬁrn” out of the
glossary and into the antiquarian’s dictionary, signifying the ablative
case. [Grammatical case indicating separation, direction away from, and
sometimes manner or agency.]
Hydrology.
1. “Scientiﬁc study of water in nature: its properties, distribution, and
behavior. The science that treats the occurrence, circulation properties,
and distribution of the waters of the earth and their reaction to the
environment. Science dealing with the properties, distribution and ﬂow of
water on or in the earth” (USBR website). 2. Modiﬁed to hydro-philology.
The attentive and loving study of the language of water. 3. The mysteries
of virga, hail, hot springs, capillary forces, alluvium, fetch, rifﬂes. The
wonderful suggestiveness of mud cake, littoral, ephemeral creek, jeopardy
opinion, eddy, morning glory spillway, muck, ﬂocculation, gravel blanket,
paradox gate, sheepsfoot roller, or sticky limit. 4. The multiculturalism
of arroyo, playa, reservoir, revetment. 5. The great disappointment of the
scientiﬁc and bureaucratic hijacking of Eolian, fatal ﬂaw, future without,
grapple, grizzly, groin, horsehead, reach, resilience, rill, sinuosity, and
weep hole.
Inﬁltration.
1. “The ﬂow of ﬂuid into a substance through pores or small openings”
(USGS website). 2. Inﬁltration within federal, state and local government
to change the language of laws away from ownership of acre-feet, miner’s
inches, prior appropriation, to a Powellian language of the communal—
use, rather than ownership, biotic and human use, as opposed to selfinterested use. As Kittredge claims:
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In the American West we are struggling to revise our dominant
mythology, and to ﬁnd a new story to inhabit. Laws control our
lives, and they are designed to preserve a model of society based
on values learned from mythology. Only after re-imagining our
myths can we coherently remodel our laws, and hope to keep our
society in a realistic relationship to what is actual. (64)

In situ.
“In place, the original location, in the natural environment” (USBR
website). Example/question: Is Rainbow Bridge really “in situ”?
2. Where the language of water needs to be resettled.
Irretrievable.
“Commitments that are lost for a period of time” (USBR website). Only
in bureaucratic language could this mean “lost for a period of time.” Fear
not, futurists: Hetch Hetchy is “irretrievable,” but in the government sense.
Precipitation.
1. “As used in hydrology, precipitation is the discharge of water, in
liquid or solid state, out of the atmosphere, generally upon a land or
water surface. It is the common process by which atmospheric water
becomes surface or subsurface water …[.] The term ‘precipitation’ is also
uncommonly used to designate the quantity of water that is precipitated.”
(Meinzer, 1923, p. 15 in USGS website). 2. The abundant precipitation
in the winter of 1955 left Northern California ﬂooded to heights still not
duplicated. Although we were not in the ﬂood plain, our December lambs
turned green from mold (only last year did I learn that this was fatal),
and I have suffered from lifelong allergies to molds. 3. In Northern New
Mexico when it rains two inches in an hour, dirt roads turn to gumbo. You
stop where you are, and if you want to get home from town, you walk,
even in your town clothes, watching as the earth clings to you, wanting to
keep you in place. That sucking sound is the lip-smacking earth feeding
on your best shoes.
Reclamation.
Not listed in USGS glossary. Not listed in USBR glossary. 1. Code
word for dam building in the ﬁrst two thirds of the twentieth century.
The Bureau of Reclamation, a federal agency that spent tax dollars to
subsidize agriculture, but more often agribusiness, utility companies,
and urban development. See Floyd Dominy. 2. Act of re-appropriation,
reclaiming the West as an “emotional homeland.” 3. Coincident with the
new language of USBR, reclaiming federal power for conservation and
preservation. 4. Reclamation of language and representation in the service
of biotic communities and even backwaters.
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Relict.
1. “A species, population, etc., which is a survivor of a nearly extinct
group. Any species surviving in a small local area and widely separated
from closely related species” (USBR website). 2. Floyd Dominy, the
farmer with a D8 and a dream of a little dam. 3. Relicts now gone:
Edward Abbey; Everett Reuss, who walked away in Canyonland; Maynard
Dixon, who dared to paint aridity; Arth Chafﬁn, almost alone at Hite
Ferry; Mary Austin’s pocket miners.
Scour.
1. “Erosion in a stream bed, particularly if caused or increased by channel
changes” (USBR website). 2. The ailment in cattle that makes day-use
recreationists write letters to their Congressmen. Get those cattle with
diarrhea off our range. My new hiking boots are ruined!
Things we can actually do with these words:
1. Play: the language of water is becoming indigenous to the West, and
it’s a language rich with possibility: Acequia, braided channels, crick,
ditch rider, diversion, drought, sometimes drouth, ephemeral, ﬂoodgate,
headgate, irrigation, subirrigation, meander, submeander, meromictic,
miner’s inches, mirage, parched, rain shadow, rifﬂe, riparian, riprap,
runoff, spring box, tanks, troughs, throughfall, virga, water crop, water
court, water gap, water law, waterpocket fold, water master, water witch.
2. Twist them, divert them: here’s a post-timber sale tongue twister: How
much water will a watershed shed if a watershed gets waterlogged from
logging?
3. Read them: A short of list of western books both wet and dry: wet
books: MacLean’s A River Runs Through It, Roosevelt’s Ranch Life and
the Hunting Trail, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, Doig’s Bucking the
Sun, Stegner’s Angle of Repose, McNickle’s Wind from an Enemy Sky,
and Nichols’s The Milagro Beanfield War, Anaya’s Bless Me, Ultima; dry
books: Austin’s The Land of Little Rain, Abbey’s Desert Solitaire, Cather’s
My Ántonia, Silko’s Ceremony, McCarthy’s Blood Meridian.
4. Reclaim them: Why can’t ownership become owning up?
Stewardship? Why can’t the land own us?
One ﬁnal term from the USBR Glossary:
Author’s signature. “This is the signature of the person or persons
with primary responsibility for writing the document. Signature of the
document by the author(s) signiﬁes that a draft document was provided to
team members and that they had an opportunity to comment on the draft.
The author’s signature also implies that comments were considered and
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that any critical issues or inﬂuencing factors were incorporated into the
document” (USBR website). I await the chance to place my “author’s”
signature on this document.
Nancy Cook, Ph.D., is an associate professor and teaches nineteenth, twentieth,
and twenty-ﬁrst century American literature and culture in the English
Department at the University of Montana, Missoula. She has published several
articles and is working on a book on class issues in the twentieth century rural
West.
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